Skip to content
Grounds publishedDecided 26 Jul 2018

High Court

Nanofilm Technologies International Pte Ltd v Semivac International Pte Ltd and others

Feedback & support

[2018] SGHC 167Case no. Suit No 747 of 2016

What happened, in plain English

There is no plain-English summary of this judgment yet.

Ask about this judgment

Laws this judgment relies on

Grounds of decision

Official text from eLitigation

  1. Introduction

  2. [1] This is an action brought by the plaintiff against two former employees and the company set up by the former employees. The dispute concerns specialised coating technology. The plaintiff makes four claims. First, that the 1st defendant infringed copyrights belonging to the plaintiff. Second, that the 2nd defendant breached his employment contract with the plaintiff. Third, that the 1st and 2nd defendants breached their duty of confidence owed to the plaintiff. Last, that the 3rd defendant induced the 2nd defendant to breach his contract with the plaintiff.

  3. [2] For convenience, the judgment that follows is structured as such:

  4. (i) The parties

  5. (ii) An overview of the technology

  6. (iii) The genesis of the dispute

  7. (iv) The witnesses and procedural issues

  8. (i) The Semivac Slides

  9. (ii) The Semivac Drawings

  10. (A) Infringement and the plaintiff’s pre-existing technical drawings

  11. (I) Do the Semivac Drawings reproduce a substantial part of the plaintiff’s pre-existing technical drawings?

  12. (II) The useful article defence and the plaintiff’s pre-existing technical drawings

  13. (B) Infringement and the Semivac Drawings

  14. (I) Were the copyrights in the Semivac Drawings infringed?

  15. (II) The useful article defence and the Semivac Drawings

  16. (A) The Semivac Slides

  17. (B) The Semivac Drawings

  18. (ii) Against the 1st and 2nd defendants for breach of confidence

  19. (iii) Against the 2nd defendant for breach of contract

  20. (iv) Against the 3rd defendant for inducing breach of contract.

  21. The background

  22. The parties

  23. [3] The plaintiff, Nanofilm Technologies International Pte Ltd, is a Singapore company incorporated in May 1999. It is in the business of manufacturing and providing Filtered Cathodic Vacuum Arc (“FCVA”) technology products and services. The plaintiff’s chief executive officer and founder is Dr Shi Xu, and its senior vice-president is Dr Wei Hao.

  24. [4] The 1st defendant, Semivac International Pte Ltd, is also a Singapore company, and is in the business of providing products and services in the vacuum industry. The 1st defendant specialises in providing pumps, spare parts, and installation and maintenance services.

  25. [5] The 2nd defendant, Xu Yibo, was employed by the plaintiff on 6 April 2000 as an applications engineer. He was then promoted to manager – production mechanical on 1 January 2007. The 2nd defendant’s duties in this role included designing components using software. On 1 August 2014, the 2nd defendant was re-designated as – or in harsher terms, demoted to – senior engineer – mechanical design. His employment with the plaintiff was eventually terminated on 13 January 2016. Whilst in the employ of the plaintiff, the 2nd defendant became a director of the 1st defendant on 6 October 2008, and continued as such until 11 January 2016.

  26. [6] The 3rd defendant, Hu Lang, was employed by the plaintiff from November 1999 to 4 January 2008 as a senior process engineer. He was subsequently promoted to senior manager of after-sales technical support. The 3rd defendant then left the plaintiff to set up the 1st defendant and has been its managing director since 6 October 2008.

  27. An overview of the technology

  28. [7] Whilst this is not a case of patent infringement, an overview of the technology will be helpful to shed light on the issues that have arisen. The following overview is based on the evidence and submissions put before the court.

  29. [8] FCVA technology, put simply, is a method of coating materials or products with a thin film of metallic, ceramic or composite substances. For example, the technology can be used to coat articles with a thin film of diamond-like carbon particles, known as tetrahedral amorphous carbon, to reduce friction and prolong the life of the article. The general technology has been known for quite a long time and appears to date back to technology developed in the Soviet Union before the 1980s. Cathodic vacuum arc technology, when first developed, apparently did not incorporate a filter. Thereafter, filters of various shapes were used. Eventually the plaintiff developed its version of FCVA technology which uses a “double bend filter”, together with some other improvements, the details of which are unnecessary for present purposes.

  30. [9] FCVA technology comprises hardware and software. For the purposes of this case, the hardware is essentially a “machine” made from various components such as a power supply, circuit boards, various types of valves, vacuum pumps, filters amongst other things. The software used in the control panel is concerned with the carrying out of the various processes involved in FCVA coating.

  31. [10] Whilst the plaintiff asserts that it has obtained numerous patents over its FCVA technology, I note that the plaintiff does not in this case rely on any patents or registered design rights. Indeed, it is not clear whether there are any relevant patents which are still in force over FCVA technology.

  32. [11] What is clear is that some, possibly many, hardware components of the FCVA machine are available from various original equipment manufacturers (“OEM”). In a sense, some of the components are generic components that could be used in a variety of different types of machines serving the same, similar or even different purposes. On the other hand, some components might be developed “in-house” by the plaintiff, such as a valve with a particular shape and set of dimensions: the point being that advantages may arise from the particular shape.

  33. [12] Whilst the evidence could have been clearer, it appears that although some parts or components of the plaintiff’s FCVA machine are designed in-house for use in a generic FCVA machine, some components may be designed in accordance with the needs of particular customers. FCVA machines can be made in different sizes and might be adjusted or tailored, so to speak, for particular types of coating applications.

  34. [14] For completeness, I note Dr Wei Hao’s evidence that the plaintiff’s business comprises manufacturing and servicing their own machines. Further, whilst the plaintiff’s main business is in FCVA machines/technology, Dr Wei Hao explains that they also make and supply more traditional and cheaper coating machines. Indeed, the 2nd defendant in cross-examination agreed that the plaintiff sold different types of vacuum coating machines, including machines using something called a “sputter source”, which appears to involve a different process from FCVA machines.

  35. The genesis of the dispute

  36. [15] The 3rd defendant had been working for the plaintiff for almost ten years at the time of his departure in early January 2008. It is not disputed that, at the time of his departure, the 3rd defendant and the 2nd defendant had been colleagues for about eight years.

  37. [16] After the 3rd defendant left in January 2008, the 2nd defendant remained a full-time employee of the plaintiff. The 2nd defendant, together with the 3rd defendant, then “set up” the 1st defendant in 2008. That said, I note that there is a dispute as to whether the 2nd and 3rd defendant jointly decided to set up the 1st defendant or whether the 3rd defendant persuaded the 2nd defendant to join him shortly after the 1st defendant was incorporated. This will be examined later. In any case, it is not disputed that the 2nd defendant became a director of the 1st defendant at or about the same time the 3rd defendant became the managing director of the 1st defendant.

  38. [17] The plaintiff’s basic case is that the 2nd defendant did not obtain the plaintiff’s consent to become a director of the 1st defendant or to perform any work for the 1st defendant.

