High Court · Decided 3 September 2019
BXH v BXI
Feedback & support[2019] SGHC 141 · Case no. Originating Summons No 1224 of 2017
✱ What happened, in plain English
There is no plain-English summary of this judgment yet.
Ask about this judgment →Laws this judgment relies on
Grounds of decision
Official text from eLitigation
Introduction
- [1]
[1] By this application, the plaintiff seeks to set aside an arbitral award issued in favour of the defendant. The plaintiff brings this application under Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (“the Model Law”).
- [2]
[2] I have dismissed the plaintiff’s application. The plaintiff has appealed against my decision. I now set out my reasons.
Brief factual background
- [3]
[3] The plaintiff and the defendant are both Hong Kong companies. The plaintiff’s business is distributing and remarketing the defendant’s consumer goods in Russia. The defendant’s business is designing, developing, manufacturing and selling consumer goods. The defendant is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a Singapore company which I shall call “the Parent Company”.
- [4]
[4] The defendant lodged its notice of arbitration with the SIAC in October 2015. In it, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff owed it a total of US$36.4m being the sums due to the defendant on 106 unpaid invoices for goods sold and delivered and finance charges accruing on those invoices.
- [5]
[5] The plaintiff rejected the tribunal’s jurisdiction from the outset of the arbitration. The SIAC constituted the tribunal in April 2016 (in the circumstances which I set out at [249]–[255] below) and left it to the tribunal to determine whether it had jurisdiction. The plaintiff thereupon declined to participate any further in the arbitration. The tribunal held an evidential hearing in May 2017 in the plaintiff’s absence and issued its final award in July 2017. The tribunal’s award addressed both the plaintiff’s objection to jurisdiction as well as the merits of the defendant’s substantive claim against the plaintiff. The tribunal found in favour of the defendant on both aspects.
- [6]
[6] The plaintiff’s primary argument before me is that the award should be set aside under Art 34(2)(a)(i) of the Model Law because the tribunal lacked jurisdiction to determine the dispute between the parties. Jurisdiction is in issue because the contract in which the arbitration agreement is found is not a contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. That original contract is, instead, one between the plaintiff and the Parent Company. The defendant claims both its substantive rights against the plaintiff and its right to resolve that claim by way of arbitration as the result of a series of subsequent assignments and novations.
- [7]
[7] The plaintiff’s alternative argument is that the award should be set aside under Art 34(2)(a)(iv) of the Model Law. The plaintiff argues that, even if the tribunal had jurisdiction, the composition of the tribunal was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties. The crux of the plaintiff’s argument on this ground is that the tribunal constituted to determine the parties’ dispute comprised a sole arbitrator even though their arbitration agreement stipulates that it should comprise three arbitrators.
- [8]
[8] I shall deal with the plaintiff’s two grounds in turn. I begin with the issue of jurisdiction.
The eight contracts
- [9]
[9] Determining the plaintiff’s challenge to jurisdiction involves an analysis of the parties’ complicated legal relationship. For present purposes, that relationship is set out in eight related contracts. Some of these contracts are bipartite, some are tripartite and one is between four parties.
- [10]
[10] In brief, as a result of these contracts, at various times: (a) the defendant assumed the Parent Company’s rights and obligations to the plaintiff; (b) a third party (which I shall call “the Factor”) became entitled to receive payment for some of the defendant’s goods; and (c) a Russian corporation (which I shall refer to as the “Russian Corporation”) became obliged to make payment for some of the defendant’s goods. Establishing whether the tribunal has jurisdiction therefore involves tracing the parties’ substantive rights and obligations as well as the procedural right to commence arbitration against the plaintiff through this matrix of eight contracts.
- [11]
[11] The following table enumerates each of these eight contracts, setting out the name by which I shall refer to it in this judgment, the date of each contract and the parties to each contract:
I now describe each of these eight contracts in more detail.
1. The Distributor Agreement
- [12]
[12] In December 2010, the plaintiff and the Parent Company entered the Distributor Agreement. The Distributor Agreement authorised the plaintiff to market and sell the Parent Company’s goods and services in Russia. The plaintiff began to purchase goods and services from the Parent Company under the Distributor Agreement in and after December 2010.
- [13]
[13] Clause 25.9 of the Distributor Agreement is an arbitration agreement between the defendant and the Parent Company. Clause 25.9 is of central importance in this application. I therefore now set it out in full:
- [14]
[14] It is the defendant’s contention that all of the Parent Company’s rights and obligations under the Distributor Agreement – both its substantive and its procedural rights – were novated to the defendant under the next contract in the series, which I describe at [17]–[20] below. The tribunal accepted the defendant’s contention.
- [15]
[15] A complication in this case – and another point on which the plaintiff relies to argue that the tribunal has no jurisdiction – is that the Distributor Agreement expressly provides that it is to expire on 26 December 2012. I return to the significance of this point at [72]–[79] below.
2. The Transition Agreement
- [16]
[16] In January 2013, the Parent Company and the defendant entered into the Transition Agreement. The objective of the Transition Agreement was to transfer to the defendant all of the Parent Company’s assets and liabilities. Thus, the Transition Agreement expressly obliges the Parent Company to “assign or novate, as applicable, and transfer all its rights and obligations under the Existing Agreements to [the defendant] as per the Effective Date”. The Transition Agreement expressly names the Distributor Agreement as being within the meaning of the defined term “Existing Agreements”.
3. The Assignment and Novation Agreement
- [17]
[17] A few days after the Transition Agreement, the plaintiff, the defendant and the Parent Company entered into the Assignment and Novation Agreement. The Assignment and Novation Agreement follows up on the Transition Agreement by novating the Parent Company’s entire legal relationship with the plaintiff under the Distributor Agreement to the defendant.
- [18]
[18] Clause 1 of the Assignment and Novation Agreement provides as follows:
The Assignment and Novation Agreement expressly names the Distributor Agreement as being within the meaning of the defined term “Agreements”.
- [19]
[19] Following the Assignment and Novation Agreement, the defendant began invoicing the plaintiff for goods supplied. The earliest invoice from the defendant to the plaintiff is dated 7 February 2013. During a brief transition period, ending with an invoice dated 16 February 2013, the Parent Company continued to invoice the plaintiff for goods as well. All invoices to the plaintiff after that date were issued only by the defendant.
- [20]
[20] The defendant contends that the Assignment and Novation Agreement, and in particular cl 1 of that agreement, novated to the defendant all of the Parent Company’s rights and obligations under the Distributor Agreement including the right to submit disputes with the plaintiff “arising out of or in connection with” the Distributor Agreement to arbitration under cl 25.9. The plaintiff contends for a number of reasons that the Assignment and Novation Agreement failed to have that effect.
3. The Participation Agreement
- [21]
[21] In early October 2013, the defendant and the Factor entered into the Participation Agreement. The Participation Agreement established a factoring arrangement under which the defendant was obliged to offer the Factor an option to buy all of the invoices which the defendant issued to its customers based in Russia, including the plaintiff. I shall refer to invoices in this class as “Russian invoices”. A factoring arrangement such as this offered the defendant the usual commercial advantages of reducing its payment collection times and improving its short-term cash flow.
