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Grounds publishedDecided 12 Jul 2019

High Court

Zillion Global Ltd and another v Deutsche Bank AG, Singapore Branch

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[2019] SGHC 165Case no. Suit No 716 of 2014

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The plaintiffs, Zillion Global Limited and Fields Pacific Limited (“Zillion” and “Fields” respectively, and “the Plaintiffs” collectively), are companies incorporated in the British Virgin Islands. At all material times, the beneficial owner of the Plaintiffs was Mr Pan Fang-Jen (“Pan”), and their purpose was to hold his assets. The Plaintiffs were customers of the Private Wealth Management (“PWM”) division of the defendant, Deutsche Bank AG, Singapore Branch (“DB”). The Plaintiffs had opened both discretionary accounts and advisory accounts (also known as non-discretionary accounts) with DB. The key difference between these two types of accounts was that for a discretionary account, the bank exercised its own discretion in deciding which transactions to enter into, but for an advisory account, the client made the decision as to which transactions to enter into. This suit is concerned primarily with the advisory accounts the Plaintiffs had with DB, ie, (i) Zillion’s advisory account; (ii) a foreign exchange margin trading account (“FX GEM account”) which was linked to Zillion’s advisory account; and (iii) Fields’ advisory account. These three accounts will be referred to as “the Accounts”.

  3. [2] I make a preliminary point (on which I elaborate at [13] below) that in advancing their respective cases in their pleadings and submissions to this court, the parties generally did not draw a distinction between the Plaintiffs, or between the Accounts, should there be any distinction to draw. Since the parties chose to advance their cases as such, I will proceed on the basis that the arguments advanced by the Plaintiffs and by DB respectively applied to the Plaintiffs and the Accounts without distinction. I will also refer to Pan and the Plaintiffs interchangeably unless the context requires a distinction to be drawn between them.

  4. [3] The Plaintiffs filed the writ of summons on 3 July 2014 against DB. They had four main heads of claim against DB, namely, for: (a) breach of an implied term of the relevant contracts generally; (b) negligence generally; (c) misrepresentation on 30 July 2008 and 31 July 2008; and (d) breach of contract on 13 October 2008.

  5. [4] DB relied on contract terms in its defence to exclude or restrict its liability. DB also pleaded that the Plaintiffs’ actions founded on contract and on tort in respect of and/or relating to any matter in the Accounts that had arisen prior to 3 July 2008 had accrued more than six years before the time the Plaintiffs filed the writ of summons, and were barred by virtue of s 6(1)(a) of the Limitation Act (Cap 163, 1996 Rev Ed).

  6. [5] The trial for this suit was bifurcated. I heard the trial on liability over the course of 18 days, and reserved judgment.

  7. Dramatis personae

  8. [6] I set out a table of dramatis personae of some of the persons involved at the material time and/or in these proceedings for easy reference:

  9. Facts

  10. Background and the opening of accounts with DB and other banks

  11. [7] Pan was born in the People’s Republic of China in 1941. He emigrated to the Republic of China (“Taiwan”) with his parents when he was about seven years old. At all material times, he was a citizen and resident of Taiwan. He graduated from junior middle school in Taiwan but did not do well enough to progress to senior middle school. He enrolled in a vocational institute named World College of Journalism. As an adult, he was involved in many different business ventures. However, it was his coal business and property-related investments that made him his wealth. At the material time, he was a retired businessman and a high net worth individual. The Plaintiffs averred that Pan was not proficient in English and could not read, speak or understand English save for simple words; DB disputed this and averred that while Pan preferred to converse in Mandarin, he was able to converse in English.

  12. [8] Before November 2006, Pan had both discretionary and advisory accounts with other banks, namely, Citigroup Private Bank (“Citibank”) and JP Morgan, and he invested substantial sums with each of these banks. These accounts were opened in his name and in the names of companies of which he was the beneficial owner and which included the Plaintiffs.

  13. [9] On or about 14 November 2006, DB approached Pan in Taipei, Taiwan to introduce its PWM services to him. DB was represented by, inter alia, Juan and Tsang who were both conversant in Mandarin.

  14. [10] In the following months, Pan opened both discretionary and advisory accounts with DB in the names of the Plaintiffs. A total of five accounts were opened (including the Accounts as mentioned at [1] above). Juan became the Relationship Manager for all five accounts. The five accounts opened were:

  15. (a) an advisory account in Fields’ name opened on or around 20 December 2006;

  16. (b) an advisory account in Zillion’s name opened on or around 22 March 2007, and the linked FX GEM account in Zillion’s name opened on 24 May 2007; and

  17. (c) two discretionary accounts in Zillion’s name opened on 22 March 2007.

  18. [11] Although the Plaintiffs had pleaded that their claims were in relation to all five accounts, Pan agreed during cross-examination that the Plaintiffs’ claims were in fact in relation to only three of these accounts: the advisory accounts and the linked FX GEM account, which are those listed at [10(a)] and [10(b)] above. As mentioned at [1] above, these three accounts will be referred to as “the Accounts”. The Plaintiffs’ claims were not in relation to the two discretionary accounts listed at [10(c)] above.

  19. [12] When opening the Accounts, the Plaintiffs executed, inter alia, the following contractual documents:

  20. (a) Service Agreement: executed by Zillion on 22 March 2007 and by Fields on 20 December 2006;

  21. (b) Risk Disclosure Statement: executed by Zillion on 22 March 2007 and by Fields on 20 December 2006;

  22. (c) DB Master Agreement for Foreign Exchange Transactions and Derivatives Transactions (“Master Agreement”): executed by Zillion on 26 February 2008; and

  23. (d) Risk Disclosure Statement (Foreign Exchange and Derivative Transactions) (“Risk Disclosure Statement (FX)”): executed by Zillion on 26 February 2008.

  24. [13] As I mentioned at [2] above, I observe that in advancing their respective cases in their pleadings and submissions to this court, the parties generally did not draw a distinction between the Plaintiffs, or between the Accounts, should there be any distinction to draw. This lack of precision is odd, considering how some of the contractual documents were executed by Zillion only and not by Fields, like the Master Agreement and the Risk Disclosure Statement (FX). By way of another example, the three margin call letters which will be discussed later were also addressed to Zillion and not to Fields. However, since the parties chose to advance their cases as described, I will proceed on the basis that the arguments advanced by the Plaintiffs and by DB respectively applied to the Plaintiffs and the Accounts without distinction. Accordingly, I will proceed on the basis that the contractual documents and all other matters in question also applied to the Plaintiffs and the Accounts without distinction.

  25. [14] Returning to the chronology, around December 2006 and in 2007, Pan also opened both discretionary and advisory accounts in his name and in the Plaintiffs’ names with another bank, the Union Bank of Switzerland (“UBS”).

  26. Pan’s relationship with DB and his investment objective

  27. [15] In relation to the Accounts, DB introduced financial products to Pan and/or the Plaintiffs as part of its PWM services. DB and Pan had almost weekly meetings, and from December 2006 to 13 October 2008, DB had almost daily telephone discussions with Pan and/or his staff (including Chang and Chen). These meetings and telephone conversations were generally conducted in Mandarin. In these proceedings, DB produced in evidence voice logs of the telephone conversations of around 86 days.

  28. [16] From January 2007 to September 2008, Pan injected approximately US$360m worth of assets and cash into the Accounts.

