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Grounds publishedDecided 24 Sep 2019

High Court

Anita Hatta v Lee Siow Kiang Georgia and others

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[2019] SGHC 222Case no. Suit No 555 of 2017

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The plaintiff, Ms Anita Hatta, is a film and television producer. The first defendant, Dr Lee Siow Kiang Georgia, is a doctor and the founder and medical director of TLC Lifestyle Practice (“TLC”), a clinic specialising in aesthetic treatments. Dr Lee is also the sole director of the second, third and fourth defendants (“the Companies”), which are engaged in the packaging, marketing and sale of DrGL® products, a line of skincare created by Dr Lee.

  3. [2] Ms Hatta and Dr Lee met for an evening discussion on 20 January 2012. Subsequently, on 2 February 2012, Ms Hatta invested $2m for the purposes of the second, third and fourth defendants (“the Investment”). She thereafter received, on 3 February 2012, 5% of the Companies’ shareholding. In early 2017, as part of negotiations to secure new capital investment from Adval Capital Pte Ltd (“Adval”), the second and third defendants’ assets were transferred to a new company, in return for entitlement to 20% shareholding in the new joint venture company.

  4. [3] On 20 June 2017, Ms Hatta brought the present proceedings. She contends Dr Lee made misrepresentations on the evening of 20 January 2012 and seeks rescission of her $2m investment or, in the alternative, damages in the sum of $2m pursuant to s 2 of the Misrepresentation Act (Cap 390, 1994 Rev Ed) (“Misrepresentation Act”). In the alternative, she contends that Dr Lee’s actions between 2012 and 2017 amount to minority oppression, and seeks a share buy-out by Dr Lee, either at $2m, or at a price to be determined by an independent valuer.

  5. Background

  6. Ms Hatta’s investment and the parties’ understanding

  7. [4] In or around 2006, Ms Hatta was introduced to Dr Lee by a mutual friend, Ms Sherry Lim. Ms Lim was then a patient of Dr Lee’s. Ms Hatta also became Dr Lee’s patient. Ms Lim subsequently became Ms Hatta’s personal assistant. The three were also social acquaintances.

  8. [5] In or around 2011, Ms Lim heard that Dr Lee was looking for investors to further develop her range of skincare products, DrGL®. On 19 January 2012, Ms Lim arranged for Dr Lee and Ms Hatta to meet the next evening at Ms Hatta’s home.

  9. [6] During this meeting on 20 January 2012, Ms Hatta contends, Dr Lee informed both her and Ms Lim that she required additional capital for the Companies to expand their business overseas, expand their distribution network, conduct more research and development and expand the Companies’ bottling facilities. She spoke of her plans to have DrGL® products sold in large department stores in Singapore and to expand abroad. There were other interested investors looking to invest in the Companies. A third party investor by the name of Andy Wong, for instance, had offered to invest a sum of $24m in the Companies. Ms Hatta asserts that Dr Lee made three key representations to her during that meeting (“the Representations”):

  10. (a) The sales of the DrGL® skincare products were doing very well and had exceeded $5m since its launch in or around 2008.

  11. (b) Dr Lee had personally invested approximately $14m into the Companies.

  12. (c) The Companies were worth $40m or Dr Lee knew that the Companies were worth $40m, and Ms Hatta’s investment of $2m would represent 5% of the shareholdings in the Companies.

  13. [7] Dr Lee denies making the Representations. Her recollection is that they had a short meeting, and she is unable to remember the details of their exchange, save that Ms Hatta offered her house for use for the Companies’ events. Following the meeting at Ms Hatta’s house, Ms Hatta was introduced to Mr Frank Cintamani by Dr Lee, as a close friend who assisted her with business matters. Ms Hatta was asked to continue the discussions with Mr Cintamani.

  14. [9] On 3 February 2012, Fide and the Companies agreed on an Exclusive Rights Agreement (“the First ERA”). Mr Cintamani and Ms Hatta represented Fide and Dr Lee represented the Companies. Under the First ERA, dated 2 February 2012, Fide agreed to purchase exclusive rights to produce all events for the Companies for four years in exchange for a sum of $4m, which was to be paid in 2 tranches of $2m. Fide was to pay $4m to the Companies, specifically, $2m on execution of the First ERA, and $2m within six months thereafter.

  15. [10] Three share transfer forms were signed by parties, for the following:

  16. (a) a transfer of 500 ordinary shares in the second defendant, for a stated consideration of $1, from Dr Lee to Ms Hatta;

  17. (b) a transfer of 5 ordinary shares in the third defendant, for a stated consideration of $1, from Mr Cintamani to Ms Hatta; and

  18. (c) a transfer of 50 ordinary shares in the fourth defendant, for a stated consideration of $1, from Dr Lee to Ms Hatta.

  19. [11] On or about 2 February 2012, Ms Hatta issued two cheques of $2m each in favour of Fide, one for the purpose of the Investment, and the other for the purpose of the Fide Loan. Both cheques were made to Fide because Mr Cintamani informed her that, after discussions with Dr Lee, Dr Lee had requested for the payment of the Investment to be made through Fide. Mr Cintamani and Ms Hatta went to the United Overseas Bank and deposited the said cheques into Fide’s account. Mr Cintamani later withdrew these monies and deposited them both into his personal bank account. On 3 February 2012, Mr Cintamani gave Dr Lee a cheque for $2m that was made out in his own name and addressed to her personally.

  20. Events from 2012 to 2015

  21. [12] The parties are in agreement that between 2012 and 2015, Ms Hatta and Dr Lee maintained a good shareholder relationship, which was largely an informal one. What is in dispute is Ms Hatta’s role in the Companies. According to Ms Hatta, both she and Dr Lee understood that in consideration of Ms Hatta’s $2m investment, apart from being given 5% of shareholding in the Companies, Ms Hatta would be consulted on material events, regularly updated and involved in decision-making on key matters (I refer to this in this judgment as “the Alleged Understanding”, and detail its specifics below). Dr Lee, in contrast, denies the existence of the Alleged Understanding. Ms Hatta, she says, was “entirely unconcerned” with the Companies’ operations, and was updated only at Dr Lee’s discretion.

  22. [13] Around 1 September 2012, Fide and the Companies entered into a revised version of the First ERA titled “Amendment of Exclusive Rights Agreement Dated 2 February 2012” (“the Revised ERA”). Dated 1 September, the Revised ERA purported to supersede the First ERA, and stated that, given that Fide had “failed to make payments on the 2nd tranche”, it would “forego any further rights or claims for the exclusive appointment to produce all events for the Companies”. Mr Cintamani signed the Revised ERA on behalf of Fide.

  23. [14] Subsequently, Dr Lee approached Ms Hatta to make a further investment in the Companies. On 23 November 2012, Dr Lee asked Ms Hatta to invest a further $2m. In an email informing her that the initial $2m had been rechannelled into the Companies, Dr Lee asked: “wonder if you can assist us to fulfil the balance 2million for the other 5%”.

