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Grounds publishedDecided 22 May 2019

High Court

Patsystems Pte Ltd v PT Bursa Komoditi Dan Derivatif Indonesia

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[2019] SGHC 131Case no. Suit No 804 of 2016

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Grounds of decision

Official text from eLitigation

  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The Plaintiff in this case is a company incorporated in Singapore which engages in the business inter alia of developing and marketing computerised financial trading systems for use in trading on the global derivatives markets. The Defendant is a company incorporated in the Republic of Indonesia which carries on business as a commodities- and derivatives-based exchange in Indonesia. The two parties entered into a written Software Licence & Support Agreement dated 9 September 2009 (“the Licence Agreement”) and a written Addendum to the said Licence Agreement dated 1 May 2010 (“the Addendum”). The Plaintiff sued the Defendant in the present proceedings for the total sum of US$604,340.68 in respect of 17 invoices issued by the Plaintiff to the Defendant between 28 March 2012 and 19 August 2014. The Defendant denied any liability to pay the sum claimed. The Defendant also filed a counter-claim against the Plaintiff alleging breaches by the Plaintiff of “the terms, whether express or implied, of the [Licence] Agreement and Addendum”, in respect of which it sought the refund of the entire licence fee or, alternatively, damages.

  3. [2] On 31 October 2018, following a 3-day trial and the filing of written submissions, I allowed the Plaintiff’s claim and dismissed the Defendant’s counter-claim. The Defendant later applied for leave to file a notice of appeal out of time. I granted the Defendant’s application on 21 January 2019, and it filed the notice of appeal on 23 January 2019. I now set out below the reasons for my decision. I will start by setting out the more pertinent provisions of the Licence Agreement and the Addendum before summarising each party’s case and the evidence led in support of its case, and then setting out my factual findings and reasoning.

  4. Background: The Licence Agreement and the Addendum

  5. [4] The Licence Agreement also provided for the payment of annual fees for System Support and Maintenance (“S&M fees”), at US$150,000 per year in respect of support and maintenance for the Matching Engine System and US$75,000 per year in respect of support and maintenance for the E-Broker Core System and Front-End.

  6. [5] Finally, the Licence Agreement also provided for the Plaintiff to charge a usage fee (referred to as “Retail Lot Charges” in the invoices) for every lot traded by API retail users of certain front-end applications.

  7. [6] For ease of reference, I reproduce below the more pertinent clauses in the Licence Agreement:

  8. [7] A copy of the Addendum of 1 May 2010 is found at pp 74 to 77 of Mr Oliviero’s AEIC. The Addendum was stated to be incorporated into and to form part of the Licence Agreement; and in the event of any conflict between its terms and those of the Licence Agreement, the former were to prevail. In gist, the Addendum made a number of additional provisions in relation to the payment of S&M fees by the Defendant. In particular, it put in place a process whereby the two parties would conduct six-monthly reviews of the software system provided by the Plaintiff to the Defendant to ensure that the system was meeting “business needs, … reliable and well-supported”. The process put in place by the Addendum prescribed inter alia the manner in which the Defendant would give the Plaintiff notice of non-compliance and how it would be entitled to seek a refund of the S&M charges payable under the Addendum subsequent to such notification of non-compliance.

  9. [8] I reproduce below the more pertinent clauses in the Addendum:

  10. Summary of the parties’ cases

  11. [9] Following the signing of the Licence Agreement, the Defendant signed off on the User Acceptance Testing (“UAT”) on 29 November 2009. It is not disputed that the soft launch of the Defendant’s trading platform took place in December 2009 and its official launch in March 2010. It is also not disputed that after paying the first instalment of US$112,500 of the first S&M payment on 9 July 2010, the Defendant began withholding payment of the subsequent S&M amounts, claiming that it was experiencing multiple problems with the software system provided by the Plaintiff.

  12. [10] In the ensuing dispute over Plaintiff’s claim for the allegedly outstanding S&M, the chief bone of contention concerned whether the parties’ contractual rights and obligations were to be found solely in the express provisions of the Licence Agreement and the Addendum, or whether the terms of these two written agreements had been varied via subsequent email correspondence. The Plaintiff’s case was that the parties’ rights and obligations were wholly encapsulated in the express terms of the Licence Agreement and the Addendum; that subsequent email correspondence represented ongoing discussions between the parties in their attempt to find a solution to the issues which the Defendant raised in relation to the software system provided by the Plaintiff; that these discussions did not result in a legally binding final agreement; and that any “agreement” or “compromise” alluded to in the emails represented goodwill gestures on the part of the Plaintiff which were not legally binding.

  13. [11] The Defendant’s case, on the other hand, was that subsequent to the signing of the Licence Agreement and the Addendum, the parties had agreed in their email correspondence on legally binding contractual variations. The Defendant claimed that the basis for the first such contractual variation – which the Defendant termed “the Arrangement” – was set out in an email sent by the Plaintiff’s then Regional Director of Asia-Pacific, one Barry White (“Mr White”) on 30 May 2011. According to the Defence and Counter-claim filed by the Defendant, the terms of the Arrangement were as follows:

  14. (a) that the Plaintiff would replace the Defendant’s existing software system with a new system called the Global Trading Administration (“GTA”), “subject to [the Defendant’s] comfort and confidence that the GTA would indeed resolve the issues faced by the Defendant”, and that the GTA would be offered to the Defendant “for test purposes over the course of the next three months, i.e. until the end of August 2011”;

  15. (b) that “[i]n exchange”, the Defendant would pay the S&M fees of US$112,500 then outstanding for the S&M period of 30 June 2010 to 31 December 2010; and

  16. (c) that the Defendant “would withhold the payments for the S&M fees until the point that the GTA was implemented, and/or the Defendant signed off on the documents accepting the GTA”.

  17. [12] The Defendant claimed that the parties subsequently renegotiated the terms of the Arrangement and that a second contractual variation followed, the terms of which were to be found in Mr White’s email of 28 March 2012. These, according to the Defence and Counter-claim, were as follows:

  18. (a) that the Defendant would pay the Plaintiff the annual S&M fee of US$75,000 for the E-Broker Core System and Front-End; and

  19. (b) that the Defendant “was entitled to withhold” the annual S&M fee of US$150,000 for the Matching Engine Support “until the GTA was implemented”.

  20. [13] For ease of reference, I reproduce below the contents of Mr White’s emails of 30 May 2011 and 28 March 2012.

