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Grounds publishedDecided 3 May 2019

High Court

Poh Lian Construction (Pte) Ltd (in liquidation) v Lauw Wisanggeni and others (Chia Quee Hock and others, third parties)

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[2019] SGHC 114Case no. Suit No 1067 of 2015

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Grounds of decision

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] This is a suit brought by the plaintiff against its ex-directors and senior management for breaches of duty primarily in relation to the management of three construction projects, as well as the alleged concealment of the plaintiff’s true financial position from the plaintiff’s board of directors and the board of its parent company. Having heard the evidence of the witnesses and reviewed the parties’ submissions, I now give my judgment.

  3. Background facts

  4. Dramatis personae

  5. [2] The plaintiff is a construction company whose portfolio of projects included at one time numerous large-scale public and private residential and commercial projects. At all material times, it was a wholly-owned subsidiary of United Fiber System Limited (“UFS”), a company listed on the Singapore Exchange (“SGX”) that was primarily an investment holding company. It is not in dispute that the plaintiff was the only significant revenue-generating asset of UFS at all material times.

  6. [4] The first defendant, Mr Lauw Wisanggeni, was appointed as the plaintiff’s executive chairman and executive director in February or March 2009, with a starting salary of $50,000 per month. Prior to his appointment, the first defendant had provided consultancy services to UFS on forestry developments. This was unrelated to the construction business of the plaintiff.

  7. [5] The second defendant, Mr Leong Chee Keng, was appointed as the plaintiff’s chief operating officer in June 2009, with a starting salary of $21,000 per month. He was appointed as a director in December 2009.

  8. [6] The third defendant, Mr Ng Giok Beng, was employed by the plaintiff from October 2009 as a senior project manager, with a starting salary of $9,500 per month.

  9. [7] The first third party, Mr Chia Quee Hock, founded the plaintiff in 1975 and was managing director of the plaintiff from around 1983. He was also appointed deputy chairman of UFS in 2001, and thereafter a non-executive director of UFS in 2009. The first third party does not read, speak or understand English.

  10. [8] The second third party, Mr Peh Pit Tat, and the third third party, Mr Chan Kin, are the vice-president and chief investment officer respectively of Argyle Street Management Limited, which is a fund management entity with an interest in UFS. The second and third third parties joined the UFS board as non-executive directors in June 2011 and May 2011 respectively. In July 2011, both the second and third third parties were appointed to the plaintiff’s board as directors, without drawing a salary.

  11. The Sophia project

  12. [9] The plaintiff was invited to submit a tender for the Sophia Residence project (“the Sophia project”) in September 2009. It is not a matter of serious dispute that the plaintiff was keen to get this project, as it had at that point of time not obtained any construction projects for 18 months, since it was awarded the Green Meadows project in March 2008. There were concerns about the sustainability of the plaintiff’s business as a result. The developer of the Sophia project was Sophia Residence Development Pte Ltd, which is a subsidiary of Guocoland (Singapore) Pte Ltd (“Guocoland”), a substantial developer and one that the first defendant was well acquainted with.

  13. [11] On 10 November 2009, the plaintiff submitted a tender of $115.84m for the Sophia project, which tender was signed by the first and second defendants. This tender was accepted by the developer, with a contract period of 30 months from 1 March 2010 to 31 August 2012. UFS was obliged to announce the award of the tender at the contract price of $115.84m through the SGX, which it did. The first third party together with the second defendant signed the Conditions of Contract for the Sophia project.

  14. [12] For reasons which are disputed, the Sophia project faced considerable delay. In an attempt to address the issues, in January 2013, the plaintiff entered into a tripartite agreement with the developer and Kimly Construction Pte Ltd (“Kimly”), for Kimly to be engaged as the construction manager to complete the Sophia project. However, this effort was unsuccessful.

  15. [13] In March 2013, the developer gave notice to terminate the plaintiff as the main contractor for the Sophia project, noting the plaintiff’s failure to proceed with the contracted works “with diligence and due expedition”, as well as the plaintiff’s filing of an application for JM a few days prior.

  16. The Bishopsgate project

  17. [14] In January 2010, the plaintiff received an invitation to tender for the Bishopsgate Residences project (“the Bishopsgate project”) by Prime Residential Development Pte Ltd (“Prime”), which was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Kajima Overseas Asia Ltd (“Kajima”), another substantial developer.

  18. [15] On 11 March 2010, a representative of CCM Industrial Pte Ltd (“CCM”) submitted to the plaintiff (via email to the third defendant) a tender for $50,998,000.00, stated to be for the “design and construction of condominium housing development at Bishopsgate for Prime”. In this tender, CCM offered and undertook to “design and provide working/construction drawings for all architectural and structural works and mechanical and electrical services, complete and maintain the whole of the Works”, with a completion period of 22 months.