  39. [18] The plaintiff alleges that, whilst in the employment of the plaintiff, the 2nd defendant created numerous technical drawings for the 1st defendant. The technical drawings were created using the laptop and software (computer-aided design program (“CAD”)) provided by the plaintiff. The laptop had been provided to the 2nd defendant because there was a period when he was required to travel overseas. The plaintiff avers that some of the drawings were created during the plaintiff’s official working hours. Other drawings may have been created outside of office hours, using the plaintiff’s laptop.

  40. [19] I note that these technical drawings (the “Semivac Drawings”), which bore the 1st defendant’s name, were recovered from the 2nd defendant’s laptop with the assistance of Nexia TS Risk Advisory Pte Ltd (“Nexia”), a computer forensics company. Some 48 Semivac Drawings were recovered by Nexia.

  41. [20] Nexia’s report concluded that the 2nd defendant had in his possession technical drawings of the plaintiff (not drawn by the 2nd defendant), which were then changed/modified for the first defendant’s use. The plaintiff’s case is that, aside from these 48 Semivac Drawings, there were many more technical drawings which it was unable to recover from the laptop. This is indeed likely, as the 3rd defendant under cross-examination agreed that the 1st defendant made more than just 48 Semivac Drawings.

  42. [21] The plaintiff’s case is that most of the Semivac Drawings were either unauthorised copies or adaptations of technical drawings belonging to the plaintiff. The defendants’ case essentially is that the majority of the Semivac Drawings were produced by the 2nd defendant without reference to any drawings in which the plaintiff can claim copyright. That said, I note the 2nd defendant admits that four of the Semivac Drawings were created using the plaintiff’s existing files; ie, the 2nd defendant modified the plaintiff’s files to create four of the Semivac Drawings.

  43. [22] In addition, the plaintiff’s case is that sometime between 2002 and 2007, the 1st defendant published a set of presentation slides (the “Semivac Slides”), which contained certain technical drawings, diagrams, photographs, and graphs. The presentation slides were created for the purpose of showcasing a coating system referred to as Direct Cathodic Vacuum Arc (“DCVA”) system. The technology involved in the FCVA and DCVA systems are said to be similar. Indeed, the plaintiff’s case is that the DCVA system is, to all intents and purposes, identical to the FCVA system.

  44. [23] Whilst the plaintiff’s case could have been clearer, it appears that the plaintiff basically complains of:

  45. [24] By unlawful competition what is meant are the claims for copyright infringement, breach of contract, breach of confidence and inducing breach of contract. There is no claim for unfair competition or passing off. There is also no claim against the defendants for unauthorised copying of computer programs associated with the plaintiff’s FCVA technology.

  46. [25] The 2nd defendant asserts that although he was a director of the 1st defendant, he did not in fact do much work for the 1st defendant and that only a few design drawings were made by him for the 1st defendant. The 3rd defendant goes on to deny that he had induced the 2nd defendant to become a director and to do work for the 1st defendant, in breach of the 2nd defendant’s contractual duties to the plaintiff. In particular, the 3rd defendant denies that he was aware or ought to have known that there were express contractual restrictions imposed on the 2nd defendant.

  47. [26] The defendants also generally take the position that, in any case, the 1st defendant was not a competitor as such of the plaintiff. It appears that by this what is meant is that:

  48. (a) the plaintiff is not in the business of servicing and maintaining machines (aside from their own); and

  49. (b) the 1st defendant was not in any case involved in manufacturing FCVA machines.

  50. Instead, the 1st defendant was interested in DCVA technology, a different technology used for producing thin film coatings on industrial products. That said, the 3rd defendant admitted at trial that FCVA and DCVA technologies, even if not identical, are similar. Indeed, the evidence suggests that some components needed in FCVA machines will also be needed in DCVA machines.

  51. [27] One other point worth underscoring at the outset is that there is no direct evidence from any customer of an actual purchase of a DCVA or FCVA machine from the 1st defendant. Indeed, there is no direct evidence that the 1st defendant even has a DCVA machine in Singapore.

  52. [28] Against this, the plaintiff rightly points out that the Semivac Slides referred to earlier includes a photograph of a DCVA Batch Vacuum Coating System machine. The photograph naturally suggests that the 1st defendant had indeed built at least one DCVA machine. The 3rd defendant’s evidence was that he prepared the Semivac Slides at the request of one “Mr Ho”, who is said to be a director of Drachs Technology (S) Pte Ltd. According to the 3rd defendant, Mr Ho wanted a technical briefing on coating technology. The 3rd defendant asserts that he does not know what Mr Ho did with the slides and denies using them to make a presentation to a company called Seagate, in Thailand, for the 1st defendant.

  53. [29] Unfortunately, there is no independent evidence to support the 3rd defendant’s assertions. Mr Ho was not asked to give evidence. Further, when cross-examined, the 3rd defendant’s evidence was that the photograph of the DCVA Batch Vacuum Coating System machine was found on the internet and simply taken and used in the Semivac Slides. When questioned further, the 3rd defendant responded that he found the photograph by conducting an internet search using the name of a Chinese company, Guandong Naisense Coating Technology Ltd (“Naisense”), as the search term. With respect, this is odd, especially as the 3rd defendant denied that he was a director of Naisense several times. Why would he then use the name of that company as the search term? I note that the 3rd defendant ultimately changed his stance, after he was shown records indicating that he was indeed a director of Naisense. The defendants in closing submissions, after noting that Naisense is a joint venture company between a Chinese company and a Singapore company called Topbond Technology International Pte Ltd (“Topbond”), merely state that “the 3rd Defendant appears to have been a director for a period of 3 years from 2012 which he was not aware of.” The 3rd defendant is both a director and shareholder of Topbond.

  54. [30] Overall, I find the 3rd defendant’s evidence on the Semivac Slides and his relationship to Naisense most unsatisfactory. Even though there is no evidence on how many DCVA machines the 1st defendant or 3rd defendant may be connected to, through Naisense or any other company, the point is that the 3rd defendant was most surely interested in producing DCVA machines and components. Indeed, the inference is strong: the 3rd defendant was knowingly concealing the link with Naisense.

  55. The witnesses and procedural issues

  56. [31] Four witnesses testified for the plaintiff:

  57. [32] Two witnesses testified for the defendants:

  58. [33] The defendants’ Defence (Amendment No 2) mainly consists of a series of denials and non-admissions, as well as a number of averments. Some of these have been referred to already. In brief, the core of the defence, as then pleaded, was as follows:

  59. (a) The plaintiff and 1st defendant were not competitors.

  60. (b) The technical drawings found in the 2nd defendant’s laptop (the Semivac Drawings), which form part of the plaintiff’s case, were created by the 2nd defendant for the 1st defendant and were not made in the course of employment with the plaintiff. The copyright in these Semivac Drawings do not belong to the plaintiff.

  61. (c) The copyrights in the works embodied in the plaintiff’s presentation slides and which were said to have been used without permission by the defendants to create their own presentation (the Semivac Slides) do not belong to the plaintiff.

  62. (d) The 2nd defendant did not misuse any confidential information of the plaintiff in the course of creating the Semivac Drawings for the 1st defendant at the request of the 3rd defendant.