- [22]
[22] Clause 2.9.6 the Participation Agreement provides that, if the Factor exercises its option to purchase a particular invoice from the defendant, the defendant is obliged to transfer to the Factor ownership of the invoice and the invoice’s “Associated Rights”. The Participation Agreement defines “Associated Rights” to mean, among other things, “all [the defendant]’s rights by law as an unpaid vendor or under the sale contract”. I set out cl 2.9.6 in full at [130] below.
- [23]
[23] As a result of the Participation Agreement, after 2 October 2013, the invoices which the defendant issued to the plaintiff and which the Factor had purchased were endorsed with a caution reminding the plaintiff that its debt to the defendant represented by the invoice could be discharged only by payment directly to the Factor (“the Caution”):
- [24]
[24] Pursuant to the Participation Agreement, the Factor purchased from the defendant invoices issued to the plaintiff worth the total sum of US$27.45m.
4. The Gold Plan Agreement
- [25]
[25] In November 2013, shortly after the Factor entered into the Participation Agreement with the defendant, the Factor entered the Gold Plan Agreement with the plaintiff. The Gold Plan Agreement was a financing agreement under which the Factor extended trade credit to the plaintiff on invoices which the Factor had purchased from the defendant.
- [27]
[27] The plaintiff contends that the effect of the Participation Agreement and the Gold Plan Agreement read together is that the right to receive payment under any invoice purchased by the Factor and the right to commence arbitration to recover those debts have all been assigned by the defendant to the Factor and can no longer be asserted by the defendant against the plaintiff.
6. The Debt Transfer Agreement
- [28]
[28] In December 2014, the plaintiff, the defendant and the Russian corporation entered into the Debt Transfer Agreement. Under the Debt Transfer Agreement, the Russian Corporation undertook the obligation to pay the debt which was due under a number of invoices which the plaintiff had failed to pay. The maturity dates for these invoices fell between 21 September 2014 and 12 December 2014. The parties refer to the debt arising from these invoices as “Open Debt”. The Open Debt amounts to a total sum of US$32.3m.
- [29]
[29] The objective of the Debt Transfer Agreement is a matter in contention. Certain clauses suggest that the parties intended to novate to the Russian Corporation the plaintiff’s obligation to pay the Open Debt, completely extinguishing the plaintiff’s obligation to do so. However, another provision of the Debt Transfer Agreement appears to be inconsistent with that intention, as will be seen later.
7. The Open Debt Agreement
- [30]
[30] Shortly after entering into the Debt Transfer Agreement, the three parties to that agreement – the plaintiff, the defendant, and the Russian Corporation – entered into the Open Debt Agreement with the Factor.
- [31]
[31] The Open Debt Agreement is brief. It begins by adverting to the Debt Transfer Agreement and then states in its entirety as follows:
- [32]
[32] The Open Debt Agreement is closely connected to the Debt Transfer Agreement. That is clear from cl 1 of the Open Debt Agreement and the timing of its execution. The objective of this agreement appears to be to dovetail the Debt Transfer Agreement with the Participation Agreement and the Gold Plan Agreement by obliging the Russian Corporation to pay the Open Debt to the Factor rather than to the defendant and by obliging the Factor to apply any payments from the Russian Corporation to reduce the Open Debt.
- [33]
[33] It is not disputed that the Russian Corporation has paid only part of the Open Debt to the Factor. As at May 2015, the outstanding Open Debt stood at US$7.07m.
8. The Buy Back Agreement
- [34]
[34] In 2014 or 2015, the Factor decided to withdraw from business connected to Russia. As a result, the defendant agreed to buy back from the Factor all of the Russian invoices which the Factor had purchased from the defendant under the Participation Agreement but which the defendant’s customers had not yet paid. As a result, in April 2015, the defendant and the Factor entered into the Buy Back Agreement.
- [35]
[35] Under the Buy Back Agreement, the defendant repurchased from the Factor all of the invoices which the defendant’s Russian customers had failed to pay the Factor as at that date for a total of US$43.9m.
- [36]
[36] The defendant contends that it carried out a second buy back in December 2015 of another batch of invoices owed by the plaintiff with a face value of US$2.2m. According to the defendant, the second buy back covers additional invoices which were also outstanding at the time of the Buy Back Agreement but which the Factor had inadvertently failed to include in that agreement.
- [37]
[37] The plaintiff rejects the defendant’s contention on the Buy Back Agreement. It suffices for now to note that the plaintiff’s contention is that the Buy Back Agreement read with the Gold Plan Agreement was not a repurchase of any invoices by the defendant, and does not transmit back to the defendant the debts comprised in those invoices or the right to commence arbitration against the plaintiff to recover those debts. The plaintiff further argues that it was not given notice of any buy back arrangement.
Primary ground: jurisdiction
Classification of the debts
- [38]
[38] The defendant’s claim against the plaintiff is based on 106 invoices which the parties have called invoices C1 to C106. The underlying matrix of contracts suggests that these 106 unpaid invoices can be divided into two main categories in two ways: based on whether or not the invoices were purchased by the Factor (see [21] above) and based on whether or not the invoices are part of the Open Debt (see [28] above). The resulting four-fold categorisation of the invoices can be summarised in the following table:
Not part of the
Open Debt
(Debt 1)
Part of the
Open Debt
(Debt 2)
Not purchased by the Factor
(Debt A)
Debt 1A(C86 – C106)Value: US$8.95m
Debt 2A (N.A.)
Purchased by
the Factor
(Debt B)
Debt 1B(C3 – C6, C13, C18, C28, C30 – C85)Value: US$20.38m
Debt 2B(C7 – C12, C14 – C17, C19 – C27, C29)Value: US$7.07m
- [39]
[39] As can be seen from the table, what I shall call Debt 1 comprises those invoices that are not part of the Open Debt. Subject to the qualification in [41] below, Debt 1 can be further divided into two subcategories:
(a) Debt 1A: This category comprises invoices which the Factor never purchased from the defendant. Accordingly, these invoices were not endorsed with the Caution (see [23] above) and were always payable by the plaintiff only to the defendant. The Debt 1A invoices are invoices C86 to C106. They amount in total to US$8.95m.
(b) Debt 1B: This category comprises invoices which the Factor did purchase from the defendant, but which the defendant alleges it bought back from the Factor. These invoices were endorsed with the Caution. The Debt 1B invoices are invoices C3 to C6, C13, C18, C28, and C30 to C85. They amount in total to US$20.38m.
- [40]
[40] Subject again to the qualification in [41] below, Debt 2 can also be divided into two subcategories:
(a) Debt 2A: This category comprises the Open Debt invoices which the Factor never purchased from the defendant. There are, in fact, no invoices and no debts in this category. There is therefore no need to analyse this category further.
(b) Debt 2B: This category comprises Open Debt invoices which the Factor did purchase from the defendant but which the defendant alleges it bought back from the Factor. The Debt 2B invoices therefore contain the Caution. These invoices are C7 to C12, C14 to C17, C19 to C27 and C29. They amount in total to US$7.07m.
