High Court · Decided 11 January 2019
Crescendas Bionics Pte Ltd v Jurong Primewide Pte Ltd
Feedback & support[2019] SGHC 04 · Case no. Suit No 477 of 2015
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] The plaintiff is Crescendas Bionics Pte Ltd, a Singapore registered entity that was incorporated as a property developer. The plaintiff is part of the Crescendas Group. Mr Lawrence Leow Chin Hin (“PW1”), a key witness for the plaintiff, is the Chief Executive Officer of the Crescendas Group and a director of the plaintiff.
- [2]
[2] The defendant is Jurong Primewide Pte Ltd, a general building contractor, registered as a Grade A1 contractor with the Building and Construction Authority (“BCA”). The defendant is a wholly owned subsidiary of Jurong International Holdings Pte Ltd (“JIHPL”). On 30 June 2008, the plaintiff and the defendant signed the Letter of Intent dated 26 June 2008 (“the LOI”). This four-page document was the only written contract signed by the plaintiff and the defendant. The parties agree that the LOI is binding on them. In the LOI, the plaintiff engaged the defendant as the management contractor to build a seven-storey multi-user business park development with two levels of basement carpark at Biopolis Drive/Biomedical Groove (“the Project”). The LOI stated that the contract sum for the Project was $95,870,000 (the “Contract Sum”).
- [5]
[5] The LOI further stipulated that the plaintiff would pay the defendant for the provision of preliminaries (“Preliminaries Sum”). “Preliminaries” refer to all the groundworks done by the defendant that do not typically form the permanent structure of the building and do not come within the scope of work of the various trade contractors and their trade preliminaries for the Project. The preliminaries works that the defendant were to provide typically included the provision of a site office, vehicle washing point, preparation of the progress reports, provision of plant and equipment (eg, tower cranes) and employment of site staff to manage the whole work site of the Project. In other words, the defendant, being a management contractor, provided the management contractor’s preliminaries for the Project.
- [9]
[9] The Project was eventually certified as completed on 12 January 2011 by the Superintending Officer (“SO”), Jurong Consultants Pte Ltd (“JCPL”), which was appointed by the plaintiff. The parties agreed that this exceeded the stipulated time period required of the defendant to complete the Project under the LOI.
- [10]
[10] Prior to the start of the trial, the parties had successfully resolved some of the claims raised in their pleadings leaving the following outstanding disputes for this court to consider:
(a) Was the Preliminaries Sum for the defendant, the management contractor, agreed by the parties under the LOI to be $12.3 million?
(b) Did the defendant agree to waive its first $5 million of the shared savings?
(c) Was the defendant entitled to its counterclaim of $155,000 which was the cost incurred to secure the performance bond?
(d) Were the delays in the completion of the Project due solely to the defendant or were both the plaintiff and the defendant responsible for the delays?
(e) Is the plaintiff entitled to liquidated damages for the delay?
(f) Is the plaintiff entitled to a refund of the additional preliminaries it paid to the defendant for the delay in the Project’s completion?
- [11]
[11] As this trial was bifurcated, I shall only determine the liabilities of the parties. The assessment of damages will be determined at a later stage.
Background
Events leading up to the signing of the LOI
- [12]
[12] Sometime in 2007, Mr Tang Tat Kwong (“DW1”), the Chief Executive Officer of JIHPL, which is the parent company of the defendant, and PW1 representing the Crescendas Group, agreed to make a joint bid for the development of the Project. The plaintiff was used as the vehicle to make the joint bid for the development of the Project.
- [13]
[13] This culminated in the execution of a Heads of Agreement dated 29 October 2007 (“HOA”) signed by Accrington Pte Ltd, the plaintiff’s parent company, and JIHPL. Under the HOA, the plaintiff was required to engage the defendant as the management contractor for the Project.
- [14]
[14] In or around December 2007, the plaintiff was awarded the contract to develop the Project. Pursuant to the HOA, it entered into discussions with the defendant to negotiate the contract sum and the scope of work that the defendant would provide as the management contractor for the Project.
- [15]
[15] In accordance with the HOA, the plaintiff appointed JCPL as the design consultant and the SO of the Project. JCPL developed the design intent of the Project with input from the defendant. JCPL also developed and issued the architectural design drawings, which were used by the defendant (as management contractor) to engage the trade contractors. In turn, the defendant developed the relevant detailed drawings for the construction of the various works in the Project.
- [18]
[18] For the negotiation of the LOI the plaintiff was represented by PW1, Mr Onn Soon Lee (“PW2”), Mr David Loh Weng Keong (“Mr David Loh”) and Mr Patrick Teo (“Mr Teo”). The defendant was primarily represented by Mr David Tse Tze Kwong (“DW2”) and DW1.
- [19]
[19] In the course of the negotiation between the plaintiff and the defendant, numerous meetings were conducted and they exchanged emails and drafts of the LOI in April, May and June 2008. The details of these correspondence, meetings and drafts are important in the determination of the quantum of the Preliminaries Sum and other issues under the signed LOI. This will be discussed in greater detail below at [104] onwards.
- [20]
[20] On 11 June 2008 the defendant sent the plaintiff a breakdown of the preliminaries for the Project entitled “Preliminaries for Main Building Works for Biopolis III at One-North” which explained how the sum of $12.3 million was derived (“June Preliminaries Breakdown”).
- [21]
[21] Eventually, the parties signed the LOI dated 26 June 2008 on 30 June 2008. The LOI is the central source of the parties’ disputes.
- [22]
[22] It cannot be gainsaid that pursuant to the LOI, the plaintiff would have to pay the trade contractors through the defendant for their services rendered to the Project. However, it was the defendant who entered into the various trade contracts with the various trade contractors after evaluating the respective tender submissions through a tender exercise. Each tender exercise involved tender questionnaires, tender interviews, tender opening and price negotiation. The defendant would then prepare a tender report in which the preferred trade contractor was identified. The selected trade contractor would subsequently be recommended to the plaintiff for its approval.