  21. [14] As to the Defendant’s counter-claim, as noted at the start of these written grounds, the Defendant pleaded breaches by the Plaintiff of “the terms, whether express or implied, of the [Licence] Agreement and Addendum”, in respect of which it sought the refund of the entire licence fee or, alternatively, damages. The Defendant did not plead any specific implied terms in the Defence and Counter-claim. Instead, it referred to clause 10.1 of the Licence Agreement, clause 2.2 of Schedule 5 of the Licence Agreement, and the Review Criteria set out in the Addendum.

  22. [15] It is not disputed that a substantial portion of the relevant communications in this case – including the relevant email correspondence – took place between Mr White and Mr Setiabudi. By the time of the trial, however, both Mr White and Mr Setiabudi had left the employment of the Plaintiff and the Defendant respectively, and they were not summoned as witnesses by either party. I will next set out the evidence given by the witnesses who were summoned. Mr Oliviero was the Plaintiff’s sole witness. The Defendant called as its witnesses its Director Mr Megain Widjaja (“Mr Widjaja”) and its former Manager of Market Operations Mr Teddy Sangeroki (“Mr Sangeroki”).

  23. PW1 Mr Oliviero’s evidence

  24. [16] Mr Oliviero acknowledged from the outset that he came on the scene only after the ION group of companies (in which he served as CEO of the Agency Trading and Processing Division) acquired Patsystems plc, a public-listed company in the United Kingdom, in February 2012. The Plaintiff was one of Patsystems plc’s subsidiaries.

  25. [17] Mr Oliviero was appointed as the Plaintiff’s CEO with effect from June 2012 but started having oversight of its commercial matters in the few months before then. Sometime in April or May 2012, he was briefed by Mr White on the matters relating to the Defendant’s account. Inter alia, he was told that the Defendants had “raised issues regarding the reliability of the Plaintiff’s software, as well as alleged gaps in functionality between the Plaintiff’s system and the Defendant’s purported business requirements”; further, that “[w]hile the Plaintiff’s support team had resolved many of the reported issues along the way, the Defendant had continued to complain that it was encountering problems” and had withheld payment of the S&M fees on the basis of these complaints. Mr Oliviero understood the email communications of 30 May 2011 and 28 March 2012 to be gestures of goodwill.

  26. [19] In cross-examination, Mr Oliviero said he had been “surprised” by Mr White’s email to him on 22 May 2012. In that email, Mr White had alluded to “many issues” being encountered by the Defendant in using the Plaintiff’s software system, ranging “from software reliability issues to functionality gaps”, and had proposed that as a “goodwill gesture”, the Defendant be offered “a S&M reduction of 50% of 225,000 USD S&M which they are contracted to at present, which would mean they would be paying $112,500 until we get them to move onto GT PME and get to a live state”. In his email reply to Mr White, Mr Oliviero asked the latter to “clarify what is contractual and what has been agreed as gesture of goodwill”, and requested that a full legal review be done. Mr Oliviero clarified that he had formed the understanding that Mr White’s communications with the Defendant had hitherto been “a number of goodwill offers that had not been finalised in actual documented paperwork” because after he asked Mr White to “clarify what is contractual, what is goodwill”, the latter had by “end of May / June 2012” “yet to produce a piece of contractual document that reflected the agreement between the parties”.

  27. [20] Mr Oliviero also testified that from what he could see, the “offers” made by Mr White to the Defendant – such as the “offer” of the GTA system – were “commercial concessions” which the Plaintiff was not contractually obliged to make, and which Mr White made because he “was trying to have a positive experience” for “a new client”. It was pointed out to Mr Oliviero that the bulk of the contested invoices were issued from June 2013 onwards and that following Mr White’s email of 30 May 2011, the Plaintiff had not in fact issued invoices to the Defendant for S&M payments in 2011 and 2012 (leaving aside the invoice of 28 March 2012 which formed one of the contested invoices). In response to defence counsel suggesting that this showed the Plaintiff to be “abiding by the agreement that [Mr White] had struck with the Defendant in May 2011” to let the Defendant withhold “annualised S&M fees”, Mr Oliviero initially stated that he thought it suggested the Plaintiff “was effectively working to implement that agreement”. However, in re-examination, he clarified that in using the term “agreement”, what he had been referring to was “the discussion between [Mr White] and [the Defendant]”:

  28. [21] Mr Oliviero also testified that following Mr White’s briefing to him in May 2012 regarding the Defendant’s account, he did not hear from Mr White again until 28 August 2012, when the latter forwarded to him an email of the same date from the Defendant’s Mr Setiabudi. The key contents of Mr Setiabudi’s email to Mr White were as follows:

  29. [22] According to Mr Oliviero, he understood Mr Setiabudi to be proposing in this email “that: (1) only US$ 75,000 was payable annually for the S&M fees for the OMS; (2) the previous amounts of US$112,500 paid on 9 July 2010 and US $112,500 paid on 4 July 2011 would be recognised as payment for these S&M fees up to 31 May 2013; and (3) no other amount would be payable for S&M fees since the GTA system launch was delayed”. In forwarding Mr Setiabudi’s email to Mr Oliviero (as well as Mr Oliviero’s colleague David Groggin), Mr White stated that it was for their information and to let them “have visibility on this”. Mr White also added:

  30. [23] On 30 August 2012, Mr White wrote to Mr Oliviero about Mr Setiabudi’s email of 28 August 2012, making inter alia the following comments:

  31. [24] When asked by Mr Oliviero to clarify what the next steps were and what he required, Mr White replied that it would be best to find out “whether the GT PME will be available for” the Defendant “sometime in the future”; that there had been “a number of ups and downs with the offering”; and that he would be able to make a suggestion once he knew what they could “achieve on the GT PME”.

  32. [25] Vis-à-vis Mr Setiabudi, Mr White also responded to his 28 August 2012 email on 30 August 2012, stating that he would “discuss with [his] management on the matter and come back”. It is not disputed that he did not revert to Mr Setiabudi with any substantive reply before leaving the Plaintiff’s employment in late October / early November 2012. According to Mr Oliviero, the likely reason for the absence of any substantive reply to Mr Setiabudi was the fact that at the time of Mr White’s departure, no decision had yet been made by the Plaintiff as to whether the GTA system would be made available as a solution to its customers.

  33. [26] The Plaintiff eventually made the decision to abandon the GTA system as a project in end-2013 / early 2014. Before then, however, Mr Oliviero met with Mr Widjaja and his team in Jakarta in mid-January 2013 as he wanted to discuss the issue of their outstanding S&M payments and also to get their direct feedback on the issues they claimed to be facing with the Plaintiff’s software. According to Mr Oliviero, he communicated to Mr Widjaja and his team at this meeting that “whatever [Mr White] had agreed with [them] was not legally and contractually binding”; and they then had a discussion to try “to find an amicable resolution in what was a long outstanding dispute in terms of non-payment and open support issues”. As far as he was concerned, the Plaintiff’s take-away from this meeting was that it would have to “go away and document” what it believed “was a contractual position” and how it believed it could “solve the open support issues”.

