Skip to content
Grounds publishedDecided 27 Nov 2018

High Court

Re IM Skaugen SE and other matters

Feedback & support

[2018] SGHC 259Case no. Originating Summons No 673 of 2018

What happened, in plain English

There is no plain-English summary of this judgment yet.

Ask about this judgment

Laws this judgment relies on

Grounds of decision

Official text from eLitigation

  1. Introduction

  2. [1] Originating Summonses No 673, 674 and 675 of 2018 were filed by IM Skaugen SE (“IM Skaugen”) and its subsidiaries SMIPL Pte Ltd (“SMIPL”) and IMSPL Pte Ltd (“IMSPL”) (collectively, the “applicants”) respectively for moratorium relief pursuant to s 211B(1) of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) (“the Act”). OS 673 and 675 were opposed by MAN Energy Solutions SE (previously known as MAN Diesel & Turbo SE) (“MAN”). MAN was a creditor of IMSPL, but not a creditor of IM Skaugen and SMIPL.

  3. [2] The applications brought into sharp focus the approach that the court should take when dealing with applications for relief under s 211B(1) of the Act by related companies that are seeking breathing space to develop a group restructuring plan. Each company seeks a moratorium on an individual basis either to formulate a compromise or arrangement to propose to its creditors for consideration, or having proposed a compromise or arrangement, time for the creditors to consider, and negotiate revisions to the same. Notwithstanding that the separate legal personality of each company requires separate applications to be made, each compromise or arrangement is intertwined with and interdependent on the others, and forms part of a master restructuring plan – the group restructuring plan – that paves the way for the rehabilitation of the group as a whole, or that part of it that is sought to be rehabilitated. This is a reflection of the economic reality that the group functions as an economic unit with varying levels of economic integration amongst its constituent entities, notwithstanding the separate legal personality of each entity. A scenario such as this raises important questions on the interpretation of ss 211B(4)(a) and 211B(4)(b) of the Act, and how the court should weigh creditor support and resistance when faced with an application for relief under s 211B(1).

  4. [3] After considering the submissions of the parties, I granted the applicants moratorium relief. The substantive portions of the moratorium orders made in relation to OS 673 to 675, which were broadly identical in terms, were as follows:

  5. (a) Pursuant to s 211B of the Act, for a period of three months from 28 June 2018:

  6. (i) No resolution shall be passed for a winding up of the applicants;

  7. (ii) No appointment shall be made of any receiver or manager over any property or undertaking of the applicants;

  8. (iii) No proceeding, whether before a court, arbitral tribunal or administrative agency, and whether current, pending or threatened against the applicants, shall be commenced or continued against the applicants (other than proceedings under s 211B or ss 210, 211D, 211G, 211H, or 212) except with the leave of the court and subject to such terms as the court may impose;

  9. (iv) No execution, distress, or other legal process against any property of the applicants shall be commenced, continued, or levied, except with the leave of the court and subject to such terms as the court may impose;

  10. (v) No step to enforce any security over any property of the applicants, nor any step to repossess any goods held by the applicants under any chattels leasing agreement, hire-purchase agreement or retention of title agreement, shall be taken except with the leave of the court and subject to such terms as the court may impose;

  11. (vi) No right of re-entry or forfeiture under any leases in respect of any premises occupied by the applicants (including any enforcement pursuant to ss 18 or 18A of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act (Cap 61, 1994 Rev Ed)) shall be enforced, except with the leave of the court and subject to such terms as the court may impose; and

  12. [4] On the conditions accompanying the moratoria, I made the following orders pursuant to s 211B(6) of the Act:

  13. (a) If the applicants acquire or dispose of any significant property or grants security over any significant property, such information relating to the acquisition, disposal or grant of security shall be submitted to the court not later than 14 days after the date of the acquisition, disposal or grant of security;

  14. (i) Audited annual financial reports of the applicants for the financial years 2014, 2015 and 2016;

  15. (ii) Unaudited annual financial reports of the applicants for the financial year 2017;

  16. (iii) Latest management accounts of the applicants as at 31 May 2018.

  17. (i) A report on the valuation of the applicants’ significant asset, which shall be a report providing an estimate of the net proceeds recoverable by the applicants under the MAN Assignment Agreements as defined in paragraph 28 of the first affidavit of Bente Karin Flo filed in OS 673 on 31 May 2018.

  18. Background facts and procedural history

  19. [7] IM Skaugen is a holding company incorporated in Norway. It has several wholly-owned subsidiaries including SMIPL, IMSPL, and Somargas II Pte Ltd (“Somargas”), collectively known as the IMS Group. A chart identifying the entities in the IMS Group can be found at Annex A. The IMS Group owned and operated a pool of multigas carriers and vessels which were Singapore flagged. IMSPL is incorporated in Singapore, and was registered with the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore as an Approved International Shipping (“AIS”) enterprise from 2005 to 2015. Subsequently, SMIPL and several other entities in the IMS Group became the vessel-owning companies, and they applied for renewal of the AIS status in place of IMSPL, obtaining such approval on 19 January 2015.

  20. [8] The IMS Group has faced dire financial straits in recent times. As such, the applicants sought moratorium relief under s 211B(1) of the Act for breathing space, to allow IMSPL and SMIPL to propose a compromise or arrangement to their respective creditors, and to allow the creditors of IM Skaugen time to consider the compromise or arrangement which had been proposed. The applicants sought a six-month moratorium from the date of the application (31 May 2018), ie six months inclusive of the automatic 30-day moratorium that would apply under s 211B(8) upon filing a s 211B(1) application (“the Automatic Stay”). In addition, the applicants sought the appointment of Mr Morits Skaugen, CEO of IM Skaugen, as the IMS Group’s foreign representative.

