Skip to content
Grounds publishedDecided 4 Sep 2019

High Court

Singapore Medical Council v BXR

Feedback & support

[2019] SGHC 205Case no. Originating Summons No 14 of 201829 paragraphs

What happened, in plain English

There is no plain-English summary of this judgment yet.

Ask about this judgment

Grounds of decision

Official text from eLitigation

  1. Introduction

  2. Background facts

  3. [3] The respondent is a specialist in plastic surgery who was practising at his own medical clinic (“the Clinic”) at all material times. Between 5 January 2008 and 24 August 2013, the respondent treated one Ms P (“the Patient”) for her condition of enlarged parotid glands with the use of botulinum toxin (more commonly known as “botox”) injections. The treatment was a success as the respondent was able to substantially reduce the Patient’s parotid glands.

  4. [4] On 7 April 2014, the Patient filed a complaint against the respondent alleging that the respondent had, without her consent, used her confidential medical information and unanonymised photographs in a chapter of his book and in at least two medical presentations: GD at [3]. On 9 October 2014, the Complaints Committee of the SMC wrote to the respondent, inviting him to provide his written explanation to the complaint that was filed against him. The respondent did so by way of a letter dated 11 December 2014. The respondent’s case was that he had obtained the Patient’s consent to use her unanonymised photographs and to describe her case in medical publications and presentations: GD at [4].

  5. [5] Almost two and a half years after the respondent had provided his written explanation to the complaint, the SMC issued a Notice of Inquiry dated 25 May 2017 setting out the five charges that were being brought against the respondent. The Notice of Inquiry was subsequently amended on 16 August 2017 to reflect the dates on which the respondent’s alleged infringing conduct had occurred.

  6. [6] The five proceeded charges (collectively, “the Charges”) can be summarised as follows:

  7. (a) Charge 1: The respondent failed to maintain clear and accurate medical records of the Patient, in that insufficient detail of the Patient’s consent given for the use of her photographs and medical information during a consultation on 4 August 2008 and in subsequent consultations from 27 April 2009 to 24 August 2013 was documented, in breach of Guideline 4.1.2. of the Singapore Medical Council Ethical Code and Ethical Guidelines (2002 edition) (“2002 ECEG”). The respondent’s conduct therefore amounted to an intentional, deliberate departure from standards observed or approved by members of the medical profession of good repute and competency, and he was thereby guilty of professional misconduct under s 53(1)(d) of the Medical Registration Act (Cap 174, 2014 Rev Ed) (“the MRA”).

  8. (b) Charge 1A: An alternative to Charge 1 alleging that the respondent’s conduct in failing to maintain clear and accurate records and failing to document the Patient’s consent in sufficient detail amounted to such serious negligence that it objectively portrayed an abuse of the privileges which accompany registration as a medical practitioner, and he was thereby guilty of professional misconduct under s 53(1)(d) of the MRA.

  9. (c) Charge 2: The respondent failed to obtain the Patient’s informed consent before using her unanonymised photographs in a book chapter which he published in 2011, thereby resulting in a breach of the Patient’s confidentiality and privacy, and such conduct amounted to such serious negligence that it objectively portrayed an abuse of the privileges which accompany registration as a medical practitioner, and he was thereby guilty of professional misconduct under s 53(1)(d) of the MRA.

  10. (d) Charge 3: The respondent failed to obtain the Patient’s informed consent from 4 August 2008 to 2013 for the use of her unanonymised photographs in at least two medical presentations in 2010 and 2013, thereby resulting in a breach of the Patient’s confidentiality and privacy, and such conduct amounted to such serious negligence that it objectively portrayed an abuse of the privileges which accompany registration as a medical practitioner, and he was thereby guilty of professional misconduct under s 53(1)(d) of the MRA.

  11. (e) Charge 4: The respondent failed to obtain the Patient’s informed consent from 4 August 2008 to 2011 for the use of medical information unrelated to her condition of enlarged parotid glands in his book chapter, and such conduct amounted to such serious negligence that it objectively portrayed an abuse of the privileges which accompany registration as a medical practitioner, and he was thereby guilty of professional misconduct under s 53(1)(d) of the MRA.

