High Court · Decided 24 January 2019
Singapore Rifle Association v Singapore Shooting Association and others
Feedback & support[2019] SGHC 13 · Case no. Suit No 459 of 2016
✱ What happened, in plain English
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
- [3]
[3] The defendants have appealed against my decision. I now set out my reasons in full.
Background
The parties
- [4]
[4] The plaintiff, SRA was founded in 1862 as a recreational sports club dedicated to the sport of shooting. It has maintained that purpose since, and is today a registered society under the Societies Act (Cap 311, 2014 Rev Ed). Since August 2015, its chairman has been Mr Eng Fook Hoong. Mr Eng is assisted by Mr Conrad Chung, who is SRA’s honorary secretary. Before Mr Eng took office, SRA was chaired by Mr Loo Woei Harng.
- [5]
[5] Like SRA, the Singapore Gun Club (“SGC”) is a recreational sports club dedicated to the sport of shooting. It was founded in the 1950s, and its president today is Mr Michael Vaz Lorrain, the second defendant. Mr Yap Beng Hui, the third defendant, is one of SGC’s two vice-presidents, and Mr Patrick Chen, the fourth defendant, is SGC’s honorary secretary. Mr Vaz, Mr Yap and Mr Chen are the second, third and fourth defendants respectively.
- [6]
[6] SRA and SGC are the two founding members of SSA, the first defendant, which is Singapore’s national authority or “national sports association” (“NSA”) for the sport of shooting. SSA is a registered charity and an institution of a public character under the Charities Act (Cap 37, 2007 Rev Ed) as well as a registered society under the Societies Act. Its objects include coordinating, regulating, advising and administering all matters relating to the sport of shooting, and safeguarding the interests of the shooting sport.
- [7]
[7] Mr Vaz was elected president of SSA in May 2013, and he has held that office ever since. His deputies in SGC, Mr Yap and Mr Chen, have also been secretary general and treasurer of SSA respectively since September 2014. SSA has an advisor in BG (Ret) Lim Kim Lye, who was invited by Mr Vaz to join the SSA council in that capacity in 2013. Mr David Lieu has been SSA’s general manager since December 2014. At the material time, Mr Loo Woei Harng was SRA’s representative on the SSA council.
The National Shooting Centre
- [8]
[8] Shooting activities for SRA took place at the NSC, which is a complex of shooting ranges located at Old Chua Chu Kang Road. At the NSC, SRA and SGC each had an armoury, where the firearms, ammunition and other shooting equipment belonging to each club were respectively stored. BG Lim had once proposed that all firearms in the NSC be stored in one armoury and all ammunition be stored in another. This proposal was never implemented, but it later became something of a flashpoint.
- [9]
[9] The NSC is built on land which is owned by the state and leased to the Singapore Sports Council, a statutory board whose responsibility is to oversee and promote sports generally in Singapore. Following a rebranding exercise in 2014, the Singapore Sports Council adopted the new name “Sport Singapore”. For convenience, I shall refer to it by its new name. At the material time, Sport Singapore sub-leased the NSC to SSA, and SSA was, in turn, entitled to manage and develop the NSC and enter into arrangements with SSA’s constituent members in relation to the use of the NSC.
The construction of the Club Range
- [11]
[11] Led by Mr Conrad Chung, who is an architect, SRA’s construction of the Club Range began promptly after the conclusion of the Agreement. At the time the Agreement was signed, the location known as Range X was not an empty plot of land. There was already a disused and dilapidated shooting range there. Instead of tearing down the existing structure and building a new one in its place, SRA’s plan for the construction of the Club Range was to refurbish the existing range. Mr Chung’s plan had two phases. The first phase would involve replacing the dilapidated pre-existing structures, including overhead steel trusses and old target structures. It would also involve minor works such as the installation of a lightning protection system. The second phase would involve the construction of a metal roof over a resting area. SRA’s understanding was that only the second phase needed approval from the relevant authorities, including building plan approval from the Building and Construction Authority of Singapore (“BCA”) and planning approval from the Urban Redevelopment Authority (“URA”). I shall refer to these approvals as “regulatory approvals” for convenience.
- [12]
[12] The first phase began in December 2014. Progress was interrupted that month by preparations for the 2015 South-East Asian Games, but the works resumed and the first phase was completed by March 2015. Throughout that period, SRA kept SSA and Sport Singapore updated on the project by email and letter.
- [13]
[13] However, from April to October 2015, SSA secretly complained first to Sport Singapore and then to BCA about SRA’s construction work at Range X. Thus, on 15 September 2015, Mr Vaz, without SRA’s knowledge, sent an email to BCA and Sport Singapore to report that SRA had constructed “illegal structures”. The email also and “urgently ask[ed] that BCA calls for the demolition of the structures before anyone is seriously hurt”. BCA investigated the matter and conducted a site visit at Range X on 21 September 2015, which was attended by only Mr Vaz, Mr Lieu and two BCA officers. SRA was neither informed of the site visit nor invited to send any representative to attend. The BCA officers observed, at the time of inspection, that the structures “posed no immediate danger”. Undeterred, Mr Vaz sent another email to BCA after the site visit to offer his personal opinion that the wall of the original Range X was “never designed to take the loading” of what Mr Vaz regarded as “heavy beams” erected by SRA across the width of Range X. Mr Vaz expressed concern that the “excess loads” (in Mr Vaz’s words) could “lead to structural failure”. SRA would not find out about these complaints until much later.
- [17]
[17] In the meantime, on 9 November 2015, SRA filed its defence and counterclaim in the Eviction Suit. Part of its defence was the assertion that because the parties had agreed that SRA would carry out upgrading works at SRA’s armoury to enhance its security, SSA had implicitly granted SRA a contractual licence to occupy the armoury which SSA could not unilaterally revoke. In its counterclaim, SRA claimed damages for the loss it had suffered as a result of the floods, alleging that the loss had been caused by SSA’s failure to maintain the premises. On 25 November 2015, SSA filed its reply, in which it averred that it was SSA, not SRA, whom the parties had agreed would be responsible for upgrading the security of the NSC armouries, including by implementing BG Lim’s idea of storing firearms in one armoury and ammunition in another.