The LOI
- [23]
[23] Despite the large scale of the Project, the signed LOI was a bare-bones document of only four pages. The parties attempted to enter into a more formal and comprehensive agreement in the months following the signing of the LOI but were unsuccessful as they had encountered irreconcilable differences.
- [24]
[24] For ease of reference, I shall now reproduce the relevant clauses of the LOI:
The Contract Sum
- [25]
[25] Clauses 1.0, 1.1 and 1.2 provide for the Contract Sum under the LOI:
- [26]
[26] The defendant argues that under cl 1.2, the Preliminaries Sum is fixed at $12.3 million. This is computed by subtracting the Profit and Attendance for the Management Contractor of $1,302,500 from the sum of $13,602,500. However, the parties dispute whether the Preliminaries Sum was agreed at $12.3 million. I shall discuss this further at [104] onwards.
The shared savings for GMP
- [27]
[27] The shared savings in the LOI between the parties can be found in cll 4.0, 4.1 and 4.2:
- [28]
[28] The dispute here is whether the defendant had agreed to waive its share in the first $5 million of the shared savings. This will be discussed further below at [180] onwards.
The contract period
- [29]
[29] Clause 5.0 of the LOI lays down the contract duration for the Project:
- [30]
[30] Under the signed LOI, the contractual completion date for the Project was on 22 January 2010, which is 18 months from 23 July 2008. This is undisputed. However, the parties disagreed on the meaning of “substantial completion” in cl 5.0. This issue is crucial because it will determine the date on which the development of the Project is deemed complete under the signed LOI. This will in turn determine the duration of the delay in completing the Project. I shall discuss this issue below at [223] onwards.
Liquidated damages
- [31]
[31] Given that the Project was delayed and was completed after 22 January 2010 which is the completion date stipulated under cl 5.0 of the LOI, the liquidated damages clause under the LOI is relevant. Clause 6.0 of the LOI provides for liquidated damages:
- [32]
[32] The “Works” referred to in cl 6.0 cited above refers to the construction and maintenance of the Project. The parties are in disagreement as to whether cl 6.0 applies. The defendant submits that cl 6.0 does not apply because the plaintiff had caused critical delays to the Project which the plaintiff denies. This will be discussed in greater detail below at [353] onwards.
Terms of payment
- [33]
[33] The dispute on the quantum of the Preliminaries Sum to be paid also involved the interpretation of cl 7.1 which can be found under the heading “Terms of Payment” in the LOI:
- [34]
[34] The parties’ dispute here concerns the meaning of the second paragraph of cl 7.1 of the LOI. The plaintiff submits that the second paragraph of cl 7.1 meant that the parties had agreed to determine the quantum of the Preliminaries Sum within four weeks of the Project’s commencement date. The defendant on the other hand, submits that this paragraph meant that the parties agreed to discuss within four weeks of the Project’s commencement date how the Preliminaries Sum of $12.3 million was to be paid out by the plaintiff over the duration of the Project. I shall deal with this issue below at [104] onwards.
The draft contract
- [36]
[36] The plaintiff disagreed with the Preliminaries Breakdown and ultimately, the Draft WT Contract was not executed. Nonetheless, the Preliminaries Breakdown and the Draft WT Contract continue to be relevant because the parties regularly referred to these documents in the course of the Project.
The performance bond
- [37]
[37] On 29 July 2009, the defendant provided the plaintiff with the OCBC Bond. The OCBC Bond was for the sum of $4,793,500. The plaintiff eventually returned the OCBC Bond to the defendant on 21 January 2010 because it was a conditional bond and not an on-demand bond. According to the plaintiff, the OCBC Bond was not in compliance with the LOI because it was understood by the parties that the defendant was to provide an on-demand performance bond. Furthermore, the OCBC Bond was provided one year late and this again was not in compliance with what was agreed under the LOI.
- [38]
[38] One of the disputed issues is that the parties disagreed on whether there was an obligation on the defendant to provide a performance bond under the LOI. If there was such an obligation, the parties disagreed on what kind of performance bond the defendant must provide. I shall discuss this issue below at [171] onwards.
The delays
- [39]
[39] As mentioned above, under the LOI, the development of the Project was to be completed by 22 January 2010. However, the Project was only certified to be completed on 12 January 2011.
- [40]
[40] The defendant accepted that the Project was not completed within 18 months as stipulated under cl 5.0 of the LOI. However, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff had also substantially contributed to the delays and these were critical delays. The liability for the delays will be discussed at [218] onwards below.
The parties’ cases
- [41]
[41] The parties’ main areas of disagreement are as follows:
(a) The amount for the defendant’s Preliminaries Sum under the LOI;
(b) Whether the defendant had an obligation to provide a performance bond under the LOI, and if so, what sort of performance bond it would have to provide;
(c) Whether the defendant had waived its share of the first $5 million of the shared savings; and
(d) The liabilities of the parties in relation to the delays caused to the completion of the Project.
- [42]
[42] The parties’ cases in respect of each of the above disputed areas are summarised as follows:
The Preliminaries Sum
The plaintiff’s claim
- [43]
[43] The plaintiff submits that under the LOI, the plaintiff was all along under the understanding that the Preliminaries Sum of $12.3 million for the defendant should also include the preliminaries for all the trade contractors of the Project. The plaintiff claims that this assertion is supported by the events leading up to the signing of the LOI. However, during a dinner meeting on 27 June 2008, DW2 told the plaintiff that the sum of $12.3 million was only meant for the preliminaries to be provided by the defendant. The plaintiff disagreed and immediately made clear in the draft LOI which was attached in an email by PW2 on 28 June 2008 that the $12.3 million was to cover all of the preliminaries of the Project. According to the plaintiff, the defendant objected to this and the disagreement could not be resolved until the phone conversation between PW1 and DW2 on the afternoon of 30 June 2008 (“30 June Conversation”). In that phone conversation, the plaintiff alleges that the parties agreed that the $12.3 million stated in the LOI as the Preliminaries Sum was a tentative figure and the final amount of the Preliminaries Sum was to be decided within four weeks of the commencement of the Project. This was the intent behind the second paragraph of cl 7.1 of the signed LOI.
