Skip to content
Grounds publishedDecided 15 May 2019

High Court

United Integrated Services Pte Ltd v Harmonious Coretrades Pte Ltd

Feedback & support

[2019] SGHC 126Case no. Originating Summons No 1113 of 2018 (Registrar’s Appeal No 79 of 2019)14 paragraphs

What happened, in plain English

There is no plain-English summary of this judgment yet.

Ask about this judgment

Grounds of decision

Official text from eLitigation

  1. Introduction

  2. [1] A garnishee owed a sum to the judgment debtor pursuant to an adjudication determination obtained by the judgment debtor under the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act (Cap 30B, 2006 Rev Ed) (“SOPA”). Separately, the judgment debtor owed a debt to the judgment creditor, which remained unsatisfied. The judgment creditor applied to garnish the debt due from the garnishee in satisfaction of the debt owed to it by the judgment debtor.

  3. Facts

  4. [5] The present case involves three building and construction companies which were involved in a construction project. Their respective capacities in the construction project were as follows:

  5. (a) The main contractor: United Integrated Services Pte Ltd (the “garnishee”);

  6. (b) The sub-contractor: Civil Tech Pte Ltd (the “judgment debtor”); and

  7. (c) The sub-contractor’s sub-contractor: Harmonious Coretrades Pte Ltd (the “judgment creditor”).

  8. Final garnishee order

  9. [7] As the adjudication determination remained unsatisfied in full, the judgment creditor commenced garnishee proceedings, seeking to attach any debt due and accruing from the garnishee to answer the debt owed to it by the judgment debtor.

  10. Debt under final garnishee order no longer due

  11. The inherent powers of the Court to set aside an order

  12. The three circumstances for setting aside an order

  13. (b) Secondly, where the judgment has been obtained by fraud. This fraud must relate to matters which prima facie would be a reason for setting the judgment aside if they were established by proof and the fraud must have been discovered after the judgment was passed; and

  14. The court retains the discretion to set aside an order outside the three circumstances

  15. [20] The words “uphill task” and “onerous task” do not connote impossibility; they merely evince that the threshold for invoking the Court’s inherent powers is high. On the facts of Ong Cher Keong and Sunny Daisy, the high threshold was not met, and the orders were accordingly not set aside.

  16. [21] That the threshold for invoking the court’s residual discretion to utilise its inherent powers is high is not new. As the Court of Appeal observed in Roberto Building Material Pte Ltd & others v Overseas-Chinese Banking Corp Ltd and another [2003] 2 SLR(R) 353 (“Roberto Building”) at [16]:

  17. [22] It is hereby noted that while the court in Roberto Building had utilised the term “inherent jurisdiction” as opposed to “inherent powers”, it was likely delimiting the scope of its inherent powers. As the Court of Appeal clarified in Re Nalpon Zero Geraldo Mario [2013] 3 SLR 258 at [33]:

  18. [23] Notwithstanding the inappropriate use of “inherent jurisdiction” in Roberto Building, the point remains that the threshold for invoking the court’s inherent powers is high.

  19. Whether the final garnishee order should be set aside to prevent injustice

  20. [32] Nonetheless, as explained in Roberto Building at [16], the threshold for invoking the court’s inherent powers is high, and the “essential touchstone is really that of ‘need’.”

  21. [33] “[I]n looking at the question of necessity in the context of the court’s inherent jurisdiction, one must take a sensible approach that has regard to all the circumstances of the case” (UMCI Ltd v Tokio Marine & Fire Insurance Co (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2006] 4 SLR(R) 95 at [92]).

  22. [35] While such guidelines are useful, preventing injustice is ultimately an amorphous concept, and the facts of each case are of primary importance in determining whether it is warranted for the court to exercise its inherent powers.

  23. Underlying debt no longer accruing

  24. Exposing the garnishee to a debt which it may not even owe

  25. [40] Similar circumstances were before the English Court of Appeal in Hale v Victoria Plumbing Co Ltd and another [1966] 2 QB 746 (“Hale”). There, the judgment creditor obtained judgment against the judgment debtor for £256 13s. 10d. The judgment debt being unsatisfied, the judgment creditor sought to attach a debt which it alleged to be owing from the garnishee to the judgment debtor in satisfaction of the judgment debt which it was owed.

  26. [43] In the present case, while 1AD, being a SOPA adjudication determination, has temporary finality in that it “finally and conclusively determin[es] the parties’ rights”, it is liable to being reversed by final adjudication in accordance with the provisions of SOPA (W Y Steel Construction Pte Ltd v Osko Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 380 at [71]). If, upon final adjudication, it is determined that no debt is in fact due from the garnishee to the judgment debtor, the garnishee would have paid to the judgment creditor a debt which it did not even owe.

  27. [44] In fact, contrary to Hale whereby the garnishee’s counterclaim was merely alleged through an affidavit, an adjudicator has in fact determined that the liquidated damages and back-charges owed by the judgment debtor to the garnishee would likely outweigh the value of works which remain unpaid by the garnishee to the judgment debtor. Here, the second adjudicator in 2AD had, after considering the valuation of works in 1AD as well as liquidated damages and back-charges which were not before the adjudicator in 1AD, arrived at a negative sum of $1,176,050.67. Therefore, the garnishee’s counterclaim has been determined to be valid and has temporary finality by virtue of 2AD.

  28. Insolvency of judgment debtor

  29. The need to prevent injustice to the garnishee

  30. [52] In the circumstances, given that (a) the enforcement of the underlying debt is stayed, (b) the garnishee may ultimately owe no debt to the judgment debtor, and (c) the judgment debtor’s insolvency may work to the detriment of the garnishee, the present case fully necessitates the invocation of the court’s inherent powers to prevent injustice befalling the garnishee.

  31. Conclusion