  24. [15] On 21 December 2012, Dr Lee wrote to a lawyer, Ms Kuah Boon Theng, to ask her to prepare an agreement which envisaged a $2m investment for 5% in the second defendant and 12% in the fourth defendant in phases. The same email contained an instruction to Mr Richard Chan, an accountant for the Companies, to prepare a share transfer. Ms Kuah replied on 27 December 2012 with a draft agreement. Ms Lim replied to ask Ms Kuah to amend Ms Hatta’s address. Ms Hatta then asked to see the accounts and to verify the extent of Dr Lee’s investment. On 9 January 2013, Dr Lee asked Mr Chan for records of expenditure relating to the “Total spent for skincare to date” and the accounts. On 12 January 2013, Dr Lee sent an email detailing $13,251,474.52 spent by the Companies. On 18 January 2013, Mr Chan followed on with the skincare development component for a slightly different period, March 2003 to December 2011, for a similar sum. Both related to TLC’s expenses. Ms Hatta did not place any further funds with Dr Lee.

  25. [16] During this time period, between 2012 to 2015, the Companies’ financial statements reflected losses for the Companies each year.

  26. The joint venture with Adval

  27. [17] In late 2015, a personal friend of Dr Lee, Ms Patsy Ong-Hahl, became interested in the Companies, and Dr Lee requested that Adval, Ms Ong-Hahl’s company, develop a growth plan for the Companies. On or around 4 December 2015, Adval commenced a due diligence exercise to understand the Companies’ businesses. In or around February 2016, Dr Lee and Adval entered into extensive discussions on Adval’s proposed investment plan. Ms Hatta was not involved in these discussions.

  28. [18] On 11 February 2016, Dr Lee introduced Ms Hatta to Mr Clarence Ku, Adval’s Chief Financial Officer. This was the first time that Ms Hatta was informed of the discussions with Adval. On 22 February 2016, Dr Lee sent an email to Ms Hatta, summarising a proposal from the proposed investors. This was “JV Structure 1”, the first of five joint venture proposals. This proposal stated that:

  29. (a) The Companies were to transfer their assets to Dr Lee, who would then transfer said assets to the joint venture company.

  30. (b) Dr Lee and Ms Hatta would receive 19% and 1% of the shares in the joint venture company respectively.

  31. [19] On 26 February 2016, Ms Hatta emailed Dr Lee with certain queries concerning Adval’s investment. Later that day, Dr Lee informed Ms Hatta that she intended to hold an Extraordinary General Meeting (“EGM”) for the Companies on 16 March 2016, as the “new investors…needs [sic] to be finalised by March”. On 3 March 2016, Ms Hatta received a Notice of EGM that was to be held on 18 March 2016 for the Companies, with the purpose of said EGM being to approve the sale of the Companies’ assets. On 7 March 2016, Ms Hatta received hard copies of the draft assets purchase agreement. In contrast to JV Structure 1, where Dr Lee was to take over the assets of the Companies personally, under the new proposed structure (“JV Structure 2”), it would be Dr Lee’s clinic, TLC, that would obtain the assets of the Companies.

  32. [20] Ms Hatta appointed a proxy to attend the EGM on 18 March 2016, who raised several concerns relating to the purported lack of information provided to Ms Hatta about the proposed joint venture structure, and the fact that the EGM appeared to be a mechanism to force the sale of the Companies without addressing Ms Hatta’s concerns. Faced with the questions presented by Ms Hatta’s proxy, Dr Lee adjourned the EGM. A subsequent revision of the joint venture structure was then proposed to Ms Hatta in emails dated 19 May 2016 (“JV Structure 3”). Pursuant to JV Structure 3, the second defendant was to purchase the assets of the Companies. Additionally, Dr Lee undertook to pay off all the debts of the Companies.

  33. [21] Following additional discussions regarding the potential joint venture with Adval, Dr Lee forwarded to Ms Hatta another draft investment term sheet on 7 June 2016, which proposed a new structure for the joint venture (“JV Structure 4”). Ms Hatta replied via email on 14 June 2016, taking issue with several changes made in JV Structure 4; this included the fact that an individual, Mr Chuah Wai Chow (“Mr Chuah”) would be the majority shareholder instead of Adval, that there would be three directors (Mr Chuah, Ms Ong-Hahl and Dr Lee) instead of two (Ms Ong-Hahl and Dr Lee), and that there was a risk that the second defendant’s shares in JV Company would be further diluted.

  34. [22] On 28 November 2016, Dr Lee sent an email to Ms Hatta, stating that an “in-principle agreement with the proposed investors has been reached on the terms of a deal…” The key aspects of the proposed deal (“Final JV Structure”) were that:

  35. (a) Dr Lee and Ms Hatta would maintain their respective shareholding proportions in the second and third defendant, which would function as vehicles used to participate in the joint venture company, now named A DrBrand Pte Ltd (“ADB”).

  36. (b) The second and third defendants would transfer all their business assets to ADB in exchange for 20% of ordinary shares in ADB.

  37. (c) The trademarks used by the second and third defendants in their skincare and spa businesses would be transferred and assigned to ADB for the cost of applying for registration of the marks.

  38. (d) After taking over conduct of the business, the investors would work towards achieving an IPO or strategic sale within 5 years.

  39. [23] After receiving Dr Lee’s email, Ms Hatta replied on 6 December 2016, raising several questions about the Final JV Structure. On 6 January 2017, Ms Hatta received an email from the Companies’ accounting firm, Richard Consultants Pte Ltd (“RC”), attaching the following: a Notice of proposed Members’ Resolutions in Writing of the second and third defendants; the text of said proposed resolutions; a draft business transfer agreement relating to the joint venture; a draft subscription agreement relating to the joint venture; and a draft shareholders’ agreement relating to the joint venture. No deadline was given for Ms Hatta’s decision. On or around 19 January 2017, Ms Hatta received an email from RC attaching a notice of passed Members’ Resolutions in Writing of the second and third defendant, signed by Dr Lee. The notice stated that the substantial sale of the assets of the second and third defendant to ADB had been approved.

  40. [24] On 20 June 2017, Ms Hatta brought the present proceedings against the four defendants.

  41. Issues

  42. [25] In this suit, Ms Hatta advanced two categories of claims. The first is founded on allegations of three misrepresentations made by Dr Lee on 20 January 2012. The second is of minority oppression arising out of Dr Lee’s conduct on and after 2 February 2012, when Ms Hatta became a minority shareholder of the second to fourth defendants. I deal with each of these in turn.

  43. Misrepresentation

  44. Context

  45. [26] Ms Hatta seeks to rely on three categories of misrepresentation: fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and misrepresentation under s 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act.

  46. (a) There was a representation of fact made by words or conduct.

  47. (b) The representation must be made with the intention that it should be acted upon by the plaintiff.