  34. [27] In the course of conducting this review, a number of points became clear to Mr Oliviero. In particular, he noted that the software system which was the subject of the perpetual licence purchased by the Defendant was an “out of the box” software system. This was crucial because it meant that the onus would be “on the customer to ensure that the software was appropriate for its business needs”: “the Plaintiff did not warrant that its software was fit for any particular purpose (such disclaimer being part of the [Licence] Agreement)”; and the UAT period provided for in the Licence Agreement was “the customer’s opportunity to ensure that the software it [was] purchasing [was] suitable for its business requirements”. This, according to Mr Oliviero, was:

  35. [28] In this case, Mr Oliviero noted that the Defendant had signed off on the UAT Acceptance on 29 November 2009 expressly confirming acceptance of the software. In addition, whilst the Defendant had served one notice of non-compliance under the Addendum on 21 January 2011, it had not followed up with any further notices as provided for under the review criteria set out in the Addendum to request a refund of the S&M charges payable. In the circumstances, there was no contractual basis for the Defendant to withhold the payment of S&M fees, especially when it was continuing to request support and maintenance for the issues it had raised.

  36. [29] In line with the above understanding, the Plaintiff sent the Defendant a set of Powerpoint slides on 10 June 2013, setting out the “contractual parameters insofar as the acceptance of the Plaintiff’s software and the payment of S&M fees [were] concerned”, how it would address the issues raised by the Defendant regarding the software, and – crucially – the “amounts and invoices due to be paid by the Defendant … which would include new invoices which would be issued concurrently with the slides”. Inter alia, the slides made reference to invoices which were being issued concurrently and stated the total amount due from the Defendant to be US$657,332.90. The Defendant was also informed that “as a gesture of good will due to the issues experienced with the J-Vision and J-Clear components [of the Plaintiff’s software]”, the amount due would be discounted to US$507,332.90 if it paid the issued invoices within 30 days of receipt. There was no mention in these slides of “the May 2011 arrangement that was struck with [Mr White]” or of the GTA system.

  37. [30] Despite an email from Mr Widjaja on 10 June 2013 stating that the Defendant would “come back” to the Plaintiff “shortly”, nothing further was heard from the Defendant for some weeks, nor did it make any payment of the invoices. When the Plaintiff sent a reminder on 4 July 2013 regarding payment of the invoices, Mr Widjaja responded by inviting Mr Oliviero to travel to Jakarta again “to discuss this matter”, saying there were “outstanding issues that needs [sic] to be cleared up”. Mr Oliviero did not take up this invitation to visit Jakarta yet again. In his view, things had come to a point where it would be commercially difficult for the Plaintiff to continue providing support and maintenance services to the Defendant while outstanding invoices totalling US$657,332.90 remained unpaid. In his response to Mr Widjaja, he pointed out that the Plaintiff had already summarised in the slide presentation its “detailed internal due diligence” of the software issues raised by the Defendant; and that while he remained available to discuss any specific issues, “this should not be linked to the issue of the overdue invoices” – which, he added, he expected the Defendant to clear “by the 10th of July 2013 in line with [its] contractual obligations”.

  38. [31] The Defendant did not respond to Mr Oliviero’s email, nor did it make any payment by 10 July 2013. On 11 July 2013, Mr Oliviero wrote to the Defendant stating that as the overdue invoices totalling US$657,332.90 remained unpaid, the Plaintiff “may suspend” its services to the Defendant if payment was not made within 14 days. On 22 July 2013, he received the following letter in response from Mr Widjaja:

  39. [32] Mr Oliviero did not understand Mr Widjaja’s allegation about “constant damages to the software”: as far as he was concerned, at the January 2013 meeting the Defendant had raised 10 issues with the software; and in its June 2013 slides, the Plaintiff had explained in detail how each issue could be resolved – but no steps had been taken by the Defendant. On 11 September 2013, some weeks after a tele-conversation with Mr Widjaja, Mr Oliviero received from the Defendant’s Mr Sangeroki a list of issues which the latter said had “not [been] captured yet in [their] previous discussion”. Mr Sangeroki ended the email by stating:

  40. [33] On reviewing Mr Sangeroki’s list of issues, Mr Oliviero realised that it was “almost a completely new list of issues”. He became concerned that the Defendant “was just putting forth a never-ending list of issues ... as justification for withholding payment”; and that the Plaintiff would find itself in a “lose-lose situation” if it continued trying to resolve these alleged issues while receiving no payment for its support and maintenance services. Accordingly, on 4 October 2013, the Plaintiff notified the Defendant that it would be suspending its services with effect from 19 October 2013 pursuant to clause 7.2 of the Licence Agreement, in view of the latter’s failure to pay its overdue charges (by then totalling US$657,441).

  41. [34] Following the Plaintiff’s letter of 4 October 2013, the parties had a series of discussions. On 17 October 2013, the Defendant asserted during a tele-conversation that “there was an agreement that the Plaintiff would only charge the Defendant US$75,000 for S&M fees until the Plaintiff offers the GTA system to the Defendant, and that by paying US$225,000 so far, the Defendant had paid their S&M fees up to May 2013”. On that basis, the Defendant asserted that “there was only US$75,000 due for the period from June 2013 to June 2014, which they would be willing to pay”. It will be noted that these assertions corresponded with the claims made in Mr Setiabudi’s email to Mr White on 28 August 2012 (see [21] above). When Mr Oliviero objected that their understanding was wrong and that the Licence Agreement provided for S&M fees of US$225,000 a year, the Defendant claimed that the Plaintiff’s software “was not working”, that they did not use the J-Clear component of the software “as a result of issues encountered”, and that it was “not feasible” for them to pay yearly S&M fees of US$225,000.