The circular resolution and the demolition of the Club Range
- [18]
[18] Then, on 30 November 2015, Mr Vaz convened a meeting of the SSA council to ratify the following five resolutions that had been passed earlier that year:
(a) a resolution adopted on 14 March 2015 that BG Lim’s two-armoury idea be implemented;
(b) a resolution adopted on 9 May 2015 that the existing armoury doors be replaced with better ones called Chubb Doors;
(c) a resolution adopted on 4 September 2015 that SRA be given notice to vacate their armoury;
(d) a resolution adopted on 26 September 2015 that SSA institute the Eviction Suit; and
SRA’s representative on the SSA council, Mr Loo, was absent from the meeting.
- [19]
[19] These resolutions were not originally adopted by voting through a show of hands. Mr Vaz explained that he had received legal advice that the resolutions ought to have been passed that way under SSA’s constitution, and that he should call a meeting to have the resolutions voted on again by way of show of hands. SRA, on the other hand, suggested that Mr Vaz convened the meeting because SRA’s lawyers had written on 8 October 2015, in response to the eviction notice, to seek details of the SSA council resolutions mentioned in that notice, including how those resolutions were passed and who voted for them. SRA had also in its defence and counterclaim in the Eviction Suit alleged that the eviction notice and Eviction Suit were issued and commenced without proper authority or approval.
- [21]
[21] The second defendant Mr Vaz then decided that he had had enough. The very next day, he wrote to Mr Yap, the third defendant, indicating his intention for the SSA council to suspend the privileges of SRA at the NSC with effect from 1 January 2016 for SRA’s refusal to comply with the resolutions that the SSA council had earlier passed and subsequently ratified on 30 November 2015. Mr Vaz did not call a physical meeting of the council. Instead, he asked Mr Yap to put the resolution in writing and to circulate it by email to the council for a vote, which Mr Yap did on 16 December 2015. That is why the resolution has been referred to by the parties as the “circular resolution”. The resolution was seconded by Mr Chen, the third defendant. On the same day, SRA got wind of the circular resolution through Mr Loo and instructed its lawyers to send a letter to SSA’s lawyers to object to the resolution and demand its retraction. Despite this letter, Mr Vaz, Mr Yap and Mr Chen proceeded to vote in favour of the resolution. Mr Loo voted against the resolution while the remaining three council members either abstained or did not respond. The circular resolution was therefore passed.
- [22]
[22] On 18 December 2015, Mr Vaz started making arrangements to convene a board of inquiry (“BOI”) apparently to investigate SRA’s breaches and for SRA to explain its reasons for not complying with SSA’s resolutions. Thus, shortly after the circular resolution was passed, Mr Vaz appointed BG Lim to chair the BOI. Two others, who were from another member club of SSA, were also appointed to the BOI. At around the same time, on 21 December 2015, Pikasa began the demolition of the Club Range at the NSC. A month later, the demolition was complete.
The board of inquiry hearings
- [23]
[23] The BOI’s first set of hearings took place on 1 and 4 February 2016. At this hearing, the BOI determined, based on the materials before it, that SRA had committed the breaches alleged in the circular resolution. The BOI then adjourned the proceedings until 17 February 2016, where it expected to hear SRA on the breaches.
- [24]
[24] While the first set of hearings was underway, the police was auditing the armouries at the NSC. The police discovered that the armouries contained firearms which had no proper records because they belonged to members who had died, quit their respective clubs or left Singapore. As a result, the police seized 75 firearms from the SRA armoury and two firearms from the SGC armoury. Following this discovery, Sport Singapore decided on 6 February 2016 to terminate its sub-lease with SSA, and resumed control of the NSC premises. The NSC was also shut down pending further investigation and a review of processes.
- [25]
[25] These events led the BOI to postpone the second set of hearings on SRA’s breaches to 16 March 2016. This set of hearings was ostensibly for the purpose of hearing SRA’s answers to allegations against it. Before this set of hearings took place, the SSA council met on 13 February 2016. BG Lim attended, and informed the SSA council that the BOI had concluded that SRA had indeed committed the four alleged breaches as stated in the circular resolution. Mr Vaz then proposed a motion to suspend SRA, with the specific terms of the suspension to be decided later. The motion was carried with three votes in favour and two abstentions. The three votes in favour were cast by the three Individual Defendants. SRA’s representative on the SSA council, Mr Loo, was not present at this meeting.
- [26]
[26] At the resumed hearing of the BOI on 16 March 2016, Mr Timothy Ngui and Mr Kevin Leong of SRA were in attendance, and they presented a set of objections on behalf of SRA. They objected to BG Lim’s appointment as chairman of the BOI, contending he was in a position of conflict because it was he who had proposed the idea of consolidating firearms and ammunition into separate armouries. They also submitted that a majority of SRA’s alleged breaches were live issues before the High Court in the Eviction Suit and therefore inappropriate for determination by the BOI. The BOI did not accept these objections, and proceeded to affirm its conclusion at the first set of hearings that SRA had indeed committed the alleged breaches.
- [28]
[28] In April 2016, the SSA council re-convened. BG Lim presented the conclusions of the BOI. Mr Vaz then proposed a motion to suspend SRA as a member club of SSA and to suspend SRA’s privileges at the NSC. The only voting members of the SSA council present at this meeting were the three Individual Defendants. Mr Loo was again absent from the meeting. The motion was passed unanimously by the votes of the three Individual Defendants.
The present suit
Parties’ pleaded cases
- [30]
[30] SRA’s case has two main parts. First, it claims that the circular resolution is ultra vires and should be declared null and void on a number of grounds. These include the fact that SSA has no power under its constitution to suspend the privileges of SRA, the fact that the resolution was passed in breach of the proper procedure for passing a resolution under SSA’s constitution, and the fact that SRA was not given a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the allegations made in the resolution against SRA.