  48. (c) The plaintiff had acted upon the false statement.

  49. (d) The plaintiff suffered damage by doing so.

  50. (e) The representation was made with knowledge that it is false or in the absence of any genuine belief that it is true.

  51. [28] For a claim in negligent misrepresentation to succeed, there must be the following (see IM Skaugen SE and another v MAN Diesel & Turbo SE and another [2018] SGHC 123 at [121]):

  52. (a) The defendant must have made a false representation of fact.

  53. (b) The representation induced actual reliance.

  54. (c) The defendant must owe a duty of care.

  55. (d) There must be a breach of that duty of care.

  56. (e) The breach must have caused damage to the plaintiff.

  57. [29] Section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act, on the other hand, functions as a statutory remedy. As explained by the Court of Appeal in RBC Properties Pte Ltd v Defu Furniture Pte Ltd [2015] 1 SLR 1021 at [66]:

  58. [30] The elements required for a claim under s 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act are hence similar to that of negligent misrepresentation, except that the burden of proving the absence of negligence lies on the defendant rather than the claimant. Section 2(1) requires the following elements (see The Law of Contract in Singapore (Andrew Phang Boon Leong, gen ed) (Academy Publishing, 2012) at para 11.215:

  59. (a) a misrepresentation made by one person to another;

  60. (b) a subsequent contract between them;

  61. (c) consequential loss; and

  62. (d) an absence, at the time the contract was made, of a belief or reasonable grounds in the truth of the facts represented.

  63. [31] It is common ground that three requirements are crucial to the various types of misrepresentation alleged: first, a misrepresentation by Dr Lee; second, an intention on the part of Dr Lee for Ms Hatta to rely on her representation; and third, Ms Hatta’s reasonable reliance on the misrepresentation. For reasons that will become clear, I begin my analysis with these three elements.

  64. Whether the Representations were made

  65. [32] Ms Hatta’s claim rests on three representations she contends Dr Lee made to her on 20 January 2012. First, sales for the DrGL® skincare products had exceeded $5m since its launch in or around 2008 (referred to in this judgment as “the Sales Representation”). Second, the Companies were worth $40m (referred to in this judgment as “the Valuation Representation”). Third, Dr Lee had personally invested approximately $14m into the Companies (referred to in this judgment as “the Investment Representation”). I deal with these in turn.

  66. The Sales Representation

  67. [33] During the course of cross-examination, Ms Hatta was presented with evidence from a supporting affidavit that she had filed in Originating Summons No 1134 of 2015 (“OS 1134”), which concerned her application for leave to bring an action on behalf of Fide against Mr Cintamani. In her affidavit, she stated that during her meeting with Dr Lee on 20 January 2012, Dr Lee had told her that “her businesses were not doing well”.

  68. [34] Ms Hatta’s explanation was that Dr Lee had stated that the Companies’ businesses were not doing well “on the surface”, and that Dr Lee had told her not to worry. This was not convincing.

  69. [35] Moreover, after the investment, the communications between Ms Hatta and Dr Lee demonstrate that both parties were aware that the Companies were loss-making. In a WhatsApp text message sent by Dr Lee to Ms Hatta on 20 March 2013, Dr Lee informed Ms Hatta that she was “work[ing] hard so I can get the company to start earning money for you dear. The companies are not profitable yet.” Ms Hatta did not raise any query, nor did she appear in any way alarmed. Ms Hatta, when presented with the Companies’ financial statements for 2012 and 2013, did not appear to be concerned with the fact that they were showing substantial losses. Had the representation been made to Ms Hatta, it is likely that she would have questioned Dr Lee when she was presented with these statistics. Ms Hatta’s claim that she had remained silent because she trusted Dr Lee to “manage the company [sic] in the best interests of the companies” is not persuasive.

  70. [36] I therefore find that this representation was not made.

  71. The Valuation Representation

  72. [37] Dr Lee’s evidence was that she had not completed a valuation of the Companies as at 20 January 2012. $4m was proposed to her by Ms Hatta in return for a 10% shareholding, and this, given her own time and investment, she felt was a fair offer. By the time of trial, Ms Hatta conceded that Dr Lee did not explicitly state that the Companies’ value amounted to $40m. It was argued, rather that this representation was implied. Ms Hatta contended that, because Dr Lee proposed $2m for a 5% shareholding in the Companies, a straight-line mathematical calculation would imply that the Companies were worth $40m.

  73. [38] First, this position, which was adopted on the first day of trial, was not pleaded. What was pleaded was that there was a representation that the Companies were worth $40m or that Dr Lee knew they were worth $40m. Second, Dr Lee’s position was that such a straight-line mathematical calculation was inappropriate in the present case, where the Companies were start-ups. Her evidence was that the price of the shares at the time of the negotiation was not associated with any discussion as to their value.

  74. [39] I accept that the representation could not have been implied. In the context of a start-up, the price to be paid by the investor depends upon the future potential with which the particular investor views the project. As there is no ready market for such shares, the price that parties agree upon would depend upon a range of intangibles, aspirational factors and calculations premised upon a subjective assessment of value. Ms Hatta’s expert witness, Mr Andre Toh Sern, agreed during his cross-examination that the approach adopted towards the valuation of start-ups would be considered from “many perspective[s]”, and that there would be differences in the way in which start-ups would be valued compared to mature companies.

  75. [40] There was an alternative argument advanced, which was coupled with the contended misrepresentation that Dr Lee had invested $14m. This was that $40m was used because Dr Lee said another investor, Andy Wong, had offered $24m, and Ms Hatta’s $2m would bring the Companies’ value to $40m. This argument, which latches onto a rather convenient mathematical addition of $24m, $14m and $2m totalling $40m, is entirely speculative and inconsistent even with Ms Hatta’s case. It was not disputed that Andy Wong was presented as an alternative that Dr Lee rejected in favour of Ms Hatta. It would also have been clear from Dr Lee’s acceptance of Ms Hatta’s offer over Andy Wong’s that the price did not bear any relation to a time-of-sale valuation of the Companies.

  76. [41] I find that this representation was not implied.

  77. The Investment Representation

  78. [42] Two pieces of evidence are important to this issue. The first is a text sent from Ms Lim to Ms Hatta, where Ms Lim relayed the conversation she had with Dr Lee on 19 January 2012:

  79. Dr Lee concedes that the statement was made in the 19 January 2012 conversation she had with Ms Lim in her clinic. She concedes also, that “it’s possible” she may have repeated this statement to Ms Hatta at their meeting on 20 January 2012.

  80. [43] Another piece of the puzzle, while subsequent in time, is provided by Ms Hatta’s request for Dr Lee to detail her prior investment in the three companies after Dr Lee asks her for a second round of funding at the end of 2012. Ms Hatta would likely not have asked for it if it had not arisen in prior discussion. Consistent with this, and in response to the request in January 2013, Dr Lee then furnishes a breakdown of a figure close to $14m.