  63. [34] In short, without going into details, the defence was a denial that the plaintiff owned the copyright in the relevant works as well as a denial that the defendants had misused any confidential information belonging to the plaintiff. There was no affirmative defence raised, whether based on the statutory provisions in the Copyright Act (Cap 63, 2006 Rev Ed) (“Copyright Act”) or at common law (such as an implied right of repair).

  64. [35] During the course of the trial, Dr Wei Hao gave evidence for the plaintiff under cross-examination that more than 50 FCVA machines had been made and sold. After hearing counsel in chambers, the defendants sought leave to amend the defence to add the useful article defence found in s 70 of the Copyright Act. The relevance of the evidence that 50 machines were made to the useful article defence will be discussed later. Leave was granted after the plaintiff’s counsel stated that there were no objections to the amendment. Counsel for the plaintiff also stated that it would not be calling any witnesses or offering any further evidence in any case, and that it would not be seeking leave to amend their reply. To complete the picture, I note that the defendants did not seek leave to recall the plaintiff’s witnesses for cross-examination. Further, whilst the defendants addressed the useful article defence in closing submissions, I note that no submissions were made by the plaintiff.

  65. The claim against the 1st defendant for copyright infringement

  66. The Semivac Slides

  67. [36] As briefly touched on above, the plaintiff claims that the 1st defendant infringed its copyrights in 14 technical drawings, diagrams and/or photographs by reproducing them in the Semivac Slides. For example, one diagram said to have been copied relates to a representation of FCVA Technology. Another example is a photograph of a component part named “NTI-CS2007 Eugene”, reproduced in the Semivac Slides.

  68. [37] The plaintiff’s case in respect of the Semivac Slides is that the 3rd defendant had access to the drawings, diagrams, photographs, etc, whilst he was an employee of the plaintiff, up to his resignation on 4 February 2008. After he left the plaintiff, it appears that he retained copies of these works. Thereafter, sometime around February and April 2015, the 1st defendant made a presentation using the Semivac Slides to Seagate. Seagate was a customer of the plaintiff. After the presentation, it appears that a copy of the Semivac Slides was provided to the plaintiff. It is not clear who provided the slides, but it seems likely that it was Seagate.

  69. [38] During the trial, the plaintiff made clear that it is no longer pursuing its claim over two of the 14 items. Conversely, the plaintiff seeks to claim copyright over certain additional data reproduced in Dr Shi’s affidavit of evidence-in-chief (“AEIC”). As the data listed in Dr Shi’s AEIC is not part of the plaintiff’s pleaded case, I will not make a determination on them. The plaintiff’s claim to copyrights over the works therefore comprises the following 12 items, exhibited in Annex A: (i) one diagram; (ii) nine photographs; and (iii) two graphs. These will be referred to collectively as “the Works”.

  70. [39] The plaintiff claims copyright over the Works on the basis that they were created by their respective authors during the course of their employment with the plaintiff. In its statement of claim, the plaintiff claims that the authors of the Works are as follows:

  71. [40] The defendants dispute the plaintiff’s alleged copyright over the Works. Counsel for the defendants essentially makes two points. First, the point is made that it is possible that the Works were created before the incorporation of the plaintiff. Given that there is no evidence that the authors of the Works assigned their copyrights to the plaintiff, it is asserted that the plaintiff does not own the copyrights over the Works. Second, for the nine photographs, the defendants submit that it is unclear if the plaintiff owns the copyrights, given that the plaintiff was only able to produce copies, and not originals, of the photographs. Further, the defendants assert that it is unclear whether the photographs were taken by the plaintiff or by a company named Fabulous Printers Pte Ltd (“Fabulous Printers”), which the plaintiff commissioned to produce a marketing brochure.

  72. [41] The basic principles on authorship and ownership of copyright are well established. It will be sufficient to set out a brief summary of the principles of particular relevance to the case at hand.

  73. [42] First, in the case of original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works, copyright vests in the author under s 30(2) of the Copyright Act. “Author” is defined in s 7(1) of the Copyright Act, in cases of photographs, as the person who took the photograph. There is no statutory definition of authorship in the case of literary, dramatic and musical works. Whilst there has been considerable discussion on who is an author in academic literature and case law, the basic principle is clear. The author is the person whose intellectual effort is responsible for the work in terms of its original expressive elements. In many cases the work will be a product of joint authorship: see s 7(1) of the Copyright Act which states that a work of joint authorship means “a work that has been produced by the collaboration of 2 or more authors and in which the contribution of each author is not separate from the contribution of the other author or the contributions of other authors.” Joint authors will usually (but not always) hold the copyright as tenants in common. One joint owner can bring an action for infringement without joining in his co-owner, although this may have an impact on remedies.

  74. [43] Second, there are special statutory provisions (subject to contrary agreements) which vest the copyright in original works in a person other than the author. These are:

  75. [44] Third, copyright as a species of property can of course be dealt with by assignments and licences. Whilst assignments must be in writing (s 194(3) of the Copyright Act) to be effective at law, an oral assignment may be enforceable, in appropriate cases, as an equitable assignment. Although an equitable assignee may have a sufficient interest to seek interlocutory relief, it may be necessary to perfect the title (by written assignment) or to join in the legal owner if a claim is to be taken through to trial.

  76. [45] Fourth, s 195 of the Copyright Act contains statutory provisions which deal with assignments of future copyright. In brief, this deals with an agreement on ownership of copyright that will come into existence at some future date. The provision states that such an agreement will have the effect of vesting the copyright in the assignee as soon as the copyright comes into existence. For example, if an agreement is signed whereby the prospective author agrees to assign the copyright in the work to be written to a third party then as soon as the copyright comes into existence (when the work is reduced to writing or material form), the copyright vests automatically in the third party without the need for any other act.

  77. [46] The fifth point to note is that copyright as a species of property can be made the subject matter of trusts. Equitable interests can arise in copyrights. There is little doubt that in appropriate cases a constructive trust may arise, whether on its own right or as a remedy.

  78. [48] After considering the evidence and bearing in mind the above principles, I find that the plaintiff has discharged its burden of proof in respect of its copyright claims over the Works. I now explain the reasons which have led me to this conclusion.

  79. [49] Turning first to the diagram, Dr Shi admitted under cross-examination that the diagram was created in 1995 by Cheah Li Kang and himself. This is contrary to what was stated in the statement of claim, where the diagram was said to have been created on 4 September 2002 by Cheah Li Kang. Ordinarily, it would follow that the copyright in the diagram vests in Dr Shi and Cheah Li Kang as joint authors, although this would depend on the detailed facts and circumstances. The evidence, whilst sketchy, will be touched on below.

  80. [50] During cross-examination, Dr Shi went on to claim that the copyright to the diagram was originally “owned” by himself and Nanyang Technological University of Singapore (“NTU”), where he was at that time an assistant professor and Cheah Li Kang was a doctorate candidate. Dr Cheah subsequently became the plaintiff’s chief technological officer from May 2002 to 31 January 2008. The plaintiff was incorporated in 1999. Dr Shi goes on to claim that the copyright was given to the plaintiff via a “licensing” agreement.

