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Grounds publishedDecided 29 May 2019

High Court

Ram Niranjan v Navin Jatia and others and another suit

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[2019] SGHC 138Case no. Suit No 911 of 2016

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] Sadly, this was yet another case involving disputes between family members over property and money. In this case, the disputes were between a son and his parents. The disputes centred around various matters including a residential property of some 10,600 square feet, two office units, shares in a company and investments in bonds.

  3. [2] The facts were ugly. In one incident, the father exposed himself to his son in the presence of his daughter-in-law and grandson. In another incident, the son called the police who arrested his father and mother for trespass and they spent a night in the lock-up. In her affidavit of evidence-in-chief (“AEIC”), the mother declared in no uncertain terms that “[she does] not have a son”; she repeated this during her oral testimony.

  4. [3] The present proceedings involved two actions which were consolidated – Suit 911 of 2016 (“Suit 911”) and Suit 139 of 2017 (“Suit 139”).

  5. [4] In Suit 911, the father, Mr Ram Niranjan (“Ram”), was the plaintiff. His son, Mr Navin Jatia (“Navin”) was the first defendant. Navin’s wife, Mdm Samridhi Jatia (“Mrs Navin”) was the second defendant. The third defendant, Evergreen Global Pte Ltd (“Evergreen”) was a company started by the plaintiff but which subsequently became controlled and managed by Navin. Ram’s wife/Navin’s mother, Mdm Shakuntala Devi (“Mrs Ram”), was the fourth defendant. She was a nominal defendant who effectively aligned her case with Ram’s.

  6. [5] Suit 911 also involved a counterclaim by Navin against Ram, and a third party action by Mrs Ram against Navin and Mrs Navin.

  7. [6] In Suit 139, Navin sued Ram for defamation arising from certain statements made by Ram to one Pankaj s/o Dhirajlal (“Pankaj”), a family friend.

  8. [7] Ram and Mrs Ram succeeded in some but not all of their claims in Suit 911. Navin’s counterclaim was dismissed, as was his claim in Suit 139. Appeals have been filed by all the parties in Suit 911. There is no appeal against the dismissal of S 139.

  9. Background

  10. [8] The numerous claims in these proceedings were based on events that spanned over more than two decades.

  11. [9] An Indian national by descent, Ram invested S$1m in Singapore in 1989 and became a Singapore permanent resident under a scheme for foreign investors. Mrs Ram also became a Singapore permanent resident. On 15 May 1989, Ram incorporated Evergreen. As of 14 June 1989, Evergreen’s directors were Ram and one Mr Kamal Kishore (“Kishore”) who was Ram’s trusted business associate. Evergreen’s issued share capital at incorporation was 11 shares. On 1 December 1989, it was increased by 500,000 shares. As of 30 September 1990, Ram held 500,010 shares while Kishore held the remaining one share as Ram’s nominee. Evergreen’s main business was in exporting yarn, filament yarn and tyres to Nepal and the Indian sub-continent.

  12. [10] The newly-incorporated Evergreen needed an office. To that end, Ram bought unit #10-05 at High Street Plaza (“HS Unit #10-05”) for S$512,366 on 3 June 1989. At the same time, Ram continued with his trading and distribution businesses in Nepal in addition to the textile, televisions, lamp and umbrella factories that he had set up there.

  13. [11] Also in 1989, Navin moved to join his parents in Singapore and began serving his national service. He completed his national service in 1991 and became a Singapore citizen. Navin started working at Evergreen in mid-1991.

  14. [12] In 1993, Navin signed an option to purchase a piece of landed property at 44 Poole Road, Singapore (“the Poole Road property”) for S$2.88m. Navin exercised the option on 13 March 1993. The property comprised a detached bungalow on some 10,600 square feet of land. As a permanent resident, Ram could not own landed property without approval.

  15. [13] The purchase of the Poole Road property was completed in June 1993 in Navin’s sole name. Navin was then 23 years old. Of the purchase price of S$2.88m, S$2.3m was paid using a mortgage loan from Overseas Union Bank Limited (“OUB”). Whether it was Ram or Navin who paid for the property was in dispute. However, it was not in dispute that the Poole Road property effectively functioned as the family home for the better part of the next 23 years or so.

  16. [14] Ram spent a lot of his time in Nepal and India, in particular, after 1994 when there was political instability in Nepal. Between 1994 and 2004, Ram spent time in India trying to manage the problems that his businesses were facing in Nepal.

  17. [15] Meanwhile, in Singapore, Navin was appointed as a director of Evergreen on 14 September 1994. Ram claimed that this was done without his consent.

  18. [16] In January 1995, Ram bought a second unit at High Street Plaza (“HS Unit #10-04”) for S$938,716.20. This unit is adjacent to HS Unit #10-05, which Ram already owned.

  19. [17] On 3 April 1995, the board directors of Evergreen (“the Board”) approved the transfer of the one share held by Kishore to Navin; the transfer was effected on 29 April 1995. On 4 April 1995, Kishore resigned from his directorship in Evergreen. At the end of 1995, the directors of Evergreen were Ram, Navin and one Mr Om Prakash. On 10 December 1996, Om Prakash resigned and was replaced by Mrs Navin.

  20. [18] Between 1995 and September 2006, the following allotments/transfers of shares in Evergreen took place:

  21. Date

  22. Transfer/allotment

  23. Shareholding

  24. [29] Apr 1995

  25. Kishore transferred the one share held by him to Navin.

  26. Ram: 500,010

  27. Navin: 1

  28. [5] Mar 1996

  29. 499,989 shares were allotted to Ram.

  30. Ram: 999,999

  31. Navin: 1

  32. [25] Oct 2002

  33. Ram transferred 499,999 shares to Mrs Ram.

  34. Ram: 500,000

  35. Mrs Ram: 499,999

  36. Navin: 1

  37. [30] Sep 2006

  38. 6m shares were allotted to Ram (1,250,000 shares), Mrs Ram (1,250,001 shares) and Navin (3,499,999 shares).

  39. Ram: 1,750,000

  40. Mrs Ram: 1,750,000

  41. Navin: 3,500,000

  42. Ram claimed that the above allotments and transfers were carried out without his knowledge or consent.

  43. [19] By 2006, Ram and Navin were at loggerheads. The reasons were in dispute. Amongst others, Ram claimed that during a quarrel sometime in 2001 over matters relating to Evergreen’s business, Navin threw a punch at him. Mrs Ram managed to pull Ram away and Navin’s punch landed on a glass window, breaking the glass. Subsequently, Ram’s younger daughter, Kalpana Binani (“Kalpana”), and her husband, Braj Binani (“Braj”) stepped in to mediate. Navin denied throwing the punch at Ram. Another incident took place in December 2006 during which Navin allegedly tried to hit Ram again. Kalpana and Braj were again summoned to Singapore to mediate.

  44. [20] This time, the mediation led to a Memorandum of Understanding dated 9 December 2006 being signed by Ram, Mrs Ram and Navin (“the MOU”). Mrs Navin was named as a party to the MOU but she did not sign the MOU. The reason why she did not sign was in dispute. Whether the MOU was intended to be legally binding was also in dispute. Under the MOU:

  45. (a) Clause 1 provided that Evergreen would have a “revised Capital structure” under which Ram would hold 25%, Mrs Ram 25% and Navin 50%.

  46. (b) Clause 2 provided that in view of the “restructured shareholding pattern”, Navin would ensure that the personal guarantees which Ram, Mrs Ram and Mrs Navin had given to Evergreen’s bankers will be discharged “at the earliest possible convenience”.

