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Grounds publishedDecided 9 Nov 2018

High Court

Public Prosecutor v BNO

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[2018] SGHC 243Case no. Criminal Case No 68 of 2017

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] BNO (“the Accused”), claimed trial to the following three charges (“the Charges”):

  3. [2] The Victim was a nine-year-old boy. He was the schoolmate of the Accused’s youngest son (“E”) at the material time. The Prosecution’s case was that the Accused had outraged the modesty of the Victim by touching the Victim’s penis before causing the Victim’s penis to penetrate the Accused’s mouth, without the Victim’s consent, on two separate occasions on the night in question. On the first occasion, the Accused caused the Victim’s penis to penetrate his mouth two times. On the second, the Accused caused the Victim’s penis to penetrate his mouth once. Both occasions took place in the bedroom of the Accused’s youngest son during a sleepover.

  4. The Prosecution’s case

  5. [3] The Prosecution tendered evidence from a total of 18 witnesses, with the key witness being the Victim. The Prosecution sought to corroborate his evidence with that of his parents, his teacher (“JR”) and his counsellor (“CF”) from his school, a senior consultant forensic scientist from the Health Sciences Authority (“HSA”) (Peter Douglas Wilson) and an Emeritus Consultant from the Department of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry of the Child Guidance Clinic of the Institute of Mental Health (Dr Cai Yiming).

  6. The Victim’s evidence

  7. The Victim’s acquaintance with E’s family

  8. [4] The Victim and E were classmates from August 2014 to June 2015. According to the Victim, they were “really good friends” and they remained as friends even though they went to different classes after June 2015. The Victim first met the Accused either in school or at the Accused’s residence, and he found the Accused to be “a nice, funny, trustworthy person”. The Victim first met the Accused’s wife (“AW”) when he was either in kindergarten or in first grade. AW worked in the cafeteria at the Victim’s school. The Victim found AW to be “nice”.

  9. Events prior to 31 October 2015

  10. [5] The Victim had been to the Accused’s residence for playdates with E about four or five times, including the last occasion on 31 October 2015. Three of these occasions were sleepovers, the first of which took place in May and the other two in October 2015, and one was an after-school playdate on 30 October 2015. He thought that the playdate on 30 October 2015 was “enjoyable and fun”, and he “really enjoyed” the sleepovers at the Accused’s residence “because [E would invite] some of [their] other friends and also [the Accused] would play with [them] and [they] played with Nerf guns”.

  11. [6] During the first sleepover, the Victim was invited to celebrate E’s birthday and he slept in the living room of the Accused’s house with E and his friends. The second sleepover was sometime in early October 2015. E had also invited two other friends, BE and RF, for this sleepover. After dinner, the Accused told the Victim to take a shower. The Victim felt surprised as the Accused went into the bathroom while he was naked in the shower and said something along the lines of “[h]ere’s the soap”. The Accused also told him “not to wear underwear” before going to sleep “as it [would let his] body breathe” either when he was taking the shower or just before. The Victim did as he was told. Subsequently, after playing and watching television, the Accused told E, BE, RF and the Victim that he had a scary story to tell them, and told them to go to the upper bunk of the bunk bed in E’s older brother’s (“R”) room. After they climbed up, the Accused switched off the lights, closed the door and also went up to the upper bunk. He sat cross-legged and told the Victim to sit on his lap while he told the scary story. Thereafter, all of them played the word game known as Mad Libs. The Victim informed his father (“B’) after the second sleepover that the Accused got him to sit on his lap. B told him right away that it was “not correct” for someone to ask the Victim to sit on his lap. B gave a similar account when he testified.

  12. Events on 31 October 2015

  13. [9] At about 10.30pm, the Accused told E and the Victim to go to bed. The Victim slept on the upper bunk of E’s bunk bed (“the bunk bed”) while E slept on the lower deck. The bunk bed was positioned against the wall of the room. The Accused then left the room, leaving the door to E’s room slightly ajar. The Victim talked to E for a short while before E stopped responding. The Victim inferred that E was tired and wanted to sleep. E fell asleep soon. As the room felt warm, the Victim was unable to fall asleep. He called E’s name three times but there was no response.

  14. [10] At or about 11.15pm on the same day, the Victim saw a dark figure entering the bedroom. The Victim estimated the time to be around 11.15pm because he had checked his watch approximately 10 or 15 minutes before and he saw that it was 11.00pm or 11.05pm. He saw that the figure was wearing a pair of spectacles and had short hair resembling the Accused. The light from the hallway allowed him to see that it was indeed the Accused when the door opened wider. The Accused entered the room and then closed the door, leaving it ajar with light coming in from the hallway. The Victim stated in his Conditioned Statement (“CS”) that he was then lying on the bed with his back facing the ceiling. He clarified when testifying in court that he was lying on the bed with his head near the ladder. He was lying sideways with his chest facing the wall, but with his head facing up and tilted slightly to the left and his face aligned with the ladder. His left shoulder blade and his rib cage were facing the ceiling. His body was closer to the wall than to the outer edge of the bed.

  15. [11] The Victim feigned sleep out of respect for the Accused’s earlier instruction for him to sleep. Nevertheless, he opened his eyes a little to see what was going on. The Accused then stepped onto the lower deck of the bunk bed on which E was sleeping and the Victim heard a very soft “crack” sound. The Accused was standing towards the end of the bed away from the ladder. The Victim saw his face above the railing of the upper bunk and observed him to be checking on whether E and the Victim were asleep by looking up and down. According to the Victim, the mattress of the upper bunk reached approximately the Accused’s upper chest. The Accused dragged the Victim by his kneecaps, causing his whole body to move closer to the railing of the bunk bed. The Accused then spread the Victim’s legs. He proceeded to touch the Victim’s penis from outside his shorts by moving one finger around his penis in a circular motion for a few seconds. The Victim tried to move closer to the wall hoping that the Accused would stop but he was not able to do so because the Accused held his kneecap “pretty tightly”.

  16. [12] Thereafter, the Accused pulled the Victim’s shorts down to his thighs and exposed the Victim’s penis. The Accused then touched the Victim’s exposed penis with his finger (subject of the first charge). The Victim testified that he was “shocked” and felt “frightened of what he [was] going to do next”. The Accused subsequently left E’s room and the bedroom door was left ajar. The Victim did not pull up his shorts because he did not want the Accused to know that he was awake earlier on should the Accused return.

  17. [13] About a minute later, the Accused did return. Once again, he stepped onto the lower deck of the bunk bed and stood on it. The Accused leaned forward and bent his neck over the Victim’s groin area. He closed his mouth around the Victim’s exposed penis. According the Victim, it was “like he was going to eat something” and he did so for a few seconds (subject of the second charge). The Accused stopped momentarily and repeated the same action. He then left E’s room for a short while before returning to place his mouth around the Victim’s penis in the same manner again (subject of the third charge). He then pulled up the Victim’s shorts and left the room. The Victim was “really shocked” by what the Accused did. All this time, the Victim’s face was in the same position.