  12. (f) Charge 5: The respondent failed to obtain the Patient’s informed consent from 4 August 2008 to 2013 for the use of her medical information unrelated to her condition of enlarged parotid glands in at least two medical presentations in 2010 and 2013, thereby resulting in a breach of the Patient’s confidentiality and privacy, and such conduct amounted to such serious negligence that it objectively portrayed an abuse of the privileges which accompany registration as a medical practitioner, and he was thereby guilty of professional misconduct under s 53(1)(d) of the MRA.

  13. [7] The respondent claimed trial to the Charges.

  14. [8] We note that at the time the Charges were framed, the SMC was aware that during a consultation between the Patient and the respondent on 4 August 2008, the Patient had signed the following written statement (“the Written Statement”):

  15. One of the primary issues that the DT had to consider therefore was whether the Written Statement was sufficient to amount to “informed consent” for the purposes of using the Patient’s photographs and medical information in publications and presentations.

  16. The decision of the DT

  17. The DT’s findings on conviction

  18. [9] Following an inquiry by the DT, the respondent was acquitted of the Charges against him. The DT found that on 4 August 2008, the respondent had obtained the Patient’s informed consent to use her unanonymised photographs and medical information, both related and unrelated to her condition of enlarged parotid glands, in medical and/or scientific publications and presentations. The Patient’s consent was recorded in writing by the respondent in his case notes on the Patient’s medical records, and this was done in a manner which satisfied the applicable standard observed and/or was approved by members of the medical profession with good repute and competency. Further, the Patient had neither revoked nor modified her consent until her e-mail to the respondent dated 22 September 2013. Therefore, the respondent had not acted in breach of the consent that the Patient had given him as alleged in the Charges.

  19. [11] First, the DT noted that there was no objective evidence adduced by the SMC to support the Patient’s assertion that the respondent had given her separate oral assurances in relation to her Written Statement that he would (a) blank out her eyes in the photographs or use photographs that show her face from the nose downwards; (b) only use information describing her condition of enlarged parotid glands and not her past cosmetic procedures; and (c) only use photographs and information in one medical paper: GD at [217(e)], [221]–[223]. The only evidence that the SMC relied on in this regard was the testimony of the Patient and her husband.

  20. [12] Secondly, there was no documentary evidence to support the Patient’s claims that the respondent had given the presentations in which he had allegedly used her photographs and medical information. In fact, the SMC was unable to pinpoint with any specificity when or where these alleged presentations had taken place. This gave rise to serious doubts as to whether these presentations even existed to begin with: GD at [246], [249]. Even at its highest, the SMC rested its case entirely on the respondent’s recollection of the conferences that he had allegedly presented the Patient’s case at: GD at [351].

  21. The DT’s decision on costs

  22. [14] The DT then concluded as follows:

  23. The parties’ cases

  24. The applicable law

  25. The power of the High Court to order costs against the SMC

  26. The principles to be applied in determining whether to make an adverse costs order against the SMC

  27. (b) The “event” or the outcome of the proceedings is one of the factors that may be taken into account but it is not the only one.

  28. (c) Similarly, the regulatory function of the entity in question is also only one of the factors that may be taken into account although it will often be an important and sometimes even an overriding one.

  29. (d) The degree of weight to be placed upon the fact that the SMC has a regulatory function will depend on various factors. In particular, the court will consider whether the decision to bring the charges was made honestly, reasonably, and on grounds that reasonably appeared to be sound in the exercise of its public duty. The determination of the Complaints Committee would be pertinent in determining whether the charges were brought on grounds that reasonably appeared to be sound.

  30. (e) The court will also consider the financial prejudice to the doctor amounting to substantial financial hardship.

  31. (f) Finally, the court will consider “any other relevant fact or circumstances”.

  32. Preliminary observations

  33. Our decision

  34. The respondent was acquitted of the Charges

  35. The Charges were not brought on grounds that reasonably appeared to be sound

  36. [28] Based on the findings made by the DT, we are satisfied that most of the Charges against the respondent were not brought on grounds that reasonably appeared to be sound. We come to this conclusion for the following reasons: First, the SMC did not have any objective evidence to prove that the respondent had given the alleged medical presentations which were the subject of Charges 3 and 5. Secondly, the SMC’s expert witness admitted that he did not have any authority for his opinion that the respondent was under a duty to (a) inform the Patient of her right to revoke her consent, and (b) obtain either explicit permission for “blanket use” of the Patient’s photographs and medical information or permission for the specific and full extent of each instance of use as proximally possible. Yet, the SMC had relied entirely on this expert’s evidence for its assertion that the respondent was bound by such ethical obligations and had thereby committed the infringing acts in Charges 2 to 5. Thirdly, the DT found the complaints made by the Patient to be “vexatious and baseless”, and it should have been incumbent on the SMC to ascertain the veracity of these complaints before preferring the Charges.