- [44]
[44] Unfortunately, the parties were unable to reach an agreement on the final Preliminaries Sum even after four weeks from the commencement of the Project. Nevertheless, in the interest of completing the Project, the plaintiff agreed that JCPL would certify payments for the Preliminaries Sum based on the fixed sum of $12.3 million without prejudice to the plaintiff’s right to challenge the same later. The plaintiff then paid the Preliminaries Sum to the defendant less $155,000.
The defendant’s defence
- [46]
[46] The defendant contends that the plaintiff agreed that the defendant’s Preliminaries Sum was fixed at $12.3 million under the LOI and that this sum did not include the trade preliminaries.
- [47]
[47] First, the defendant avers that the plaintiff understood what a fixed Preliminaries Sum in all the draft LOIs meant, ie, that it did not include the trade contractors’ preliminaries, and the parties proceeded on that basis.
- [48]
[48] Second, the defendant also contends that the 30 June Conversation did not occur and that this evidence should be disregarded. The defendant argues that the plaintiff did not rely on this conversation when attempting to re-negotiate the Preliminaries Sum subsequent to the signing of the LOI.
- [49]
[49] Third, the defendant avers that cl 7.1 of the LOI which is under the heading “Terms of Payment” set out how the fixed Preliminaries Sum of $12.3 million was to be disbursed to the defendant. According to the defendant, the second paragraph of cl 7.1 of the signed LOI came about because of a disagreement between the parties on how the fixed sum of $12.3 million was to be disbursed to the defendant. Apart from paying the defendant 10% of the $12.3 million within 30 days of the signing of the LOI, the defendant initially wanted the plaintiff to pay 60% of the Preliminaries Sum within four months of the execution of the signed LOI. This was set out in the earlier draft of the LOI which was circulated by DW2 in an email to the plaintiff on 28 June 2008 at 1.51pm. However, the plaintiff was not agreeable to the defendant’s request for the advance payment of the 60%. Thus the 60% advance payment was taken out of cl 7.1 but the present paragraph 2 of cl 7.1 of the signed LOI was inserted to allow the parties to negotiate and to come to an agreement within four weeks of the Project’s commencement date on how the remainder of the Preliminaries Sum was to be disbursed to the defendant.
- [50]
[50] The defendant also argues that it is commercially sound and sensible for the defendant to want to fix the Preliminaries Sum given the rising prices of the raw materials in the construction industry when the LOI was under negotiations. Hence the defendant disagrees with the plaintiff’s interpretation of the second paragraph of cl 7.1 of the signed LOI and argues that there was no overpayment when the plaintiff paid the defendant the $12.3 million less $155,000.
- [51]
[51] Finally, the defendant argues that since the plaintiff drafted the second paragraph of cl 7.1 of the signed LOI, the contra proferentum rule will apply such that a viable interpretation that is against the interests of the party that drafted the clause is to be preferred. Therefore, by the operation of the contra proferentum rule, any ambiguity in cll 1.0 and 7.1 of the signed LOI is to be construed against the plaintiff. That means the Preliminaries Sum of $12.3 million was fixed and definite, and not tentative or provisional.
The Performance Bond
The defendant’s counterclaim
- [52]
[52] The defendant counterclaims against the plaintiff for the balance of the fixed Preliminaries Sum in the amount of $155,000 which it had incurred for the procurement of a performance bond as demanded by the plaintiff. The defendant had provided to the plaintiff a performance bond in the form of the OCBC Bond. Furthermore, the defendant also claims that there is no contractually binding provision under the LOI requiring the performance bond to be acceptable to the SO or the plaintiff. Hence, the SO had erred in certifying that the defendant did not provide a performance bond. Therefore, the defendant is entitled to be paid $155,000 for the procurement of the OCBC Bond.
The plaintiff’s defence
- [53]
[53] The plaintiff denies that it is obliged to pay the defendant for the provision of the OCBC Bond as the defendant failed to comply with the requirements under the LOI which include the provision of an on-demand performance bond. The OCBC Bond provided by the defendant was a conditional performance bond instead of an on-demand performance bond. Furthermore, the OCBC Bond was only furnished more than a year after the execution of the LOI. These were in breach of the LOI. Hence, the plaintiff did not accept the OCBC conditional performance bond. Thus, the plaintiff submits that it is not liable to the defendant for the sum of $155,000.
The first $5 million of shared savings
The defendant’s counterclaim
- [54]
[54] This is the defendant’s counterclaim for its share of the first $5 million of the shared savings. The defendant submits that it is entitled to 50% of the total shared savings achieved in the completion of the Project. According to the defendant, the plaintiff did not pay the defendant its 50% share in the first $5 million of the shared savings because it was under the misapprehension that the defendant, by virtue of the defendant’s letter dated 6 April 2009 (“6 April Letter”), had offered to waive its share in the first $5 million of the shared savings. The defendant contends that out of goodwill and on a without prejudice basis, it stated in the 6 April Letter that it was prepared to waive its share in the first $5 million of the shared savings provided the plaintiff kept to the commercial terms of the LOI. The defendant argues that this meant that the plaintiff accepts that (i) the Preliminaries Sum was fixed at $12.3 million; (ii) there would be no reduction in the GMP figure; and (iii) there would be no change to the Management Contractor’s Fees. The plaintiff failed to comply with these conditions in its purported acceptance letter dated 9 May 2009 (“9 May Letter”). Accordingly, the defendant avers that the goodwill gesture to waive its share in the first $5 million of the shared savings was unenforceable and void.