  81. [51] The problem is that, apart from Dr Shi’s assertion, there is no evidence of the actual licensing agreement. It is also unclear what Dr Shi meant by his assertion that he and NTU were the owners of the copyright. Whilst it is certainly possible that NTU acquired a “share” of the rights over the diagram (co-ownership) pursuant to contractual agreements, there is no evidence at all of the relationship between Dr Shi, Dr Cheah and NTU in 1995, such as agreements (if any) and applicable provisions on ownership of intellectual property rights in research output at NTU.

  82. [52] It is well-known that contractual provisions regulating the rights and interests of students, supervisors, academics and universities are often complex – and perhaps especially so where outside commercial interests are also involved in the research, whether through funding or provision of resources. It comes as no surprise that academic commentaries have been written on the subject such as Ann Louise Monotti and Sam Ricketson, Universities and Intellectual Property, Ownership and Exploitation (Oxford University Press, 2003). There is no evidence, however, in the present case as to the detailed circumstances under which the FCVA technology, and more importantly, the diagram, were created or developed.

  83. [53] Another difficulty is that even if it is assumed that Dr Shi and NTU were the joint owners of the copyright, it is unclear what is meant by assignment of copyright to the plaintiff under a “licensing” agreement. A licensing agreement is not an assignment. It appears Dr Shi meant “an assignment agreement” but the problem is that the actual agreement (and the terms) was not put in evidence.

  84. [54] It follows that the question arises whether the plaintiff can rely on any of the statutory presumptions set out in Part V, Division 4 of the Copyright Act. The fact that there are five statutory provisions concerned with presumptions and proof of facts in copyright proceedings provides a salutary reminder of the practical problems which claimants often encounter in establishing copyright and ownership. Of particular relevance to the case at hand are the provisions on authorship, subsistence and ownership of copyright.

  85. [55] For convenience, I set out the statutory provision on subsistence and ownership in full:

  86. [56] In the present case, the defendants have challenged the ownership of copyright. Dr Shi, for the plaintiff, has, in his AEIC, indeed asserted that he was the author of the diagram. Then again, as noted, in cross-examination the assertion was made that the diagram was jointly created by Dr Shi and Dr Cheah. The diagram in question is set out on a power point slide bearing the plaintiff’s name. Dr Shi also stated, in his AEIC, that the plaintiff was the owner of the copyright.

  87. [57] In my view, Dr Shi’s affidavit is relevant to s 130(1B) of the Copyright Act and constitutes prima facie proof of the matters stated therein, unless the contrary is proven. I note that what s 130(1B) of the Copyright Act requires is that the plaintiff make an affidavit in which assertions of facts are made which are relevant to showing that it is the owner of the copyright. In the present case Dr Shi has stated, in his AEIC, that the plaintiff is the owner of the copyright.

  88. [58] I also note in passing that the statutory presumption in relation to authorship as set out in s 131 of the Copyright Act provides (in brief) that where a name purporting to be that of the author appears on copies of the work as published, that person is presumed, unless the contrary is established, to be the author of the work. Take for example the Australian case of Tolmark Homes Pty Ltd v Paul [1999] FCA 1355. In that case, the applicant, a project homebuilder and developer, alleged that the respondent infringed its copyright in a design plan. An issue emerged as to the authorship of the design plan. The respondent argued that the design plan was drawn by one Ms Johnson, the applicant’s draughtsperson. The respondent sought to rely on a similar presumption on authorship in s 127(1) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Aust) as the design plan in question contained a statement stating that it was drawn by Ms Johnson. The applicant argued that the design plan was merely traced by Ms Johnson, from another design plan drawn by one Mr Sneesby, a director and manager at the applicant. The court found that the presumption had been rebutted by the applicant as Mr Sneesby, during his evidence, was asked to place the two design plans over each other, illustrating that the plans were identical and satisfying the court as such.

  89. [59] It should be noted that s 131 of the Copyright Act sets out a presumption in relation to authorship of a work. On the other hand, s 130(1B) of the Copyright Act states that the affidavit made by the plaintiff shall be admitted into evidence and constitutes prima facie proof of the matters stated therein, until the contrary is proved.

  90. [60] In the present case, it appears that the authors of the diagram were Dr Shi and Dr Cheah. Dr Shi explains in his AEIC that he is the CEO and founder of the plaintiff, and that Dr Cheah was the plaintiff’s chief technological officer from 2002 to 2008. He also asserts in his AEIC that the plaintiff is the owner of the copyright. I am of the view that the defendants have not proved the contrary – namely, that Dr Shi and Dr Cheah were not the authors of the diagram. There is no question that Dr Shi is indeed the founder of the plaintiff. Further, there does not appear to be any dispute over the assertion that Dr Cheah became the plaintiff’s chief technological officer. Whilst it may well be true that the diagram was created before the plaintiff was incorporated, this does not mean that the plaintiff could not become the copyright owner. The simple point is that the copyright can be assigned and indeed this is precisely the evidence or at least the effect of the evidence of Dr Shi. I note and accept that under s 130(1B) of the Copyright Act, the burden, at the end of the day, remains on the plaintiff to establish ownership. The affidavit is prima facie proof of the matters stated. I have no doubt that, ideally, the applicable provisions on ownership of intellectual property rights in research output at NTU and the “licensing” agreement should have been put into evidence. Nevertheless, looking at the evidence as a whole, including the evidence that the plaintiff has obtained some 45 patents over FCVA technology, I am satisfied that the plaintiff has done enough to establish ownership of the copyright in the diagram. Further, whilst not in any sense conclusive, I note that there is no evidence at all that NTU has claimed any rights over the FCVA technology in general or the diagram in particular.

  91. [61] Although the plaintiff’s evidence on the authors of the nine photographs also has inconsistencies, I find that this ultimately has no impact on its claim to copyrights over the nine photographs. In its statement of claim, the authors of the nine photographs were listed as Cheah Li Kang, Tracy Tan, Ricky Chan and Phua Yong Sang, who were/are employees of the plaintiff. Under cross-examination, however, Dr Shi admitted that the photographs were taken by Fabulous Printers, which the plaintiff commissioned to produce a marketing brochure. Even if the photographs were taken by Fabulous Printers, the plaintiff would still own the copyrights over the photographs by virtue of s 30(5) of the Copyright Act, which states:

  92. The fact that the original photographs were not adduced, perhaps because they may have been in the possession of Fabulous Printers, is thus immaterial. I find that the plaintiff has copyrights over the nine photographs.

  93. [62] As for the two graphs, these were said to be created by Cheah Li Kang during his employment with the plaintiff. Section 30(6) of the Copyright Act, as noted above, states:

  94. By virtue of s 30(6) of the Copyright Act, the plaintiff is entitled to the copyrights over the two graphs.

  95. [63] I now turn to the question of whether the 1st defendant infringed the plaintiff’s copyrights in the diagram, nine photographs and two graphs. I find that the 1st defendant did infringe the plaintiff’s copyrights in the diagram, nine photographs and two graphs by reproducing them in the Semivac Slides. In coming to this conclusion I note the 3rd defendant admitted under cross-examination that he created the Semivac Slides by copying from the plaintiff’s slides, which contained the diagram, nine photographs and two graphs.