  81. [44] I find, on a balance of probabilities, that the Investment Representation was made on the evening of 20 January 2012. Ms Hatta then asked about it in due course in January 2013, after Dr Lee asked for a second $2m tranche of investment.

  82. Intention to induce

  83. [47] Did Dr Lee make this last representation with intention to induce Ms Hatta to invest in the Companies? The 20 January 2012 meeting was set up with the specific purpose of discussing Ms Hatta’s potential investment. In view of the context, it is fair to assume that any statements made by Dr Lee were made for the purpose of inducing Ms Hatta to invest. Specifically, the $14m investment statement was important, because it showed that Dr Lee herself, aside from spending time building up her product, had expended money on the venture. It would logically follow that she had an intention to induce Ms Hatta to invest in the Companies through her statement.

  84. Reasonable reliance

  85. [48] Nevertheless, reasonable reliance is pivotal to any case of misrepresentation. The representee must be induced by the misrepresentation to act upon it. In considering whether the representee was induced by the representor’s representation, the element of reliance from the perspective of the representee (see Wee Chiaw Sek Anna v Ng Li-Ann Genevieve (sole executrix of the estate of Ng Hock Seng, deceased) and another [2013] 3 SLR 801 (“Anna Wee”) at [43]). The representation must “act upon the will of the representee”, such that the representee is influenced to change his behaviour in reliance on the representation (see Anna Wee at [44]). Ms Hatta’s conduct demonstrates that she did not rely on any of Dr Lee’s representations. Notwithstanding that I have held that only one of the three alleged representations were made, if I am wrong in that regard, it is clear that no reliance was placed on any of the three representations, for the following reasons.

  86. [49] First, Ms Hatta’s investment was not immediate. It was more than ten days later that the various documents for the investment were signed. There was no allegation that she was hurried in any way by Dr Lee. Second, her conduct prior to making the investment indicated that she was not concerned about any particular aspects pertaining to the pleaded representations. She failed to request documentation of any kind, whether of financial accounts, sales and revenue statements, Andy Wong’s offer to invest $24m, or Dr Lee’s investment of $14m. Neither did she request for the signing of any warranties of any kind.

  87. [50] Third, no questions were asked about the sales volume or value of the Companies. This remained the case even after Ms Hatta engaged an accountant, Mr Jeff Khoo, in 2015, to advise her with regard to the Companies’ financial statement for 2014. Regarding the amount invested by Dr Lee, Ms Hatta did ask Dr Lee in January 2013, but she did not query or follow up on the breakdown furnished to her then, which showed that while it was relevant in her consideration of the further request of $2m, which she did not invest, she had not relied upon it in making the original $2m investment.

  88. [51] The final indicator is the time at which the misrepresentation claim was brought. The amendment to the statement of claim was made on 19 December 2017, almost six months after her initial statement of claim dated 20 June 2017. This was the first time Ms Hatta raised the issue, almost six years after the time when Dr Lee had purportedly first made the various representations.

  89. [52] Further, it was conceded that any reliance on a representation made must be reasonable (see Quah Poh Hoe Peter v Probo Pacific Leasing Pte Ltd [1992] 3 SLR(R) 400 at [13]). Ms Hatta’s experience as a television producer in the media industry, after having produced shows like “Asia’s Next Top Model” and “Almost Famous” would mean that she would possess at least a minimal understanding that losses can ensue from investments. It would be reasonable to expect her to complete a minimal degree of due diligence where a point was of importance to her. It was not reasonable, on her part, to have been induced by oral assertions as to the sales volume or value of the Companies, or the amount of money Dr Lee had invested. The need to check the Companies’ financial statements would have been plain. She had sufficient time and resources to seek any independent legal advice that she required.

  90. [53] In this context, Ms Hatta’s case included criticism that she had been “taken in” by Dr Lee’s “larger than life” public persona and celebrity status, and Dr Lee’s “façade” of success. These image projections could not be said to amount to representations of fact nor could reliance have been placed reasonably upon them. Criticism was also made that Dr Lee spoke of rejecting other investors who were interested to invest more. These were not pleaded as misrepresentations, nor did Ms Hatta ascertain at any time the veracity of the other expressions of interest.

  91. [54] I thus find that Ms Hatta had not placed any reliance on any of the pleaded representations (in so far as any were made) nor would such reliance have been reasonable on the part of Ms Hatta.

  92. Conclusion on misrepresentation, estoppel, affirmation and delay

  93. [55] Ms Hatta’s claim on misrepresentation was of three kinds: negligent, statutory and fraudulent. At the base for all three claims is the need for reasonable reliance. In the light of my finding that there was no reasonable reliance on the part of Ms Hatta, all three alternatives fail.

  94. [56] I should mention that at various points of submissions and trial, Ms Hatta made various contentions as to fraud, on the basis that the First ERA was a sham agreement. In so far as these contentions relate to misrepresentation, the First ERA, signed on 3 February 2012, could not form a part of the misrepresentations made on 20 January 2012. I assume the contentions were made as part of the case for dishonesty in the context of the fraudulent misrepresentation claim. It is not necessary to consider these contentions as the representation claim has not been made out.

  95. [57] A further consequence of the failure of the misrepresentation claim is that there is also no necessity for me to consider Dr Lee’s pleaded defences of estoppel, affirmation and delay that could otherwise bar Ms Hatta from seeking rescission of her investment.

  96. Minority Oppression

  97. Context

  98. [58] I now turn to Ms Hatta’s claim under the head of minority oppression, pursuant to s 216 of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) (“Companies Act”). The common element which undergirds the four limbs in s 216 (ie, oppression, disregard of a shareholder’s interests, unfair discrimination and prejudice) is commercial unfairness. While a minority shareholder is not required to identify the specific limb relied on, it needs to demonstrate that the conduct complained of amounts to commercially unfair conduct (Ho Yew Kong v Sakae Holdings Ltd and other appeals and other matters [2018] 2 SLR 333 (“Sakae”) at [81]).

  99. [59] Commercial fairness is not, however, considered in the abstract. The Court of Appeal in Tomolugen Holdings Ltd and another v Silica Investors Ltd and other appeals [2016] 1 SLR 373 (“Tomolugen”) cited at [87] Lord Hoffmann’s summation of the law in the House of Lords in O’Neill v Phillips [1999] 1 WLR 1092 (“O’Neill”) at 1098–1099, which explains as follows in relation to s 459 of the Companies Act 1985 (c 6) (UK), the then English equivalent of s 216 of the Companies Act:

  100. [60] In Tomolugen at [88], Sundaresh Menon CJ explained that “the essence of a claim for relief on the ground of oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct lies in upholding the commercial agreement between the shareholders of a company [emphasis added]”. Therefore, whether the majority’s conduct amounts to unfairness must be seen in the context of the commercial agreement entered between the shareholders of the company. This commercial agreement does not merely refer to that encapsulated in the formal documents; it would also extend to informal understandings between the members. It is this agreement which creates legitimate expectations among the shareholders of the company, which the court considers in determining whether to grant relief under s 216 of the Companies Act, a point also reiterated in Sakae at [82].