- [55]
[55] The defendant also argues that the offer in the 6 April Letter was not a distinct or fixed offer but one which must be read in the light of the ongoing negotiations between the parties in their attempt to resolve their differences at that point in time. The defendant avers that these differences were not ultimately resolved and there was no agreement that the defendant would not take its share of the first $5 million of the shared savings.
- [56]
[56] Furthermore, the defendant argues that the plaintiff did not provide any consideration in return for the acceptance of the defendant’s offer in the 6 April Letter.
- [57]
[57] Therefore, the defendant submits that there was no binding agreement between the parties that the defendant would waive its share in the first $5 million of the shared savings. Thus, the defendant claims its share of the shared savings from the plaintiff.
The plaintiff’s defence
- [58]
[58] The plaintiff’s defence avers that by way of the 6 April Letter, the defendant had offered to forgo its share in the first $5 million of shared savings as part of their agreement post-LOI. This was a result of a compromise arising from the disagreements between the parties. The plaintiff duly accepted this offer. The plaintiff argues that the defendant intended the offer made in the 6 April Letter to be a binding offer. This binding offer was accepted by the plaintiff via its 9 May Letter. The plaintiff also argues that it had offered a valid consideration in return for the defendant’s offer in the 6 April Letter. In particular, the plaintiff had agreed to abstain from taking further actions against the defendant in the light of the ongoing disagreements between them and in return, the defendant agreed to waive its right to share in the first $5 million of the shared savings.
- [59]
[59] Thus, the plaintiff claims that the defendant is not entitled to its share in the first $5 million of the shared savings.
The delay in the Project’s completion
The plaintiff’s claim as regards the completion date of the Project
- [60]
[60] The Project was delayed for about a year and the plaintiff claims for liquidated damages in accordance with cl 6.0 of the LOI. First, the plaintiff argues that “completion” under cl 5.0 of the LOI is achieved only when:
(a) all works had complied with the requirements of the BCA and the various inspectors (“the Authorities”) before they are prepared to issue the Temporary Occupation Permit (“TOP”);
(b) all works, including those that are not required for TOP application (ie, “Non-TOP works”), in particular, testing and commissioning works had to be completed and accepted by the Authorities; and
(c) all documentation required by the Authorities (such as the relevant certifications) had been submitted by the defendant to the SO to allow the SO to apply for TOP.
- [61]
[61] The plaintiff relies on the various draft LOIs exchanged between the parties prior to the execution of the LOI to show that the parties had the above intention when they signed the LOI. The plaintiff also argues that the Project was not ready for TOP inspection and application as at 22 December 2010 (which is the date the defendant contends was the date of completion for the Project) as there were numerous works which were outstanding as of 22 December 2010.
- [62]
[62] However, the Project was only certified completed on 12 January 2011. Therefore, the plaintiff asserts that the defendant is liable for 355 days of delay. Hence, the plaintiff claims a total of $17,750,000 in liquidated damages. In the alternative, the plaintiff claims general damages from the defendant for the delays caused by the defendant in the completion of the Project under the common law. Thus, the plaintiff claims for loss of rental income and loss and damages arising from the payment of staff salaries on site during the period of delay of the Project.
The defendant’s defence as regards the completion date of the Project
- [64]
[64] As regards the issue of when the Project was completed, the defendant argues that “completion” under cl 5.0 of the signed LOI was achieved when the Project was ready for TOP application. The defendant relies on the draft LOI sent by DW2 in an email dated 28 June 2008 and the signed LOI as evidence of this intention. Thus, the defendant contends that the Project was ready for TOP application on 22 December 2010 because that was the date when the BCA directed that an application be made for TOP albeit subject to compliance with certain minor requirements imposed by the BCA.
- [65]
[65] The defendant also urges the court not to accord too much weight to the SO’s representative, Siah Puay Lin’s (“PW3”), evidence regarding the completion date for the Project because the SO in this case had adopted numerous conflicting approaches in assessing the actual completion date which had given rise to different completion dates. Therefore, the defendant submits that the Project was completed, according to cl 5.0 of the signed LOI, on 22 December 2010 instead of 12 January 2011.
The defendant’s allegations that the delays were caused by the plaintiff
- [66]
[66] The defendant further avers that it is not liable for any delay in the completion of the Project. First, the plaintiff had caused acts of prevention which set the time for completion under the LOI at large. Second, the Project was completed within reasonable time. The defendant contends that the plaintiff’s acts of prevention were as follows:
(a) The termination of the Resident Engineer (“RE”) by the plaintiff caused delay in the piling works;
(b) The delay in the award of the RC works trade contract due to the plaintiff’s standing instructions not to award any trade contracts without its approval. The plaintiff also interfered in the defendant’s tender process;
(c) The delay in the award of the Aluminium and Glazing work (“A&G works”) trade contract;
(d) The delay arising from the additional works from the Registered Inspector (“RI”) inspection; and
(e) Delay arising from the additional works from the BCA inspection.
- [67]
[67] The defendant’s contentions are as further elaborated:
(1) The termination of the RE
- [68]
[68] The defendant argues that the plaintiff had caused six days of delay from the period of 26 to 31 December 2008 due to the plaintiff’s termination of the RE on 23 December 2008 without an immediate replacement by JCPL who was also the SO. According to the defendant, piling works could not proceed without the presence of the RE on site. This is because the RE was required for the following two broad aspects of piling works:
(a) Boring works: the RE was required to decide, based on the soil sample excavated, whether the piles could terminate at a depth that was shorter than the requisite socketing depth; and
(b) Casting works: the RE was to decide or determine the founding depth of the piles. This was to ascertain if the hole excavated by the piling contractor had actually reached the required design parameters specified by the Qualified Person (“QP”) Design, and to ensure the pile would fulfil its designed load bearing capacity requirements.