  42. [35] The Defendant also proceeded on 18 October 2013 to send the Plaintiff copies of emails which it claimed constituted “written proof” of the agreement for it to pay only US$75,000 per year for S&M fees: namely, Mr White’s email of 28 March 2012 to Mr Setiabudi and Mr Setiabudi’s email of 28 August 2012 to Mr White (see [13] and [21] above). On the same day, the Plaintiff emailed the Defendant to say that it would “take no action on its notice of suspension without further notice” in light of the ongoing dialogue between the parties. The Plaintiff also requested that “without prejudice to [its] right to payment of all outstanding invoices”, the Defendant should remit payment of US$225,000 “representing the $75,000 per annum support and maintenance fees that [the Defendant] does not dispute is due”. Mr Oliviero explained that the Plaintiff made this request because “based on the Defendant’s own position that US$75,000 of S&M fees [was] due for each period, and given that the full S&M fees for the periods 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012, 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013, and 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014 [remained] unpaid, a total amount of at least US$ 225,000 (i.e. US$75,000 per period) should be payable by the Defendant without dispute”.

  43. [36] Over the next few months, the Plaintiff heard nothing further from the Defendant, although on 6 January 2014, the latter made a single payment of US$75,000. Mr Oliviero understood this single payment to be in line with the Defendant’s suggestion that it should pay only US$75,000 in S&M fees for the period June 2013 to June 2014. On 15 January 2014, the parties had another tele-conversation in which the Defendant again claimed to have difficulties agreeing to pay the outstanding S&M fees because of “unresolved issues with the Plaintiff’s software”. This led to another email from the Defendant on 24 January 2014 enclosing yet another – much longer – list of alleged issues with the software system.

  44. [38] It should also be noted that it was after the service of the Notice of Termination that the Defendant started issuing formal written letters to the Plaintiff each time it encountered an issue with the Plaintiff’s software. The Plaintiff eventually ceased the provision of support services on 8 August 2014; and the Defendant having continued to make no further S&M payments despite the issuance of a formal demand by the Plaintiff, the present suit was filed on 26 July 2016.

  45. DW1 Mr Widjaja’s evidence

  46. [39] Mr Megain Widjaja is the Director of the Defendant. He testified that the Defendant was incorporated in Indonesia in 2008 to carry on business as a futures commodity and derivatives-based exchange. As a new entity, the Defendant wanted to engage a software service provider “that could provide a full-fledged software system that would enable it to function effectively as a commodity and futures exchange”. The Defendant made their needs known to the two potential vendors they were then in discussion with – the Plaintiff and another company called Trayport Limited. The Defendant subsequently took a keener interest in the Plaintiff because it “seemed to understand the Defendant’s interests as a new entrant on the exchange market” and because of various assurances by Mr White as to the Plaintiff’s ability to provide “a comprehensive front to back exchange system”. According to Mr Widjaja, these assurances were repeated by the Plaintiff throughout the parties’ negotiations between 2008 and 2009. These negotiations culminated in the Licence Agreement of 9 September 2009.

  47. [40] Mr Widjaja claimed that the Defendant encountered problems with the Plaintiff’s software “almost from the outset … with the first complication arising as early as 8 December 2009” when data relating to daily reports generated by the system was lost. The next incident occurred on 11 January 2010 when users were unable to access their contracts in the system. “Most crucially”, according to Mr Widjaja, the J-Clear and J-Vision components of the Back Office system were “simply not functioning”, which meant that the Defendant was unable to generate the necessary data reports for its members and for the Indonesian regulatory authorities; and eventually, the Defendant had to switch to software provided by a local third-party vendor called Polamedia. It was with a view to remedying the initial problems that the parties entered into the Addendum of 1 May 2010, which laid down inter alia a set of review criteria to “enable the Defendant to choose the option of seeking a refund and/or discount of payable monies to the Plaintiff in the event that the software [was] defective”.

  48. [41] It is not disputed that following the signing of the Addendum on 1 May 2010, the Defendant issued a Notice of Non-Compliance to the Plaintiff on 21 January 2011 listing a number of alleged defects as provided for in the review criteria in the Addendum. It is also not disputed that this was the only Notice of Compliance issued by the Defendant in the entire history of its dealings with the Plaintiff; and that following the issuance of this notice on 21 January 2011, there was no follow-up action by the Defendant to request either a refund of or a discount on the S&M charges payable.

  49. [42] Nevertheless, Mr Widjaja claimed that the Defendant continued to encounter errors in the Plaintiff’s software. In the period between January 2010 and July 2010, 15 issues emerged across the Front Office, Back Office Clearing and Exchange Systems which “greatly hampered the Defendant’s ability to provide the necessary trading services to its customers as bargained for under the [Licence] Agreement”. According to Mr Widjaja, the Defendant expressed its frustration in various emails to the Plaintiff, but found the latter unable to “adequately remedy existing issues or prevent new issues from arising”. In his opinion:

  50. [43] The Defendant was aware that under clause 7.3 of the Licence Agreement, it “was to provide a Notice of Dispute in respect of any invoice it wished to dispute”. Mr Widjaja said that the Defendant had not issued any such Notice of Dispute because it “desired to preserve the goodwill between the two parties, and trusted the Plaintiff to make good on its promises in the [Licence] Agreement and the Addendum”. He claimed, however, that it was in light of the Defendant’s “ongoing problems with the software” that the Plaintiff made an offer in February 2011 “to replace the entire software with a new one” known as the Global Trading Administration (“GTA”) which was intended to resolve the issues troubling the Defendant in respect of the current software”. At this juncture, however, the Defendant was apparently uncertain as to whether the GTA system would “be the answer for all [its] platform problems”. This concern was expressed by Mr Setiabudi in an email he sent to Mr White on 23 May 2011. In this email Mr Setiabudi set out the following proposals:

  51. [44] Mr Widjaja claimed that Mr White’s email of 30 May 2011 (see [13] above) was a “counter-proposal” to the Defendant which the latter accepted. To recap, the five points of Mr White’s “proposal” of 30 May 2011 were as follows:

  52. [45] In Mr Widjaja’s words, the Defendant’s agreement to Mr White’s email of 30 May 2011 “had the effect of modifying, in writing, the respective obligations of both parties”. His evidence was that this contractual modification – which the Defendant referred to as “the Arrangement” – contained the following terms:

  53. [46] Indeed, Mr Widjaja’s evidence was that “[t]hrough the Arrangement, the Plaintiff had essentially invited the Defendant to hold off on the legal rights it might otherwise have had as a result of the defective software system, in exchange for the Plaintiff’s promise that it would similarly compromise on its entitlement to S&M fees”. In particular, he testified that the Plaintiff’s “proposal” to provide the GTA system was “an absolutely critical aspect of the Arrangement” because the Defendant “placed great weight on the Plaintiff’s promise that the GTA system would resolve” the problems it had encountered in the existing software.