  21. [9] MAN, a German company under the Volkswagen group of companies, is in the business of providing marine engines and turbomachinery. It opposed OS 675 on the basis that it was the principal creditor of IMSPL. MAN also opposed OS 673 even though it was not a creditor of IM Skaugen, apparently because it had an interest in IMSPL’s assets, which had been purportedly dissipated by way of assignment from IMSPL to IM Skaugen. MAN had no locus standi to oppose OS 674 as it was not a creditor of SMIPL.

  22. The parties’ cases

  23. The applicants’ arguments in support of OS 673 to 675

  24. The requirements under s 211B had been complied with

  25. [12] The applicants submitted that the requirements under s 211B of the Act had been fully complied with. MAN’s principal objection was that the applicants had not complied with the requirements of s 211B(4), and the disagreement centred on whether ss 211B(4)(a) and 211B(4)(b) were disjunctive or conjunctive requirements. The applicants submitted that they were disjunctive requirements turning on whether a compromise or arrangement had been proposed or was intended to be proposed. MAN on the other hand asserted that the requirements were conjunctive regardless. The text of s 211B(4) is reproduced below at [45].

  26. [13] Accordingly, on the applicants’ case, satisfying either limb (a) or (b) of s 211B(4) would suffice depending on the scenario that was in play. The question of which limb applied would depend on whether a compromise or arrangement was intended to be proposed or had been proposed. Section 211B(4)(b) would apply in the former situation and s 211B(4)(a) would apply in the latter situation. It was common ground that IMSPL and SMIPL were in the former situation and IM Skaugen was in the latter situation. As IM Skaugen had proposed a compromise or arrangement to its creditors, s 211B(4)(a) would apply and had been complied with as its secured creditors, Nordea Bank Finland plc (“Nordea”) and Swedbank AB (“Swedbank”) as well as its unsecured creditors, namely its IMSK14 bondholders and Gasmar AS (“Gasmar”), had either given letters of support or at the very least had indicated that they had no objections to the moratorium. On the other hand, as SMIPL and IMSPL had not proposed a compromise or arrangement but intended to do so, s 211B(4)(b) would apply. SMIPL and IMSPL submitted that they had complied with s 211B(4)(b) because a brief description of the principal features of the intended compromise or arrangement was set out in the affidavits filed in support of their respective applications. In gist, the features provided for payment to the creditors, on a pari passu basis, proceeds from SMIPL and IMSPL’s 5% share of the claims against MAN. In addition, creditors would receive distributions, in the case of IMSPL, from the proceeds of a contingent United States (“US”) claim (see [17] below) and in the case of SMIPL, from the proceeds of sale of shares in the Wuhan University of Technology-Skaugen Training and Consultancy Co Ltd. In return, SMIPL and IMSPL would be released from any claims by their creditors, including contingent claims under guarantees. There was no disagreement of any substance that SMIPL and IMSPL had complied with s 211B(4)(b).

  27. [14] There was also no dispute that the other limbs of s 211B(4), namely limbs (c) and (d), had to be and had been complied with. The applicants stated that to the best of their knowledge and wherever applicable, they had provided information of their secured and unsecured creditors in accordance with ss 211B(4)(c) and 211B(4)(d) respectively. In summary, the secured creditors of IM Skaugen were Nordea, in the sum of about US$34.4m, and Swedbank, in the sum of around US$20.2m. Gasmar was an unsecured creditor of IM Skaugen in the sum of US$937,081, as were bondholders of the IMSK14 bond which amounted to US$57m and which had fallen due on 6 April 2018. Whereas IMSPL and SMIPL were stated not to have any secured creditors, I noted at the time of the hearing, that in so far as unsecured creditors were concerned, Nordea was also a creditor of IMSPL and SMIPL, as IMSPL and SMIPL were guarantors of Somargas’s liabilities to Nordea. These liabilities had crystallised on 6 April 2018. On balance, it seemed apparent to me that Nordea was the single largest creditor of the IMS Group, and its support for the restructuring efforts of the group as a whole and the relevant entities of which it was a creditor specifically, was critical. I return to the significance of this at [61] below.

  28. The court should exercise its discretion to grant the moratoria as the applicants were making a bona fide attempt at restructuring

  29. [15] The applicants argued that the IMS Group’s business had long-term viability, notably because the group had committed substantial resources to develop its expertise and to effect a business transformation, the latter of which included shifting the group’s focus from seaborne transportation of liquefied petroleum gas to the regional distribution of liquefied natural gas.

  30. [17] Apart from the viability of the IMS Group’s core business and the NewCo plan sketched above, the applicants argued that the IMS Group’s financial situation would be improved by successful outcomes in several claims. First, the aforementioned claims by IM Skaugen against MAN, of which 5% would be paid out to each of IMSPL and SMIPL. Second, the setting aside application pending in the Danish courts in relation to the Award. Third, a separate claim in a second arbitration proceeding seated in Denmark and administered by the Danish Institute of Arbitration (Case No E-2635), commenced by IMSPL against MAN in June 2017, pertaining to MAN’s purported non-compliance with the terms of the Award. Fourth, the claim by IMSPL against an ex-agent in the US of about US$2m.