  101. [61] These principles are the premise in analysing Ms Hatta’s contentions. In brief, she contends that commercial unfairness has arisen because Dr Lee has breached an understanding between them (detailed and referred to below as “the Alleged Understanding”). This Alleged Understanding grounded the quasi-partnership which she claims the parties had. In failing to meet Ms Hatta’s legitimate expectations, Ms Hatta contends, Dr Lee has also breached fiduciary duties. Two broad issues need to be addressed:

  102. (a) What is the content of the commercial agreement between parties?

  103. (b) Has any commercial unfairness accordingly arisen?

  104. The commercial agreement between Dr Lee and Ms Hatta

  105. [62] Ms Hatta contends that the Companies were quasi-partnerships, premised upon the Alleged Understanding, which she details as follows:

  106. (a) to be consulted on material events that would affect the Companies’ reputation and continuity, including but not limited to, the forward planning and direction of the Companies’ business and future;

  107. (b) to be regularly updated on the Companies’ financial statements and reports;

  108. (c) to be addressed on any of her concerns regarding the business and financials of the Companies; and

  109. (d) to be involved in any decision-making process relating to key money matters, including but not limited to any potential re-allocation, buy-out, monetising and disposal of the Companies’ assets.

  110. Did the Alleged Understanding exist?

  111. [63] It is not disputed that there is no record of the Alleged Understanding in any formal document. The evidence shows that there was no agreement for Ms Hatta to be consulted on material events that would affect the Companies’ reputation and continuity (ie, (a) of the Alleged Understanding). It is true that Ms Hatta had been consulted on a few instances, such as when she and Dr Lee discussed the setting up of a company in China on or around 18 December 2012 to register DrGL® products and when Dr Lee requested Ms Hatta’s feedback on 5 October 2013 on three potential partners that the Companies were considering engaging. However, for the most part, Dr Lee only provided updates on the Companies’ affairs to Ms Hatta.

  112. [64] When given information and updates by Dr Lee, at least prior to the introduction of Adval, Ms Hatta did not protest that Dr Lee had acted contrary to any understanding that she would be consulted before any important business decisions were undertaken. The following are examples where major decisions were made and Ms Hatta was of the view that an update was sufficient and did not complain about not being consulted before the decisions were taken:

  113. (a) 22 May 2012: Dr Lee updated Ms Hatta on various milestones and business decisions she had made without consulting or involving Ms Hatta. This included a franchise development project with AS Louken for overseas markets, the re-location of the second defendant, exploring the possibility of entering the China market with Luxasia, starting a hair spa outlet at Marina Bay Sands for the third defendant, etc.

  114. (b) 23 November 2012: Dr Lee informed Ms Hatta that she planned to enter into a joint venture with a Chinese contact for the China markets.

  115. (c) On 20 November 2013, Dr Lee informed Ms Hatta that she was going to sign a non-disclosure agreement with an interest group to help the Companies expand.

  116. (d) 5 July 2014: Dr Lee informed Ms Hatta that TA Associates, a global growth private equity firm, had expressed interest in investing in the Companies.

  117. (f) On 1 October 2015, Dr Lee informed Ms Hatta that the Companies had started an outlet at BHG Bugis and the Companies would focus more on the online business.

  118. [65] The evidence indicates that Dr Lee updated Ms Hatta from time to time, and they also met up socially from time to time. Some elements of the Alleged Understanding exist, which I explain more fully below. But it was clear that Dr Lee was the sole director and managed the Companies without taking directions or engaging in close consultation with Ms Hatta on the usual run of business decisions or operations of the Companies.

  119. [66] That the Alleged Understanding did not exist in its full form as alleged is also reinforced by the fact that the Companies were not quasi-partnerships, contrary to Ms Hatta’s contention. It is apposite, at this juncture, to return to the locus classicus of Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries and others [1973] 1 AC 360 (“Ebrahimi”), per Lord Wilberforce at 379–380:

  120. [67] The first point to note is that a quasi-partnership is a label used where parties work in circumstances akin to a partnership. In the present case, it was plain after Ms Hatta’s cross-examination that she did not participate in the making of major decisions in the Companies. When questioned during cross-examination, Ms Hatta gave evidence that she expected to be consulted on the appropriate attire for Dr Lee when Dr Lee attended events such as catwalk shows, birthday parties and award ceremonies, and that she had contributed to the decision-making process of the Companies by suggesting whether, when the Companies shifted offices, the new offices should face the building lift. Ms Hatta later admitted that she had little experience in real estate matters. Her lack of a substantial role is consistent with the size of her 5% shareholding.

  121. [68] A useful contrast may be drawn with Over & Over Ltd v Bonvests Holdings Ltd and another [2010] 2 SLR 776 (“Over & Over”), where the Court of Appeal found the existence of a quasi-partnership. There, the court found at [9] that the Sianandar and Lauw families had agreed at the outset that there would be mutual consultation on any important decisions relating to the operations and management of Richvein, the joint venture investment. Whenever important issues affecting the operations or management of Richvein arose, Henry Ngo, from the Sianandar family, would consult the Lauw family before making any decisions (see Over & Over at [10]). In July 1991, Henry Ngo unilaterally terminated a contract with a third party without consulting the Lauw family and this immediately served as a cause of concern for the latter (see Over & Over at [12]).

  122. Implied or informal understanding giving rise to legitimate expectations

  123. [69] Notwithstanding the absence of a quasi-partnership in its traditional sense set out in Ebrahimi, Ebrahimi itself makes clear that Ms Hatta is not precluded from raising other legitimate expectations which could arise from implied or informal understandings between parties. The absence of presence of a quasi-partnership is not determinative of the question of whether equitable considerations ought to apply in any given case. As summarised by Mr Phillip Sales sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge in Fisher v Cadman and others [2006] BCLC 499 (“Fisher”) at [84]:

  124. [70] Fundamental to this analysis is the type of company involved. On the one hand, in a “purely commercial” venture based on an arm’s length relationship, the rights and obligations which parties owe to one another would typically be “adequately and exhaustively” reflected in the formal documents (eg articles of association and shareholders’ agreements) (as explained by Lord Wilberforce in Ebrahimi, see [66] above). This ought to be contrasted with companies formed on the basis of a personal relationship, and it is this character of a company that allows for equitable considerations to come into play. The rationale is that that the “affairs [of the company] were dealt with on a very informal basis throughout” and this indicates “a common understanding that the constitutional documents did not represent the complete and exhaustive statement of how the relationship between the members and the members and management should be conducted” (see Fisher at [89]).

