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Grounds publishedDecided 26 Jul 2018

High Court

Tan Swee Wan and another v Johnny Lian Tian Yong

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[2018] SGHC 169Case no. Suit No 1238 of 2015

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  1. [1] This action concerns a project dating back to around middle of 2010 between Tan Swee Wan and Kelvin Low Keng Siang (the “first plaintiff” and “second plaintiff” respectively, and collectively “the plaintiffs”) and Johnny Lian Tian Yong (“the defendant”). The project involved developing computer software for use in software asset management and computer systems, with the intention of ultimately listing the company to be set up for the project (“the Project Company”) on the NASDAQ Exchange in the United States (“the Project”).

  2. [2] The plaintiffs’ role was to develop the computer software. The defendant’s role was essentially to raise funds and to bring in investors. For reasons which I shall discuss in detail later, the plaintiffs withdrew from the Project in or around June 2011. The circumstances leading to their withdrawal are heavily disputed and include alleged issues over the development of the software, its commercial potential and problems in respect of funding. The defendant’s basic position is that because of issues over the state of development of the software and the projected revenue stream, the investor who was supposed to provide the main source of funding for the project decided not to proceed with his investment. The plaintiffs’ position is that, at the time of their decision to withdraw from the Project, the defendant concealed the fact that the funds had in fact been raised and the Project was essentially on track. On this basis, the plaintiffs assert they are entitled to claim certain contractual payments.

  3. [3] The plaintiffs commenced this suit against the defendant on 3 December 2015. Three alternative causes of action were pleaded:

  4. [4] The defendant denies the plaintiffs’ allegations and claims. He also brings a counterclaim for a loan totaling S$400,000 made to the first plaintiff sometime in March or April 2011.

  5. [5] The trial was held over seven days. A total of four witnesses were called, including the first and second plaintiffs, the defendant, and a witness for the defendant, Mr Chang Meng Heng, from Bizpoint International Pte Ltd (“BPI”).

  6. [6] I now deliver my judgment, which I shall structure as follows:

  7. (f) Conclusion.

  8. [7] While I shall begin with the plaintiffs’ case and evidence, I shall indicate those points on which there is no substantial dispute between the parties. I will also touch on some key areas in which the defendant’s and the plaintiffs’ cases diverge, which will then be elaborated on if necessary in the following section setting out the defendant’s case.

  9. Overview of the plaintiffs’ case

  10. The background

  11. [8] The first plaintiff and the defendant met around 1986 when they were members of the Singapore Police Force. The defendant left the Police Force sometime in 1991 and became a businessman. The first plaintiff remained and thereafter became acquainted with the second plaintiff around May 1997. At this time, the first plaintiff was heading the Computer Crime Branch. The second plaintiff was his subordinate.

  12. [9] Sometime in 1998, the first plaintiff introduced the second plaintiff to the defendant so that the second plaintiff might obtain advice on the engagement of a domestic helper. The defendant, after leaving the Police Force in 1991, was involved in various business ventures including that of a domestic helper agency. I note that the first plaintiff’s Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief also makes a passing reference to the defendant as “an agent in a multi-level marketing business”. This was not elaborated on in the plaintiffs’ evidence and was not specifically touched on in cross-examination. I shall return to this at the end of the judgment.

  13. [10] The defendant asserts that he was introduced to the second plaintiff sometime in 2002 (and not 1998), but the parties have no serious disagreement as to how they became acquainted. There is no dispute that the defendant was the first to leave the Police Force to try his hand in business. As will be examined in more detail later, the defendant has held directorships (executive and non-executive) in many companies involved in a wide range of businesses. It is clear that he is often brought into companies as an investor, usually receiving shares and sometimes being given a non-executive director’s position. The monies invested may be his own or sourced from or combined with sums raised from other investors whether in Singapore, China or elsewhere. In other cases, the defendant may also take a more active management role as an executive director, that is, to come on board the company for the purpose of helping to grow the business – possibly to the point where a listing on a recognised stock exchange becomes possible.

  14. [11] While the defendant left for the business world in 1991, the first plaintiff remained in the Police Force where he acquired experience in computer forensic criminal investigation. The first plaintiff also acquired a degree in science from the National University of Singapore while with the Police Force. The second plaintiff also appears to have served in the area of investigation of computer crimes. In this way, there is no doubt that, as compared to the defendant, the plaintiffs were far better acquainted and much more familiar with computer systems and computer programming. This forms the backdrop against which the plaintiffs and defendant came together to collaborate for the Project that lies at the heart of this action. That said, I note that while the first plaintiff asserts that he is not familiar with financial matters and simply brought technical skills to the table, I am satisfied that the first plaintiff has greater familiarity and involvement in financial matters than he is prepared to acknowledge. The relevance of this will become clearer later. On the other hand, while it has been suggested that the defendant is more familiar with information technology than he admits, I have the clear impression that he is not an IT aficionado and that his IT knowledge is rather general in nature.

  15. [12] The first plaintiff left the Police Force sometime in 1998 and joined Microsoft Singapore for about a year, working in intellectual property enforcement. Thereafter, he joined Seagate for two years followed by a short period at KPMG (forensics and litigation support).

  16. [13] By 2001, the first plaintiff and the defendant had become close friends. The second plaintiff did not know the defendant as well as the first plaintiff did, but their relationship was also cordial and they were on friendly terms. In general, it appears that the defendant had much more frequent contact with the first plaintiff as opposed to the second plaintiff. It seems the second plaintiff was based in China for much of the period when certain key discussions or matters transpired between the first plaintiff and defendant. The defendant’s evidence, which I accept, is that he mostly left it to the first plaintiff to explain the discussions to the second plaintiff.

  17. [14] Unfortunately, as a result of the dispute that subsequently arose over the Project and which led to this law suit, the friendship between the parties has been lost and replaced by considerable animosity.

  18. [15] One feature of this case is the lack of contemporaneous documentation to establish, support and corroborate the evidence of the witnesses on many key issues in dispute between the parties. While there are some emails in evidence (together with their attachments), it seems that many of the discussions between the parties were never recorded or confirmed by minutes or emails. Indeed, as will be seen, the material record on the agreement between the parties in respect of the Project is surprisingly sparse and incomplete given the size of the deal contemplated. The plaintiffs and defendant have explained this lack of documentation by saying that there was a good deal of trust between the parties and that it was not thought necessary to have everything recorded or confirmed in writing. After all, they were friends who helped each other out on personal matters from time to time.

  19. The setting up of Tecbiz

  20. [16] Sometime around early 2001, the plaintiffs decided to start their own business together with Mr Ong Cheng Ho (“Mr Ong”), who was also a police investigator, leveraging on their acquired skills in investigating computer crimes. The defendant was invited to join as an investor and to provide general business advice. The plan was to enter the market for computer forensics and detection and prevention of copyright infringement and software piracy. Pursuant to this plan, around August 2001, the first plaintiff incorporated Tecbiz Sherlock Pte Ltd. The company’s name was subsequently changed to Tecbiz Frisman Pte Ltd (“Tecbiz”). At the time of incorporation, the first plaintiff held 60% of the shares and the remaining 40% of shares in Tecbiz were held by Mr Ong. The second plaintiff was then still with the Police Force and apparently felt it would be inappropriate for him to hold shares in the company. Subsequently, on 10 October 2001, the defendant invested S$166,667 in Tecbiz and was allotted 33,333 of the shares in return (at S$4 per share).