- [31]
[31] Secondly, SRA claims that Mr Vaz, Mr Yap and Mr Chen conspired to injure SRA. SRA asserts that they did so by working together as members of the SSA council to procure the passing of an ultra vires resolution purporting to suspend the privileges of SRA at the NSC. SRA claims damages for loss arising from its investigation into and response to this alleged conspiracy.
Issues to be determined
- [34]
[34] Having regard to the evidence, the law and the parties’ cases, I consider that there are three main issues to be determined:
(a) First, is the circular resolution of 16 December 2015 ultra vires?
(b) Second, are Mr Vaz, Mr Yap and Mr Chen liable to SRA in the tort of conspiracy?
(c) Third, is SRA liable under cl 10 of the Agreement to pay SSA the cost of demolishing the Club Range?
- [35]
[35] I shall consider these questions in turn.
Issue 1: Validity of the circular resolution
- [36]
[36] I accept SRA’s case that the circular resolution is ultra vires. This is for three independent reasons. First, under SSA’s constitution, the SSA council has no power to suspend the privileges of a member of SSA. Secondly, SSA’s constitution also does not empower the SSA Council to make decisions by circular resolution. Finally, the circular resolution was in any event passed without SRA being given a chance to be heard, and is therefore void for being in breach of natural justice. I turn now to explain each of these reasons.
Power of suspension
- [37]
[37] In a leading English treatise on unincorporated associations, it is stated that “[a]ny rule relating to discipline, including expulsion, suspension, or any other penalty, should be framed in plain and unambiguous language”: Nicholas Stewart QC et al, The Law of Unincorporated Associations (Oxford University Press, 2011) at para 6.06. This is only to be expected because the consequences of disciplinary action, especially in the form of expulsion or suspension, can be severe and drastic, and it is only fair that members of the association have the assurance that the power to impose such consequences are clearly defined and limited.
- [38]
[38] The starting point therefore is to examine SSA’s constitution for provisions on the suspension of members’ privileges. As SRA correctly points out, none of the 18 articles in the constitution concern disciplinary action, let alone provide for a power of suspension (with one exception, which relates to non-payment of membership fees). SRA also correctly observes that there are no by-laws, guidelines or written procedures in the constitution for that purpose.
- [39]
[39] SSA argues that Arts 6.4, 8.1 and 16.1 of the constitution, read together, empower SSA to suspend the privileges of SRA. These provisions read:
- [40]
[40] To begin, nothing on the face of these provisions empowers SSA to suspend SRA’s privileges. Art 6.4 refers to suspension of a member’s privileges only on the ground that the member falls into arrears with its subscription or other dues. That ground is not engaged in this case. Art 8.1 merely entrusts the council with the administration and management of SSA. Clearly, this must be performed in accordance with the constitution, and cannot be read as allowing the council to create powers for itself which the constitution does not confer. Art 16.1 also makes no express reference to any power of suspension. In fact, a provision very similar to art 16.1 was considered in Chee Hock Keng v Chu Sheng Temple [2015] SGHC 192 (“Chee Hock Keng”), where it was held at [52] per Aedit Abdullah JC (as he then was) that:
I agree fully with the foregoing passage, and consider that what it says about expulsion applies equally to suspension. After all, both are penal in nature and both involve deprivation of the privileges of membership.
- [41]
[41] This leaves the argument from the implication of terms to be considered. In Chee Hock Keng, the court declined to imply a power of expulsion, following the Court of Appeal’s decision in Foo Jong Peng and others v Phua Kiah Mai and another [2012] 4 SLR 1267 (“Foo Jong Peng”). In Foo Jong Peng, the Court of Appeal held that a term conferring a power on the management committee of a club to remove office bearers could not be implied. Such a term failed the “business efficacy” test as it was not necessary for the effective management of the club. It also failed the “officious bystander” test as such a power could not be said to be so obvious that members of the club would have considered that it would go without saying that the management committee itself should be free to remove an office bearer. In the present case, I would follow the approach adopted in Chee Hock Keng and Foo Jong Peng and similarly hold that it is neither necessary to imply a power of suspension for the effective management of SSA nor is the power of suspension so obvious that members of SSA would consider that it goes without saying that the SSA council should have the power to suspend members of SSA.
- [42]
[42] Accordingly, the circular resolution is ultra vires because the SSA council was not authorised under SSA’s constitution to suspend the privileges of SRA at the NSC.
Power to pass circular resolutions
- [43]
[43] I also consider that the constitution does not empower the SSA council to make decisions by way of circular resolution. The starting point, again, must be SSA’s constitution. The relevant provision are arts 8.6, 8.8, 8.9 and 8.11, which provide:
- [44]
[44] SSA argues that notwithstanding art 8.6, the constitution does not preclude other forms and means of passing a resolution. Specifically, it does not require that all resolutions be passed at a council meeting. SSA relies again on arts 8.1 and 16.1, making the same argument as it does in support of SSA’s power to suspend its members, that those provisions give the SSA council unrestricted powers to address any issue or matter arising out of any point not expressly provided for in SSA’s constitution. According to the defendants, this entails that the council may determine and use other means of passing a resolution, including circular resolutions of the kind used in this case.
- [45]
[45] I have no hesitation in rejecting SSA’s argument. On the one hand, I accept that on its face, art 8.6 appears only to regulate how resolutions are to be passed at meetings and does not specify that all resolutions must be passed at meetings. On the other hand, the overall tenor of the provisions quoted at [43] above indicates that decisions of the SSA council are to be made in meetings. Art 8.8 requires the council to meet at least once every quarter, and allows additional council meetings to be convened at short notice. Art 8.9 emphasises the importance of attendance at council meetings. Art 8.11 prescribes the quorum for council meetings and makes provision for how meetings may proceed if the attendance is below quorum. Art 8.6 makes rather prescriptive provisions for how resolutions are to be passed at meetings (by secret ballot unless there is unanimous agreement for voting to be done by show of hand) while no provision is made for how resolutions may be passed without a meeting. These provisions taken together, including the requirement for secret ballot at council meetings, are inconsistent with the notion that the SSA council could, in the absence of specific provisions empowering it to do so, make decisions by circular resolution.
