High Court · Decided 25 September 2019
Seah Chee Wan and another v Connectus Group Pte Ltd
Feedback & support[2019] SGHC 228 · Case no. Companies Winding Up No 78 of 2018
✱ What happened, in plain English
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Official text from eLitigation
Introduction
- [1]
[1] In this judgment, I deal with an application to wind up a company by one of its contributories, who is also a creditor, on the grounds that it is just and equitable to wind it up and also that it is unable to pay its debts as they fall due. There is a separate but linked application in Originating Summons No 449 of 2018 (“OS 449/2018”), which is an application under s 182 of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) (the “Act”) to convene an Extraordinary General Meeting of the same company without the necessary quorum. OS 449/2018 will be the subject of a separate judgment although the material facts in relation to that application are essentially the same as that for the present winding up application.
The background to the disputes
The setting up of the company
- [2]
[2] The company that it is at the centre of these disputes is Connectus Group Pte Ltd, a company established and based in Singapore (“Connectus Group”). It was incorporated on 16 August 2012. It is in the business of providing human resource services, particularly employment and executive search services.
- [3]
[3] Connectus Group was set up by (i) Seah Chee Wan, who is also referred to as Alex Seah (“AS”), (ii) Seah Shiang Ping, who is also referred to as Stacey Seah (“SS”), and (iii) Lim Tien Ho (“LTH”). The two Seahs are siblings. Together with LTH, the three of them had been colleagues in Hudson Global Resources (Singapore) Pte Ltd (“Hudson”), which is a well-established firm in the same line of business.
- [4]
[4] AS, SS and LTH decided to strike out on their own. They came up with the name “Connectus” for their own human resource services business and Connectus Group was thus set up.
- [5]
[5] To start the business, the three of them needed additional capital investment. In March 2012, before Connectus Group was incorporated, SS had been introduced through an acquaintance to one Ng Sing King, also referred to as Paul Ng (“PN”). PN was a potential investor who had various business interests. SS asked PN whether he would be interested in being a partner in their business that would be established. PN had many meetings with AS, SS and LTH. He learnt of their respective areas of specialities and what each of them wanted to do. PN told them about his own track record in human resource services businesses in Singapore and China. He had acted as a consultant and advisor to several such businesses. With his undoubted experience, AS, SS and LTH were looking to PN as an advisor on how to set up and run a successful human resource services business.
- [6]
[6] PN eventually agreed to invest in the business venture. In November 2012, a few months after Connectus Group was incorporated, PN used a company that he substantially owned and controlled, APBA Pte Ltd (“APBA”), to subscribe for shares in Connectus Group. On 12 November 2012, the four shareholders - APBA, SS, AS and LTH - entered into a Shareholders’ Agreement in relation to Connectus Group (“the SHA”).
- [7]
[7] The SHA was comprehensive and dealt with all the usual matters that one would expect to be covered by such an agreement. It included provisions dealing with how meetings would be conducted, restrictions on voting rights, reserved matters, anti-dilution of shareholding, “tag-along” and “drag-along” rights, dividends policy, management deadlock, buy-out provisions etc. There is also a provision of the SHA (clause 5.2), which provided, in gist, that each of the shareholders was entitled to appoint a director to the board of Connectus Group unless his shareholding fell below 15%.
- [8]
[8] After the entry of APBA, the shareholding in Connectus Group was as follows:
(a) AS - 117,000 shares (23.4%)
(b) SS - 117,000 shares (23.4%)
(c) LTH - 117,000 shares (23.4%)
(d) APBA - 149,000 shares (29.8%)
- [9]
[9] It is not disputed that PN had asked for slightly more than a 25% stake so that he could block any special resolutions. After APBA’s investment, as per the terms of the SHA, PN was appointed as APBA’s representative to the board of Connectus Group. The only other directors were AS, SS and LTH.