  37. No objective evidence that the respondent had given the alleged medical presentations that were the subject of Charges 3 and 5

  38. [29] Charges 3 and 5 essentially allege that the respondent had failed to obtain the Patient’s informed consent before using unanonymised photographs of her face and her medical information, both related and unrelated to her condition of enlarged parotid glands, in at least two medical presentations in 2010 and 2013. However, as we will demonstrate below, the DT found that the SMC did not have any evidence, apart from bare assertions from the Patient, to prove that those medical presentations had even taken place.

  39. [30] We begin first with the alleged presentation in 2010. The SMC’s case was that in mid-2010, the Patient discovered that the respondent had presented her case at a plastic surgery conference, and that he had done so without first obtaining her consent to use her medical information. Despite this, the SMC was unable to adduce any evidence to prove that this alleged plastic surgery conference had indeed taken place. The Patient was also unable to provide any details of this alleged conference. The DT therefore held that the SMC had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent had in fact presented the Patient’s case at a plastic surgery conference in 2010: GD at [246]. As for the alleged presentation in 2013, the SMC contended that the respondent had presented the Patient’s case at a conference in South America in 2013. Similarly, the SMC was unable to adduce any evidence that a presentation was in fact made by the respondent in South America in 2013, and the DT found that the SMC had failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt: GD at [266]–[267].

  40. [31] Indeed, when the respondent candidly testified at the proceedings below that he may have presented the Patient’s case in 2008 or 2009, the SMC changed its case and sought to amend Charges 3 and 5. It argued that the respondent should be convicted on the basis that he had allegedly admitted to presenting the Patient’s case in 2008 and 2009. The DT noted at [351] of the GD that at its highest, the SMC was resting its case entirely on the respondent’s own recollection of the conferences that he had allegedly presented the Patient’s case at. In our judgment, this was a clear indication that the SMC had no evidential basis in support of its own case.

  41. [32] From the DT’s findings, it was apparent to us that the SMC did not have any objective evidence to support its allegation that the respondent had presented the Patient’s case at two medical presentations in 2010 and 2013. Accordingly, there was no reasonable basis for the SMC to have preferred Charges 3 and 5 against the respondent.

  42. SMC’s expert witness did not have any basis for his opinion in relation to the ethical duties alleged in Charges 2 to 5

  43. [33] As we alluded to at [8] above, it was undisputed that the Patient had provided the respondent with her Written Statement, which ostensibly gave him permission to use her photographs in medical/scientific publications and to describe her case. The SMC’s case was that as part of the respondent’s duty to obtain the Patient’s informed consent, he also had an obligation to (a) inform her of her right to withdraw or modify her consent at any reasonable point in time (GD at [284(c)]), and (b) obtain explicit permission for “blanket use” of the Patient’s photographs and medical information in any medical or educational publication or presentation, or obtain permission for the specific and full extent that he was using the Patient’s photographs or medical information, as proximally as possible before each particular use (GD at [311]) (collectively, “the Additional Requirements”). Therefore, because he had failed to satisfy the Additional Requirements, he had failed to obtain “informed consent” from the Patient, as defined by the SMC.

  44. [34] It was therefore integral to the SMC’s case for it to establish that the applicable standard of informed consent involved the Additional Requirements. The sole basis for the SMC’s case that the duty to obtain informed consent also included the Additional Requirements was the evidence of its expert witness, Dr PE. However, the DT found that Dr PE did not have any tangible basis or support for his opinion. In relation to the alleged duty to inform the Patient about her right to withdraw consent, Dr PE acknowledged that the standard forms used by hospitals did not contain an express provision that a patient could revoke his or her consent. Dr PE also conceded that such a duty was not provided for in the 2002 ECEG, and that he was not aware of any evidence of any other ethical requirement for the same: GD at [293]–[294]. The DT also noted that while Dr PE had referred to a model consent form provided in an article by the American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics, that consent form was merely aspirational, and in any event did not explicitly state that the medical practitioner has to inform the patient of his right to withdraw consent.