- [41]
[41] This categorisation is subject to one qualification. The tribunal dealt with invoices C94 and C95 as part of Debt A. Those two invoices, however, do contain the Caution. The plaintiff’s case is therefore that the Factor purchased these two invoices and that they therefore should form part of Debt B. In this judgment, I shall accordingly treat invoices C94 and C95 together with Debt B. All further references to Debt B in this judgment should be taken as including invoices C94 and C95 and all further references to Debt A should be taken as excluding those two invoices.
- [42]
[42] The bulk of the defendant’s claim against the plaintiff in the arbitration is Debt 1B. The parties therefore consider the Debt 1B invoices to be archetypical of their transactions.
The parties’ arguments
- [43]
[43] The parties’ arguments on the jurisdiction of the tribunal address the different categories of debt separately, though there is some degree of overlap. I start by summarising the arguments which apply to all categories of debt, before turning to the arguments that apply only to the invoices purchased by the Factor, ie Debt B. I then conclude by summarising the arguments which apply only to the remaining invoices, ie Debt A.
The right was never transferred to the defendant
- [44]
[44] The plaintiff’s starting point is to deny that it is a party to any arbitration agreement with the defendant at all. In particular, the plaintiff argues that it is not bound by the Parent Company’s assignment and novation of the Distributor Agreement to the defendant. It rests this argument on several grounds:
(a) First, the Distributor Agreement had expired before the parties entered into the Assignment and Novation Agreement. The result is that the Distributor Agreement had no contractual force on 25 January 2013, which is when the Parent Company purported to novate it to the defendant.
(b) Second, neither the Parent Company nor the defendant gave notice of the assignment or novation to the plaintiff.
(d) Fourth, even if the Distributor Agreement governs the defendant’s substantive claim, it does not contain a valid arbitration agreement. That is because there is an inconsistency between cl 25.9 and cl 25.8 of the Distributor Agreement, which provides for the exclusive jurisdiction of the Singapore courts.
- [45]
[45] The defendant’s arguments in response can be summarised as follows.
- [46]
[46] In response to the plaintiff’s first argument on the expiry of the Distributor Agreement:
(a) The Distributor Agreement did not expire on 26 December 2012. The Distributor Agreement, properly construed, provides for automatic, annual renewal.
(b) Even if the Distributor Agreement did expire before the parties entered into the Assignment and Novation Agreement, an implied contract by conduct arose between the parties on terms identical to those set out in writing in the Distributor Agreement.
(c) The plaintiff is estopped from denying that the Distributor Agreement, and by extension the arbitration agreement in cl 25.9, is in force between the parties.
(d) The principle of separability means that the arbitration agreement in cl 25.9 survives the expiry of the Distributor Agreement.
- [47]
[47] The defendant also argues that it gave the requisite notice to the plaintiff that the Distributor Agreement had been assigned and novated to it. It relies on an email sent by the defendant to the plaintiff and to the defendant’s other business partners on 14 December 2012, which stated that “starting from 14 January 2013, [the defendant’s group] will move its operations from Singapore to Hong Kong”.
- [48]
[48] The defendant contends that each individual sale of goods to the plaintiff was governed by the entire contractual framework set out in the Distributor Agreement and the subsequent agreements. Accordingly, the arbitration agreement in the Distributor Agreement did apply to the defendant’s claims under the invoices it issued to the plaintiff.
- [49]
[49] Finally, the defendant argues that there is no contradiction between cll 25.9 and 25.8 of the Distributor Agreement. The clauses can be read together such that the arbitration agreement in cl 25.9 governs the resolution of all disputes arising under the Distributor Agreement while the jurisdiction clause is merely the parties’ submission to the Singapore courts’ supervisory jurisdiction over any such arbitration.
The defendant lost the right and never regained it
- [50]
[50] The plaintiff’s argument in relation to Debt B specifically is that the defendant assigned the right to commence arbitration to recover Debt B to the Factor and that that right remained thereafter vested in the Factor and not in the defendant.
- [51]
[51] The plaintiff accepts that an arbitration agreement can be assigned and that the assignee thereby obtains the right to commence arbitration to enforce the substantive rights supported by the arbitration agreement. It relies in particular on cl 2.9.6 of the Participation Agreement to argue that because arbitral clauses are universal rights, they fall within the scope of “Associated Rights” and were thus transferred from the defendant to the Factor.
- [52]
[52] Therefore, according to the plaintiff, the defendant effected a legal assignment of the arbitration agreement to the Factor, which resulted in the defendant divesting entirely the right to commence arbitration in favour of the Factor. This, it says, is the combined effect of the Participation Agreement, the Gold Plan Agreement and the Caution endorsed on the invoices.
- [53]
[53] The defendant’s main argument in response is that even if it assigned its rights under the arbitration agreement to the Factor, those rights returned to the defendant when the Factor assigned Debt B back to the defendant under the Buy Back Agreement.
- [54]
[54] The plaintiff denies that the Factor assigned Debt B back to the defendant. It argues, first, that the Buy Back Agreement was not intended to assign Debt B back to the defendant. As a result, the Factor remained entitled to receive payment of Debt B pursuant to the Participation Agreement. The plaintiff relies in particular on cl 3 of the Buy Back Agreement which states that the Factor “will continue to collect payments (if any) from or on behalf of … [the plaintiff]”.
- [55]
[55] Even if the Factor did assign Debt B back to the defendant under the Buy Back Agreement, the plaintiff argues that this assignment did not take effect as a legal assignment under s 4(8) of the Civil Law Act (Cap 43, 1999 Rev Ed) (“CLA”) because the plaintiff as the obligor received no notice of any such assignment. The assignment, if it took place at all, was therefore at best merely an equitable assignment. The plaintiff then argues, first, that an equitable assignment is effective to assign substantive rights but not the right to arbitrate. In the alternative, the plaintiff argues that an equitable assignee has no right to commence arbitration against the plaintiff in its sole name, but is instead obliged to join the equitable assignor – in this case, the Factor – as a co-claimant.
- [56]
[56] Finally, for the invoices which the defendant claims to have repurchased in the second buy back, the plaintiff argues that the defendant bought these back only after the arbitration had commenced. Accordingly, the defendant did not hold the rights represented by these invoices when it commenced this arbitration in October 2015.
The plaintiff is not the correct respondent
- [57]
[57] In relation to Debt 2B specifically, the plaintiff argues in addition that it novated Debt 2B to the Russian Corporation. It submits that this is the effect of the Debt Transfer Agreement, which is consistent with the Open Debt Agreement. Accordingly, the proper respondent to any claim for Debt 2B is the Russian Corporation and not the plaintiff.
- [58]
[58] The defendant rejects the plaintiff’s interpretation of the Debt Transfer Agreement. The defendant contends, based on the background to this agreement, that it was not intended to transfer the obligation to pay Debt 2B from the plaintiff to the Russian Corporation. The defendant also contends that, based on the express terms of this agreement, the plaintiff is released from its obligations to the defendant only when the Russian Corporation makes full payment to the defendant. This, it submits, is inconsistent with a novation of debts.