- [10]
[10] The four shareholders brought different practice areas and business segments to the table. AS had been working for a number of years in China, developing human resource businesses there. He wanted to continue focusing on growing the business in China. SS’s and LTH’s practice areas were based in Singapore. SS was primarily interested in servicing the healthcare industry, while LTH’s practice areas were the IT and semiconductor industries.
- [11]
[11] PN’s contribution was his experience and expertise in running a human resource services business. While the other three had experience only in employee recruitment and executive search, PN offered to help Connectus Group develop revenue streams in areas like payroll administration, recruitment process outsourcing, interim management and contract staffing.
- [12]
[12] AS, SS and LTH were employed full-time by Connectus Group and drew salaries. On the other hand, APBA provided consultancy and accounting services to Connectus Group, and billed the company for these services.
The entry of Edwin Lim and his family
- [13]
[13] Less than a year later, in July 2013, LTH decided to part ways with Connectus Group. He sold his shares in the company to PN, who then sold them to one Ong Poh Suan, also known as Sharon Ong (“SO”). She is the wife of Edwin Lim Tow Ee (“EL”), another former colleague of AS and SS from Hudson, and one of the central players in the eventual disputes between the parties. It is not disputed that the AS, SS and EL had known each other for some time, even before they worked together in Hudson. EL was looking to leave Hudson to join Connectus Group. He was introduced by AS and SS to PN. EL wanted to take up LTH’s stake in Connectus Group, and AS, SS and PN then agreed to have him come on board as their fourth shareholder and also to become the Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of the company.
- [14]
[14] The trouble was that EL was an inveterate gambler and often found himself in debt. He did not have the funds needed to buy LTH’s stake. EL approached his father, Lim Meng Foo (“LMF”), for the capital. LMF’s unchallenged evidence is that he agreed to pay for the 23.4% stake in Connectus Group so that EL could become the CEO of the company. He would not have come up with the funds if EL was not going to be offered the job of CEO. However, knowing his son’s gambling habits, LMF decided that it would be best that the 23.4% stake be registered in the name of EL’s wife, SO. She was also appointed as a director of the company.
- [15]
[15] Hence, with the departure of LTH, the four shareholders in Connectus Group were AS, SS, APBA and SO, in the same shareholding proportion as before, save that SO stepped into the shoes of LTH. In effecting the transfer of the Connectus Group shares from PN to SO, a document was executed by PN, APBA, AS and SS, which stated, amongst other things, that “APBA, Alex, Stacey and Ng agree to waive the SHA completely and immediately”. While these words on the SHA are quite ambiguous, the evidence of the parties before me was that they treated the SHA as no longer having any legal force. Neither side relied on any of the SHA provisions as continuing to give them any particular rights as shareholders or to impose any legal obligations on the other shareholders.
The business in China
- [17]
[17] On 27 March 2013, Connectus Group entered into a Cooperation Agreement (the “Cooperation Agreement”) with a Chinese company called Shanghai Lethic Business Consulting Co Ltd (“SLBC”). This was a company that was majority owned and controlled by a businessman called Chary Zhu De Quan, who the parties referred to simply as “Chary”. PN also has a shareholding interest in SLBC. In fact, it was PN who had introduced the other shareholders of Connectus Group to Chary.
- [18]
[18] The parties have variously described the Cooperation Agreement with SLBC as a “joint collaboration agreement” or a “joint collaborative agreement”. This was always intended to be a transitional arrangement until Connectus Group could establish its own subsidiary in China. In essence, pursuant to the Cooperation Agreement, Connectus Group would deposit RMB 1.2m of investment funds with SLBC. In turn, SLBC would set up the entire business infrastructure to allow Connectus Group to operate in China, including the hiring of employees and acting as the payroll agent. The operating expenses would be paid for in the first instance by SLBC. The Cooperation Agreement also provided that SLBC would also sign contracts on Connectus Group’s behalf, issue invoices and also collect on all payments. SLBC would also charge a management fee to Connectus Group.