  29. [17] As regards Pan and his investment objective, the Plaintiffs pleaded that Pan was an investor with no sophistication in respect of financial investments, and that his financial objective was to preserve his wealth and protect it from depreciation. DB disputed this. DB pleaded that Pan was an experienced and sophisticated investor, who was also speculative and aggressive, with the growth of his wealth as his investment objective. DB alleged that Pan exercised his own judgement and made his own decisions as to which transactions to enter into under the Accounts.

  30. [18] For example, Yim’s unchallenged description of Pan as set out in Yim’s affidavit of evidence-in-chief (“AEIC”) at paras 26–27 was as follows:

  31. [19] In terms of the documentation at the material time, Juan filled in, on behalf of DB, the “Client Acceptance & Profile Report” (“CAPR”) for Pan twice. The two CAPRs were completed internally within DB, without obtaining “confirmation” from Pan as to their contents. The details concerning the two CAPRs are as follows:

  32. (a) Initially in the CAPR dated 26 January 2007, Pan’s objective for investable assets was described as “Balanced”. This meant that he was an investor who was “prepared to accept risk of infrequent and modest losses”, and was “[s]eeking total return both from income and capital appreciation”.

  33. (b) However, in the CAPR dated 24 April 2008, Pan’s risk profile was no longer described as “Balanced” but described as “Growth (higher risk/ possible higher return)” instead. This meant that he was an investor who was “prepared to accept risk of market-like losses in line with those of the equity markets and who intend[ed] to meet the possibility of significant short-term fluctuations by long-term investments”, and was “[s]eeking total return mainly via capital appreciation”, where “[l]iquidity [was] of no primary concern”.

  34. (c) Pan’s risk profile was never described in either of the two CAPRs as “Conservative (lower risk/ lower return)”, which was the third and remaining descriptor, and would have meant that he was a “[r]isk-averse investor who [sought] not to incur risk or losses”, and was “[s]eeking stability and liquidity through current income and/ or modest return on capital”.

  35. [20] A Risk Profile Questionnaire dated 19 August 2008 was also completed in respect of Pan (“Questionnaire”), which Sze believed Juan completed on behalf of DB. The Questionnaire was also completed internally within DB, without obtaining “confirmation” from Pan as to its contents. The Questionnaire stated that Pan’s risk rating was “5”, which “indicated an aggressive risk profile and [that] the client was seeking capital growth”.

  36. [21] Whilst the two CAPRs and the Questionnaire were completed internally within DB, they reflected DB’s assessment of Pan’s risk profile, regardless as to whether or not that was in fact his risk profile. It would appear that DB did not think of Pan’s investment objective as being to preserve his wealth and to protect it from depreciation.

  37. [22] On the other hand, the Plaintiffs highlighted a telephone conversation held on 6 December 2010 at or around 1pm primarily between Pan and Juan to support the Plaintiffs’ submission that Pan’s investment objective was simply to preserve his wealth. It was recorded in the English translation of the transcript for this conversation that Juan replied “Yes” to a series of Pan’s statements where he said: “What I want is not about the profit”, “My main aim is not to shrink my asset” and “How not to decrease the value, it’s my biggest wish”. It does not appear to me that Juan was affirming these statements that Pan made, but rather that she was just noting that he was making these statements. In any case, this conversation took place in December 2010, more than two years after the time the Plaintiffs pleaded that DB allegedly closed out certain positions under the Accounts in breach of contract on 31 October 2008 (see [70(d)] below). I thus place little weight on this conversation of 6 December 2010 in understanding what Pan’s objective was in relation to the Accounts at the material time.

  38. [23] I make some observations on Pan as an investor.

  39. [24] I find that Pan was evasive during cross-examination when answering questions from DB’s counsel on the transactions the Plaintiffs entered into under the Accounts. This was so even when Pan was specifically referred to transcripts for telephone conversations between him and DB, and was asked questions on the contents of these transcripts. I find that Pan was trying to portray himself as an investor who was fully dependent on DB’s advice as to which transactions to enter into under the Accounts when in fact this was not the case.

  40. [25] I find that Pan had a mind of his own as to which transactions to enter into. From the English translations of the transcripts for various telephone conversations, it can be seen that Pan was not a passive listener who simply accepted DB’s suggestions and advice, but was very much involved during the telephone discussions on which transactions to enter into. He requested/directed DB to obtain certain specific information for him to make his investment decisions. For instance, one of Pan’s directions was for DB to produce an analysis report in English on three telecommunication companies, and to have the report translated into Chinese. Pan also said to hand him the original English version for him to “take a look” and that he would “find a telecommunications expert” with whom he would discuss the telecommunication companies.

  41. [26] As early as in May 2007 (at least from Pan’s communications with DB), Pan was familiar with the operations of the various financial products he considered purchasing, like accumulators, and he was able to have discussions with DB’s employees to assess whether to purchase them. I do not accept the Plaintiffs’ allegation that he did not understand the risks associated with accumulators and at [147] below, I elaborate on this point. At present, I mention briefly that even though the Plaintiffs suffered losses on accumulators, they continued to purchase accumulators even after 13 October 2008 when some positions of the Plaintiffs under the Accounts were closed out by DB, although they said that the value of these transactions was much less than those previously entered into. Pan also made decisions on the type, size and specification of the transactions he wanted to enter into. These financial products were relatively complex in their operations (see [48]–[49] below for a description of accumulators).

  42. [27] Pan also had some investment practices which appeared not to have the objective of simply preserving his wealth and protecting it from depreciation. For instance, Pan was willing to trade more in a company’s stock even though its price was falling. Pan was also unwilling to enter into a transaction where he could “earn money now, but [where he] would be cutting down [his] profits to 6% or so”, as he said to DB’s employees during a telephone conversation.

  43. [28] In the circumstances, although the Plaintiffs sought to show that Pan did act on the recommendation of DB at times, this did not detract from the fact that he had his own mind and that it was he who finally decided what transactions to enter into and the terms thereof. I also find that Pan’s investment objective was not to preserve his wealth and protect it from depreciation, but rather to grow his wealth by taking risks. Pan was an experienced investor who understood the financial products he purchased, and he chose to purchase numerous accumulators despite their complexity and risk of capital loss (see [49] below). He was aggressive in that he was prepared to take high risks for high returns. I reach these conclusions even without having to have regard to the CAPRs or the Questionnaire.

  44. [29] I also make some observations on Chang.

  45. [30] DB’s case was that Chang was the main gatekeeper for the Accounts, ie, the key person for the Plaintiffs with whom DB would often communicate on transactions to be entered into, like in relation to information on prices, and Chang would in turn update Pan accordingly.

  46. [31] On the other hand, the Plaintiffs took the position that Chang’s role was initially only to safe-keep and apply one of two corporate seals of a company known as AOC International (presumably owned by Pan). As a colleague of hers had a serious illness, Chang also joined the colleague and Pan in meetings and telephone discussions with banks. Chang’s role was to record the transactions which Pan entered into during the meetings and discussions. Gradually, she also started to arrange these meetings and discussions. However, Chang deposed in her AEIC that her main role was still to safe-keep and apply one of two corporate seals of AOC International. The Plaintiffs also appeared to take the position that Pan and Chang were not even aware that Chang was treated by DB as Pan’s gatekeeper. Chang deposed in her AEIC that she did not have any financial investment qualifications and knew little about financial investments, and she disagreed during cross-examination that she would discuss the terms of proposed investments before they were put to Pan. Chang also deposed that she was not proficient in English and could not read, speak or understand English save for simple words.

