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Grounds publishedDecided 13 Mar 2018

High Court

Thio Syn Kym Wendy and others v Thio Syn Pyn and another

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[2018] SGHC 54Case no. Suit No 490 of 201325 paragraphs

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Grounds of decision

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  1. Introduction

  2. Background

  3. Events leading to this action

  4. [2] The full facts underlying this action can be found in my earlier judgment, Thio Syn Kym Wendy and others v Thio Syn Pyn and others [2017] SGHC 169 (“the Judgment”). Here, I will only outline the broad factual background and set out the facts that are relevant to the outstanding issue of share valuation.

  5. [3] Mr Thio Keng Poon (“Mr Thio”) was a businessman who, in the 1960s, procured the incorporation of three companies: United Realty Ltd (“URL”), a property investment holding company, MDI, a manufacturer and distributor of dairy products and beverages, and Thio Holdings Pte Ltd (“THPL”), an investment holding company. These three companies are the corporate defendants in this action. Together with their subsidiaries and a Hong Kong company, they form the Thio family’s group of businesses (“the Group”).

  6. All of the children, save Vicki, are parties in this litigation, and I will refer to them by their western personal names as I did in the Judgment.

  7. [5] The plaintiffs are Wendy, Michael and Serene. They are minority shareholders in each of the three corporate defendants. Collectively, they hold 20% of the shareholding in MDI and lower percentages of the share capital of URL and THPL.

  8. [6] The three individual defendants are Mdm Kwik, Ernest and Patrick. Together, they hold 30% of the shareholding in URL, 38.5% of the shareholding in MDI and 77.25% of the shareholding in THPL. All of them are directors of all three companies. Ernest and Patrick are, respectively, the managing director and deputy managing director of MDI.

  9. [7] Over the years, Mr Thio passed down the family wealth to his sons by allotting shares in URL, MDI and THPL to them. Each of his sons initially held the same number of shares but Michael’s shares were transferred to Ernest and Patrick in 1991. By the year 2000, Mr Thio, Mdm Kwik, Ernest and Patrick were the only family members who held shares in the Group. They were also directors of the Group companies.

  10. [8] In 2002, Mdm Kwik expressed a wish that some financial provision be made for the daughters. Mr Thio then decided that Michael, Vicki, Wendy and Serene should receive shares in the Group companies by way of bonus issues. These shares were allotted in March and April 2002.

  11. [9] On 23 December 2005, following a dispute in the family regarding certain proposed changes to the shareholdings in the Group, the members of the family, THPL and MDI entered into a Deed of Settlement (“the Deed of Settlement”) which provided for an adjustment of shareholdings in the Group. After the Deed of Settlement, Ernest and Patrick retained majority control of MDI through the combination of their shareholdings in MDI and their control of THPL. Around the same time as the Deed of Settlement, Michael and the three sisters were appointed directors of each of the Group companies.

  12. [10] Despite the Deed of Settlement, friction between Mr Thio, on the one hand, and Ernest and Patrick, on the other, increased. Mr Thio sued his wife and children and several companies in the Group for, amongst other things, oppression. Ultimately, he succeeded on part of his claims but, in 2010, the shareholders of MDI voted to remove Mr Thio as a director.

  13. [11] From 2011, discussions took place between Wendy, Serene and Vicki on the one hand, and Ernest and Patrick on the other, regarding a possible purchase by Ernest and Patrick of their sisters’ shares. Without informing their brothers, Michael and the sisters appointed Ernst & Young LLP (“E&Y”) to prepare valuations of URL, MDI and THPL. According to Michael, their only instruction to E&Y was to provide the indicative value of 100% equity stake in each company and the indicative value of the siblings’ respective equity stakes in each of the companies as of December 2010. E&Y provided its indicative valuation results in a presentation dated 9 September 2011 which was revised on 11 November 2011. E&Y valued MDI’s equity as being between $1,197.6m and $1,295.2m.

  14. My findings in the Judgment

  15. [13] In 2013, the plaintiffs brought a minority oppression action against the defendants. After a trial, I made the following findings:

  16. (a) Although the companies in the Group were “family companies” in the sense that most of the directors in the relevant companies were members of the Thio family, the Thios did not operate on the basis of a relationship of mutual trust and confidence in relation to how the companies were run. I therefore concluded that URL, MDI and THPL were neither quasi-partnerships nor companies akin to quasi-partnerships.

  17. (b) There was no common understanding among the parties that the plaintiffs were entitled to participate in the management of the Group as directors.