  18. [14] The Victim decided that he did not want to stay at the Accused’s residence any longer and climbed down the bunk bed. He “wanted to go to a safe place straightaway”. He checked on E and found that E was lying close to the wall and facing the wall. He knelt on the mattress and tapped E on the shoulder three times. E did not respond, so he whispered E’s name but there was again no response. After he packed his belongings inside E’s room, he proceeded to the Accused’s bedroom on the second floor of the residence with the intention of telling him that he wanted to go home because he was not feeling well. There, he saw the Accused lying on the bed using his laptop on his knees. He informed the Accused that he wished to call his father (B) to send him home because he had a headache and a stomach ache. The Accused told him that it might be migraine. AW then came out of the attached bathroom and said that it might be too late to contact B. The Victim nonetheless insisted on calling him. AW then passed their home telephone to the Victim who called B and told him in French to pick him up. The Victim went to retrieve his belongings from E’s room where E was still sleeping in the same position. Thereafter, the Victim went downstairs to the first floor with the Accused and AW to wait for B to arrive.

  19. [15] I flesh out the reactions of the Victim upon B’s arrival in greater detail at [106] to [109]. It will suffice to note at this point that when B arrived shortly after, B reminded the Victim to watch his manners and thank his hosts. The Victim gave the Accused a high five and got into B’s car. Once in the car, he told B what had happened to him. B confronted the Accused and his wife. The Accused flatly denied the Victim’s allegations. B and the Victim then left to return home.

  20. Events subsequent to 31 October 2015

  21. [16] The Victim stated that he stopped being friends with E because E stopped talking to him on 2 November 2015, which was the Monday after the incident.

  22. [17] The Victim did not speak to his parents about what had happened on the night of 31 October 2015 after that night because it was “a sensitive topic” and he preferred not to talk about it.

  23. Evidence of the Victim’s father (B)

  24. [18] B first received a text message from AW on the night of 31 October 2015 regarding the Victim. B replied by a text message to ask AW to tell the Victim to call him. Over the phone, the Victim told B to come and pick him up fast. Sensing that something was wrong, B immediately drove to the Accused’s residence.

  25. [19] When B arrived at the Accused’s residence, he found that the Victim did not look normal and was eager to leave. B recalled that he had asked the Victim to say goodbye to the Accused before leaving, but did not recall how the Victim did this. Once outside, he recalled that the Victim “just disappeared” and “swiftly went into the car”. In the car, the Victim asked B to promise that he would not disclose what he was about to hear to anyone and the Victim then told him what the Accused had done in E’s bedroom. B was shocked and alighted from the car to confront the Accused. At this time, the Victim was crouched on the floorboard of the backseat of the car.

  26. [20] When B confronted the Accused, the Accused claimed that B’s accusations were untrue as he had been in his room using his computer at the material time. Although angry, B left the Accused’s residence to tend to the Victim who was “scared” and “hiding” in the car. Subsequently, B called his wife (“C”), who was in New York at that time, to inform her of what had happened. B later contacted CF, the counsellor from the Victim’s school, and informed him of what had happened. On 2 November 2015, B lodged a police report in relation to the incident at the Accused’s residence.

  27. Evidence of the Victim’s mother (C)

  28. [21] On 31 October 2015 at noon, New York time, C received a call from B and was shocked to hear that E’s father had touched the Victim’s penis and put the Victim’s penis in his mouth. B informed her that he had been watching rugby at home when the Victim called and “insisted” to be picked up from E’s house. She also gathered that when B reached the Accused’s residence, he observed that the Victim was “not his usual cheerful self”. The Victim went straight to the rear seat of the car, and told B what happened as he was about to drive off. B then went to confront the Accused and the Accused did not say much, but AW intervened. B then drove the Victim home and upon reaching home, the Victim asked to take a shower.

  29. [22] The following day, C emailed the Victim’s teacher (JR) to seek help as to what to do. JR suggested speaking to the school counsellor CF. B spoke to CF and the latter suggested lodging a police report. B informed C that he did so.

  30. Evidence of the Victim’s teacher (JR) and counsellor (CF)

  31. [23] JR corroborated that C did call her on 1 November 2015 and informed her that the Victim had been molested at a sleepover at a friend’s house the previous night. JR stated that C was in shock, and she told C that she would call the Victim’s school counsellor, CF, as quickly as she could, and assured C that the school would do everything to help.

  32. [24] JR recounted that the next day, she and CF met the Victim. They told the Victim that his parents had informed them about what happened, and assured the Victim that he could speak to them if he needed. JR opined that in the first two weeks following the incident, the Victim seemed “very serious” and “was not smiling for those weeks”; they knew “something was different about him because he looked very preoccupied” and there were “times where [the Victim] was so needy that he insisted on seeing [CF] right away”. On those occasions, the Victim “appeared agitated and as though there was something he needed to share with [CF]”.

  33. [25] CF confirmed that JR had told him what had happened to the Victim. He then received a call from B on the night of 1 November 2015, who informed him about what had happened to the Victim. B told him that after picking the Victim up, the Victim’s first words were something to the effect of “[he was] never sleeping here again” or “[he did not] want to sleep there again”.

  34. [26] CF recounted that B had told him that he had tried contacting staff from the Victim’s school because he was lost as to what he should do. CF then informed the principal of the school. The next day, on 1 November 2015, CF met the Victim with JR, and he recalled that the Victim “looked very tentative and nervous”. The Victim wanted to tell two of his friends what had happened, but CF counselled him not to. CF was advised by an officer from the Ministry of Social and Family Development (“MSF”) that the case should be reported to the police, and CF conveyed this to B. CF added that later that afternoon, the Victim approached him and told him that he was nervous about talking to the police. The Victim also kept asking if the Accused had done what he did to the Victim to other kids. Subsequently, the police contacted the school and came down to speak to some of the parents and the students. The Victim also told his two friends what had happened, in CF’s presence.

  35. [27] CF reported that the Victim raised a lot of questions such as “why [him]” and “why did [the Accused] choose [him]”, and was fearful that the Accused would retaliate and go over to his house at night. The Victim had a very obvious fear that the Accused was “watching him and waiting to have revenge”. He also expressed that he looked forward to leaving Singapore during summer break and felt “frustrated” at the number of times he had to recount the events. C also recounted the Victim having said similar things to her.

  36. Expert evidence

  37. [28] The Prosecution produced a report from Peter Douglas Wilson (“Wilson”) from the HSA, who conducted experiments on whether E’s bed could support the different combinations of weights resultant from the alleged actions, and sound experiments on the level of noise produced during the alleged offences. The Prosecution also sent the Accused’s laptop to the Technology Crime Forensic Branch (“TCFB”) for analysis. Sixty-seven obscene images (“the obscene images”) were found in the laptop. Activity logs were found on the laptop as stated in Annex A, B and D of the report by TCFB (“the TCFB report”).