  47. [32] I find that Chang was hardly ignorant about the transactions the Plaintiffs entered into under the Accounts, despite her evidence to the contrary. In a telephone conversation held on 2 June 2008 at or around 2.49pm between Chang, Juan and Kwok, it began with Juan informing Kwok that “[Chang] wants to talk to us about how she calculates the [foreign exchange]”. Chang then started talking about her calculations. I will set out the conversation later at [103] below.

  48. [33] When cross-examined on this telephone conversation, Chang denied that she was doing any calculations in relation to the Accounts on behalf of Pan, or that she wanted to check DB’s calculations. She instead testified that Pan did not know she was doing these calculations. During re-examination, Chang explained that she did these calculations for her own knowledge because she “would like to know in [her] mind”. I find her evidence in respect of this telephone conversation hard to believe.

  49. [34] There were numerous telephone conversations between Chang and DB’s employees, of which Pan was not a part. DB relied on Chang to convey information to Pan, and discussed proposed investments with her before they were put to Pan.

  50. [35] I do not accept Pan’s evidence that Chang discussed proposed investments with DB without his knowledge and consent. Pan’s evidence in his AEIC and during cross-examination was that in April 2008, he scolded Chang for conveying DB’s advice on accumulators to him instead of telling DB to advise him directly, and told Juan to explain proposed investments to him directly and not by way of passing messages through Chang. However, in a telephone conversation held on 24 July 2008, Pan himself instructed DB, “Go and talk to [Chang] about [the transaction] and we will do this.” The fact that Pan would have separate discussions with Chang as to which transactions to enter into was evidenced in a telephone conversation where Pan told Juan, “[Chang] has given me ample ‘brainwashing’.” In Chang’s telephone conversations with DB’s employees without Pan, Chang would also convey Pan’s responses in respect of the Accounts and the transactions thereunder. In fact, Chang would even tell DB’s employees how they should focus their conversations with Pan.

  51. [36] In the circumstances, I find that Chang was the main gatekeeper for the Accounts, where DB would often communicate information pertaining to the Accounts to her and discuss proposed investments with her, for her to update Pan. She was familiar with the transactions entered into under the Accounts, and Pan also relied on her as he made decisions under the Accounts.

  52. [37] The remaining facts set out will focus on key dates and/or events relevant to the dispute between the parties in relation to the four main heads of claim.

  53. Trip between 30 July 2008 and 1 August 2008

  54. [38] From 30 July 2008 to 1 August 2008, DB hosted Pan, Chang and Chen on a three-day all-expenses-paid trip to Hong Kong.

  55. [39] The Plaintiffs pleaded that on 30 July 2008, Juan told Pan when he was checking in at the hotel, that DB had helped the Plaintiffs earn a profit of US$50m.

  56. [40] On 31 July 2008, DB had a meeting with Pan at the office of DB HK (“31 July 2008 Meeting”). The attendees at this meeting included Pan, Chang, Juan, Kwok and Yim.

  57. [41] The Plaintiffs pleaded that at the 31 July 2008 Meeting, Juan repeated to Pan that DB had helped the Plaintiffs earn a profit of US$50m. The Plaintiffs submitted that there did not appear to be anyone else who heard Juan make this representation other than Pan and (perhaps) Kwok (who had sat beside Pan during the meeting). Pan deposed in his AEIC that he “recall[ed] exclaiming loudly that this was the best piece of news that [he] had heard in a while”. I will refer to the two times that Juan allegedly represented to Pan that the Plaintiffs had earned a profit of US$50m collectively as “the US$50m profit representation”. DB did not admit that the US$50m profit representation had been made to Pan.

  58. [42] The Plaintiffs also pleaded that at the 31 July 2008 Meeting, DB told Pan that the Plaintiffs made a profit of US$19.26m in respect of foreign exchange transactions alone (“the US$19.26m FX profit representation”). Specifically, the Plaintiffs alleged that it was Kwok who made the US$19.26m FX profit representation to Pan. Pan deposed in his AEIC that he recalled Kwok telling him that “the Plaintiffs had also made approximately USD 20 million from foreign exchange transactions”.

  59. [43] On the other hand, Yim deposed in his AEIC that Kwok showed Pan a slide presentation titled “FX & Commodities” and dated the same day (“31 July 2008 Slides”). The 31 July 2008 Slides were in the form of hardcopies handed to Pan and the others at the meeting. In the 31 July 2008 Slides, there was a slide titled “Zillion Global: FX P/L” showing a spreadsheet which summed several items of realised and unrealised profits and losses for foreign exchange transactions, and arrived at the grand total of US$19,264,844.49. DB admitted that it had informed Pan by way of the 31 July 2008 Slides that the Plaintiffs’ profit, including unrealised profits, in respect of foreign exchange transactions was US$19,264,844.49 as at 31 July 2008.

  60. [44] At the 31 July 2008 Meeting, DB also recommended Pan to purchase various financial products, including “the Trumpet”. Thereafter, the Plaintiffs entered into, inter alia, the following transactions on 31 July 2008 (“31 July 2008 Transactions”), which the Plaintiffs pleaded generated the following financial consequences subsequently:

  61. (a) the Trumpet: alleged loss of US$12,493,100;

  62. (b) Australian dollar (“AUD”)/US dollar (“USD”) accumulator (ie, to accumulate AUD at a certain strike price in USD ): alleged loss of US$15.7m;

  63. (c) gold/USD accumulator: alleged loss of US$3.05m;

  64. (d) Credit Derivative Transactions (Citigroup Inc): profit of US$327,932.98 (agreed between the parties); and

  65. (e) Renewal Opportunity Notes (otherwise known as ‘renewable opportunity certificates with accrual notes’ (“ROCAs”)) linked to uranium companies Cameco Corporation and USEC Inc: alleged loss of US$646,500.

  66. [45] I will briefly provide some description of the financial products mentioned at [44(a)] to [44(c)] and [44(e)] above which allegedly resulted in losses for the Plaintiffs.

  67. [46] The Trumpet was five separate strangles which operated independently of each other, and an investor would sell the Trumpet for an upfront combined premium of US$200,000. Each of the five strangles was for a specified duration and was a combination of (i) a put option for AUD, with a lower “strike price” (in USD), and (ii) a call option for AUD, with a higher “strike price” (in USD). Whether or not the options would be exercised by the buyer of the Trumpet depended on how the spot price (prevailing market price) for AUD changed. If the spot price for AUD fell below the lower strike price, the buyer of the Trumpet could exercise the put option, and the investor would have to buy a certain amount of AUD from him at the lower strike price. If instead the spot price for AUD rose above the higher strike price, the buyer of the Trumpet could exercise the call option, and the investor would have to sell a certain amount of AUD to him at the higher strike price. The five strangles had different combinations of lower and higher strike prices and different specified durations.

  68. [47] Accordingly, the maximum profit the investor would receive from the Trumpet was the upfront combined premium of US$200,000. The investor would enjoy this maximum profit when the spot price for AUD remained within each of the five strangles’ range of lower and higher strike prices. However, the investor’s profit would be reduced whenever the buyer of the Trumpet exercised a put option or a call option when the spot price for AUD moved outside of a strangle’s range of lower and higher strike prices, ie, when it either fell below the lower strike price, or rose above the higher strike price. Should the spot price for AUD move far outside of a strangle’s range of lower and higher strike prices, the investor might see his upfront premium completely depleted and also suffer a loss.

  69. [48] As for the accumulators, the type of accumulator in question was a structured product under which an investor committed to purchase and accumulate a varying quantity of a product at a pre-agreed “strike price” over a specified duration. The strike price would have been set at a discount to the product’s spot price at the time the accumulator was purchased. The investor would be obligated to continue purchasing and accumulating the product at the strike price, unless the product’s spot price reached a pre-agreed “knock-out price”. The accumulator would then be “knocked out” (terminated). The knock-out price would have been set at a price higher than the product’s spot price at the time the accumulator was purchased.