  21. [17] On 16 January 2002, Mr Ong sold his shares in Tecbiz and the second plaintiff (who had now left the Police Force) became a shareholder. The shares in Tecbiz were thus held in the following proportions: the first plaintiff held 45%; the second plaintiff held 25%; and the defendant held 30%. The shareholding in Tecbiz remained in these proportions until April 2011, when the relationship between the plaintiffs and defendant soured.

  22. [18] While the defendant was a non-executive director and shareholder in Tecbiz almost from the very start, his role was essentially passive: that of an investor who had a seat at the table, so to speak. He lacked technical expertise in computer software and the operations of Tecbiz were left to the plaintiffs. The defendant did attend board meetings and had sight of company reports, but his evidence was that he was not concerned with the details and that he did not recall much of the matters discussed.

  23. Tecbiz’s core business

  24. [19] Tecbiz’s core business was the provision of forensic IT services to the private sector. These included the examination of computer and IT systems for evidence of wrongdoing, such as the use of pirated software, unauthorised access and appropriation of confidential information. This was the business Tecbiz started and indeed continued with, until the plaintiffs gave up their directorships in 2011. It appears that Microsoft was a customer of Tecbiz’s IT forensic services as well.

  25. [20] The expertise within Tecbiz eventually extended from forensic examination of computer systems to the development of software programs to assist in the forensic work of Tecbiz. As will be seen, the development of software applications lies at the heart of the dispute between the parties. While the plaintiffs did have knowledge of computer technology, it seems the key person at Tecbiz who led developments in software applications was Mr Tan Kah Leong (“Mr Tan”). Indeed, it appears that Mr Tan did much of the early developmental work on the software package which gave rise to the Project.

  26. [21] The evidence is that if Tecbiz wanted to grow the software development side of their business, then aside from capital injections, it might be necessary to expand their team of programmers and software engineers. This is essentially the backdrop against which I turn to the attempts by Tecbiz to attract new investments in or around 2005 with a view to expanding the business. The eventual “failure” of these early attempts led to the discussions with the defendant and his involvement in fund-raising in late 2010.

  27. Early attempts by Tecbiz to attract investors: Sirius and Spring Seeds

  28. [22] According to the defendant, sometime in 2005, Tecbiz decided to attract new investors. To this end, on 1 September 2005, Mr Eugene Wong (“Mr Wong”), who was founder and director of a venture capital investment company, Sirius Venture Consulting Pte Ltd (“Sirius”), was appointed a director of Tecbiz. Subsequently, in September 2006, Sirius and another company, Spring Seeds Pte Ltd (“Spring Seeds”) each invested S$300,000 in return for shares in Tecbiz. Another new director, Mr Jen Shek Voon (“Mr Jen”), was appointed to represent Spring Seeds’ interests.

  29. [23] A subscription agreement was signed on 5 September 2006 by Tecbiz, the plaintiffs, the defendant, Sirus, and Spring Seeds. The documentation in evidence for this investment by Sirius and Spring Seeds was substantial and included:

  30. [24] On 3 March 2009, Sirius and Spring Seeds both gave notice to redeem their redeemable convertible preference shares. The defendant asserts this was because Tecbiz was unable to fulfil certain milestones in the subscription agreement, but the details are unclear. An email dated 5 January 2010 sent by the first plaintiff to Mr Wong and Mr Jen (copied to the second plaintiff and the defendant) suggests that the 2009 financial year had been “difficult” for Tecbiz because of the global economic downturn, and mentions an unsuccessful “attempted OTC listing in FY 2009”. This appears to be a reference to an attempt to list Tecbiz around 2009 in Phillip Securities’ Over-the-Counter (“OTC”) Board in Singapore, which was unsuccessful or at least was not proceeded with because of the sense that the listing was premature. The email went on to state that 2010 would likely be another difficult year, and that Tecbiz was adopting a strategy of remaining lean and focusing on high margins markets and services. The email concluded with the first plaintiff stating that there was a need to reduce the size of the board of directors because board activity would be “very thin”, and respectfully requesting that Mr Wong and Mr Jen resign from the board.

  31. [25] Nothing turns on the reason for Spring Seeds and Sirius’ withdrawal from Tecbiz in 2009. The point I make, however, is that the first plaintiff appears to be reasonably knowledgeable about finance, investments, venture capital funding, listings and business operations. The first plaintiff is clearly not just a “technical person” (supra [11]). It is evident that by 2009, he had considerable business experience of his own and that he was very much involved in the engagement with Spring Seeds and Sirius. It does not appear to me that the first plaintiff is “hands-off” when it comes to business and financial arrangements.

  32. The birth of the Solvesam project

  33. [26] While there is a lack of clarity over the dates, it appears that sometime around 2005, Tecbiz conceived the idea for developing a new software program or package which had as its objective management of information technology assets, software licences and license compliance. Corporate users needed to comply with the terms of software licences, including licence renewals and restrictions on the number of computers in which the software could be stored and used. Given the large number of software programs a corporate user may need, there was a need to assist companies in managing their licences so as to ensure “proactive compliance with the terms and conditions of these licences”. The second plaintiff also explains that assistance on compliance involved obtaining data on the usage information of various software products deployed within the companies and analysing them against the software licence purchase records and entitlements.

  34. [27] At the time, Tecbiz was using a software tool called LicenceCare produced by Microsoft in providing software asset management services for customers of Microsoft products, but the tool had “some limitation(s)”. Thus, Tecbiz developed its own software, “Solvesam”. The first version of Solvesam was developed, and “soft launch[ed]” sometime around 2006. For convenience, this will be referred to as “SS V1.0” which existed as a server version as well as a thumbdrive version. At the time, the plan was to market it as part of Tecbiz’s software asset management service. This involved providing the customer with a complete service package that included accessing and linking up the customer’s computers/servers in a manner that would allow Tecbiz to manage the customer’s software licences. SS V1.0 was not sold as a standalone product.

  35. [28] SS V1.0 was officially launched around March 2007. The plaintiffs’ evidence is that it was well received, and was used by Tecbiz in providing software asset management services to significant corporate customers including Thai Airways, Jurong International Pte Ltd and China National Oil Corporation.

  36. [29] The plaintiffs assert that by 2011, Tecbiz had begun selling copies of the “enforcement edition” of Solvesam to Microsoft China to assist in conducting raids on companies by checking for evidence of breaches of licence terms and conditions. Evidence of this includes:

  37. [30] The defendant was not involved in the development of SS V1.0, but was present at Tecbiz board meetings where SS V1.0 was raised and discussed. For example, on 25 May 2007, the defendant was present at a board meeting during which the first plaintiff updated the board on “the successful development and testing of [SS V1.0]”, as well as the fact that Tecbiz had received an invitation to speak on Software Asset Management at a Microsoft Worldwide Partner Conference, and had secured a contract with Thai Airways.