- [46]
[46] I do not accept that art 16.1, which has become SSA’s last refuge in this series of arguments, empowers the council to make decisions by circular resolution. Art 16.1 is entitled “Interpretation” and empowers the council to use its discretion on “any question or matter arising out of any point which is not expressly provided for in this Constitution”. The purpose of art 16.1 is to allow the council to use its discretion on matters not expressly provided for in the constitution. Art 16.1 cannot be read to give the SSA council carte blanche to create new powers for itself or create new modes of exercising its powers, especially when these matters (eg how council resolutions are passed) have already been expressly provided for in the constitution. More importantly, art 16.1 makes clear that the invocation of art 16.1 involves a “decision of the Council”. SSA is not able to point to any previous resolution of the SSA council deciding that the council could henceforth make decisions by circular resolution.
- [47]
[47] The defendants’ last argument here is that the court should imply a term in SSA’s constitution that enables SSA to pass circular resolutions. The defendants say firstly that there is a “gap” because the council meets only once every two to three months, and so a term must be implied to allow the council a means of deciding matters between each meeting, such as by way of circular resolution. Secondly, the defendants say that although allowing circular resolutions pose an alleged risk to board governance standards, circular resolutions are not illegal, and good governance is preserved by the fact that physical council meetings would still take place regularly.
- [48]
[48] I reject these submissions. I do not accept that there is a gap in the constitution in the sense that the drafters failed to address their minds to how the council would make decisions between regular meetings. That is because while art 8.8 requires a council meeting to be held at least once every quarter, it also empowers the president of SSA to call a council meeting “at any time”, as long as he gives five days’ notice. Since there are already express provisions for the making of urgent decisions in between regular meetings (ie by convening additional meetings at short notice) there is no gap to be filled by SSA’s proposed implied term. Even if there were a gap, the proposed implied term would not satisfy the “business efficacy” test because the ability of the president of SSA to call a council meeting at any time at short notice renders it unnecessary, for the effective operation of SSA, to imply a term enabling the SSA council to pass circular resolutions.
- [49]
[49] Finally, the proposed term also fails the “officious bystander” test as I do not accept that an obvious term to be implied to fill that gap would be a term empowering the council to make circular resolutions. This is because the mechanism of circular resolutions has been famously criticised for promoting bad corporate governance, a criticism that the defendants appear to acknowledge at some level. My conclusion is also supported by the fact that never in SSA’s history has there been an attempt to pass a circular resolution.
- [50]
[50] For the reasons above, the circular resolution is ultra vires because the SSA council was not authorised under the SSA constitution to make decisions by circular resolutions.
Right to be heard
- [51]
[51] Finally, even if I am wrong that the circular resolution is ultra vires, I hold that it was passed in breach of the rules of natural justice, in that the circular resolution was passed without giving SRA a reasonable opportunity to be heard.
- [52]
[52] It is not disputed that SRA has a right to be heard and that SRA was not given an opportunity to be heard prior to the passing of the circular resolution. SSA’s explanation is that SRA need not be given such an opportunity because SRA was not suspended pursuant to the circular resolution. Instead, the circular resolution was merely a preliminary measure for gauging the level of support for SRA’s suspension. If there were sufficient support, then SSA would proceed to convene a BOI to investigate SRA’s failures to comply with the council’s resolutions, and to hear SRA’s reasons for those failures. Only after that would the council make a decision to suspend SRA’s privileges at the NSC. SRA was therefore afforded an opportunity to be heard at the hearing of the BOI held on 16 March 2016.
- [53]
[53] The issue here therefore is one of fact. Assuming that the circular resolution was not ultra vires, did the SSA council intend, by the circular resolution, to suspend SRA’s privileges at the NSC? The answer must be discerned from the terms of the resolution itself. The relevant terms are reproduced below:
- [54]
[54] For the following reasons, I reject SSA’s argument that the resolution was not intended to be the instrument to effect the suspension of SRA’s privileges at the NSC. First, the terms of the circular resolution clearly indicate otherwise. The council, it says, “resolves by Circular Resolution, to suspend the privileges of [SRA]”. And the resolution gives a specific date for the suspension to take effect, ie 1 January 2016. Nothing is mentioned in the resolution about any need to convene a BOI. It does not say that the suspension would come into effect after a BOI has made its finding, or after formal adoption of a decision to suspend in a subsequently convened council meeting.
- [55]
[55] Second, there is no reference to a BOI hearing in any of the emails that preceded the passing of the circular resolution. Nor do these emails bear out SSA’s explanation that the circular resolution was merely some sort of straw poll to gauge the level of support for a suspension within the SSA council before the formal process for suspension is initiated. In particular, I note that there was no mention by SSA of a BOI until after SSA received the letter dated 16 December 2015 from SRA’s lawyers objecting to the circulation (see [21] above) and complaining that, among other things, SSA had failed to respect SRA’s right to due process. (The first written reference to a BOI was in Mr Vaz’s e-mail of 18 December 2015 to the Vice-President of SSA, Mr Peter Teh. ) In my view, therefore, the defendants’ explanation that they had all along intended to convene a BOI is a mere afterthought.
- [56]
[56] In fact, when Mr Vaz wrote to Mr Yap on 11 December 2015 proposing the terms of the resolution, he could not have put it in clearer terms that the resolution was the means by which SSA would penalise SRA for its alleged breaches and, as quickly as possible, regain “control of the situation” in the light of SRA’s recourse to legal action against SSA. Mr Vaz wrote:
- [57]
[57] This email shows firstly that Mr Vaz was serious about suspending SRA’s privileges at the NSC. He would have expelled SRA if he could, but he did not think it would sit well with some in the SSA council. He therefore opted for a less drastic course. In fact, he had been thinking of expelling SRA since at least 1 October 2015, as an email he sent that day shows. Secondly, the email of 11 December 2015 shows that he was eager to impose the suspension. He wanted the suspension to take effect on 1 January 2016. Thirdly, given this tight timetable, there was simply no time to convene any BOI to conduct any hearing on or investigation into SRA’s alleged breaches during the short two weeks between the passing of the circular resolution and the date it was supposed to take effect. From this, the inference is clear that the BOI hearings – all of which were conducted after January 2016 – were an empty formality intended only to create the impression that SRA was given some kind of due process when in fact suspension was but a fait accompli.