  19. [16] The plaintiff subsequently submitted a tender for the Bishopsgate project at a contract sum of approximately $58.5m, which was accepted by Prime on 15 May 2010. The Conditions of Contract for the Bishopsgate project included the following cl 2.3.1:

  20. [18] On 2 July 2010, Mr Gen Yasuda of Kajima (“Mr Yasuda”) sent a letter to the second defendant, reiterating that the plaintiff was not allowed to subcontract the whole of the works for the Bishopsgate project, referring to the aforementioned cl 2.3.1 (see [16] above). This letter was prompted by a prospectus that CCM had lodged with the Monetary Authority of Singapore and SGX, and released to the general public for the purpose of its proposed listing, which Mr Yasuda described as “written in such a manner that everybody would be made to believe CCM is the main contractor of our project”. Mr Yasuda said that the “impression of letting our main contractor sub-contract the whole of the Works is detrimental to our business in terms of reputation and sales, amongst other aspects”. Mr Yasuda went on to say that “the only way to stop the rumours and control the damage is to totally disconnect CCM from the project”, and requested the plaintiff to “remove CCM from the project altogether”.

  21. [19] It was recorded in the minutes of a subsequent site meeting in July 2010 that the plaintiff would progressively phase out CCM’s involvement in the Bishopsgate project, and Mr Lim Soon Hock was recorded as agreeing to do so by end of July 2010. It is not in dispute that this was not done until one year later. It should be noted that there was no attempt by the first to third defendants or CCM to convince Mr Yasuda that his view that the plaintiff had contracted the whole of the Works to CCM was inaccurate.

  22. [20] In August 2011, the second defendant emailed the first defendant stating the following:

  23. The first defendant, and the second and third third parties gave their approval for the settlement with CCM proposed in the email. As evident from the above, this settlement was for the sum of $2m, which included outstanding payment for work done and retention sums, as well as a “compensation/ex-gratia payment for cessation of complete Site execution and operation” of $498,134.17. CCM’s involvement with the Bishopsgate project ceased in or around August 2011 after the settlement sum of $2m was paid.

  24. [21] In March 2013, Prime gave notice to terminate the plaintiff’s employment as main contractor for the Bishopsgate project.

  25. The Goodwood project

  26. [22] In December 2009, the plaintiff tendered for the condominium project at Goodwood Residences (“the Goodwood project”) at a price of $191.93m. The tender was signed by the first and second defendants. The developer accepted the tender in the same month. The developer of the Goodwood project was Goodwood Residences Pte Ltd, a subsidiary of Guocoland. The contract period for the completion of the project was 30 months.

  27. [23] By December 2011, it was clear that the project was in severe delay, as the completion date was merely six months away and much of the contract works had yet to be completed. The plaintiff had up to that point made progress claims amounting to only 30 percent of the total contract sum. It should be noted the plaintiff does not allege that the first and second defendants were responsible for this delay.

  28. [24] In an attempt to resolve the issue, in March 2012, the third defendant was appointed as the project manager of the Goodwood project with the responsibility of overseeing the daily operations of the project. With the approval of the first and second defendants, the third defendant engaged Reinforced Concrete (“RC”) subcontractors to provide casual labourers and supervisors for the Goodwood project at an hourly rate of $12 per hour for each labourer and $15 per hour for each supervisor.

  29. The first defendant’s unit in Goodwood Residences

  30. [25] In April 2010, the first defendant entered into an option to purchase a unit in Goodwood Residences (“the Goodwood unit”) for a purchase price of $8.68m. In July 2013, the first defendant sold the property at a price of $10.6m. On the plaintiff’s case, the purchase of the Goodwood unit was not disclosed to the plaintiff’s board at any time, whereas it is the first defendant’s pleaded case that this purchase was disclosed to Mr M Rajaram, UFS’s non-executive Chairman, and Mr Hoshi Deboo, a UFS director.

  31. JM and subsequent events

  32. [26] In March 2013, the second third party made an application to court for the plaintiff to be placed under JM. According to the second defendant, the second third party had called him from the airport and asked him to shut the gates on the Goodwood project without disclosing the application for JM. The second defendant said that the news of the application came as a surprise to him.

  33. [27] In the affidavit filed in support of the application, the second third party opined that the plaintiff was or would be unable to pay its debts and was cash flow insolvent, and that placing the plaintiff under JM would promote its survival as a going concern and/or achieve a more advantageous realisation of its assets than in a winding up.