- [19]
[19] While the Cooperation Agreement was, on paper, only between Connectus Group and SLBC, it is not disputed that there were two other stakeholders. Bonnie Wang and Frank Zhang (collectively, “the Chinese partners”) were two former colleagues of AS in Hudson who worked in China. They were now part of the management team of the Chinese operations of Connectus Group, and they together own 33.33% of the business there. Hence, they contributed RMB 300,000 out of the RMB 1.2m of investment funds that were deposited with SLBC. However, as far as SLBC was concerned, the entire amount of RMB 1.2m was booked as coming from Connectus Group. The parties have collectively referred to the business arrangement with the Chinese partners as the “joint venture in China”.
- [20]
[20] AS was based in China and was the head of the operations of the joint venture there. His evidence was that the profits generated by the joint venture was a total of about RMB 3.335m for the years 2013 to 2015. This figure is corroborated by Profit & Losses statements (“P&L Statements”) signed off by AS on behalf of Connectus Group from 2013 to 2015, which show that the joint venture’s gross profit for the years 2013, 2014 and 2015 were RMB 164,674.03, RMB 1,904,825.51 and RMB 1,265,591.44 respectively; the three figures add up to approximately RMB 3.335m.
- [21]
[21] After three years of operation, Connectus Group was permitted under Chinese regulations to set up a wholly-owned subsidiary in China. In 2016, Connectus Business Consulting (Shanghai) Co Ltd was established as a wholly-owned foreign subsidiary. Parties referred to this company as “Connectus WFOE”, with WFOE being the acronym for “wholly foreign-owned enterprise”. As the name suggests, Connectus WFOE is 100% owned by Connectus Group.
- [22]
[22] On 27 April 2016, Shanghai Connectus Group Co Ltd (“Connectus Shanghai”) was established with the following shareholding – 66.67% owned by Connectus WFOE and 33.33% owned collectively by the Chinese partners.
- [23]
[23] Eventually, the business of the joint venture in China was transferred from SLBC to Connectus Shanghai and carried out through that new company.
Other agreements signed with Chary-controlled entities.
- [24]
[24] In the second half of 2016, Connectus Group executed an agreement with Shanghai Lethic Talent Services Co., Ltd (“SLTS”), which was dated 1 August 2016. This is another company substantially owned and controlled by Chary. PN also has a shareholding interest in SLTS.
- [25]
[25] Under this agreement, SLTS acknowledged that it owed a “consultancy fee” of about RMB 3.335m to Connectus Group and that this would be paid on or before 31 March 2017. It is not in dispute that Connectus Group did not provide any consultancy services to SLTS. This agreement had been suggested by Connectus Group’s auditors as a device by which the company could recognise the approximately RMB 3.335m profits of the Chinese joint venture in the accounts of Connectus Group. In fact, there was another agreement signed between the same parties slightly earlier where SLTS confirmed that it was holding on Connectus Group’s behalf “accumulated profits” from the Chinese joint venture in the amount of approximately RMB 3.335m. But, there is no dispute that this agreement was superseded by the one describing the amount of RMB 3.335m as a “consultancy fee” that was owed.
- [26]
[26] The reason for SLTS’s involvement must be explained. It is not entirely clear what the arrangements were but, it appears that, while SLBC was the party to the Cooperation Agreement with Connectus Group, the parties agreed for SLTS to be the entity that actually held the cash receipts that was generated by the business of the joint venture in China.
- [27]
[27] In 2015, Connectus Group was short of cash and needed funds. It turned to another company substantially owned and controlled by Chary called Talent-Spot Asia Co., Limited (“TSHK”), which is incorporated in Hong Kong, for loans. These were interest-bearing loans. A loan agreement was executed sometime in late September 2016, but back-dated to 31 December 2015, after the disbursement of most of the loans in 2015. The loan agreement set out the various amounts and the interest payable. There was another loan agreement dated 1 July 2016 which dealt with some smaller loan amounts. About RMB 4m was borrowed by Connectus Group from TSHK in total.