  38. [31] While the defendant may not have been aware of the details of SS V1.0 in 2006 and 2007, he would certainly have been generally aware of SS V1.0 and that it was a significant development in Tecbiz’s software asset management business.

  39. Further attempts to raise funds between 2008 and 2009

  40. [32] With the birth of SS V1.0, Tecbiz was keen to attract investment for the purposes of growing the business with the ultimate goal of securing a listing on a stock exchange. Expansion of SS V1.0 into a fully developed software asset management system would require injection of capital and technical expertise. As will be seen, one major aspect of the parties’ plans for Solvesam was to develop a cloud-based version. This would require expensive infrastructure, hence the need for funding.

  41. [33] It appears this was the reason why Tecbiz considered a listing on Phillip Securities OTC Board in 2009. Consideration was also given in late 2009 to the idea of selling Tecbiz to Deloitte & Touche Financial Advisory Services (“Deloitte”). According to the first plaintiff, the sale did not materialise because among other reasons: (a) the offer price was too low; (b) the defendant would not be part of the business at Deloitte; and (c) Deloitte was only interested in acquiring the forensic investigation business, and not SS V1.0.

  42. [34] I pause here to note that while the defendant was a non-executive director of Tecbiz, he appears to have played a fairly important role in discussions and planning of future developments of Tecbiz, at least from the business or financial perspective. That much is clear from the fact that one reason for the decision not to sell Tecbiz’s business to Deloitte was that Deloitte was only interested in acquiring Tecbiz’s management team which of course excluded the defendant.

  43. Further and planned iterations of SS V1.0

  44. [35] From 2009 through to 2010, the parties continued to consider how to develop Tecbiz’s business and Solvesam. The plan, as explained in a Tecbiz slide presentation sent to the defendant around 27 August 2010, was to target the China market on account of the large number of IT users in China. To succeed, it would be necessary to develop SS V1.0 into a “Cloud-based” product. It seems the goal was to develop Solvesam into an “IT [a]sset [m]anagement tool to be used for computer maintenance services for the purpose of generating revenue from advertising, group buy and market trend analysis”. It was envisioned that this would be achieved by developing SS V1.0 through the following iterations:

  45. [36] The evidence is that by around early or mid-2011, SS V1.25, the web-based version, existed at least as a demonstration model. Unfortunately, the Solvesam project never developed beyond SS V1.25 since the plaintiffs withdrew from the project in mid-2011 for reasons that will be examined later. The point, however, is that the Solvesam project appears to have developed over numerous discussions into a fairly sophisticated plan which culminated in the hope that SSV3 would have a degree of market penetration such that it would be like a Facebook for China (in terms of the number of user accounts).

  46. Expansion of the defendant’s role: raising funds for Solvesam

  47. [37] While 2009 was not a good year for Tecbiz, a positive development took place in April 2010 when International Enterprise Singapore offered its assistance in setting up an overseas marketing office in Shanghai, China, under the Internationalisation Capability Development Programme. As a result, Tecbiz established a representative office in China in August 2010 with the second plaintiff as the Chief Representative. The second plaintiff also relocated to China.

  48. [38] It is evident that Microsoft was interested in developments in the Solvesam software around 2010, as can be seen from the various invoices referred to at [29] above. According to the plaintiffs, sometime around August 2010, Mr Alex Cooper, Microsoft’s general manager in China, even suggested that Tecbiz set up a separate company to develop Solvesam further and suggested that he might be able to assist in finding venture capitalists to invest in the new company. The defendant was informed of this suggestion by email dated 27 August 2010 which included the powerpoint slides mentioned at [35] above on how Solvesam could be developed, together with a copy of Mr Cooper’s curriculum vitae.

  49. [39] The fact that Microsoft China was interested in Solvesam is also clear from the fact that in November 2010, they expressed interest in training sessions on Tecbiz’s enforcement tool for Microsoft’s technicians and lawyers, as well as training on how to use the software for inspection.

  50. [40] In short, the plaintiffs’ position is that SS V1.0 had been well received and that the plans to develop SS V.1.25 and beyond had certainly attracted the attention of Microsoft. The plaintiffs also assert that they did not receive complaints from other customers as to the capabilities of the Solvesam software.

  51. [41] According to the plaintiffs, the defendant, after being informed of Mr Cooper’s proposal, offered to develop his own fund-raising proposal. He advised against having Mr Cooper involved as “it was difficult to work with venture capitalists”, and the parties would lose control of the company. The plaintiffs say that although they knew the defendant was a “smooth talker and skilled salesperson”, they were keen on his fund-raising proposal because they viewed him as their trusted friend who would have their interests at heart.

  52. [42] Several discussions took place between the parties, likely around end August to October 2010. A key assertion of the plaintiffs is that the defendant was an experienced businessman who stressed (essentially boasted of) his ability to raise funds and to bring new start-up companies up to and through to listing on NASDAQ.

  53. [43] At around that time, it appears the plaintiffs were also exploring the option of applying for government grants to develop the Solvesam project and expand Tecbiz. When the defendant was informed, the plaintiffs say he discouraged these grant applications and instead stressed his own experience and ability in fundraising.

  54. [44] One example which the defendant is said to have raised in this context was his involvement in fund raising and a listing exercise for Techmedia Advertising Inc (“TECM”) in the United States. In brief, TECM was allegedly first set up in Singapore as Techmedia Advertising Singapore Pte Ltd. A related company, Techmedia Advertising Mauritius, was set up as the parent of Techmedia Advertising India to carry out media related activities in India and take advantage of tax treaties. The defendant was said to have led the fund-raising exercise with the intention of listing TECM on NASDAQ. According to the plaintiffs, the defendant cited or made references to TECM so as to persuade the plaintiffs that he would be able to lead and drive the fund-raising exercise for the Solvesam project.

  55. [45] A key statement which the plaintiffs assert was made by the defendant, and which the plaintiffs claim to have relied on, was that TECM was already listed on NASDAQ. The plaintiffs say the defendant never informed them of any problems that had arisen over fundraising, or the fact that TECM was never listed on NASDAQ, and was instead initially listed on the Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board (“OTC BB”) in the United States and thereafter “down-graded” to “Over-the-Counter Pink Sheets” (“OTC Pink Sheets”). The plaintiffs claim the defendant made this representation prior to the parties coming to an understanding on the defendant’s fundraising involvement. They also assert that the defendant reinforced the representations in early 2011 (after the understanding was allegedly reached) by repeating the claim that he had successfully raised funds for TECM which was listed on NASDAQ.

  56. [46] The plaintiffs assert that they were impressed by the defendant’s success in his fundraising efforts for TECM because they had been informed by the defendant of the TECM fund-raising exercise years earlier. By email dated 18 September 2008, the defendant informed the plaintiffs that TECM was intending to carry out a reverse take-over of a US-listed company in less than 18 months. The plaintiffs were invited to participate by subscribing for shares. The email included slides on TECM and its goal to provide one-stop advertising solutions in whatever appropriate media format in India. The plaintiffs declined the invitation.