  96. [64] This is not a case where there is mere similarity between the “ideas” or “concepts” as set out in the works of the plaintiff and defendants. The plaintiff’s works and the alleged infringing Semivac Slides are nearly identical.

  97. [65] In coming to the conclusion that the Semivac Slides have infringed the plaintiff’s copyrights, I note that some of the Semivac Slides include additional elements or points of graphic detailing, as compared to the plaintiff’s Works. For example, the Semivac Slides’ version of the diagrammatic representation of the FCVA system has a good deal of added background graphics (see Annex A). The same is true for the Semivac Slides’ version of Photo 2 (as marked in Annex A). This does not, however, make a difference to copyright infringement.

  98. [66] It is well-established that in deciding whether a substantial part of the plaintiff’s work has been reproduced, what is important is to identify what was copied (taken) from the copyright work and reproduced in the alleged infringement, and then to ask whether that part which was taken is a qualitatively substantial part of the copyright work. For example, to reproduce the plaintiff’s photograph of an object and to add depictions of other objects as well as fresh literary information does not alter the fact that the plaintiff’s photograph was used: see, generally, Designers Guild Limited v Russell Williams (Textiles) Limited [2000] 1 WLR 2416. The issue is whether a substantial part of the copyright work has been taken and not whether the part taken forms a substantial part of the infringing reproduction.

  99. The Semivac Drawings

  100. [67] The plaintiff also contends that it owns the copyrights in the 48 Semivac Drawings. The plaintiff’s case appears to be that the Semivac Drawings, which bear the 1st defendant’s name, were created by the 2nd defendant for the 1st defendant whilst he was an employee of the plaintiff and with the use of the plaintiff’s equipment (laptop and computer programs). These, include (for example):

  101. [68] I pause to note that there is some lack of clarity over just what are the technical drawings over which the plaintiff claims copyright. There are two possibilities. The first is that the plaintiff is asserting copyright in the underlying technical drawings that were created by the 2nd defendant and/or the plaintiff’s other employees in the course of employment with the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleges that these technical drawings were adapted by the 2nd defendant, to create the Semivac Drawings. The second possibility is that the plaintiff is asserting copyright in the Semivac Drawings: these are the technical drawings done by the 2nd defendant at the request of the 3rd defendant, for the 1st defendant.

  102. [69] The difficulty is that it is unclear when the Semivac Drawings were created and whether they are direct copies or adaptations of the plaintiff’s existing technical drawings.

  103. [70] What is undisputed is that the Semivac Drawings were found in the 2nd defendant’s laptop (recovered with the help of Nexia) after his employment was terminated.

  104. [71] The plaintiff’s case essentially is that these 48 Semivac Drawings were created by the 2nd defendant whilst he was an employee of the plaintiff. By this, what the plaintiff appears to mean is that the 2nd defendant was responsible for the Semivac Drawings and that the 2nd defendant had either created technical drawings of component parts in the course of employment with the plaintiff or copied technical drawings made by other employees of the plaintiff, modified them, and added the Semivac identifier. It appears that the plaintiff’s case is that it should be inferred that this was done for the purposes of enabling the 1st defendant to produce component parts and to market these in competition with the plaintiff, either as spare parts or as complete machines.

  105. [72] The plaintiff thus claims that it is the lawful owner of the copyright in the 48 Semivac Drawings on the basis of:

  106. [75] To be clear, there is no evidence from any of the plaintiff’s actual customers of their having engaged the 1st defendant to service, repair or provide maintenance services for FCVA machines purchased from the plaintiff. That said, it does appear that the 1st defendant did fabricate parts for some customers based on the Semivac Drawings. This much was admitted by the 3rd defendant in cross-examination. In a similar vein, the 2nd defendant’s evidence was that the 1st defendant’s business was in the area of repair and servicing of vacuum pumps, motors and power supplies. Where a spare part was needed, these would be obtained from OEM suppliers. If the part was not available, the 1st defendant would arrange for the part to be made, in which case they would need to generate technical drawings from samples.

  107. [76] In summary, the plaintiff claims that two types of infringing reproductions of the Semivac Drawings were made by the 1st defendant when building its FCVA or DCVA machine:

  108. [77] The defendants’ basic position is that they deny that the plaintiff owns the copyrights in the 48 Semivac Drawings. Specifically, counsel for the defendants submits that the Semivac Drawings were not created during the course of the 2nd defendant’s employment with the plaintiff as the plaintiff is not in the business of creating such technical drawings (ie, technical drawings for components belonging to third parties).

  109. [78] On the contrary, the defendants’ case is that the Semivac Drawings were created during the course of the 2nd defendant’s employment with the 1st defendant, and the 1st defendant thus owns the copyright over the Semivac Drawings. These technical drawings (which, as it will be recalled, bear the 1st defendant’s name) are said to have no relevance at all to the plaintiff’s product or systems.

  110. [79] In this way, the defendants’ core position appears to be that, aside from the four Semivac Drawings which the 2nd defendant admits to copying/adapting from the plaintiff’s technical drawings, all the other Semivac Drawings were created by the 2nd defendant without any reference to or use of technical drawings made for the plaintiff.

  111. [80] In the alternative, the defendants aver that there was no copyright infringement in relation to the Semivac Drawings as the plaintiff’s technical drawings have been industrially applied, thus satisfying s 70(1) of the Copyright Act.

  112. [81] Finally, the defendants also take the position that there is no evidence that the 1st defendant transferred the technical drawings from one computer to another, or that the 1st defendant manufactured components relating to the plaintiff’s FCVA machine.

  113. [82] In short, it appears that the defendants take the position that, whilst the 2nd defendant did use the plaintiff’s laptop to create the Semivac Drawings, these drawings and the relevant components are for machines and processes which have nothing to do with the plaintiff’s FCVA machine. The defendants’ case is that the drawings related to third party components for paint spray systems, ion milling systems, and wafer pick-up semiconductors. However, as noted above, I have found that the 3rd defendant was most surely interested in producing DCVA machines and components.

  114. [83] I turn first to consider the issue as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to copyright in the Semivac Drawings. As noted already, s 30(6) of the Copyright Act stipulates that the copyright in a work belongs to the employer where the work is made by an employee in pursuance of the terms of his employment. Whether a work is created by an employee in pursuance of the terms of his employment is a question of fact.

  115. [84] If the Semivac Drawings were created by the 2nd defendant and/or other employees of the plaintiff at the instruction of the plaintiff, there would be no doubt that the copyrights would belong to the plaintiff. The position is trickier where, as is the case here, the 2nd defendant whilst he is an employee uses the plaintiff’s equipment (the laptop and CAD program) to create the Semivac Drawings for the 1st defendant, at the request of the 3rd defendant. Leaving aside breaches of duties of fidelity, etc, the mere fact that the 2nd defendant used the plaintiff’s equipment to create the drawings does not mean that he did so in the course of his employment with the plaintiff. Indeed, at first sight, it may even seem a little odd for the plaintiff to claim that the works produced by the 2nd defendant in breach of his contractual duties of fidelity, etc, are nevertheless to be regarded as works that were made in the course of employment with the plaintiff.

