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Grounds publishedDecided 23 Apr 2019

High Court

Public Prosecutor v Ridhaudin Ridhwan bin Bakri and others

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[2019] SGHC 105Case no. Criminal Case No 35 of 2016

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] Three accused persons, Mr Ridhaudin Ridhwan bin Bakri (“Ridhwan”), Mr Muhammad Faris bin Ramlee (“Faris”), and Mr Asep Ardiansyah (“Asep”), were jointly tried before me for a number of sexual offences allegedly committed against a female Singaporean (“the Complainant”) on 26 January 2014 in Room 310 (“the Room”) of a hotel formerly located along Duxton Road, Singapore (“the Duxton Hotel”). The Duxton Hotel has since been torn down. At the time of these alleged offences, the Complainant was 18 years of age, while each of the three accused persons was 20 years of age.

  3. [2] Ridhwan, the first accused, is a Singaporean male facing three charges:

  4. (a) One charge of sexual assault by penetration under s 376(2)(a) of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) (“PC”), punishable under s 376(3) of the PC, for penetrating the Complainant’s anus with his finger without her consent, in the living room of the Room, sometime on the morning of 26 January 2014 (“the 1st Charge”).

  5. (b) One charge of rape under s 375(1)(a), punishable under s 375(2) of the PC, for penetrating the Complainant’s vagina with his penis without her consent, in the living room of the Room, sometime in the morning of 26 January 2014 (“the 2nd Charge”).

  6. (c) One charge of using criminal force with intent to outrage the modesty of the Complainant punishable under s 354(1) of the PC, for sucking her nipples, in the living room of the Room, sometime in the morning of 26 January 2014 (“the 3rd Charge”).

  7. [3] Faris, the second accused, is a Singaporean male facing two charges:

  8. (a) One charge of rape under s 375(1)(a), punishable under s 375(2) of the PC, for inserting his penis into the Complainant’s vagina without her consent, in the bathroom of the Room, sometime in the morning of 26 January 2014 (“the 4th Charge”).

  9. (b) One charge of sexual assault by penetration under s 376(2)(a), punishable under s 376(3) of the PC, for penetrating the Complainant’s vagina with his finger without her consent, in the living room of the Room, sometime in the morning of 26 January 2014 (“the 5th Charge”).

  10. [4] Asep, the third accused, is also a Singaporean male, and he faces the following two charges:

  11. (a) One charge of sexual assault by penetration under s 376(1)(a), punishable under s 376(3) of the PC, for penetrating the Complainant’s mouth with his penis without her consent, in the bathroom of the Room, sometime in the morning of 26 January 2014 (“the 6th Charge”).

  12. (b) One charge of attempted rape under s 375(1)(a), punishable under s 375(2) read with s 511 of the PC, for attempting to insert his penis into the Complainant’s vagina without her consent, in the bathroom of the Room, sometime in the morning of 26 January 2014 (“the 7th Charge”).

  13. [5] In relation to a majority of these charges, the accused persons did not dispute that the relevant sexual activity had occurred between each of them and the Complainant, but argued that such activity had been consensual. Therefore, two of the main issues in contention are whether the Complainant had the capacity to give consent at the material time of the offences, and if so, whether she did in fact give such consent.

  14. Background

  15. [6] I will first set out the background before dealing with the areas of contention in greater detail.

  16. [7] The alleged offences occurred in the morning of 26 January 2014. The three accused persons and the Complainant had met for the first time on the evening prior, on 25 January 2014, at a birthday party for Mr Muhammad Elmi Ching bin Aman (“Elmi”) which was planned by his then-girlfriend, Ms Ros Izzati Atiqah binte Mohd Zulkifli (“Izzati”). This party was held in the Room, which was internally divided into two floors. On the first floor was the living room, which comprised a seating area with tables, sofas and a television. The main door, which was the only entrance and exit out of the Room, was located on this floor. A spiral staircase connected the first floor to the mezzanine level, which I shall refer to as “the second floor”. On this second floor was a bedroom containing a double bed and a cabinet, and the Room’s only bathroom, which some witnesses also referred to as the “toilet”. The bathroom layout was rectangular and on entering it, one would see a bathtub on the right, a water closet on the left, and the sink with a counter-top in front of the door. Above the sink was a mirror that faced the bathroom door.

  17. [8] The Complainant did not know and had not met the accused persons, Elmi, or Izzati prior to 25 January 2014. Her original plan for that evening was to meet some friends and then visit a nightclub. Shortly after 10pm, however, Mr Muhammad Fadly bin Abdull Wahab (“Fadly”) messaged her and invited her to have drinks at Elmi’s birthday party. Although Fadly repeatedly urged her to come alone, the Complainant insisted on bringing along her friend, Mr Mohamed Affandi bin Ibrahim (“Affandi”), and Fadly eventually agreed. Evidence showed that, at that time, Fadly was planning to get the Complainant drunk at the party and had brought along a bottle of vodka for that purpose. The three accused persons were Elmi’s friends and were also invited to the party.

  18. [9] The Complainant and Affandi arrived at the Duxton Hotel close to or slightly after midnight on 26 January 2014. By the time they joined the party, all three accused persons, together with Elmi, Izzati, and the other attendees, were already in the Room and were engaging in casual conversations at the first floor while consuming alcohol. The Complainant sat next to Fadly on a sofa. Conversations continued and, save for Izzati, all the attendees consumed alcohol. The Complainant behaved normally at the time of her arrival, and she subsequently interacted mostly with Fadly and Affandi. According to the Complainant, she had not consumed any alcohol earlier that evening prior to arriving at the party. I will elaborate later on the evidence on the type and amount of alcohol that she consumed at the party (see below at [141]).

  19. [10] After some time, an impromptu plan was made for the attendees of the party to head to a nightclub named Zouk. At around 1am on 26 January 2014, as the attendees were preparing to leave the Room for Zouk, the Complainant tried to stand up on her own but had difficulty doing so. She collapsed onto the ground, and some evidence suggested that she vomited on the floor. Fadly then brought the Complainant to the bathroom on the second floor. When it became clear that the Complainant would not be able to go to Zouk, Fadly and Mr Muhammad Hazly Bin Mohamad Halimi (“Hazly”) elected to stay behind with her while the other attendees made their way to the nightclub. I shall refer to those who left for Zouk collectively as “the Group”.

  20. [11] After the Group had left the Room, Fadly and/or Hazly brought the Complainant out of the bathroom and placed her on the bed on the second floor. The two men then took a photo of themselves with the Complainant partially undressed and her breasts exposed. At this point, the Complainant was still unconscious. Fadly then sent the photo to his friend at around 1.58am.