  34. [28] Mr Tam Chee Chong and Mr Andrew Grimmett were appointed as joint and several interim judicial managers following the second third party’s application, and thereafter joint and several judicial managers in April 2013. Subsequently, on the direction of this court in June 2014, the judicial managers called a meeting of creditors to put to vote a resolution on whether legal proceedings should be commenced against the first to third defendants. The vote was carried, resulting in the present proceedings.

  35. Parties’ cases

  36. The plaintiff’s case

  37. The Sophia project

  38. [30] The plaintiff’s case in relation to the Sophia project suffers from the difficulty that the pleaded case, the case pursued at trial, and the case put forth in closing submissions do not appear to be entirely consistent. On a narrower view, the plaintiff’s primary complaint appears to be that the first and second defendants had caused the plaintiff to tender for the Sophia project at a price of $115.84m “in blatant disregard of the approval obtained” from the UFS board for the tender price of $120m. In short, the alleged breach arises because the first and second defendants acted contrary to the express approval of the UFS board, or at least failed to secure the necessary approval for the actual bid price which was submitted.

  39. [33] Relatedly, the plaintiff asserts that the first and second defendants caused it to submit the tender without calling for the necessary quotations from its subcontractors. In this regard, the plaintiff relies on the testimony of Mr Nelson, who apparently reviewed documents disclosed in the proceedings and did not find quotations sought for work items such as concrete works or wet trades.

  40. The Bishopsgate project

  41. [35] The plaintiff alleges that the defendants caused or authorised the plaintiff to tender for the Bishopsgate project with the intention that if the plaintiff succeeded in its bid, it would subcontract the entire contract works to CCM, in breach of cl 2.3.1 of the Conditions of Contract. The plaintiff submits that it is evident from the documents that it had engaged CCM to prepare a tender, and that the second defendant simply added a profit margin to CCM’s tender price and submitted that tender as the plaintiff’s own bid for the Bishopsgate project. The plaintiff also points to section 8 of the plaintiff’s letter of award to CCM, which required CCM subcontractors to purchase and wear the plaintiff’s work uniforms whilst on site, as evidence of the defendants being clearly aware that subterfuge was needed in the carrying out of CCM’s works. The first and second defendants knew or had notice of cl 2.3.1 as they were the authorised signatories for the Bishopsgate project, and the third defendant must have been familiar with the tender documents as he was responsible for liaising with CCM. However, by the end of the trial, the plaintiff appeared to have abandoned the claim against the third defendant in this regard, and Mr Tan Chuan Thye SC confirmed this in his oral submissions.

  42. [37] In relation to the first defendant’s assertion that he was not aware of the intention to subcontract works to CCM at the time the plaintiff submitted the tender for the Bishopsgate project, the plaintiff asserts that the first defendant would have known that the plaintiff was shorthanded at the time of the tender, as the first defendant was involved in operational matters of the plaintiff around the same time. Thus, “it is unlikely he did not know that CCM would be engaged to perform the majority of the works on the project”.

  43. [38] The plaintiff claims that even after Kajima became aware of the subcontract to CCM, and directed CCM’s removal from the project site, the defendants permitted CCM to continue work on the Bishopsgate project for more than one year against the instructions of Kajima, in further breach of cl 2.3.1. In particular, the second defendant authorised CCM’s workers to wear the plaintiff’s uniforms on site even after Kajima’s instructions for CCM’s removal, and also gave instructions to CCM regarding the engagement of subcontractors for mechanical and engineering works in August 2010.

  44. [39] On the plaintiff’s case, CCM’s involvement in the Bishopsgate project necessitated its subsequent disengagement. This caused the wastage of management resources, delays and disruptions on site and the payment of an ex gratia sum of $498,134.17 under the settlement agreement. Thus, the plaintiff claims against the defendants for the ex gratia payment of $498,134.17 as well as the liquidated damages it incurred for the Bishopsgate project amounting to approximately $8.6m. In its closing submissions, the plaintiff further asserts that it would have avoided losses amounting to $12.973m in the Bishopsgate project but for the defendants’ breaches, in that the defendants permitted the plaintiff to undertake the Bishopsgate project when it had no capacity to do so.

  45. The Goodwood project

  46. [40] The plaintiff’s complaint against the defendants in relation to the Goodwood project appears to be split into the following limbs:

  47. [41] According to the plaintiff, it is standard industry practice that workers be engaged on a per unit basis, ie, for the value of work performed rather than for time spent doing the work. Hiring workers on an hourly rate was clearly unfavourable to the plaintiff because workers would not be incentivised to complete their work in a timely manner. Mr Nelson opined that payment of workers on a man-day basis would “only be common for small numbers engaged on ad-hoc duties for flexibility, not the delivery of substantial core works packages”. Although the plaintiff referred to such hourly-rate workers as both “RC workers” and “casual labourers” in its pleaded case and at the trial, I shall refer to them uniformly as “casual labourers” for clarity.