  70. [49] Accordingly, accumulating the product would be profitable when its spot price remained higher than the strike price. However, accumulating the product would be loss-making when its spot price became lower than the strike price. The investor would be obligated under the terms of the accumulator to continue purchasing the product at the strike price, and could additionally be required to accumulate a larger quantity of the product as well (at the strike price) at a pre-agreed “gearing ratio”. The gearing ratio was the multiplier used to determine the quantity of the product the investor would be required to purchase. At the time of purchase of the accumulator, the strike price could be negotiated lower in exchange for a higher gearing ratio. The investor bore the risk of capital loss contingent on a decline in the product’s spot price. (For a description of accumulators, see Deutsche Bank AG v Chang Tse Wen and another appeal [2013] 4 SLR 886 (“Chang Tse Wen”) at [11]; Teo Wai Cheong v Crédit Industriel et Commercial and another appeal [2013] 3 SLR 573 at [4]).

  71. [50] As for the ROCAs, a ROCA was a structured product which was an equity-linked note with a payoff dependent on the equity’s performance over a specified duration, and an investor’s principal (that was used to purchase the ROCA) was not guaranteed. The ROCA was thus unlike a typical bond where an investor expected to receive his principal back. When the equity traded within a specified range, the ROCA earned a fixed interest that was above the market return. However, when the equity traded outside this range, the ROCA did not earn any interest. Additionally, the ROCA might have a mandatory early redemption period such that if the equity traded at a specified price level before maturity, the ROCA must be redeemed for a pre-specified amount. At maturity, the investor might also be required to take physical delivery of the equity, which meant that he might lose his principal if the price of the equity dropped. Therefore, the investor bore the risk of capital loss contingent on a decline in the equity’s price.

  72. [51] It was the Plaintiffs’ case that the US$50m profit representation and the US$19.26m FX profit representation were misrepresentations and that Pan relied solely on these representations when the Plaintiffs entered into the 31 July 2008 Transactions.

  73. August 2008

  74. [52] In August 2008, collateral shortfall problems started materialising in the Accounts.

  75. 18 September 2008 Meeting (and the 17 September 2008 Margin Call Letter)

  76. [53] On 18 September 2008, DB had a meeting with Pan at the office of DB HK (“18 September 2008 Meeting”). DB pleaded that during this meeting, its employees informed Pan that DB had written a margin call letter addressed to Zillion and dated 17 September 2008 (“17 September 2008 Margin Call Letter”), and proceeded to discuss the letter’s contents with Pan.

  77. [54] The 17 September 2008 Margin Call Letter was in relation to Zillion’s advisory account. It stated that there was a current shortfall of US$41,505,215.56 between the collateral value and the total exposure, and accordingly, DB requested that Zillion take immediate steps to restore the shortfall by 19 September 2008, by either providing additional security or reducing the total exposure. DB added that during the interim period when the shortfall was outstanding, it reserved its rights under the contracts, including the right to liquidate any part or the whole of the collateral without prior notice and the right to terminate the facility.

  78. [55] However, the Plaintiffs pleaded that DB neither sent the 17 September 2008 Margin Call Letter nor communicated its contents to them at the material time. The Plaintiffs claimed that a copy of this letter was only provided by DB’s solicitors to the Plaintiffs’ solicitors after 13 October 2008.

  79. 3 October 2008 Margin Call Letter

  80. [56] I proceed to discuss the events on the night of 3 October 2008. At or around 9.56pm, Juan sent an e-mail to Chang with the subject title “Fw: [Issued Margin Call Letter] / Zillion Global Group [with Zillion’s advisory account number]” (“3 October 2008 E-mail”), and copied DB’s employees, including Yim and Sze, on the e-mail. As for the contents of this e-mail, Juan had simply forwarded an internal DB e-mail and its attachment. The internal DB e-mail was originally sent on 3 October 2008 at or around 9.23pm by one Ms Samantha Leung from DB’s Credit Risk Management to Juan, and the other recipients included Tsang, Yim and Sze (the latter two were copied on the e-mail).

  81. [57] The internal DB e-mail stated:

  82. [58] The attachment was a margin call letter DB had written, addressed to Zillion and dated 3 October 2008 (“3 October 2008 Margin Call Letter”). It was in relation to Zillion’s advisory account. The 3 October 2008 Margin Call Letter stated that there was a current shortfall of US$8,950,765.73 between the collateral value and the total exposure, and accordingly, DB requested that Zillion take immediate steps to restore the shortfall by 6 October 2008, by either providing additional security or reducing the total exposure. As with the 17 September 2008 Margin Call Letter (see [54] above), DB added that during the interim period when the shortfall was outstanding, it reserved its rights under the contracts, including the right to liquidate any part or the whole of the collateral without prior notice and the right to terminate the facility. This letter was signed by Chiu and Samantha Leung.

  83. [59] At around the time Juan sent the 3 October 2008 E-mail to Chang, Juan also met Chang at Pan’s office in Taipei. This “3 October 2008 Meeting” was held at around 10pm. DB pleaded that when Juan met Chang, Juan discussed the contents of the 3 October 2008 Margin Call Letter with Chang. On the other hand, Chang deposed in her AEIC that while Juan mentioned that she had e-mailed a document to Chang, Juan did not tell Chang that the document was a margin call letter.

  84. [60] The Plaintiffs pleaded that Chang did not check the 3 October 2008 E-mail that day, which was a Friday. On 4 October 2008, there were telephone conversations between Chang and DB’s employees. The Plaintiffs pleaded that it was the following day, on or about 5 October 2008, that Chang opened the 3 October 2008 E-mail. They averred that Chang could not understand the contents of the e-mail because it was in English (which she could not read save for simple words), and that when she called Juan to ask what the e-mail was about, Juan said that she did not know as she herself had not read the e-mail.

  85. [61] It was part of the Plaintiffs’ case that sending the 3 October 2008 E-mail with the enclosed 3 October 2008 Margin Call Letter to Chang did not mean that DB had sent the 3 October 2008 Margin Call Letter to the Plaintiffs/Zillion because the e-mail and the letter should have been sent to Pan instead. As with the 17 September 2008 Margin Call Letter (see [55] above), the Plaintiffs averred that DB neither sent the 3 October 2008 Margin Call Letter nor communicated its contents to them at the material time.

  86. 6 October 2008 Margin Call Letter

  87. [62] On 6 October 2008, DB had a meeting with Pan at the office of DB HK (“6 October 2008 Meeting”). The attendees at this meeting included Pan, Chang and Chen, and, from DB, Juan, Tsang, Yim, Sze and Chiu.

  88. [63] DB pleaded that it had issued to the Plaintiffs a further margin call letter addressed to Pan, Zillion and dated 6 October 2008 (“6 October 2008 Margin Call Letter”), and DB’s case was that the letter was handed to Pan at the 6 October 2008 Meeting, and that it had also informed Pan of the shortfall in the Accounts.

  89. [64] The 6 October 2008 Margin Call Letter was in relation to the FX GEM account linked to Zillion’s advisory account. It stated that as at the valuation date of 6 October 2008, DB was under-collateralised in the sum of US$17,726,681.62, and accordingly requested that Zillion “post collateral with a post haircut market value of USD 17,726,681.62 for value 08 Oct 2008” [original emphasis omitted]. Unlike the 17 September 2008 Margin Call Letter and the 3 October 2008 Margin Call Letter (see [54] and [58] above respectively), DB did not add that during the interim period when the shortfall was outstanding, it reserved its rights under the contracts, including the right to liquidate any part or the whole of the collateral without prior notice and the right to terminate the facility. However, the Plaintiffs did not raise any issue with regard to the differences between the contents of the 6 October 2008 Margin Call Letter and those of the earlier two letters.