  31. [18] Further, to explain the need for moratorium relief, the applicants made reference to claims brought in arbitrations seated in London by entities from a group helmed by Teekay Corporation and Teekay LNG Partners LP (“the Teekay Group”) against companies in the IMS Group. The applicants alleged that these claims were a coordinated attack by the Teekay Group to eliminate the IMS Group as a market competitor. The claims had apparently taken a significant toll on the IMS Group by diverting its resources and management time from the group’s rehabilitation efforts. The applicants submitted that granting the moratorium would allow the IMS Group relief from Teekay Group’s legal proceedings so that it could focus on formulating the group restructuring plan. It should be noted that there were also counterclaims brought by IMS Group companies against the entities from the Teekay Group.

  32. MAN’s objections to OS 675

  33. The requirements of s 211B(4)(a) had not been complied with

  34. [20] While this was not discussed in any detail in its written submissions, during the hearing MAN advanced the argument that ss 211B(4)(a) and 211B(4)(b) were conjunctive requirements regardless of whether a compromise or arrangement had been proposed or was intended to be proposed. As such, the applicants had to satisfy both ss 211B(4)(a) and 211B(4)(b). In the case of IMSPL, even though it had not proposed a compromise or arrangement but intended to do so, for the purpose of limb (a), it had to produce evidence of support for the intended compromise or arrangement from its creditors together with an explanation of how such support would be important to its success. MAN submitted that IMSPL had not done so and indeed could not do so, since MAN as its principal and majority creditor would not provide such support, and therefore the application ought to be dismissed.

  35. Any intended scheme was doomed to fail

  36. [21] MAN further submitted that any compromise or arrangement that might be proposed by IMSPL had no prospect of success given MAN’s opposition. The predicate of this submission was that MAN was the principal creditor of IMSPL by reason of the Award. MAN asserted that as the Award constituted about 76% of IMSPL’s unsecured debt, this meant that IMSPL could not cross the statutory threshold of 75% in value required for a scheme vote to be carried. The applicants attempted to meet this argument by asserting that there was a real possibility that the Award would be set aside, and that claims against MAN would succeed. In such circumstances, MAN might not be a creditor of IMSPL by the time the intended compromise or arrangement was proposed, considered by the creditors and put to a vote at a duly called scheme meeting. Of course, this argument has been materially undermined by the outcome of SUM 3315 and SUM 2612 on the enforcement of the Award, although I note that the application for leave to appeal against the dismissal of SUM 3315 in the Court of Appeal is still pending at the time of writing (see [10] above).

  37. IMSPL was a shell entity and the application was an abuse of process

  38. [22] MAN also questioned the bona fides of IMSPL’s application. It contended that the application was an abuse of process and an attempt to stymie the claims of legitimate creditors. In support of this argument, MAN pointed to IMSPL’s supposed admission that it was a mere shell with no active business or operation to be rehabilitated, and that the sole purpose of the moratorium sought in OS 675 was so that IMSPL could redistribute any proceeds arising from its share of the claim against MAN. As such, since IMSPL was not a going concern but a mere litigation vehicle, there was nothing to rehabilitate or resuscitate via any intended compromise or arrangement. Thus, allowing the moratorium would not further the legislative intent behind s 211B to provide an active business with the breathing space to formulate a rescue plan.

  39. [23] MAN further pointed out that the applications were filed three days after the dismissal of the application in SUM 3315 to challenge the enforcement of the Award. MAN thus suggested that the applications were a mere tactic to delay the enforcement of the Award, rather than any bona fide attempt at rehabilitating the business of the IMS Group. MAN buttressed this argument by again making the point that any restructuring effort, at least in so far as IMSPL was concerned, was an exercise in futility given MAN’s resistance to the same.

  40. Issues to be determined

  41. [24] In view of the nature of the applications and the parties’ arguments as presented, the key issues that arose for determination were as follows:

  42. (a) Should the requirements under ss 211B(4)(a) and 211B(4)(b) be read disjunctively or conjunctively, ie, was an applicant under s 211B(1) required to fulfil both ss 211B(4)(a) and 211B(4)(b) or simply one or the other? (“the s 211B(4) issue”)

  43. (b) What constituted evidence of creditor support for the purpose of s 211B(4)(a) particularly in the context of a group restructuring? (“the Creditor Support issue”)

  44. (c) Were the applications bona fide? (“the bona fides issue”)

  45. [25] As will soon become apparent, there were some areas of overlap between the three issues. Most notably, the presence of creditor support was relevant to the s 211B(4) issue as well as the Creditor Support issue. I propose nonetheless to deal with them separately for the sake of clarity.

  46. Approach to statutory interpretation

  47. [26] As the determination of some of the issues in this case would involve the interpretation of salient provisions in s 211B, a brief summary of the approach to statutory interpretation is apposite to set a framework for the legal analysis that follows.