  125. [71] In the present case, the Companies have two shareholders, one a skilled entrepreneur with majority stake, the other an investor who, aside from the context of the investment, is not involved in the industry in which the products are sold. Ms Hatta emphasised that theirs was a personal relationship of mutual trust and confidence. That this was so may be seen from the total absence of documentation to govern their relationship and the informal basis on which Dr Lee and Ms Hatta dealt with one another. In my view, notwithstanding that the Companies were not quasi-partnerships, it is appropriate for equitable considerations to apply in this case (ie, for informal and implied understandings to give rise to legitimate expectations). The parties could not have contemplated that the articles of the Companies would completely and exhaustively govern their relationship.

  126. [72] Nevertheless, it is not the mutual trust and confidence between the shareholders which determines the content of the legitimate expectations. For that content, I return to the guidance of Lord Hoffmann in O’Neill (at [59] above), that the commercial agreement between parties is crucial. Where a quasi-partnership exists, as Lord Wilberforce pointed out in Ebrahimi, the frame forms a convenient label where a common understanding is implicit within the course of conduct and expectations appurtenant to partners. Outside of a quasi-partnership, the commercial agreement may be of a different kind, carrying its own informal understanding. But such understanding must arise out of the context and circumstances shown by the evidence. Consumer protection is not the function of s 216 of the Companies Act. It is therefore to the parties’ commercial agreement that I direct the inquiry.

  127. What was their informal understanding?

  128. [73] On the facts, I find that the informal understanding between Dr Lee and Ms Hatta would include three elements. The first arises from Ms Hatta’s responsibility as a 5% shareholder. As a shareholder, she had a responsibility to sign off on financial statements. This gives her a right to ask questions about such statements and a reasonable expectation for appropriate answers and relevant information on financial statements to be given.

  129. [74] Two other elements arise out of the object of their joint enterprise. This object is best expressed by Dr Lee, in a text to Ms Lim on 21 January 2012, which reads:

  130. [75] This text is important, because it was sent the day after their meeting on 20 January 2012, and prior to the documents being signed in February 2012. Her wish was for “the partner who believe in me to stick with me to enjoy the fruits of my endgoal from the hard work”. This wish was reiterated when Dr Lee approached Ms Hatta for another $2m on 23 November 2012, where she informed Ms Hatta that Mr Cintamani had offered to invest, “but I feel that it will be better for the company to have less partners for ease of sell out in the future [emphasis added]”. Dr Lee’s case acknowledged that the premise of Ms Hatta’s investment into her Companies, which both knew were loss-making, was joint gain on exit.

  131. [77] For this reason, the elements of (a) to (d) of the Alleged Understanding that relate specifically to Ms Hatta’s $2m investment, her responsibility to sign off on financial statements as a shareholder, and the jointly envisaged exit must exist. These elements would comprise of the following:

  132. (a) being informed and having queries answered reasonably in relation to the financial statements or her investment;

  133. (b) being informed and having queries answered reasonably in relation to the Adval JV; and

  134. (c) fair treatment in the final Adval JV deal.

  135. Fiduciary duties

  136. [78] Implicit in the commercial agreement would also be an “implied understanding that corporate participants in directorial positions would not use their positions of power to ‘defraud’ other participants, contrary to their duties in statute, common law or equity” (Walter Woon on Company Law (Tan Cheng Han, ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, Revised 3rd Ed, 2009) at para 5.76). This implied understanding would naturally fall within the commercial agreement of the parties which formed the basis of their association. This implied understanding is supported by case law. Coomaraswamy J has observed that it follows from a director’s fiduciary duties to act in the best interests of a company that shareholders will have a legitimate expectation that those in control of the company will act bona fide in the interests of the company (Leong Chee Kin (on behalf of himself and as a minority shareholder of Ideal Design Studio Pte Ltd) v Ideal Design Studio Pte Ltd and others [2018] 4 SLR 331 at [65]).

  137. [79] In considering breaches of fiduciary duty as part of an oppression action, I begin with the analytical framework used in Sakae. It is first necessary to consider whether it was an abuse of process for Ms Hatta to bring an oppression action for breaches of fiduciary duties committed by Dr Lee, instead of commencing a statutory derivative action under s 216A. This requires the court to have regard to the analytical framework set out by the Court of Appeal in Sakae at [116]:

  138. [81] Following on, then, with the specific fiduciary duties, these are the no-profit and no-conflict rules, which were explained by the Court of Appeal in Sakae at [135]:

  139. [82] Pertinent to the facts of this case that we will come to, this duty of loyalty must be distinguished from that of care, skill and diligence, which must be sufficiently serious before amounting to oppression, and must be pleaded: see Sakae at [132] and [147].

  140. Conclusion on the content of legitimate expectations

  141. [83] I hold therefore, that the commercial agreement between Dr Lee and Ms Hatta would entail the following informal and implied understandings: for Dr Lee to uphold her fiduciary duties; to deal with Ms Hatta’s questions on the financial statements and the Adval JV fairly; and to treat Ms Hatta fairly in the final Adval JV deal. These would give rise to legitimate expectations, which if breached, would amount to commercial unfairness. I next deal with whether these expectations have been fulfilled.

  142. Whether legitimate expectations were met

  143. Fiduciary duties

  144. [84] I begin with the legitimate expectations arising from the implied understanding that Dr Lee would comply with her fiduciary duties. Ms Hatta raises a plethora of contentions with respect to Dr Lee’s alleged breach of fiduciary duties, which I summarise into four categories:

  145. (a) Dr Lee had mischaracterised her $2m investment;

  146. (b) Dr Lee had wrongfully discharged Fide from its performance of the ERA;

  147. (c) Dr Lee had mismanaged the finances of the Companies; and

  148. (d) the Adval JV was not commercially fair to Ms Hatta.

  149. [85] I find that breaches of fiduciary duty do arise in the first three areas. In respect of the Adval JV I do not so find, but deal with the issue in the context of the three elements of their understanding which I have outlined at [77].

  150. (1) Use of Ms Hatta’s $2m investment

  151. [88] Both parties were not able to explain this document at trial. Ms Hatta understood $2m to be her investment in the Companies, and the additional $2m to be a loan to Fide. The document was prepared by Dr Lee and Mr Cintamani. Despite Dr Lee’s understanding, explained during cross examination, that the ERA was meant as a mechanism for her to receive $2m from Ms Hatta in exchange for 5% of the Companies’ shares, there is no mention of any share transfer in the ERA itself. Instead, Dr Lee and Ms Hatta separately entered into three share transfer agreements, which state that Ms Hatta provided $2 in consideration to Dr Lee and $1 in consideration to Mr Cintamani in exchange for receiving 5% of the Companies’ shares.