  54. [47] By end-2011, however, the Defendant had not yet received the GTA system in replacement of its existing software. In the meantime, it continued to experience “instability” in using existing software. In addition, Mr Widjaja claimed that he observed that following the ION group’s acquisition of the Plaintiff in February 2012, the Plaintiff “was experiencing difficulty with keeping to the Arrangement”. Specifically, concern was expressed about the S&M fees due from – and not paid – by the Defendant, which by then had accumulated to US$225,000. This concern apparently led Mr White to seek to renegotiate the Arrangement with the Defendant and resulted in “a new compromise” (referred to by the Defendant as “the Revised Arrangement”). The Defendant’s case was that the basis for this “new compromise” was to be found in the following passages in Mr White’s email to Mr Setiabudi on 28 March 2012:

  55. [48] It should be noted that although the Defendant’s case was that it accepted the “fresh” proposals in Mr White’s email, the only email response on record from the Defendant – following a reminder by Mr White – was a brief email from Mr Setiabudi on 17 April 2012 stating as follows:

  56. [49] In its closing submissions, the Defendant has acknowledged that “the documentary record of any acceptance [of Mr White’s email of 28 March 2012] seems scarce”. Nevertheless, in his AEIC, Mr Widjaja asserted that this email of 28 March 2012 again modified the parties’ contractual rights and obligations by putting in place the following “fresh” contractual arrangement:

  57. [50] In early May 2012, there was some email correspondence between the Plaintiff and the Defendant about UAT of the GTA system. On 5 June 2012, however, Brian Ko (the Plaintiff’s technical relationship manager) requested the Defendant to “suspend [its] UAT testing in [the] GT Test environment for the time being”, as he understood from his “management team” that “the GT roll out project [was] presently on hold”. There was apparently no immediate reply from the Defendant to this update from Brian Ko, but on 28 August 2012, Mr Setiabudi sent an email to Mr White (see [21] above). To recap, Mr Setiabudi listed 8 points which he said formed the basis of what the Defendant believed to be “fair and mutual”:

  58. [51] As seen earlier, Mr White’s reply to Mr Setiabudi on 30 August 2012 was that he would come back after discussing the matter with his management. In his AEIC, Mr Widjaja claimed that this email reply showed that Mr White was still “committed to the Revised Arrangement”. In cross-examination, however, he conceded that he was not sure what Mr White was “trying to say” and described the reply as “in limbo”. Mr Widjaja further testified that after Mr White’s departure from the Plaintiff in November 2012, it became apparent to him that the Plaintiff “intended to abandon both” the Arrangement and the Revised Arrangement.

  59. [52] On 10 June 2013, Mr Widjaja received the Plaintiff’s email enclosing its slide presentation. He noted that the slides did not mention the GTA system at all, which he found “very unfair”. As to the invoices which were issued to the Defendant concurrently with the slides, he said the Defendant was “surprised and confused” to receive these invoices. As to the Plaintiff’s analysis in the slides of the 10 issues which the Defendant had raised in relation to its software in January 2013, Mr Widjaja said he believed his team would have looked at the solutions proposed by the Plaintiff and “tried to do something” – but he also said he did not think the proposed solutions solved the issues. He admitted that he did not know if anyone from the Defendant had implemented the Plaintiff’s proposed solutions, as there was “a clear segregation of duties” within the Defendant’s organisation, and it was Mr Setiabudi who was “fully in charge of the technical aspects of the system implementation, or even the fixing of the Patsystems … the issues”. Nevertheless, he believed Mr Setiabudi and his team “would have done something to talk about this”.

  60. [53] It is not disputed that the Defendant did not send the Plaintiff any substantive comments on the 10 June 2013 slides. On 22 July 2013, after receiving the Plaintiff’s letter of 11 July 2013 threatening suspension of services in the event of the invoices remaining unpaid, Mr Widjaja wrote to the Plaintiff stating that “payment was withheld because of the defects in the software” but offering “to settle the invoices provided the Plaintiff made good on its promises under the Agreement”.

  61. [54] In cross-examination, Mr Widjaja conceded that his letter of 22 July 2013 made no mention of the Arrangement and/or the Revised Arrangement and/or the Plaintiff’s failure to supply the GTA system, but insisted that the contractual variations allegedly represented by the Arrangement and the Revised Arrangement still stood. In re-examination, Mr Widjaja was referred by the Defendant’s counsel to his email of 5 July 2013, in which he had responded to the Plaintiff’s chaser for payment by inviting Mr Oliviero to visit Jakarta to “discuss this matter” (see [30] above). Mr Widjaja claimed that by alluding to “outstanding issues” in this email, he was really referring to the GTA system, and that his invitation to Mr Oliviero to visit Jakartaa was really both to make the latter “responsible for the GTA” and to “discuss” the Plaintiff’s slide presentation.

  62. [55] Mr Widjaja also claimed that although his letter of 22 July 2013 made no mention of the Arrangement and/or the Revised Arrangement and/or the Plaintiff’s failure to supply the GTA system, these were actually referenced in his letter of 24 January 2014. Whilst he conceded that this letter of 24 January 2014 also did not explicitly mention the Arrangement and/or the Revised Arrangement and/or the GTA System, he asserted that there were “implicit” references”. He claimed that the sentence “we have, in good faith, agreed to have Patsystems fixing the issues” was really a reference to the GTA system because the GTA system was supposed to be the solution to the defects in the Plaintiff’s existing software. He also claimed that the sentence “Patsystems agrees to restructure the payment of the support system” was really a reference to the Arrangement of 31 May 2011.

  63. [56] As to the Defendant’s counter-claim, Mr Widjaja asserted that the Defendant had made known to the Plaintiff from the beginning its “desire for a comprehensive and functioning software system that would enable it to achieve its commercial goal of being a reliable and successful commodity and futures exchange in Indonesia”. In his AEIC, Mr Widjaja referred to clause 10.1 of the Licence Agreement, clause 2.2. of Schedule 5 of the Licence Agreement, and the Review Criteria stated in the Addendum. He expressed the opinion that “the software provided for by the Plaintiff to the Defendant was … not up to the standards required under the Agreement” as it was – according to him – “not serviceable, operable, or functional”, “did not ‘comply with’ the necessary specifications”, and did not “operate … immediately on installation”. He did not specify in his AEIC which contractual specifications the Plaintiff had failed to comply with but made the general statement that the Defendant had “experienced inexplicable, and often unresolved, defects in the Plaintiff’s software on an unacceptably frequent basis”. He further asserted that these “defects” had “undermined the core benefit which the Defendant had contracted for when signing the Agreements in the first place, that is, a stable and functioning software system that would facilitate the Defendant’s commercial interests as a new player in the market”.