  38. The Defence’s case

  39. [29] The Accused’s defence was a complete denial of what the Victim claimed had happened in E’s room.

  40. The Accused’s evidence

  41. [30] The Accused agreed that the three sleepovers did take place at his residence. During the first sleepover, the Victim, E and two other boys played with Nerf guns and light sabers while he was sitting on the ground floor doing his work. Occasionally, E would ask him to join the games. All he did was to hold the Nerf guns while seated on the sofa to shoot bullets at the boys. During the second sleepover, the Accused denied ever going up to the upper bunk of any bed, telling the boys a scary story and having the Victim sit on his lap. He also denied asking the Victim to take a shower, and denied that there was any practice of his sons sleeping without underwear.

  42. [31] AW had invited the Victim and two other boys for a sleepover on 30 October 2015, but due to conflicts in scheduling, C asked if the Victim could stay over at the Accused’s residence for a sleepover on 31 October 2015, Halloween night, instead. AW agreed. On 31 October 2015, the Victim, E and two other boys went trick-or-treating in the neighbourhood around the Accused’s residence, and came back to the Accused’s residence at about 9.30pm. At 10.11pm, the Victim and E were counting the number of sweets that they had collected, and this was evidenced by a photograph taken in E’s room with a time stamp of 10.11pm. At 10.13pm, the Accused sent the photograph and a text message stating the number of sweets the Victim and E had collected to B. According to the Accused, he went down to the ground floor after that and relaxed on the sofa. Thereafter, E and the Victim asked him to play Mad Libs with them. The Accused told them he was too tired but E pleaded with him to go up to his room in eight minutes, seeing that the StarHub cable box placed at the landing of the staircase showed the time as 10.32pm.

  43. [32] The Accused testified that he went up to E’s room at about 10.50pm. When he reached the room, E was already on the lower bunk bed and the Victim was on the upper bunk bed. During the game of Mad Libs, the Accused remembered the Victim yelling out “penis” and “sexy” “very clearly and loudly” every time. The game lasted for about two to four minutes. The Accused then switched off the lights and left. He closed the door to E’s bedroom fully when he left. He could still hear E and the Victim giggling inside the room. According to the Accused, he did not ask the Victim whether he was a light or heavy sleeper.

  44. [33] Subsequently, the Accused went to the ground floor and saw four boys still playing PlayStation games. He remembered that at exactly 10.58pm, the boys reminded one of them that he had two minutes to get home before he got into trouble with his parents. That boy went home, and the rest of the boys went up at about 11.10pm. The Accused followed them up. The Accused’s eldest son (“S”) went to his own bedroom on the second level, and AW picked up spare toothbrushes from the master bedroom for R’s two friends who decided to sleepover. Eventually R, his two friends, the Accused and AW were all on the third floor. The Accused sat on the edge of R’s lower bunk bed and the boys started bouncing balls in the basketball hoop area in the hallway outside R’s room while taking turns to use the bathroom. AW was tidying up the hallway. R’s bedroom was across the hallway from E’s room. Eventually, the boys went to R’s room and closed the door. The Accused could still hear them laughing and talking in the room. The Accused testified that he went down to S’s room on the second floor but AW stayed on the third floor to continue tidying up. After speaking to S for a short while, he crossed the hallway to his own room just as AW was coming down the stairs from the third floor. Both of them proceeded to their bedroom, and the Accused laid down on the bed to use his laptop. The Accused said that this was at 11.21pm since the TCFB report stated that his laptop resumed from “suspend” mode at 11.21pm.

  45. [34] According to the Accused, he heard a soft knock on the door after that, and the Victim walked in. The Victim requested to call B because he had a stomach ache and a headache. While AW helped the Victim to call B, the Accused offered to get some water for him. He went down to the ground floor, and the Victim followed him down voluntarily. On the ground floor, the Accused handed the Victim a glass of water and the Victim drank it. They did not “really talk”. The Victim then went back up to the master bedroom and the Accused followed him. The Accused testified that the Victim appeared “totally calm” and “very friendly”. Thereafter, the Victim called B and spoke to him in French. The Accused, AW and the Victim then proceeded to the ground floor to wait for B.

  46. [35] The Accused recounted that the Victim was “actually quite talkative” and “actually asked if he could come over for another sleepover” while waiting for B to arrive. The Victim also described his symptoms in more detail to the Accused and AW, and told them that his younger brother was ill. After a while, B arrived. B thanked the Accused and AW and was apologetic for causing them to stay up late. The Victim also thanked the Accused and AW for hosting him, and gave the Accused a high five before they left.

  47. [36] About three or four minutes later, the Accused saw B’s car coming back to his residence. The Accused opened the front door and B got out of his car. B reported that the Victim said that the Accused had touched his private parts. The Accused was shocked. B requested to see AW, and later repeated the Victim’s allegations to AW. AW then asked to speak to the Victim. B opened the backdoor of the car and they saw the Victim on the floorboard behind the driver’s seat. B asked the Victim to repeat what he had said and told him that he was there to protect him, but the Victim did not say anything. AW was also asking the Victim what had happened. The Accused testified that he was getting “a little bit angry” and told the Victim that he “must [have been] dreaming or imagining or something”. The Accused said that what was alleged did not happen, and the Victim “actually nodded”. The Accused recalled that the Victim “seemed embarrassed” and “looked to be more scared of his father than anybody else”. He “seemed terrified of his father”, and was not crying.

  48. [37] The Accused denied all the allegations made by the Victim. He stated that E always slept on the outer edge of the lower bunk bed because he always felt that the upper bunk bed was going to collapse on him and because he got a better draft from the air-conditioning if he slept on the outer edge.

  49. The Accused’s spinal injury

  50. [38] A substantial ground of the Defence was that it was highly improbable that the Accused had committed the alleged offences on account of the spinal injury that he had been suffering from since 2011 when he fell off an elephant while holidaying in Thailand. Dr Yegappan Muthukaruppan (“Dr Yegappan”), who had been treating the Accused since March 2011, testified that the Accused had nerve impingements at his lower back and neck and that his condition had been getting progressively worse. The Accused had been prescribed a brace, strong painkillers and a nerve stabiliser for his spinal injury, and had discussed the option of undergoing spinal fusion surgery although it was decided that the surgery should be postponed. Dr Yegappan testified that stepping up onto the mattress of the lower bed from the floor, which was about 57cm above the floor, would have caused the Accused “quite a lot of pain”. It was “highly unlikely” for the Accused to have leaned over the upper bunk and brought his mouth down over the penis of someone lying on the mattress and it would have caused him “moderate to severe pain”. If the person lying on the mattress was lying on his side with his body facing the wall, it would have “even more unlikely” for the Accused to have put his mouth over the person’s penis. It was highly improbable for the Accused to have dragged a person who weighed about 27.6kg for about 40 to 50cm across the mattress. This would have caused the Accused “moderate to severe back pain”. Running would also have been very unlikely for the Accused, given his condition.