The plaintiff cannot claim sums due on debit notes issued unilaterally
- [59]
[59] I now consider Debt 1A. This comprises invoices which are not part of the Open Debt and which the Factor did not purchase. The plaintiff’s chief complaint is that these invoices are not contractual in nature but are in fact debit notes issued unilaterally by the defendant to the plaintiff and which therefore do not give rise to any contractual obligation to pay.
- [60]
[60] The plaintiff also raises specific arguments in relation to specific invoices:
(a) in relation to invoices C86 to C93 and invoice C106 (totalling US$0.99m), the plaintiff argues that these debts were extinguished by December 2014; and
(b) in relation to invoices C100 to C105 (totalling US$4.87m), that these are debts owed by another entity entirely.
- [61]
[61] For these reasons, the plaintiff submits that the tribunal has no jurisdiction over the defendant’s claim for Debt 1A as well.
- [62]
[62] The defendant argues that the Debt 1A invoices – being in form debit notes replacing original invoices – are valid demands for payment based on its internal accounting practices. It therefore submits that a dispute over Debt 1A is within the tribunal’s jurisdiction.
The tribunal’s findings
- [63]
[63] The tribunal’s findings can be summarised as follows:
(a) The Distributor Agreement did not expire on 26 December 2012.
(b) The defendant was the correct claimant in the arbitration because the Assignment and Novation Agreement validly novated the Parent Company’s rights and obligations under the Distributor Agreement to the defendant.
(c) The dispute set out in the defendant’s Notice of Arbitration did not arise under the Gold Plan Agreement but instead arose under the Distributor Agreement. The result was that the resolution of the defendant’s claim was therefore governed by the arbitration agreement in the Distributor Agreement and not by the exclusive jurisdiction clause in the Gold Plan Agreement.
(d) The defendant effected a legal assignment of Debt B to the Factor. It was therefore unnecessary to consider whether the defendant effected an equitable assignment of Debt B to the Factor.
(e) The Open Debt Agreement effected a legal assignment of the Open Debt to the Factor.
(f) There was nothing to prevent the Factor from assigning the Open Debt back to the defendant.
(g) The Factor did in fact assign the Open Debt back to the defendant, and the defendant had not lost the right to recover the Open Debt from the plaintiff. The defendant was therefore the proper claimant in the arbitration.
(h) Despite the Debt Transfer Agreement with the Russian Corporation, the plaintiff was the proper respondent in the arbitration.
Issues on jurisdiction
- [64]
[64] The paramount question as to jurisdiction is whether the plaintiff and defendant were parties to an arbitration agreement within the meaning of the International Arbitration Act (Cap 143A, 2002 Rev Ed) (“IAA”) when the defendant issued its notice of arbitration. This paramount question can be divided into the following subsidiary questions:
(a) Did the Assignment and Novation Agreement novate to the defendant the arbitration agreement between the plaintiff and the Parent Company in cl 25.9 of the Distributor Agreement?
(b) Did the Participation Agreement assign to the Factor the arbitration agreement in relation to invoices purchased by the Factor, ie Debt B? If so, did the Buy Back Agreement and the second buy back assign that benefit back to the defendant?
(c) In relation to Debt 2B, were the plaintiff’s obligations transferred from the plaintiff to the Russian Corporation such that the plaintiff ceased to be obliged to pay Debt 2B entirely?
(d) Does the defendant have a valid claim on invoices C3 to C6 which form part of Debt 1B?
(e) Does the defendant have a valid claim on the debit notes which constitute Debt 1A?
- [65]
[65] Apart from these five questions arising from the matrix of contracts, a further two issues arise as to the tribunal’s jurisdiction. They are:
(a) Was cl 25.9 of the Distributor Agreement incorporated into the contracts of sale between the parties?
(b) Is cl 25.9 of the Distributor Agreement unworkable for being inconsistent with the jurisdiction clause in cl 25.8 of the same agreement?
- [66]
[66] I deal with these two issues after dealing with the five questions which I have identified.
Assignment and novation of the Distributor Agreement
- [67]
[67] As mentioned, the basis of the tribunal’s jurisdiction in the arbitration is cl 25.9 of the Distributor Agreement. This is a fairly lengthy clause which I have already set out in full (see [13] above). I reproduce only the relevant parts now:
- [68]
[68] To recap, the plaintiff argues that the defendant was not and never became a party to the Distributor Agreement. To this end, it submits that the Distributor Agreement expired on 26 December 2012, before the parties entered into the Assignment and Novation Agreement. This means that the Parent Company could not have transferred the arbitration agreement to the defendant under the Assignment and Novation Agreement because the entire Distributor Agreement had ceased to have contractual force before then.
- [69]
[69] The defendant rejects this and relies on the parties’ conduct to argue that the Distributor Agreement continued to have contractual force after 26 December 2012. The defendant also relies on the doctrine of separability to argue that, at the very least, the arbitration agreement continued to have contractual force after that date.
- [70]
[70] Whether the defendant became a party to the arbitration agreement in cl 25.9 in the first place raises the following subsidiary issues:
(a) Did the Distributor Agreement expire on 26 December 2012?
(b) Even if the Distributor Agreement did expire on that date:
(i) Did the arbitration agreement in cl 25.9 of the Distributor Agreement survive the expiry of the Distributor Agreement?
(ii) Alternatively, did the parties’ conduct after that date give rise to an implied contract on the same terms as the Distributor Agreement?
(iii) Further and in the alternative, is the plaintiff estopped from denying the continued existence of the Distributor Agreement?
- [71]
[71] I will consider each argument in turn.
Expiry of the Distributor Agreement
- [72]
[72] The plaintiff’s first argument is that the Distributor Agreement expired on 26 December 2012, before it could be novated to the defendant. The plaintiff relies on Attachment A to the Distributor Agreement, which defines both the “Term Start” and the “End Date” of the agreement. Notably, the “End Date” is stated to be 26 December 2011. The plaintiff also points to the clause beneath the defined start and end date of the agreement, which states:
- [73]
[73] Reading the clauses together, the plaintiff submits that the Distributor Agreement continued for a year after 26 December 2011 and then expired on 26 December 2012. Neither the plaintiff nor the Parent Company gave notice to the other to extend or terminate the Distributor Agreement. On that basis, the plaintiff argues that the Distributor Agreement expired on 26 December 2012.
- [74]
[74] The defendant adopts a different interpretation of these provisions. The defendant submits that, in the absence of notice, the Distributor Agreement was extended automatically for successive one-year periods, and not just for a single year ending 26 December 2012. The defendant’s case is therefore that the Distributor Agreement remained in force all the way until it gave notice to terminate the agreement on 8 September 2015.