  57. [47] Leaving aside the fact that TECM was never successfully listed on NASDAQ, the plaintiffs also note the defendant’s conviction on 31 March 2014 for an offence under the Securities and Futures Act (Cap 289, 2006 Rev Ed) relating to offering securities without a licence in connection with TECM. The plaintiffs also claim that “various individuals” who had invested in TECM contacted the plaintiffs towards end 2014, complaining about the defendant’s failure to list TECM on NASDAQ, the listing of TECM on OTC BB and the subsequent downgrading to OTC Pink Sheets. None of these investors gave evidence and no details were provided as to who these investors were or, indeed, how or why they made contact with the plaintiffs. It is undisputed that the TECM fundraising exercise had no connection with the Solvesam project.

  58. [48] The plaintiffs claim that the structure of the fundraising proposal for the Solvesam project bore striking similarities to the fund-raising structure for TECM. The defendant’s involvement and the requirement that the defendant must have complete control or responsibility for funds raised from investors, and the alleged goal of listing TECM on NASDAQ was essentially the same as what was proposed for Solvesam project.

  59. [49] Thus, the plaintiffs refer to TECM for two reasons. First, because the defendant’s claims about his success with TECM is relied on (a) as an actionable misrepresentation; and/or (b) as the basis for a term of the Oral Agreement; and/or (c) as an element of the common understanding reached. Secondly, it appears (although this is less clear) that the plaintiffs raise TECM as similar fact evidence – to support their contention that the defendant never believed or had an intention to carry through with his representations, promises and statements on the Solvesam project.

  60. The understanding and/or agreement between the plaintiffs and the defendant

  61. [50] The plaintiffs assert that their discussions with the defendant culminated in an understanding on the defendant’s fundraising proposal. Evidence as to the date or period when the understanding was reached was unclear to say the least. No records were made of any of the discussions. There is not a single email or communication from either side that purports to capture or summarise the understanding that had been reached. The evidence suggests that many conversations took place during which certain points were raised and consensus reached. The plaintiffs’ argument is that by marrying together all the conversations, an oral agreement emerged on the following terms:

  62. [51] I pause to note that while the plaintiffs’ pleadings have referred to the above figures as representing the understanding on how the funds raised were to be used and disbursed, it appears that there was an earlier understanding that the plaintiffs would be paid US$1m each whilst only US$2m would be set aside for expenses. I shall return to this below, but make the point that this is clearly not a case where there were just one or two meetings during which all the terms of the agreement were discussed and agreed upon. Instead, it appears that there were likely many meetings over a period of many months on different points.

  63. [52] For example, while it is undisputed that SIPL was incorporated on 23 December 2010, it is unclear if the alleged understanding that the investment funds raised had to be under the sole control or responsibility of the defendant was reached before or after that date. Based on the first plaintiff’s evidence, it appears that the “understanding” on control over the funds raised was only reached sometime after 7 January 2011 when the plaintiffs were allegedly informed that the investors only trusted the defendant to control the funds. That being so, it appears that the alleged Oral Agreement could only have come into existence sometime in early January 2011 and not in 2010 as pleaded.

  64. [53] Indeed, even the term that the plaintiffs and defendant would collectively hold 51% of the shares in SIPL while the remaining was to be held by investors sourced from the People’s Republic of China is one which appears to have been raised and “agreed” only in early June 2011.

  65. The incorporation of the Project Company

  66. [55] As mentioned, SIPL was incorporated as the Project Company on 23 December 2010. Shortly thereafter, around 5 January 2011, the plaintiffs became directors and shareholders. There is nothing to suggest that any of the parties were merely non-executive directors. The plaintiffs and defendant were also equal shareholders of SIPL. Later, around 20 July 2011 (after the plaintiffs withdrew from the Solvesam Project), SIPL changed its name to SSI Holdings Pte Ltd (“SSI”) for reasons which will be gone into later.

  67. The events in January 2011

  68. [56] January 2011 was clearly an important month given that SIPL had just been incorporated. By this time, Tecbiz had established a representative office in China and the second plaintiff had relocated to China. As alluded to earlier, Microsoft China was a user of the enforcement edition of Solvesam software and had indicated its interest in the development of the Solvesam system.

  69. [57] In late 2010, the defendant had informed the plaintiffs that he was meeting, or in discussions with, investors in China, but the evidence on who these investors were is thin and hazy, and it seems that at this stage, the defendant had not yet managed to secure any definite or confirmed investments.

  70. [58] Then, in January 2011, the defendant informed the plaintiffs that a Chinese fund manager called “Ah Dong” was very keen on the Solvesam project. Ah Dong would represent a group of individual retail investors who would invest in a fund company on the basis that their investments would be channelled to the Solvesam project (ie, to SIPL). The plaintiffs were later informed that Ah Dong’s real name was “Chi Jiayu” (“Mr Chi”).

  71. [59] Mr Chi’s key requirement was that the funds raised must be under the defendant’s control. The plaintiffs understood this to mean that the defendant was to be the custodian of the funds prior to the defendant’s transfer of the funds to the Project Company (ie, SIPL, supra [55]). It did not mean that the defendant was to have full discretion as to how the funds were to be applied, used or disbursed. The funds were to be applied in accordance with the understanding that had been reached between the plaintiffs and the defendant. Indeed, under cross-examination, the defendant also stated that what Mr Chi wanted was for the defendant to be responsible for the funds raised, as opposed to the defendant having total control over the use of the funds for SIPL.

  72. [61] As an aside, it also appears that the defendant, even at this early stage, was considering bringing in another IT company, BPI, into the Solvesam project with the aim of securing a listing on NASDAQ. The plaintiffs claim that sometime in late 2010 or early 2011, the defendant raised the possibility of using SIPL to acquire BPI which was then listed on the Phillip Securities OTC Board in Singapore. According to the plaintiffs, the discussion was brief as the defendant did not yet have any firm proposals on the acquisition of BPI. The relevance of this point will become clearer later.

  73. The Subscription Agreement

  74. [62] According to the plaintiffs, the defendant then requested that the first plaintiff prepare a draft of the Subscription Agreement (supra [3(b)]). The draft was prepared based on the discussions between the parties and was sent by the first plaintiff to the defendant and the second plaintiff on 19 January 2011. The draft was not prepared by legal counsel apparently because the parties were good friends and trusted each other. Furthermore, the first plaintiff was told, and appears to have accepted, that the Subscription Agreement was more for the investor, Mr Chi, or his fund company, than to regulate the dealings between the plaintiffs and the defendant. The defendant undertook to translate the draft Subscription Agreement into Chinese and to procure Mr Chi’s agreement and signature.

  75. [63] Before I set out the main provisions of the Subscription Agreement, the following points are noted:

  76. [64] The key provisions of the Subscription Agreement as drafted by first plaintiff and sent to the defendant on 19 January 2011 are as follows:

  77. [65] There are no other terms or conditions or warranties. For instance, there are no provisions on governing law or dispute resolution, nor any warranties in respect of the Solvesam software. The Subscription Agreement also does not impose any obligations on the Founders to procure the transfer of all rights in the Solvesam software to SIPL.