  48. [27] It is trite that statutory interpretation is a purposive endeavour, in that an interpretation that would promote the purpose or object underlying the written law must be preferred to an interpretation that would not do so (s 9A(1) Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed)). The manner in which such an exercise should be undertaken has been expounded in several recent judgments by the Court of Appeal, perhaps most notably in Tan Cheng Bock v Attorney-General [2017] 2 SLR 850 (“Tan Cheng Bock”). The correct approach to purposive interpretation can be summarised as a three-step approach as follows:

  49. (a) First, a court should ascertain the possible interpretations of the provision in question, by determining the ordinary meaning of the words in the provision, aided by rules and canons of statutory construction (Tan Cheng Bock at [38]);

  50. (b) Second, a court should then formulate the legislative purpose of the provision. In this regard, it may be necessary to consider the specific purpose of the particular provision in question, although it should be presumed that a statute is coherent as a whole, such that its individual provisions should be as far as possible read consistently with both the specific purpose of the provision and the general purpose of the underlying statute (Tan Cheng Bock at [40]–[41]). In ascertaining the legislative purpose, extraneous material may be a useful aid to interpretation, but primacy must be accorded to the text of the provision (Tan Cheng Bock at [43]), and hence extraneous material should not contradict the express text of the provision except in very limited circumstances (Tan Cheng Bock at [50]);

  51. (c) Third, a court should compare the possible interpretations of the provision against the purpose of the relevant provision, and prefer the interpretation which furthers the purpose of the written text (Tan Cheng Bock at [54(c)]).

  52. [28] Since the legislative purpose of a provision is important in arriving at its proper interpretation, I propose to deal briefly with the legal framework in s 211B, which was only recently introduced via the Companies (Amendment) Act 2017 (No 15 of 2017) (“the Amendment Act”), before embarking on an analysis of the issues.

  53. [29] The changes brought about by the Amendment Act were undertaken in an attempt to enhance Singapore’s restructuring framework and to further Singapore’s capabilities in managing cross-border insolvencies. The key changes related to the framework for schemes of arrangement and judicial management, rescue financing, pre-package schemes, and cram-down provisions as well as the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (see Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (10 March 2017) vol 94 (Indranee Rajah, Senior Minister of State for Finance)). The changes enacted by the Amendment Act were based on the recommendations of the Insolvency Law Review Committee (“the ILR Committee”) in its 2013 report (Report of the Insolvency Law Committee, 2013) (“the ILRC Report”) as well as the recommendations of the Committee to Strengthen Singapore as an International Centre for Debt Restructuring (“the Restructuring Committee”) in its 2016 report (Report of the Committee to Strengthen Singapore as an International Centre for Debt Restructuring, 2016) (“the Restructuring Report”).

  54. [30] I shall focus on the changes that were made to the scheme of arrangement regime as the applications were made under that regime. The scheme of arrangement provisions are now found in ss 210, 211, 211A–J and 212 of the Act. The scheme of arrangement as originally designed was not intended as an insolvency regime, but a means of facilitating the adjustment of shareholders’ rights, or creditors’ rights, without the need for unanimity from the shareholders or creditors as the case may be. It allowed for a statutory cram-down of contractual rights, provided that minimum thresholds of support had been obtained. It was a hybrid mechanism that allowed the implementation of debt restructuring arrangements, without being seen as making an insolvency application, under a process that involved a layer of judicial oversight to ensure that the rights of minority creditors were not unfairly or oppressively subjugated. As such, it fell short of formal insolvency proceedings. This to some extent explained why it resides in Part VII of the Act concerning “Arrangements, Reconstructions and Amalgamations” rather than the parts of the Act that contain the provisions on insolvency. This will of course change with the new Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act which consolidates Singapore’s personal and corporate insolvency, and debt restructuring laws into an omnibus statute. The scheme of arrangement regime will then migrate from the Act to the new omnibus statute.

  55. [31] Notwithstanding the originally conceived purpose of the scheme of arrangement, debtors and creditors, in no small part due to the creativity of practitioners, have customised it as a debtor-in-possession restructuring regime. This filled a lacuna in the Act – the absence of a debtor-in-possession restructuring framework. Accordingly, when considering the reforms that were needed, the ILR Committee and the Restructuring Committee settled on the scheme of arrangement as the debtor-in-possession regime, and accordingly recommended enhancements to it.

  56. [32] An immediate shortcoming that was identified by the two committees was that the moratorium available under the Act for a scheme of arrangement was not as robust as that available in liquidation and judicial management. The ILR Committee had observed (at p 136 of the ILRC Report) that “the protection afforded by the statutory moratorium provided at section 210(10) of the Act was relatively weak compared with the moratoriums found in the liquidation or judicial management regimes”. To address this, it had recommended (at p 142 of the ILRC Report) that “the scope of the statutory moratorium should be no narrower than that in judicial management”.

  57. [33] In particular, two weaknesses in the moratorium for a scheme of arrangement were identified. First, that the moratorium for a scheme of arrangement was not available upon filing and only on application, unlike the automatic moratorium which applied upon filing for judicial management pursuant to s 227C of the Act, a non-debtor-in-possession insolvency regime. A company that proposed a scheme of arrangement could, pending the filing and disposal of an application for a scheme meeting to be called, and if one was called, pending the holding of that meeting, apply for moratorium relief under s 210(10) of the Act which reads as follows:

  58. [36] The Amendment Act left s 210(10) intact. Instead, it introduced a new and independent scheme of arrangement regime in ss 211A to 211J, replete with powerful new restructuring tools and enhanced moratorium features. The newly introduced s 211B(1) reads as follows:

  59. [37] Section 211B which introduced enhanced moratorium relief had four significant changes. First, relief was now available not only where a compromise or arrangement had been proposed but also where one was intended to be proposed. Thus, the provision also applied where the company had not yet proposed a compromise or arrangement but was taking concrete steps to do so. This addressed the weakness identified above in [35], and was based on the recommendations of the ILR Committee (at pp 143–144 of the ILRC Report):