  18. (c) Only the claim of minority oppression against Ernest and Patrick in respect of the affairs of MDI was made out and only in the following respects:

  19. (i) their use of MDI to further their personal pursuit of Mr Thio when the matter could have been settled by accepting Serene’s offer to make compensation for the sums claimed from Mr Thio;

  20. (ii) their conduct in selectively using the results of an independent report prepared by a consultancy firm to justify increasing their remuneration, drastically reducing Michael’s remuneration and taking away long established benefits for non-executive directors, while simultaneously refusing to implement comments that would have taken away their own benefits; and

  21. (iii) perhaps to a lesser extent, their engineering of a situation where they would have received unjustifiable backdated emoluments from MDI’s Malaysian subsidiaries had they not renounced the payments at the last minute.

  22. Events following the Judgment

  23. [15] The parties jointly appointed Mr Richard Hayler (“Mr Hayler”) as the independent valuer. In the course of finalising Mr Hayler’s terms of reference, Ernest and Patrick sought to include a term stating that the plaintiffs’ shares in MDI were to be valued on the basis of “fair market value”, which would allow for a discount to be applied to the valuation of the shares. The plaintiffs disagreed and the parties were unable to reach a compromise.

  24. [16] On 20 November 2017, the parties jointly wrote to the court requesting a hearing to seek directions on the issue of whether a discount should be applied to the valuation of the plaintiffs’ shares in MDI. The parties were in agreement that no formal application needed to be filed.

  25. The parties’ cases

  26. [17] The sole issue before the court is whether any discount should be applied to the plaintiffs’ shares.

  27. The plaintiffs’ case

  28. The defendants’ case

  29. [20] Ernest and Patrick made separate submissions through their respective counsel but their positions are consonant. For convenience, I will henceforth refer to them as “the defendants”, and I note for the avoidance of doubt that the other named defendants in the action are not involved in the buyout of the plaintiffs’ shares.

  30. [21] The defendants’ submissions begin by emphasising the distinction between a discount for lack of control and that for lack of marketability. The former refers to a discount that accounts for a minority shareholder’s lack of control over the management of the company, while the latter reflects the difficulty in selling the shares of a private company in general due to share transfer restrictions and the narrowness of the market. Nonetheless, they adopt the same stance as to both types of discounts as they argue that discounts for lack of control and marketability should generally be applied when the company in question is not a quasi-partnership.

  31. [22] The defendants disagree with the “general rule” characterised by the plaintiffs and contend that In re Bird makes clear (at 431) that there is “no universal or even a general rule in a case where the company had never been a quasi-partnership”. The defendants then go further to cite other authorities such as the English case of Irvine and another v Irvine and another (No 2) [2007] 1 BCLC 445 (“Irvine”), which states that a minority shareholding “is to be valued for what it is, a minority shareholding … [s]hort of a quasi-partnership or some other exceptional circumstance” (at [11]). The defendants read this to mean that there is a presumption or default position that a discount should be applied if the company is not a quasi-partnership.

  32. The law on the application of minority discounts

  33. [24] The different positions enunciated in the cases cited in the parties’ submissions indicate that the legal principles on the applicability of minority discounts are not fully settled.

  34. [25] Where the company in question is a quasi-partnership, the legal position is more certain. In such cases, there is a strong presumption that no discount should be applied: In re Bird at 430; Strahan v Wilcock [2006] 2 BCLC 555 (“Strahan”) at [1]; Robin Hollington, Hollington on Shareholders’ Rights (Sweet & Maxwell, 7th Ed, 2013) (“Hollington”) at para 8-152. This presumption may be displaced in special circumstances (O’Neill and Another v Phillips and Others [1999] 1 WLR 1092 at 1107), such as when the minority shareholder has acted in such a manner as to deserve his exclusion from the company or has contributed to the oppressive conduct of the majority: see In re Bird at 430–431; Hollington at para 8-152.

  35. [27] While it is clear that a presumption of no discount exists where the company is a quasi-partnership, the legal position is far less certain as to whether the converse is true such that there would be a presumption of a discount for shares in companies that are not quasi-partnerships. The defendants rely on the obiter dicta of Arden LJ in Strahan at [17] that it would be “difficult to conceive of circumstances in which a non-discounted basis of valuation would be appropriate” where the company in question is not a quasi-partnership, as well as the remarks of Blackburne J in Irvine at [11] that “[s]hort of a quasi-partnership or some other exceptional circumstance”, there is no reason to attribute a pro rata share of the overall value of the company to minority shares.