  78. [66] The plaintiffs’ position is that the parties entered into the Subscription Agreement with Mr Chi on or about 24 January 2011. This was the date when the defendant by email provided the plaintiffs with copies of the execution page signed by Mr Chi (supra [63(d)]). However, it was only on or around 10 February 2011, after the parties had met Mr Chi and his group of investors in Singapore, that the plaintiffs and the defendant signed the execution page. The plaintiffs say this was the first time they had met Mr Chi.

  79. [67] I pause to note that, according to the plaintiffs, the original understanding between them and the defendant was that each Founder (ie, each of the plaintiffs and the defendant) would receive US$1m (“Founders’ Fees”) and that US$2m would be set aside to cover expenses. However, upon being informed of substantial expenses incurred by the defendant to meet and entertain Mr Chi, the plaintiffs say they agreed to increase the sum set aside for expenses to US$2.3m and to reduce the Founder’s Fees to US$900,000 each.

  80. [68] The key provision of the Subscription Agreement relates to payment of the Founders’ Fees to the plaintiffs. Under Clause 1, the Investor was to subscribe in cash for new ordinary shares equivalent to 30% of the ordinary shares of SIPL in accordance with Schedule 2. For convenience, I reproduce Schedule 2 below:

  81. [69] The plaintiffs say that under the Subscription Agreement, Mr Chi was obligated to provide funds totalling US$20m. Of this amount, US$15m was to be paid to SIPL in five tranches. This sum represented the working capital that the defendant agreed to raise for the Solvesam project through his Chinese investors. The remaining US$5m was to be paid to the Founders in four tranches. It appears that the plaintiffs’ case is that this sum set out in the Subscription Agreement reflected the understanding and terms of the Oral Agreement between the plaintiffs and the defendant, ie, that the Founders would be entitled to receive US$900,000 each and another US$2.3m would allocated for expenses of the fund-raising exercise.

  82. [70] I pause here to stress that the word “understanding” as used in the preceding paragraphs is used loosely and as a matter of convenience to refer to the Oral Agreement and/or understanding which the plaintiffs alleged was reached with the defendant in late 2010 or early 2011. As noted, there is a dispute over whether an understanding was reached at all and, if so, whether the understanding ever resulted in a binding Oral Agreement between the plaintiffs and the defendant.

  83. [71] I note also that the plaintiffs make reference to a “common understanding” reached between the parties in 2010 and in respect of which they have claimed for breach of constructive trust by the defendant. This “common understanding” is based on three of the points of the Oral Agreement (supra [50]):

  84. (a) That the defendant would be responsible for raising the funds from prospective investors from the People’s Republic of China;

  85. (b) The funds had to be under the defendant’s control because the potential investors’ representative only trusted the defendant; and

  86. (c) The defendant would procure the eventual transfer and disbursement of the funds (in the manner described at [50(g)] above).

  87. [73] Thus the overall picture, as understood by the plaintiffs, was that if Mr Chi chose to transfer the funds from his investment vehicle to the defendant, the defendant would transfer/allocate the funds received to SIPL and the Founders in accordance with Schedule 2 and the understanding between the plaintiffs and the defendant.

  88. [74] The plaintiffs’ case is that Mr Chi indeed raised and paid the US$20m, and they were entitled to receive their share of the Founders’ Fees and, failing that, to recover damages. The basis for their claim derives from (i) the Oral Agreement; (ii) fraudulent misrepresentation and deceit; and (iii) a constructive trust arising from a common understanding between the parties.

  89. [75] However, the evidence that Mr Chi did in fact raise US$20m and that this amount was in fact transferred to the defendant to be transferred to SIPL for the Solvesam project is thin. Indeed, there is no evidence at all that Mr Chi paid any monies to the defendant.

  90. [76] Further, while there is evidence that some monies were paid into SIPL’s bank accounts (in the manner that I shall describe later), the account statements do not indicate who was the payee or the source of the monies, and many of the deposits were made after the plaintiffs had decided to pull out of the arrangement by divesting their shares in SIPL to the defendant. The total sums paid in are also far below the US$20m that Mr Chi was supposed to raise and invest in SIPL and Solvesam.

  91. [77] The plaintiffs, in support of their case, point to the following events or communications that took place between February and March 2011:

  92. [78] The plaintiffs point to the above emails and communications in support of their case that the defendant was still keen on the Solvesam project and SIPL in February 2011. In short, the plaintiffs’ case is that the defendant had not given any indication that Mr Chi was not proceeding with his investment or had changed his mind. On the contrary, the impression created was that all was well and that considerable funds would soon be injected into SIPL alongside the projected acquisition of BPI.

  93. [79] According to the plaintiffs, they subsequently discovered that there was no evidence that BPI’s projected revenue for 2011 was US$25m. Further, the plaintiffs point out that there is no evidence to support the defendant’s claim to have provided personal guarantees to the investors under Mr Chi.

  94. The opening of a Hong Kong bank account for SIPL

  95. [80] As mentioned, SIPL was incorporated in Singapore in December 2010, while the Subscription Agreement is said to have been entered into around 24 January 2011. It followed that SIPL needed to open bank accounts soon after 24 January 2011 to receive the investment funds and indeed for business operations.

  96. [81] It will be recalled that Mr Chi was using a fund company, HKFXI, as his vehicle to receive the monies from the investors. By an email dated 11 March 2011, the defendant (through his assistant) informed the plaintiffs that a Hong Kong bank account for SIPL was to be opened with DBS Bank (Hong Kong) Limited (“DBS Hong Kong”) to facilitate the transfer of funds from HKFXI to SIPL. Two directors were required to open the bank account in Hong Kong. The plaintiffs decided that the second plaintiff would open the bank account together with the defendant.

  97. [82] The plaintiffs’ position is that the defendant was in control of SIPL’s bank account in HK. This was in accordance with Mr Chi’s requirement that the defendant should have control and be responsible for the investment monies. It seems that although the bank formally required both directors to be signatories for transactions exceeding HK$50,000, the defendant would be able to operate the account on his own for remote transactions as he had possession of the internet banking token.

  98. [83] The second plaintiff, whilst one of the two authorised signatories, never operated the account. Whilst the second plaintiff had an internet banking token, this only enabled him to access the account for viewing purposes. I note there is some evidence that the second plaintiff might not have received his token from DBS. For example, by email dated 13 May 2011, the second plaintiff requested the defendant’s assistant to provide a copy of the bank statement of SIPL’s DBS Hong Kong account. The statement was needed to apply for a waiver of an office rental in Suzhou. The second plaintiff was, at that time, based in China and since the bank statements were sent to Singapore, he required the assistance of the defendant. It is also clear that the defendant without delay provided copies of the bank statements for the DBS Hong Kong account for April and May 2011 when he was requested to do so. The statements reflected a sum of HK$31,996,200 in the account as at 13 May 2011. There is nothing to suggest that the defendant tried to hide or block the plaintiffs’ access to information on SIPL’s DBS Hong Kong account.