  21. [12] At around 2.20am, Elmi returned to the Room to pick up Izzati’s identification card (“IC”). He testified that, upon his return, he saw that the Complainant was fully dressed by that time, but she was in an unconscious state on the ground of the second floor of the Room. Fadly tried to wake the Complainant and asked if she was alright, but she did not respond. As Elmi was in a rush, he left quickly thereafter and estimated that he had only spent around one to two minutes in the Room.

  22. [13] After Elmi left, Fadly and Hazly raped the Complainant in the bedroom of the second floor while she was unconscious. As at the time of this trial, they have pleaded guilty to charges of rape and have been convicted and sentenced by another court.

  23. [14] Meanwhile, at Zouk, Asep got into an altercation. His shirt was torn and thus he had to return to the Room. He returned alone. According to Asep, he initially sat on the sofa on the first floor. He then went to the bathroom on the second floor. He said that he saw the Complainant seated in the bathtub, and that she was leaning back and her legs were straight. He soon left the bathroom and returned to the first floor. Sometime later, Ridhwan and Faris also returned to the Room. At this point, the persons in the Room were the three accused persons, as well as Fadly, Hazly, and the Complainant.

  24. [15] It was undisputed that, at some point after returning from Zouk, Faris went to the bathroom on the second floor and had sexual intercourse with the Complainant. However, issues relating to the Complainant’s consent and her capacity to do so remain in contention. In essence, the Complainant could recall little about what had occurred in the bathroom that morning, and the Prosecution’s case was that she had neither the capacity to consent, nor had she in fact consented to sexual intercourse with Faris. On the other hand, Faris’ account was that the Complainant had propositioned him for sex while he was in the bathroom with her, and thereafter consented to penile-vaginal intercourse with him. These events form the basis of the 4th Charge (see [3(a)] above).

  25. [16] Subsequently, after Faris exited the bathroom alone, Asep went to use the bathroom. Similarly, while issues relating to the Complainant’s consent and her capacity to do so remain in dispute, it was not contested that, while in the bathroom with the Complainant, Asep had inserted his penis into the Complainant’s mouth, and that he had also attempted to insert his penis into her vagina although he did not eventually manage to do so as he lost his erection. These events form the basis for the 6th and 7th Charges (see [4(a)] and [4(b)] above).

  26. [17] Elmi and Izzati returned to the Room at around 5.04am while Asep and the Complainant were in the bathroom. They made their way to the second floor to use the bathroom. They saw that the bathroom door was partially closed and one of them gave it a slight push, causing it to swing open at a wider angle. Elmi testified that although the bathroom was dark, he could see a reflection of Asep and the Complainant in the mirror. According to him, the two persons were standing near the sink and facing the mirror with Asep standing behind the Complainant. Both were topless, though Elmi could not see if the bottom half of their bodies were also exposed. Izzati’s evidence was that from where she stood near the bathroom door, she could not see anything because the bathroom lights were switched off.

  27. [18] When Elmi pushed the door open, Asep quickly pushed the door shut. A few minutes later, Asep emerged from the bathroom alone. Izzati then entered the bathroom. She saw the Complainant and asked Elmi to get Fadly to help the Complainant out of the bathroom. Fadly, who was initially on the first floor, then went to the second floor, assisted the Complainant out of the bathroom, and brought her to the first floor. The witnesses’ observations of the Complainant’s condition at this time are material, and I will revisit them later in the analysis (see [160]-[164] below).

  28. [19] Eventually, the Complainant ended up lying down on the first floor near the main door of the Room. At this point, the three accused persons, as well as Fadly and Hazly, were also on the first floor where they slept for the night. Elmi, Izzati and another individual slept on the bed on the second floor.

  29. [20] It was not in dispute that, sometime later that morning, Ridhwan, who initially slept near the spiral staircase and later moved to sleep next to the Complainant, had penile-vaginal intercourse with the Complainant and also sucked her nipples. These events form the basis for the 2nd and 3rd Charges (see [2(b)] and [2(c)] above), and in this regard, the contested issues again relate to the Complainant’s consent and her capacity to do so. In essence, the Complainant’s account was that she could remember some of these events that transpired in the living room that morning, but that she did not consent and had been too weak and confused to resist or scream at that time. On the other hand, Ridhwan claimed that the Complainant had consented to such intercourse and sexual activity with him, and had in fact initiated such activity. In addition, the 1st Charge against Ridhwan accuses him of digitally penetrating the anus of the Complainant at around the same time and location (see [2(a)] above). Ridhwan’s explanation was that he had done so by mistake while trying to locate the Complainant’s vagina.

  30. [21] In addition to the charges relating to events that occurred in the bathroom, Faris was also accused of inserting his finger into the Complainant’s vagina in the living room around the same time that morning as when Ridhwan committed the alleged offences mentioned above. This forms the basis of the 5th Charge against Faris (see [3(b)] above). Faris disputed that such penetration had in fact occurred.

  31. [22] According to the Complainant, after the events that transpired with Ridhwan and Faris in the living room, the next thing she remembered was waking up later that morning and hearing one male person, whom she subsequently identified as Ridhwan, saying “I pity her” in Malay (“aku kesian tengok dia”), and a male person whom she identified as Faris agreeing. She testified that she had pretended to sleep for a period because she wanted to know what the others were talking about, and because she felt shy, embarrassed, and disappointed. Sometime later, she sat up and made her way to the bathroom on the second floor of the Room on her own. By that time, most of the persons in the Room were awake. The Complainant soon left the Duxton Hotel with Fadly and Hazly, who sent her to a nearby MRT station in a taxi. From there, she made her own way home by public transport to Johor Bahru, Malaysia.

  32. [23] In the ensuing period, the Complainant exchanged WhatsApp messages with some of her friends about what had allegedly happened in the morning of 26 January 2014 in the Room. Meanwhile, the accused persons and other attendees of Elmi’s birthday party also exchanged messages regarding these events. These messages are material and I will elaborate on them later.

  33. [24] Two days later, on 28 January 2014, the Complainant filed a police report which led to the separate arrests of the three accused persons on or around 29 January 2014.

  34. Overview of the evidence

  35. Witnesses

  36. [25] In respect of the main trial, the Prosecution adduced evidence from a total of 54 witnesses. 16 of those witnesses (comprising 15 factual witnesses and one expert) testified in court and supplemented their conditioned statements with oral testimony. The conditioned statements of the remaining 38 witnesses were admitted by consent.

  37. [26] As for the accused persons, they each testified in their defence at trial, and jointly relied on the evidence of one expert witness. In addition, Ridhwan also called Fadly as his witness.

  38. The accused persons’ statements to the police

  39. [27] The Prosecution relied heavily on the statements given by the three accused persons to the police during the course of the investigations. All of these statements were taken at the Police Cantonment Complex (“PCC”). I will briefly outline them here and elaborate on them where necessary in the analysis.