- [28]
[28] On behalf of Connectus Group, AS cancelled the “consultancy fee” agreement with SLTS in 11 October 2017. This was done without board approval or consultation with his other directors. His evidence was that, while he had initially agreed to have such an agreement, he now felt that it was a sham and was done only to “window dress” the accounts of Connectus Group.
Other loans to Connectus Group
- [29]
[29] The loans made by TSHK to Connectus Group in 2015 were not the only loans taken by the company. In 2013 and 2014, the shareholders had made loans to the company of varying amounts, in proportion to their respective shareholding. There were loan agreements that were prepared and signed by all the shareholders, setting out the interest amounts. These were intended to be short-term loans to help the company tide over cash-flow difficulties, and there were dates stipulated for repayments of these loans. But, Connectus Group never had enough money to repay the shareholder loans in full.
- [30]
[30] In 2017, AS made further short-term loans to Connectus Group to keep it going. In that year, a total of S$275,000 was lent to the company by AS, with an agreed rate of interest of 10%. Unlike the shareholder loans made in 2013 and 2014, these further loan agreements were only signed by AS, as lender, and EL, in his capacity as CEO of Connectus Group. Nonetheless, PN admitted that he knew about these loans.
The deterioration of the parties’ relationships with each other
- [31]
[31] The relationship between the shareholders was fraught with difficulties from sometime in 2014. After APBA became a shareholder, it seconded one of its employees, Kwang Chan Pong (“Kwang”), to act as the Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) of Connectus Group. In this way, APBA took charge of the accounting function for Connectus Group. After his appointment as CFO, Kwang reported that EL had been drawing his commissions from Connectus Group in advance of when they would normally be paid, which is when the company brought in a profit. It appears that EL was taking advances on these commissions because he needed to fund his gambling habit.
- [32]
[32] After Kwang had pointed out to the shareholders that Connectus Group was actually borrowing money to pay EL his commissions in advance and that revenue had been wrongly booked into the accounts of Connectus Group so that EL could draw commissions, the relationship that EL had with APBA started to strain considerably. In September 2014, EL caused Connectus Group to stop payment of fees due to APBA for consultancy and accounting services. When EL proposed that Kwang be removed as the CFO, PN objected to this. Despite this, Kwang eventually left his position as the CFO in May 2015. PN also claimed to have objected to Connectus Group taking loans from TSHK in 2015, but this was sanctioned by AS and EL.
- [34]
[34] An EGM of Connectus Group was convened on 11 August 2015. Several days before that, on 5 August 2015, APBA issued a letter to AS, SS, SO and the company secretary in response to the notice of EGM that had been issued. A number of matters were raised, including PN’s efforts to meet with the other directors to discuss the serious debt and cash flow situation of the company. More significantly, the letter also went on to state:
As the Company is in essence a joint venture between [APBA], [AS], [SS], and [SO], [PN’s] directorship is inextricably bound together with our shareholding in the Company. As such, there is no basis for [PN] to be excluded from management (and removed as a director) whilst we are still a shareholder of the Company. However, if the other shareholders wish for us to exit as a shareholder, we are prepared to discuss our exit from, and [PN’s] directorship in, the Company…
- [35]
[35] On 11 August 2015, just before the start of the EGM, it is alleged by AS that there was a private meeting between EL and PN. What transpired at that meeting and what EL and PN might have agreed has not been disclosed to the Court. But, what happened after that meeting was that EL immediately had a discussion with AS and SS, where he told them that he, and hence SO, was withdrawing his support for the resolution to remove PN as a director. The EGM then proceeded with the requisitioning shareholders agreeing to withdraw their proposed resolution. PN denied that there was any such private discussion with EL just before the start of the EGM.
- [36]
[36] The financial situation of Connectus Group did not improve in 2016 and 2017. EL continued to take advances on his salaries and commissions throughout 2016. In the meantime, in early 2017, SO’s shares in Connectus Group were transferred to her father-in-law, LMF. LMF’s evidence was that he had retired from his job at the beginning of 2017, and there was now no longer any restrictions for the Connectus Group shares to be registered in his name. After all, he had paid for those shares.