- [75]
[75] On this point, I accept the plaintiff’s submission and reject the defendant’s. The defendant’s argument that the Distributor Agreement contemplated successive renewals for additional one-year terms indefinitely is quite inconsistent with the parties’ express contractual provisions on the term of the agreement. The clause in Attachment A provides expressly that unless notice is given by either party, the agreement “shall continue after the End Date for a period of one (1) years [sic]” [emphasis added]. The parties chose to define “End Date” in the Distributor Agreement expressly as “26 December 2011”. It is significant to me that the Distributor Agreement defines “End Date” as a specific date and not recursively by reference to the end of the current one-year extension effected by notice. That this clause comes just one line after the defined duration of the agreement also serves as an indicator that the reference to “End Date” in the following clause must refer to the fixed date stipulated in the Distributor Agreement. In my view, the Distributor Agreement provided that it would continue to have contractual effect after 26 December 2011 up to 26 December 2012, at which point it would expire unless the parties entered into a separate extension agreement.
- [76]
[76] The defendant’s alternative argument is that the Distributor Agreement provided that it would continue to apply so long as the plaintiff continued ordering goods from the counterparty to that agreement and the counterparty continued supplying goods in response. For this argument, it relies on cl 24.4 of the agreement. Clause 24.4 provides:
- [77]
[77] I reject this argument also. Clause 24.4, on a plain reading, means only that, if the plaintiff’s counterparty authorises the plaintiff to perform certain specific activities under the Distributor Agreement after it ceases to have contractual force, those specific activities will be governed by the terms of the Distributor Agreement which are relevant to those activities and the plaintiff is therefore obliged to carry out the authorised activities in the manner stipulated in the agreement. Clause 24.4 does not, on its face, provide that all the terms of the Distributor Agreement – comprising both rights and obligations vested in both the plaintiff and the counterparty – continue to have contractual force simply because the plaintiff has been authorised to perform those specific activities.
- [79]
[79] Accordingly, cl 24.4 does not form a basis for the defendant to argue that the Distributor Agreement as a whole continued to have contractual force after 26 December 2012.
Survival of cl 25.9
- [80]
[80] The defendant’s alternative argument is that, in any event, the arbitration agreement in cl 25.9 survived the expiry of the Distributor Agreement on 26 December 2012. There are two facets to this argument. The defendant bases this argument on both the principle of separability of arbitration agreements and on cl 25.3 of the Distributor Agreement:
- [81]
[81] The defendant submits that an arbitration agreement is a “paradigm example” of a term which by its nature survives the expiration of the contract into which it is integrated. Therefore, as a consequence of both the principle of separability and the parties’ own contract, cl 25.9 continued to have contractual force after 26 December 2012.
- [82]
[82] The principle of separability means that the invalidity of a contract does not necessarily entail the invalidity of an arbitration agreement which is integrated into that contract. Lord Hoffmann, delivering the judgment of the House of Lords in Fiona Trust & Holding Corp v Privalov [2007] 4 All ER 951 said (at [17]):
- [83]
[83] The principle of separability does not, however, mean that an integrated arbitration agreement can never cease to have contractual effect together with the contract into which it is integrated. As Steven Chong J (as he then was) noted in BCY v BCZ [2017] 3 SLR 357 at [61], separability does not insulate the arbitration agreement from the substantive contract for all purposes. The question is whether, in this case, it was the intention of the parties that the expiry of the Distributor Agreement should also bring the arbitration agreement between the parties to an end. The intention of the parties, as always, is to be ascertained objectively from the words interpreted by applying the contextual approach.
- [84]
[84] It is generally presumed that the parties intend a dispute resolution clause to survive the substantive contract ceasing to have contractual force. That is because the fundamental purpose of a dispute resolution clause is to govern the resolution of disputes between the parties arising out of the contract. This was recently affirmed in Nippon Catalyst Pte Ltd v PT Trans-Pacific Petrochemical Indotama and another [2018] SGHC 126 at [36], where Audrey Lim JC (as she then was) quoted with approval this statement of principle from Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration, Vol I (Wolters Kluwer, 2nd Ed, 2014) at pp 888–889:
This is not, of course, a legal presumption in the technical sense of the word. It simply reflects the fact that contractual disputes frequently manifest themselves only after the substantive contract has ceased to have contractual force between the parties. Indeed, it is very often that the parties’ dispute is precisely about whether the contract has in fact ceased to have contractual force.
- [85]
[85] There are, in this case, no circumstances from which it can be suggested that the plaintiff and the Parent Company, as the parties to the Distributor Agreement, intended their arbitration agreement to cease to have contractual effect on 26 December 2012, when the Distributor Agreement expired. Indeed, that would be a wholly uncommercial interpretation to put upon cl 25.9 of the Distributor Agreement for the reasons I have already given.
- [86]
[86] Further, cl 25.3 of the Distributor Agreement is in fact express indication that the plaintiff and the Parent Company intended their arbitration agreement in cl 25.9 to survive the expiry of the contract. By including cl 25.3, the parties expressly agreed that certain clauses of the Distributor Agreement would continue to bind the parties even after the Distributor Agreement as a whole had ceased to have contractual effect. I agree with the defendant’s submission that the reference in cl 25.3 to terms “which by their nature” survive the termination of the contract captures an arbitration agreement such as cl 25.9.
- [87]
[87] Accordingly, I find that the arbitration agreement continued to have contractual force as between the plaintiff and the Parent Company when the Distributor Agreement expired on 26 December 2012. But I also find, for the reasons which follow, that the Distributor Agreement, or a substantive contract on terms identical to it, continued to have contractual force after the Distributor Agreement expired on 26 December 2012.
Implied contract
- [88]
[88] The defendant submits that an implied contract on the same terms as the Distributor Agreement arose after 26 December 2012. The defendant relies on the conduct of the parties as evidence of an implied contract. This is certainly a recognised manner by which an implied contract can come into existence. As Chitty on Contracts (HG Beale gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 33rd Ed, 2019) (“Chitty on Contracts”) explains at para 1–111:
- [89]
[89] The overarching question is whether an intention to renew their written contract after its expiry can be inferred from the parties’ conduct, even though that intention is never expressed in words. The exact terms of any implied contract that may arise will of course depend on the facts of each case. I refer to three cases cited by the defendant in which the court found that an implied contract arose.
- [90]
[90] SJD Group v KJM (Scotland) [2010] CSOH 13 (“SJD Group”), a decision of the Outer House of the Scottish Court of Session, concerned a franchise agreement which commenced on 1 August 2003 and expired after a five-year term on 1 August 2008. The parties nevertheless continued as though the agreement had not expired, with the plaintiff providing its services to the defendant and invoicing the defendant for payment as before. Lord Glennie held that a reasonable detached observer, looking at the conduct of the parties after the agreement expired, would infer that the parties were continuing to do business, as far as possible, on the same terms as before. Insofar as the original contract provided for a fixed expiry date, however, Lord Glennie held that the observer would not conclude that the implied contract was to be for a further fixed period of five years but that it would continue only until one party terminated it upon reasonable notice to the other (at [21]).