  51. [39] Dr Yegappan also opined that the Accused had not overstated the severity of his condition in the three letters he had sent to Dr Yegappan in 2012, stating inter alia that he could not sit in one position for long, that the pain was getting worse over the past few months, and that he still could not have his children or anything heavy on his lap. Dr Yegappan concluded that while it was nevertheless possible for the Accused to have done the actions alleged by the Prosecution, doing them would have caused him moderate to severe pain.

  52. Evidence of E, R and AW

  53. [40] The accounts of E, R and AW were substantially the same. E testified that during the second sleepover, none of his friends, including the Victim, took a shower. His father did not go up to the upper bunk of any bunk bed, nor did he tell a scary story, nor did he have the Victim sit on his lap. As for the third sleepover, E testified, similarly to the Accused, that he saw the time was 10.32pm when he asked the Accused to play Mad Libs with him and the Victim in eight minutes. After a while, the Accused went up to play Mad Libs and E recalled that the Victim kept shouting “penis” and “sexy” during the game. Thereafter, E stated that his father switched off the lights and left the room. He did not ask the Victim if he was a light or deep sleeper. E testified that after his father left, he talked with the Victim for a while before the Victim started “tossing and turning” as if he was having a “seizure”. He stood up and checked that the Victim was okay. He saw that the Victim was lying close to the wall and was lying on his stomach, with his head at the headboard end.

  54. [41] E further testified that while in his room, he could hear balls being bounced, the toilet flushing and his mother talking to his brother and his friends. Thereafter, his mother popped her head into his room and then left without saying anything. E recalled the Victim climbing down the ladder and leaving after that. He thought that the Victim was going to the bathroom. The Victim never tapped him nor called out his name. He remembered the clock in his room showing 11.30pm. E then fell asleep. E also added that he was “not really good friends” with the Victim even before the material night.

  55. [42] AW remembered that the time was 10.58pm when one of R’s friends was reminded that he had two minutes to get home. After that boy left at 10.58pm, the rest of the boys went upstairs at about 11.00pm or 11.10pm. Her eldest son (S) went to his room on the second floor, while AW went to get toothbrushes for R’s two friends. Thereafter, on the third floor, R and his two friends, J and N, bounced balls where the basketball hoop was and took turns to use the bathroom. The Accused was sitting on R’s bed while AW was tidying up the hallway on the third floor. After getting R and his two friends to go to bed, the Accused and AW switched off the lights. The Accused went down to S’s room while AW stayed on the third floor to clean up. She then went to check on E and the Victim. She saw that E was still awake, and saw the Victim tossing. The Victim was lying on his stomach, with his face facing the wall. He was close to the wall and his head was at the headboard end (the end furthest away from the ladder). She testified that the door to E’s room was fully closed before she checked on them, and she similarly closed the door when she left. When she went down the stairs, she met the Accused at the hallway of the second floor and both of them then went to the master bedroom. The rest of her testimony was essentially the same as the Accused’s. She reiterated that the Victim’s demeanour when he wanted to contact B to go home was “calm”, and it was “impossible” for a nine-year-old to remain so calm if what he alleged had actually happened to him.

  56. [43] Both E and AW also gave the same evidence as the Accused, that E ordinarily slept on the outer edge of the lower bunk bed because he was afraid of the upper bunk bed collapsing and to get a better draft from the air-conditioning.

  57. [44] R gave evidence that he remembered the time to be 10.58pm when one of his friends had to leave. After proceeding to the third floor, R and his two friends bounced balls at the hallway on the third floor and took turns to use the bathroom. He also testified that after his parents closed the door to his room and switched off the lights, he opened the door to check if anyone was outside and then continued chatting with his friends.

  58. Inconsistencies in the Victim’s testimony

  59. [45] The Defence submitted that there was no corroborating evidence or DNA or fingerprint evidence, and the Victim’s testimony was not credible and did not meet the threshold of being unusually convincing because of numerous inconsistencies in his evidence.

  60. The alleged timings of incidents

  61. [46] The Defence pointed to different timings in the Summary of Facts and the Victim’s conditioned statement as to when Mad Libs was played in E’s bedroom. In his cross-examination, the Victim testified that it was possible that it was about 10.50pm when he played Mad Libs with E and the Accused in E’s room. However, upon his attention being drawn to his conditioned statement, he changed his testimony and stated that he had played Mad Libs before 10.30pm. In the Summary of Facts prepared by Investigation Officer Dave Ng Soon Tien (“IO Ng”) on 2 November 2015, it was stated that the Accused left the bedroom around 9.30pm. In the report produced by Dr Cai Yiming (“Dr Cai”) after interviewing the Victim to determine if he was fit to give evidence in court, it was stated that the Accused entered E’s room at around 11.00pm and not 11.15pm, as claimed by the Victim on the stand. The Defence submitted that the Victim was unable to give any explanation for the inconsistencies.

  62. What happened during each entry by the Accused

  63. [47] The accounts given in the Victim’s conditioned statement and in his oral testimony differed (see [11] above) from the Summary of Facts, which stated that the first entry by the Accused took place at about 9.50pm and that the Accused merely entered and left the room. The Summary of Facts further stated that during the second entry, the Accused touched the Victim’s penis outside his clothes; during the subsequent occasions, the Accused put his mouth around the Victim’s penis once during each re-entry. It was not stated in the Summary of Facts that the Accused had pulled up the Victim’s shorts after the last re-entry. The Victim testified during cross-examination that the Summary of Facts was incorrect. The Defence submitted that the Summary of Facts would have been based on what the Victim said when the alleged accounts were still fresh in his mind.

  64. [48] Reference was again made to the report prepared by Dr Cai which sets out the Victim’s account of the offences. Only two entries into the bedroom appeared to have been recorded. The Victim disagreed with this detail in Dr Cai’s report. But this detail was similar to the version CF provided: his evidence was that the Victim reported only two entries into the bedroom. Furthermore, the text message sent by B to AW the following day after the incident suggested that the Accused had pulled down the Victim’s shorts only on the second entry and not the first entry. The Victim’s explanation for this was that there must have been a misunderstanding between him and B.