  48. [42] As for the appropriate market rate, Mr Nelson was of the view that a reasonable rate for a skilled worker from the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) would be $12 per hour, a PRC supervisor $11–$13 per hour, and a non-PRC worker $6.50 to $7.50 per hour.

  49. [43] According to the plaintiff, the failure to adequately supervise the work of the casual labourers was evident from the fact that various subcontractors had been billing the plaintiff for more workers than actually supplied. Mr Nelson was of the opinion that “extensive deployment of casual workers paid on an attendance-only basis brings with it additional challenges that would necessitate increased levels of supervision”.

  50. [44] The plaintiff claims that the decision to employ casual labourers on an hourly basis and at higher than market rate, as well as the absence of adequate supervision, led to the plaintiff exceeding its initial labour budget for the Goodwood project by more than $15m.

  51. The concealment issue

  52. [47] In closing submissions, however, the plaintiff takes an expanded view of its case on this point. It submits that the first and second defendants:

  53. Loss and damage

  54. [48] The concealment of the losses only came to light after UFS’s auditor, Ernst & Young LLP (“EY”) examined the plaintiff’s management statements in August 2012 in connection with a proposed reverse takeover of UFS. As a result of the delay and the manner in which the projects had been tendered for and managed, the plaintiff was unable to remedy the damage that had been done. Thus, the plaintiff claims that the defendants’ breaches of duty caused it to suffer loss and damage, and that the plaintiff “lost the chance to avoid the eventual substantial losses incurred in relation to the Projects, which caused it to be propelled into insolvency”.

  55. [49] On the plaintiff’s case, had the plaintiff’s board or the UFS board been properly apprised of the plaintiff’s true financial position at an earlier time, steps could have been taken to avoid the eventual losses, such as by obtaining third party assistance to manage the projects, negotiating with developers and subcontractors to reduce or delay the amounts payable by the plaintiff, obtaining financing to better equip the plaintiff to address project management issues and sourcing for an investor to purchase or restructure the plaintiff. In closing submissions, the plaintiff argues that if the UFS board had the necessary information in early 2012, it could have done earlier what it eventually did in November 2012 and with greater success – this would have involved, amongst others, the efforts of the second and third third parties to bring the three projects to completion, to engage external legal counsel to handle the plaintiff’s applications for variation orders and file EOT claims, and to engage Guocoland to find solutions. These efforts would have enabled the plaintiff to possibly avoid insolvency if they had been undertaken in early 2012 rather than in late 2012, given that the plaintiff had a healthier cash buffer at that point in time.

  56. [50] Although the plaintiff’s pleaded case in relation to EOT claims only alleged that the defendants had failed to properly file EOT claims in relation to the Goodwood project, in its closing submissions the plaintiff extends its attack on the EOT claims to all three projects. However, in its pleaded case, the plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendants in respect of the EOT claims for the Goodwood project. Conversely, in its closing submissions, the plaintiff’s allegations in respect of the EOT claims for all three projects merely serve to rebut the defendants’ arguments that even if they were liable for losses, those losses ought to be reduced to account for EOT claims which would have been submitted and approved.

  57. [51] As of February 2013, the plaintiff estimates a total loss of approximately $83m in respect of the three projects. The plaintiff’s creditors have filed proofs of debts in the liquidation in excess of $370m, and the plaintiff’s employees have claimed approximately $0.5m.

  58. The first defendant’s Goodwood unit

  59. [52] The plaintiff claims that the first defendant had breached his duty to disclose that he had purchased the Goodwood unit, and that he had subsequently sold this for a profit of $1.92m. Through this acquisition and sale, the first defendant gained a secret profit from an opportunity obtained through his directorship with the plaintiff, which was a breach of his duty to the plaintiff (“the no-profit rule”). The first defendant had found out about the availability of the units from Ms Trina Loh of Guocoland during a lunch which he attended in his capacity as the plaintiff’s Executive Chairman, and had purchased the Goodwood unit shortly thereafter. Even if the first defendant had disclosed this purchase to Mr M Rajaram and Mr Hoshi Deboo, this did not constitute disclosure to the UFS board.

  60. [53] The plaintiff further argues in closing submissions that the first defendant placed himself in a position of conflict by virtue of his acquisition of the Goodwood unit, as he would have stood to benefit as an owner of the unit from liquidated damages for delayed delivery of vacant possession of the unit. This was in conflict with his duty to minimise delays of the Goodwood project as the plaintiff’s Executive Chairman (“the no-conflict rule”). However, in oral submissions, Mr Tan Chuan Thye SC stated that the plaintiff is no longer pursuing this argument.