  40. Faris’ statements to the police

  41. [28] The Prosecution relied on two statements given by Faris to the police:

  42. (a) The first was recorded by Inspector Thermizi Tho (as he then was) (“ISP Tho”) on 30 January 2014 from about 12.45am to 2.05am pursuant to s 33 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) (“CPC”) (“Faris’ 1st Statement”).

  43. (b) The second was recorded by then-Assistant Superintendent Arun Guruswamy (“ASP Guruswamy”) on 16 October 2014 from about 6.50pm to 9.00pm pursuant to s 22 of the CPC (“Faris’ 2nd Statement”).

  44. [29] At trial, Faris challenged the admissibility of both of these police statements. An ancillary hearing was thus held, which I will discuss later.

  45. Asep’s statements to the police

  46. [30] Asep gave four statements to the police. The Prosecution relied on two of his statements:

  47. (a) The first was recorded by Assistant Superintendent Mohamed Razif (“ASP Razif”) on 30 January 2014 from around 12.28am to 2.00am pursuant to s 22 of the CPC (“Asep’s 1st Statement”).

  48. (b) The second was recorded by ASP Guruswamy on 16 October 2014 from about 9.11pm to 11.15pm also pursuant to s 22 of the CPC (“Asep’s 2nd Statement”).

  49. [31] Asep challenged the admissibility of his 2nd Statement. I will discuss the relevant ancillary hearing later.

  50. Ridhwan’s statements to the police

  51. [32] Ridhwan gave four statements to the police. The Prosecution relied on three of his statements:

  52. (a) The first was recorded by Assistant Superintendent Amos Tang (“ASP Tang”) on 30 January 2014 from about 12.04am to 1.03am pursuant to s 22 of the CPC (“Ridhwan’s 1st Statement”).

  53. (b) The second was recorded by Senior Investigation Officer Suzana Sajari (“SIO Sajari”) on 3 February 2014 from about 11.30am to 1.50pm pursuant to s 22 of the CPC (“Ridhwan’s 2nd Statement”).

  54. (c) The third was recorded by ASP Guruswamy on 5 February 2014 from about 12.00pm to 2.20pm pursuant to s 22 of the CPC (“Ridhwan’s 3rd Statement”).

  55. [33] Ridhwan did not challenge the admissibility of any of his police statements.

  56. The expert evidence

  57. [34] As the issue of the Complainant’s capacity to consent at the material time was heavily contested, both parties also relied on expert opinion to buttress their respective cases in this regard.

  58. [35] The Prosecution relied on the opinion of Dr Guo Song (“Dr Guo”), a senior consultant psychiatrist from the Institute of Mental Health (“IMH”). Dr Guo produced two written reports and supplemented them with oral testimony in court. The two reports were:

  59. (a) The first dated 22 October 2015, comprising 11 pages in total. This report should be read together with (i) a two-page errata, and (ii) several articles which Dr Guo referred to in the report and subsequently produced at trial. I shall refer to these documents collectively as “Dr Guo’s 1st Report”.

  60. (b) The second dated 12 July 2016 (“Dr Guo’s 2nd Report”), comprising two pages, was supplementary to Dr Guo’s 1st Report.

  61. [36] The three accused persons relied on the expert opinion of Dr Munidasa Winslow (“Dr Winslow”) of Promises Healthcare Pte Ltd. Dr Winslow produced one report of six pages dated 13 September 2016 (“Dr Winslow’s Report”) and supplemented it with oral testimony.

  62. Preliminary matters

  63. [37] Before turning to the issues of criminal liability and the ancillary hearings proper, I will address two preliminary matters.

  64. [39] Second, at the commencement of trial, Asep objected to the conduct of a joint trial. The basis of the objection was that the Prosecution would be seeking to admit and rely on Faris’ police statements, and that the contents of those statements – specifically, the parts relating to the Complainant’s state of consciousness in the early morning of 26 January 2014 – would be prejudicial to his defence. In this regard, Asep relied on s 258(5) of the CPC and argued that since he and Faris were charged for distinct offences, the court was not allowed to rely on Faris’ statements in determining his guilt. In that light, a joint trial should be avoided as it would be practically difficult for the court to ignore Faris’ statements while assessing Asep’s guilt.

  65. [40] The other two accused persons, Faris and Ridhwan, had no objections to the joint trial.

  66. [43] In the present case, I was of the view that the alleged offences of the three accused persons were committed “in the same transaction”. The alleged offences clearly shared a close proximity in time and place, and there was also strong continuity in action as they formed part of a chain of events which related proximally to each other. As for unity in purpose, in so far as the Prosecution’s case was concerned, the three accused persons shared similar motives and designs against the Complainant. Although there was no allegation that the accused persons had acted in concert, such an allegation was not necessary: “Community of purpose in the sense of conspiracy is not in any way necessary, though if it is present, its presence will be a further element supporting a finding that the offences are committed in the same transaction” (Nathan Tse at [31], quoting Mitra on the Code of Criminal Procedure (16th ed, 1987) at p 1385). Indeed, even if it could not strictly be said that the alleged offences were united in purpose, I was of the view that they were so proximally and circumstantially connected that the facts compelled their being treated as part of the same transaction.

  67. [45] In any event, even if the alleged offences were not so proximate as to constitute the same transaction under s 143(b) of the CPC, they would fall within s 143(c) of the CPC which permits joint trials to be held for persons accused of “2 of more offences which form or are a part of a series of offences of the same or a similar character”. In my view, the present charges constituted a series of offences which shared a close physical, temporal, and circumstantial nexus. The charges also related to offences of the same or a similar character, ie, sexual offences of varying severity committed against the same complainant. Similar reasoning was adopted in Public Prosecutor v Muhammad Rahmatullah Maniam bin Abdullah and another [1999] SGHC 252 (“Rahmatullah”) which considered the predecessor provision to s 143(c) of the CPC. There, the High Court held that two accused persons who had sexually assaulted the same victim on the same morning and at around the same place could be jointly tried, even though they had committed the offences without the knowledge or involvement of the other person (Rahmatullah at [25]), and even though there “was no indication of any common purpose or unity of purpose” (Rahmatullah at [26]), based on the following reasoning:

  68. [46] As for the appropriate exercise of discretion in this case, I was of the view that the following factors supported the ordering of a joint trial:

  69. (a) I agreed with the Prosecution that given the close proximity in time and place of the alleged offences, and the significant overlap in witnesses and evidence against each of the accused persons, it was in the public interest for the court to conduct a holistic examination of the entire sequence of events that transpired in the early morning of 26 January 2014 rather than to attempt to segregate and confine the evidence to very specific and isolated instances in that morning. This would be done subject to the caveat that a confession by any of the accused persons would not be used against another accused person since the accused persons were not charged for the same offence, thereby precluding s 258(5) of the CPC from being satisfied.