  99. Developments in March 2011

  100. [84] March 2011 was a busy period for the plaintiffs and the defendant. Numerous discussions and communications took place. These largely concerned four main topics: (i) the opening of a bank account for SIPL in Hong Kong to receive the investment funds (as mentioned above); (ii) setting up SIPL’s Suzhou office and the registration and certification of the Solvesam software; (iii) presentations and meetings with the Chinese investors in Singapore; and (iv) the intended acquisition of BPI.

  101. [85] Given the patchy state of the evidence, a time-line for March 2011 based on the plaintiffs’ evidence may be helpful.

  102. (a) 1 March 2011: A test on the Solvesam software was conducted by the Conformance Test Centre for Information Technology Standards. The test summary concluded, inter alia, that the sample competently performed all the functions stated in the Solvesam Enforcement User Manual.

  103. (b) 11 March 2011: The defendant informed the Plaintiffs by email (through his assistant) that he would be travelling to Hong Kong to open an account for SIPL with DBS Hong Kong.

  104. (c) 18 March 2011: The second plaintiff requested the defendant to provide the name of the fund company involved in the fund raising exercise.

  105. (d) 19 March 2011: The defendant informs the plaintiffs by email that the fund company in Hong Kong was known as “Xuang Fong” together with the following points:

  106. (i) The fund company had agreed to transfer US$5m to SIPL in connection with the setting up of a subsidiary in Suzhou.

  107. (ii) DBS Hong Kong had conducted due diligence on the source of funds from Xuang Fong.

  108. (iii) Xuang Fong had agreed to open a DBS Hong Kong account at the same branch to facilitate transfers.

  109. (iv) Xuang Fong would be able to complete full financing in a few months.

  110. (v) An office space in Singapore had been identified for SIPL which would be confirmed if the acquisition of BPI was confirmed.

  111. (vi) That listing by year end should be possible if the acquisition of BPI was successful.

  112. (vii) That 120 investors were coming to Singapore on 29 March 2011 and wished to meet the Plaintiffs.

  113. (e) 22 March 2011: A company called Universal Wide Investment Holdings Limited (“UWI”) was incorporated in Hong Kong with the defendant and his assistant or associate, Mr Chan Boon Wee, as the founding members and directors. UWI is also known as Xuang Fong.

  114. (f) 23 March 2011: The defendant through his assistant, Mr Chan, requested the first plaintiff to speak on the Solvesam software at a seminar on 30 March 2011 before potential investors in Singapore. The first plaintiff responded by expressing surprise as to why he was asked to speak to investors as he thought the plaintiffs were not supposed to be responsible for raising funds. Nevertheless the first plaintiff spoke at the seminar on Solvesam software.

  115. (g) 23 March 2011: The defendant by email raised the need to hold discussions on the paid-up capital for a Chinese subsidiary in Suzhou.

  116. (h) 24 March 2011: The second plaintiff by email informed the first plaintiff and the defendant of Microsoft China’s urgent demand that the Solvesam product be made available for sale in China. Other points raised by the second plaintiff included the following.

  117. (i) Tecbiz had been registered as the owner of copyright in the Solvesam software.

  118. (ii) Potential activities in April included presentations to various Chinese governmental and judicial bodies as well as registration of Solvesam as a product for marketing and sale in China.

  119. (iii) While some local clients such as Microsoft China were expecting local sales by April 2011, the second plaintiff’s impression was that the earliest that the SIPL subsidiary could be registered was April 2011 with completion possibly in June 2011. For this reason, the second plaintiff had revived contacts with some potential resellers who would “import” Solvesam into China.

  120. (iv) That DBS Hong Kong had yet to confirm when SIPL’s bank account in Hong Kong would be opened.

  121. (v) That design work would have to commence on a brochure for Solvesam Web (ie, SS V.1.25) for Microsoft.

  122. (i) 24 March 2011: The defendant by email sent the plaintiffs a profile of BPI and its subsidiary, Quantum Consultancy Services Pte Ltd (“Quantum”) together with information about BPI’s auditors and lawyers. The second plaintiff, who was in China, requested for more information on the details of the proposed acquisition, including the percentage share swap, who would be the controlling shareholder after the transaction, the structure of the board of directors and how the deal would affect the understanding reached over the initial allocation of funds.

  123. (j) 31 March 2011: The first plaintiff had a discussion with BPI on the arrangements for the new office premises as well as other details relating to the planned acquisition, such as the corporate structure of SIPL and accounting matters. The first plaintiff’s understanding at this stage was that SIPL would buy out all shareholders in BPI and issue new shares in SIPL to BPI shareholders.

  124. (k) End March 2011: The defendant personally provided the first plaintiff with a cheque for S$200,000. According to the first plaintiff, this was pursuant to a request made by the first plaintiff in February 2011 for an advance on his US$900,000 Founders’ Fees entitlement.

  125. [86] The plaintiffs’ case is that the time-line for March 2011 clearly establishes that the defendant was proceeding on the basis of the Oral Agreement and understanding that they had earlier reached. The email of 19 March 2011 allegedly shows that the defendant was proceeding with fundraising for the Solvesam project for SIPL and that he never raised any issues or doubts over the uniqueness, functionality and prospects for Solvesam software.

  126. [87] Further, the plaintiffs take the point that there would be no need to have discussions on setting up the Suzhou subsidiary if the defendant was already harbouring doubts on the viability of the Solvesam project.

  127. [88] As will be seen, the defendant’s position is quite different. According to the defendant, issues had arisen over the uniqueness and functionality of the Solvesam software and there were doubts over the prospects for SIPL if its success was to be based solely on the Solvesam project. It appears that the defendant’s concern was that it would take some time for the Solvesam project to develop into a fully operational cloud platform. Indeed, in answer to questions from the Court, the first plaintiff agreed that to achieve NASDAQ listing, SIPL would need a finished product that was tried and tested. Further developing the product was one thing; whether it was successful to the public was quite a different matter. The first plaintiff’s estimate was that it would take about two years to develop the product and that their hope was to go for a NASDAQ listing about a year or so thereafter. The defendant therefore took the view that the acquisition of BPI was necessary to improve the prospects for SIPL. Further, once Mr Chi decided to pull out of the planned US$20m investment (because of his concerns over the Solvesam software), the acquisition and development of BPI became the main goal and not just a supporting business for SIPL.

  128. [89] It is clear that during March 2011, the first plaintiff and defendant were moving forward on the acquisition of BPI by SIPL. The second plaintiff, who was in China, was kept aware of the discussions by the first plaintiff. The acquisition of BPI had become a key element in the plan to raise funds for SIPL and the hoped for eventual listing on NASDAQ. Indeed, as mentioned (see [85(d)(v)] above) the defendant informed the plaintiffs that arrangements for office premises in Singapore for SIPL was pegged to the successful acquisition of BPI. While the first plaintiff appeared to have no issue with the planned acquisition BPI, the second plaintiff had requested for more information from time to time (see [85(i)] above).

  129. The first plaintiff sells his Tecbiz shares to the defendant

  130. [90] The shareholding of the plaintiffs and the defendant in Tecbiz at the start of 2011 was still as follows:

  131. (a) The first plaintiff held 45%;

  132. (b) The second plaintiff held 25%; and

  133. (c) The defendant held 30%.