- [69]
[69] The defendant highlighted that because the RE was not present on site, the trade contractors responsible for piling works were unable to cast any piles for the period of 26 to 31 December 2008 when they could have done so. The defendant submits that casting works was the critical stage of piling works and so without a RE, the piling works had effectively “stopped”. In fact, the defendant’s expert, Mr Koh Beng Soon (“DW4”) testified that the trade contractors for the piling works would have completed approximately 30 piles with only 6 piles outstanding if the RE had not been terminated. However, due to the termination of the RE, no piles were casted during this period. Therefore, the plaintiff’s termination of the RE had delayed the Project.
(2) Delay in the award of the RC works trade contract
- [70]
[70] The defendant alleges that the plaintiff had caused delay in the award of the RC works trade contract on the following grounds:
(a) The plaintiff had directed the defendant not to award the RC trade contract without its approval and had subsequently issued its approval late;
(b) The plaintiff had interfered in the tender process for the RC works trade contract by the late introduction of Chang Hua Pte Ltd (“Chang Hua”) in January 2009;
(c) The plaintiff delayed its grant of approval of the tender recommendation issued by the defendant on 5 February 2009; and
(d) Subsequently, instead of approving the tender recommendation issued by the defendant on 5 February 2009, the plaintiff introduced Tien Rui Pte Ltd and Shanghai Construction Co Pte Ltd’s (“Shanghai Tien Rui”) joint tender submissions on 24 April 2009 thus prompting the defendant to go through the whole tender process again.
- [71]
[71] The defendant also submits that the plaintiff’s directions not to award the RC works trade contract without its approval and subsequent conduct of delaying the award of the RC works trade contract were part and parcel of the plaintiff’s scheme to slow down the completion of the Project.
- [72]
[72] Finally, the defendant submits that the site was ready to receive the RC works trade contractors on 6 January 2009. However, the defendant contends that due to the plaintiff’s interference in the RC works tender process, the plaintiff’s directions not to award any trade contract without its approval, and later its delay in approving the tender recommendation for the RC works trade contract issued by the defendant, the defendant had paced its work by reference to the plaintiff’s delaying actions. Thus, the plaintiff had caused delay for the period from 2 January 2009 to 1 June 2009 when the RC works was awarded. This is 151 days of delay caused by the plaintiff.
(3) Delay in the award of the A&G works
- [73]
[73] It is not disputed by the parties that the tender report and recommendation for the award of the A&G works trade contract was issued for the plaintiff’s approval on 22 September 2009 but the plaintiff only gave its approval on 17 November 2009.
- [74]
[74] The defendant submits that the plaintiff is liable for causing critical delays between 12 October 2009 (instead of 22 September 2009) and 16 November 2009 – a total of 37 days of delay. This is because the defendant relied on DW4’s analysis which found that the A&G works trade contract needed to be awarded by 12 October 2009 so as to allow the relevant design information on the cast-in items to be provided to the RC works trade contractor by February 2010 when the relevant RC works for the second-storey slab were supposed to commence. DW4 derived the date of 12 October 2009 by calculating backwards from the projected date of the start of works for the second-storey slab in February 2010 based on the Master Program and taking into account the delay in the piling works and the award of the RC works trade contract (“Impacted Master Program”). On 17 November 2009, when the A&G works trade contract was awarded, the defendant submits that it is entitled to the 37 days’ delay because it could have used that time to do other catch-up works to make up for the fact that the Project was already in delay.
- [75]
[75] The defendant also submits that in the event the court finds that there was no actual delay to the progress of the Project arising from the plaintiff’s late award of the A&G works trade contract because the A&G works were completed faster than was planned, the defendant is nonetheless entitled to the full amount of time allocated for A&G works. According to DW4, the defendant should be entitled to 37 days’ delay.
(4) Delay arising from the RI and BCA inspections
- [76]
[76] On 4 November 2010, the RI conducted a combined mechanical and electrical, and architectural inspection of the Project site. By way of letter dated 9 November 2010, the SO informed the defendant that there were certain follow-up works which had to be done. The letter enclosed a list of the RI’s comments following from the inspection on 4 November 2010. In total, there were 42 items which required the defendant’s attention.
- [77]
[77] On 9 December 2010, the BCA conducted a pre-TOP inspection of the Project. By way of letter dated 9 December 2010, the SO wrote to the defendant enclosing a list of the BCA’s comments for the defendant to follow up on.
(5) Reasonable time to complete
- [79]
[79] The defendant avers that the various acts of prevention by the plaintiff set the time for the completion of the Project at large. Furthermore, there is no extension of time (“EOT”) clause under the LOI. Hence, the defendant asserts that cl 6.0 of the LOI on liquidated damages is no longer applicable.
- [80]
[80] The defendant further contends that the Project was completed within reasonable time. The defendant argues that in calculating reasonable time, the court should take a holistic view of the Project and have regard to the theoretical programme, the actual nature and scope of works to be done and the time needed to do so, as well as the actual site condition.
- [81]
[81] On this, the defendant submits that the court must look at the time actually taken to complete and then work backwards to see if that time was reasonable. The onus is then on the plaintiff, as employer, to show that the time actually taken to complete the Project was excessive. The defendant submits that the relevant factors this court should take into consideration in conducting this holistic analysis of reasonable time to complete are:
(a) the actual circumstances and site conditions;
(b) the actual scope of the works;
(c) correspondence which was exchanged between the parties as to the reasonable completion date;
(d) the amount of critical delays which each party was responsible for;
(e) the non-critical delays which each party was responsible for;
(f) the original contract duration;
(g) the contractual allocation of risk and/or the relevant contractual bargain;
(h) the nature of the Project;
(i) parties’ conduct towards the original contractual completion date; and
(j) any adjusted completion dates which were discussed by the parties.
- [82]
[82] The defendant relied on two English authorities for its propositions above: Pantland Hick v Raymond & Reid [1893] AC 22 (“Pantland Hick”) and Astea (UK) Ltd v Time Group [2003] All ER (D) 212 (“Astea”).
- [83]
[83] The defendant contends that the Project was completed within a reasonable time. Thus, the plaintiff is not entitled to seek general damages from the defendant for the delays it had itself caused.