  60. [38] Second, s 211B provided for the Automatic Stay, subject to fulfilment of statutorily prescribed requirements (see s 211B(8) read with s 211B(9) and s 211B(13)). This reconciled the disparity highlighted above (at [33]) between an application for judicial management and scheme of arrangement. Further, if the s 211B(1) application was allowed, the court would extend the moratorium beyond the Automatic Stay for such periods and on such terms as the court deemed fit pursuant to s 211B(5)(a). The court could again extend this moratorium even further on terms, on application made before the expiry of the moratorium (see s 211B(7)). As the Automatic Stay could apply in a situation where a compromise was only intended to be proposed but had not actually been proposed, and recognising that the scheme was a debtor-in-possession regime, safeguards were introduced to prevent abuse. That such safeguards were necessary was made clear in the Restructuring Report (at paras 3.8–3.10):

  61. It is clear from the above that one of the key safeguards was support from creditors of sufficient importance, particularly where a compromise or arrangement had not been proposed. The other safeguard was the requirement that there be a brief description of the intended compromise or arrangement. These safeguards were eventually introduced as ss 211B(4)(a) and 211B(4)(b) respectively of the Act.

  62. Thus, the court’s jurisdiction to grant a moratorium restraining acts outside Singapore is really in substance akin to granting injunctive relief in an anti-suit injunction. Indeed, seen this way, it is also not dissimilar to granting a Mareva injunction that restrains conduct outside jurisdiction. These points become relevant in relation to how the relief should be calibrated, which I consider at [85]–[86] below.

  63. [41] In explaining the expansion of the circumstances under which a company could obtain a moratorium under s 211B(1), Mr Edwin Tong SC, who was a member of the ILR Committee and the Restructuring Committee, said the following during the second reading of the Companies (Amendment) Bill 2017 (Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (10 March 2017) vol 94):

  64. [43] Having briefly sketched the legal framework and the legislative purpose for moratorium relief under s 211B(1), I now move on to consider the three issues at hand.

  65. My decision

  66. The s 211B(4) issue

  67. [44] This was a significant issue not only for the purposes of the applications but also as a matter of general importance, as it concerned the statutory conditions that must be satisfied before moratorium relief might be granted under s 211B(1) in relation to the two scenarios envisaged under the section – where a compromise or arrangement had been or was intended to be proposed. At the outset, I was informed by counsel for the applicants that there were differing approaches on this issue taken in past applications, resulting in inconsistency in the application of the provision, although no specific precedent was brought to my attention. A moratorium is an extraordinary relief holding in abeyance the enforcement of the legitimate rights of creditors against the company that is seeking to restructure. Accordingly, certainty in the application of the statutory requirements was critical.

  68. [45] As noted earlier, the issue essentially centred on the proper interpretation of ss 211B(4)(a) and 211B(4)(b). For ease of reference, s 211B(4) provides as follows:

  69. [46] As noted above at [12], the applicants and MAN essentially diverged on whether the requirements in ss 211B(4)(a) and 211B(4)(b) were to be read conjunctively or disjunctively. On the applicants’ view, the requirements were disjunctive, and it sufficed that either s 211B(4)(a) or s 211B(4)(b) was satisfied depending on which scenario was engaged. Accordingly, in the case of a company intending to propose a compromise or arrangement, such as SMIPL and IMSPL, it was sufficient to satisfy s 211B(4)(b) by providing a brief description of the intended compromise or arrangement. It was not necessary to also satisfy s 211B(4)(a) by providing evidence of support from creditors and an explanation of the importance of such support. On the other hand, MAN’s view was that the two limbs should be read conjunctively. As such, IMSPL’s application should fail since it had failed to provide evidence of support from its creditors and an explanation of the importance of that support for the purpose of s 211B(4)(a). Indeed, on MAN’s view, there was no way IMSPL could fulfil the criteria in s 211B(4)(a), since IMSPL would not be able to furnish evidence of creditor support given the opposition of its majority creditor, MAN. As noted earlier, MAN did not raise any serious issue with regard to s 211B(4)(b). Having considered the parties’ respective views on the s 211B(4) issue, I was of the opinion that neither perspective was correct.

  70. [47] As a preliminary observation, it should be recalled that s 211B(1) differs from its s 210(10) counterpart most notably in that an applicant in the case of the former need only intend to propose a compromise or arrangement, without having yet done so (see [36] above). This was made clear from the text of s 211B(1), where a distinction was drawn between the scenario where a company “proposes…a compromise or an arrangement”, and where a company merely “intends to propose…a compromise or an arrangement”. I shall refer to the scenario in which a company has proposed a compromise or arrangement as the First Scenario, and where a company intended to do so as the Second Scenario.

  71. [48] The first step to statutory interpretation involves ascertaining the possible interpretations of the provision in question (see [27(a)] above). At the risk of over-simplification, I was of the opinion that s 211B(4) lent itself to three possible interpretations:

  72. (a) On the first interpretation, which was the one adopted by the applicants, the requirements in ss 211B(4)(a) and 211B(4)(b) were to be read disjunctively, and they applied to the First Scenario and Second Scenario respectively. In other words, under the First Scenario where an applicant had proposed a compromise or arrangement, it would need to furnish evidence of creditor support for the proposed compromise or arrangement, together with an explanation of how such support would be important for the success of the proposed compromise or arrangement as required under s 211B(4)(a). On the other hand, under the Second Scenario, an applicant intending to propose a compromise or arrangement would need to fulfil s 211B(4)(b) and provide a brief description of the intended compromise or arrangement.