  134. [91] According to the first plaintiff, sometime around March or April 2011, the defendant requested the first plaintiff to sell him 7.5% of Tecbiz shares so that he would appear to be the “boss” of Tecbiz. The first plaintiff agreed and transferred 7.5% of the shares to the defendant for S$200,000. The defendant now owned 37.5% of Tecbiz, while the first and second plaintiffs owned 37.5% and 25% respectively.

  135. [92] I pause to note that while the first plaintiff claims that he sold the shares to the defendant for S$200,000 the documentation on the share transfer (including documents relating to the payment of stamp duty) states the consideration as being S$100,000. The first plaintiff was unable to offer a satisfactory explanation for this discrepancy, save to offer that he must have failed to notice the error in the transfer documents on the sale price. As will be seen, the defendant’s case is that the correct sale price was indeed S$100,000 which was paid to the first plaintiff in cash. The defendant’s position is that a separate S$200,000 cheque payment made out by him to the first plaintiff was nothing more than a loan to the first plaintiff. The relevance of this point to the defendant’s counterclaim will become clearer shortly.

  136. Acquisition of BPI

  137. [93] Evidence as to when the agreement was struck between SIPL and BPI is somewhat unclear. By April 2011, the business plan for SIPL had changed, by which I mean that the original plan to raise funds ofUS$20m to develop the Solvesam software and to achieve a listing of SIPL on NASDAQ had morphed into a business model wherein the acquisition of BPI was going to play a key part. The plan now was for SIPL to buy over BPI’s assets and business in exchange for shares in SIPL. Discussions and communications took place between the plaintiffs and the defendant on a draft Business Transfer Agreement (“BTA”) with the plaintiffs expressing concerns that the terms were too favourable for BPI.

  138. [94] Sometime during April 2011, the defendant apparently informed the plaintiffs that he had already signed a BTA on behalf of SIPL. The plaintiffs were unhappy with the terms and requested negotiations for a supplemental agreement. The defendant carried out negotiations for a supplemental agreement in May 2011. During this time, the plaintiffs met BPI staff including members of BPI’s technical team.

  139. [95] It seems that two meetings took place during which there were discussions of Solvesam’s functionality and capabilities. A planned demonstration of the existing Solvesam software at the first meeting apparently did not take place because of technical issues.

  140. [96] The second meeting (attended only by the second plaintiff) on 20 May 2011 is described as being “useful” and “positive” with an idea discussed to research development of an Appstore hardware box. Apparently, this feature would assist in reaching the goal of SS V3.

  141. [97] The second plaintiff states that while BPI staff raised the point that features that SIPL intended to develop for Solvesam were available in the US market, the second plaintiff took this as a positive sign that SIPL was developing the product in the right direction. According to the second plaintiff, the goal was to develop Solvesam with minimal resources and as quickly as possible so that by marketing the next version of Solvesam in China, they would be one of the first to introduce those features to the Chinese market.

  142. [98] The plaintiffs’ general point, once again, is that there would be no reason for BPI to hold technical discussions with the plaintiffs in May 2011 if SIPL had already decided to abandon the Solvesam project.

  143. [99] The negotiations for a supplemental agreement were, however, apparently unsuccessful. The supplemental agreement was never signed. What was left was the BTA entered into by the defendant on behalf of SIPL.

  144. [100] In early June 2011, the plaintiffs assert that they reached an agreement with the defendant on how the shares of SIPL were to be allocated between the plaintiffs and the defendant post-acquisition of BPI’s business. The points of this agreement are as follows.

  145. (a) The plaintiffs and the defendant would collectively hold 51% shares in SIPL. The remainder of the shares would be held by the investors sourced by Mr Chi as per the Subscription Agreement.

  146. (b) BPI would hold 15% of the 51% shares of the plaintiffs and defendant.

  147. (c) The first and second plaintiffs would each hold 10.33% of the shares in SIPL. The defendant would hold 15.33% of the shares in SIPL so that he retained control, as per the wishes of Mr Chi.

  148. (d) Since the plaintiffs each held 33.33% shares in SIPL at the time, they would each transfer 23% of the shares (690 shares each) to the defendant for transfer to BPI, Mr Chi and the investors. The end result was that the plaintiffs each had a 10.33% share in SIPL.

  149. [101] On 6 June 2011, the plaintiffs signed the SIPL directors’ resolution and instruments of transfer, transferring 690 shares each to the defendant. The plaintiffs assert that the defendant continued to represent that they would be paid the Founders’ Fees of US$900,000 each (less S$200,000 for the first plaintiff, as he claims to have received this sum by way of an advance).

  150. [102] Further, around 3 June 2011, the second plaintiff requested DBS Hong Kong to provide a reference letter in respect of SIPL’s account for the purposes of registering Solvesam International (Suzhou) Co Ltd as a subsidiary for SIPL. The reference letter which was provided around 9 June 2011 stated that the bank balance as at 8 June 2011 was an “eight-figure” sum in Hong Kong dollars.

  151. Requests by the plaintiffs for payment of the Founders’ Fees

  152. [103] The plaintiffs’ case is that between May and June 2011, they raised the issue of the payment of Founders’ Fees with the Defendant on two occasions: First, in early May 2011 at a café in Siglap; and secondly, sometime around 20 June 2011 at the St Regis hotel in Singapore. There is, however, no contemporaneous documentary evidence of these discussions.

  153. [104] The plaintiffs’ evidence is that the defendant did not reject or deny that they were entitled to Founders’ Fees. Instead, the defendant is alleged to have essentially adopted stalling tactics by insisting he was too busy to physically attend at SIPL’s bank in Hong Kong to arrange for the payments to be made.

  154. Circumstances leading to the plaintiffs’ withdrawal from SIPL

  155. [105] On 29 June 2011, Tecbiz received an email from a Mr Hu concerning Solvesam and Tecbiz (“the Hu Email”). The first plaintiff was concerned as the email set out false or incorrect statements including:

  156. (a) That Solvesam was being used by the Singapore Government and government-linked agencies including the Police and a “government airline”.

  157. (b) Microsoft had provided 50,000 user accounts for a clinical trial of Solvesam (whereas in truth Microsoft had only provided 500 user accounts).

  158. (c) Solvesam had the capability of revealing the browsing history of users and whether, when and where the user’s account had been hacked.

  159. (d) Microsoft had proposed a purchase price of US$80m for Solvesam.

  160. (e) SIPL had applied for 3 patents.

  161. [106] The plaintiffs were also concerned because the Hu Email stated that Xuang Fong was the source of the following falsehoods: (a) Tecbiz (not SIPL) was raising funds for the Solvesam project; and (b) Tecbiz (not SIPL) would eventually be listed on NASDAQ. The plaintiffs were also worried that the falsehoods might damage the relationship with Microsoft China.

  162. [107] The plaintiffs’ fears worsened after the first plaintiff investigated the source of the falsehoods on 29 June 2011 only to discover a blog-post hosted on a Chinese website, http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_779f04da0100q3n9.html, (“the Blog Post”) which also made false or misleading statements similar to those set out in the Hu Email.