  70. (c) Importantly, the Complainant would have to repeat much of her evidence more than once. Whether or not the Complainant was telling the truth, it would be unjust to require her to attend court and repeat most of her evidence for the trial of each accused person, with the difference being the evidence for the occasion when each offence was allegedly committed.

  71. [47] Having addressed the provisions on joint trial under s 143 of the CPC, I turn now to Asep’s argument about prejudice under s 258(5) of the CPC. The version of s 258(5) applicable at the material time stated as follows:

  72. Section 258(5) has since been amended but the amendments do not affect the present case.

  73. [49] Accordingly, I granted the Prosecution’s application for a joint trial of the three accused persons and proceeded on that basis. I should add that, apart from the initial objection by Asep, at no point during the trial or at closing submissions did any of the accused persons raise any issue of prejudice as a result of the joint trial. In any event, to err on the side of caution, I have not relied on Faris’s police statements, whether or not they contain any confession, in assessing the guilt of Asep, and vice versa.

  74. The ancillary hearings

  75. The law on admissibility of police statements

  76. [50] The law on the admissibility of police statements was largely undisputed in the present case. The basic and fundamental principle is that a statement must have been given voluntarily to the police by the accused before it may be admitted in trial. This principle is codified in s 258(3) of the CPC, the material parts of which read as follows:

  77. [51] The Prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the statements it seeks to admit were made voluntarily. In Chai Chien Wei Kelvin v Public Prosecutor [1998] 3 SLR(R) 619, the Court of Appeal explained the content of the test of voluntariness in the following terms at [53] (see also Lim Thian Lai v Public Prosecutor [2006] 1 SLR(R) 319 at [14]):

  78. [52] Although the main text of s 258(3) of the CPC mentions only “threat, inducement or promise”, it is well accepted that other forms of oppressive conduct tending to or in fact sapping the will of the accused may also negate the voluntariness of a statement. In Tey Tsun Hang v Public Prosecutor [2014] 2 SLR 1189 (“Tey Tsun Hang”), the High Court explained at [88] that, under the present version of the CPC, oppression is rationalised within the framework of threat, inducements or promise, since Explanation 1 to s 258(3) states that if “a person in authority who had acted in such a manner that his acts tend to sap and have in fact sapped the free will of the maker of the statement … such acts will amount to a threat, inducement or promise” [emphasis in original]. This stands in contrast with the former approach where oppression was a distinct ground for a finding of involuntariness (Tey Tsun Hang at [88]). Despite this conceptual shift, however, the substantive law on oppression remains the same: “The litmus test for oppression is whether the investigation was, by its nature, duration or other attendant circumstances, such as to affect the accused’s mind and will such that he speaks when he otherwise would have remained silent” (Tey Tsun Hang at [113]). I would add that the same standard applies even where the allegation is not that the accused would have remained silent, but that he would have given a different version of the statement, had he not been oppressed.

  79. Ancillary Hearing in respect of Faris’ statements

  80. [53] As mentioned, Faris challenged the admissibility of both of the police statements relied on by the Prosecution (see [28] above). Two main contentions were raised: (a) that material aspects of the statements were given in oppressive conditions and therefore not voluntary; and (b) that there were procedural irregularities during the statement-taking process which rendered the prejudicial effect of the statements greater than their probative value. At the end of the ancillary hearing, I held that both statements were admissible. I will explain my decision in relation to the two statements in sequence.

  81. Faris’ 1st Statement

  82. [54] I begin with the content and formalities of Faris’ 1st Statement. This statement was, on its face, recorded by ISP Tho at the PCC on 30 January 2014 from about 12.45am to 2.05am (see [28(a)] above). It was recorded in the English language and contained 14 paragraphs of prose over 5 pages:

  83. (a) Paragraphs 1 to 7 introduced Faris, his particulars, and the background to Elmi’s birthday party at the Duxton Hotel from 25 to 26 January 2014.

  84. (b) Paragraph 8 stated that at the party, Faris drank “quite a lot and… felt tipsy subsequently”. He did not pay attention to how much the others were drinking, but thought that “we all drank about the same amount” because they would refill their empty cups at the same time. Save for three individuals who did not drink, the rest of the attendees “were all tipsy”. Faris also noticed the Complainant “had been vomiting. She even vomited on the bed.” (It was not disputed that “drinking” in this context referred to the consumption of alcohol.)

  85. (c) Paragraph 9 stated that the attendees decided to go to Zouk at about midnight, but observed the following of the Complainant’s condition at that time:

  86. (d) Paragraphs 9 and 10 recorded certain events which occurred at Zouk. In essence, Faris consumed more alcohol there and returned to Duxton Hotel with Ridhwan soon after Asep left Zouk. When Faris and Ridhwan entered the Room, Faris noticed Hazly and Fadly watching television in the living room, while the Complainant was inside the bathroom. Faris heard the Complainant vomiting and went to take a look, whereupon he “saw her in the bathtub”. Faris then went back to the living room and slept on the living room floor.

  87. (e) The last part of paragraph 11 through to paragraph 14 of the statement are material as they were challenged as inaccurate by Faris, and they will be relied on in the analysis of the charges below (see [156]). They read as follows:

  88. [55] Faris signed at least once at the bottom of each page of the statement. The final part of the statement was a paragraph which recorded, amongst other things, that ISP Tho had informed Faris prior to statement-taking that Faris may make any amendment to the statement. It also recorded that ISP Tho “did not offer any threat, inducement promise to [Faris] either before or during the recording of the statement. [Faris] gave the statement voluntarily”. This paragraph was followed by the signatures of both Faris and ISP Tho.

  89. [56] Faris raised two main arguments as to why his 1st Statement was not admissible.

  90. (a) First, he contended that the statement had been given as a result of oppression. Specifically, he said that he had agreed to the inclusion of the last part of paragraph 11 until paragraph 14 of the statement, even though they were not true, because of pressure from SIO Sajari who was also present at the time of statement-taking together with ISP Tho (ie, from 12.45am to 2.05am). According to Faris, SIO Sajari made “suggestions” to him about what had happened, and Faris felt compelled to agree because SIO Sajari “kept shouting” at him, and he “d[id] not know what to do” and “just had to give her what she wanted”. He also alleged that SIO Sajari had shouted “You think this is funny”, told him that rape was a capital matter (which Faris understood to mean “a big case” that involved a long term of imprisonment ), and asked him to take off his t-shirt and squat for “quite a long time” with his hands placed behind his head and neck, until he had “pins and needles”. During this time, apart from asking a few introductory questions, ISP Tho was “just typing”.