  61. The defendants’ case

  62. [54] The first to third defendants’ cases are more or less aligned, although not in relation to all the claims. Nonetheless, they can be summarised together for simplicity.

  63. The circumstances of the defendants’ employment

  64. [55] The defendants are united in their portrayal of the circumstances leading up to their employment with the plaintiff and/or their involvement in the three projects, namely that the plaintiff was in a precarious financial position since 2008 due to the weak economy and construction industry, and had recently suffered from mass resignations across various departments. The first and second defendants were thus engaged by the plaintiff to manage the crisis and do damage control, and the third defendant was subsequently brought on board the Goodwood project for a similar purpose. The first defendant further highlights that he did not have prior experience in the construction industry, and that his employment was to allow the plaintiff to leverage on his relationships and connections with developers and financial institutions. In other words, the first defendant was engaged to play the role of a rain-maker. The first defendant thus relied on the second defendant and other senior management to manage the day-to-day operations of the plaintiff. In fact, the first defendant asserts that this was a condition he insisted on for his employment with the plaintiff. Notably, this is not challenged by the plaintiff.

  65. The Sophia project

  66. [58] Further, the first defendant says that he had informed the UFS board over the phone of the tender price of $115.84m and had explained the basis for the decision. In any case, the UFS board would have been aware of the same given the announcement through the SGX that UFS was required to make upon the plaintiff being awarded the Sophia project.

  67. The Bishopsgate project

  68. [60] The first and second defendants deny that there was a total subcontract of the Bishopsgate project to CCM, or that there was any resultant breach of cl 2.3.1. CCM was only subcontracted to perform the structural works of the Bishopsgate project, and the plaintiff retained overall management control of the project operations through its site management staff and administrators. Even though Kajima had instructed the plaintiff to remove CCM from the Bishopsgate project, this was not because of any perceived breach of cl 2.3.1, but rather because CCM had misrepresented, in its prospectus, that it was the main contractor for the Bishopsgate project.

  69. [61] In any case, the first defendant claims not to have been aware of CCM or its involvement in the Bishopsgate project when he signed the contract which contained cl 2.3.1. The first defendant only became aware of CCM’s involvement in the Bishopsgate project after the second defendant informed him orally that Kajima wanted the plaintiff to remove CCM from the project.

  70. The Goodwood project

  71. [63] According to the defendants, the need for additional labour on the Goodwood project was a result of significant delays in the provision of construction drawings by the developer, as well as the insolvency of some of the appointed labour subcontractors.

  72. [64] Due to the labour crunch at the material time, it was necessary to engage additional manpower at an hourly rate rather than on a per-unit basis. The prospective subcontractors were not agreeable to being paid on a per-unit basis because they would be taking over in the middle of the project without knowing the state of the construction, and would therefore bear the risk of rectifying defective works left behind by previous subcontractors. The subcontractors were also worried about uncertainties as the construction drawings were not ready, and as such could not provide quotations on a per-unit basis.

  73. [65] Contrary to the plaintiff’s allegations, the defendants insist that there was adequate supervision of the casual labourers employed, such as via the use of a biometric check-in system, as well as personal site visits.

  74. The concealment issue

  75. [68] In response to the plaintiff’s allegations regarding the failure to disclose the plaintiff’s cash flow difficulties to its board, the second defendant argues that this was outside the scope of the plaintiff’s pleaded case. In so far as the cash flow difficulties arose from delays to the plaintiff’s projects, the first and second defendants argue that these matters had been disclosed to the plaintiff’s board, either implicitly or explicitly. Finally, the first defendant argues that even if he had breached his duties in relation to the concealment of financial information, the plaintiff could not show that if he had discharged those duties, the board would have taken effective action such that the plaintiff would have been able to avoid its losses.

  76. The first defendant’s Goodwood unit

  77. [69] The first defendant argues that the Goodwood unit had been open for sale to the public, and that he had purchased the unit in the same manner as a member of the public could have. The first defendant adds that his purchase price of $8.68m was above the developer’s minimum sale price. In relation to the alleged breach of the no-conflict rule, the first defendant argues that it could not have been in his interests to have hoped for delayed delivery of the unit just so as to obtain liquidated damages.

  78. The third party claim

  79. [70] The first defendant in turn brought a claim against the first, second and third third parties (collectively, the “third parties”), alleging that they were liable to contribute on the following bases:

  80. (a) The third parties failed to take steps towards ensuring that UFS repaid the $12.2m it owed the plaintiff, which contributed towards the plaintiff’s insolvency.

  81. (b) The third parties were involved in key decisions for the plaintiff’s projects and were aware of the plaintiff’s accounting practices; therefore, if the defendants were liable in respect of plaintiff’s claims above, the third parties would likewise be liable. In particular:

  82. (i) The first third party would be liable in respect of the claims in relation to the Sophia project, as he had signed the Conditions of Contract and would have been aware of the underbidding.