  65. The Victim’s sleeping position

  66. [49] The Defence submitted that there was a material change in the Victim’s evidence regarding his sleeping position when the alleged first entry by the Accused took place. In his conditioned statement, the Victim stated that he was sleeping with his back facing the ceiling. This gelled with E’s testimony that he saw the Victim lying close to the wall, and “lying on his belly”. It was also corroborated by AW, who testified that when she checked on them, she saw the Victim lying in the same position as E had described. However, during cross-examination, the Victim explained that he was sleeping with his left shoulder blade and rib cage facing the ceiling; thus, he was lying on his right, with his chest facing the wall.

  67. Other instances showing that the Victim was not credible

  68. [50] Apart from various “improbabilities” in the Victim’s account, some of which I shall address in due course in evaluating the Victim’s testimony (see [101]–[102] below), the Defence pointed to the following instances which showed that the Victim was not credible:

  69. (a) The Victim claimed in his conditioned statement that when the Accused stood on the lower bed, the mattress on the upper bunk was at the level of the Accused’s upper chest. However, as the Reach Experiment conducted by the HSA (exhibit P43) showed, the level of the mattress would only be at the belly button of someone of the Accused’s height.

  70. (b) The Victim testified that he had told his parents upon returning home after the second sleepover that the Accused had entered the bathroom while he was having a shower. However, B and C recalled only being told about this after the incident on 31 October 2015. .

  71. (c) The Victim’s testimony that the Accused got him and two other boys onto the upper bunk in R’s bedroom during the second sleepover was contradicted by the evidence of IO Then Lee Yong (“IO Then”). IO Then testified that he was told that the incident took place in E’s bedroom instead. Moreover, the two boys who were present were not called by the Prosecution to testify.

  72. (d) Although the Victim had been taught by the school counsellor to shout “no” and get away from anyone who was about to touch him inappropriately, he did not follow what he had been taught and instead kept quiet when the alleged incidents occurred.

  73. Possible reasons for the Victim to fabricate the allegations

  74. [51] The Defence offered three possible reasons why the Victim would falsely implicate the Accused. I shall go through them in detail below at [114] to [122]. I summarise these reasons here. First, it was suggested that the Victim was afraid for having disturbed B when B was watching the “live” telecast of the rugby World Cup final that night. Second, it was suggested that the Victim had made up these allegations as a form of attention-seeking behaviour because of his emotional distress at his parents undergoing a divorce. Third, it was suggested that the Victim had been shaken by the Halloween atmosphere that night, and could thus have imagined the sexual assault.

  75. [52] The Defence further suggested that the Victim could have imagined acts of a sexual nature occurring because he had been sexualised at school, for example, by being exposed to discussions about oral sex in the social media group chats among students of his school.

  76. The Victim’s father (B) was not entirely truthful

  77. [53] The Defence submitted that although B was quick to bolster the Victim’s allegations, his evidence revealed inconsistencies with that of other witnesses. For instance, the Victim admitted that he did give a high five to the Accused and had thanked him before leaving the house. However, B testified that he could not recall the Victim giving the Accused a high five nor saying goodbye to the Accused and AW. Another instance related to the Victim’s reaction upon being asked to repeat what he had said to his father to the Accused and AW. The Victim’s account was that he had refused to do so; this was corroborated by the Accused and AW. However, according to B, the Victim responded by pointing to the Accused or saying something along the lines of “he was the one”.

  78. [54] B further testified that he told AW that he was going to report the matter to the police on the night of the incident. This was denied by AW. Subsequently, B testified, to the contrary, that calling the police was not even on his mind at that time because he had to deal with the situation that his son had been sexually abused. He stated that it was only on the following day that he was advised by CF to lodge a police report. He also gave evidence that contradicted the Victim’s testimony in respect of having thrown away the pyjamas he had worn on the night of the incident and having told B so. B testified that he did not know what had happened to the Victim’s pyjamas; he assumed that the pyjamas had been washed, and this was what he told the police. In the light of the inconsistencies, the Defence submitted that B was not entirely truthful.

  79. Explanations for the obscene images

  80. [55] The Accused also objected to the admissibility of the obscene images found in his laptop. In the event, I held that the obscene images were inadmissible. Nevertheless, the Defence sought at length to provide explanations for their existence in the Accused’s laptop. The Accused claimed that the obscene images were “temporary internet files from browsing websites” related to a sexual performance-enhancing drug (“affected research websites”) which he had accessed in the course of his research work at his previous company (“MAP”) or after he left his company when he was working on a case study on the launch of the drug (“P”). The Accused claimed that he had purchased his laptop from MAP when he left, and there was no total reformat of it. To support his allegation that he continued to access such websites after he left MAP, the Accused produced his report titled “A Unique Perspective on the [MAP] Launch of [the drug “P”] – Perspectives as of September 2015” (“the Report”), which he had sent to his company’s headquarters in Italy on 10 January 2016, which was a year after he left MAP. Before the obscene images were ruled to be inadmissible, the Defence called upon its expert witness Chu Yan Ting Frances (“Frances Chu”) to give evidence that reformatting a laptop might not remove all data, and Alessandro Forlin as well as Professor Peter Lim Huat Chye (“Professor Peter Lim”) to give evidence in support of the Accused’s position ie, that affected research websites were accessed to gain insight into the potential homosexual customer base in the process of marketing P.

  81. Prosecution’s application to admit Annex C of P54

  82. [56] I turn now to set out the detailed reasons for my rulings on two applications made in the course of the trial by the Prosecution and the Defence respectively. The first of these was the Prosecution’s application to admit Annex C of P54 as rebuttal evidence. Annex C consisted of the obscene images (67 obscene photographs in total) retrieved from the Accused’s laptop depicting persons, mostly males, engaged in sexual acts. The Prosecution based this application on two grounds: (a) to disprove the Accused’s evidence of good character, ie, that he was only sexually interested in women, pursuant to s 56 of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed); and (b) to rebut the specific argument of the Accused that he was not sexually interested in males.

  83. [57] With regard to the first ground, the Prosecution argued that by testifying on the stand that he was a heterosexual with strong family ethics/Asian values, the Accused had lowered his character shield so his character was liable to being attacked by virtue of s 56 of the Evidence Act. In relation to the second ground, the Prosecution argued that Annex C was relevant to rebutting the Accused’s allegation that he was not sexually interested in males, thus satisfying the criterion of relevance for admission of evidence under s 5 of the Evidence Act. It was also submitted that Annex C satisfied s 14 of the Evidence Act since it would go towards showing the “existence of any state of mind”, the state of mind in the present case being the Accused having homosexual tendencies.

  84. [58] It was only well after the defence was called that counsel challenged the admissibility of Annex C as rebuttal evidence, on the basis that this was not a matter arising ex improviso, ie, a matter which the Prosecution could not have reasonably have foreseen, and that there was no lowering of the Accused’s character shield because evidence regarding his sexuality and family ethics were only adduced through cross-examination by the Prosecution. Defence counsel submitted that Annex C did not arise from anything which the Prosecution could not reasonably have foreseen, and the Prosecution had been in possession of Annex C since the time a forensic examination was conducted on the Accused’s laptop (the forensic report being dated 13 May 2016). Defence counsel also submitted orally that the character of the Accused was not put in issue by him since it was the Prosecution who had led the Accused to testify about his character during his cross-examination.