  163. [108] The first plaintiff forwarded a Portable Document Format (“PDF”) copy of the Blog Post to the defendant and the second plaintiff and complained in strong language about the falsehoods. The first plaintiff’s view was that the defendant was the source of the falsehoods because the website appeared to be connected with Xuang Fong and also made references to TECM and Hu Bei Min Kang Pharmaceutical Limited, both of which were companies which the defendant was involved. The defendant took the position that he had nothing to do with the falsehoods.

  164. [109] On 30 June 2011, the first plaintiff replied to sender of the Hu Email, stating, inter alia, that Tecbiz was an independent company which had no connections with Xuang Fong/UWI. The first plaintiff also stated that certain stakeholders in Tecbiz had explored the possibility of collaborating with UWI to develop Solvesam through SIPL but that “nothing has been finalised”. The first plaintiff’s email also set out a list of statements made in the Hu Email which were objected to as being inaccurate.

  165. [110] The plaintiffs say the Hu Email and the Blog Post caused them to lose trust in the defendant. Despite the defendant’s denials, the plaintiffs took the view that only someone with knowledge of Tecbiz and the Solvesam project would be able to post such falsehoods or half-truths. For example, one of the false or misleading statements was that Solvesam had the capability of revealing the browsing history of users. This was not true. While Solvesam had the ability to determine if the user was using pirated software and to identify the IP address of the user, it could not discover the browsing history of the user. Further, while Microsoft had recommended the Solvesam software on its website and recommended the software to the Intellectual Property Office of China, there was no Microsoft proposal to purchase Solvesam, let alone one for US$80m.

  166. [111] The plaintiffs argue that by virtue of the defendant’s alleged dissemination of the falsehoods, he was in repudiatory breach of the understanding and Oral Agreement between the parties that (i) the funds would be raised in the name of SIPL with no link back to Tecbiz; and (ii) SIPL would be eventually listed on NASDAQ. In my view, while the online falsehoods were understandably irritating and worrying to the plaintiffs, it is hard to see how they meant that the defendant was acting in breach of his undertaking or agreement to raise funds with no link back to Tecbiz.

  167. [112] The point has been made already that Solvesam did originate from Tecbiz. It was Tecbiz which had an established business and reputation in the market. The plaintiffs wanted to ensure that the core forensic IT business of Tecbiz remained intact and with Tecbiz, and to isolate Tecbiz from the consequences of any legal issues or problems at SIPL. To be sure, a statement that Tecbiz would be listed on NASDAQ and would head the Solvesam project (or words to that effect) would need to be corrected – lest investors were misled. But given the long relationship between the plaintiffs and defendant and all the facts and circumstances, the plaintiffs appear to have been very quick to draw the conclusion that the defendant had no intention to use SIPL as the Project Company for the development of Solvesam and the eventual NASDAQ listing.

  168. [113] The plaintiffs say that by around the end of June 2011 they had come to the conclusion that the defendant never intended to act on the representations that he had made to the plaintiffs in late 2010 or early 2011 that he would raise funds for the Solvesam project in SIPL’s name and not Tecbiz’s; and that he would list SIPL on NASDAQ. They concluded that the defendant was simply making use of their names and the Solvesam project to “raise funds” and to “subsequently siphon the [f]unds to line his own pockets”. That is a serious charge: it is an allegation that the defendant was acting fraudulently from the outset.

  169. Discovery of more online falsehoods

  170. [114] The plaintiffs say that in early July 2011 they discovered other websites which had published other half-truths and falsehoods which they believe to have been attributable to the defendant. In brief, these were:

  171. (a) A website hosted at www.pe668.com containing similar half-truths to that contained in the Blog Post.

  172. (b) Another website hosted at www.xiangmantang.com falsely stating that Tecbiz was aiming for a NASDAQ listing in 2012 and that UWI/Xuang Fong had been appointed to develop Tecbiz’s initial offerings project.

  173. (c) Telephone conversations between the plaintiffs and a Mr Wang who claimed to represent “Xi An Yongze Network and Technology” which was apparently interested in a partnership with Tecbiz and who was allegedly referred to the plaintiffs by UWI/Xuang Fong.

  174. (d) A website that appeared to be the website of UWI/Xuang Fong which stated the defendant was the Chairman of UWI/Xuang Fong and Mr Chan was the director. The website also referred to TECM as a company listed on NASDAQ.

  175. The plaintiffs resign and withdraw from SIPL

  176. [115] In summary, the plaintiffs say that by end June and early July 2011, there was a good deal of confusion over what was happening. Microsoft China was keen on the Solvesam software being launched and made available to its customers and users. The plaintiffs were concerned that the half-truths and confusion would hurt the relationship with Microsoft China. In fact, the plaintiffs say that they were by then convinced that the defendant never intended to use SIPL to develop Solvesam and was simply stringing them along in an elaborate scam.

  177. [116] It will be recalled the first plaintiff had more direct contact and discussions with the defendant on SIPL, BPI and the Solvesam project. Indeed, it is clear that the second plaintiff on several occasions asked the first plaintiff and defendant for more information so that he could better understand what was the state of the arrangements.

  178. [117] By 1 July 2011, the second plaintiff had decided that he wanted to withdraw from SIPL. On that date, the second plaintiff, by email to the defendant (copying the first plaintiff) sent in his notice of resignation and indicated his total withdrawal from “the Solvesam company including the Singapore and Suzhou companies under Solvesam”. In resigning, the second plaintiff referred to (amongst other things) his dissatisfaction over the lack of progress in meetings and his recent discoveries of the online falsehoods. He also stated that “the business approach and work” did not suit him and that he wanted to be removed immediately as shareholder and director of SIPL. The second plaintiff also asked for details on those who would be assigned to take over his duties so that he could make preparations to hand over the preparatory work and provide them with the necessary information. This included information on the progress of the setting up of the Suzhou office for SIPL and the approval to register SIPL Suzhou’s Chinese name.

  179. [118] The second plaintiff’s resignation took place amidst the plaintiffs’ discovery of the various online falsehoods summarised in the previous section. The first plaintiff’s position is that sometime around 3 or 4 July 2011, he and the defendant had a heated discussion during which the defendant denied publishing the false information and claimed that he was carrying out his own investigations on who was responsible. The defendant, however, refused to publish corrections on the Tecbiz website until his own investigations were completed. When the question of resignation cropped up, the first plaintiff’s position was that if the plaintiffs did resign then (i) the plaintiffs’ shares in SIPL would be sold to the defendant; (ii) the Solvesam project could no longer be carried out by SIPL; (iii) SIPL should change its name by removing the word Solvesam; and (iv) that Tecbiz and Solvesam logos as well as images of the plaintiffs were to be taken out of the defendant’s presentation materials and websites.

  180. [119] I pause to note that the intellectual property rights in the Solvesam software still belonged to Tecbiz. The plaintiffs’ position (which the defendant agrees with) was that when they resigned from SIPL, the understanding or agreement reached with the defendant on fundraising and the Solvesam project in late 2010 or early 2011 was over. The plaintiffs had worked hard to develop Tecbiz and the Solvesam software and upon their resignation, SIPL and its Suzhou subsidiary would have no part or interest in the Solvesam software.

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