  83. (ii) The third parties had decided to continue with the existing labour arrangements for the Goodwood project at the plaintiff’s board meeting on 22 October 2012; they would therefore also be liable in respect of the hiring of casual labourers.

  84. (iii) The first third party signed the tender for the Bishopsgate project prior to its submission; he would therefore have knowledge of and be liable for the total subcontract.

  85. (c) After the third parties removed the defendants from the plaintiff’s management, the third parties took over management of the plaintiff and mismanaged the plaintiff’s projects, such as by failing to make EOT claims. The third parties also applied to place the plaintiff in JM in a negligent manner, without considering the impact of the JM on the plaintiff’s business and the possible alternatives to JM, which included the first defendant’s expressed interest to purchase the plaintiff. This was because of their conflicting interest in wanting to secure the reverse takeover of UFS. These actions prevented the plaintiff from avoiding insolvency.

  86. [71] In his closing submissions, the first defendant also alleges that the third parties’ failure to consult key stakeholders prior to placing the plaintiff in JM undermined its prospects of survival.

  87. The third parties’ case

  88. [72] The third parties deny that they were liable for contribution in respect of any of the claims against the defendants. They argue that they relied on the first defendant to present an accurate picture of the plaintiff’s financial situation, and were not in a position to compel UFS’s repayment of the $12.2m loan. The first third party argues that he was not aware of the tender price for the Sophia project until after it was awarded to the plaintiff, and that he was unaware of any total subcontract of the Bishopsgate project at the time the subcontract to CCM was awarded. In respect of the third party claims pertaining to the Sophia and Bishopsgate projects, the third parties also argue that the plaintiff’s underlying claims against the defendants fail for lack of evidence. In respect of the casual labourers at the Goodwood project, the third parties claim that they did not know about the details of these labourers’ engagement even as late as the 22 October 2012 board meeting.

  89. Issues for determination

  90. [74] The following issues thus arise for my determination:

  91. My decision

  92. [75] At the outset, I must reiterate that the plaintiff’s case at the end of the trial is not entirely consistent with its case as pleaded in the Statement of Claim, as would have been evident from my outline of the plaintiff’s case above. I am therefore mindful of the general rule that a court should decide on the basis of unpleaded issues or claims only in the very rare circumstances where “no prejudice is caused to the other party” or where “it would be clearly unjust for the court not to do so”: V Nithia (co-administratrix of the estate of Ponnusamy Sivapakiam, deceased) v Buthmanaban s/o Vaithilingam and another [2015] 5 SLR 1422 at [40]. In my view, this high bar is not met by any of the plaintiff’s submissions in the present case which could be said to be unpleaded. As such, where the plaintiff makes an argument at the close of the trial which is substantially outside of the scope of its pleaded case, it will not factor in my decision. I will return to this point at appropriate junctures in my analysis below.

  93. The Sophia project

  94. [76] At its core, the plaintiff’s allegation against the first and second defendants in respect of the Sophia project is that the bid of $115.84m was too low, and would have resulted in either an excessively thin profit margin, or an outright loss. In its pleaded case, the main focus of the plaintiff’s allegation was that notwithstanding the UFS board’s approval of a bid at $120m, the first and second defendants had submitted a different and lower bid (see [30] above). It should be noted that the plaintiff’s case was predicated on UFS board approval, as opposed to approval by the plaintiff’s own board, being sufficient authorisation of the tender price. I turn first to the narrower question of the UFS board approval.

  95. [79] It is also telling that upon the plaintiff being awarded the Sophia project, UFS made an SGX announcement of the award of the tender at the price of $115.84m. If the UFS board had only approved a tender price of $120m, members of the UFS board would no doubt have raised concerns at the time of the SGX announcement. Indeed, I would assume that an investigation would have been undertaken as to how the tender was submitted at a price that was not approved, and the first and second defendants would have been held to account. There is no evidence to suggest that this happened. This to me is telling.

  96. [89] Finally, the plaintiff also argues that the first and second defendants failed to “lock in” the prices of its subcontracts following the award of the Sophia project (see [34] above). Since there is no reference to such a failure anywhere in the pleadings, I disregard it. Further, it appears from the unchallenged evidence of Mr Lim Soon Hock and Ms Gao that quotations from subcontractors would typically have a validity period during which the subcontractors are locked in to the quoted price, although this might not be the case for all quotations received. This was the case with the plaintiff’s past projects. I do not see how the plaintiff can reasonably take issue with the defendants proceeding on the same basis for the Sophia project. Strangely, the same criticism has not been made with regard to the Bishopsgate and Goodwood projects. It therefore seems to be a convenient afterthought.