  152. [89] After obtaining the $2m from Mr Cintamani via a personal cheque, as stated above at [11], and without Ms Hatta’s knowledge, Dr Lee proceeded to loan the $2m to the Companies, with the amount reflected as a personal loan from Dr Lee. This was an interest-bearing loan. The net result of the agreements was that the Companies had additional liabilities, a loan of $2m, interest payable, and the grant of exclusive rights to Fide. In fact, the amounts stated at Clause 2(a) of the First ERA ought to have been reflected as consideration within the share transfer documents. Mr Chan was clear in his evidence in court that he had not seen the First ERA, and was not responsible for filling in the amounts in the completed First ERA. He was also clear that the amounts listed at Clause 2(a) would have amounted to valid consideration. The $1 value on the share transfer form was in fact a misstatement. Dr Lee agreed in cross-examination that what was done was an unnecessarily convoluted method of procuring working capital for the Companies.

  153. [90] The mere fact that this arrangement was misleading or convoluted might not however necessarily amount to commercial unfairness, if the eventual result was that $2m was injected into the Companies. Ms Hatta did not complain that anything was amiss when Dr Lee informed her in November 2012 that her $2m had been “rechannelled” into the Companies. What was objectionable was Dr Lee’s creation of liabilities (in the form of the loans) and Dr Lee’s profiting from the interest earned on those loans, when it was clear that both Dr Lee and Ms Hatta had a common understanding that the $2m was to be used as working capital.

  154. [91] This common understanding is reflected in Dr Lee’s evidence that she was looking for an investor to inject expansion capital into the Companies, and her email to Mr Ku and Ms Ong on 24 February 2016:

  155. [92] The loans that were provided by Dr Lee to the Companies, between 3 February 2012 (one day after the ERA was signed) and 31 December 2012, were identified in the expert report of Ms Chai Tse Yin. They amounted to $2,070,000 in total:

  156. (a) On 26 March 2012, Dr Lee extended a loan of $1,200,000 to DRGL (“Loan 1”) and $500,000 to CIEL (“Loan 2”).

  157. (b) On 23 November 2012, Dr Lee extended a loan of $150,000 to DRGL and $150,000 to CIEL.

  158. (c) There were two smaller loans of $40,000 to DRGL (on 23 February 2012) and $30,000 to CIEL (on 31 October 2012).

  159. [93] The loan agreements for Loan 1 and Loan 2 provided that the interest amounts were $240,000 and $100,000 respectively. Ms Chai’s expert opinion, which was made plain in her report and in cross-examination, is that interest was paid by DRGL and CIEL to Dr Lee. From the time the loans were extended to 31 January 2017 (ie, Ms Chai’s review period), interest amounting to $90,000 and $39,166.51 were paid by DRGL and CIEL respectively.

  160. [94] Dr Lee and Ms Evelyn Chan’s (Dr Lee’s personal assistant and the General Manager of the Companies) explanation was that this was an inadvertent mistake as the loans were meant to be interest-free loans, and were indicated as such in the relevant directors’ resolutions. The monthly repayments went towards repayment of the principal loan and not towards any interest. In my view, this explanation was a convenient afterthought. To take Loan 1 as an example (the same reasoning applies to Loan 2), it was clearly stipulated that the “Amount of Loan” was $1,200,000 and the “Interest” was $240,000, amounting to a total of $1,440,000. The loan agreements were signed by Dr Lee. The loan agreement was only two pages long and Dr Lee, a sophisticated entrepreneur, must have realised that interest was payable on the loan. Further, Loan 1 provided for 120 monthly instalments of $12,000 each, which would amount to $1,440,000. This monthly repayment figure of $12,000 would therefore include the interest payable per month (ie, $2,000) and this was precisely the approach taken by Ms Chai in her analysis. Dr Lee’s explanation that the entire $12,000 went towards repayment of the principal sum does not add up. In addition, her contention that the cash books did not record any interest is neither here nor there, since Ms Chai’s opinion was that the cash books were wrongly recorded.

  161. [95] The interest earned was a profit that put her personal financial interests and those of the Companies in conflict. A duty to disclose the loan to Ms Hatta thereby arose. By not doing so, the interest then constituted a secret profit. Dr Lee’s argument, in this context, that Ms Hatta had not imposed any constraint upon her in the treatment of her investment is no defence to her breach of fiduciary duty. Millett LJ’s summation of fiduciary duty in Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1 at 18, cited by the Court of Appeal in Ng Eng Ghee v Mamata Kapildev Dave (Horizon Partners Pte Ltd, intervener) [2009] 3 SLR(R) 109 at [135], is pertinent:

  162. [96] The $2m capital ought to have been injected directly into the Companies by Dr Lee. That was in any event what her investor expected. By imposing a loan, Dr Lee placed herself in a conflict of interest and the secret profit made thereby was in breach of her fiduciary duty.

  163. (2) Discharge of the First ERA

  164. [97] Subsequently, the First ERA was thereafter discharged on 1 September 2012 without Ms Hatta’s knowledge. In November 2012, Dr Lee began a conversation with Ms Hatta about a second $2m injection instead.

  165. [98] Ms Hatta, on her part, characterised Dr Lee and Mr Cintamani’s First ERA and Revised ERA as an elaborate scheme. In fact, the plan was not an elaborate, but a simple, one. On the face of the First ERA, Ms Hatta agreed to invest $4m. Half was to be paid to Dr Lee, with the other half being first loaned to Fide and then paid to Dr Lee after 6 months. Both halves were banked into Fide’s account, which Mr Cintamani then withdrew. While he gave the first half to Dr Lee, the second half remains unaccounted for. At trial, both parties distanced themselves from the First ERA. Ms Hatta contended that she only intended to make a $2m investment to the Companies, and that the further $2m was a loan to Fide. Dr Lee’s evidence was that Ms Hatta intended from the outset to make a $4m investment in two tranches, while asserting that she was not aware of what the First ERA contained. The version that each party maintained at trial was consistent with the narrative they each sought to advance, but the plain language of the First ERA was consistent with events as they unfolded.

  166. [99] As the First ERA was signed on 2 February, the second payment to the Companies was due by 2 August. What followed instead was its discharge in September. At the centre of Ms Hatta’s bitterness is an email sent on 1 September 2012 by Mr Cintamani to Dr Lee, in which Mr Cintamani makes the statement: “As you know the structure was suggested and put in place to act as a buffer between Anita and DrGL.” Various allegations as to Dr Lee’s fraudulent intent are made as a result. I have dealt with this in the context of the misrepresentation claim, at [56]. In the context of the minority oppression claim, the issue that is relevant is Dr Lee’s conduct after receipt of the email. Unknown to Ms Hatta, Dr Lee, on discovering no doubt that the money was not forthcoming from Fide, discharged the First ERA, releasing Fide (and Mr Cintamani) from any liability for the ERA.