  116. [85] For example, if X is employed by Y (a specialist in computer programs for electronic games) as a programmer and goes on to use Y’s computer to create a computer program for Z (a specialist in spreadsheet programs) without Y’s knowledge, it does not follow that the spreadsheet program was made in the course of his employment with Y.

  117. [86] On the other hand, the plaintiff submits that an employee who creates a work of the type that he was employed to create, but does so for a third party, cannot assert his own breach of fiduciary duty to deny that it was written in the course of employment. The case relied on is Missing Link Software v Magee [1989] 1 FSR 361 (“Magee”). The 1st defendant in that case was formerly the software development manager of the plaintiff company. He left and set up his own company, marketing a computer system which was a rival to the plaintiff's personnel management system. An independent expert appointed by the plaintiff could not find any evidence of similarities in the systems such as to suggest copyright infringement or misuse of confidential information. Nevertheless, it was claimed that the only explanation for how the defendant was able to write a competing program so quickly was that he must have written the whole or large portions of the program whilst he was still an employee of the plaintiff.

  118. [87] The plaintiff in Magee, in seeking interlocutory relief, argued that the copyright in the competing program belonged to it. In an earlier motion to discharge the interlocutory injunction, Hoffmann J (as he then was) held at 367 that there were two ways in which the plaintiff's claim to the copyright might be supported. First, the defendant, in writing a competing program whilst employed by the plaintiff, was arguably acting in breach of the fiduciary duties which he owed to the plaintiff. On this basis, Hoffmann J held it was arguable that the “fruits of the breach”, namely, the copyright in the program or the part of it which he wrote while in the plaintiff's employment, was held on constructive trust for the plaintiff. Alternatively, it was arguable that since the defendant was in breach of his fiduciary duty in writing the program, he could not be allowed to set up his own breach to prove that the program was written outside of the course of his employment.

  119. [88] In a subsequent motion, Judge Paul Baker QC, relying on two cases drawn from the law on patents, British Syphon Company Limited v George Sidney Homewood [1956] RPC 225 and Patchett v Sterling Engineering Company Limited (1955) 72 RPC 50 (“Patchett”), came to a similar conclusion. In Patchett, Viscount Simonds stated at 56 that:

  120. [89] In Magee, Judge Baker QC opined that this principle was not necessarily confined to work done during hours of work. If the defendant was employed to make an invention and finds that inspiration comes to him in the bathtub, that inspiration would still fall within Viscount Simonds’ statement of principle.

  121. [90] A number of points arise in respect of the Magee decision. First, the decision was interlocutory and arose in the context of a grant of interim injunctive relief. Second, the view that there may be scope for the imposition of a constructive trust by way of an equitable restitutionary remedy where the work is written in breach of a fiduciary obligation or in breach of the duty of fidelity, is one that resonates with principle. Third, the alternative view that a defendant cannot set up his own breach in support of his claim that the work was not produced in the course of employment, is one that needs to be examined with care. Much will depend on the facts and circumstances, including the nature and scope of the obligation said to be breached.

  122. [91] I pause to note that not all employees will owe fiduciary obligations to their employers. Indeed, it seems clear that the employment relationship is not a fiduciary relationship as such, but that in appropriate cases an employee may be found to owe fiduciary obligations to his or her employer. In the present case, even if the 2nd defendant was not a fiduciary, the point remains that there is no doubt that he owes a contractual duty of fidelity to the plaintiff. To be sure, there is some uncertainty as to the difference in content between the two and it has been said the contractual duty of fidelity requires something less than single-minded loyalty. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the duty of fidelity does not apply to acts done outside office hours. The 2nd defendant’s duty of fidelity will be discussed in more detail later.

  123. [92] Turning to the evidence in the case at hand, it will be recalled that the Semivac Drawings were found in the 2nd defendant’s laptop after his resignation. This laptop was provided by the plaintiff for the 2nd defendant’s use in carrying out his work for the plaintiff. It is clear from the evidence that the 2nd defendant, whilst he was still an employee, used the laptop both during and after office hours, to create these drawings.

  124. [93] The general point has been made that FCVA technology or FCVA machines comprise many hardware components. Some of these components could be obtained from OEM suppliers. The evidence suggests that sometimes modification may be necessary to adapt the part for the plaintiff’s purposes. In other cases, it appears that parts would be designed completely in-house and developed solely to the plaintiff’s design and specifications.

  125. [94] Either way, it is clear that a good deal of technical design drawings would be created by the plaintiff over the course of years. Some of these technical design drawings might even be produced by means of reverse engineering of existing parts produced by third party suppliers. But even if that is so, I note there is no claim or evidence of any third party asserting rights or even making complaints against the plaintiff. Further, it does not follow that a technical drawing produced by examining and studying the actual component will lack originality (on the basis that it is a slavish indirect copy of the third-party OEM technical drawings). Whilst it is correct, as a matter of general principle, that a copy of a copy of an original is still a copy, any copy, to infringe, must still reproduce a substantial part of the original that is relied on. Whether it does, must depend on the facts and circumstances. In any case, the point that is presently being made is that I am satisfied that such technical drawings for component parts would indeed be produced in connection with the plaintiff’s business.

  126. [95] What is clearly important is not just the design of individual component parts, but the system as a whole. It follows that there may well be some technical drawings of the plaintiff which relate to components that are not “exclusively” made for FCVA machines. The defendants assert that the copyrights in the Semivac Drawings do not belong to the plaintiff as the Semivac Drawings do not relate to the plaintiff’s FCVA technology, and that the plaintiff and 1st defendant are not competitors. Looking at the evidence as a whole, I have come to the view that the plaintiff’s evidence is to be preferred, in that whilst some of the drawings may well relate to standard components, this does not mean that they are not related to the plaintiff’s business.

  127. [96] In reaching my decision, I have no doubt that even if the DCVA technology is not identical with FCVA technology, the goals and purposes are essentially the same. To be sure, whilst there may be components which are found only in FCVA machines, the evidence supports the view that there are many other parts which are common to both DCVA and FCVA machines, or which are similar.

  128. [97] In any case, the evidence is clear that the plaintiff is in the business of manufacturing and providing FCVA technology products and services. As part of this business, its employees, such as the 2nd defendant, design vacuum technology components using software. These components do not necessarily relate to the plaintiff’s FCVA technology alone. As mentioned earlier, the plaintiff sells more traditional coating machines as well. The 2nd defendant himself admitted that his duties at the plaintiff included:

  129. In other words, the 2nd defendant’s job scope was not limited to designing components solely connected with the plaintiff’s FCVA technology. Rather, his job scope included designing components relating to general vacuum technology.

