Skip to content
Grounds publishedDecided 6 May 2019

High Court

BSD v Attorney-General and other matters

Feedback & support

[2019] SGHC 118Case no. Originating Summons No 945 of 201738 paragraphs

What happened, in plain English

There is no plain-English summary of this judgment yet.

Ask about this judgment

Laws this judgment relies on

Grounds of decision

Official text from eLitigation

  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The cases before me raised the following questions:

  3. (iii) inspect and take copies of the application, supporting affidavit/s and related court documents?

  4. [2] With respect to the first question, I decided that the parties against whom production orders have been made were prima facie entitled to inspect and take copies of the relevant documents unless it was shown that granting access to the court file would prejudice investigations or subvert the ends of justice. The AG, who was the Respondent in the matters before me, has appealed against these decisions.

  5. Background

  6. MACMA

  7. [4] The MACMA was enacted to facilitate the provision and obtaining of international assistance in criminal matters. The MACMA applies to requests for assistance by foreign countries to Singapore and vice versa. The types of assistance that may be requested include “the provision and obtaining of evidence and things”: s 3, MACMA.

  8. (a) that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that a specified person has carried on or benefited from a foreign offence;

  9. (b) that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the thing to which the application relates –

  10. (i) is likely to be of substantial value (whether by itself or together with another thing) to the criminal matter in respect of which the application was made; and

  11. (ii) does not consist of or include items subject to legal privilege; and

  12. (c) that the court is satisfied that it is not contrary to the public interest for the thing to be produced or that access to it be given.

  13. [7] In addition, s 22(6) provides that no person is required to produce or make available any thing that he could not be compelled to produce in the criminal proceedings in the Requesting State.

  14. [8] Assistance under the MACMA is provided only to a country that has given an undertaking to provide similar assistance to Singapore (see s 16(2)) or to a prescribed country that has entered into an agreement, memorandum of understanding or a treaty with Singapore to provide such similar assistance (see s 17(1)).

  15. [9] The Requesting State in the cases before me, had signed an agreement with the Government of the Republic of Singapore concerning mutual legal assistance in criminal matters (“the MLA Agreement”). Article 16(1) of the MLA Agreement provides as follows:

  16. Registrar’s Appeal State Courts No 1 of 2018 (“RAS 1/2018”)

  17. Registrar’s Appeal State Courts No 2 of 2018 (“RAS 2/2018”)

  18. [12] The AG also applied, ex parte, for production orders against the three appellants in RAS 2/2018 (together, “the RAS2 Appellants”). On 29 June 2017, the District Court made productions orders against each of the RAS2 Appellants for production of certain business and financial documents.

  19. [13] Upon being served with the production orders, the RAS2 Appellants made a joint application for leave to take copies of all the documents, including the supporting affidavits and notes of evidence, relating to the AG’s applications. On 15 November 2017, the District Court dismissed the application. RAS 2/2018 is the appeal by the RAS2 Appellants against the District Court’s dismissal of the application.

  20. Originating Summons No 945 of 2017 (“OS 945/2017”)

  21. [15] The RAS1 Appellant sought, among other things, the names of the Banks (which it was a customer of) against whom productions orders had been made, and copies of the court documents (including affidavits and notes of arguments) relating to the orders.

  22. RAS 1/2018 and RAS 2/2018

  23. [16] The issues in these two appeals were similar. The RAS1 Appellant and RAS2 Appellants (together, “the RAS Appellants”) applied to take copies of documents in the Court files, pursuant to O 89B r 3 of the Rules which reads as follows:

  24. [19] The RAS Appellants submitted that leave should be granted to them to inspect the court files unless the AG could show that doing so would prejudice investigations. The RAS Appellants’ arguments were straightforward:

  25. [20] The RAS Appellants submitted that the right to be heard must carry with it the right to know the case and the evidence given or statements made against the person exercising that right: Mustafa Ahunbay v Public Prosecutor [2015] 2 SLR 903 at [71], citing B Surinder Singh Kanda v Government of the Federation of Malaya [1962] AC 322 (at 337).