  91. (b) Second, Faris alleged that there had been several procedural breaches during the statement-taking process. It was not clear if he meant that these breaches in themselves negated the admissibility of the statement, or that they, coupled with the oppressive acts of the police, led to the recording of an untrue and inaccurate account in the statement.

  92. [57] The Prosecution’s case was that Faris’ 1st Statement was voluntarily given and procedurally proper. In relation to the allegations against SIO Sajari, its version was that SIO Sajari had not even been present at the taking of Faris’ 1st Statement. Instead, during the material period, she was elsewhere occupied with the handling of Ridhwan and his statements, and ISP Tho was the only person taking Faris’ statement. Thus, Faris’ allegations against SIO Sajari could only have been untruths belatedly contrived in a bid to escape liability. As for the alleged procedural irregularities, the Prosecution submitted that ISP Tho had complied with the requisite procedures.

  93. [58] In my view, there had been no oppression in relation to Faris’ 1st Statement because SIO Sajari was not present at the taking of this statement, and could not have acted as Faris alleged. It was, therefore, not possible for any conduct on her part to sap the will of Faris in relation to this statement. I came to this view for the following reasons.

  94. [59] First, there was consistent and corroborated evidence that SIO Sajari was not present throughout the period when Faris’ 1st Statement was taken.

  95. (a) ISP Tho’s evidence was that on 29 January 2014 at around 11.35pm, he and two other officers placed Faris under arrest when Faris reported to the Serious Sexual Crimes Branch (“SSCB”) at the PCC. Faris was then escorted to an interview room in SSCB, where ISP Tho alone interviewed him from around 12.45am to 2.05am on 30 January 2014. This was consistent with the fact that only ISP Tho’s name was reflected on Faris’ 1st Statement. Thereafter, at around 2.15am, ISP Tho and ASP Guruswamy escorted Faris to the lock-up at the PCC.

  96. (b) Deputy Superintendent Amos Tang Lai Hee (“DSP Tang”) gave evidence that between 12.04am and 1.03am on 30 January 2014, he interviewed Ridhwan and took a statement from him. DSP Tang’s usual practice was to hand the statement over to the lead investigation officer (“IO”) once he finished recording it, and the lead IO in this case was SIO Sajari. While DSP Tang was referring to his usual practice and candidly said that he could not recall what had actually occurred in this case, the Prosecution submitted that there was no reason for him to depart from this practice on 30 January 2014. I agreed that some weight should be placed on DSP Tang’s usual practice, particularly in the light of SIO Sajari’s role as the lead IO and the fact that she was the person who had instructed DSP Tang to take the relevant statement from Ridhwan in the first place. I add that 1.03am, which was around the time DSP Tang handed the statement over to SIO Sajari, was sometime after the commencement of the recording of Faris’ 1st Statement.

  97. (c) SIO Sajari similarly testified that she received Ridhwan’s statement from DSP Tang at slightly after 1.03am. Between then and 2.00am, she was reading it and using it to prepare the form for Ridhwan’s type-written cautioned statement for use with him later. At around 2.00am, SIO Sajari and DSP Tang escorted Ridhwan from SSCB to the lock-up for a medical examination, and then at around 2.15am, she commenced recording Ridhwan’s cautioned statement using the form that she had earlier prepared. In my view, the timeline was credible. SIO Sajari’s account that she had escorted Ridhwan to his medical examination at around 2.00am was also corroborated by DSP Tang. (I should add that Ridhwan’s cautioned statement was in relation to a charge under s 376(1)(a) of the PC for penile-anal penetration, which appeared not to have been pursued as it was not a charge before this court.)

  98. [60] While it would have been better if there had been objective contemporaneous evidence of SIO Sajari’s whereabouts, I accepted her explanation that she had disposed her field book and other confidential documents when she left the police force and was told in 2016 that she would not be required as a witness in this case. Indeed, it was apparently Faris’ counsel who had told the Prosecution in 2016 that SIO Sajari would not be required as a witness, in reliance on which SIO Sajari disposed of her field book and documents when the Prosecution conveyed the same to her. Faris’ counsel said she took this position because the Prosecution had initially said that it was not relying on his 1st Statement. On the other hand, the Prosecution said that they had not intended to rely on Faris’ 1st Statement until he took a certain position. Thus, when the parties’ cases morphed later, SIO Sajari’s oral testimony was again needed, but the field book and documents could no longer be retrieved. This was unfortunate but I did not consider it to suggest anything untoward on the part of SIO Sajari. Neither did Faris suggest that SIO Sajari had given a false reason for disposing her field book and other confidential documents.

  99. [61] Second, and in contrast, there was a material inconsistency in Faris’ own account of when SIO Sajari had been present at the statement-taking.

  100. (a) Initially, during the cross-examination of SIO Sajari in the ancillary hearing, Faris asserted through his counsel that SIO Sajari had been present with him and ISP Tho from 11.45pm on 29 January 2014 to about 2.00am on 30 January 2014. This time period would include both the pre-interview conversation between Faris and the officers (11.45pm to 12.45am), and the entire duration of the statement-taking proper (12.45am to 2.05am).

  101. (b) Subsequently, however, after the evidence of the Prosecution had been given, Faris testified in cross-examination that only ISP Tho was with him during the pre-interview stage, and that SIO Sajari had entered the room “halfway when recording the statement”. When pressed on when exactly SIO Sajari had entered the room, he said that he could not remember, even though he stressed that it was before paragraph 12 of his 1st Statement was taken. He accepted that this was a change from the position that his counsel had taken when she cross-examined SIO Sajari.

  102. [62] In my view, this inconsistency raised doubts about the accuracy and veracity of Faris’ account. The Defence sought to play this down by stressing that Faris had been consistent in maintaining that SIO Sajari was present at least during the latter half of the interview, but this did not inspire confidence. It seemed that he had tailored his evidence to try and meet the evidence that the Prosecution had adduced. In fact, Faris’ evidence suggested further inconsistencies with other parts of his statement, for instance, that ISP Tho had played only a passive role and was “just typing” during the interview. Surely ISP Tho would have taken on a more active role had he been the only officer present during the first half of the interview.

  103. [63] Third, the parts of the statement which, according to Faris, were suggested by SIO Sajari aggressively and agreed to by him in fear included exculpatory content. In particular, paragraph 14 of Faris’ 1st Statement stated specifically “I did not insert my finger inside her vagina” and thereafter “I did not put my penis inside her vagina” [emphases added]. Yet, Faris insisted in attributing the contents of the entire paragraph to SIO Sajari:

  104. [64] I agreed with the Prosecution that this further undermined the credibility of Faris’ account. It beggared belief that SIO Sajari would be shouting at Faris and accusing him of committing offences in one moment, and then volunteering exonerative facts to Faris to be recorded in his statement in another. No plausible explanation was put forth by Faris to reconcile such contrasting accounts of the conduct of SIO Sajari.