  130. [98] I find that my conclusion is further buttressed by the evidence of the 3rd defendant. Similar to the 2nd defendant, the 3rd defendant stated that:

  131. And that:

  132. [99] Subsequently, when the 3rd defendant sought to prove that the technical drawings were of components belonging to third parties, he produced a table detailing the different kinds of machines the technical drawings are alleged to relate to. Pertinently, multiple drawings are said to relate to “Ion Milling system, US company”. It appears to me that this system is the same system the plaintiff is said to have created technical drawings for, for the purposes of reverse engineering. It is thus clear that the 2nd defendant’s creation of the technical drawings does indeed overlap with the plaintiff’s business, in the sense that those drawings also relate to components that are related to or which might be used in the plaintiff’s machines and related technologies.

  133. [100] In short, the evidence as a whole supports the finding that technical drawings for a large variety of components and parts were made by various employees of the plaintiff, including the 2nd defendant, over the course of many years. Whilst many of these drawings would relate specifically to FCVA technology, I am satisfied that other drawings relate to parts which are either not exclusive to FCVA technology or which are for related technologies and machines, including sputtering machines. Indeed, the defendants admit to basing four of the Semivac Drawings off the plaintiff’s pre-existing technical drawings. The point is that, if the plaintiff and 1st defendant were in wholly unrelated businesses and the products did not overlap, it is surprising that the 2nd defendant would copy or modify the plaintiff’s pre-existing technical drawings to create the Semivac Drawings for the 1st defendant.

  134. [101] For these reasons, I make the following findings:

  135. [102] It follows that there is no doubt that the plaintiff is the owner of the copyright in the technical drawings that were created by its employees in the course of employment, even if some drawings related to components or parts that were not exclusive to FCVA machines or were required for use in connection with some different type of machine or technology. If a substantial part of such a copyrighted drawing was copied by the 2nd defendant for the 1st defendant, a prima facie case of copyright infringement will arise (defences aside).

  136. [103] The question whether there are separate copyrights in the Semivac Drawings (whether because they are original as sufficient changes had been made to the expressive elements as set out in the underlying technical drawings, or simply because they are not copies of any pre-existing work) and who is the owner of the copyright is a different matter.

  137. [104] Leaving aside for the moment the question of originality, it appears that the plaintiff does have a number of alternative grounds on which it can be said to be the copyright owner.

  138. [105] First, following Magee, it may be said that the 2nd defendant cannot rely on his own breach of contract (engaging in work for the 1st defendant) to make good the submission (and effectively take advantage of his own wrongdoing) that the Semivac Drawings were not made in the course of his employment with the plaintiff. This follows from the finding that the creation of the Semivac Drawings fell within the general scope of what the 2nd defendant was employed by the plaintiff to do.

  139. [106] Second, the plaintiff may also be able to assert rights over the Semivac Drawings on the basis of a constructive trust. I note that the principle that copyright can be the subject matter of a trust, including a constructive trust, is well-established and not in dispute. For example, several members of the UK’s House of Lords in Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109 expressed the view (in obiter) that the Crown would have strong arguments to claim the copyright in a book in equity given that the book had been written by the author (a recently retired head of an intelligence agency) and published in flagrant breach of confidence. The author in that case was not a simple confidante or employee who owed a duty of fidelity; he was in a very real sense a fiduciary of the Crown: see Lord Keith of Kinkel at 263, Lord Griffiths at 276; see also Attorney-General v Blake [1998] 2 WLR 805 and Attorney-General v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268 (“A-G v Blake”).

  140. [107] In the present case, it is not necessary to come to a firm landing on whether the plaintiff can assert rights over the Semivac Drawings on the basis of a constructive trust. Instead, I find that the plaintiff is entitled to claim the copyrights to the Semivac Drawings for the following reasons. First, following Magee, the Semivac Drawings can be said to have been made in the course of the 2nd defendant’s employment with the plaintiff. The 2nd defendant was not a junior employee. Instead, he was the manager of production mechanical and subsequently a senior engineer. He was given access to computer equipment, and special access to the plaintiff’s database of technical drawings, by virtue of his high position in the plaintiff company. Further, the components designed in the Semivac Drawings were indeed the type of components that fell within his employment scope.

  141. [108] Second, even if the Semivac Drawings were not made in the course of the 2nd defendant’s employment with the plaintiff, the plaintiff would still be entitled to the copyright (if any) in the Semivac Drawings because of the Agreement of Invention Assignment and Confidentiality.

  142. [109] As noted earlier, the 2nd defendant signed an Agreement of Invention Assignment and Confidentiality on 6 April 2000 which stipulated that:

  143. [110] Section 195 of the Copyright Act, as applied to the above contractual provision, will have the effect of vesting the copyright in such drawings in the plaintiff. I pause to add that the defendants in their pleadings and closing submissions did not raise any issue over the enforceability of the contractual provision, whether on grounds of restraint of trade or otherwise. The only argument raised by counsel for the defendants as to the applicability of the Agreement of Invention Assignment and Confidentiality is that it only covers works related to the business of the plaintiff, and that the Semivac Drawings do not relate to the plaintiff’s business. However, I have found that the Semivac Drawings are indeed related to the business of the plaintiff. I thus reject counsel for the defendants’ argument.

  144. [111] Before I leave the issue of ownership of copyright, I pause to make the observation that the Semivac Drawings will only attract copyright in the first place if they are original works in their own right. This is not a point on which detailed submissions were made. Indeed, the defendants have not pleaded or challenged copyright in the Semivac Drawings on the basis that they are simply slavish copies of pre-existing drawings. I make two observations before considering whether the Semivac Drawings are original works. First, if a Semivac Drawing is simply a slavish copy of a pre-existing technical drawing, it will not attract copyright as an original work. Second, if a Semivac Drawing, whilst based on a pre-existing drawing, exhibits sufficient additions and modifications, etc, it may well attract its own copyright as an original work (whether or not it infringes copyright in the copied drawing). Third, if a Semivac Drawing is not copied from any pre-existing work at all – it will in all probability be regarded as original and protected by copyright.

  145. [112] I now turn to the question of whether the 1st defendant infringed the plaintiff’s copyright. Given the above analysis, it is convenient to split the discussion into two parts: (i) infringement and the plaintiff’s pre-existing technical drawings; and (ii) infringement and the Semivac Drawings.

  146. Infringement and the plaintiff’s pre-existing technical drawings

  147. (1) Do the Semivac Drawings reproduce a substantial part of the plaintiff’s pre-existing technical drawings?

  148. [113] Before I turn to the first question (whether the Semivac Drawings reproduced a substantial part of the technical drawings of the plaintiff), I note again the earlier point at [94] that even if a pre-existing technical drawing was produced by reverse engineering for the plaintiff, it does not follow that the technical drawing that was produced must lack originality. For clarity and avoidance of doubt, I approach this part of the judgment on the basis that the pre-existing technical drawings are original. As will be seen, little turns on this since the conclusion I have reached is that the plaintiff fails in its claim for infringement of any copyright in the pre-existing technical drawings produced and relied on.