  73. (b) On the second interpretation, which was the one adopted by MAN, the requirements under ss 211B(4)(a) and 211B(4)(b) were to be read conjunctively, regardless of whether one was concerned with the First Scenario or the Second Scenario. An applicant who proposed a compromise or intended to do so must furnish both evidence of creditor support and a brief description of the compromise.

  74. (c) The third interpretation, which I believed was the correct one, was that the requirements in ss 211B(4)(a) and 211B(4)(b) applied disjunctively in the First Scenario and conjunctively in the Second Scenario. In other words, a company which had proposed a compromise or arrangement needed to only furnish evidence of creditor support and an explanation of the importance of that support, thereby satisfying s 211B(4)(a). There was no need to also satisfy s 211B(4)(b). On the other hand, a company which intended to propose a compromise or arrangement would need to show both creditor support and the importance of the same, and provide a brief description of the intended compromise or arrangement.

  75. [49] I will explain why I preferred the third interpretation. In arriving at my conclusion, I bore in mind the principles of statutory interpretation summarised at [27] above. First of all, I think it was fairly obvious that the first interpretation was untenable as it flew against the plain text of the statute. The first interpretation might appear to have some intuitive appeal in that it would mean that the requirements in ss 211B(4)(a) and 211B(4)(b) mapped neatly onto the First and Second Scenarios envisaged in s 211B(1). However, this meant that an applicant under the Second Scenario, that is, a company that intended to propose a compromise or arrangement, needed to only fulfil s 211B(4)(b) and not s 211B(4)(a). Yet, the text of s 211B(4)(a) clearly refers to evidence of creditor support for the “intended or proposed compromise or arrangement” [emphasis added]. In other words, the fact that an applicant company intended to propose a compromise or arrangement but had not yet done so did not excuse the company from the need to comply with s 211B(4)(a). The first interpretation must hence be rejected, as it could not be reconciled with the express language of s 211B(4)(a).

  76. [51] I should add that adopting the first interpretation would lead to the strange result of an applicant in the First Scenario (one who had proposed a compromise or arrangement) being subject to a more onerous requirement of evidencing creditor support as opposed to an applicant in the Second Scenario (one who had not but intended to propose a compromise or arrangement). If at all, one would have thought that the latter should be subject to more stringent requirements. In my view, not only was the first interpretation incongruent with the language of s 211B(4)(a), it would also draw an unprincipled and indeed illogical distinction between the First and Second Scenarios. On the other hand, the interpretation that s 211B(4)(a) applied to both the First and Second Scenarios achieved consistency with the text of the provision, consistency with the objective of the provision and consistency in the application of the provision to the First and Second Scenarios. Further, it also advanced the legislative purpose of s 211B(4) as a mechanism to prevent abuse of the moratorium. Given that the Automatic Stay arose upon application for the moratorium, and the ability of the court to extend the said moratorium, some safeguards were needed to protect the interests of the creditors. This is particularly where a debtor was in possession and sought moratorium relief without having proposed a compromise or arrangement, ie the Second Scenario. By requiring in the Second Scenario evidence of creditor support for the moratorium, coupled with an explanation of the importance of such support, s 211B(4)(a) ensured that the interests of creditors were taken into consideration when moratorium relief, automatic or otherwise, was granted to the applicant.

  77. [52] There were also sound reasons for rejecting the second interpretation which MAN had advanced. First, the language of s 211B(4)(b) made it clear that the requirement to furnish a brief description of the intended compromise only applied where the company had not but intended to propose a compromise or arrangement to its creditors, ie the Second Scenario. Hence, where the applicant had already proposed a compromise or arrangement, s 211B(4)(b) was not triggered.

  78. [53] Second, reading ss 211B(4)(a) and 211B(4)(b) conjunctively in the First Scenario would lead to a strange result. Let me explain. In the First Scenario, the applicant would have proposed a compromise or arrangement, and produced evidence of creditor support for that compromise or arrangement. The creditors would therefore have had the terms of the compromise or arrangement before them, with sufficient detail for them to evaluate it and to indicate their support. As such, it was difficult to see what purpose would be served by requiring the applicant to nonetheless provide a brief description of the compromise or arrangement to enable the court to assess whether the compromise or arrangement was feasible and merited consideration by the creditors. It seemed that the court was already doing exactly that for the purpose of s 211B(4)(a), by assessing the importance of the creditors’ support for the compromise or arrangement that had been proposed. The court’s task in the First Scenario was to assess whether creditor support was adequate and important for the purpose of s 211B(4)(a), which meant that it was assessing whether the compromise was “feasible” and merited consideration by the creditors. On the other hand, s 211B(4)(b) served two quite different purposes. First, the brief description of the compromise allowed the court to assess whether, at least on a prima facie level, the compromise was feasible and merited consideration by the creditors. Second, it enabled the creditors to assess whether they should apply to set aside the Automatic Stay. This was clear from the Explanatory Statement to the Companies (Amendment) Bill 2017, which stated the following:

  79. Thus, it was clear that s 211B(4)(b) served the purpose of safeguarding the interests of creditors and enabling the court to assess whether the application under s 211B(1) ought to be allowed, where a compromise had not yet been proposed. Accepting the second interpretation appeared to me not only to introduce a meaningless requirement but one that did not square with the language and intent of s 211B(4)(b).