  47. (c) Clause 3 provided that Ram will remain as a “non-executive Director” and “elected Chairman of the Board of the Company”. Clause 4 provided that Navin will assume the role of managing director and “will have effective control of the day-to-day operations of the company” and if necessary, Evergreen’s operations will be supported by Navin’s personal guarantee secured by his personal assets.

  48. (d) Clause 5 provided for a power of attorney to be given by Evergreen to Navin for “running the day to day operations of the company” and on terms which included the following:

  49. (i) Clause 5(i): The term of office will be from 1 October 2006 until 31 December 2011 and will be subject to renewal thereafter.

  50. (ii) Clause 5(ii): Navin will be paid a remuneration of S$35,000 per month.

  51. (iii) Clause 5(ix): Navin was under an “obligation … to arrange to provide SGD360,000 in three prior instalments in favour of [Ram] and [Mrs Ram] effective 1/10/2006 till further advice towards meeting expenses in Nepal and Mumbai and out of pocket expenses” (“the Annual Allowance”). It was not disputed that payment of the Annual Allowance could take the form of dividends from Evergreen or director’s fees to Ram. It was also not disputed that the Annual Allowance was paid up to 2013.

  52. (iv) Clause 5(xii): Ram “has provided one office block to be used by [Evergreen] and till such time he has extended this to be used by the company. The company will be under obligation to meet all its outgoings in running and maintaining the office”.

  53. (v) Clause 5(xiii): Navin “shall be under obligation to acquire a residential property for [Mrs Ram] to the extent of US$1 million anywhere as she desired”. To exercise this right of hers, Mrs Ram had to first indicate her desire for such a property in writing to Navin.

  54. (vi) Clause 5(xvii): Ram and Mrs Ram “have absolute discretion of right of stay with full comforts in [the Poole Road property] for their entire lives.”

  55. [21] In May 2007, Ram opened an account with UBS AG (“UBS”), in his and Mrs Ram’s names, for purposes of making investments (“Ram’s UBS account”). Navin managed the investment of the moneys in Ram’s UBS account and invested Ram’s monies in bonds (“the Bonds”). The Bonds were paid for in part using loans from UBS. The actual amount invested for Ram was in dispute. Navin claimed that the Bonds were a joint investment by Ram and him, in “about equal shares”. The Bonds were held in an account held by La Brasserie Corporation Ltd (“La Brasserie”), an entity controlled by Navin and Mrs Navin. Ram asserted that his bonds should have been held by an entity called Mandalay Global Assets Ltd (“Mandalay”) instead. Mandalay was company incorporated in The Bahamas and was owned and managed by UBS Trustees. Initially, the beneficial owners were Ram and Mrs Ram. In February 2013, Mrs Navin was added as the third beneficial owner.

  56. Further allotments of shares in Evergreen

  57. [22] Between 2007 and 2008, there were two more allotments of shares.

  58. Date

  59. Transfer/allotment

  60. Shareholding

  61. [13] July 2007

  62. 1,040,000 shares were allotted to Ram (260,000 shares), Mrs Ram (260,000 shares) and Navin (520,000 shares).

  63. Ram: 2,010,000

  64. Mrs Ram: 2,010,000

  65. Navin: 4,020,000

  66. [25] Aug 2008

  67. 1.96m shares were allotted to Ram (490,000 shares), Mrs Ram (490,000 shares) and Navin (980,000 shares).

  68. Ram: 2,500,000

  69. Mrs Ram: 2,500,000

  70. Navin: 5,000,000

  71. Again, Ram claimed that these allotments were made without his knowledge and consent.

  72. Transfer of one share to Mrs Navin

  73. [23] On 28 December 2012, Navin transferred one share in Evergreen to Mrs Navin. Once again, Ram claimed that the transfer was without his knowledge and consent.

  74. [24] Unfortunately, the MOU did not end the disputes between Ram and Navin. Navin stopped paying the Annual Allowance after October 2013. About a month later, Braj and Kalpana found out about this. Braj asked Navin why he was not paying the Annual Allowance to his parents in accordance with the MOU.

  75. [25] Ram alleged that when Navin refused to pay the Annual Allowance, he asked Navin to transfer the Bonds to him but Navin did not do so. In early July 2014, Ram found out from UBS that there were no bonds held in his UBS account. As stated earlier, the Bonds were held in La Brasserie’s name. Navin admitted that in July 2014, Ram asked him to transfer the Bonds to Mandalay. On 24 July 2014, Navin instructed UBS to transfer the Bonds (together with the outstanding loans) to Mandalay. Subsequently, Navin changed his mind. According to Navin, this was because Ram had started demanding that Navin transfer his shares in Evergreen, the Poole Road property and US$5m to Ram. Ram disputed Navin’s allegation. In November 2014, Navin instructed UBS to liquidate the Bonds instead. The proceeds from the sale of the Bonds plus interest income amounted to US$4,270,058.83. Navin held on to the entire sum, and claimed that he did so because he wanted to discuss a global settlement with Ram.

  76. [26] Also in November 2014, Mrs Ram left Ram. Ram claimed that this was because of his strained finances at the time, which in turn stemmed from Navin’s refusal to pay the Annual Allowance and Ram’s share of the moneys from the investment in the Bonds. According to Mrs Ram, however, she left Ram after quarrelling with him over his threats to close down Evergreen as a result of his disagreements with Navin.

  77. [27] On 2 January 2015, Mrs Ram and Navin entered into an agreement (“the SPA”) for the sale of Mrs Ram’s 25% shareholding in Evergreen to Navin for US$1,962,000. Mrs Ram sought to set aside the SPA in the third party proceedings. Under the terms of the SPA,

  78. (a) the transfer of the shares to Navin was to take place upon Mrs Ram’s demise;

  79. (b) pending the transfer, Mrs Ram was to grant an irrevocable power of attorney to Navin to deal with all the rights and interests with respect to the shares; and

  80. (c) in the event Mrs Ram breached the terms of the SPA, Navin would be entitled to transfer the shares to himself forthwith.

  81. [28] Pursuant to the SPA, Mrs Ram signed a power of attorney dated the same day, in favour of Navin (“the POA”). Navin paid Mrs Ram the sum of US$1,962,000 by way of a cheque dated the same day. Navin also signed a letter addressed to Mrs Ram, stating that he “will endeavour to provide [her] the sum of SGD180,000 per year, to the best of [his] ability, towards [her] housing/living maintenance expenses etc”.

  82. [29] On 26 March 2015, Mrs Ram signed a Revocation of Power of Attorney purporting to revoke the POA. This was sent to Navin and Evergreen on 30 March 2015. By a letter dated 6 April 2015, Navin informed Mrs Ram’s then-solicitors that he had exercised his right pursuant to the SPA and transferred the purchased shares to himself.

  83. [30] Ram claimed that he did not know about the signing of the SPA at the time. Mrs Ram left him in November 2014 and he only met Mrs Ram again in January 2015 at a family wedding in Bangkok where they then reconciled.

  84. [31] Eventually, Braj and Navin’s father-in-law were roped in to mediate the disputes between Ram and Navin. A meeting was scheduled for 11 August 2015. Before the scheduled meeting of 11 August 2015 could take place however, on 6 August 2015, Ram, Mrs Ram, Navin and Mrs Navin signed a settlement deed (“the 2015 Deed”). Pursuant to the 2015 Deed:

  85. (a) Navin paid Ram US$2m “in full and final settlement of all or any Issues (including any claim(s) thereto) arising between them.” The term “Issues” was defined as “disagreements over matters concerning personal business styles, work aptitudes, monies and other personal matters/concerns … which have created certain disharmony within the family or amongst the individual members”.