  90. [65] The Plaintiffs did allege that DB neither gave a copy of the 6 October 2008 Margin Call Letter nor communicated its contents to Pan until after 13 October 2008. The Plaintiffs alleged that there was no mention of such a letter during the 6 October 2008 Meeting.

  91. 8 October 2008 to 12 October 2008

  92. [66] Thereafter, from 8 October 2008 to 12 October 2008, there were, amongst other things, telephone conversations involving Chang and DB’s employees.

  93. 13 October 2008 Transactions

  94. [68] Later that afternoon, DB closed out certain positions under the Accounts (“13 October 2008 Transactions”), and these included selling five gold call options, one AUD call option, three AUD forwards and A$80m, and unwinding a gold option.

  95. [69] At about 7.28pm, Chang called Juan and Juan informed her that DB had closed out certain positions under the Accounts. Pan deposed in his AEIC that Chang thereafter informed him of the same.

  96. Parties’ cases

  97. [70] The Plaintiffs had four main heads of claim against DB, namely that:

  98. (a) DB breached an implied term of the contracts with the Plaintiffs which obliged DB to provide regular updates on the state of the Accounts and the transactions thereunder;

  99. (b) DB breached a tortious duty of care it owed to the Plaintiffs to take reasonable care and skill;

  100. (c) DB was liable to the Plaintiffs for misrepresentation under s 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act (Cap 390, 1994 Rev Ed) and for negligent misrepresentation when DB made the US$50m profit representation and the US$19.26m FX profit representation; and

  101. (d) DB breached the contracts with the Plaintiffs by unilaterally closing out certain positions under the Accounts through the 13 October 2008 Transactions.

  102. [71] In so far as DB relied on contract terms in its defence, the Plaintiffs relied on ss 2 and 3 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act (Cap 396, 1994 Rev Ed) (“UCTA”) and pleaded that any contract term that sought to, amongst other things, exclude or restrict DB’s liability for breach of contract or for negligence was unenforceable because it did not satisfy the requirement of reasonableness.

  103. [72] As mentioned at [4] above, DB also pleaded that the Plaintiffs’ actions founded on contract and on tort in respect of and/or relating to any matter in the Accounts that had arisen prior to 3 July 2008 had accrued more than six years before the time the Plaintiffs filed the writ of summons on 3 July 2014, and were barred by virtue of s 6(1)(a) of the Limitation Act.

  104. [73] I will address the Plaintiffs’ four main heads of claim seriatim. In so doing, I will generally analyse these claims on the premise that there was no contract term which excluded or restricted DB’s liability. I will then proceed to consider, where necessary, whether there was any contract term that sought to exclude or restrict DB’s liability and whether such a term was enforceable. I will thereafter also consider, where necessary, the issue of a time bar.

  105. Issue of breach of an implied term

  106. [74] I proceed to consider the Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of an implied term.

  107. Summary of the parties’ positions

  108. [75] The Plaintiffs pleaded that it was an implied term of the contracts between them and DB that DB must provide regular updates on the state of the Accounts and the transactions thereunder:

  109. (a) including providing information on the total assets, total liabilities, net assets/liabilities, outstanding notional values, collateral value, total exposure, mark-to-market value and notional value (“Specific Details”); and

  110. (b) providing these updates daily.

  111. I will refer to the pleaded implied term as “the Alleged Implied Term”.

  112. [76] The Plaintiffs pleaded that DB breached the Alleged Implied Term by failing to provide daily updates with the Specific Details in relation to the Plaintiffs’ investments in structured products for foreign exchange and commodities, such as gold, and in structured products for equities. While DB provided the Plaintiffs with monthly client statements, monthly trading activity statements for foreign exchange investments, and various letters containing mark-to-market values for transactions, the Plaintiffs alleged that these did not set out all the liabilities for the Accounts, the collateral value of the assets, the total exposure of the Accounts, and all the mark-to-market values of outstanding transactions.

  113. [77] The Plaintiffs pleaded that had DB provided daily updates with the Specific Details, they would not have entered into transactions with a total exposure in excess of the value of their assets with DB, and they thus claimed all loss suffered as a result of this alleged breach.

  114. [78] On the other hand, DB denied that the Alleged Implied Term was an implied term of the contracts between the Plaintiffs and DB. DB also pleaded that there was no obligation to provide the Specific Details to the Plaintiffs in addition to the information set out in the monthly client statements. In this regard, DB relied on various contract terms to support its pleadings.

  115. [79] Further or in the alternative, DB pleaded that even if the Alleged Implied Term were an implied term of the contracts between the Plaintiffs and DB, DB had regularly provided the Specific Details to the Plaintiffs.

  116. Decision

  117. [80] As the Court of Appeal stated in Sembcorp Marine Ltd v PPL Holdings Pte Ltd and another and another appeal [2013] 4 SLR 193 (“Sembcorp Marine”), the process of implying a term in a contract is “best understood as an exercise in giving effect to the parties’ presumed intentions” (at [93]) [emphasis in original]. The three-step process to be used for implying a term in a contract is as follows (see Sembcorp Marine at [101]):

  118. (a) first, a gap in the contract must have arisen because both parties did not contemplate the gap – a term will not be implied where one party had expressly contemplated the gap (see CAA Technologies Pte Ltd v Newcon Builders Pte Ltd [2017] 2 SLR 940 at [75]);

  119. (c) third, the proposed term must be one which the parties, having regard to the need for business efficacy, would have responded “Oh, of course!” had the proposed term been put to them at the time of the contract – ie, the proposed term must pass the officious bystander test.

  120. Whether there was a gap in the contracts that the parties did not contemplate

  121. [81] It was not disputed that there was no express term in the contracts between the Plaintiffs and DB that DB must provide regular updates with the Specific Details, whether daily or otherwise. The question then is whether there was a gap in the contracts as to DB’s obligation to provide updates on the Accounts that the parties did not contemplate. The Plaintiffs contended that there was a gap because the parties did not and could not have contemplated this issue as to whether DB was to provide the Specific Details. On the other hand, DB contended that there was no gap because the contractual documents had clearly set out and defined the parties’ respective rights and responsibilities.

  122. [82] I find that in entering the contracts with the Plaintiffs, DB contemplated the type and frequency of updates it would provide the Plaintiffs. DB contemplated that it would provide the Plaintiffs with “bank statements”, since there was a “Bank statements” section in the Service Agreement (the document was mentioned at [12(a)] above). This section, however, did not specify the information that was to be provided in these bank statements or how frequently these bank statements were to be provided.

  123. [83] On the other hand, the contractual documents stipulated that DB was not required to provide some of the Specific Details to the Plaintiffs unless the Plaintiffs requested them. For instance, DB was not required to inform the Plaintiffs of “any potential losses which may arise because of changes in market quotations” (under cl 6 of “Our responsibilities” in the Service Agreement) [emphasis added]. DB was also not required to inform the Plaintiffs of the mark-to-market valuation of a derivative transaction, where the “Pricing risks in relation to Over-the-Counter financial derivative transactions” sections in both the Risk Disclosure Statement and the Risk Disclosure Statement (FX) (the documents were mentioned respectively at [12(b)] and [12(d)] above) stated:

  124. [84] I do not accept the Plaintiffs’ submission that just because the contractual documents were based on DB’s standard form contracts and were not negotiated between the parties, this meant that the parties did not and could not have contemplated the issue as to whether DB was to provide the Specific Details.