  85. [59] After hearing the parties’ submissions, I dismissed the Prosecution’s application to adduce Annex C as rebuttal evidence. I opined that character was put in issue, and Annex C might be potentially relevant as a specific rebuttal in relation to the Accused’s assertions of being a family man with strong moral or ethical values. But in any event, I dismissed the application on the basis that the prejudicial effect of its admission might be higher than the probative value. Upon further consideration of the parties’ submissions, I will now elaborate on and clarify my decision to dismiss the application.

  86. [60] The statutory basis for the admission of rebuttal evidence is s 230(1)(t) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) (“CPC”). Section 230(1)(t) gives the Prosecution the right to call a person as a witness or recall a witness for the purpose of rebuttal, and is intended to allow the calling of rebuttal evidence based on the long-standing practice in the courts (Jennifer Marie & Mohamed Faizal Mohamed Abdul Kadir, The Criminal Procedure Code of Singapore (Academy Publishing, 2012) at paras 12.060 and 12.061). The admission of rebuttal evidence is a matter for the court’s discretion, and the threshold for allowing rebuttal evidence for both civil and criminal proceedings has been set out conclusively in Public Prosecutor v Bridges Christopher [1997] 3 SLR(R) 467 at [51] as follows:

  87. [62] The present situation is distinguishable from a case where a defendant seeks to prove his good character; in the latter case, it is likely that the Prosecution would be allowed to adduce rebuttal evidence in reply because the situation is one arising ex improviso, provided that the Prosecution did not foresee the Defence raising the issue. In the present case, the failure to meet the threshold for allowing rebuttal evidence alone is sufficient to dispose of the Prosecution’s application to adduce Annex C. Nevertheless, for completeness, I go on to address the other issues brought up by the Prosecution.

  88. [63] The Prosecution argued that the Accused had testified as to his good disposition or reputation and it could therefore adduce evidence as to his bad character pursuant to s 56 of the Evidence Act. The prohibition of questions as to his bad disposition and character under s 122(4) of the Evidence Act (setting out what is commonly known as the character shield) would therefore not apply. The context however was that the Prosecution had produced a document titled “Selection of … Family Pictures” depicting photographs of the Accused’s family and his annotated descriptions of them being “[a] solid family unit with a very happy, loving, 14-year marriage” with “3 wonderful children loved by their parents and raised with strong family ethics/Asian values” during the cross-examination of the Accused (later admitted into evidence and marked as P55). Upon being questioned by the Prosecution, the Accused stated that he had produced the document and sent it to IO Ng while investigations into this case were ongoing. The Accused explained that his family had “strong ethical values”, and would “always do the right thing, tell the truth”, and that he and his wife are “on top of what [their] kids do”. Unrelated to P55, the Prosecution also cross-examined the Accused as to his sexuality, whereupon he testified that he was heterosexual and had no sexual interest in males. Based on these answers to questions regarding his sexuality and P55 posed by the Prosecution, the Prosecution argued that the Accused had lowered his character shield.

  89. [64] It is unnecessary for me to make any comment as to whether being heterosexual is evidence of a person’s good character or disposition; I will analyse the parties’ submissions in the framework of s 56 because the parties had presented their submissions as such. In any event, the Accused’s evidence of having “strong ethical values” was arguably an assertion of good disposition. I opined that character was put in issue as a result. However, upon further deliberation and analysis, I have come to the position that the Accused’s character shield was not lowered. Although P55 was produced by the Accused and P55 was intended to show that he was a person of good disposition, the Accused did not tender this document to court nor seek to have it admitted. I would not have had sight of this document and would not have known of the Accused’s claim to having strong ethical values had the Prosecution not tendered P55 to court. Similarly, the Accused’s testimony as to his sexuality only arose upon being cross-examined by the Prosecution. None of this testimony was offered by the Accused of his own accord. In such a situation, where the Prosecution has elicited this evidence through cross-examination, it may be said to have forced the Accused’s hand, and thus it could not be said that the Accused had lowered his character shield.

  90. [65] This position is in line with a purposive reading of s 56(1) of the Evidence Act, which sets out the exhaustive scenarios where the Prosecution can call evidence to establish that the accused is a person of bad disposition or reputation. Section 56(1) states:

  91. Sections 56(1)(a) and 56(1)(c) envision active steps being taken by the accused to adduce evidence as to his good character or disposition. Section 56(1)(b) uses the phrase “himself give evidence”, which may encompass giving evidence during cross-examination, but it would be consistent with the other sections to interpret s 56(1)(b) as also requiring an active step initiated by the accused to testify as to his good disposition or reputation. This must be distinguished from a situation where the Accused is simply answering questions from the Prosecution under cross-examination; such a situation is not the same as one where the accused volunteers evidence as to his good disposition or reputation of his own accord. Moreover, a restrictive interpretation of s 56(1)(b) is also warranted because s 56 is an exception to the prohibition of questions as to an accused’s bad disposition and character under s 122(4) of the Evidence Act. It is only where the three scenarios set out in s 56(1) apply that an accused’s character shield is lifted.

  92. [66] As far as I am aware, there is no Singapore authority on this particular issue, ie, whether evidence given by an accused during cross-examination as to his alleged good disposition or reputation in response to questions posed by the Prosecution can be considered a lowering of his character shield. The English case of R v Henry Beecham [1921] 3 KB 464 (“Henry Beecham”) is helpful in this regard. In that case, the defendant in cross-examination was repeatedly asked and pressed to answer the question whether he bought the motor-car in question because it was capable of being driven at high speed and he replied at last that it “did not appeal to [him] for that reason, because [he did] not care for driving at a high rate of speed [himself]”. The Prosecution latched onto this answer and treated it as evidence given by the defendant of his good character as a driver, and sought to question him about his prior driving convictions. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeal held that with regard to the cross-examination, they were “bound to say that [they could not] approve of the manner in which the defendant was led by counsel for the Prosecution to give an answer which in [their] view virtually amounted to putting his character as a driver in issue. If the method by which this defendant was induced to bring his character into question were to be held legitimate, the result would be that practically any defendant might be forced into the same position”. Therefore, the court held that the defendant’s answer did not amount to him giving evidence of his good character within the meaning of s 1(f)(ii) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 (c 36) (UK), a section similar to s 56 of the Evidence Act.