  80. [54] Hence, in the round, I favoured the third interpretation. I was of the opinion that the requirements in ss 211B(4)(a) and 211B(4)(b) should be read conjunctively in the Second Scenario. As regards the First Scenario, I was of the opinion that only s 211B(4)(a) would apply. This meant that in the instant case, IM Skaugen, which was in the First Scenario, would have to fulfil s 211B(4)(a); whereas SMIPL and IMSPL, which were in the Second Scenario, would have to fulfil both ss 211B(4)(a) and 211B(4)(b). With these conclusions, I now move to the discussion of what creditor support in the context of s 211B(4)(a) meant, and the issue of whether creditor opposition by a majority creditor was fatal to an application under s 211B(1) particularly in the context of a group restructuring.

  81. The Creditor Support issue

  82. The appropriate test to assessing creditor support for the purposes of a s 211B(1) application

  83. [55] I was of the opinion that in determining what constituted relevant evidence of creditor support for the purpose of s 211B(4)(a), considerable insight could be gleaned from an analysis of the cases relating to the grant of a moratorium under s 210(10). I took this view given the parallels between an application for a moratorium under s 210(10) and one under s 211B(1).

  84. [56] As briefly discussed above at [35], the cases of Conchubar and Pacific Andes have established that in relation to an application under s 210(10), close scrutiny of the merits of the proposed compromise or arrangement or its viability and likely acceptance by the creditors should not be carried out at that stage. Hence, the test is for the court to determine whether on a broad assessment, “there was a reasonable prospect of the scheme working and being acceptable to the general run of creditors” (see Conchubar at [12]; Pacific Andes at [65]). I believed that with some adjustment, the same test should apply to applications under s 211B(1).

  85. [57] In a s 211B(1) application, the court is concerned with determining whether an applicant company should be given breathing space to undertake restructuring efforts. In making that determination, the court undertakes a balancing exercise between allowing the applicant the requisite breathing space and ensuring that the interests of creditors are sufficiently safeguarded. It is not uncommon to expect that the restructuring efforts of an applicant under s 211B(1) are nascent or certainly not at a level of maturity to be placed before a duly called scheme meeting. The fact that s 211B(1) contemplates the Second Scenario, and does not require the application to be coupled with an application under s 210(1) for a scheme meeting to be called, speaks to this. That being the case, as a matter of approach, it seemed incorrect for the court to engage in a close scrutiny of the proposed compromise (in the First Scenario) or intended compromise (in the Second Scenario). This balance between giving the debtor adequate breathing space and ensuring that the creditors’ rights were not excessively restrained was best served by applying a test similar to that for a s 210(10) application with some modifications, ie whether on a broad assessment, there was a reasonable prospect of the proposed or intended compromise working and being acceptable to the general run of creditors. It should be noted in this regard that the test under s 211B(4)(b) – whether the intended compromise or arrangement was feasible and merited consideration by the company’s creditors – was intended to be similar to the test in Conchubar (see the Explanatory Statement to the Companies (Amendment) Bill 2017 at [53] above).

  86. [58] The requirement for evidence of creditor support in s 211B(4)(a) should hence be applied with this test in mind. This meant that where a compromise had been proposed (ie the First Scenario), evidence of creditor support and the importance of that support should assist the court to make a broad assessment as to whether there was a reasonable prospect that the proposed compromise or arrangement would work and be acceptable to the general run of creditors. Similarly, where a compromise or arrangement was intended to be proposed (ie the Second Scenario), the court should make a broad assessment, based on the brief description of the intended compromise or arrangement, whether it was feasible and merited consideration by the creditors. In doing so, the court must take into account evidence of support of the creditors for the moratorium (see above at [50]) and the attendant explanation of the importance of that support to the success of the intended compromise or arrangement. This was evident from the Restructuring Report, which spoke (at para 3.10(b)(ii), quoted at [38] above) for example on the importance of the support of secured creditors “whose assets are integral to the operations of the debtor”. In the present case, the support of Nordea was important with regard to how this test ought to be applied, which I discuss below at [62]–[64]. Therefore, in substance, the court was really doing no more than making a broad assessment of whether there was a reasonable prospect of the intended compromise working (“feasible”) and being acceptable to the general run of creditors (“merits consideration by the company’s creditors”). I should add that in both situations, the court should at that stage, refrain from undertaking a vote count, restricting itself to making a broad assessment as to the feasibility of the compromise and its acceptability to the creditors (see Pacific Andes at [65]). In this regard, when analysing the support from the creditors, the quality of the support is important. Section 211B(4)(a) speaks to that by expressly linking the importance of the creditor support to the success of the rehabilitation efforts. Accordingly, if significant or crucial creditors were supportive, that would be a material consideration. That perhaps explained the requirements for the applicant to furnish a list of all secured creditors (see s 211B(4)(c)) and twenty of the largest unsecured creditors (see s 211B(4)(d)) so that the court could properly weigh the support and the explanation of the importance of that support provided by the applicant. This was of relevance in the context of IMSPL, which I explain below at [61].

  87. Applying the test to the present facts

  88. [59] In the instant case, IM Skaugen had shown that its secured creditors, Nordea and Swedbank as well as its unsecured creditors, namely the bondholders and Gasmar, had either given letters of support or at least indicated that they had no objections to the moratorium. These four creditors were the largest creditors of IM Skaugen in value. It would hence seem indisputable that there was a reasonable prospect that the compromise would work and be acceptable to the general run of its creditors. Similarly, for SMIPL, its creditors Gasmar and Nordea had indicated that they had no objections to the moratorium, and it appeared from the brief details furnished of the intended compromise that there was equally a reasonable prospect that the scheme would work and be acceptable to the general run of creditors. Notably, in the case of both IM Skaugen and SMIPL, there was no creditor opposition to their applications.