  64. [57] In cross-examination, Mr Widjaja admitted that he had not provided any evidence of any monetary loss on the Defendant’s part. On being shown materials extracted by the Plaintiff’s counsel from the websites of the Association of Futures Markets and MarketsWiki, Mr Widjaja also admitted that the Defendant’s exchange had experienced a steady growth in the volume of contracts traded on it between 2010 and 2013 (from 61,000 contracts in 2010 to 934,000 contracts in 2013). He agreed that the more contracts that were traded on the exchange, the more revenue the Defendant would make, although he asserted that the volume of contracts traded on its exchange had been falling by double digits since 2014.

  65. DW2 Mr Sangeroki’s evidence

  66. [58] Mr Teddy Sangeroki began working for the Defendant in June 2010 and left the company in March 2015. He is currently working as a corporate secretary in another company related to Mr Megain Widjaja. Whilst working for the Defendant, he was put in charge of its Market Control Centre (“MCC”) Division, where he was responsible for “monitoring and overseeing the backend operations of the Plaintiff’s software”, and “coordinating with the Plaintiff to rectify issues with the system as and when those might have arisen”. In cross-examination, he agreed that he had no training in computer engineering: his last job prior to joining the Defendant had been that of assistant director at a flour factory. He also agreed that in liaising with the Plaintiff on technical problems, whilst he would be able to “see the technical problem because it affected the trading transaction”, he would not be capable of understanding in technical terms the root cause of the problem.

  67. [59] Notwithstanding his admitted lack of technical expertise, Mr Sangeroki gave a detailed description in his AEIC of what he said were the various systems which made up the Plaintiff’s software. In cross-examination, it was put to him that his understanding of the plaintiff’s software system contained multiple errors: for example, that he had wrongly classified a number of systems as being part of the Matching Engine when they were actually Front End Broker products. He denied that his understanding of the software system contained any errors, claiming that he had derived such understanding from what “[he] had learnt from the user guide”, from explanations given by the Plaintiff’s staff, and from the Defendant’s own summary of documents provided by the Plaintiff.

  68. [60] Mr Sangeroki also gave evidence of what he claimed were “widespread and incessant issues and problems with the [plaintiff’s] Matching Engine System” and the “issues and non-delivery of the Back Office System”. In respect of the Matching Engine System, he gave several examples of alleged “problems”. For example, he said that the Matching Engine System was unable to run automatically when started up by the Defendant at the start of each day, and would instead need to be manually “bounced” “a minimum of two times every day” – with various attendant risks (such as possible loss of data) – just to ensure that all the applications on this system would run. Aside from this example of the need for manual “bouncing” of the system, Mr Sangeroki cited six other examples of “problems” with the Matching Engine System. It should be noted that of these six other alleged “problems”, Mr Sangeroki conceded that three had been solved, although he claimed that one was only “temporarily” solved”, while the solutions provided for the other two allegedly did not explain the cause of the error and did not guarantee non-recurrence. As for the Back Office System, he said that the “most critical issue” was the inability of the J-Clear System to produce any reliable financial reports, including reports needed “for purposes of the relevant regulatory requirements”. He also referred to several other issues such as the inability of the J-Clear system to allow members of the Defendant’s exchange to view their trade history and financial statements. According to Mr Sangeroki, the issues with the Back Office System “made the Defendant’s platform … appear unreliable and an unprofessional platform, making members or traders wary of using the Defendant to trade commodity and futures contracts”.

  69. [61] According to Mr Sangeroki, throughout the history of the Defendant’s usage of the Plaintiff’s software, 171 incident reports had been logged with the Plaintiff on the problems encountered with the software. These 171 incident reports included incident reports logged after the issuance of the Plaintiff’s Notice of Suspension of Service on 4 October 2013. Mr Sangeroki contended that these 171 incident reports were “not exhaustive” because the Defendant did not log an incident report each time an issue arose. He also referred to various emails exchanged with the Plaintiff which he said illustrated the issues that the Defendant had with the software. In his opinion:

  70. [62] Mr Sangeroki said that eventually the Defendant resolved some of their more major issues by “using third-party vendors to step in and fulfil the functions that the Plaintiff’s software simply could not”.

  71. [63] In cross-examination, Mr Sangeroki was asked to reconsider his claim that “no other exchange” besides the Defendant had used the Plaintiff’s software system. He was shown documentation appearing to show that other exchanges such as Thailand’s Agricultural Futures Exchange (“AFET”) had in fact installed the Plaintiff’s software system with all the modules present. He insisted, however, that he was correct in asserting that the Defendant was the only exchange to use the Plaintiff’s software system.

  72. The key issues in contention

  73. [64] I will next deal with my analysis of the key issues in contention between the parties and explain my reasons for finding in favour of the Plaintiff on these issues.

  74. [65] In respect of the Plaintiff’s claim for the total sum of US$604,340.68 in respect of the 17 invoices listed in the Statement of Claim, it was not disputed that the key issues were as follows: firstly, whether the Arrangement and the Revised Arrangement constituted valid contractual variations which modified the parties’ rights and obligations to the extent that the Defendant would not be liable to pay the said invoices; and secondly, in the event the Arrangement and the Revised Arrangement were found not to be valid contractual variations, whether the Plaintiff was nevertheless “estopped from relying on the non-issuance of any Notice of Dispute as indication that the Defendant accepted, and/or waived all rights to dispute each of the Invoices”.

  75. [66] In respect of the Defendant’s counter-claim for the refund of the entire licence fee or alternatively damages, the key issues were whether the Plaintiff had breached any term of the contract between the parties; and if yes, which contractual term it had breached.

  76. The Plaintiff’s claim on the unpaid invoices

  77. [67] In respect of the Plaintiff’s claim on the unpaid invoices, I rejected the Defendant’s argument that “the Arrangement and/or the Revised Arrangement was an effective variation of parties’ obligations under the [Licence] Agreement and Addendum”. I agreed with the Plaintiff that no binding agreement was reached between the parties in the terms of the Arrangement and the Revised Arrangement as pleaded. My reasons were as follows.

  78. The Arrangement

  79. [68] I will deal first with the Arrangement. To recap: the Defendant’s case, as explained in Mr Widjaja’s AEIC, was that the Arrangement represented a binding agreement which was reached by the defendant’s acceptance of the following terms offered in Mr White’s email of 30 May 2011:

  80. [69] It should be noted that Mr Widjaja described Mr White’s email of 30 May 2011 as a “counter-proposal” to Mr Setiabudi’s email of 23 May 2011, which had contained the Defendant’s own “proposal” with regard to the GTA system and the payment of S&M fees. Mr Widjaja specifically stated in his AEIC that it was Mr White’s “counter-proposal” of 30 May 2011 which the Defendant “eventually accepted”. In cross-examination, Mr Widjaja confirmed that it was the Defendant’s case that the terms of the Arrangement were encapsulated in Mr White’s 30 May 2011 email. There was no suggestion at any time that the Arrangement contained terms other than those set out in the 30 May 2011 email, as reproduced above.