- [58]
[58] There are two further points I should deal with for completeness. First, I consider that the reference in the 11 December 2015 email to having the circular resolution ratified at a council meeting before Christmas does not detract from the notion that the effective instrument for bringing about the suspension of SRA’s privileges was the circular resolution. The email does not speak of passing a fresh resolution or a definitive resolution at the council meeting to be held before Christmas. Instead, the purpose of the meeting was to ratify the circular resolution, thus confirming that the circular resolution was intended to be the operative instrument. If anything, the intended timing of the council meeting (before Christmas) further confirms that the convening of the BOI was never on the cards, so to speak, until after SSA received SRA’s lawyers’ letter of 16 December 2015. Second, although Mr Yap remarked in cross-examination that he and Mr Vaz had “discussed a little” the convening of a BOI when they met on 30 November 2015, I did not give much weight to this remark. This point was not mentioned in Mr Yap’s affidavit of evidence-in-chief, not corroborated by any of the other defendants and not borne out by any documents.
- [59]
[59] I therefore find that SSA intended the circular resolution to be the effective instrument for bringing about the suspension of SRA’s privileges at the NSC, and that there was never any intention on the part of SSA to convene a BOI until after SRA got wind of the circular resolution and got its lawyers to write to SSA protesting the circular resolution. Accordingly, in so far as the circular resolution purported to suspend SRA’s privileges at the NSC, it must be invalidated because SRA was not given a fair hearing before the circular resolution was passed.
Mootness of the challenge
- [60]
[60] It remains for me to deal with SSA’s submissions that SRA’s challenge against the validity of the circular resolution is moot. SSA’s first submission in this regard is built on the fact that SRA is no longer a member of SSA. I do not see how this assists SSA’s case. When this suit was commenced, SRA was still a member of SSA. The purported expulsion of SRA by SSA six months after the commencement of this suit cannot deprive this court of the jurisdiction to rule on a dispute which was clearly extant and relevant at the time the suit was brought. I also note that, up till today, SRA has not accepted the legality of its expulsion and continues to contest it. Although SSA makes the point that no formal legal proceedings have been brought by SRA to contest the expulsion, I note that the time limit for bringing such legal action has not expired.
- [61]
[61] SSA’s second submission is that SRA never had privileges to use the NSC under SSA’s constitution. Instead, any such privilege stemmed solely from the Agreement. I reject this submission. As SRA correctly highlights, the Agreement dealt only with the Club Range. The Agreement does not spell out any other rights or privileges SRA enjoys at the NSC. Those other rights or privileges pre-date and are independent of the Agreement. Hence, they must arise as a result of SRA’s relationship with SSA as a member of the latter. Moreover, not even Mr Vaz himself believed that he was acting in vain in proposing the circular resolution. As president of SSA, he believed that SRA had been accorded privileges at the NSC as a result of its membership of the SSA, and SSA was therefore entitled to suspend those privileges as a matter of SSA’s internal discipline. Hence, SSA’s case on the true source of SRA’s privileges at the NSC is incorrect in law and contrary to the evidence.
- [62]
[62] A final point to be addressed here relates to two motions passed respectively at the SSA council meeting on 13 February 2016 and at the SSA council meeting on 9 April 2016. The motion of 13 February 2016 provided for the suspension of SRA “as a Member Club of SSA” without indicating the specific terms of suspension. It was adopted with three votes in favour, zero votes against and two abstentions. The three votes in favour were cast by Mr Vaz, Mr Yap and Mr Chen. The motion of 9 April 2016 provided for the suspension of SRA “as a Member Club of SSA with no privileges on the use of all ranges and armouries in NSC”. It was adopted with three votes in favour, zero votes against and zero abstentions. The only voting members of the SSA council present at this meeting were Mr Vaz, Mr Yap and Mr Chen, and all three voted in favour of the motion. Did the passing of these two motions cure the irregularities identified in respect of the circular resolution? In my judgment, the answer is “no”.
- [63]
[63] The fact remains that SSA has no power under its constitution to suspend a member or a member’s privileges, as I have concluded at [42] above. The fact also remains that at the time the circular resolution was passed, SRA had not been given a fair hearing on the cause for suspending its privileges, as I have concluded at [59] above. In fact, the motion of 13 February 2016 was also passed without the BOI having heard from SRA: see [23]–[25] above. Although the motion of 9 April 2016 was passed after the BOI held its second hearing, during which SRA was invited to make representations but declined for reasons outlined at [26] above, I am not persuaded that this would have cured any concerns over breach of natural justice, given my finding at [57] above that the BOI was an empty formality intended only to create the impression that SRA was given some kind of due process when in fact suspension was but a fait accompli.
- [64]
[64] For all the reasons above, I hold that the circular resolution was ultra vires and invalid.
Issue 2: Conspiracy to injure
- [65]
[65] I turn now to SRA’s claim in conspiracy. For the reasons below, I accept SRA’s case that Mr Vaz, Mr Yap and Mr Chen are liable in the tort of conspiracy by agreeing to injure SRA’s interests through procuring an ultra vires resolution of the SSA Council with the intention of causing such injury. I begin with the applicable principles.
Applicable principles
- [66]
[66] Both sides relied on SH Cogent Logistics Pte Ltd and another v Singapore Agro Agriculture Pte Ltd and other [2014] 4 SLR 1208 (“SH Cogent”) as authority for the elements of the tort of conspiracy. In that case, Woo Bih Li J stated that the essence of conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to act in a manner that is intended to injure, and that does injure another (at [17]). He then set out the elements of the tort as follows (at [18]):
(a) There must be an agreement between two or more persons to do certain act.