  97. The Bishopsgate project

  98. [91] To answer the question of whether there was a total subcontract in the negative, I would have to be satisfied that a not insignificant proportion of the work in the Bishopsgate project was being undertaken at the material time by the plaintiff itself. This is because the prohibition in cl 2.3.1 of the Conditions of Contract (see [16] above) is against “sub-contract[ing] the whole of the design and construction of the Works”, and is not merely a prohibition against a total subcontract to a single subcontractor. In other words, cl 2.3.1 required the plaintiff to undertake, on its own, at least a material portion of the design and construction of the relevant works.

  99. [92] The second defendant submits there was not a total subcontract to CCM as “essential” work such as the aluminium and glass works and the supply of marble and stone works had been subcontracted to Kajima subsidiaries. In so far as the second defendant is pointing towards the mere supply of marble by Kajima subsidiaries, this does not help establish that there was no total subcontract to CCM of the design and construction of the relevant works. Further, there is no documentary evidence before the court of any such subcontracting, when one would expect that to be readily available if the assertion is true. Ultimately, as I have pointed out, cl 2.3.1 requires the plaintiff to undertake a material potion of these works itself, and so this submission does not help the second defendant in any case.

  100. [93] The first and second defendants also rely on Kajima’s complaints of misrepresentations by CCM to show that Kajima itself did not think that the plaintiff had totally subcontracted the works to CCM; instead, Kajima was only dissatisfied that CCM was misrepresenting itself as a total subcontractor. However, a somewhat different perspective presents itself when Kajima’s complaints are considered in detail. In Kajima’s letter to the second defendant dated 2 July 2010, Mr Yasuda began by “reiterat[ing]… that you will not be allowed to sub-contract the whole of the Works”. This is consistent with the interpretation of cl 2.3.1 I have set out above. The letter then went on to complain that rumours of a total subcontract of the works to CCM abounded, and that such an impression was detrimental to Kajima’s reputation and business (see [18] above). In this letter, Kajima did not suggest that it had any evidence that the works had been totally subcontracted. Indeed, it would appear that the plaintiff and CCM had taken steps to ensure that Kajima would remain unaware of the degree of CCM’s involvement, such as by requiring CCM to purchase the plaintiff’s uniforms for its workers (see [35] above). Kajima’s main concern was therefore to address the “rumours” that there was a total subcontract to CCM. For good measure, Kajima nevertheless emphasised that there was a prohibition on a total subcontract under cl 2.3.1. It is clear that Kajima’s complaints do not shed much light on whether there had in fact been a total subcontract. Kajima’s complaints therefore do not assist the first and second defendants.

  101. [94] Further, on balance, I find that the nature of Kajima’s complaints and its subsequent insistence on CCM’s removal from the Bishopsgate project support the plaintiff’s case that there was in fact a total subcontract to CCM. If there was no total subcontract and Kajima was solely concerned about a misrepresentation on CCM’s part, the natural response would have been for Kajima to direct its dissatisfaction at CCM, and to force CCM to remove the inaccurate misrepresentations. The plaintiff bore no responsibility for CCM’s action in this regard. That Kajima’s dissatisfaction was largely directed at the plaintiff would suggest that its true complaint was that the plaintiff had engaged in a total subcontract in breach of its contractual obligations. Looked at from another perspective, if there was in fact no total subcontract to CCM, it is unclear why CCM would lie in its prospectus. I would have expected two things to have happened then. First, CCM itself would have taken steps to rectify the prospectus and clarify with Kajima its correct role, for fear that Kajima or the plaintiff would take drastic steps if it failed to do so. Second, the second defendant would have asserted that CCM’s representation was incorrect and taken steps to establish to Kajima’s satisfaction that that was indeed the case. Neither of this happened. Instead, one year after Kajima’s protests, the defendants took the step of procuring the plaintiff to terminate the subcontract and pay CCM compensation pursuant to a settlement agreement instead of standing its ground. This sequence of events only makes the second defendant’s failure to assuage Kajima or to have CCM correct the representations in the prospectus even more difficult to understand. Whether looked at from the perspective of Kajima, CCM, or the defendants, the events that I have outlined make little sense if the CCM subcontract were not a total subcontract, but are entirely understandable if it were. It is also notable that neither the first nor the second defendant called any representative of CCM to corroborate their account.

  102. [95] I therefore find that the CCM subcontract was a total subcontract in breach of cl 2.3.1. The subcontract clearly was not in the plaintiff’s best interests, and by entering into it, the defendants who were involved would have breached their duties: see Goh Chan Peng and others v Beyonics Technology Ltd and another and another appeal [2017] 2 SLR 592 (“Beyonics”) at [77(c)].