  26. [22] On appeal, the Manitoba Court of Appeal observed as follows, at [11] –[12]:

  27. [25] Apple Daily concerned, among other things, a search warrant obtained under the Hong Kong Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (Cap 201) (1971) (“POBO”). The warrant was issued pursuant to an ex parte application under O 119 r 4 of the Hong Kong Rules of the High Court (Cap 4) (1998) (“HKROC”). An application to set aside the warrant was dismissed. On appeal, a preliminary issue was whether the applicant should have been allowed to inspect the affidavit supporting the application for the search warrant. The Hong Kong Court of Appeal held (at 663C) that public interest immunity applied to the affidavit and it could not be revealed so long as the investigation in aid of which the warrants were sought continued. However, the Court also discussed O 119 r 5 of the HKROC.

  28. The Court went on to hold (at 662E) that there were no grounds in that case which might justify a departure from the norm.

  29. [27] Chan Mei Yiu concerned an application for judicial review of the magistrate’s decision to issue search warrants under the Hong Kong Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Ordinance (Cap 525) (1997) (“HK MLACMO”). In the course of the judicial review proceedings, the applicants sought discovery of the Italian prosecutor’s letter of request to the Hong Kong authorities, and the information that had been presented to the Hong Kong magistrate for the purposes of obtaining the search warrants (“the supplementary information”). The facts showed that the Italian prosecutor had sent similar letters of request to the authorities in California and Ireland relating to the same set of offences which were the subject of the letter of request to Hong Kong.

  30. [28] The Hong Kong Court of First Instance was of the view that there were arguable inconsistencies, misstatements and omissions in the letter of request to the Californian authorities, and noted that there were allegations of “seriously misleading” matters in the Irish proceedings. The Court further noted there was no reason to suggest that the letter of request to Hong Kong significantly differed from those to California and Ireland (ie, in terms of the possible inconsistencies and alleged misleading matters). However, the Court refused the application for discovery for the following reasons (at [32] – [35]):

  31. (a) Redaction was not possible and there was a real danger that comprehensive disclosure would be potentially detrimental to the proper course of the investigation.

  32. (b) The information that the applicants had already obtained from the Californian and Irish proceedings (including the letters of request) as to the alleged misrepresentations, omissions, and material non-disclosure were sufficient to enable the applicants to present their case even in the absence of the Hong Kong letter of request itself.

  33. [29] The DAG referred me to the following observations by the Court in Chan Mei Yiu at [9]:

  34. [30] The DAG argued that

  35. (a) similar to the position in Hong Kong, there is a need for confidentiality under the MACMA and pointed out that under s 22(8), applications for production orders were to be heard in camera; and

  36. [31] I agreed with the RAS Appellants that the statutory right to challenge the production orders would be meaningless if they were not even allowed to inspect the court papers. How else could they even begin to consider whether they had any grounds to challenge the production orders?

  37. [34] The conditions in s 22(4), MACMA, are as follows:

  38. (a) that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that a specified person has carried on or benefited from a foreign offence;

  39. (b) that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the thing to which the application relates –

  40. (i) is likely to be of substantial value to the criminal matter in respect of which the application was made; and

  41. (ii) does not consist of or include items subject to legal privilege; and

  42. (c) that the court is satisfied that it is not contrary to public interest for the thing to be produced or that access to it be given.

  43. [35] In my view, the RAS Appellants could not possibly even consider challenging the production orders without having access to the application, the supporting affidavit and any submissions made to the court in respect of the application. I found myself unable to agree with the reasoning in Apple Daily and Chan Mei Yiu. In my view, the approaches taken in both these cases would render the RAS Appellants’ statutory right under O 89B r 2(2) to challenge the production orders made against them, an illusory one.