- [91]
[91] SJD Group was considered and approved by Males J, albeit in obiter, in the English High Court in the case of PSG Franchising v Lydia Darby Ltd [2012] EWHC 3707 (QB). The facts of the case are similar to those in SJD Group. Males J agreed (at [54]) with Lord Glennie’s reasoning that the likely inference from parties continuing to deal with each other after an agreement expires as though the agreement were still in force is that they intended their contractual relationship to continue on the same terms as in the expired agreement. Males J did not, however, have to consider the term of the implied contract and whether, as in SJD Group, the implied contract would continue only until terminated by either party on reasonable notice.
- [92]
[92] In Brambles v Wail [2002] VSCA 150, the plaintiff entered into an agreement with the defendant’s employer, Andar Transport, for the latter to provide delivery services. The agreement was for a term of three years from 4 April 1990. It expired on 4 April 1993 without the plaintiff renewing the agreement. Nonetheless, the defendant on behalf of Andar continued to carry out weekly deliveries for the plaintiff and invoiced it accordingly. The Victorian Court of Appeal found the inference that the parties had proceeded as though they were bound by a single agreement on the same terms as the expired agreement to be a more compelling inference than the inference that they had entered into a series of individual implied agreements covering each subsequent delivery (at [61]):
- [93]
[93] The plaintiff attempts to distinguish these three cases on the grounds that in all those cases, it was the original parties to the agreement who continued to act as if the agreement remained in force after its expiry. It may be appropriate to imply a new contract on identical terms to an expired contract as between the original parties to the expired contract based on the original parties’ prior course of dealing. In this case, however, the defendant is a third party to the original Distributor Agreement between the plaintiff and the Parent Company.
- [94]
[94] The plaintiff relies on Grossner Jens v Raffles Holdings Ltd [2004] 1 SLR(R) 202 (“Grossner Jens”). In Grossner Jens, the plaintiff claimed payment for its brokering services, alleging that it had provided those services pursuant to an implied contract between itself and the defendant. Tan Lee Meng J dismissed the plaintiff’s claim, noting that material terms of the alleged contract had not been agreed. The plaintiff’s scope of duties and remuneration also could not be implied from any previous course of dealing between the parties because there were insufficient dealings between them (at [14] and [18]). The plaintiff appears to be arguing, based on this case, that because there were no prior dealings between itself and the defendant, there is no basis to find that an implied contract arose on the terms of the Distributor Agreement – a contract to which the defendant was not even a party before it expired.
- [95]
[95] The plaintiff is correct, as a matter of pure principle, that the court cannot conjure an implied contract out of nothing. But that is not the situation on the facts before me. The defendant here, although initially a third party to the Distributor Agreement, stepped into the shoes of the plaintiff’s original counterparty (ie the Parent Company) pursuant to a tripartite novation. Accordingly, the question in our case is whether the plaintiff dealt with the Parent Company (prior to the novation), and later with the defendant (after the novation), consistently with the notion that the Distributor Agreement was still in force.
- [96]
[96] On the evidence before me, it is clear that the plaintiff and the Parent Company continued their course of dealing under the Distributor Agreement even after it expired on 26 December 2012. As mentioned above (at [12] and [19]), the Parent Company began invoicing the plaintiff in December 2010 and continued to do so until 16 February 2013. In the meantime, the defendant began issuing invoices to the plaintiff on 7 February 2013 and continued supplying goods to the plaintiff until the last quarter of 2014. A reasonable detached observer, on these facts, would draw the inference that an implied contract, terminable on reasonable notice, subsisted between the plaintiff and the Parent Company on the same terms as the Distributor Agreement on and after 26 December 2012. That is what the Parent Company and the plaintiff then novated to the defendant on 25 January 2013.
- [97]
[97] This inference is supported by the evidence. In or around mid-2013, the defendant required all its customers to provide letters of guarantee. The plaintiff accordingly procured a related company to provide a guarantee to the defendant. The guarantee is dated 9 August 2013 and was to be effective for a period of one year, until 9 August 2014. The guarantee confirms that the defendant is “a party of a [Distributor Agreement] with [the plaintiff]” and states that the guarantor’s obligations include:
It is evident, by the act of procuring the guarantee and by the terms of that guarantee that the plaintiff, the defendant and its guarantor considered the Distributor Agreement as continuing to set out the contractual terms which bound the parties as of 9 August 2013.
- [98]
[98] Lastly, the parties also entered into other agreements after 2012 that expressly referred to the Distributor Agreement. The first of those agreements is the Assignment and Novation Agreement on 25 January 2013. The preamble of the Assignment and Novation Agreement states:
The only “agreement(s) listed in the table below” is the Distributor Agreement.
- [99]
[99] Similarly, the Debt Transfer Agreement of 12 December 2014 between the plaintiff, the defendant and the Russian Corporation states unequivocally that “[the plaintiff] and [the defendant] are parties to the [Distributor Agreement] … which is in full force and effect as of the date hereof” [emphasis added].
- [100]
[100] In my view, the conduct of the plaintiff and the Parent Company puts it beyond doubt that they considered themselves to be bound by a contract on the terms set out in the Distributor Agreement after its expiry on 26 December 2012. Similarly, the conduct of the plaintiff and the defendant after entering into the Assignment and Novation Agreement puts it beyond doubt that they considered themselves to be bound by a contract on the terms set out in the Distributor Agreement on and after 25 January 2013. The inference is even more compelling than that in Bramble v Wail because there was more than conduct in this case to evidence the parties’ intention. They not only carried on with the sale and purchase of goods and invoicing as normal, they expressly affirmed in words that they considered the Distributor Agreement to continue to bind them at various points in 2013 and 2014. I therefore find that there was an implied contract on identical terms as the Distributor Agreement that arose between the plaintiff and the Parent Company parties after 26 December 2012, which was then novated to the defendant on 25 January 2013 and which continued thereafter until the defendant terminate it by notice in September 2015.
- [101]
[101] A final point to consider is whether an arbitration agreement contained in an implied contract satisfies the requirement of being “in writing” under s 2A(3) of the IAA. Section 2A(4) of the IAA, however, states that an arbitration agreement is “in writing if its content is recorded in any form, whether or not the arbitration agreement or contract has been concluded orally, by conduct or by other means” [emphasis added]. In AQZ v ARA [2015] 2 SLR 972 at [119]–[120], Judith Prakash J (as she then was) held that the arbitration agreement in an oral contract satisfied the statutory requirement of writing because it was on terms identical to an arbitration agreement contained in an earlier written contract between the parties. The arbitration agreement between the plaintiff and defendant is, in all but the most formal or technical of senses, cl 25.9 of the Distributor Agreement.
- [102]
[102] The defendant is therefore entitled to rely on the arbitration agreement in cl 25.9 of the Distributor Agreement to found the tribunal’s jurisdiction.
Estoppel
- [103]
[103] Finally, the defendant relies on the same facts set out at [96]–[99] above to argue that the plaintiff represented to the defendant by conduct that the Distributor Agreement continued to have contractual force after 26 December 2012. The plaintiff is therefore estopped from asserting that the Distributor Agreement expired on 26 December 2012, and in particular, is estopped from denying the existence of the arbitration agreement.