  167. [100] At general law, this breach could only have been avoided if there was “full disclosure to all the shareholders of all the material facts and shareholders’ agreement is subsequently obtained” (Traxiar Drilling Partners II Pte Ltd (in liquidation) v Dvergsten, Dag Oivind [2018] SGHC 14 at [106]; Dayco Products Singapore Pte Ltd (in liquidation) v Ong Cheng Aik [2004] 4 SLR(R) 318 (“Dayco”) at [13]). This should be distinguished from a director’s statutory duty to disclose conflict of interests to the board of directors under s 156 of the Companies Act. Under these circumstances, Dr Lee needed to seek informed consent: the only individual who could provide such consent on the facts was Ms Hatta, the other remaining shareholder in the Companies.

  168. [101] Dr Lee contends that it would have been inappropriate for her to issue a demand to Fide for the sum owed to the Companies under the ERA as both Mr Cintamani and Ms Hatta were Fide’s directors and shareholders. This is a sleight of hand as the lack of enforcement of an obligation is wholly different from the discharge of an obligation. Much later, when Ms Hatta queried as to what happened to the First ERA on 13 May 2016, Dr Lee responded that the ERA was “a separate issue” from Ms Hatta’s $2m investment for 5% of the Companies’ shareholding, and that there was no need for either Fide or the Companies to perform their obligations under the First ERA. In fact, the First ERA was not, as Dr Lee contended, a separate issue. Dr Lee also deliberately misled and omitted to update Ms Hatta on the discharge in her 1 June 2016 reply to Ms Hatta’s queries of 31 May 2016:

  169. [102] The $2m liability of Fide to the Companies was an avenue for funding that Mr Ku queried as well on 16 February 2016. In fact, Dr Lee had a conflict of interest between her personal loyalty to Mr Cintamani, and her loyalty to the Companies. She ought to have informed Ms Hatta that she intended to discharge Fide from its obligation not only because Ms Hatta had supplied the remaining $2m (albeit on Ms Hatta’s case as a loan to Fide), but because Dr Lee was placed in a position of conflict.

  170. (3) Whether Dr Lee has misused the Companies’ funds

  171. [104] Ms Hatta contends that Dr Lee had wrongfully misused the Companies’ funds for her personal purposes and/or purposes that were not related to the business purpose of the Companies. The relevant transactions were identified in Appendix 10 of Ms Chai’s second interim report. Some 273 suspicious transactions were alleged.

  172. [105] The period in question is a 5-year time span. Some 40 of these 273 transactions occurred prior to Ms Hatta’s involvement with the Companies. Ms Hatta’s evidence-in-chief did not address the transactions which were prejudicial to her. It is possible to find from Ms Chai’s evidence various instances of expenditure in the present case that could not be properly accounted for, specifically relating to payments of sums by the Companies to TLC and DrGeorgiaLee Pte Ltd, which were owned by Dr Lee. For instance, Ms Chai pointed out that the third defendant was paying the full rental sum of $6,200 from May 2015 to December 2016 pursuant to the Tenancy Agreement between TLC and the third defendant, on the basis that an entire unit at Pacific Plaza was being loaned. The third defendant continued to pay this monthly sum in full despite TLC moving into and sharing the same premises as the third defendant from 2 May 2015 onwards. There was little reason for the third defendant to bear the full burden of rent when TLC was sharing the premises. In a similar vein, the Tenancy Agreement between DrGeorgiaLee Pte Ltd and the second defendant dated 1 December 2014 provided for the rent payable by the second defendant to be that of $5,500 per month. Yet from September 2015 to February 2017, the second defendant started paying rent of $11,770 per month (including GST) to DrGeorgiaLee Pte Ltd. Save for a revision to the Tenancy Agreement, which was not shown during the proceedings, there is little reason for the second defendant to be paying in excess.

  173. [106] These allegations should nonetheless be approached with caution, for three reasons. First, the duty to exercise care, skill and diligence must be delineated from the duty of loyalty. The duty of care, skill and diligence is not imposed to exact loyalty from a director, and any breach must be sufficiently serious to found minority oppression: see Sakae at [135] and [152]. The function of the Sakae analytical framework is to differentiate derivative actions, which pursue wrongs against the relevant company, and minority oppression actions, which deal with injury to minority shareholders. This distinction is consistent with the requirement for serious prejudice to the minority shareholder in such cases. Serious prejudice was not articulated.

  174. [108] Finally, Sakae also makes the point, at [132], that the breach of duty of care, skill and diligence must be specifically pleaded. While there is reference in paragraph 9A of the statement of claim to the duty to act in the best interests of the Companies, paragraph 50 makes clear that allegations of minority oppression go towards breach of fiduciary duties and not the other duties owed to the Companies.

  175. [109] Of greater concern were the related party transactions that were entered into by Dr Lee. Ms Chai’s evidence indicated that, despite the fact that the Companies were technically insolvent, Dr Lee had concealed the existence of related party transactions in the Companies’ financial statements by procuring the Companies to borrow from third party finance companies such as Orix, while at the same time making repayments, in some cases with interest, towards herself and her related companies.

  176. [110] Dr Lee mounts the argument that there is no general bar against related party transactions, and that Ms Hatta has to demonstrate how she was prejudiced by them.

  177. [112] Apart from Loan 1 and Loan 2 examined above, the other relevant loan is a $300,000 loan extended by TLC to the second defendant on 13 March 2013 (“Loan 3”). Although the loan agreement stated that it was interest-free, a monthly interest of $1,504.79 was paid to TLC and disclosed in the 2015 and 2016 financial statements, amounting to $58,690.41 in Ms Chai’s period of review. The payment of interest to TLC was conceded by Dr Lee.

  178. [113] Accordingly, Dr Lee was placed in a position of conflict and Ms Hatta’s informed consent ought to have been obtained (see [100] above). In this regard, it is immaterial whether the Companies suffered any detriment (Dayco at [34]). It is also irrelevant if the terms of the loans were fair and in the company’s interests (Aberdeen Railway Co v Blaikie Brothers [1843–1860] All ER Rep 249 at 252). A director in a position of conflict would not be permitted to assert that his actions were bona fide or thought to be in the interests of the company (Nordic International Ltd v Morten Innhaug [2017] 3 SLR 957 at [53]).

  179. [114] This last breach was aggravated by a failure to answer Ms Hatta’s queries. This failure is dealt with below, from [130], because the queries subsequently became intertwined with queries in relation to the Adval JV.

  180. [116] Moreover, the facts of the present case are materially different from that in Parakou. In Parakou, it was found that the repayments were unprecedented, in so far as there was “no evidence of any established past practice of similar payments” and the lenders did not provide the company with any “new credit” in consideration for the repayments (Parakou at [111(f)]. In the present case, apart from the Orix loans, the Companies relied wholly on loans provided by Dr Lee and TLC to sustain their operations (a point made by Adval in their due diligence report, see [118(a)] below). The loans, therefore, provided a constant stream of credit to the Companies and the mere fact that there were repayments is not sufficient to show a breach of fiduciary duties, and there was no evidence that Dr Lee and TLC were preferred at the expense of other creditors.

  181. (4) The Adval JV

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