  86. (b) Each party agreed to henceforth “conduct himself/herself in the best possible manner so as to achieve a good and harmonious relationship with one another and also vis-à-vis [Evergreen] (including its officers, employees, agents or otherwise) so as to enhance [Evergreen’s] growth and success in whichever way possible” (“the harmonious relationship clause”).

  87. (c) The parties also agreed and confirmed that the 2015 Deed “revokes and supersedes all previous agreements, arrangements and/or understandings made between them (including those made individually between certain parties to [the 2015 Deed], without the involvement of all four parties herein)”.

  88. [32] Also around this time, Navin transferred his entire 10% shareholding in another company called EG Global Holdings Pte Ltd (“EG Global”) to Ram. The remaining 90% of the shares in EG Global were held by Ram (45%) and Mrs Ram (45%). According to Navin, the transfer to Ram was at Ram’s request and made by Navin as a gesture of goodwill.

  89. [33] The 2015 Deed was followed soon after by a further agreement dated 1 September 2015 (“the September Agreement”) signed by the same parties to the 2015 Deed. In the September Agreement,

  90. (a) Navin stated that, based on Ram’s and Mrs Ram’s request, he agreed to execute a deed of gift and power of attorney to transfer to Mrs Ram 7,300 shares in an Indian company called Janson Engineering and Trading Company Pte Ltd (“Janson”); and

  91. (b) the parties agreed that henceforth, “[they] will each retain the assets held in respective names and will be free to deal with the same in any manner”.

  92. [34] Ram claimed that he had signed the 2015 Deed on the understanding that Navin would

  93. (a) return to Mrs Ram the shares in Evergreen which Navin had transferred to himself pursuant to the SPA;

  94. (b) pay Ram the Annual Allowance;

  95. (c) return one unit at High Street Plaza to Ram; and

  96. (d) return the shares in Janson to Mrs Ram. Ram alleged that Navin held the shares in Janson on trust.

  97. Navin disputed any such understanding. Navin did transfer 7,300 shares in Janson to Mrs Ram but he said that the transfer was pursuant to the September Agreement.

  98. [35] Any flicker of hope for a harmonious relationship after the 2015 Deed and the September Agreement dissipated soon enough. Navin alleged that on or about 14 January 2016, Ram defamed him during a conversation with Pankaj. In March 2016, Navin commenced action against Ram for defamation. That action was subsequently transferred to the High Court and became Suit 139.

  99. [36] Also, life over at the Poole Road property was anything but harmonious. Ram and Mrs Ram alleged that Navin and Mrs Navin attempted to make life miserable for them at the Poole Road property. Ram gave the example of the visit by his elder brother and sister-in-law in May 2016. They had come from India to visit Ram and Mrs Ram at the Poole Road property. Ram alleged that it was an embarrassing episode for him, as his guests saw for themselves how Ram and Mrs Ram were effectively restricted to living in their bedroom. Ram also alleged that his guests were not accorded the respect due to them as elders.

  100. [38] On 14 July 2016, Mrs Ram was unwell and suffered from body aches. Navin’s sister, Kusum Jain, arranged for a lady to go to the Poole Road property to give Mrs Ram a massage. Navin was not at home. Mrs Navin spoke to him about it and he told her to call the police, which she did. Navin claimed that he told Mrs Navin to call the police because Mrs Ram did not respond to her questions about the lady. Navin claimed that he did not want illegal helpers working in the house and that Ram had previously threatened to report to the Ministry of Manpower that Navin had illegal maids at the Poole Road property.

  101. [39] On 31 July 2016, an incident happened at the Poole Road property during which Ram reacted to something Navin said by pulling down his pants and exposing himself to Navin in the presence of Navin’s wife and son. The CCTV recording of this incident was played in court. Ram claimed that Navin had told him “I will f--- you”. Navin denied this. The CCTV had no voice recording. Navin called the police who, upon arrival, advised Ram to leave the Poole Road property.

  102. [40] Ram returned to the Poole Road property the next day. Navin called the police again. What actually happened after the police arrived was in dispute. In the event, the police arrested both Ram and Mrs Ram and charged them with criminal trespass. Ram and Mrs Ram spent the night in the police lock-up and were released on bond the next day. Ram claimed that since then, Mrs Ram and he have not been able to access the Poole Road property to pack and retrieve their belongings. Although Navin had his parents’ belongings packed and sent to them, Ram and Mrs Ram alleged that many of their belongings were missing.

  103. The claims in Suit 911

  104. [41] In summary, Ram’s claims in Suit 911 were primarily for:

  105. (a) minority oppression under s 216 of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) in relation to the affairs of Evergreen;

  106. (b) various allotments and transfers of shares in Evergreen to be set aside;

  107. (c) orders enforcing the terms of the MOU;

  108. (d) payment of his share of the proceeds of sale of the Bonds;

  109. (e) the 2015 Deed to be set aside; and

  110. (f) delivery up of his belongings, alternatively, damages for conversion.

  111. [42] Mrs Ram’s claims against Navin and Mrs Navin in the third party proceedings were mainly for:

  112. (a) orders enforcing the MOU;

  113. (b) the SPA to be set aside and the shares in Evergreen transferred back to her;

  114. (c) the 2015 Deed and September Agreement to be set aside; and

  115. (d) delivery up of her belongings, alternatively, damages for conversion.

  116. [43] Navin’s counterclaims in Suit 911 were for:

  117. (a) the return of the sum of US$2m paid to Ram pursuant to the 2015 Deed;

  118. (b) the return of the 7,300 shares in Janson that were transferred to Mrs Ram; and

  119. (c) the return of the shares in EG Global that were transferred to Ram.

  120. Navin’s counterclaims were based on his allegation that Ram had breached the harmonious relationship clause under the 2015 Deed.

  121. The 2015 Deed and September Agreement

  122. [44] Navin’s and Mrs Navin’s main defence was that the 2015 Deed and the September Agreement constituted a full and final settlement of all disputes between the parties which had arisen at the time.

  123. [45] Ram’s case was that the 2015 Deed was void for uncertainty, or alternatively, that it was voidable for misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, unconscionability, and/or material non-disclosure. Mrs Ram pleaded much the same, with the additional reliance on the doctrine of non est factum.

  124. [46] A contract is valid and enforceable if its terms are certain. A term is uncertain if there is no objective or reasonable method of ascertaining how the term is to be carried out: Rudhra Minerals Pte Ltd v MRI Trading Pte Ltd (formerly known as CWT Integrated Services Pte Ltd) [2013] 4 SLR 1023 at [32]. At the same time, courts do strive to uphold contracts where possible rather than striking them down: Climax Manufacturing Co Ltd v Colles Paragon Converters (S) Pte Ltd [1998] 3 SLR(R) 540 at [22] and [26].

  125. [47] As stated in [31(a)] above, the 2015 Deed was stated to be in full and final settlement of all “Issues”. Ram submitted that the definition of “Issues” was uncertain. Ram also argued that it was not clear what previous agreements, arrangements and/or understandings were superseded by the 2015 Deed (see [31(c)] above).

  126. [48] I disagreed with Ram. The 2015 Deed defined “Issues” as those “disagreements over matters concerning personal business styles, work aptitudes, monies and other personal matters/concerns … which have created certain disharmony within the family or amongst the individual members”. Although it could have been better drafted, in my view, the definition was sufficiently certain to be enforceable. The 2015 Deed also purported to revoke and supersede all past agreements and understandings. Such a provision is commonly found in settlement agreements and I was of the view that there was nothing ambiguous or uncertain about the provision. During oral submissions, Ram’s counsel agreed that such a provision was not uncertain.