  45. [35] As for the alleged duty of the medical practitioner to obtain explicit permission for “blanket use” or to obtain fresh permission for each particular use, Dr PE admitted that he had no personal experience taking consent from his patients for publication purposes. Neither had he been in the position of an editor or publisher who would have been able to assess the practice of the Singapore medical community as it was in 2008. He further conceded that he could not cite any authority for his views that a doctor must inform that patient of the exact forum of use, and if the forum was unknown at the time of consent-taking, that a doctor must explicitly obtain consent for use in any forum: GD at [314]. In addition, Dr PE admitted that he had never obtained consent from his patients for the use of their medical information or photographs in writing medical journals, articles, or textbook chapters. Therefore, it was apparent to us that Dr PE did not have the relevant professional experience to opine on issues relating to obtaining informed consent for the purposes of presentations or publications.

  46. [36] We agree with the respondent that the SMC should, at the very least, be expected to scrutinise (a) whether its expert has the relevant expertise so as to determine if the expert is qualified to give evidence, and (b) the basis on which the expert forms his opinion so as to determine if the opinion is a reasonable one, supported by authority or personal experience. Given the findings of the DT that we have outlined above, we do not think that the SMC had made such efforts in the present case. The SMC preferred Charges 2 to 5 solely on the basis of Dr PE’s opinion, without first verifying whether Dr PE had the relevant professional experience or authority to support his views. We are therefore satisfied that Charges 2 to 5 were not brought on grounds that reasonably appeared to be sound.

  47. [37] On a related note, we note that Mr Chia appeared to have confused the normative basis upon which Charges 2 to 5 were framed, with the factual basis for whether those charges would ultimately be made out. At the hearing before us, we highlighted to Mr Chia that the standard of professional conduct, which the respondent allegedly breached pursuant to Charges 2 to 5, was based entirely on Dr PE’s evidence. Mr Chia however argued that the nub of Charges 2 to 5 was a factual inquiry – if the Patient’s version of the events was to be preferred, then the respondent would be convicted of Charges 2 to 5. Conversely, if the respondent’s version of the events was to be preferred, then he would be acquitted of those charges. With respect, we do not think this is correct. Facts cannot be considered in the abstract. In determining whether a charge has been made out, a court or a disciplinary tribunal must first identify the normative standard which a reasonable and competent medical practitioner is expected to adhere to, before turning to examine whether on the facts of each particular case the medical practitioner in question had satisfied those standards. Mr Chia argued that it was not unreasonable for each side to advance their own factual narrative, and that the conviction or acquittal of the respondent ultimately boiled down to which narrative the DT preferred. That, with respect, misses the point. What we found to be unreasonable was the fact that Dr PE’s evidence, which the SMC solely relied on to establish the normative standard that was then basis for Charges 2 to 5, was completely lacking in support or authority.

  48. The complaints made by the Patient were vexatious and baseless

  49. [38] The SMC founded the factual basis for its case primarily on the evidence of the Patient and her husband. It was therefore significant that the DT found the Patient’s complaint to be “vexatious and baseless”: GD at [427]. This finding further buttressed our conclusion that the Charges were not brought on grounds that reasonably appeared to be sound.

  50. [39] Not only did the DT find the Patient’s complaints to be vexatious and baseless, it also saw fit to “express its strongest condemnation for the Patient’s conduct in bringing the Complaint, and in giving her evidence against [the respondent]”: GD at [417]. As we noted at the hearing, this is by no means a common finding and not one that a court or a tribunal would make lightly. Apart from the false allegations that the respondent had presented her case at medical presentations in 2010 and 2013, the DT found that the Patient and her husband had been lying in respect of these other areas:

  51. (a) The Patient claimed that she was a “homemaker”, and described herself as a “naïve” individual who unequivocally and unreservedly trusted the respondent on matters relating to her confidentiality. However, the DT found that far from being naïve, the respondent was “at all material times a sophisticated, capable, and highly educated professional with a mind of her own, who understood the concept of confidentiality and was not afraid to express her disagreements and dissatisfactions to [the respondent]”: GD at [56]–[59].

  52. (b) The Patient gave evidence that during a consultation on 4 August 2008 between 9.58 am and 10.18 am, a period of 20 minutes, she had a brief discussion with the respondent on the day’s treatment, made her way to the treatment room, received Botox injections, and then left the treatment room to make payment. The DT found it “highly unlikely” that the Patient’s sequence of events would have fitted into a 20 minute time frame as the Patient alleged: GD at [197]–[199].