  125. [85] Pan was an experienced investor who had advisory accounts with other banks before he opened advisory accounts with DB (ie, the Accounts). Indeed, it was the Plaintiffs’ case that the client statements from Citibank and JP Morgan contained more information, at least with respect to providing the mark-to-market values, than those from DB. If the Plaintiffs in fact considered the additional information important, they would have asked if DB’s client statements would include such information.

  126. [86] Furthermore, DB would have been aware what information its client statements would provide. It chose not to provide more information initially (DB provided more information in respect of the Specific Details after 13 October 2008 ).

  127. [87] Therefore, there was no true gap in the contracts between the Plaintiffs and DB as to DB’s obligation to provide the Specific Details.

  128. Whether the Alleged Implied Term was necessary for business efficacy

  129. [88] Even if there were a gap in the contracts as to DB’s obligation to provide the Specific Details that the parties did not contemplate, the question would then have been whether it was necessary to imply the Alleged Implied Term for business efficacy.

  130. [89] The Plaintiffs first pleaded that the Alleged Implied Term was necessary for them to maintain a higher collateral value than the total exposure, and to maintain the margin cover DB required. In their pleadings, the Plaintiffs referred to the “Credit, banking and foreign exchange facilities” section in the Service Agreement, and the “Margin requirements” section in the Risk Disclosure Statement. The Plaintiffs also pleaded that without the Specific Details, they would not be in a position to make informed decisions in relation to transactions under the Accounts. The Plaintiffs pleaded that as a result, they entered into transactions with a total exposure in excess of the value of their assets with DB.

  131. [90] On the other hand, DB submitted that it was not necessary to imply the Alleged Implied Term. It submitted that the banking relationship with the Plaintiffs was commercially workable without DB providing them with the Specific Details.

  132. [91] I make two preliminary points. First, while the Plaintiffs’ submitted that the incomplete information DB provided, ie, without the Specific Details, allowed DB to misrepresent the state of the Accounts on several occasions because the Plaintiffs had no means of verifying the information it provided, this had not been pleaded by the Plaintiffs. It is also a separate matter from the question of implying a term whether DB misrepresented the state of the Accounts on several occasions, and I will only deal with this under the Plaintiffs’ claim for misrepresentation (see [70(c)] above). Also, as far as the issue of misrepresentation is concerned, the Plaintiffs pleaded that DB was liable in respect of only two specific representations, ie, the US$50m profit representation and the US$19.26m FX profit representation.

  133. [92] Second, DB provided the mark-to-market values for equities options and derivatives in client statements for August 2008, and provided daily summary sheets after 13 October 2008, which included information on items constituting the Specific Details, such as that on the total assets, the collateral value and the total exposure. However, the fact that DB provided some of the Specific Details to the Plaintiffs subsequently did not mean that providing such information was necessary to give efficiency to the contracts between the Plaintiffs and DB.

  134. [93] I set out the relevant contract terms to which the parties referred. The “Credit, banking and foreign exchange facilities” section in the Service Agreement stated:

  135. [94] The “Margin requirements” section in the Risk Disclosure Statement stated:

  136. I add that similar contract terms to these were also found in the “Margin requirements” section in the Risk Disclosure Statement (FX).

  137. [95] From these contract terms, the Plaintiffs had to maintain a higher collateral value than the total exposure (cl 5 of “Credit, banking and foreign exchange facilities” in the Service Agreement) and had to maintain the required margin cover (cll 1 and 4 of “Margin requirements” in the Risk Disclosure Statement). However, the Plaintiffs did not express that a fear of insufficient collateral deterred them from entering into transactions under the Accounts.

  138. [96] Furthermore, the collateral and margin requirements were to secure the Plaintiffs’ obligations to DB under the Accounts. As between the Plaintiffs and DB, the collateral and margin requirements were to safeguard and protect DB’s interests.

  139. [97] To ensure that the Plaintiffs met the collateral and margin requirements, DB did not necessarily have to update the Plaintiffs with the Specific Details. In this regard, I refer to another contract term relied on by DB, cl 2.6 of the Master Agreement, which was located under the “Obligations” section. It stated:

  140. [98] Clause 2.6 of the Master Agreement stated that DB would notify the Plaintiffs of the collateral and margin requirements, and when there was insufficient collateral, DB would give the Plaintiffs “one business day’s notice” to deliver additional collateral. Such a clause meant that for the Plaintiffs to maintain a higher collateral value than the total exposure and to maintain the required margin cover, DB did not have to update the Plaintiffs with the Specific Details; DB could simply notify the Plaintiffs of the collateral and margin requirements they had to fulfil.

  141. [99] I also observe that cl 2.7 of the Master Agreement, in a related context, stated:

  142. [100] In my view, it was the Plaintiffs’ responsibility to monitor the Accounts and ensure, amongst other things, that trading limits (the “Prescribed Limits”) were not exceeded and the close-out ratios not reached. Hence, while DB’s regular updates to the Plaintiffs with the Specific Details might assist them in monitoring for themselves whether there was sufficient collateral in the Accounts, it was not DB’s responsibility to provide such updates of its own accord. Accordingly, there was no necessity to provide such regular updates for business efficacy for the contracts between the Plaintiffs and DB.

  143. [101] In any event, I find that the Plaintiffs themselves knew or at least had an idea of their positions in relation to the collateral value, the total exposure and the margin cover. This was particularly so when the Plaintiffs entered into transactions under the Accounts.

  144. [102] For instance, both Pan and Chang were aware that DB assigned different collateral values for different assets, and Chang was explaining the same to Pan in one of the telephone conversations involving her, Pan and DB’s employees.

  145. [103] Chang also knew how to do some form of calculation of the mark-to-market loss and demonstrated this understanding to DB’s employees. Chang could also calculate profits of transactions, and she conveyed this to DB’s employees in a telephone conversation on 2 June 2008 at or around 2.49pm. I referred to this conversation at [32] above. The English translation of the relevant transcript stated:

  146. [104] As can be seen from that conversation, Chang was even teasing Juan (from DB) if DB wanted to pay Chang to make calculations for DB. While this was meant as a joke, there was no joke that Chang was making her own calculations. Chang’s reference to her background in finance also gave a different picture from her AEIC where she said at para 17 that she did not have any financial investment qualifications (see [31] above). Hence, even if it were true that Chang did not have such formal qualifications, she was clearly experienced in financial matters as she herself alluded to. As mentioned at [33] above, I found Chang’s evidence at trial that she was not doing calculations on behalf of Pan hard to believe.

  147. [105] In so far as Chang also gave evidence that she did not know how to calculate the mark-to-market value and the collateral value, it might be that Chang was not able to calculate all the various items constituting the Specific Details with complete accuracy, where some of the figures were generated by DB’s internal system. Yet, in the light of the transcripts for various telephone conversations, I find that Chang was fairly knowledgeable about the various items constituting the Specific Details and that she assisted Pan with monitoring them for the Accounts and the transactions thereunder.

  148. [106] In any event, it was obvious that the Plaintiffs knew that they had to maintain a higher collateral value than the total exposure and to maintain the required margin cover. If the Plaintiffs were not able to do full calculations for these objectives without the Specific Details, they should have asked for them to be provided on a daily basis. They knew about the concept of the Specific Details such as the mark-to-market values (see [85] above). Yet, transactions continued without the need for such details.