(b) If the conspiracy involves:
(i) unlawful means, then the conspirator must have intended to cause damage to the claimant;
(ii) lawful means, then the conspirators must additionally have had the predominant purpose of causing damage to the claimant.
(c) Acts must have been performed in furtherance of the agreement.
(d) Damage must have been suffered by the claimant.
- [67]
[67] As for the ambit of “unlawful means”, in EFT Holdings, Inc and another v Marineteknik Shipbuilders (S) Pte Ltd and another [2014] 1 SLR 860 (“EFT Holdings”) the Court of Appeal considered (at [91] per Sundaresh Menon CJ) whether Singapore should follow the House of Lord’s rejection in Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Total Network SL [2008] 1 AC 1174 (“Total Network”) of the notion that “unlawful means” are confined to actionable civil wrongs of the kind enunciated by the majority in OBG Ltd v Allan [2008] 1 AC 1 (“OBG”). While expressing a preference for the Total Network approach, the Court of Appeal in EFT Holdings held that it need not reach a conclusion on the point as there was no dispute in that case over the element of unlawfulness. What is clear from EFT Holdings is that in Singapore, the ambit of “unlawful means” comprises at least civil wrongs which are actionable by the claimant: see OBG at [49] per Lord Hoffmann. In the present case, the SSA council’s passing of an ultra vires resolution, in breach of SSA’s constitution, to suspend SRA’s privileges at the NSC, is actionable by SRA. The passing of that resolution therefore constitutes unlawful means. Hence, the applicable species of the conspiracy tort here is unlawful means conspiracy.
Whether unlawful means conspiracy is established
- [68]
[68] Having regard to these principles, the issues I need to address are:
(a) whether the Individual Defendants committed acts pursuant to an agreement among themselves;
(b) whether the Individual Defendants intended to cause damage to SRA; and
(c) whether SRA suffered damage.
Whether the Individual Defendants committed acts pursuant to an agreement among themselves
- [69]
[69] As the alleged unlawful means is the passing of the circular resolution to suspend SRA’s privileges at the NSC, the overt acts alleged to be committed in furtherance of the conspiracy would be the acts of the Individual Defendants in drafting, promoting and voting for the circular resolution. There is no dispute that the Individual Defendants carried out such acts. The question which remains is whether these acts were committed by the Individual Defendants pursuant to an agreement among themselves.
- [70]
[70] In this regard, it was observed by the Court of Appeal in EFT Holding (at [113]) that the existence of an agreement is often inferred from the circumstances and acts of the alleged conspirators (citing Asian Corporate Services (SEA) Pte Ltd v Eastwest Management Ltd (Singapore Branch) [2006] 1 SLR(R) 901 (“Asian Corporate Services”) and The “Dolphina” [2012] 1 SLR 992). In Asian Corporate Services, the Court of Appeal noted at [19] per Chao Hick Tin JA that “[i]t is not often that the victim of a conspiracy will be able to obtain direct evidence to prove the allegation. Proof of a conspiracy is normally to be inferred from other objective facts.” Similarly, it was observed in The Dolphina (at [264] per Belinda Ang J) that, because direct evidence of a combination is unlikely to be forthcoming:
- [71]
[71] Finally, as observed in Chung Cheng Fishery Enterprise Pte Ltd v Chuan Hern Hsiung and Another (Lin Chao-Feng and Another, Third Parties) [2008] SGHC 135 at [79]–[82] per Andrew Ang J, citing Kuwait Oil Tanker Co SAK v Al Bader [2000] 2 All ER Comm 271 at 312 per Nourse LJ:
(a) the common intention to injure may be forged expressly or tacitly;
(b) participation in a conspiracy can be active or passive;
(c) the agreement of a participant can be inferred if it is proved that he knew what was going on, and the intention to participate is also established by his failure to stop the unlawful activity; and
(d) the close confidence shared between participants may lead to the inference that one participant would have known another participant’s reason for wanting particular acts to be done.
- [72]
[72] Before the circular resolution was disseminated to all members of the SSA council on 16 December 2016, Mr Vaz, Mr Yap and Mr Chen had been working together to procure a suspension of SRA’s privileges. On 11 December 2015, Mr Vaz sent an email to Mr Yap indicating his intention to table a resolution to suspend SRA’s privileges at the NSC commencing 1 January 2016. In the email, Mr Vaz stated that he would be “pleased to assist in writing the circular”. On 14 December 2015, Mr Yap replied with a draft circular resolution, which Mr Vaz amended and sent by email on the morning of 16 December 2015 to the SSA council (less Mr Loo of SRA) and representatives of Sport Singapore. Besides explaining the intended suspension in his email, Mr Vaz took care to emphasise the need to “play by the book” since SRA would receive the resolution. He also instructed Mr Yap to get a seconder for the resolution. Mr Yap obtained Mr Chen’s agreement to act as the seconder sometime between 10:29 am and 11:59 am on 16 December 2015. (Mr Yap sent an e-mail to Mr Chen at 10:29 am asking Mr Chen to second the resolution, to which Mr Chen responded only at 4:27 pm. The finalised draft circular resolution was sent to all SSA Council members at 11:59 am on 16 December 2015 naming Mr Chen as the seconder. It was Mr Yap’s and Mr Chen’s evidence that there was a telephone conversation between them sometime between 10:29 am and 11:59 am during which Mr Chen agreed to second the resolution. )
- [73]
[73] If further evidence of the existence of an agreement is needed, reference may be made to the way Mr Vaz tabulated the votes. On 18 December 2015, before Mr Yap had recorded his own vote, Mr Vaz sent an email to the SSA council’s vice-president, Mr Peter Teh, to say that the council had the votes to suspend SRA. At that time, there were only two positive votes, namely, those of Mr Vaz and Mr Chen. Apart from Mr Yap who had not voted and SRA’s Mr Loo who had objected, the other council members had either abstained or not responded. The only explanation for this is that there was already an understanding between Mr Vaz and Mr Yap that the latter would support the resolution. Mr Yap conceded this during cross-examination:
- [74]
[74] In fact, the existence of the agreement among the Individual Defendants can be traced back to the SSA council meeting of 30 November 2015, during which Mr Vaz, Mr Yap and Mr Chen all voted to ratify previous SSA council resolutions whose alleged breach by SRA would later form the basis of the circular resolution to suspend SRA. As SRA highlighted in its closing submission, in convening the meeting on 30 November 2015 for the purpose of the ratification exercise, Mr Yap kept the meeting’s agenda deliberately vague. Nothing was mentioned about any intention on Mr Vaz’s part to table previous resolutions for ratification. The agenda simply stated:
It was Mr Yap’s evidence that Mr Vaz had, on the sidelines of the 30 November 2015 meeting, discussed with him a plan to get SRA suspended, and according to his recollection Mr Chen “could be” present at this conversation.