  36. [30] Having considered all of the cases cited to me by counsel, I find a coherent and principled reading of the authorities to be as follows. The starting point is that there is no general rule in cases involving companies that are not quasi-partnerships. This was the position taken by Nourse J in the seminal case of In re Bird at 431 (affirmed on appeal in In re Bird Precision Bellows Ltd [1986] 1 Ch 658) upon which subsequent local and English decisions such as Low Janie, Strahan and Irvine were based, although it seems to me that the findings and dicta in some subsequent cases have strayed somewhat from this original position while purporting to endorse it. I think that this view adequately takes into account the balance of competing considerations I have referred to at [29] above. Likewise, I decline to recognise the existence of any presumption or “baseline” which has been suggested to me by counsel.

  37. Application to the present facts

  38. [33] Considering that I have found that MDI is not a quasi-partnership and that there was no common understanding among the parties that the plaintiffs were entitled to participate in MDI’s management, the starting point is that there is no default position or presumption as to whether a discount should apply. Instead, I will simply weigh the facts in coming to a decision on this issue.

  39. [36] As for the defendants, they argue that the plaintiffs should not be treated as unwilling sellers as the plaintiffs had expressed a willingness to sell the shares to the defendants in 2011, and the sale only fell through because the parties were unable to agree on a price. I do not think that the plaintiffs’ willingness to sell at what they considered a reasonable price should be held against them. If anything, their refusal to accept the net tangible asset method of valuation that was proposed by the defendants shows that they were not desperate to sell at any price. Now the plaintiffs will have to sell at the price set by the valuer and they cannot withdraw as they did previously if they are not happy with the price so fixed. To me, therefore, the 2011 negotiations are not a significant factor in deciding the basis of the valuation.

  40. [37] The defendants also submit that a discount is justified because the plaintiffs received their shares by way of a gift. I disagree with the defendants’ attempt to draw an analogy between a gift and a purchase of shares at a discounted price, which would ordinarily point in favour of a discount being applied: Hollington at para 8-153. This is because the gift was intended by Mr Thio and Mdm Kwik to benefit the plaintiffs, and the fact that the plaintiffs gave no consideration does not in any way reflect the reduced value of their minority shareholdings. I note that the defendants, too, had received their original shareholdings by way of gift from their parents. The High Court’s decision in Lim Chee Twang v Chan Shuk Kuen Helina and others [2010] 2 SLR 209, which the defendants rely on to show that there ought to be a minority discount where the shares had been received as a gift, is distinguishable as the minority shares in that case had been gifted by the oppressor rather than a third party: at [78] and [150(a)].

  41. [38] Finally, I see little relevance in the fact that the defendants were largely responsible for the financial success of MDI in recent decades whereas the plaintiffs were not involved in the day-to-day management of the company. The cases that the defendants cite do not support their argument that a lack of contribution by the minority shareholders per se is a reason to apply a discount; the minority shareholders in the Nova Scotian case of Mathers v Mathers [1992] NSJ No 266 and the Saskatchewanian case of Derdall v Derdall Irrigation Farms Ltd [2010] SJ No 513 had respectively acted in ways that were detrimental to the companies. This is plainly not the case here. Moreover, it was accepted by the entire Thio family that the defendants would be responsible for running the Group companies. Just as I found at [68] of the Judgment that “the plaintiffs including Michael were happy to leave management of the Group in Ernest’s and Patrick’s hands”, the defendants, too, were happy to have management and control of the Group and should not be allowed to complain now about the plaintiffs’ inaction.

  42. [39] On the balance, while I acknowledge that it is a close case in the absence of strong factors that clearly point in either direction, I hold that no minority discount should apply to the sale of the plaintiffs’ shares in MDI. I reach this decision on the basis that the Group was family-run and family-owned, even if it did not amount to a quasi-partnership or import any obligations of mutual trust and confidence between the shareholders. The family-run nature of the Group and the way in which the various parties had come into their shareholdings suggest that the defendants were always meant to ensure that the interests of MDI and their siblings would be protected or at least not harmed. It is not a strong factor, but it is nonetheless one that deserves consideration as part of the overall circumstances of the case. In my judgment, a valuation of the plaintiff’s shares with no minority discount applied would be an outcome that is fair and equitable to all of the parties, especially in light of the defendants’ commercially unfair and oppressive actions and the plaintiffs’ lack of culpability as minority shareholders in causing the breakdown of the relationship between the parties.

  43. Conclusion