- [104]
[104] The defendant argues that two types of estoppel are engaged on these facts. The first type is contractual estoppel. Where the parties to a contract have, in their contract, agreed that a specified state of affairs forms the basis on which they have contracted, they are estopped from alleging that the actual facts are inconsistent with the state of affairs specified in the contract (see Chitty on Contracts at para 4–116).
- [105]
[105] The second type of estoppel is estoppel by convention. Where both parties to a contract act on an assumption as to the state of the facts or the law, they are estopped from denying the truth of that assumption if it would be unjust or unconscionable to allow that (Chitty on Contracts at para 4–108).
- [106]
[106] The difference between the two types of estoppel is explained in Chitty on Contracts at para 4–116 in this way:
- [107]
[107] The terms that the defendant relies on as giving rise to a contractual estoppel are those found in the preamble to the Assignment and Novation Agreement and the Debt Transfer Agreement (see [98]–[99] above). In OMG Holdings Pte Ltd v Pos Ad Sdn Bhd [2012] 4 SLR 201, Andrew Ang J noted that there are indications that a contractual estoppel may be founded on a recital in an instrument not by deed. Ang J went on to opine, at [71]:
- [108]
[108] With respect, the reasoning at [71] of OMG Holdings is not entirely clear. If the basis of estoppel by convention is that parties have acted on an assumed state of affairs that is not a legally binding term within their contract, then there would be no need for the requirement that the proposition in the recital was “intended to be an agreement” between the parties.
- [109]
[109] Nevertheless, nothing turns on the precise difference between contractual estoppel and estoppel by convention in this case. It makes no difference in the present case whether the statements confirming the continuation of the Distributor Agreement in the preamble to the Assignment and Novation Agreement and in the Debt Transfer Agreement are interpreted as being legally binding terms which both parties are precluded as a matter of contract from denying or as an extrinsic state of affairs which the defendant acted upon. Either characterisation leads to the conclusion that the plaintiff is estopped from denying that the Distributor Agreement’s terms continued to bind it after 26 December 2012. The defendant supplied goods to the plaintiff in 2013 and 2014 on the basis that the parties continued to be bound by the terms set out in the Distributor Agreement. The plaintiff accepted those goods. It would be unconscionable for the plaintiff to assert now, in a claim by the defendant on unpaid invoices for those goods, that such reliance was mistaken.
- [110]
[110] Accordingly, I accept the defendant’s alternative argument that the plaintiff is estopped from denying the existence of the Distributor Agreement, and from denying that it is bound by the arbitration agreement contained in cl 25.9 of the Distributor Agreement.
Notice
- [111]
[111] Finally, the plaintiff argues that cl 1 of the Assignment and Novation Agreement itself mandates that notice must be given by the Parent Company to the plaintiff and defendant before the novation will be effective. Such notice, the plaintiff contends, was not given.
- [112]
[112] Clause 1 of the Assignment and Novation Agreement provides:
- [113]
[113] The first point I make is that the Assignment and Novation Agreement, despite the use of the word “assigns” in cl 1, effected a novation of the Distributor Agreement from the Parent Company to the defendant, not an assignment. I say that because it expressly transferred both the Parent Company’s rights as well as its obligations to the defendant. That is no doubt the reason why it was drawn up and executed as a tripartite agreement. There is no general requirement for notice to be given to an obligor before an obligee whose rights arise by reason of a novation may take action to enforce those rights alone and in its own name. The issue of notice arises here only because of the express terms of cl 1 of the Assignment and Novation Agreement.
- [114]
[114] The defendant’s case is that the Parent Company did give the notice required by cl 1 of the Assignment and Novation Agreement. It relies on an email dated 14 December 2012 from the Parent Company to a number of its business partners, including the plaintiff, informing them of the impending transition of the Parent Company’s operations to the defendant “starting from 14 January 2013”. The defendant argues that the 14 December 2012 email constitutes notice under cl 1, and that the novation took effect on 14 January 2013.
- [115]
[115] The documents, on their face, seem to support the defendant’s submission. The relevant email is short and states simply:
- [116]
[116] The email is titled “Assignment and Novation to [the defendant] – transition will occur on 14 January 2013” [emphasis added]. This makes it clear that the transition will take place as an event on the specified date and not as a process commencing on the specified date. Further, the email comes with one attachment, an Information Letter which elaborates:
The attachment itself is titled: “on 14 Jan 2013 [the defendant] starts operations.pdf”.
- [117]
[117] The chief difficulty with the defendant’s submission is that the 14 December 2012 email, and the alleged effective date of novation of 14 January 2013, came before the three parties executed the Assignment and Novation Agreement on 25 January 2013. This raises the question whether, as a matter of construction of the Assignment and Novation Agreement, the 14 December 2012 email is capable of being the contractual notice required by cl 1 of that agreement.
- [118]
[118] Clause 1 does not require notice to be issued only after cl 1 acquires contractual effect. The language of cl 1 is neutral on this point: “as notified by [the Parent Company] to [the plaintiff] and [the defendant] not less than thirty (30) days prior to such date”. I accept the defendant’s submission that the words “as notified” do not unequivocally suggest that notice is an event for the future (eg “as will be notified”). Nothing much can be discerned from it, and it does not preclude the possibility of a notice in the past (eg “as already notified”).
- [119]
[119] Indeed, it is significant to me that the only legal significance of the notice is to fix the Effective Date. Clause 1 of the Assignment and Novation Agreement does not impose an obligation on the Parent Company to give notice. In other words, if the Parent Company never gave notice, it would not be in breach of the agreement. All that would happen in that case is that the novation which the defendant had agreed to would simply not become effective. That suggests to me that what is important is that the plaintiff should know the Effective Date, regardless of how and more importantly when that happens.
- [120]
[120] The factual circumstances make it clear that the notice being issued before the Assignment and Novation Agreement is of little contractual significance. These circumstances reveal how the parties would have seen the 14 December 2012 email and its attachment.
- [121]
[121] The earliest indication to the Parent Company’s partners, including the plaintiff, of the impending novation came with an email on 19 November 2012 from the Parent Company. The email attached a blank draft of the Assignment and Novation Agreement, on identical terms as the one executed on 25 January 2013 with the plaintiff. The email states:
- [122]
[122] From the email, it is apparent that the Parent Company and the defendant intended to execute assignment and novation agreements with each of its customers, including the plaintiff, latest by 30 November 2012. From the evidence, there were some customers of the Parent Company who executed their assignment and novation agreements before 30 November 2012. It was not explained why the plaintiff’s Assignment and Novation Agreement was executed only on 25 January 2013. I am prepared to infer that the intention of the Parent Company and the defendant was similarly to execute this agreement by 30 November 2012. The plaintiff would have been aware of the Parent Company’s and the defendant’s intention, as two of its officers were copied on the email. In light of this, all parties must be taken to have understood the 14 December 2012 email as the notice required under cl 1, even if there were reasons that prevented particular counterparties from executing the novation agreement with the Parent Company and the defendant before 30 November 2012.