- [37]
[37] In July 2017, AS, SS and PN discovered that EL had made unauthorised withdrawals of the company’s funds. He was severely in debt because of his gambling addiction. PN arranged to meet EL in Shanghai. It was not disclosed to the Court what they had discussed and what agreements they had reached. But, shortly thereafter, LMF and APBA executed mutual undertakings to the effect that each of them would not sell their shares in Connectus Group without the other. This was a preparation for a mutual exit from Connectus Group by APBA and LMF. The actual undertakings were not put into evidence in these proceedings, but there is no dispute that they were executed for the purpose of binding APBA and LMF to an agreement to sell their shares as one majority bloc.
- [38]
[38] EL acknowledged that he owed approximately S$110,514.58 to Connectus Group. He then resigned as the CEO of the company in late July 2017. He was made a bankrupt by Resorts World Sentosa by the end of August 2017.
- [39]
[39] After this, things continued to spiral downwards for Connectus Group. EL had left things in a complete mess, and the company did not have enough funds to carry on. Issues were raised in relation to the continued management of the Singapore office. The company was struggling to pay the rent for the premises in Singapore. TSHK was also pressing for repayment of its loans. By May 2018, there was also no staff left in the company, as all of them had resigned.
- [40]
[40] Beginning from August 2017, PN started pressing AS and SS to account for the state of affairs of the company. He started describing them as “executive directors” in his emails, where he asked them various questions about the cash position of the company. It is not disputed that, around this time, the parties were in discussions for APBA and LMF to sell their shares to AS and SS, or for APBA to buy over the shares of AS and SS. PN represented LMF in these discussions. But, eventually, this did not come to fruition because parties could not agree on the price and whether AS and SS would agree to a non-competition clause in the event of them selling their shares.
- [41]
[41] On 19 September 2017, AS and SS commenced proceedings against Connectus Group seeking recovery of outstanding shareholders’ loans and interest due to them in the amount of S$418,857.81 in the case of AS and S$266,446.81 in the case of SS. These proceedings were then discontinued less than two weeks later on 1 October 2017, even though there was no repayment of any of the amounts owed.
- [42]
[42] On 10 October 2017, TSHK commenced proceedings in Singapore against Connectus Group, seeking recovery of its loans in the amount of approximately RMB 4.2m and interest of approximately RMB 800,000. These proceedings are still pending.
- [43]
[43] On 9 November 2017, the landlord of the office premises served a statutory demand on Connectus Group for the amount of S$67,743.10 due as unpaid rent. The arrears had been outstanding since June 2017.
- [44]
[44] AS and SS wrote emails to PN proposing solutions such as a voluntary winding-up or judicial management. PN wanted to meet at a directors’ meeting to discuss matters, but AS and SS did not want to meet him in person.
- [45]
[45] PN raised several issues about the accounts that had been prepared by the company, and wanted AS and SS, who he described repeatedly now as “executive directors”, to explain the company’s dire financial situation. His evidence was that AS was not able to give him a satisfactory explanation of the company’s state of affairs in a meeting with the company’s auditors in February 2018.
- [46]
[46] With the concurrence and support of LMF, with whom APBA together control 53.2% of the shares of Connectus Group, on 26 December 2017, APBA requisitioned an EGM of the company to consider resolutions to remove AS and SS as directors of the company. The EGM was held on 10 January 2018, with APBA’s representative and LMF attending. However, as AS and SS were absent, and as Connectus Group’s articles of association require three members of the company to form a quorum, the EGM was dissolved for being inquorate.
- [47]
[47] Subsequently, APBA and LMF again convened another EGM to consider the resolutions to remove AS and SS. The EGM was held on 26 March 2018. It was again dissolved due to a lack of quorum given the absence of AS and SS. The resolutions that were proposed by APBA, and supported by LMF, also included a resolution to replace AS and SS with PN’s sister, one Ng Siew King.