  44. [38] The decision in Chan Mei Yiu should also be read in the context of the facts of the case. The court was influenced by the fact that the applicants had sufficient information (obtained from the Californian and Irish proceedings) to “enable justice to be done in [that] particular case” (at [33]). The Court found that the extent of the information was such that the applicants were not deprived of the means of proper presentation of their case. The Court suggested (at [34]) that, since arguable inconsistencies had already arisen on the information, the applicants could make their case and it would then be on the Hong Kong authorities to put forth the Hong Kong letter of request to answer the inferences that arise from the evidence. In my view, these observations by the Court in fact also demonstrated the necessity for the applicants to have sufficient information to enable them to challenge the orders made against them.

  45. [39] The decision whether to grant leave under O 89B r 3 involves a balancing exercise between the applicant’s need to have access to the court documents and the reasons for not granting access. I accepted that this balancing exercise had to be carried out with the purposes of the MACMA in mind. In my view, the approach taken in Beach was fair and just.

  46. [42] There was nothing before me to suggest that granting leave to the RAS Appellants would prejudice the criminal investigations in the Requesting State. I was therefore inclined to grant leave. However, as the Requesting State had only authorised the disclosure of what was necessary to obtain the production orders, the RAS Appellants and the DAG agreed that the Requesting State should first be given an opportunity to determine the extent to which it wishes its request to be executed. It will be recalled that under Article 16(1) of the MLA Agreement, if the request cannot be executed without breaching confidentiality, the Requested State shall, before executing the request, so inform the Requesting State which shall then determine the extent to which it wishes the request to be executed (see [9] above).

  47. [43] Accordingly, I adjourned RAS 1/2018 and RAS 2/2018 to enable the AG to obtain the Requesting State’s decision on this.

  48. [45] Second, the DJ was of the view that it was unnecessary for the RAS Appellants to have sight of the court documents for purposes of filing applications to discharge or vary the production orders because the production orders had previously been varied without the RAS Appellants having had sight of the court documents. I disagreed with the DJ’s view. The production orders required the RAS Appellants to produce the documents described in the orders, by 23 August 2017. The orders in question were varied to state that the AG shall not disclose the documents or their contents to any other party including the Requesting State, pending the final disposal of applications to discharge the production orders, if filed within a prescribed deadline. The applications to vary the orders were intended to preserve the status quo and were consented to by the AG. Clearly, these applications did not require the RAS Appellants to have had sight of the court documents and therefore were not valid reasons to refuse leave to inspect and take copies of the court documents.

  49. OS 945/2017

  50. [47] At the outset, it must be noted that the RAS1 Appellant had no basis to inspect and take copies of the court documents relating to the Bank production orders unless it had the requisite standing to apply to discharge or vary the orders.

  51. [49] The RAS1 Appellant submitted that

  52. (b) it had the requisite standing to apply to discharge or vary the Bank production orders under O 32 r 6 of the Rules and the common law.

  53. [56] Mr Zhuang further submitted that the Rules regulate procedure and cannot confer substantive rights. That is correct as a general principle. However, in the present case, O 89B r 2(2) was enacted pursuant to s 23(7) of the MACMA, which expressly states that the Rules may provide for the discharge and variation of production orders. In my view, O 89B r 2(2) should be given its full effect. I noted also that there is nothing in the MACMA that can be said to be inconsistent with O 89B r 2(2).

  54. [57] Moreover, the interpretation that I have given to O 89 r 2(2) was also consistent with the fact that applications for productions orders under the MACMA have to do with criminal matters. The investigating agency must be free to carry out its investigations and seek evidence or information from anyone who might possess such evidence or information. I could not see any reason why any other person (including the target of the investigations and, where the information relates to bank accounts, the account holder) should be entitled to information as to who the investigating agency has approached in the course of its investigations, much less what evidence or information has been obtained from those persons.

  55. [58] For the above reasons, I concluded that the RAS1 Appellant had no standing to challenge the Bank production orders. It followed that there was no reason why it should be provided with the information sought or be given access to the court documents relating to the Bank production orders. Accordingly, I dismissed the application.