  127. [49] Ram’s pleaded case was that he was induced to sign the 2015 Deed by Navin’s misrepresentations that he would arrange for the Annual Allowance to be paid and for the Evergreen shares sold to him under the SPA to be returned to Mrs Ram (as trustee for Ram) after Ram signed the 2015 Deed. Navin did neither.

  128. [50] Mrs Ram pleaded that Navin had made life very unpleasant at the Poole Road property, and that she signed the 2015 Deed in reliance on Navin’s misrepresentation that things “would return to normal” if she signed the 2015 Deed. According to Mrs Ram, Navin continued to make life unhappy for her.

  129. [51] An actionable misrepresentation consists in a false statement of existing or past fact made by one party before or at the time of making the contract, which is addressed to the party misled, and which induces that party to enter into the contract: Tan Chin Seng and others v Raffles Town Club Pte Ltd [2003] 3 SLR(R) 307 at [20], citing Anson’s Law of Contract (28th Ed, 2002) at p 237. In other words, an actionable misrepresentation does not operate on statements of intention.

  130. [52] It was not necessary for me to make any finding as to whether Navin made the representations as alleged. It was clear that both Ram’s and Mrs Ram’s pleaded cases on misrepresentation were based on statements of intention and not existing fact, and therefore failed. A statement of intention can be a representation of existing fact where the representor did not in fact hold the intention he was expressing. However, this was not pleaded by Ram and Mrs Ram.

  131. [53] Ram pleaded that there was a relationship of trust and confidence between Navin and him. He also pleaded that he was dependent on Navin for the Annual Allowance, had nowhere else to stay in Singapore apart from the Poole Road property, was cash-strapped and could not maintain his and Mrs Ram’s then-standard of living. The 2015 Deed, according to Ram, was manifestly disadvantageous to him because it effectively meant that he waived all his claims to the moneys from the Bonds, which were his to begin with. Moreover, the US$2m he received under the 2015 Deed was highly disproportionate to the value of all the entitlements he had to relinquish in exchange, such as the proceeds of the Bonds, the Evergreen shares that Mrs Ram sold to Navin (which Ram claimed was held on trust for him by Mrs Ram), the payment of the arrears of the Annual Allowance and resumption of payment thereof.

  132. [54] Mrs Ram pleaded that she did not receive any benefit for entering into the 2015 Deed. Navin had ceased to pay her and Ram the Annual Allowance since 2013. She also did not receive independent legal or financial advice before entering into the 2015 Deed.

  133. [55] There are two elements in duress. First, there had to be pressure amounting to compulsion of the victim’s will. Second, the pressure exerted had to be illegitimate: E C Investment Holding Pte Ltd v Ridout Residence Pte Ltd and another [2011] 2 SLR 232 at [48].

  134. [56] Both Ram and Mrs Ram claimed that they signed the 2015 Deed under economic duress. Navin stopped paying the Annual Allowance to his parents in 2013. Ram claimed that he was in a vulnerable financial position, having been deprived of the Annual Allowance and his Bonds, and that Navin was adamant that Ram had to sign the 2015 Deed before he would receive either.

  135. [57] Mrs Ram’s case appeared to be that the economic duress arose because Navin stopped paying her half share of the Annual Allowance in 2013.

  136. [58] In my view, Ram and Mrs Ram failed to prove economic duress. Mrs Ram received the US$1,962,000 in January 2015 pursuant to the SPA. Ram had access to those funds since, according to him, the shares that Mrs Ram sold under the SPA, were held by Mrs Ram on trust for him (a fact that Mrs Ram confirmed ). That amount was left intact until a full six months later. Even then, US$1m was withdrawn not for the purposes of meeting daily expenses, but for the purposes of investment. Neither Ram nor Mrs Ram gave any credible explanation why they did not have to make use of the proceeds from the sale of the shares under the SPA for their living expenses. The inescapable conclusion was that they were not in such a desperate need for money for their living expenses, as they claimed.

  137. [59] Further, the evidence did not support any compulsion of will:

  138. (a) Ram testified that he signed the 2015 Deed on the understanding that Navin would return the shares in Evergreen, pay the Annual Allowance, return one unit at High Street Plaza to Ram, and return the shares in Janson (see [34] above). It seemed to me that the evidence was more consistent with the striking of a bargain than any compulsion of will.

  139. (b) Mrs Ram testified that she signed the 2015 Deed “because Ram had signed it.” This put paid to any allegation of compulsion of will.

  140. [60] In BOM v BOK and another appeal [2019] 1 SLR 349 (“BOM v BOK”), the Court of Appeal provided a useful summary on the law of undue influence (at [101]). Essentially, there are two classes of undue influence:

  141. (a) “Class 1” undue influence, also known as actual undue influence, requires the plaintiff to show that he entered into the impugned transaction because of the undue influence exerted upon him by the defendant. To do this, the plaintiff has to demonstrate that: (i) the defendant had the capacity to influence him; (ii) the influence was exercised; (iii) its exercise was undue; and (iv) its exercise brought about the transaction.

  142. (b) “Class 2” undue influence, also known as presumed undue influence, does not require the plaintiff to prove actual undue influence. Instead, it suffices for the plaintiff to show (i) that there was a relationship of trust and confidence between him and the defendant; (ii) that the relationship was such that it could be presumed that the defendant abused the plaintiff’s trust and confidence in influencing the plaintiff to enter into the impugned transaction; and (iii) that the transaction was one that calls for an explanation. This class of undue influence is further divided into “Class 2A” and “Class 2B” undue influence.

  143. (i) Under “Class 2A” undue influence, there are relationships that the law irrebuttably presumes to give rise to a relationship of trust and confidence. Once the plaintiff shows that his relationship with the wrongdoer triggers the presumption and that the impugned transaction calls for an explanation, there is a rebuttable presumption that the wrongdoer has exerted undue influence.

  144. (ii) Under “Class 2B” undue influence, the plaintiff must prove that there is a relationship of trust and confidence. If it is shown that there was such a relationship and that the transaction calls for an explanation, then there is a rebuttable presumption of undue influence.

  145. [61] In my view, both Ram and Mrs Ram failed to prove undue influence (whether actual or presumed). The evidence simply did not support their case.

  146. [62] With respect to actual undue influence, Ram and Mrs Ram relied on the same allegations that they relied on for economic duress. For the same reasons discussed above, I concluded that they did not sign the 2015 Deed under any actual undue influence.

  147. [63] As for presumed undue influence, Ram relied on both Class 2A and Class 2B undue influence. As for Mrs Ram, it was not clear if she was relying on Class 2A undue influence but it was at least clear that she did rely on Class 2B undue influence. In any event, with respect to Class 2A undue influence, in a parent-child relationship, the presumption that the parent has influence over the child arises out of the authority that a parent inherently has over his/her child, in particular a young child. There is no presumption that a child has influence over the parent, merely by reason of the parent-child relationship. Indeed, even as between an adult child and elderly or senile parents, no presumption of influence over the parents arise: Chitty on Contracts vol 1 (H G Beale gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 33rd Ed, 2018) at para 8-080.

  148. [64] Although Class 2A undue influence was not applicable, Ram and Mrs Ram could still rely on Class 2B undue influence if they could prove a relationship of trust and confidence reposed by them in Navin, and that the transaction called for an explanation.