  93. [67] Similarly, in the present case, the Accused was induced to testify as to his strong ethical values and sexual orientation by the Prosecution’s questions and production of P55. Admittedly, it was the Accused who had created P55 with all its attendant annotations in the first place; however, he did not seek to adduce it in court and nothing was mentioned of P55 until the Prosecution adduced it in court. I agree with the court’s holding in Henry Beecham that under such circumstances, it could not be said that the Accused had given evidence tending to establish his good disposition or reputation within the meaning of s 56 of the Evidence Act.

  94. [68] In the circumstances, the Prosecution cannot then rely on their second ground, which was that Annex C ought to be admissible for the purpose of rebutting the specific argument of the Accused that he was not sexually interested in males, to circumvent the prohibition on adducing evidence as to the bad disposition of the Accused after characterising the issue as a matter of character evidence pursuant to s 56 of the Evidence Act.

  95. [69] In any case, even if the Accused’s character shield was lowered and Annex C was admissible as evidence of the Accused’s bad disposition or reputation, or to rebut the specific argument that the Accused was not sexually interested in males, I found that the court should exclude Annex C in the exercise of its judicial discretion because it had greater prejudicial effect than probative value. The existence of this exclusionary discretion of the court was confirmed in Muhammad bin Kadar and another v Public Prosecutor [2011] 3 SLR 1205 (“Kadar”), where the Court of Appeal (at [51] and [53]) approved of the holding in Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239 (“Phyllis Tan”) that the court has a discretion to exclude any evidence that had more prejudicial effect than probative value. Phyllis Tan was in turn based on the first limb set out by Lord Diplock (with whom the other judges agreed) in R v Sang [1980] 1 AC 402 (“Sang”) at 437, ie, that a trial judge in a criminal trial always has a discretion to refuse to admit evidence if in his opinion its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value.

  96. [70] The exclusionary discretion was applied to the admission of accused persons’ statements in Kadar, and it is also equally applicable in the area of character evidence, as in the present case. In fact, the area of character evidence was where the concept of excluding evidence based on its probative value being less than its prejudicial effect first took root, as canvassed by Lord Diplock in Sang at 433. In the present case, the probative value of Annex C was low. Even if the contents of Annex C might be suggestive of the Accused’s homosexual tendencies, they did not necessarily indicate that he must have been sexually attracted to pre-pubescent males. The prejudicial effect outweighed the probative value since the photographs might nevertheless colour the court’s view as to the Accused’s sexual orientation and suggest that he was therefore more predisposed to commit the offences he was charged with. For the above reasons, I therefore refused the Prosecution’s application.

  97. Defence’s Kadar application

  98. [71] I shall now address the application made by the Defence. After the defence was called on 1 Feb 2018, Counsel for the Accused applied for a copy of the Victim’s statement recorded by the Police on 2 November 2015, pursuant to Kadar and s 147 of the Evidence Act. There were two grounds cited for this application: (a) the alleged material discrepancies and contradictions between the Victim’s testimony in court and the Summary of Facts produced by IO Ng, and between IO Ng’s testimony in court and the Victim’s testimony; and (b) the subsequent amendment of the first charge to remove the words “over his shorts” from the charge as originally framed. The alleged discrepancies between the Summary of Facts and the Victim’s testimony have been set out above at [47]. The defence also contended that IO Ng testified that during the second sleepover at the Accused’s residence, the Accused, the Victim and two other children were on the upper deck of the bunk bed in E’s room and not in R’s room.

  99. [72] The Prosecution resisted the application, on the basis that the grounds for disclosing witness’ statements under s 259 of the CPC were not applicable and that there had been no breach of the disclosure obligations set out in Kadar.

  100. [73] After hearing submissions from both parties, I dismissed the Accused’s application for the disclosure of the Victim’s statement recorded on 2 November 2015. It is apposite to emphasise that what was at issue was a disclosure application. The CPC does not prescribe a statutory obligation to disclose unused material (Kadar at [102]). Section 259(1) of the CPC, as cited by the Prosecution, and s 147 of the Evidence Act, as cited by the Defence, govern the admissibility of witnesses’ statements, which is a separate issue from disclosure. The Prosecution’s duty of disclosure is purely rooted in general principles of common law (Kadar at [110]) and the court’s power to enforce this duty arises from the inherent jurisdiction of the court to prevent injustice or an abuse of process (Kadar at [112]).

  101. [74] The court in Kadar has set out the materials that the Prosecution must disclose to the Defence, but these do not include material which is neutral or adverse to the accused. It only includes material that tends to undermine the Prosecution’s case or strengthen the Defence’s case (Kadar at [113]). In relation to the phrase “material … that might reasonably be regarded as credible and relevant”, it refers to material that is prima facie credible and relevant based on an objective test (Kadar at [114]). There is a presumption that the Prosecution has complied with the disclosure obligation and this presumption is only displaced if the court has sufficient reason to doubt that the Prosecution has complied with the disclosure obligation (Lee Siew Boon Winston v Public Prosecutor [2015] 4 SLR 1184 (“Winston Lee”) at [184]).

  102. [75] In the present case, the Accused failed to raise a sufficient reason for the court to doubt that the Prosecution had complied with its disclosure obligation. The first ground raised concerned the alleged discrepancies between the Summary of Facts and the Victim’s testimony in court, as well as between IO Ng’s testimony and the Victim’s testimony. From the outset, the Prosecution rightly pointed out that the Summary of Facts was not prepared or produced by the Victim, but by IO Ng. The Victim had no knowledge as to how it was produced and no control over its contents. IO Ng testified on the stand that he had prepared the Summary of Facts on 2 November 2015 and had included information from both the Victim and the Victim’s father (ie, not solely from the Victim). Thus, defence counsel rightly conceded during the trial that the words in the Summary of Facts were not necessarily the Victim’s. Any inconsistency in the Summary of Facts could not be directly attributed to the Victim. The Summary of Facts was produced for investigative use, and its purpose was to provide a quick brief to any officer assigned to the case and to Dr Cai for him to have some brief background facts to assess the Victim’s fitness to testify in court. For the purpose of this assessment, Dr Cai’s own report was a brief one-page summary of the interview. It was notable in this regard that Dr Cai had also not relied on the Summary of Facts, but had obtained facts required for his assessment directly from the Victim. Moreover, the account of the events that the Victim gave on the stand remained consistent under cross-examination, and he consistently testified that the version in the Summary of Facts was not correct. The Victim testified that he could not remember whether he gave the police the account contained in the Summary of Facts, but the account did not seem correct. In addition, the Defence did not cross-examine IO Ng as to whether he had accurately prepared the Summary of Facts and as to which information in the Summary of Facts came from the Victim.