  56. Public interest immunity and s 125 of the Evidence Act

  57. [59] Submissions were made on the applicability of public interest immunity, whether under s 125 of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) (“the EA”) or common law. Section 125 of the EA provides as follows:

  58. Evidence as to affairs of State

  59. 125. No one shall be permitted to produce any unpublished official records relating to affairs of State, or to give any evidence derived therefrom, except with the permission of the officer at the head of the Department concerned, who shall give or withholds such permissions as he thinks fit, subject, however, to the control of the Minister.

  60. [60] The AG’s basis for asserting public interest immunity was Article 16(1) of the MLA Agreement (see [9] above). The DAG also relied on Re Section 22, in which the Court of Appeal observed (at [26]) that Article 16(1) requires the AG not to disclose the request from the requesting country even if the court were to insist on disclosure.

  61. [61] During oral submissions, the DAG acknowledged that the law as it stands in Singapore is that evidence contained in affidavits fall outside the scope of the EA since s 2(1) of the EA states that Parts I, II and III the EA shall not apply to “affidavits presented to any court”: HT SRL v Wee Shuo Woon [2016] 2 SLR 442 at [16]. Section 125 falls within Part III of the EA. However, the DAG argued that public interest immunity under the common law would still apply.

  62. [62] The RAS Appellants submitted that common law public interest immunity is not part of the law of Singapore since s 2(2) of the EA has repealed all rules which are not saved by statute and which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Evidence Act. According to the RAS Appellants, common law public interest immunity is inconsistent with s 125 in two aspects. First, unlike s 125, common law public interest immunity cannot be waived. Second, common law public interest immunity involves a balancing exercise between different public interests where the court determines that the document falls in a recognised class protected by common law public interest immunity. In contrast, under s 125, it is the relevant head of department who decides whether to invoke s 125. The RAS Appellants referred to Re Siah Mooi Guat [1988] 2 SLR(R) 165 in which the High Court held (at [36]) that it is for the Minister, not the court, to decide whether it is in the public interest that information should be disclosed. The RAS Appellants relied on SP Gupta v Union of India and another (1981) Supp SCC 87 (a decision of the Indian Supreme Court) and Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore vol 10(2) (LexisNexis, 2016 Reissue) at para 120.420, for its submission that common law public interest immunity is inconsistent with s 125 of the EA.

  63. [63] Mr Zhuang supported the RAS Appellants’ submission that common law public interest immunity is inconsistent with s 125 of the EA and ought not to apply in Singapore.

  64. [64] I was inclined to agree with the RAS Appellants and Mr Zhuang that common law public interest immunity does not apply in Singapore. However, it was not necessary for me to deal with the issue of public interest immunity, whether under s 125 or the common law. In my view, the issue of public interest immunity did not arise in the present case. The assertion of public interest immunity was based on Article 16(1) of the MLA Agreement. Article 16(1) contemplates the possibility that the Requesting State’s request cannot be executed without breaching confidentiality. In such event, Article 16(1) understandably does not require the AG to both execute the request and still maintain confidentiality. Instead, Article 16(1) provides that the AG is to inform the Requesting State that the request cannot be executed without breaching confidentiality. The Requesting State then has to determine the extent to which it wishes the request to be executed. To the extent that the Requesting State wishes its request to be executed, it would necessarily have to consent to disclosure of such information as would be necessary for its request to be executed. Alternatively, the Requesting State may decide to not proceed with its request. If the Requesting State gives its consent to disclosure, no question of public interest immunity would arise. If the Requesting State decides to not proceed with its request, the matter comes to an end.

  65. Conclusion

  66. [65] For the reasons stated above, I allowed the appeals in RAS 1/2018 and RAS 2/2018 subject however to the Requesting State’s decision whether it wishes the AG to proceed further to execute its request. As for OS 945/2017, I dismissed the application on the ground that the RAS1 Appellant lacked the requisite standing.