  105. [65] Fourth, I found Faris’ contemporaneous conduct and reaction to be inconsistent with the abuse and indignity that he had allegedly suffered at the hands of SIO Sajari.

  106. [66] In particular, Faris did not tell any person about the alleged abuses for a significant period of time. It was not entirely clear when he first raised this issue with his counsel or with the Prosecution, but it was undisputed that this was after he had engaged counsel and it was not near the time of statement-taking. He did not file a complaint or raise the issue with any other police officer. Faris explained that he did not know what would happen if he complained to a police officer about another police officer. But even if that were the case, there were other persons he could have spoken to and would naturally have done so had the alleged abuses been true, even without the benefit of counsel. For instance, he could have complained to his parents. He did not do so, and during the ancillary hearing he explained that he did not wish for his parents to get involved. However, since his parents were the ones who had bailed him out after his initial arrest, they must have already known that there was some allegation of a criminal nature against Faris. Furthermore, as the Prosecution pointed out, Faris could have told his parents about the police’s abusive conduct without telling them any detail about the charges. In any event, Faris also did not mention any of the alleged abuses to his then-girlfriend or his friends, even though they were quite serious allegations. I found this to be inexplicable.

  107. [67] A further reason Faris provided for not having told anyone about the alleged abuses was that he did not initially realise that SIO Sajari had done anything wrong. He did not, for example, know whether the police was allowed to ask an accused person to squat and take off his shirt when taking his statement. However, when pressed further, Faris accepted that he knew that it was “not normal” for police officers to put answers into the mouths of accused persons in the statement-taking process. In my view, if his allegations about SIO Sajari were true, he would have known that the alleged misconduct was wrongful. He was simply trying to come up with an excuse as to why he did not complain about the misconduct to someone else sooner thereafter.

  108. [68] Indeed, Faris later conceded that he had suspected that something was wrong and that ISP Tho was merely recording whatever SIO Sajari had “suggested” to him. Yet, despite these suspicions, he did not at any time make an attempt to read or amend the statement. He claimed to have signed once at the bottom of each page of the statement because he was told to do so, without reading the contents because he “didn’t get the time to read”. But he too did not request for more time to do so. He attributed his passivity to his perceived need to obey the police as a “higher power”. But it was doubtful if he could have been so overwhelmed by fear or respect for authority since, by his own admission, he had lied to the police in the same interview so as to ward off criminal liability.

  109. [69] For these reasons, I did not find Faris’ account of what had occurred at the taking of his 1st Statement to be credible.

  110. [70] Faris submitted that if he had wanted to lie, it would have been easier for him to make allegations against ISP Tho rather than SIO Sajari. I did not give this argument too much weight. It was not for the court to speculate as to Faris’ intentions. It should also be pointed out that SIO Sajari was the lead IO and, in that regard, played a more central role than ISP Tho. The Defence also argued that if SIO Sajari was to be believed, “then Faris could not possibly recognise her”. But the chronology should not be confused. It would not be unexpected for Faris to know of the identity and role of SIO Sajari by the time he surfaced these allegations against her, even if he did not know of her at the time of the statement-taking.

  111. [71] Finally, turning to the procedural irregularities alleged, Faris raised the following complaints in relation to his 1st Statement:

  112. (a) He was not expressly asked the language that he wished to give his statement in. If given a choice, he would have preferred to give his statement in Malay rather than English, even though he had not expressed such a preference at the time of statement-taking.

  113. (b) His statement was not read back or explained to him, nor was he given the chance to read it. In fact, the first time Faris read this statement was when his first lawyer gave it to him at a much later date.

  114. (c) He was not informed that he could make edits to the statement. He was also not asked if he would like to edit the statement when his 2nd Statement was taken.

  115. (d) He was not asked to confirm if the statement was true and correct. Even though he had signed every page of the statement, he did so only because he “was just told to sign”. He was not given the option of not signing his statement at all.

  116. [72] Faris’ 1st Statement was taken under s 22 of the CPC, the material part of which reads as follows:

  117. (There have since been amendments to s 22 of the CPC, but those amendments were introduced after the ancillary hearing.)

  118. [73] I should highlight at the outset that not every procedural breach, even if of a requirement expressly stated in s 22 of the CPC, would render a statement inadmissible if it is otherwise admissible. Explanation 2 to s 258(3) of the CPC states:

  119. [74] Faris relied on the following paragraph of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Muhammad bin Kadar v Public Prosecutor [2011] 3 SLR 1205 (“Kadar”) at [62]:

  120. [75] However, this did not support a broad proposition that every procedural irregularity or non-compliance would render a statement inadmissible. In the present case, it is not disputed that Kadar stood for the existence of a common law discretion to exclude a statement even if voluntarily taken. The test in deciding whether to exercise such a discretion is whether the prejudicial effect of the statement exceeds its probative value (Kadar at [55]). This test, while perhaps easy to state, is not so easy to apply. Where the prosecution seeks to rely on a statement, there is bound to be some probative value in it; and where the defence seeks to challenge the admissibility of a statement, it is most likely the case that admitting the statement will lead to some prejudice to the defence’s case. But the central inquiry underlying this discretionary power is the court’s fundamental concern with the reliability of the police statement. Therefore, the twin factors of “probative value” and “prejudicial effect” must be assessed with this broader question of reliability in mind. This much is clear on a closer reading of Kadar, where the Court of Appeal repeatedly stressed the need for the court to be satisfied of the reliability of a statement, including at [55] that “where prejudicial effect exceeds the probative value, the very reliability of the statement sought to be admitted is questionable” [emphasis added]. Viewed in this light, it will become apparent that Faris’ procedural complaints did not materially impinge on the reliability of either of his statements.

  121. [76] Furthermore, as I mentioned (at [56(b)]), it was not clear if Faris’ argument was that the procedural breaches in themselves rendered his statement inadmissible, or that they facilitated the recording of an inadmissible statement taken together with the allegedly oppressive acts by SIO Sajari. It appeared that Faris was arguing the latter, since the thrust of his allegation was not so much about inadvertent inaccuracy but rather that he was coerced into signing on the 1st Statement. If so, then his argument must fail as I have rejected his account of the alleged oppression. Even if the argument was of pure procedural irregularity, I was of the view that there was no material irregularity in respect of Faris’ 1st Statement for the following reasons.