- [84]
[84] The defendant also argues that in the event that the court finds that the completion date for the Project was 12 January 2011 instead of 22 December 2010, the defendant is not liable for the delay between 22 December 2010 to 12 January 2011. This period of delay was due primarily to the SO taking the time to apply for TOP and the time taken for the BCA to process the TOP application.
The plaintiff’s reply to the defendant’s claim that the delays were caused by the plaintiff
- [85]
[85] In reply to the defendant’s defence, the plaintiff pointed out that the defendant’s own expert, DW4, acknowledged that the defendant was responsible for 120 days of delay. The plaintiff accepts that some of its actions, in the course of the Project, may have the potential to disrupt the works. However, these actions did not actually cause critical delays to the completion of the Project as the defendant’s delay was the dominant and effective cause of the delay to the progress of the work.
- [86]
[86] I shall now elaborate on the plaintiff’s responses to the various causes of delay which the defendant alleged were caused by the plaintiff.
(1) The termination of the RE
- [87]
[87] In relation to the termination of the RE by the plaintiff for corruption without an immediate replacement, the plaintiff submits that the termination did not cause delay to the piling works for three reasons. First, the plaintiff argues that the court should dismiss the defendant’s case on this issue because its pleaded position was inconsistent. The defendant pleaded that all boring and casting works had stopped but later at trial changed its case to one where only casting works had stopped.
- [89]
[89] Third, the plaintiff submits that if anything, the piling works were in fact delayed by the defendant. The plaintiff avers that the defendant, as management contractor, failed to take any counter-measures or mitigating steps to avoid any delay caused by the termination of the RE. For example, the defendant could have asked its Supervision QP (Structure) from Parsons to step into the shoes of the RE. Alternatively, the defendant could have asked the SO, JCPL, for instructions or to take steps to ensure an alternative engineer was present to undertake the role of the RE. The plaintiff argues that this would have been consistent with the Building Control Act (Cap 29, 1999 Rev Ed) (“Building Control Act”).
- [90]
[90] In any event, the plaintiff submits that it should not be held liable for any delays during the period of 29 to 30 December 2008 because the replacement RE was appointed on 29 December 2008.
(2) Delay in the award of the RC works trade contract
- [91]
[91] In relation to the tender award for the RC works, the plaintiff first avers that its instruction to the defendant on 13 December 2008 to seek the plaintiff’s approval before awarding any tender for trade works did not cause delay in the defendant awarding trade contracts under the LOI. This instruction was not to stop or slow down the progress of the works but to ensure that the plaintiff’s interest was protected. Furthermore, the plaintiff informed the defendant in a meeting on 14 January 2009 that it was for the defendant to decide the tendering process and the award of trade contracts. Thus the plaintiff had retracted its 13 December 2008 instruction, and the defendant knew that it should not be used as an excuse to delay the tendering process.
- [93]
[93] In any event, the plaintiff also avers that the site was not ready to receive the RC works trade contractor until 1 March 2009. Thus, the plaintiff is not liable for any delay caused by the late introduction of Chang Hua in January 2009 because the defendant was not even ready to receive the RC works trade contractor on site. Thus, the plaintiff’s interference in the award of the RC works did not cause any actual delay in the Project’s completion.
(3) Delay in the award of the A&G works
- [94]
[94] In relation to the A&G works, the plaintiff first avers that the delay was caused by the defendant’s delay in the RC works. This had a knock-on effect and the A&G works trade contractor could not commence its works on time. Hence the purported delay by the plaintiff in the award of the A&G works did not effectively interrupt the progress of the Project. In any event, the plaintiff avers that because the defendant was late in awarding the RC works, the defendant was not in a position to commence the A&G works on 17 November 2009, the date the A&G works trade contract was awarded.
- [95]
[95] As for the defendant’s case that it needed the plaintiff’s approval before awarding the trade contract, the plaintiff submits that the defendant need not have waited for the plaintiff’s approval to award trade contracts and that this instruction was not conveyed by the defendant to its site management staff. The plaintiff further argues that the late approval of the award of the A&G works trade contract did not affect the critical path of the Project because at the date the A&G works trade contract was awarded, the RC works were far from ready to receive the A&G works. On 17 November 2009, when the A&G works trade contract was awarded, the RC works were still at the basement two level. Thus, even though the A&G works trade contract was awarded on 17 November 2009, the A&G works could not have commenced on the same day.
(4) Delay arising from the RI and BCA inspections
- [96]
[96] As for the rectification works that the defendant was required to do after the RI inspection and the BCA inspection, the plaintiff argues that the fabrication and installation of additional signage and additional railing works were compliance works that the defendant was required to fulfil under the LOI. It is an express and/or implied term in the LOI that such compliance works fall within the scope of the defendant’s work. The plaintiff also argues that the fabrication and installation of additional signage would have been provided in the scope of work of Biopolis II which formed the basis of the scope of work of the defendant under the LOI.
- [97]
[97] In the event the court finds that these were additional works, the plaintiff argues that there was no delay caused to the completion of the Project as the fabrication and installation of the additional signage and the additional railing works were completed before the other rectification works were completed. Therefore, these were not critical and they did not affect Project completion.
- [98]
[98] Finally, the plaintiff argues that in any event, the Master Program had catered 21 days for rectification works. This is more than adequate for the defendant to complete the additional works.
(5) Reasonable time to complete
- [99]
[99] The plaintiff argues that in the event this court finds that the plaintiff had committed an act of prevention and so caused actual delay to the completion of the Project (ie, they are critical delay), the court should merely add the number of days of delay caused by the plaintiff to the contract period of 18 months under the LOI to determine the reasonable time for completion. The plaintiff submits that this was the approach adopted in Fongsoon Engineering (S) Pte Ltd v Kensteel Engineering Pte Ltd [2011] SGHC 82 (“Fongsoon”), and this court should not depart from that approach. In the final analysis, the plaintiff argues that it is not liable for a single day of delay. Thus, the defendant is liable for all the delays in the Project’s completion.