  103. [76] Highlighting the inconsistencies between the Victim’s testimony in court and the Summary of Facts, which was not prepared by him and not entirely based on information provided by him, is not sufficient to bring the Victim’s statement recorded on 2 November 2015 into the two categories set out in Kadar at [113]. In Winston Lee, the High Court held that the “shifts” in the victim’s evidence from “touching, to pressing down to squeezing are not material nor do they alter the main thrust of the complaint’s version of events” and “the use of the word chest and breast are not sufficiently material to raise reasonable grounds for belief that the complainant had told differing versions about the incidents to the police” (at [190]). Thus, the High Court in Winston Lee found that there were no reasonable grounds for the belief that the Prosecution had not complied with its Kadar obligation. Similarly, the inconsistencies in the present case were not sufficiently material to raise reasonable grounds for belief that the Victim must have told widely differing versions about the incidents to the police. The allegations of fellatio and outrage of modesty were stated in both accounts to have taken place on the night of 31 October 2015, and the differences in the timing and the attributions of a particular act to a particular re-entry were insufficient to raise reasonable grounds for the belief that the Victim had told a materially different version in his statement recorded on 2 November 2015. This was even more so given that the Summary of Facts was not produced by the Victim and the Victim had no control over how it was produced.

  104. [77] The present case was different from AOF v Public Prosecutor [2012] 3 SLR 34 (“AOF”), where the Court of Appeal held that the Prosecution should have disclosed the victim’s police statements in the light of, inter alia, the significant discrepancies in the frequency of the alleged rapes (at [152]). In AOF, the victim’s testimony regarding the frequency of alleged rapes over a few years was internally inconsistent (at [130] and [144]). In the present case, on the other hand, the Victim was consistent in his oral testimony regarding his account of exactly what had happened, and all the accounts pointed to fellatio and outrage of modesty having taken place on the night of 31 October 2015.

  105. [78] In relation to IO Then’s testimony that the Victim told him that the Accused went up to the upper bunk bed of E’s room (instead of R’s room), I did not place weight on this discrepancy because IO Then testified in re-examination that he had conducted the same experiment on both the bunk beds in E and R’s rooms, and all these experiments were based on the boys’ accounts. The Victim was clear and consistent in his testimony that it was the bunk bed in R’s room that he had climbed on with the Accused and two other boys during the second sleepover. The Prosecution offered reasonable explanations why the two other boys were not available to testify and I did not think their absence during the hearing was material. In any event, any discrepancy as to which bed was involved during the second sleepover did not go so far as to show that the Victim’s statement recorded on 2 November 2015 would be exculpatory material that was likely to be admissible and objectively prima facie credible and relevant to the guilt or innocence of the Accused, or material likely to be inadmissible but yet provide a real chance of pursuing a line of inquiry that leads to material likely to be admissible and that might reasonably be regarded as credible and relevant to the guilt or innocence of the accused.

  106. [79] The Prosecution did not specifically address the second ground of the application submitted by the Defence, ie, the subsequent removal of the words “over his shorts” from the first charge as it was originally phrased. Nevertheless, I found that this amendment to the first charge was insufficient to show that the Victim’s statement recorded on 2 November 2015 would fulfil either of the two Kadar disclosure thresholds. A similar argument was also raised in Winston Lee, where the accused submitted that the change in the content of the charge, from one that stated that the accused “had slid his hand into [the victim’s] left brassiere cup to touch her left breast while pressing down” to one that stated “inserted his hand into the complainant’s left brassiere cup and touched her left breast and nipple” (at [152(b)]), was one ground for the disclosure of the victim’s police statements. The court held that the change was not material and did not alter the main thrust of the complainant’s version of events (at [190]). Similarly, in the present case, the main thrust of the Victim’s version of events that the Accused had touched his penis remained the same.

  107. [80] On a related note, the Defence suggested in its closing submissions that the first charge was not made out because the words “over his shorts” were removed from the original charge. I rejected this contention. The present case was unlike XP v Public Prosecutor [2008] 4 SLR(R) 686, where the court found that the complainant had failed altogether to mention a crucial detail which was stated in the charge that was proceeded with at trial. In contrast, the first charge in the present case was amended before the trial commenced. The Prosecution retains the discretion to proceed with any amended charge at trial. The Victim’s evidence was consistent with the particulars in the amended first charge. This was not an instance of the Victim failing to mention any detail in the proceeded charge at trial.

  108. [81] In all the circumstances, I was not satisfied that the Defence had raised sufficient reason to doubt that the Prosecution had complied with the disclosure obligation set out in Kadar. I therefore dismissed the Defence’s application for disclosure of the Victim’s statement recorded on 2 November 2015.

  109. My decision (I): evaluation of the Prosecution’s case

  110. [82] The present case centred on my evaluation of the quality of the evidence, and whether there was adequate proof of the charges beyond reasonable doubt. Essentially, it was the word of the Victim against that of the Accused.

  111. [83] The Defence was a complete denial of the Victim’s allegations. Much of the trial involved attempts to show that the Victim had purportedly given differing accounts of the incident to different witnesses at different times, and that he was not a credible witness.

  112. The corroborative evidence

  113. [84] I begin by examining two related facets – whether there was corroboration of the Victim’s allegations, and whether his testimony was “unusually convincing”.

  114. [85] Our courts have rejected the strict approach to corroboration laid down in The King v Baskerville [1916] 2 KB 658, in favour of a more liberal approach as laid down in Public Prosecutor v Mardai [1950] MLJ 33 (“Mardai”), at 33. The Court of Appeal in AOF v Public Prosecutor [2012] 3 SLR 34 (“AOF”) at [173] reiterated the endorsement of the more liberal approach, quoting Mardai with approval:

  115. [86] Whether a complainant’s previous statement can be corroborative evidence is also codified in s 159 of the Evidence Act, which states:

  116. [87] However, even if the complainant’s statement can be corroboration, it might be of less additional evidential value because it is not independent corroboration. The court in Khoo Kwoon Hain v Public Prosecutor [1995] 2 SLR(R) 591 expressed a caution along these lines (at [49]): although s 159 has the effect of elevating a recent complaint to corroboration, the court should nevertheless bear in mind the fact that corroboration by virtue of s 159 alone is not corroboration by independent evidence because it is self-serving. The Court of Appeal in AOF concluded that “whilst the failure to meet the strict standards of Baskerville corroboration does not rule out the relevance of evidence, this deficiency is likely to adversely affect the weight of the evidence which the court concerned may accord to it” (at [177]).

  117. [88] Applying the law to the present case, I found that the Victim’s contemporaneous complaint to B as soon as B arrived at the Accused’s residence was corroborative evidence. It satisfied s 159 of the Evidence Act: the Victim’s complaint to B was a statement made in ordinary conversation relating to the same sexual assaults about the time when the sexual assaults took place. There was no delay between the offences and the statement – it was made at the earliest opportunity that the Victim had. However, keeping in mind that the statement was not wholly independent, I placed reduced weight on it. Coupled with my assessment of the Victim’s demeanour and his credibility, as I shall explain below, the corroborative statement strongly buttressed the veracity of the Victim’s account.

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