  122. (a) First, in relation to the language in which the statement should be taken, s 22(3)(c) of the CPC clearly states that interpretation must be provided “if the person does not understand English”. But it was not the Defence’s case that Faris did not understand English at the time he gave the statement. Rather, the Defence’s case was that Faris would prefer to give his evidence in the Malay language (see [71(a)] above). Indeed, having observed and heard Faris in court, it was clear to me that Faris could understand and speak simple English. At various points when giving evidence, Faris would slip into English despite the presence of a court interpreter for the Malay language. Faris’ own testimony was that if he could not understand what was said to him in English, he would have clarified or asked for a Malay interpreter at the time his statement was recorded, which he did not. It was also not his case that he had expressed his preference for the Malay language but that ISP Tho had rejected the request. To the contrary, ISP Tho’s evidence was that he had asked Faris which language he preferred to converse in prior to the recording of the statement, and that Faris had indicated English. During her oral submissions, counsel for Faris accepted that s 22(3)(c) of the CPC did not require the statement-taker to positively ask the accused which language he wanted to give his statement in. Although she suggested that this might be an internal guideline for the police, this was speculative and not put to the Prosecution witnesses.

  123. (b) As for the reading back of the statement, s 22(3)(b) requires that a police statement be “read over” to the accused person, even though an explanation is not expressly required. On the evidence, I preferred ISP Tho’s version that he had read over the statement to Faris after it was recorded. This account was largely unshaken in court, and it accorded with the paragraph at the end of the statement, where it was stated at two instances that “my statement was read and explained to me”. Faris had signed immediately below this paragraph. In any event, Faris agreed that he was given the chance to and had in fact made amendments to his 1st Statement in his 2nd Statement. In this light, the reliability of the 1st Statement read together with his 2nd Statement is not compromised, and I did not consider that the prejudicial effect of admitting the 1st Statement would be greater than its probative value.

  124. (c) As for the alleged irregularities highlighted at [71(c)] and [71(d)] above, for similar reasons, I was of the view that Faris had been given the opportunity to amend his statement and to confirm its truth and accuracy. In any event, such omissions did not relate to any statutory procedural obligation under the CPC. Faris accepted this, but sought to argue that they nevertheless weighed against the accuracy and hence admissibility of Faris’ 1st Statement. I was not persuaded since in any event, as I mentioned, Faris was given the chance to and had in fact made amendments to his 1st Statement when he gave his 2nd Statement.

  125. [77] For the foregoing reasons, I held that Faris’ 1st Statement was admissible in evidence.

  126. Faris’ 2nd Statement

  127. [78] Turning to Faris’ 2nd Statement, this was recorded by ASP Guruswamy on 16 October 2014 from about 6.50pm to 9.00pm (see [28(b)] above). Faris raised two similar challenges in respect of the voluntariness and admissibility of this statement: (a) that it was taken in circumstances that were oppressive, and (b) that it was procedurally irregular in several aspects.

  128. [79] Faris’ 2nd Statement was 5 pages long and recorded in question-and-answer format. There were a total of 29 sets of questions and answers, of which the following points are material:

  129. (a) Faris indicated that he wanted to add the following facts to paragraph 11 of his 1st Statement (Questions 1 and 2):

  130. He explained that he had not mentioned this in his 1st Statement because he was “scared to admit to my mistake” and that he decided to “come clean” now because he was “feeling scared as to when the truth will come out.” (Questions 3 and 4).

  131. (b) Several clarificatory questions then followed. First, Faris clarified that by “fucking”, he meant that he had penile-vaginal intercourse with the Complainant (Question 6). As for the issue of consent, Faris provided the following answers:

  132. (c) Faris also stated the following observations regarding the condition of the Complainant at the material time:

  133. [80] At the outset, I should mention that several areas of contention raised by Faris had no clear bearing on the voluntariness of his 2nd Statement. They may be summarised as follows:

  134. (b) There was also a dispute about the circumstances in which police officers had picked up Faris to escort him back to the PCC for the statement to be taken. Much of this was also irrelevant, such as whether Faris was sitting with his then-girlfriend alone, or with a group of friends at that time. In so far as the escorting officers had apparently made certain threatening statements to Faris, I will consider those later separately (see [82]).

  135. (c) According to Faris, he arrived at the PCC at around 2.00pm. However, before his 2nd Statement was taken, DSP Burhanudeen Bin Haji Hussainar (“DSP Burhanudeen”) brought Faris into his office and had a 4-hour long conversation with him about the alleged offences. During this time, DSP Burhanudeen was said to have handed Faris a dildo and asked him to demonstrate how he had sex with the Complainant. According to Faris, ISP Tho entered the office midway through this conversation, and when DSP Burhanudeen referred to the dildo and asked Faris “Big enough or not?”, both the police officers laughed. DSP Burhanudeen and ISP Tho denied that this had occurred. DSP Burhanudeen testified that he did not bring Faris into his office and had instead waited with him at a sofa area a short distance from his office. He claimed that he was only with Faris for 25 minutes and so, while there was a short conversation about the alleged offences, there could not have been the extensive interview (including the use of a dildo as a prop) as Faris alleged. This was corroborated by an entry in DSP Burhanudeen’s field book which showed that Faris and he had arrived at the PCC at 5.50pm and that he had handed Faris over to ASP Guruswamy at 6.15pm. In so far as Faris could give a broad description of DSP Burhanudeen’s office layout, DSP Burhanudeen explained that there was a “huge window” in his office and that his door was always open. Thus, Faris could have seen his office without actually entering it. In my view, DSP Burhanudeen’s field book posed a significant obstacle to Faris’ claims. There was no suggestion that the entry was incorrect or fabricated. In any case, the relevance of this dispute was again questionable. Faris’ point was merely that the use of a dildo made him feel “shy” and “ashamed”. But he did not say that this incident had caused him to give his 2nd Statement involuntarily or to make any false allegation in the statement. Even taking his account at face value, that did not amount to oppression sapping his will and negating the voluntariness of the 2nd Statement.

  136. (d) Faris testified that after his 2nd Statement was taken, he told DSP Burhanudeen that he had no money or ez-link card to go home and DSP Burhanudeen gave him some coins. DSP Burhanudeen testified, however, that he had left office at around 8.32pm that evening and was at home by the time Faris’ statement-taking ended. Again, these timings were corroborated by his field book. In any case, Faris accepted that this incident did not have any bearing on the 2nd Statement or its voluntariness.

  137. [81] In so far as the foregoing areas of dispute were concerned, I agreed with the Prosecution that they were not material to the issue of voluntariness of Faris’ 2nd Statement. There were, however, two contentions which warranted closer consideration.

  138. [82] The first was Faris’ allegation that at the time the escorting officers came to escort him to the PCC for statement recording, two statements were made to him: (a) ASP Guruswamy told him “You can wave goodbye to your girlfriend, you won’t see her today”, and that (b) subsequently, ASP Lee Tian Huat (“ASP Lee”) said to him “just confess, we already have your DNA”.