- [123]
[123] Accordingly, I find that the Parent Company did give notice of the Effective Date to the plaintiff by the email of 14 December 2012.
- [124]
[124] I now deal with the issue of jurisdiction in relation to the three specific categories of debts. The plaintiff disputes the defendant’s right to commence arbitration against it in relation to all three categories of debt claimed by the defendant.
- [125]
[125] I begin with an analysis of jurisdiction in respect of Debt B, ie Debt 1B and Debt 2B. These are the invoices which the defendant assigned to the Factor under the Participation Agreement and which were issued to the plaintiff with the Caution endorsed upon them.
General points on Debt B
- [126]
[126] The plaintiff argues that: (a) the assignment of Debt B to the Factor under the Participation Agreement carried with it to the Factor the right to arbitrate disputes in relation to Debt B, depriving the defendant entirely of that right; and (b) that that right was never assigned back to the defendant.
- [127]
[127] The defendant argues that the assignment of Debt B to the Factor did not deprive the defendant entirely of the right to arbitrate disputes in relation to Debt B. That right remained vested in the defendant, even if it was concurrently also vested in the Factor. In the alternative, the defendant argues that the defendant later regained the right to arbitrate disputes in relation to Debt B when the Factor assigned Debt B back to the defendant under the Buy Back Agreement.
- [128]
[128] Two sub-issues therefore arise for consideration.
(a) First, did the defendant’s assignment of Debt B to the Factor deprive the defendant entirely of the right to arbitrate disputes in relation to Debt B?
(b) Second, if it did, did the Factor later assign that right back to the defendant under the Buy Back Agreement?
- [129]
[129] There is, in addition, a logically anterior sub-issue as to which law applies to determine these two sub-issues. In the arbitration, the parties agreed that the law applicable to any assignment would be Singapore, English or Hong Kong law, and that regardless of which of the three laws applied the requirements for a legal assignment were the same. The parties were also content to proceed on the basis that the law applicable to the assignment of an arbitration agreement is the same as the law applicable to the assignment of the main contract. As the parties did not address me on this issue in the present application, I proceed on the basis that the applicable law to determine the sub-issues in [128] is not substantively different from Singapore law.
Did the defendant assign the right to arbitrate to the Factor?
- [130]
[130] The Participation Agreement obliged the defendant to offer to sell to the Factor all invoices representing receivables due to the defendant from the date of its commencement, 2 October 2013. If the Factor accepted the defendant’s offer in respect of a particular invoice, cl 2.9.6 of the Participation Agreement obliged the defendant to transfer to the Factor that invoice and its “Associated Rights”:
- [131]
[131] “Associated Rights” means:
- [132]
[132] The plaintiff contends that an assignment of a particular invoice under the Participation Agreement coupled with the Caution endorsed on the invoice issued to the plaintiff effects a legal assignment of the debt represented by that invoice to the Factor, effective under s 4(8) of the CLA. The defendant, at least by the time of the hearing of this application, does not dispute this.
- [133]
[133] The more difficult issue is where the right to arbitrate a dispute in relation to a particular debt resides after the defendant assigns that debt to the Factor. The plaintiff relies primarily on two English cases to advance its proposition that an assignment of a contractual right divests the assignor completely of any right to arbitrate a dispute in relation to that right.
- [134]
[134] In NBP Developments Ltd and anor v Buildko & Sons Ltd (1993) 66 BLR 120 (“NBP Developments”), the main contractor of a building development commenced an arbitration against its employer. Midway through the arbitration, the main contractor effected an absolute assignment of its rights against the employer to a third party. The third party informed the employer that it intended to pursue the arbitration, but took no further steps to join itself as a party to the arbitration. After the arbitration had been inactive for three years, the employer applied for a final injunction restraining the main contractor (who was still the sole claimant named in the arbitration) from continuing with the arbitration. The question which arose was whether the main contractor was entitled to pursue the arbitration even after the absolute assignment. The court held that the effect of the absolute assignment was that the main contractor no longer retained any right to arbitrate. The assignee had succeeded to the rights of the main contractor in the arbitration from the date of the assignment (at 131).
- [136]
[136] The defendant disagrees that the cases cited stand for the proposition advanced by the plaintiff. The defendant submits that The Jordan Nicolov did not discuss the effect of an assignment on the assignor’s right to arbitrate. On the defendant’s case, while the effect of an assignment is to deprive an assignor of a substantive right (such as the right to a debt) and to convey it exclusively to the assignee, it does not follow that the assignment also deprives the assignor of the right to arbitrate a dispute over that right and passes it exclusively to the assignee. The defendant also bases this argument on its interpretation of the separability presumption: that because the arbitration agreement exists as a contract separate from the underlying contract into which it is integrated, an original party to an arbitration agreement is deprived of the right to arbitrate only if there is a clear expression of intent to achieve that result.
- [137]
[137] I reject the defendant’s submission. The right to arbitrate a dispute over a contractual right which has been assigned cannot be vested simultaneously in both the assignor and the assignee. The defendant cites no authority for this submission. The nature of an assignment is that it “extinguishes the legal cause of action of the assignor against the party liable so that the assignor cannot thereafter himself ask for an award against the party liable” (The Jordan Nicolov at 15). Hobhouse J was very clear that as between the assignor and assignee, “only one or the other can be entitled to an award” [emphasis added]. Although NBP Developments was concerned, strictly speaking, only with the right of an assignor to continue an arbitration that was commenced before the assignment, Fox-Andrews J also noted that the assignor “had no right to sue in their own name”.
- [138]
[138] The more subtle aspect of this argument is that an assignor of an arbitration agreement remains a party to the arbitration agreement and therefore the ground under Art 34(2)(a)(i) is not satisfied. Although in Rals (HC) (at [52]–[53]), I held that an assignee of rights under a contract does not become a party to the contract (or to an arbitration agreement integrated into that contract) in the contractual sense, the question under Art 34(2)(a)(i) of the Model Law is not only whether the parties have an arbitration agreement between them but must include the question of whether the defendant has standing to invoke the arbitration agreement in respect of a particular substantive right. By assigning to the Factor the right to receive payment under Debt B, the defendant also gave up the annexed right to arbitrate a dispute in relation to Debt B.
- [139]
[139] As a final point, the defendant distinguishes the cases cited by the plaintiff on the basis that the defendant assigned only one of its rights under the Distributor Agreement to the Factor, ie the right to receive payment under the purchased invoices. The defendant retained all of the other substantive rights which it had under the Distributor Agreement, to which the right to arbitrate under the integrated arbitration agreement still attached. As such, the defendant argues, there is still an arbitration agreement in existence between the parties. The defendant acknowledges that it would not have the right to commence an arbitration in relation to Debt B, but contends that this is an issue regarding the scope of the arbitration agreement to which both the plaintiff and the defendant are parties rather than its existence. It is therefore not a basis for setting aside the award under Art 34(2)(a)(i) of the Model Law.
The judgment continues past this page. Read the rest at eLitigation.