  149. [65] However, in my judgment, the evidence showed that at the time the 2015 Deed was signed, the relationship between Ram/Mrs Ram and Navin was anything but one of trust and confidence. The MOU, signed in 2006, did not end the disputes between Ram and Navin. Instead, by the time the 2015 Deed was signed, there was palpable distrust between Ram and Navin as a result of, among other things, the disputes over the non-payment of the Annual Allowance after 2013, the Bonds and the SPA. As for Mrs Ram, there could not have been any relationship of trust and confidence between her and Navin either. By then, there were the disputes over the Annual Allowance and the SPA (in connection with which she had revoked the POA). Braj and Navin’s father-in-law had also been roped in to mediate the disputes. Even the 2015 Deed itself was stated to be a settlement of disagreements which “have created certain disharmony within the family or amongst the individual members”.

  150. [66] I therefore found that Ram and Mrs Ram failed to show that there was a relationship of trust and confidence reposed by them in Navin. Accordingly, the presumption of undue influence under Class 2B was not applicable.

  151. [67] Before me, Ram and Mrs Ram relied on the High Court’s decision in BOK v BOL and another [2017] SGHC 316 (“BOK v BOL”). In BOK v BOL, the High Court held that the doctrine of unconscionability forms part of the law of Singapore, and set out a three-stage test to determine whether a transaction is unconscionable (at [120]–[122]). First, there must be weakness on one side, which could arise from poverty, ignorance or other circumstances, like acute grief. Second, there must be exploitation of that weakness and a transaction at an undervalue would be a necessary component of this requirement. Third, upon the satisfaction of these two elements, it will be for the defendant to demonstrate that the transaction was fair, just and reasonable.

  152. [68] I concluded that there was no reason to set aside the 2015 Deed for unconscionability. Ram and Mrs Ram relied on the same allegations that they relied on for economic duress and undue influence. In my view, they had not shown that they were suffering from such a weakness as to invoke the doctrine.

  153. [69] BOM v BOK was the appeal against the High Court’s decision in BOK v BOL. The Court of Appeal’s decision was rendered after I had given my decision in the present case. In BOM v BOK, the Court of Appeal held (at [142]) that the narrow doctrine of unconscionability applies in Singapore. To invoke the doctrine, the plaintiff has to show that he was suffering from an infirmity that the other party exploited in procuring the transaction. Upon satisfaction of this requirement, the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate that the transaction was fair, just and reasonable. There is no requirement that the transaction was at an undervalue or that there was a lack of independent advice, but these are factors that the court will invariably consider. The Court of Appeal also clarified (at [141]) that the plaintiff’s infirmity must have been of sufficient gravity as to have acutely affected his ability to conserve his own interests.

  154. [70] In my view, there is nothing in the Court of Appeal’s decision in BOM v BOK that changes my conclusion that Ram and Mrs Ram had not established unconscionability.

  155. [71] Mrs Ram also relied on the doctrine of non est factum to set aside the 2015 Deed. The doctrine of non est factum operates as an exception to the general rule that a person is bound by his signature on a contractual document even if he did not fully understand its terms. Two elements need to be established for this doctrine to be invoked. First, there must be a radical difference between what was signed and what was thought to have been signed. Second, the party seeking to rely on the doctrine must prove that he took care in signing the document, that is, he must not have been negligent. See Mahidon Nichiar bte Mohd Ali and others v Dawood Sultan Kamaldin [2015] 5 SLR 62 at [119].

  156. [72] Navin brought Mr Mohan Singh, a lawyer, to the signing of the 2015 Deed. Mr Mohan Singh was the witness to the execution of the 2015 Deed by all the four parties. He also explained the 2015 Deed to Mrs Ram in Hindi. However, Mrs Ram claimed that nobody explained the deed to her. She admitted that Mr Mohan Singh was present but claimed that she could not understand him because his Hindi was poor.

  157. [73] Even if one assumed that Mrs Ram did not understand all or some of the terms of the 2015 Deed, she would not be able to rely on non est factum so long as she knew that the document was a settlement deed. I rejected Mrs Ram’s claim that she did not understand the nature of the 2015 Deed. First, the disputes between Ram and Navin had escalated and Braj and Navin’s father-in-law had been roped in to mediate. The 2015 Deed was signed shortly before the scheduled date for the meeting with Braj and Navin’s father-in-law. Ram, Mrs Ram, Navin and Mrs Navin signed the 2015 Deed. I found it unbelievable that under these circumstances, she had no inkling at all as to what she was signing. Second, Ram knew that the 2015 Deed was a settlement deed. I found it unbelievable that he would not have told Mrs Ram that it was a settlement deed.

  158. [74] In any event, the evidence showed that Mrs Ram was clearly negligent in signing the 2015 Deed. According to her evidence, she took no steps to enquire as to the nature of the document even though Ram was present. Instead, she signed the 2015 Deed because Ram had signed it. In the circumstances, I concluded that Mrs Ram could not rely on the doctrine of non est factum.

  159. [75] Ram submitted that the 2015 Deed was a family arrangement and as such, it should be set aside because Navin failed to disclose a material fact, that is, Navin failed to disclose the actual amount of Ram’s share of the proceeds from the sale of the Bonds.

  160. [76] A family arrangement is an agreement between members of the same family intended to be generally and reasonably for the benefit of the family either by compromising doubtful or disputed rights or by preserving the family property or the peace or security of the family by avoiding litigation or by saving its honour: Rajabali Jumabhoy and others v Ameerali R Jumabhoy and others [1997] 2 SLR(R) 296 (“Rajabali Jumabhoy”) (at [204]). In any family arrangement there must be honest disclosure by each party to the other of all such material facts known to him, relative to the rights and title of either, as are calculated to influence the other’s judgment in the adoption of the arrangement, and any advantage taken by either of the parties of the other’s known ignorance of such facts will render the agreement liable to be set aside: Halsbury’s Laws of England vol 18 (Butterworths, 4th Ed, 1977), at para 315.

  161. [77] Clearly, the 2015 Deed was a family arrangement as defined in Rajabali Jumabhoy. The next question was whether Navin failed to disclose a material fact.

  162. [78] As stated in [25] above, Navin instructed UBS to liquidate the Bonds in November 2014 and he held on to the sale proceeds plus interest income amounting to US$4,270,058.83. Navin claimed that the Bonds were a joint investment by Ram and him in “about equal shares” (see [21] above). As will be seen later, I found that Ram’s share of the sale proceeds was US$3,442,378.29. Navin did not disclose this to Ram. Instead, his position was that Ram’s share was less than US$1.5m.

  163. [79] Obviously, Ram’s share of the sale proceeds was material since the 2015 Deed purported to settle all the existing disputes for a sum of US$2m to be paid to Ram. Navin had therefore failed to disclose a material fact. Accordingly, I set aside the 2015 Deed.

  164. [80] Navin’s and Mrs Navin’s case was that the 2015 Deed and the September Agreement constituted the overall settlement amongst the parties. In the circumstances, having set aside the 2015 Deed, I also set aside the September Agreement. In any event, in my view, the effect of the September Agreement was merely to confirm that a full and final settlement had been reached under the 2015 Deed. The statement that the parties would retain the assets held in their respective names added nothing of significance. I would only add that even if the September Agreement survived the setting aside of the 2015 Deed, it would not have provided Navin and Mrs Navin any defence to the claims for breaches of the MOU or for the payment of Ram’s share of the proceeds of sale of the Bonds.

  165. [82] I should add that even if the 2015 Deed were not set aside, it settled only disputes which had arisen at the time that it was signed. This was because the 2015 Deed settled only the “Issues” as defined in that document, and as defined, the term “Issues” was limited to disagreements which had created disharmony within the family or amongst the individual members. At the time the 2015 Deed was signed, there were no disputes over (a) Ram’s and Mrs Ram’s right under the MOU to stay at the Poole Road property, and (b) Mrs Ram’s claim under the MOU to payment of US$1m from Navin for the acquisition of a residential property. The 2015 Deed would not have caused Ram and Mrs Ram to lose these rights in any event.