- [75]
[75] On one view, the agreement among the Individual Defendants was reached by 16 December 2015 when Mr Chen agreed to second the resolution drafted by Mr Yap and amended by Mr Vaz. Pursuant to that agreement, the Individual Defendants promoted and voted in favour of the circular resolution. On another view, the Individual Defendants had agreed on or before 30 November 2015 to work towards suspension of SRA and, pursuant to that agreement, the Individual Defendants procured the ratification of the five resolutions subsequently used to justify the passing of the circular resolution, followed by subsequent acts of the Individual Defendants in drafting, promoting and voting for the circular resolution.
- [76]
[76] On either view, I am satisfied that there was an agreement among the Individual Defendants to procure the suspension of SRA, and that they acted in furtherance of this agreement.
Whether the Individual Defendants intended to cause damage to SRA
- [77]
[77] The next question is whether the Individual Defendants acted with the requisite intention. Given my finding that the present case involves unlawful means conspiracy, the relevant test is whether the Individual Defendants had the intention to injure SRA. It is not necessary, in cases of unlawful means conspiracy, to prove that the alleged conspirators acted with the predominant purpose of injuring the claimant.
- [78]
[78] To establish the requisite intention for unlawful means conspiracy, the claimant must show that the unlawful means and the conspiracy were targeted or directed at him. It is not sufficient that harm to the claimant would be a likely, or probable or even inevitable consequence of the defendant’s conduct. Injury to the claimant must have been intended as a means to an end or as an end in itself. As Lord Hoffmann observed in OBG at [62] (which is cited with approval by the Court of Appeal in EFT Holdings at [104]):
- [79]
[79] As the circular resolution was aimed at suspending SRA’s privileges, there is no doubt that the conspiracy was “targeted or directed” at SRA. The intention of the conspirators can be easily gathered from the terms of the circular resolution, which suspended SRA’s privileges in the following manner:
- [80]
[80] Each of these four ways in which SRA’s privileges were to be suspended would have been injurious to SRA, as it would have impeded SRA’s ability to carry out its activities and prevented SRA from providing coaching and instructional services. The final sentence in the passage quoted above, in attempting to explain that the measures were not targeted at the individual SRA members, merely serves to confirm that the measures were targeted at SRA as an organisation. During cross-examination, Mr Vaz tried to put a gloss on this by maintaining that he was targeting only the SRA council, and not SRA. This attempt by Mr Vaz to draw a distinction between SRA and its council is artificial and unsustainable. It ignores the fact that the SRA council is not only an integral part of SRA, but also the governing body of SRA. Actions which harm and impede the SRA council would necessarily harm and impede SRA. In the end, Mr Vaz could not deny that the circular resolution was intended to injure SRA.
- [81]
[81] The Individual Defendants explained in their respective affidavits of evidence-in-chief, in identical words, that they sought SRA’s suspension “without any intention to injure SRA, but in good faith for the purpose of promoting, forwarding and/or defending the best interest of SSA”. Although this is a bare assertion devoid of particulars, the defendants elaborated in their closing submissions that:
(a) SRA’s breaches of the relevant SSA council resolutions had put SSA at risk of liabilities for breach of the terms of the NSC sub-lease; and
(b) the purpose of the circular resolution was therefore to get SRA to comply with the said SSA council resolutions, so as to protect SSA from such liabilities.
- [82]
[82] My first comment is that the defendants’ explanation that the circular resolution’s purpose was to get SRA to comply with certain SSA council resolutions does not ring true. The explanation is not borne out by the terms of the circular resolution, which contains no provision for the suspension to be lifted or stayed if SRA were to comply with the said SSA council resolutions. My second comment is that, as this case concerns unlawful means conspiracy, such an explanation, even if true, would not assist the Individual Defendants. This is because even if I accept that the ends which the Individual Defendants hoped to attain through SRA’s suspension is the promotion and defence of SSA’s interests, the injury which would be caused to SRA by the proposed suspension would nonetheless constitute the means of attaining those ends. That, according to the principles discussed at [78] above, would be sufficient to satisfy the element of intention to injure in unlawful means conspiracy.
- [83]
[83] In any event, for completeness, I note that SRA proffers a different explanation for the Individual Defendants’ motive behind the conspiracy. SRA submits that Mr Vaz bears a longstanding grudge against SRA which had originated in 2012. SRA alleges that in 2012, Mr Vaz was embroiled in a power struggle with Mr Laurence Wee, the then chairman of SRA, for the presidency of SSA. When Mr Wee was elected to that office in September 2012, Mr Vaz publicly stated his intention to contest the result in the courts. Mr Wee later stepped down, and Mr Vaz was elected President of SSA. SRA alleges that Mr Vaz’s “bad blood” with SRA’s leadership continued into Mr Eng’s chairmanship of SRA. Mr Vaz also made direct reference to this in his email dated 16 December 2015 proposing the circular resolution, claiming that “since the time of SRA President Laurence Wee, SRA has consistently acted against SSA’s mission to open the NSC facilities to all Singaporeans”. When confronted with this email in cross-examination, Mr Vaz appeared to acknowledge that his animosity towards SRA played a role in his proposal to suspend SRA:
- [84]
[84] As I have found that Mr Vaz, Mr Yap and Mr Chen possessed the requisite intention for the purposes of the tort of conspiracy by unlawful means, it is not necessary for me to decide on SRA’s submission on this point. However, to appreciate more fully the context of this case, it seems to me relevant to note that there appears to be some support for SRA’s contention that Mr Vaz’s actions in this case may be explained in part by a longstanding animosity between him and SRA’s leadership.