  89. [60] The point of contention that remained was thus IMSPL. MAN argued that IMSPL had not and could not provide evidence of creditor support within the meaning of s 211B(4)(a) as it had not and could not furnish evidence of support from its majority creditor MAN. This argument was inextricably tied to MAN’s assertions that allowing the IMS Group to pursue its restructuring efforts would be futile, since any such compromise or arrangement proposed would need to obtain the requisite approval of IMSPL’s creditors, and MAN as IMSPL’s main creditor would certainly vote down any such compromise or arrangement. To my mind, this objection was not sustainable in the circumstances, as it was simply premature to consider MAN’s opposition as being fatal to any intended compromise at this stage.

  90. Weighing the relative importance of different creditors

  91. [61] But before I explain why, it is worth pointing out that MAN’s submission was undermined by the fact that it was not, it would appear, in actual fact the majority creditor of IMSPL. Entities from the Teekay Group had also made various demands against IMSPL, in claims of between US$16m and US$25m each and amounting to almost US$100m in total. If these claims were well substantiated, they would render these various entities legitimate creditors of IMSPL, each with a bigger debt than MAN.

  92. [62] Further, it was crucial to note that Nordea was also a creditor of IMSPL as IMSPL was a guarantor of Somargas’s liabilities to Nordea pursuant to a guarantee entered into on 12 April 2013. IMSPL’s liabilities to Nordea under this guarantee had crystallised as the amounts outstanding had fallen due and payable on 6 April 2018, and Nordea had sent a letter dated 10 April 2018 to IMSPL reserving its rights. The total debt owed to Nordea was in the sum of around US$34.4m, which dwarfed the debt owed to MAN of around €2m. Not only did this to a large extent put paid to MAN’s point that it was the majority creditor of IMSPL, it must further be noted that Nordea was also the largest creditor of the IMS Group, and that Nordea raised no objection to the moratorium and the group restructuring efforts. For this reason alone, it seemed that there was basis to conclude that IMSPL had satisfied s 211B(4)(a).

  93. [63] There is a further point that is worth making on the issue of creditor support, a point that is particularly relevant in the context of a group restructuring efforts. Typically, in a group restructuring, there are individual plans formulated by the entities within the group that are seeking to restructure collectively. The individual plans are necessitated by the separate legal identity of each entity and therefore its community of creditors. However, each of these plans is interrelated and interdependent, and fold into a group restructuring plan. As I noted earlier, this reflects the economic integration of the group. Thus, the success of the group restructuring efforts is contingent on approval being obtained for each plan that is a constituent part of the group restructuring plan. Indeed, s 211C recognises this by making available moratorium relief to related companies of the applicant – subsidiaries, holding company or ultimate holding company – if those companies play a necessary and integral role in the compromise of the applicant (see s 211C(2)(c)). As such, when the court makes the broad assessment as to whether there is a reasonable prospect of the compromise working and being acceptable to the general run of creditors for the purpose of a s 211B(1) application, the court cannot ignore and indeed must pay heed to the overall support of the creditors for the group restructuring efforts, of which the compromise, proposed or intended, is a part. Indeed, that is the very assessment the creditors themselves will make when they decide whether they should support the compromise. Without the support of key creditors of the group for the group restructuring efforts, it is questionable that there is a reasonable prospect: (a) of the plan working ie being carried through in terms of the commercial assumptions being realistic or feasible; and (b) the plan being acceptable to the general run of the creditors. Thus, by throwing their support behind an individual plan, the creditors are implicitly supportive of the group restructuring efforts and plan in so far as the individual plans are intertwined. I would emphasise that it is the quality of the support that is most important here. If the biggest creditors of the group as a whole are behind the group restructuring efforts, that does point to the conclusion that the efforts have a reasonable prospect of working and being acceptable to the creditors. Of course, it must not be forgotten that the key requirement remains that of support from the applicant’s own creditors as stipulated in s 211B(4)(a). But that does not mean that in weighing creditor support for the purpose of s 211B(4)(a) and the resistance that the applicant faces, the court should not have regard to support for the overall group restructuring efforts by the group’s principal creditors.

  94. [64] This assumed relevance in the context of the IMSPL. As noted earlier, Nordea, Swedbank, the bondholders and Gasmar were the biggest creditors of the IMS Group. In particular, it should be recalled that Nordea and Swedbank were secured creditors of the revenue-generating assets of the IMS Group. They were either supportive of or not objecting to the moratorium and the group restructuring efforts. This spoke to the sustainability of the restructuring efforts.

  95. Whether opposition by a major creditor is fatal to an application under s 211B(1)

  96. [65] I now explain why it was premature of consider whether MAN’s objection to the moratorium was fatal. My observations in Pacific Andes were relevant and apposite to this issue. In that case, the application for moratorium relief under s 210(10) was opposed by creditors who collectively held more than 25% of the debt owed by the applicant. The creditors argued that due to their opposition, the scheme would never receive the approval of the requisite majority of creditors at a scheme meeting, and as such it would be futile to grant a moratorium under s 210(10). In support of their argument, the creditors relied on the case of Re Ng Huat, which held that a court in determining whether to convene a scheme meeting, should consider whether there is a realistic prospect of approval of the requisite majority of creditors both in terms of value and numbers. In Pacific Andes, I declined to extend that requirement to an application under s 210(10) for the following reasons (at [70]):

The judgment continues past this page. Read the rest at eLitigation.