  149. [114] Although the plaintiff alleges that “most” of the Semivac Drawings were “either identical with or very similar to” the plaintiff’s technical drawings, only alleged equivalents of 17 of the Semivac Drawings were produced. For the avoidance of doubt, the 17 Semivac Drawings for which the plaintiff’s equivalents were produced are labelled as: (a) Senser Clamp; (b) Pulley 1; (c) Shaft 1; (d) Shaft 2; (e) Ball-Screw (L=280); (f) Ball-Screw (L=550); (g) Transfer Plate; (h) Transfer Plate 2; (i) Top Plate; (j) Bottom Plate; (k) Side Support; (l) Side Support 2; (m) Senser Slit; (n) Senser Frame 1; (o) Senser Frame 2; (p) Motor Support; and (q) Motor Support 1. The 17 Semivac Drawings and the plaintiff’s alleged equivalents are set out in Annex B.

  150. [115] In the case of the Semivac Drawing named Senser Clamp, Dr Shi’s evidence is that the plaintiff’s equivalent drawing is called Sensor Plate. The drawings are said to be identical, save for the addition of the 1st defendant’s name. Indeed, this court agrees that the drawings do appear to be almost identical in shape and detail. According to Dr Shi, the Sensor Plate drawing was produced by an employee called Tang Wei. The defendants, on the other hand, take the position that this drawing is for a component to be used in a paint spray system. The response which I accept is that the Sensor Plate was specifically designed for use in a FCVA machine, in connection with the placement of upper and lower limit sensors.

  151. [116] In the case of the Semivac Drawing named Pulley 1, Dr Shi’s evidence is that the plaintiff’s equivalent is called Timing Pulley. The plaintiff’s position is that the drawings are visually similar, asides from a difference in dimensions. A visual comparison confirms that the drawings are indeed very close in shape and detailing. The plaintiff claims that the drawing was made by another employee called Tan Yajuan. Once again, the defendants’ case is that this component is for use in paint spray systems. The plaintiff’s response is that the Timing Pulley is a component used in the FCVA machine for target rotation.

  152. [117] In the case of the Semivac Drawings named Shaft 1 and Shaft 2, the plaintiff’s equivalents are called Sliding Rod and Support Shaft. The plaintiff asserts that the functions and shapes are the same – the only differences being the dimensions. Whilst it may well be that the functions and general shape of the articles depicted are similar, I note that considerable detailing in the plaintiff’s drawings are not reproduced. Shaft 1 and Shaft 2 are far simpler in detailing. The significance of this point will be discussed below.

  153. [118] In the case of the Semivac Drawings named Ball Screw (L=280) and Ball Screw (L=550), the plaintiff’s equivalent is called Ball Screw. The plaintiff asserts that the functions and shapes are the same – the only differences being the dimensions. Once again, I note that Ball Screw (L=280) and Ball Screw (L=550) are far simpler; if they were based on the plaintiff’s Ball Screw drawing, a considerable amount of detailing is not reproduced.

  154. [119] In the case of the six drawings listed above as items (g) to (l) alleged by the defendants to be for use in a paint spray system, the plaintiff asserts that these are similar parts, with the concepts copied from the FCVA source. Whilst this may be so, it is immediately apparent that the Semivac Drawings, once again, are far simpler in terms of what is visually depicted. To the uninformed eye it would be hard to identify what, if anything, was taken from the plaintiff’s drawings – aside from the concept. Indeed, it is not even obvious to the uninformed eye what is the concept that is being referred to.

  155. [120] In the case of the Semivac Drawings named Senser Slit, the plaintiff’s equivalent is called Sensor Tail 2. Once again, the plaintiff asserts that these are similar parts, and that the concept for Senser Slit is copied from the FCVA source. The same point arises; Senser Slit bears little visual resemblance to Sensor Tail 2 – at least in terms of the expressive elements.

  156. [121] In the case of the Semivac Drawings named Senser Frame 1 and Senser Frame 2, the plaintiff’s equivalent is called Sensor Location Plate. The plaintiff asserts that these are similar or identical to the plaintiff’s technical drawings. That said, a visual comparison does not support the claim that the drawings are identical. Indeed, the degree of visual similarity is low and it does not appear that anything was taken, except perhaps the general purpose of the component.

  157. [122] Finally, in the case of the Semivac Drawings named Motor Support and Motor Support 1, the plaintiff’s equivalent drawings are called Motor Bracket and Motor Bracket/ Motor Mount Plate, respectively. The plaintiff asserts that a concept similar to the concept in Motor Support and Motor Support 1 is used in FCVA. In this case, whilst I agree there are more points of visual similarity, which suggest that more of the visual detailing in the plaintiff’s diagrams were taken, at the end of the day, it appears that what was taken was essentially the concept. Indeed, this was how the plaintiff described the Semivac Drawings, as against the plaintiff’s equivalent drawings.

  158. [123] In reaching a decision on whether the alleged infringing drawings have reproduced a substantial part of the copyrighted works, it must be borne in mind that copyright protects original expression and not the underlying idea, goal or information embodied in a work. If the idea behind a drawing is to use a depiction of a human hand to point the direction for a pedestrian, it can hardly be surprising if two signboards based on same general concept depict something that looks like a human hand: see the well-known case of Kenrick & Co v Lawrence & Co (1890) 25 QBD 99.

  159. [124] Whilst it is well-established that copyright can subsist in very simple line drawings (technical or otherwise), there is much to be said for the oft-repeated statement that the simpler the work, the more exact the copy must be, for it to be regarded as infringing. By simple, what is meant is a work where the author’s expression of the idea or concept is so closely related to the idea or concept that it is hard to separate expression from the idea. It makes good sense, bearing in mind what copyright is concerned with is original expression, to require a much greater degree of exactitude in copying in such cases to reach the conclusion that a substantial part of the plaintiff’s work has been taken. If the law was otherwise, there would be a real risk of copyright protecting ideas, principles and facts, as opposed to the original expression of ideas, principle and facts.

  160. [125] For these reasons, I have come to the view that, aside from the drawings named Senser Clamp and Pulley 1, the plaintiff has not established that the Semivac Drawings reproduce a substantial part of the alleged equivalent drawings of the plaintiff.

  161. [126] Indeed, I note the plaintiff goes on to assert that even if the drawings are not identical, the confidential information or concepts behind the plaintiff’s technical drawings have been misappropriated by the 1st and 2nd defendants. The response, however, must be that even if this is so, copyright is not concerned with protecting confidential information or concepts as such. Indeed, it is worth underscoring that copyright is not about protecting technology as such. In the case of author’s works (literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works), copyright’s concern is original authorial expression: see, for example, Catnic Components Limited and another v Hill Smith Limited [1982] RPC 183 (“Catnic”) where the court rejected the claim for copyright infringement in a drawing for a steel lintel since only the idea had been taken. The fact that the plaintiff’s design for steel box girder lintel was novel and a product of effort and labour was of no avail, since only the idea was taken: Catnic at 223, and see also Politechnika Ipari Szovetkezet and others v Dallas Print Transfers Ltd [1982] FSR 529 and extra-judicial discussion in George Wei, Law of Copyright in Singapore (Singapore National Printers, 2nd Ed, 2000) at para 8.38.

The judgment continues past this page. Read the rest at eLitigation.