  149. [107] Indeed, it appeared that the Plaintiffs preferred to do calculations in relation to their portfolio on their own apart from DB. As Pan deposed in his AEIC, he said to Juan during a telephone conversation on 3 January 2008:

  150. At trial, DB’s counsel cross-examined Pan on this statement, asking him whether he was referring to the calculations for the collateral required for his transactions under the Accounts. While Pan denied that he was referring to such calculations, he was unable to tell the court what the calculations were for if not for the collateral required. I add that even though Pan did not clarify what calculations he was referring to, the point is that the Plaintiffs were doing their own calculations because they believed that DB had its own way of doing its calculations. In other words, the Plaintiffs knew they had to protect their own interests.

  151. [108] In the circumstances, I find that it was not necessary to imply the Alleged Implied Term in the contracts between the Plaintiffs and DB for business efficacy.

  152. [109] Moreover, the Plaintiffs pitched their case at a very high level, by pleading that DB had to provide daily updates with the Specific Details. The Plaintiffs’ own expert evidence from Campana did not support their pleaded case. Campana explained that daily reporting of the Specific Details was “necessary” (because margin calls could occur daily). However, in terms of market practice, he explained that monthly (not daily) reporting of mark-to-market valuation of the entire portfolio was the minimum standard, and the Plaintiffs themselves cited this evidence from Campana in their closing submissions at para 93. Moreover, while the Plaintiffs argued that the other banks such as Citibank, JP Morgan and UBS provided mark-to-market values in their client statements, the expert evidence of both Campana and Beloreshki, DB’s expert witness, was that such mark-to-market values, if they were provided, were at best provided in monthly client statements.

  153. Whether the Alleged Implied Term passed the officious bystander test

  154. [110] Given my finding that it was not necessary to imply the Alleged Implied Term in the contracts between the Plaintiffs and DB for business efficacy, it is unnecessary to consider the officious bystander test.

  155. [111] In the circumstances, I find that the Alleged Implied Term was not an implied term of the contracts between the Plaintiffs and DB.

  156. Further comments

  157. [112] I will briefly address one other point in relation to this issue of a breach of an implied term.

  158. [113] DB pleaded that even if the Alleged Implied Term were an implied term of the contracts between the Plaintiffs and DB, DB had regularly provided the Specific Details to the Plaintiffs (see [79] above). In so far as this was a claim that DB would not have breached the Alleged Implied Term if it were implied in the contracts, DB did not seem to make a similar submission in its closing submissions. In fact, in its closing submissions, DB submitted that the Specific Details could be, and were, communicated on an ad hoc basis whenever the Plaintiffs requested them. Such a submission would not have supported a claim that DB had regularly provided the Specific Details to the Plaintiffs, whether daily or otherwise. In any case, given my finding that the Alleged Implied Term was not an implied term of the contracts between the Plaintiffs and DB, DB was not required to provide the Plaintiffs with the Specific Details daily.

  159. Issue of negligence

  160. [114] I proceed to consider the Plaintiffs’ claim for negligence.

  161. Summary of the parties’ positions

  162. [115] The Plaintiffs pleaded that by DB’s conduct and/or representations, it had assumed a duty of care in tort towards the Plaintiffs to exercise reasonable care and skill in providing advice to them as a reasonably competent and prudent financial adviser and/or banker would. The Plaintiffs also submitted that the standard of care was to be determined by reference to the steps that a reasonable and competent bank ought to have taken. In this regard, the Plaintiffs pleaded that DB breached its duty of care and pleaded 12 heads of breaches. In the Plaintiffs’ closing submissions, they grouped these breaches into two main categories:

  163. (a) the failure to manage the Accounts, to advise the Plaintiffs in accordance with their objective of wealth preservation, and to protect their wealth from depreciation; and

  164. (b) the failure in relation to risk management.

  165. [116] The Plaintiffs pleaded that DB’s conduct and actions resulted in enormous profit margins for DB, but extensive losses for the Plaintiffs. They claimed all loss suffered as a result of DB’s negligence and/or breaches of its duty of care. The Plaintiffs further pleaded that DB’s breaches of duty amounted to gross negligence.

  166. [117] On the other hand, DB denied that it had assumed a duty of care towards the Plaintiffs. DB pleaded that its duty and/or obligations were at all times governed by the contractual documents with the Plaintiffs, and averred that it did not at any material time provide the Plaintiffs with advice on the Accounts. DB also pleaded that even if it owed the Plaintiffs a duty of care as the Plaintiffs pleaded, it did not breach such duty.

  167. [118] As mentioned at [73] above, I will address this claim for negligence first on the premise that there was no contract term which excluded or restricted DB’s liability.

  168. Decision

  169. Whether DB owed a duty of care to the Plaintiffs

  170. [119] A duty of care will arise in tort if (a) it is factually foreseeable that the defendant’s negligence might cause the plaintiff to suffer harm (the threshold issue); (b) there is sufficient legal proximity between the parties; and (c) policy considerations do not militate against a duty of care (Spandeck Engineering (S) Pte Ltd v Defence Science & Technology Agency [2007] 4 SLR(R) 100 at [73], [77], [83]). The question as to whether a duty of care has arisen must be assessed by reference to the sequence of relevant facts and events up to the time the alleged duty is said to have been breached (Chang Tse Wen ([49] supra) at [22]).

  171. (1) Factual foreseeability

  172. [120] To determine whether it was factually foreseeable that a failure by DB to exercise reasonable care would harm the Plaintiffs, it is necessary first to establish what DB undertook to do with reasonable care (Chang Tse Wen at [30]).

  173. [121] The Plaintiffs submitted that DB undertook to help Pan manage his wealth and communicated this to him, and so it was foreseeable that if DB did not exercise reasonable care and skill in discharging its role, the Plaintiffs would suffer loss. On the other hand, DB submitted that it never undertook and could not have undertaken to help Pan manage his wealth under the Accounts, because Pan preferred to make his own investment decisions and it was entirely up to him to decide what transactions to enter into under the Accounts.

  174. [122] The Accounts referred to the Plaintiffs’ two advisory accounts and the linked FX GEM Account, for which Pan made the decision as to which transactions to enter into. The fact that Pan decided which transactions to enter into under the Accounts, which included transactions not recommended by DB, did not mean that DB did not render assistance to Pan with the Accounts. It just meant that the decision-making lay with Pan.

  175. [123] Despite DB’s averment in its pleadings that it did not at any material time provide the Plaintiffs with advice on the Accounts (see [117] above), this was factually not the case. There were many instances of telephone discussions during which DB gave advice or made recommendations. Yim himself agreed during cross-examination that DB would give advice on wealth management to a client for an advisory account. Yim agreed that DB had set up a team of experts in April 2008 “to help [Pan] manage his wealth”; this was in relation to the Accounts, ie, advisory accounts. Also, in the “Customised Wealth Management” slides dated June 2008, which DB presented to Pan during the full-day meeting on 3 July 2008 in Taipei, DB stated: “We are committed to providing you with a banking, investment management, advisory and fiduciary platform that delivers proprietary and open architecture solutions of superior quality to cope with your needs” [original emphasis omitted; emphasis added in italics]. In relation to this statement, Yim agreed that DB provided an advisory platform.

  176. [124] It was held in Tradewaves Ltd and others v Standard Chartered Bank and another suit [2017] SGHC 93 that it was factually foreseeable that if the bank in question did not exercise reasonable care when making a decision to recommend a certain investment to the plaintiffs with non-discretionary accounts (advisory accounts), and if the plaintiffs acted on the recommendation, they might be harmed as a consequence (at [111], [113]).