Whether SRA suffered Damage
(a) Ong Han Ling v American Insurance Assurance Co Ltd [2018] 5 SLR 549 (“Ong Han Ling”), where Belinda Ang J held that costs of investigation can constitute a head of loss in a conspiracy claim so long as there is a causal link between the costs of investigating the conspiracy and the tort itself (at [14]); and
(b) Clearlab SG Pte Ltd v Ting Chong Chai [2015] 1 SLR 163 (“Clearlab”), where Lee Seiu Kin J awarded damages for the costs of investigating confidential documents that had been removed pursuant to a conspiracy to injure the plaintiff on the basis that those costs “flowed from the conspiracy” (at [243]).
And it was [77] of R+V Verscherung which was cited by Ang J at [14] of Ong Han Ling.
Quantum of damages
- [90]
[90] I turn now to the quantum of damages to be awarded for the loss that SRA suffered as a result of this tort. SRA claims damages for the following heads of loss:
(a) legal fees and disbursements paid to SRA’s solicitors for the purpose of obtaining advice on and investigating the conspiracy, in the sum of $63,200; and
(b) costs incurred in scheduling SRA council meetings in relation to the investigation of the conspiracy, in the sum of $16,180, the breakdown of which is as follows:
(i) $1,100 in respect of Mr Eng Fook Hoong;
(ii) $3,080 in respect of Mr Simon Ng;
(iii) $3,850 in respect of Mr Conrad Chung;
(iv) $2,200 in respect of Mr Timothy Ng;
(v) $1,050 in respect of Mr Kevin Leong;
(vi) $1,100 in respect of Mr Ong Eng Chong;
(vii) $2,100 in respect of Mr Ricky Cheung;
(viii) $1,700 in respect of four other council members; and
(ix) $500 in disbursements.
Section 32A of the Charities Act
- [94]
[94] Finally, the Individual Defendants rely on s 32A of the Charities Act, which provides that the court may relieve a person on the governing board of a charity from liability for negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust if “it appears to the court” that “the person has acted honestly and reasonably and, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, he ought fairly to be excused for the negligence, default or breach.” Having regard to my finding that the Individual Defendants acted with intention to harm SRA and, in the process of doing so, not only acted in breach of the SSA constitution but also acted in breach of natural justice, I consider that this is not a case where those governing the relevant charity – in this case, the Individual Defendants in relation to SSA – had acted reasonably. A necessary condition for the invocation of s 32A is therefore not met. Therefore, no relief ought to be granted under to that provision.
Issue 3: Cost of demolition
- [95]
[95] I come now to the defendants’ counterclaim. This is a claim for a sum of $26,536, which is the amount that the defendants paid Pikasa to demolish the Club Range. The contractual basis for this claim is cl 10 of the Agreement. Clause 10, in essence, obliges SRA to indemnify SSA for losses caused by SRA’s activities at the NSC.
- [96]
[96] SRA resists this claim on four main grounds:
(a) SSA has not suffered any loss for which SSA may claim to be indemnified by SSA under cl 10.
(b) SSA in demolishing the Club Range breached an implied term to use reasonable efforts to assist SRA in obtaining the necessary regulatory approvals, and breached an implied term to refrain from demolition without first using reasonable efforts to assist SRA in regularising the Club Range. SRA contends that this implicates the principle that a person cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong, and on this principle, SSA cannot rely on its on breach of contract to claim an indemnity under the same contract under cl 10.
(c) At the time SRA entered into the Agreement, it was mistaken that the pre-existing structures at Range X had been built with regulatory approvals, and this mistake renders the Agreement void, with the effect that cl 10 is not binding on SRA.
(d) SRA was induced to enter into the Agreement by SSA’s misrepresentation that those pre-existing structures had been built with the relevant regulatory approvals, and for that reason, SRA is entitled to rescind the Agreement, with the effect that cl 10 is not enforceable against SRA.
Unilateral mistake
- [98]
[98] To set the context, I begin by mentioning BG Lim’s testimony that the pre-existing structures at Range X were constructed around 2002 or 2003. He was not contradicted by SRA in this regard. It is also not disputed that the pre-existing structures had been constructed without regulatory approval. SRA argues that at the time it entered into the Agreement, it was mistaken that these structures at Range X had been built with approval. This mistake, SRA says, renders the Agreement void, with the effect that cl 10 is not binding on SRA. In my view, this argument is without merit because the mistake in question was not fundamental to the Agreement, and because SSA did not know that SRA made that mistake at the time the Agreement was entered into.
- [99]
[99] The law on setting aside a contract at common law on the ground of a mistake on the part of one of the parties at the time the contract was entered into, otherwise called a unilateral mistake, is well settled. First, the claimant must have made a mistake in entering into the contract. Second, the mistake must have been fundamental or must relate to an essential term of the contract. Third, it must be shown that the other party had actual knowledge that the claimant was labouring under that mistake at the time the parties entered into the contract. In this regard, the court is entitled to find actual knowledge where the non-mistaken party is shown to have been wilfully blind to the mistaken party’s error. These propositions were elaborated in the Court of Appeal’s decision in Chwee Kin Keong and others v Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd [2005] 1 SLR(R) 502 at [34], [42]–[43] and [53] per Chao Hick Tin JA.
- [100]
[100] As regards the first requirement, I am satisfied that in entering the contract, SRA was mistaken that the pre-existing structures at Range X had been built with regulatory approval. I note that SSA alleges that it was SRA who built those structures in the first place because SRA had charge of Range X before it fell into disuse. By this, SSA sought to imply that SRA, being the party responsible for the construction of the original structures at Range X, must have known that the structures had been erected without regulatory approval. While there is some force to this submission, I find, for the reasons given in the next paragraph, that at the time the Agreement was signed, SRA was not aware of this fact.
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