  166. The MOU

  167. Whether the MOU was intended to be legally binding

  168. [83] Navin and Mrs Navin submitted that the MOU was an informal family arrangement set out in writing, and that there was no intention to create legal relations by any party. I disagreed.

  169. [84] It is true that in social and domestic arrangements, there is a presumption that parties do not intend to create legal relations: Gay Choon Ing v Loh Sze Ti Terence Peter and another appeal [2009] 2 SLR(R) 332 (at [72]). Nevertheless, it bears reminding that the facts, context and circumstances in each case must be carefully considered. In my view, the presumption was easily rebutted in this case. An objective assessment of the facts showed that the parties clearly intended the MOU to be legally binding.

  170. [85] First, disputes had arisen between Ram and Navin over various matters. One of the more notable incidents was when Navin attempted to punch Ram during a heated quarrel. Mrs Ram managed to push Ram aside and Navin’s fist shattered a glass window instead. Mrs Ram testified that during a “big disagreement” between Ram and Navin in 2006, Navin demanded that Ram give him shares in Evergreen.

  171. [86] Kalpana and Braj had to step in to mediate and the MOU was the result of that mediation. This was the context in which the MOU came to be signed. The matters agreed upon included

  172. (a) the capital structure of Evergreen;

  173. (b) the discharge of guarantees given by Ram and Mrs Ram in connection with Evergreen;

  174. (c) Ram’s and Navin’s roles in the company and Navin’s remuneration;

  175. (d) payment of the Annual Allowance;

  176. (e) Evergreen’s continued use of the office premises which belonged to Ram; and

  177. (f) Navin’s obligation to pay Mrs Ram US$1m to acquire a residential property of her choice.

  178. An additional provision relating to Ram’s and Mrs Ram’s right to stay at the Poole Road property was hand-written in by Navin. All of these were significant matters and reflected an agreement reached between Ram/Mrs Ram and Navin to resolve their differences. Navin himself acknowledged that he “had to try to resolve it somehow with [Ram]…”. In my view, the MOU was clearly intended to be legally binding. It was not just some informal family arrangement.

  179. [87] Second, many of the terms of agreement related to the business of Evergreen. These terms were more in the nature of a commercial settlement than a domestic arrangement.

  180. [88] Third, the provision relating to Ram’s and Mrs Ram’s right to stay at the Poole Road property was significant. As will be seen later, I concluded that it was Ram who wanted to buy and who paid for the Poole Road property. Navin became the registered owner only because Ram, not being a Singapore citizen, could not buy the property in his own name. The provision was proposed by Braj to protect Ram’s and Mrs Ram’s right to stay at the Poole Road property in express terms and Navin agreed. In my view, this showed that the MOU was intended to be legally binding; Ram and Mrs Ram would not be protected otherwise. I also accepted the testimony given by Braj (who mediated the dispute together with Kalpana) that the MOU was intended to be legally binding.

  181. [89] Fourth, the disputes between Ram/Mrs Ram and Navin led to two settlement agreements being signed – the MOU and the 2015 Deed. Both came about because of disputes between Ram/Mrs Ram and Navin. Both were entered into to resolve these disputes. Navin accepted that the 2015 Deed was legally binding but claimed that the MOU was not. In my view, there was no reason why the intention would have been different for both agreements, except for the fact that Navin wanted to rely on the 2015 Deed, but not the MOU, in this action.

  182. [90] Navin argued that the MOU could not have been intended to be legally binding because not all of the terms were subsequently followed. Although this was a relevant consideration, in my view, on an overall objective assessment of the evidence, it was clear that the MOU was intended to be legally binding.

  183. [91] It was also submitted that, in any case, the MOU was superseded by the 2015 Deed. As the 2015 Deed was set aside, this submission was moot.

  184. Annual Allowance

  185. [92] Under cl 5(ix) of the MOU (see [20(d)(iii)] above), Navin was, and continues to be, obligated to provide the Annual Allowance of S$360,000 a year to Ram and Mrs Ram. It was not disputed that payment of the Annual Allowance could take the form of dividends from Evergreen or director’s fees to Ram. It was also not disputed that the Annual Allowance had not been paid since October 2013. Navin was therefore liable to pay Ram and Mrs Ram S$1,440,000 (ie, S$720,000 each) being arrears of the Annual Allowance for the years 2014–2017. Since I had set aside the 2015 Deed for material non-disclosure, I found that Navin is under a continuing obligation to pay his parents the Annual Allowance under the MOU. As provided in the MOU, the Annual Allowance is payable in three equal instalments, ie, on the first of October, February and June of each year.

  186. Mrs Ram’s claim for US$1m for a residential property

  187. [93] Under cl 5(xiii) of the MOU (see [20(d)(v)] above), Navin is obligated to acquire a residential property for Mrs Ram worth up to US$1m anywhere she desired so long as she gives notice of such desire to Navin in writing.

  188. [94] Mrs Ram submitted that paragraph 6 of a letter dated 26 August 2016 from her lawyers to Navin’s lawyers constituted the requisite notice for the purposes of cl 5(xiii) of the MOU. I disagreed. Paragraph 6 of that letter merely asked Navin to confirm that he was ready and willing to perform his obligation under cl 5(xiii).

  189. The Poole Road property

  190. The purchase of the Poole Road property

  191. [96] Ram claimed that he wanted to buy the Poole Road property but could not do so in his own name as he was not (and still is not) a Singapore citizen. Mrs Ram was also not a Singapore citizen and still is not a Singapore citizen. The property was therefore purchased in Navin’s name as he had become (and was the only one in the family who was) a Singapore citizen. Ram claimed that he paid for the property.

  192. [97] Navin, on the other hand, claimed that the Poole Road property was purchased and paid for by him.

  193. [98] I found on a balance of probabilities that it was Ram who wanted to buy the Poole Road property and that it was purchased in Navin’s name only because Ram, not being a Singapore citizen, could not buy it in his own name. I also found that it was Ram who paid for the property.

  194. [99] First, I accepted the evidence given by Braj that Ram had mentioned that he wanted to purchase a piece of landed property in Singapore for himself and Mrs Ram, and had brought Kalpana and him to view the Poole Road property before purchasing it, and that Navin was not present. Braj gave his evidence objectively. There was no motive for him to lie about this.

  195. [100] Second, two days after Navin exercised the option to purchase the Poole Road property, an application was made to the Land Dealings (Approval) Unit for approval to take the title to the property in the names of Ram (65%) and Navin (35%), with both of them holding the property as tenants-in-common (“the LDU application”). This application was rejected on 12 April 1993. An appeal was made on 24 April 1993, this time, for approval for Navin and his parents to hold the property as joint tenants (“the LDU appeal”). The appeal was also rejected. In my view, the LDU application and the LDU appeal were consistent with the fact that it was Ram who was buying the property. In particular, I noted the following:

  196. (a) Under the LDU application and the LDU appeal, Navin’s interest in the property was to be only 35% and 33.3% respectively. This was inconsistent with Navin’s claim that he bought the property by himself. Navin’s explanation was that Ram wanted to co-invest in the property. I rejected Navin’s explanation. Navin had no credible explanation for not having included this explanation in his AEIC.

  197. (b) The LDU application expressly stated that the Poole Road property was intended to be used as a family residence. This was more consistent with Ram buying the property as Navin was not married then.