Issues to be determined
- [100]
[100] Having considered the parties’ respective cases on the disputed issues above, the issues that arise for my determination are:
(a) Whether the parties agreed that the defendant’s Preliminaries Sum was fixed at $12.3 million under the signed LOI or that the Preliminaries Sum in the signed LOI was only tentative and that the parties intended the Preliminaries Sum to be finalised within four weeks of the commencement of the Project (“Issue 1”);
(b) Whether the defendant is entitled to its counterclaim of $155,000, which is the cost it incurred to procure the OCBC Bond for the plaintiff (“Issue 2”);
(c) Whether the defendant had waived its share in the first $5 million of the shared savings (“Issue 3”); and
(d) What is the duration of the delay in the Project and what are the liabilities of the respective parties for causing the delay? (“Issue 4”).
- [101]
[101] In relation to the last issue on delay, I must first determine what constitutes the Project completion under cl 5.0 of the LOI and then determine the effective completion date of the Project. I shall then have to ascertain the liabilities of the parties for causing the delays in the completion of the Project. Accordingly, I have to consider the following issues relating to the delays:
(a) Did the plaintiff and/or the defendant cause any delay when the plaintiff terminated the RE without any immediate replacement? If so, what is the duration of the delay?
(b) Did the plaintiff and/or the defendant cause any delay in the award of the RC works to the trade contractor, namely MA Builders Pte Ltd? If so, what is the duration of the delay?
(c) Did the plaintiff and/or the defendant cause any delay in the award of the A&G works to Positive Engineering Pte Ltd? If so, what is the duration of the delay?
(d) Should the defendant be held responsible for the delay caused by the additional works, particularly the fabrication and installation of the additional signage, as instructed by the RI? If so, what is the duration of the delay?
(e) Should the defendant be held responsible for the delay caused by the additional works, specifically the additional railing works, as instructed by the BCA? If so, what is the duration of the delay?
- [102]
[102] Finally, if the plaintiff’s conduct caused the delays, whether these are acts of prevention which set the contract period under the signed LOI at large. If the plaintiff had committed acts of prevention, whether the Project was nevertheless completed in a reasonable time. If there were delays, I shall have to determine the type of damages to be awarded to the plaintiff (ie, whether the liquidated damages clause under cl 6.0 of the signed LOI applies or the plaintiff is entitled to general damages under the common law).
My decision
- [103]
[103] I shall deal first with the non-delay issues followed by the various issues relating to the delays.
Issue 1: Whether it was agreed that the Preliminaries Sum was fixed at $12.3 million or the parties intended the Preliminaries Sum to be finalised within four weeks of the commencement of the Project
The law
- [104]
[104] The Court of Appeal in CIFG Special Assets Capital I Ltd (formerly known as Diamond Kendall Ltd) v Ong Puay Koon and others and another appeal [2018] 1 SLR 170 had succinctly laid down the relevant principles to be applied in the construction of contracts at [19]:
- [105]
[105] Furthermore, the Court of Appeal in Sembcorp Marine Ltd v PPL Holdings Pte Ltd and another and another appeal [2013] 4 SLR 193 (“Sembcorp”) laid down strict requirements in relation to pleadings of extrinsic facts for the purpose of contractual interpretation (at [73]):
- [106]
[106] The Court of Appeal then explained that the effect of failing to comply with the above-stated requirements is that extrinsic facts placed before the court will not be accorded any weight when a court is construing a contract (Sembcorp at [74]).
- [107]
[107] In that light, I shall now consider the ordinary meaning of cll 1.0 and 7.1 of the LOI before looking at the context and relevant background facts pleaded by the parties leading up to the signing of the LOI on 30 June 2008. This is to consider whether my interpretation of cll 1.0 and 7.1 of the LOI is consistent with both the wordings of these clauses and the intention of the parties when they signed the LOI.
Ordinary meaning of cll 1.0 and 7.1 of the LOI
- [108]
[108] For ease of reference, I shall again reproduce cll 1.0 and 7.1 of the LOI below: Clause 1.0 of the LOI states as follows:
- [109]
[109] Clause 7.1 of the LOI states as follows:
- [110]
[110] From the above, I find that it is clear that the Preliminaries Sum under cl 1.0 is a fixed sum of $12.3 million. This provision of the signed LOI did not in any way, whether expressly or impliedly, state that the Preliminaries Sum is a tentative figure which is to be re-negotiated and agreed upon within four weeks of the commencement of the Project. I shall now explain my findings.
- [111]
[111] First, it is clearly stated in an unambiguous manner under cl 1.0 that the “Contract Sum shall be at … S$95,870,000.00” after which the signed LOI then gives a breakdown of how this figure is derived. It states clearly that the “Preliminaries (Fixed Sum)” is $12.3 million which is $13,602,500.00 less $1,302,500.000 which is the “Profit and Attendance for the Management Contractor [which] shall be … up to the limit of S$1,302,500.00”. The “Preliminaries (Fixed Sum)” is part of the total Contract Sum. However, clause 1.0 does not state that the Contract Sum of $95,870,000.00 is a tentative or provisional figure and that it has to be recalculated because the Preliminaries (Fixed Sum) is to be re-negotiated within four weeks of the commencement of the Project.
- [112]
[112] Second, cl 7 of the signed LOI deals with all matters concerning terms of payment as the name of this clause suggests. Clause 7.1 is titled “Management Contractor’s Preliminaries” and it explains that the defendant will be paid 10% down payment of the $12.3 million within 30 days of the date of the signed LOI or acceptance of the signed LOI by the defendant whichever is the later. Subsequent payments to the defendant shall be on a monthly basis based on actual work done/certified. Clause 7.1 further elaborates how the down payment monies are to be adjusted. Clause 7.2 states that the defendant’s Management Contractor’s Fees will be paid based on work done/certified, while cl 7.3 states the terms of payment for trade contractors. It is clear that cll 7.1 to 7.3 deal with the various terms of payment for the Project.