  139. [83] In relation to ASP Guruswamy’s comment, it was not put to the officer that he had said this to Faris when the officer was cross-examined. Accordingly, I did not believe that the officer had made the comment in question. In any event, even if the comment had in fact been made, I did not think it amounted objectively to a threat, inducement, or promise having reference to the voluntariness of any statement by Faris. Furthermore, it was not suggested that Faris had in fact viewed this statement as a threat to him to cooperate.

  140. [85] The second contention was Faris’ claim that ASP Guruswamy did not accurately record in the 2nd Statement what Faris had told him. Instead, the officer had allegedly consistently denied Faris’ account and recorded a different version from what Faris had said. For example:

  141. (a) At Question 2, Faris claimed to have said that the Complainant got out of the bathtub on her own, and that she had unbuttoned and unzipped his pants. However, ASP Guruswamy did not record these italicised nuances accurately in the 2nd Statement (see [79(a)] above).

  142. (b) At Question 5, Faris claimed to have stated that he could not sleep properly because he had lied in his 1st Statement, but ASP Guruswamy instead recorded that Faris “cannot [sic] sleep properly since this case started”.

  143. (c) At Question 21, Faris claimed not to have said “no”, and had instead told ASP Guruswamy that the girl looked high and that she had started it. ASP Guruswamy had failed to include this in the statement.

  144. [86] I did not accept this contention for three main reasons. First, as the Prosecution pointed out, the 2nd Statement was taken in a question-and-answer format, and several questions flowed from the preceding answer. It would thus not have made sense if the answers were not recorded accurately. For instance, Questions 4 and 5 flowed as follows:

  145. [87] Question 5 started with “If you were scared of admitting to your mistake”, which was the exact answer in Answer 4. But Faris claimed in examination-in-chief that, in relation to Question 4: “I did say that I was scared. But I was---I also told him that I was scared that the girl would tell the police a different story.” When pressed in cross-examination on how the reference to “mistake” could appear in Question 5 if that had not been provided in Answer 4, Faris insisted that he had never used the word “mistake” and that he thought that the questions were unrelated.

  146. [88] I did not believe Faris’ explanation. Question 5 was clearly premised on Answer 4. There was no reason for ASP Guruswamy to have framed Question 5 as such if Answer 4 had not referred to a “mistake”. There was also no reason for Faris not to have at least raised some queries if ASP Guruswamy had erroneously referred to a “mistake” when that was not what Faris said.

  147. [89] Furthermore, Question 5 was not the only instance of a “follow up” question. Question 21, for instance, started with “If [the Complainant] still looked drunk to you, do you think…” This was a clear reference to Answer 20, which I reproduced in full above at [79(c)] and contained a reference that “I know that she looked drunk…” According to Faris, what he had in fact told ASP Guruswamy was that “the girl could stand up on her own at the bathtub and got out of the bathtub on her own. And the girl was the one who came to me and lean against my body. That was when I fell backwards and hit the door”. If Faris’ present account was to be believed, Question 21 would have made no sense at all. And it would not have been logically possible for Faris to provide an answer to Question 21, even if he thought Questions 21 and 20 were wholly distinct questions, which was itself unbelievable.

  148. [90] Secondly, Faris was not consistent in his own testimony of how ASP Guruswamy had distorted the contents of his statement. For instance, Faris insisted that in Answer 20, he did not use the word “drunk” and had only described the Complainant as “high”. But Faris had already used the word “drunk” to describe the Complainant in Answer 2: “… I saw that [the Complainant] was drunk. …” When pressed in cross-examination to explain why he did not say that the reference to “drunk” in Answer 2 was also erroneous when specifically asked by his counsel in examination-in-chief as to the accuracy of that answer, Faris explained “[b]ecause I thought I have explained that I did not use the word ‘drunk’ to [ASP Guruswamy]. I only used the word ‘high’ to [ASP Guruswamy].” This was simply incredible. Faris was asked about the accuracy of Answer 2 before he was asked about Answer 20. He did not deny the accuracy of Answer 2. Yet he was certain that he did not use “drunk” for Answer 20.

  149. [91] Thirdly, Faris’ conduct in response to ASP Guruswamy’s alleged manipulation of his 2nd Statement contradicted his claim that such manipulation had in fact occurred. According to Faris, even though he felt something was wrong and that his answers were not being recorded properly, he did not raise any issues and simply continued to answer the questions. Indeed, at the end of the recording, he had an opportunity to read the first four or five lines of the statement and allegedly knew in fact that it was inaccurately recorded. Yet, Faris made no protest and signed each page of the statement dutifully. Once again, Faris said that he did not raise the issue because he had an absolute regard for the authority of the police. For similar reasons as I have explained above (see [66]-[68]), I did not accept this explanation. In fact, by the time of his 2nd Statement, Faris clearly knew that the investigations against him were for serious offences involving harsh consequences, and that was so pressing on his mind that he had even decided to come clean and amend his 1st Statement to admit sexual intercourse (albeit on a consensual basis) rather than to deny intercourse entirely. Against that backdrop, it was not believable that he would then have been content to let incriminating inaccuracies in his 2nd Statement remain without raising any concerns immediately or subsequently complaining to the police, his parents, or his then-girlfriend.

  150. [92] Turning to the issue of procedural breaches, Faris made the following allegations in relation to his 2nd Statement which significantly overlapped with those he made in relation to the 1st Statement (see [71] above). Again, it was not entirely clear whether his argument was that these breaches in themselves negated the admissibility of his 2nd Statement, or that they, taken together with the allegedly oppressive conduct negated such admissibility. However, neither argument succeeded as I had rejected his account of the allegedly oppressive acts and, in any case, I did not agree that there had been any material procedural breach:

  151. (a) As was the case with his 1st Statement, Faris said that he was not asked which language he wished to give his 2nd Statement in. If he had been given a choice, he would have indicated a preference for Malay. For reasons as I stated above (see [76(a)]), I did not consider this a breach of s 22(3)(c) of the CPC. As I explained, the question was not one of preference but one of whether he could not understand English. It was Faris’ own evidence that he could understand simple English and that if he did not understand he would have sought clarification or an interpreter. Faris also said that he believed ASP Guruswamy would have arranged for a Malay interpreter if he had asked for one. In any case, it was recorded on ASP Guruswamy’s field diary that “[b]efore recording [the 2nd Statement], [ASP Guruswamy] double checked with [Faris] if he is comfortable in giving his statement in English and whether or not he requires a Malay interpreter”. Nothing before me cast doubt on the accuracy or reliability of this entry.

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