  198. [102] In his AEIC, Navin claimed that the funds that he used to pay for the Poole Road property were from “a combination of [his] overseas brokerage business/investments and salary/fees/loans from Milansar Pte Ltd (“Milansar”) and Evergreen. Milansar was a company that Ram incorporated in Singapore in 1981; it was eventually closed down in December 2007. I did not believe Navin’s claim for the following reasons:

  199. (a) Navin claimed that he was able to pay for the property as he “had already been running the family business since 1991” and had “helped to increase the annual turnover of [Evergreen] from about SGD6 million in 1990 to SGD30 million in 1993”. However, this was at odds with the fact that Navin became a director of Evergreen only in September 1994. Further, it was clear from the evidence that the fact that Navin started working in Evergreen in 1991could not explain his alleged ability to pay for the Poole Road property:

  200. (i) Under cross-examination, Navin agreed that he was not paid any salary in Evergreen or Milansar until 1994. In any event, the total commissions and salaries paid by Evergreen for the years from 1991 to 1993 were only S$21,179 for 1991, S$18,964 for 1992 and S$51,405 for 1993.

  201. (ii) Further, Evergreen’s profits before tax for the financial years from 1991 to 1993 were a loss of S$338 for 1991, a profit of S$15,677 for 1992 and a profit of S$43,656 for 1993. In fact, Evergreen’s profits before tax for the years from 1994 to 1999 were also nowhere near US$300,000 a year except for 1997 (S$380,280). Evergreen’s profits could not have funded the purchase of the property.

  202. (b) Navin also claimed that he was carrying out his own brokerage business selling tyres and yarn to Afghanistan and that he earned about US$300,000 to US$400,000 in commissions per year. Navin claimed that when he exercised the option to purchase the Poole Road property in 1993, he had some US$800,000 which he had earned from his own brokerage business from 1991 to 1993. According to Navin, the moneys were brought into Singapore through his account with UCO Bank. However, he did not produce any bank statements to support his claim. The issue as to who paid for the Poole Road property was not a new issue; the statement of claim pleaded that Ram provided the funds for the purchase of the property. Navin admitted that he had not written to UCO Bank for his account statements and could not explain why he had not done so. I also noted that Navin did not give any details of his own brokerage business in his AEIC.

  203. (c) Navin did not produce any evidence of his earnings in Milansar or any of the loans which he claimed to have taken from Milansar and Evergreen to pay for the Poole Road property.

  204. (d) Mr Moti Vaswani (“Moti”) gave evidence on behalf of Navin. Moti was the lawyer who handled the conveyancing for the Poole Road property. In his oral testimony, he said that he could not remember details of the purchase. However, when he was asked whether it was Ram who paid for the property, his immediate answer was that Navin was “a NS person with a salary of $200.” When pressed for a direct answer, Moti finally said he could not recall who gave him the payment. Moti did not say that Navin paid for the property. On the contrary, Moti’s first answer showed that he did not come across anything that suggested that Navin paid for the property. In my view, if it had been clear that Navin, as “a NS person with a salary of $200”, was paying for the property, surely Moti would have remembered.

  205. [103] Fourth, the S$2.3m mortgage loan included a S$1.8m overdraft facility in Ram’s and Navin’s names. There was no reason why Ram had to be a borrower if Navin had the funds and earning capacity that he claimed he had. According to Navin, he gave the bank the details of his brokerage business and the commissions he was earning. Navin also claimed that he exercised the option to purchase on the basis of UOB’s in-principle approval for the loan (which included Ram as a co-borrower for S$1.8m) without first obtaining Ram’s consent. I found this claim too incredible to believe. Finally, I also noted that Navin was not forthcoming in his evidence about the overdraft facility to Ram and him. It was not mentioned in his AEIC. In his oral testimony, Navin at first said that the overdraft facility was against his account. It was only after he was questioned further that he admitted that it was an overdraft facility given to Ram and him.

  206. [104] It is true that Ram did not produce evidence of his payments towards the purchase price of the Poole Road property. However, the evidence gave rise to a strong inference that he was the one who made the payments. The burden therefore shifted to Navin to prove his claim that he paid for the Poole Road property. Without some other more objective evidence, I was not persuaded that Navin had discharged his burden of proof.

  207. Life interest / contractual licence

  208. [105] Ram pleaded that he allowed the Poole Road property to be registered in Navin’s name and paid for the purchase thereof in reliance on the common understanding among Ram, Mrs Ram and Navin (“the common understanding”) that Ram and Mrs Ram would have a “life interest” in the Poole Road property. In his closing submissions, Ram submitted that the life interest meant that Mrs Ram and he had an irrevocable right to reside rent-free at the Poole Road property for life.

  209. [106] Ram pleaded in the alternative that under the MOU, Mrs Ram and he were granted an irrevocable contractual licence to occupy the Poole Road property with full comforts for the duration of their lives.

  210. [107] Mrs Ram pleaded an irrevocable contractual licence to stay with full comforts at the Poole Road property for her lifetime, by reason of the common understanding pleaded in Ram’s statement of claim and/or pursuant to the MOU.

  211. [108] Both Ram and Mrs Ram sought the following reliefs:

  212. (a) A declaration that they are entitled to a right of occupation of the Poole Road property for life with full comforts.

  213. (b) Further or alternatively, a declaration that Navin holds the Poole Road property on remedial constructive trust for Ram and Mrs Ram.

  214. (d) Damages in lieu of specific performance of the contractual licence under the MOU (in Ram’s case) and under the common understanding and/or MOU (in Mrs Ram’s case).

  215. Common understanding

  216. [109] Neither Ram nor Mrs Ram adduced, in their respective AEICs, any evidence of the common understanding that was alleged to have arisen before completion of the purchase of the Poole Road property in Navin’s name. There was no evidence that this common understanding was even discussed. Ram and Mrs Ram may have had the expectation that Navin, as their son, would not deny them the right to stay at the property. However, such an expectation on the part of Ram and/or Mrs Ram did not constitute the alleged common understanding.

  217. [110] I therefore found that there was no common understanding that gave rise to a life interest. Besides, the relief sought appeared to relate only to the contractual licence under the MOU since the common understanding, as pleaded, had no reference to “full comforts”.

  218. Contractual licence under the MOU

  219. [111] Under cl 5(xvii) of the MOU (see [20(d)(vi)] above), Ram and Mrs Ram “have absolute discretion of right of stay with full comforts in the Singapore residence for their entire lives”. Braj proposed this clause. Navin admitted that he wrote this clause into the MOU and that the intent was to provide his parents with a place to stay at the Poole Road property with full comforts.

  220. [112] A licence in relation to land is a mere permission which makes it lawful for the licensee to do what would otherwise be a trespass. Such a licence is merely a defence to an action in tort and confers no estate or interest in land: Charles Harpum, Stuart Bridge & Martin Dixon, Megarry & Wade: The Law of Real Property (Sweet & Maxwell, 8th Ed, 2012) at para 34-001. A contractual licence is a contractual right, as a result of which the revocability of the licence must rest on the terms of the contract, express or implied: Tan Sook Yee, Tang Hang Wu and Kelvin F K Low, Tan Sook Yee’s Principles of Singapore Land Law (LexisNexis, 3rd Ed, 2009) (“Principles of Singapore Land Law”) at paras 19.7 and 19.31.

  221. [113] Navin’s case was that the contractual licence under the MOU was subject to an implied term that Ram/Mrs Ram did not misbehave in such a way as would make it unreasonable for them to insist on staying at the property.