  53. (c) The Patient claimed that the respondent had informed her on 19 December 2007 that Ms DNurse2, the respondent’s former clinic nurse and one of the witnesses of fact, had left the clinic’s employ “a long time ago”. However, Ms DNurse2 was able to exhibit her Central Provident Fund statements which showed that she was employed by the respondent between December 2007 and July 2009: GD at [114].

  54. [40] Given the centrality of the Patient and her husband’s evidence to the SMC’s case, it should have been incumbent on the SMC to ascertain the veracity of their evidence and to ensure that there was a sound basis for the claims that they were making. Given the fact that the Patient’s evidence was completely rejected by the DT, it does not appear that the SMC had satisfied itself that there was reasonable basis in the complaints that were lodged. In the circumstances, we do not think that the Patient’s baseless and vexatious allegations can be regarded as reasonably sound grounds on which to base the Charges.

  55. [42] In Lawrence Ang at [54], this court noted as follows:

  56. This court further noted at [56]:

  57. Inordinate delay in the prosecution of the respondent

  58. Whether the amount of time that is taken for the prosecution should be a factor for costs to be ordered against the SMC

  59. [50] In so far as the first requirement at [49(a)] above is concerned, whether or not there has been significant or inordinate delay is not measured in terms of the absolute length of time that has transpired, but must always be assessed in the context of the nature of investigations: see Ang Peng Tiam at [113]. The court should consider whether the case involved complex questions of fact which necessarily engendered meticulous and laborious inquiry over an extended period, or whether the case could be disposed of in a relatively uncomplicated manner (such as where the offender pleaded guilty): see Chan Kum Hong Randy v Public Prosecutor [2008] 2 SLR(R) 1019 at [36].

  60. [51] As for the third requirement at [49(c)], we consider that:

  61. (a) the mental anguish, anxiety and distress suffered by the medical practitioner in having the charge(s) hanging over him during the period of delay;

  62. (b) any tarnishing of the medical professional’s reputation; and/or

  63. (c) the loss of income or career opportunities suffered by the medical professional

  64. would constitute material prejudice: see Ang Peng Tiam at [115]. We emphasise, once again, that this is not an exhaustive list.

  65. Whether there was an inordinate delay in the present case

  66. [52] In the present case, we are satisfied that there was an inordinate delay in the prosecution of the respondent. To recapitulate, the Complaints Committee had issued a letter to the respondent on 9 October 2014, requesting him to provide a written explanation to the complaint that was filed against him. The respondent provided his written explanation by way of a letter dated 11 December 2014. It was only on 8 May 2017 that the SMC obtained Dr PE’s initial expert report. The SMC then served the Notice of Inquiry, along with Dr PE’s initial expert report, on the respondent shortly after on 25 May 2017. The hearing for the inquiry took place between 5 March 2018 and 18 May 2018 (GD at [27]), and the DT delivered its verdict on 27 August 2018. It should be noted that from the moment the respondent provided his written explanation, the SMC took 2 years and 6 months before it issued the Notice of Inquiry. As we alluded to at [50] above, this period of delay must be assessed with reference to the complexity of the case at hand. We do not think that this was a particularly complex matter, both factually and legally. Indeed, the SMC only called two witnesses of fact, ie, the Patient and her husband, and one expert witness, Dr PE: GD at [27]. Further, the issues in the proceedings below related to consent-taking and the documentation of this consent, which we do not think are matters of great medical or legal complexity. In our view, this delay is further exacerbated by the DT’s findings that the Patient’s complaints were vexatious and baseless, and that Dr PE’s evidence was completely unsupported by authority. This indicates that despite the relatively long period of time which was presumably spent on investigations, the SMC had failed to do its due diligence with regard to the evidence of its witnesses.

  67. [53] We are also satisfied that the delay was not contributed in any way by the respondent. We note that he had provided his written explanation two months after he was first issued with the notice of complaint, and from that point on there was nothing he could do except wait for the SMC to make its charging decision.

  68. Financial prejudice

  69. [57] The judgment of Stanley Burnton LJ in R (Perinpanathan) v City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2010] 1 WLR 1508 at [41] (which we cited with approval at [57] of Lawrence Ang) should also be borne in mind:

  70. Conclusion