  103. [96] It is not in dispute that the second defendant was actively involved in the awarding of the CCM subcontract. The second defendant has thus breached his duties to the plaintiff. It is also clear that the second defendant cannot be excused from this breach under s 391 of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed), since he has not acted honestly and reasonably by deliberately breaching cl 2.3.1 in awarding the subcontract to CCM.

  104. [98] The plaintiff has thus not shown that the first defendant had authorised the subcontract with CCM. This is fatal to the plaintiff’s claim against the first defendant: once the plaintiff contracted with Kajima to build the Bishopsgate project and the CCM subcontract was awarded, the die was cast – there is no evidence that following these events, at whatever date the first defendant came to know of the total subcontract, any wrongful action or inaction on his part increased the plaintiff’s consequent loss.

  105. [99] Thus, I find that the second defendant alone has breached his duty to the plaintiff in relation to the subcontract with CCM in the Bishopsgate project. I return to the issue of his liability for subsequent losses at [141] below.

  106. The Goodwood project

  107. [100] In relation to the casual labourers, the plaintiff’s pleaded case is that they were paid excessive wages and were not adequately supervised (see [40] above). To the extent that some of the plaintiff’s arguments in its closing submissions focus solely on the excessive hiring of casual labourers, this unpleaded claim is not open to the plaintiff, and I do not consider it further.

  108. The excessive wages claim

  109. [102] The plaintiff’s retort is that (a) the third defendant had in fact managed to engage labour on a unit-rate basis, and there was no evidence of subcontractors refusing to work on this basis; and (b) it made no sense to engage casual labourers when there were concerns with delayed construction drawings, since more labour could not resolve these concerns.

  110. [103] I find it difficult to accept the argument that just because there is some evidence that the third defendant managed to engage unit-rate labour on one occasion, that therefore means that he must have been able to do the same on other occasions, but failed to do so. I thus do not place much weight on this evidence. In fact, if any conclusion is to be drawn from this evidence, it would more likely suggest that the third defendant was not insistent on hiring casual labourers and would engage per-unit labour where possible. It is just that he was not able to find labour on that basis generally. This is in line with the uncontradicted evidence of the first and third defendants that the plaintiff was in fact unable to find labour subcontractors at a per-unit rate. It seems inconceivable that the third defendant would engage hourly-rate casual labour if there were labour available at a per-unit rate – there is simply no reason for him to prefer the former over the latter. As for the second argument, it is tolerably clear from the first defendant’s evidence that the real difficulty was that the construction drawings were being progressively prepared and made available to the subcontractors even as they were waiting onsite to commence work. This would mean that work could still be done by the labourers, albeit at an unpredictable rate. This evidence has also not been rebutted. I am therefore convinced that the defendants’ decision to hire hourly-rate labour was not unreasonable in the circumstances.

  111. [104] Next, I turn to the plaintiff’s argument that the plaintiff paid unskilled workers the wages of skilled workers (see [42] above). At the outset, I note that the plaintiff’s pleaded case is that the workers were being paid beyond their skill level (ie, that unskilled workers were being paid skilled workers’ wages). However, the plaintiff’s closing submissions extended the allegation to all the workers being paid beyond the market rate. In so far as the plaintiff’s pleaded case is concerned, the only evidence the plaintiff has adduced is from Mr Nelson who concludes that the plaintiff was billed for non-skilled labourers at skilled labourers’ rates. If I understand Mr Nelson’s reasoning correctly, his sole basis for this conclusion is that the labourers in question had non-Chinese names, indicating that they were not of PRC origin. Although Mr Nelson has no doubt produced statistics showing that non-PRC workers were generally paid lower wages, his conclusion suffers from two problems. First, there is no direct evidence that the workers were indeed not of PRC origin apart from Mr Nelson’s conclusion based on his review of their names, a conclusion he was not qualified to make as an expert. Second, there is no evidence that these workers were in fact unskilled. Ms Ker Wei Xuan (“Ms Ker”), a quantity surveyor employed by the plaintiff at the site of the Goodwood project, testified that to her knowledge, all the casual labourers on site were skilled, and her evidence has not been contradicted. I therefore cannot accept the logical leap that these allegedly non-PRC labourers whose wages Mr Nelson took issue with were unskilled simply by reason of their nationality. Mr Nelson’s conclusion that all non-PRC workers were paid lower than PRC workers because the former were all unskilled seems to me to be more a sweeping generalisation than a properly considered view backed by empirical data. Indeed, on the stand Mr Nelson much more reasonably characterised the relationship between nationality and skill level as a trend rather than a rule. The plaintiff has therefore not made good its case that there were unskilled workers being paid skilled workers’ rates.

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