  177. [125] I find that DB did give advice on wealth management to the Plaintiffs in relation to the Accounts. It was factually foreseeable that a failure by DB to exercise reasonable care when giving such advice would cause the Plaintiffs to suffer loss, if the Plaintiffs acted on the given advice.

  178. (2) Proximity

  179. [126] The Court of Appeal has also recently expounded on the proximity requirement in NTUC Foodfare Co-operative Ltd v SIA Engineering Co Ltd and another [2018] 2 SLR 588 (“NTUC Foodfare”). I summarise the applicable principles therein:

  180. (a) Proximity includes physical, circumstantial and causal proximity, and incorporates the twin criteria of voluntary assumption of responsibility by the defendant and reliance by the plaintiff (see NTUC Foodfare at [40(a)]).

  181. (b) Other proximity factors include (see NTUC Foodfare at [40(b)]):

  182. (i) the defendant’s knowledge in relation to the plaintiff of the risk of harm, or of reliance by the plaintiff, or of the vulnerability of the plaintiff; and

  183. (ii) the defendant’s control over the situation giving rise to the risk of harm and the plaintiff’s corresponding vulnerability.

  184. (c) In cases of pure economic loss, there may be sufficient legal proximity between the parties even if the defendant does not voluntarily assume responsibility to the plaintiff and the plaintiff does not specifically rely on the defendant not to cause it loss (see NTUC Foodfare at [41]).

  185. [127] The contractual matrix is also a factor to be considered when determining the question of legal proximity between the parties, and this includes circumstances showing that the defendant never undertook any relevant responsibility in its contract or that the defendant qualified it or even disclaimed it (see Chang Tse Wen at [37]). An express disclaimer of responsibility can prevent a duty of care from arising in tort, by negating the proximity sought to be established by the concept of an “assumption of responsibility”, but such a disclaimer will be subject to the UCTA if it takes the form of a contractual exclusion clause (see Go Dante Yap v Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG [2011] 4 SLR 559 at [38]). For the time being, along with addressing this claim for negligence first on the premise that there was no contract term which excluded or restricted DB’s liability (see [118] above), I will proceed on the assumption that there was no disclaimer or qualification of responsibility in the contracts between the parties.

  186. [128] As I found at [125] above, DB did give advice on wealth management to the Plaintiffs in relation to the Accounts. DB gave advice and made recommendations to the Plaintiffs on transactions under the Accounts through the Relationship Manager Juan and a team of experts. This team of experts comprised at least ten product specialists in various types of investments, including Tsang (for investment advisory), Kwok (for foreign exchange strategy), Yim (head of global investment and sales) and Chan (for fixed income strategy).

  187. [129] I consider the type of advice DB gave the Plaintiffs on wealth management in relation to the Accounts. This included:

  188. (a) DB’s almost daily telephone discussions with Chang and/or Pan to discuss investment ideas and pricing quotes and to provide updates on the Accounts (see [15] above);

  189. (b) DB’s monthly meetings with Pan, in which Juan would review the Plaintiffs’ portfolio and the different product specialists would update on the state of the Plaintiffs’ investments in the respective products; and

  190. (c) DB’s responses to Pan’s requests for advice on what he should do with the Plaintiffs’ portfolio.

  191. [130] In so far as DB argued that it had given recommendations to the Plaintiffs in response to what Pan himself wanted, this does not assist DB because it instead affirmed that DB was advising the Plaintiffs in relation to the Accounts.

  192. [131] I find that there was an advisory relationship between DB and the Plaintiffs, beyond the normal role of a salesperson in the private banking context introducing products (see Chang Tse Wen at [43]).

  193. [132] I also find that Pan did consider DB’s advice and recommendations, even though he did not always agree with DB. Also, Pan’s requests to DB for advice in relation to the Accounts evidenced some reliance on DB. Such reliance on Pan’s part was also reasonable, in the light of how DB itself gave advice to Pan in relation to the Accounts and provided him with a team of experts/product specialists in various types of investments.

  194. [133] I accept that the advisory relationship between DB and the Plaintiffs did not stem from the contractual documents executed between them, where in DB’s words, the contractual documents generally recorded “an execution-only contractual relationship”. No investment advisory agreement was signed between the parties. These facts, in and of themselves, however, did not preclude a duty of care from arising in tort.

  195. [134] In the circumstances, I find that there was voluntary assumption of responsibility by DB to give advice on wealth management to the Plaintiffs in relation to the Accounts, and that there was reliance by the Plaintiffs on such advice being given with reasonable care and skill. I find that there was sufficient legal proximity between the parties for a duty of care to arise in tort, owing from DB to the Plaintiffs.

  196. (3) Policy considerations

  197. [135] In this case, I am of the view that there was no policy consideration militating against a duty of care to the Plaintiffs on the part of DB.

  198. [136] Therefore, I find that DB owed the Plaintiffs a duty of care in tort when giving them advice on wealth management in relation to the Accounts.

  199. Whether DB was liable for any breach of its duty of care to the Plaintiffs

  200. [137] The question then is whether DB breached its duty of care to the Plaintiffs. Answering this question requires defining the scope of the duty of care and the standard of care owed by DB.

  201. [138] The standard of care DB owed to the Plaintiffs when giving advice on wealth management in relation to the Accounts is determined by reference to the advice that a reasonable and competent bank in DB’s position ought to have given (Chang Tse Wen at [72]).

  202. [139] I turn to consider the two categories of breaches which the Plaintiffs, in their closing submissions, alleged DB committed (see [115] above):

  203. (a) the failure to manage the Accounts, to advise the Plaintiffs in accordance with their objective of wealth preservation, and to protect their wealth from depreciation; and

  204. (b) the failure in relation to risk management.

  205. As mentioned, the Plaintiffs had pleaded 12 heads of breaches which they grouped into these two categories. The first of the 12 heads of breaches is that at [139(a)] above. The remaining 11 heads of breaches were grouped under that at [139(b)] above.

  206. [140] I make two preliminary points. First, I find that the standard of care owed by DB did not involve DB “managing” the Accounts, as might be suggested at [139(a)] above. The decisions as to which transactions to enter into under the Accounts (advisory accounts) were to be made by the Plaintiffs; DB had no discretion in managing the Accounts. I emphasise that the standard of care DB owed to the Plaintiffs was with regard to giving advice on wealth management in relation to the Accounts.

  207. [141] Second, as DB submitted, one difficulty with the Plaintiffs’ claim for negligence was Pan’s own evidence at the trial. I reproduce the relevant portion of Pan’s cross-examination:

  208. In fact, Pan maintained the same position during his re-examination, as follows:

  209. [142] Although the Plaintiffs submitted that DB had taken Pan’s evidence out of context, I do not agree. Pan’s evidence and position at the trial seemed to contradict the Plaintiffs’ case that DB breached its duty of care to them when giving them advice on wealth management in relation to the Accounts. Pan appeared not to take issue with the advice that DB gave, but was complaining instead that DB “lie[d]” to him. It would thus seem that Pan was not complaining that DB was negligent in giving advice, but instead that DB told certain “lies” or made certain misrepresentations. It was not clear what these “lies” were about. Nevertheless, despite Pan’s evidence suggesting that he was not complaining about DB’s negligence in giving advice, I will consider the two categories of breaches of duty which the Plaintiffs alleged DB had committed since the Plaintiffs were still pursuing them.

  210. (1) Failure to advise in accordance with an objective of wealth preservation

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