  81. [70] By way of further recap, it should also be noted that the Defendant pleaded in its Defence and Counter-claim that the binding agreement represented by the Arrangement was as follows:

  82. (a) The Defendant agreed for its present platform / software to be replaced to the GTA, subject to its comfort and confidence that the GTA would indeed resolve the issues faced by the Defendant. The GTA was to be offered to the Defendant for test purposes over the course of the next three months, i.e. until the end of August 2011;

  83. (b) In exchange, the Defendant agreed to pay the S&M fees which remained hitherto outstanding, i.e. the sum of US$ 112,500 for the S&M period of 30 June 2010 to 31 December 2010;

  84. (c) The Defendant would withhold the payments for the S&M fees until the point that the GTA was implemented, and/or the Defendant signed off on the documents accepting the GTA.

  85. [71] According to the Defendant’s case, there were two key elements to the contractual variation encapsulated in the Arrangement: that the Defendant’s existing software system would be replaced by the GTA system; and that after settling the S&M charge of US$112,500 for the period 30 June 2010 to 31 December 2010, the Defendant would be entitled to withhold all further S&M payments until it accepted the GTA system in replacement of its existing software. Having reviewed Mr White’s 30 May 2011 email, however, it was simply not possible in my view to find that it provided the basis for a contractual variation with these terms.

  86. [73] Indeed, the fact that Mr White had no intention of “offering” to let the Defendant withhold any other S&M charge may be seen in his response in the same email to Mr Setiabudi’s suggestion in the latter’s 23 May 2011 email that the Defendant should “temporarily hold $75,000 yearly from the annual S&M fee” until it felt “comfortable and … confident with GT”. In his 30 May 2011 email, Mr White’s specific response to this suggestion by Mr Setiabudi – which followed the five items of his own proposal – was emphatically in the negative:

  87. [75] I did not find the above argument viable. Even if one were to assume that the Defendant had consciously taken a decision to forbear from following up its Non-Compliance Notice with any request for a refund or discount of S&M charge, there was no evidence of any request – express or implied – by the Plaintiff that it should so forebear. This, in my view, was fatal to the Defendant’s assertion of sufficient consideration. In this connection, regard should be had to the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Combe v Combe [1951] 2 KB 215 (“Combe”). This was a case involving a couple undergoing a divorce. Between the date of decree nisi and decree absolute on the petition for divorce, the husband promised his wife to allow her £100 a year free of tax. The wife forbore to apply to the Divorce Court for maintenance, but not on any request by the husband, express or implied, that she should so forbear. The husband did not pay to his wife the payments he had promised, and she brought an action in the King’s Bench Division on his promise to make those payments to her. The English CA allowed the husband’s appeal against the decision by the court below to allow the wife’s claim, holding that there was no consideration from the wife for the husband’s promise. In his judgement, Denning LJ stated (at 221):

  88. [76] Combe has been endorsed by our own CA in Gay Choon Ing v Loh Sze Ti Terence Peter and another appeal [2009] 2 SLR(R) 332 (“Gay Choon Ing”), where Andrew Phang JA – in delivering the judgement of the CA – held (at [82]):

  89. [77] In respect of the other alleged element of the Arrangement, namely, that the Defendant’s existing software system would be replaced by the GTA system, I also did not find it possible to construe Mr White’s email of 30 May 2011 as having made any such promise. Whilst item 3 of the five-point proposal in the said email did refer to the Defendant signing off on the GTA system “[w]hich shall be offered in the coming weeks”, item 4 made it clear that the GTA system was to be offered to the Defendant “for test purposes over the course of the next 3 months until the end of August 2011”; and item 5 went on to state that the Plaintiff would “work to a plan with [the Defendant] to have a GT system installed on [the Defendant’s] hardware to at least have a system in house for low impact testing, due to hardware restrictions”. Mr White also stated that the Plaintiff would “endeavour that [they] all work to making the GT system a reality plan for [the Defendant] given the enhancements and offering that will solve many features [the Defendant] requires for their business moving forward”. Having regard to these express statements, it was clear that the 30 May 2011 email could not have provided the basis for a legally binding agreement whereby the Plaintiff undertook the obligation of replacing the Defendant’s existing software system with the GTA system.

  90. [78] Tellingly, in cross-examination, Mr Widjaja conceded that the Defendant had to test the GTA system first before deciding whether this new system worked for it; that it “could well be that” the Defendant would not like the GTA system after looking at it; and that given the mind-set at the time, “the events that were going to take place in future [were] not certain”. These concessions demonstrated, in my view, that the Defendant itself could not have treated Mr White’s 30 May 2011 email as the basis for a binding agreement for the Plaintiff to replace the Defendant’s existing system with the GTA system.

  91. [79] In re-examination, Mr Widjaja sought to backtrack from his concessions in cross-examination: he claimed that Mr White’s 30 May 2011 email had given the Defendant a “high dose of assurance” by addressing the concerns expressed in Mr Setiabudi’s 23 May 2011 email; and that in the circumstances, the Defendant had been “led to believe” that they were entering into an “agreement” which would provide an amicable solution for moving forward. A review of the responses given by Mr White vis-à-vis Mr Setiabudi’s concerns showed, however, that Mr White’s references to the provision of the GTA system to the Defendant were all in the context of a proposal for the Defendant to test the system; there was no representation at any point that the Plaintiff was binding itself to replace the Defendant’s existing system with the GTA system. In particular, in response to Mr Setiabudi’s statement (per his 23 May 2011 email) that the Defendant “agree[d] to accept [the Plaintiff’s] offer to upgrade to GT”, Mr White’s response – couched in rather circumspect terms – was:

  92. [80] Furthermore, it should be noted that the Defendant did not dispute that whilst negotiating parties might enter into a binding agreement even when a few issues remained to be agreed, there would be no binding obligation unless all the material terms of the contract were agreed on: see for example Grossner Jens v Raffles Holdings Ltd [2004] 1 SLR(R) 202 (“Grossner Jens”). In Grossner Jens, the plaintiff had offered to broker the private sale of Swissotel Holding GA (“Swissotel”) to the defendants. The plaintiff sought 1% of the transaction price as broker’s commission on successful acquisition of Swissotel by the defendants. The defendants did not accept these proposed terms of remuneration and sought to cap the commission. For this purpose, they requested the plaintiff for information on the scope of his services and on the indicative price for Swissotel – which queries the plaintiff did not reply. Subsequently, after the defendants acquired Swissotel through a competitive bidding exercise in which they appointed Morgan Guarantee to act for them, the plaintiff demanded his commission from the defendants, claiming that he had brokered the deal. His claim was dismissed by the High Court, which held that the parties had failed to agree on crucial terms such as the plaintiff’s remuneration and the scope of his brokerage services; and that accordingly, there was no binding brokerage contract between the parties. In his judgement, Justice Tan Lee Meng held that:

  93. [82] In May & Butcher v The King [1934] 2 KB 17 (“May & Butcher”), one of the two cases referenced by Lord Wright above, the appellants were general contractors who claimed that they had entered into a binding agreement with the Disposals and Liquidation Commission for the purchase by the appellants of tentage which might become available in the United Kingdom (“UK”). In respect of payment for the tentage, the alleged agreement provided that the “price or prices to be paid, and the date or dates on which payment is to be made by the purchasers to the Commission for such old tentage shall be agreed upon from time to time between the Commission and the purchasers as the quantities of the said old tentage becomes available for disposal, and are offered to the purchasers by the Commission”. The appellants appealed to the House of Lords after the court at first instance and the CA had rejected their claim. In dismissing the appeal, the House of Lords held that there was no concluded contract between the parties. As Lord Buckmaster put it (at 20):

  94. [83] Viscount Dunedin (whose judgment was cited by Lord Wright in G. Scammell), further noted (at 21) that:

  95. [84] Although in Foley v Classique Coaches Ltd [1934] KB 1 (“Foley”) the English CA distinguished May & Butcher, it is important to note the grounds on which they distinguished that case. In Foley, the plaintiff had agreed to sell and the defendants to buy a piece of land, adjoining other land belonging to the plaintiff, which the defendants intended to use for their business as motor coach proprietors. The sale of the land was made subject to the defendants entering into another agreement to purchase from the plaintiff all the petrol required for their business (“the second agreement”). The second agreement stipulated that the defendants would purchase petrol from the plaintiff “at a price to be agreed by the parties in writing and from time to time”; further, that the defendants would purchase no petrol from any other person so long as the plaintiff was able to supply them with quantified sufficient to satisfy their daily requirement”. The second agreement also provided that if any dispute or difference should arise on the subject matter of construction of the agreement, “the same shall be submitted to arbitration”. The land was duly conveyed to the defendants who – for more than three years thereafter – obtained their petrol from the plaintiffs.

  96. [85] Subsequently, disputes arose between the parties; and the defendants purported to repudiate the second agreement. The defendants alleged inter alia that the second agreement had no binding force because no agreement in writing as to price had ever been made. An application by the plaintiff for a declaration that the second agreement was valid and binding was granted by the court at first instance, whose decision was upheld by the CA. The CA decided that a term must be implied in the agreement that the petrol supplied by the plaintiff should be of reasonable quality and sold at a reasonable price, and that if any dispute arose as to what was a reasonable price, it was to be determined by arbitration. Crucially, the CA held that the facts of the case and the nature of the contract “took it out of the authority of May & Butcher” (per Greer LJ at 12). The CA noted that in this case, the second agreement had been duly stamped and bore all the signs of a legal contract, unlike the “mere informal letter” in May & Butcher. The CA also noted that the defendants had purchased all its petrol from the plaintiff for three and a half years before purporting to repudiate the second agreement. It was further held that the second agreement formed one of the two considerations agreed for the purchase of the land from the plaintiff. Finally, and critically, the CA found the case to be analogous to case involving tied houses, in which typically a publican would agree not to take beer from anyone except the brewer: noting that it was an “old-established rule” in such cases that the brewer for his part was agreeable to supplying beer of reasonable quality and at a reasonable price, the CA held that there was “no distinction in principle between a contract for the price of beer to be paid by the tenant of a tied house” and the second agreement in the case before it.

  97. [86] Turning back to the facts of the present case, it should be pointed out firstly that the replacement of the Defendant’s existing software system with the GTA system would have been a substantial endeavour which would have required extensive efforts to be made in diverse areas such as user acceptance testing, training, and resolution of hardware compatibility issues. Mr Widjaja accepted in cross-examination that the GTA system would have been an entirely new platform, and upgrading to such a new platform would not have been a matter of merely adding some patches to the Defendant’s existing software. Secondly, the Defendant did not dispute the Plaintiff’s claim that the new GTA system was “estimated to be worth US$6 million”. In cross-examination, Mr Widjaja agreed that the Defendant was not going to be given the GTA system for free.

  98. The Revised Arrangement

  99. [88] As for the Revised Arrangement, to recap – the Defendant’s case was that this was a binding agreement concluded via its acceptance of the “compromise” offered in Mr White’s email of 28 March 2012. The terms of the Revised Arrangement, as pleaded, were that:

  100. [89] As pleaded, the Revised Arrangement was substantively different from the Arrangement. The Arrangement allegedly provided for the Defendant to withhold all S&M payments post-31 December 2010 until its acceptance of the GTA system. In contrast, the Revised Arrangement allegedly provided for the Defendant to pay annually the S&M charge of US$75,000 applicable to the E-Broker Core System and Front End, while withholding the annual S&M charges of US$150,000 applicable to the Matching Engine Support until the delivery of the GTA system.

  101. [90] As with the Arrangement, however, a review of Mr White’s email showed that it could not have provided the basis for a legally binding Revised Agreement with the terms as pleaded. The “compromise” that Mr White actually put forward in his email on 28 March 2012 was as follows:

  102. [91] From the above, it was evident that insofar as Mr White spoke of the Defendant withholding any S&M payment, he was referring in clear and specific terms to the S&M charge of US$150,000 payable for the Matching Engine Support for the period 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012. Moreover, as with the Arrangement, given Mr White’s stated concern with the “build up” of a “large amount” of unpaid S&M charges and with his parent company’s attitude towards such a situation, it was unbelievable that if the parties had indeed varied their contract to let the Defendant withhold all S&M charges payable for the Matching Engine Support until it received the GTA, this should not have been expressly articulated in Mr White’s email.

  103. [93] Tellingly, in its Closing Submissions, the Defendant sought to resile from the terms it had pleaded in respect of the Revised Arrangement. It contended in its Closing Submissions that in the Revised Arrangement:

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