- [113]
[113] As it is not denied that the second paragraph of cl 7.1 of the signed LOI was inserted by the plaintiff and as this paragraph is under the section of the signed LOI which deals with the terms of payment for the defendant’s preliminaries, the above provision must obviously relate to the terms of payment relating to the defendant’s preliminaries. This is further reinforced by my findings, which I shall discuss in greater detail below, that the second paragraph of cl 7.1 of the signed LOI was inserted by the plaintiff to replace the defendant’s request for 60% advance payment of the Preliminaries Sum of $12.3 million. Therefore, the parties’ intention regarding the second paragraph of cl 7.1 of the signed LOI was not that the Preliminaries Sum of $12.3 million had to be further negotiated after the signed LOI. If this was indeed the intention of the parties, the plaintiff would not have parked this provision under the terms of payment of the defendant’s Preliminaries Sum. Instead the plaintiff would have amended cl 1.2 of the signed LOI to indicate that the Preliminaries Sum of $12.3 million has yet to be agreed.
- [114]
[114] Finally, if the second paragraph of cl 7.1 of the signed LOI is read in isolation and to the exclusion of the rest of the signed LOI, even ignoring the heading of this clause, then it might arguably be regarded as ambiguous. It is possible to mean as what the plaintiff has advocated, ie, that the Preliminaries Sum “is to be agreed within 4 weeks from the date of the project commencement”. However, as it is undisputed that the second paragraph of cl 7.1 of the signed LOI was drafted by the plaintiff, ie, PW2, under the principle of contra proferentum, any ambiguity in cl 7.1 is to be construed against the plaintiff. This court in Legis Point LLC v Tay Choon Ai [2018] 3 SLR 1269 at [67] stated that under the contra proferentum principle, “a viable interpretation that is against the interests of the draftsman is to be preferred”. Accordingly, the contra proferentum principle applies such that cl 7.1 is construed against the interests of the plaintiff. Therefore, the Preliminaries Sum of $12.3 million was fixed, and not tentative or provisional.
Reading cll 1.0 and 7.1 in the context of the signed LOI as a whole
- [115]
[115] A perusal of the signed LOI reveals that the parties had designed a contractual framework in the signed LOI such that items which were intended to be provisional were expressly stated to be so. This can be seen in cll 1.1 and 1.2 of the signed LOI which referred to Provisional Items and it made reference to eight items making up the Provisional Items. These eight items were termed Provisional Items with the agreement of the parties that the prices for these items and the scope of work involved in these works were to be negotiated and agreed at a later time. Examples of these Provisional Items are the “Landscape Works” and “Art/Sculptures”. Therefore, if the parties had intended for the Preliminaries Sum of $12.3 million to be provisional or tentative, it would have been excluded from the Contract Sum in cl 1.2. The Preliminaries Sum would have been categorised as a “Provisional Item”. This was not the case and the LOI clearly states that the “Preliminaries (Fixed Sum)” is $12.3 million.
- [116]
[116] I shall now consider whether the plain and contextual interpretation of cll 1.0 and 7.1 of the LOI which I have come to above is consistent with the events leading up to the parties’ signing of the LOI on 30 June 2008.
The events leading up to the signing of the LOI
- [118]
[118] As for the second paragraph of cl 7.1 of the signed LOI, upon tracing the correspondence between the parties and the evolution of the drafts of the LOI in the lead-up to the signing of the final LOI, I find that the evidence clearly supports the finding that this paragraph was not meant for the parties to re-negotiate the Preliminaries Sum but for the parties to agree within four weeks from the commencement of the Project how the fixed sum of $12.3 million was to be disbursed to the defendant throughout the duration of the Project. This was the reason for the plaintiff to replace the defendant’s request for 60% advance payment at the second paragraph of cl 7.1 with a completely different second paragraph of cl 7.1 in the signed LOI.
- [119]
[119] I shall now elaborate.
(1) The plaintiff knew that the defendant’s Preliminaries Sum was fixed at $12.3 million
- [120]
[120] First, when the plaintiff executed the LOI, the plaintiff was not inexperienced in the construction industry. PW1 had testified that he had experience as both developer and management contractor in the past. Although those past projects were not in the construction of a bespoke industrial building for a specialised industry such as the biomedical industry, the concept of what the job scope of a management contractor is as compared to the job scope of a trade contractor should not differ too greatly.
- [121]
[121] In particular, PW1 testified that he was aware that a management contractor would be required to provide general preliminaries on site while a trade contractor would be required to provide preliminaries specific to its trade work:
- [126]
[126] Third, the plaintiff also argues that there was nothing on the face of the documents prior to the signing of the LOI to indicate that it is to pay for the defendant’s preliminaries separately from the trade contractors’ preliminaries. The plaintiff cited the main GMP contract framework (the “Main Contract Framework”) it received from the defendant on 11 April 2008 which merely stated that $12.3 million was for “Main Building Works for Biopolis III at One-North”. The draft LOIs also did not draw any distinctions between the defendant’s preliminaries and the trade contractors’ preliminaries. The plaintiff also cited the June Preliminaries Breakdown provided by the defendant which did not state that it is only the management contractor’s preliminaries.
- [128]
[128] The Main Contract Framework indicated that the “Fixed Preliminaries” was for $12.3 million. Although it did not expressly state that the Fixed Preliminaries was for the management contractor, the logical inference, reading this Main Contract Framework, must be that the Fixed Preliminaries referred to the management contractor’s preliminaries as there was a breakdown of the Fixed Preliminaries attached to the Main Contract Framework. The breakdown of the Fixed Preliminaries made no reference to the trade preliminaries. Those items in the breakdown referred to the management of the main building works which were the responsibilities of the management contractor, ie, the defendant.
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