  222. Revocation of the contractual licence

  223. [116] In my judgment, Ram breached the Implied Term. The CCTV recordings showed the following:

  224. (a) On 13 April 2016, Ram was walking around the house carrying a knife and dressed only in a singlet and his underwear. There was no evidence of him looking for Mrs Navin or threatening her with the knife and I accepted Ram’s evidence that he was bringing the knife to cut a rope. Mrs Ram testified that Ram was in his underwear because he had taken off his “sarong” after he had slipped and his “sarong” got wet. However, that was no reason for Ram to walk around the house in his underwear when Mrs Navin was around.

  225. (b) On 17 May 2016, Ram kicked at Navin’s car (which was parked in the driveway) and/or the domestic helper. According to Ram, his elder brother and sister-in-law could not leave after their visit, because neither Mrs Navin nor the domestic helpers wanted to unlock the main gate. One of the domestic helpers, one Ms Sunanda, subsequently “grudgingly unlocked the gate using a remote control”. Ram claimed that as he was walking out to apologise to his guests, Sunanda “inexplicably opened the door of one of the cars which blocked” Ram’s way. However, the CCTV recording merely showed Sunanda opening the car door and looking for something in the car. Ram was nowhere near at this time. Just as she was done, Ram walked up to the car and kicked the car and/or Sunanda. Suannda tried to move away but Ram continued behaving aggressively towards her. The CCTV recording was clear proof that Ram’s allegation was pure fabrication.

  226. (c) On the same day, Ram kicked the door to Navin’s room. Navin was apparently not home at the time. Mrs Navin locked herself in the guestroom, with her son. Ram started banging and violently kicking the door to the guestroom, all the while hurling verbal abuse.

  227. (d) On 31 July 2016, Ram reacted to something that Navin said by pulling down his pants and exposing himself to Navin in the presence of Navin’s wife and son. Ram claimed that Navin had told him “I will f--- you”. Navin denied this. There was no voice recording. However, Ram’s behaviour was simply inexcusable.

  228. [117] The CCTV recordings confirmed Ram’s propensity towards violent behaviour and verbal abuse whilst living at the Poole Road property. It was clear to me that Ram had, by his conduct, breached the Implied Term and that Navin was fully entitled to revoke Ram’s licence to stay at the Poole Road property. Navin and his family cannot be expected to have to put up with Ram’s behaviour at the Poole Road property.

  229. [118] As for Mrs Ram, it was clear that she had not breached the Implied Term; neither was it alleged that she had breached the Implied Term. Navin had not prohibited her from staying at the Poole Road property either. Mrs Ram did not want to return to the Poole Road property after both Ram and she were arrested by the police on 1 August 2016. In her AEIC, she disowned Navin. It was Mrs Ram’s own decision not to continue staying at the Poole Road property. On the evidence before me, I was compelled to find that Navin did not breach the contractual licence where Mrs Ram was concerned.

  230. Estoppel

  231. [119] Ram pleaded that Navin was estopped from denying the life interest or revoking Ram’s and Mrs Ram’s licence to reside at the Poole Road property. As pleaded, the estoppel was based on the common understanding as to the alleged life interest. Since I found that there was no common understanding, the estoppel plea failed. In any event, the estoppel plea did not assist Ram’s case. If Ram succeeded in establishing the common understanding, that would give rise to an irrevocable right to stay at the Poole Road property and the estoppel plea would have been unnecessary. On the other hand, if Ram failed to establish the common understanding, the estoppel plea would likewise fail.

  232. Remedial constructive trust

  233. [120] I dismissed Ram’s and Mrs Ram’s claims for a declaration that Navin holds the Poole Road property on remedial constructive trust for them. The basis for these claims had not been established, whether in their pleadings or closing submissions. In fact, in his oral testimony, Ram confirmed that the only claim he was making with respect to the Poole Road property was a right to stay and nothing more.

  234. Conspiracy to evict Ram and Mrs Ram

  235. [122] Both Ram and Mrs Ram claimed that Navin and Mrs Navin conspired to remove or constructively evict them from the Poole Road property by lawful and/or unlawful means. Ram and Mrs Ram pleaded numerous alleged breaches by Navin “acting by himself and/or in concert with [Mrs Navin]” as evidence of the alleged constructive eviction. It appeared therefore that the focus was on unlawful means conspiracy.

  236. [123] I was not satisfied that Ram and Mrs Ram had proved the alleged breaches.

  237. (a) Ram/Mrs Ram alleged that Navin/Mrs Navin instructed their domestic helpers and one driver not to serve them and consequently, Mrs Ram had to do her own chores. In my view, it was more likely that, as Navin and Mrs Navin claimed, the domestic helpers and driver were simply reluctant to serve Ram and Mrs Ram, in view of Ram’s conduct.

  238. (b) I rejected Ram/Mrs Ram’s allegation that they had no access to the common areas in the house because they were locked, or that they were effectively confined to their bedrooms. The CCTV recordings showed Ram and Mrs Ram wandering freely about the house. Ram had no hesitation walking around the house holding a knife and dressed only in his singlet and underwear. This was not evidence of a man confined to his bedroom.

  239. (c) I rejected Ram/Mrs Ram’s bare allegations that they were not permitted assistance by external service providers to attend to maintenance issues in their bedroom, that Navin/Mrs Navin controlled their mail, and that they did not have the keys to the Poole Road property and if they left the house together, there was a “real likelihood” that Navin/Mrs Navin would lock them out.

  240. (d) I also did not accept Ram’s bare assertion that Navin threatened him in November 2014 that Mrs Navin would falsely accuse him of molest if he returned to the Poole Road property. No such accusation has been made even though Ram had subsequently returned to the house.

  241. [124] Ram/Mrs Ram also complained that Navin/Mrs Navin kept their children away from them. In my view, even if Navin/Mrs Navin kept their children away from Ram/Mrs Ram, given the circumstances of this case, I did not think that this sufficient to show a conspiracy to constructively evict Ram/Mrs Ram.

  242. [125] Finally, Ram/Mrs Ram complained that Navin/Mrs Navin called the police on at least five occasions making false accusations against Ram/Mrs Ram. In his statement of claim, Ram set out four occasions when the police were called. I did not think that the calls to the police showed a conspiracy to constructively evict Ram/Mrs Ram. These calls were in response to certain incidents, two of which had to do with Ram’s conduct.

  243. [126] As stated earlier, on 31 July 2016, Ram had exposed himself to Navin and his wife and son. The police were called and Ram was advised to leave the property. Ram returned the next day and Navin called the police again. Both Ram and Mrs Ram were arrested and they spent the night in the police lock-up. Navin testified that Ram was arrested because he refused to leave and kept insisting that the police should arrest him instead. According to Navin, Mrs Ram, being the dutiful wife, followed Ram to the police station. Ram and Mrs Ram disputed Navin’s evidence and produced evidence that showed that both of them were charged with criminal trespass. . The reason for the arrest was not clear and regardless of the reason, one might wonder how Navin could have left Ram, and in particular Mrs Ram, to spend the night in the police lock-up. It was one thing to call the police to tell Ram to leave the premises; it was altogether a different thing to let Ram and Mrs Ram spend the night in the police lock-up without trying to have them released on bail. Nevertheless, I did not think that this incident therefore meant that there was a conspiracy to constructively evict them.

  244. [127] I therefore dismissed the claim for conspiracy to injure. Ram/Mrs Ram had not proved that there was an agreement between Navin and Mrs Navin to carry out the alleged acts with a view to constructively evict them from the Poole Road property. Navin/Mrs Navin may have been prepared to take advantage of Ram’s conduct (such as when he exposed himself) and call the police; however, the evidence overall fell short of a conspiracy.

  245. Conversion and detinue

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