- [49]
[49] Shortly thereafter, AS and SS filed CWU 78/2018, seeking to wind up Connectus Group on the basis that it is just and equitable to do so, and also on the basis that the company is insolvent.
- [51]
[51] In respect of CWU 78/2018, directions were given by me for parties to give discovery. It was agreed by the parties that the deponents of the various affidavits in support of and in opposition to the winding-up would attend court to be cross-examined. Given the inter-connectedness of the two matters, parties also sensibly agreed that the evidence in CWU 78/2018 could be relied upon for the purpose of OS 449/2018 and vice versa.
- [53]
[53] I heard the evidence of the parties over five hearing days. Thereafter, the parties made their final submissions in writing in relation to the matters in dispute.
The parties’ cases in relation to the winding up application
AS’s case
- [54]
[54] AS relies on two grounds for his application. First, he alleges that Connectus Group is unable to pay the debts due to him, that is, the shareholders loans extended to the company. Second, he alleges that it would be just and equitable for the company to be wound up.
- [55]
[55] For the ground that Connectus Group is unable to pay its debts, AS relies on a statutory demand served on the company on 26 March 2018, which set out the sum of S$418,857.81 as the amount of his unpaid shareholder’s loans and accrued interest. The statutory demand has not been set aside. AS also refers to the other unpaid shareholder loans, the claim made by TSHK against the Connectus Group for the recovery of its loans, and the rental arrears that are due to Connectus Group’s landlord. He claims that the Connectus Group simply does not have the money to pay all these creditors.
- [57]
[57] AS also argues that Connectus Group has suffered management deadlock at the board level since about October 2017, which has been caused by unfair accusations that AS and SS are responsible for the dire financial straits of the company when, in reality, this had been caused by EL’s mismanagement and malfeasance.
- [58]
[58] Finally, AS submits that Connectus Group has ceased all its operations in Singapore as at May 2018 and hence there is a loss of substratum for the joint venture. In this regard, it is not in dispute that all operations have ceased, and Connectus Group’s main asset now is its 66.67% interest in the joint venture in China.
APBA’s case
- [59]
[59] APBA resists the application that the company should be wound up. While it accepts that Connectus Group does not have the funds to make payment of the shareholder loans that had been extended by AS and SS, APBA raises some questions about whether the debts are indeed owed. More significantly, APBA alleges that the financially distressed situation of the company has been caused by AS. APBA accuses AS of not taking the necessary steps to repatriate Connectus Group’s profits from the joint venture in China. In fact, APBA alleges that AS has breached his duties as a director by actively taking steps to frustrate the repatriation of such profits. It submits that, if the profits are repatriated to Connectus Group, there would be more than sufficient funds to make payment to all outstanding creditors of the company, including AS and SS.
- [60]
[60] APBA also denies that Connectus Group is the embodiment of a joint venture between itself, AS, SS and the Lim family. APBA claims that it is just an investor in the company and there are no express or implied understandings between the shareholders other than what is set out in the company’s articles of association. As Connectus Group is not a quasi-partnership, there is no expectation that each shareholder would be entitled to appoint a director to the board of the company. As such, APBA and the Lim family did not infringe any rights of AS or SS when they sought to remove them as directors by requisitioning the EGMs in early 2018.
- [61]
[61] As for cessation of the company’s business, APBA does not deny that Connectus Group no longer operates any business in Singapore. However, it submits that this occurred in May 2018, after the application for winding up was filed by AS and SS. Hence, as a matter of law, this is not a basis upon which AS can rely in seeking to wind up Connectus Group in the present winding up application. APBA also makes some allegations that AS and SS have acted to divert the business and employees of Connectus Group away to another company called Gateway Search Pte Ltd.
Insolvency of Connectus Group
- [63]
[63] A company is unable to pay its debts, or insolvent, if it fails either the cash flow test or the balance sheet test: Encus International Pte Ltd (in compulsory liquidation) v Tenacious Investment Pte Ltd and others [2016] 2 SLR 1178 (“Encus”) at [53]. A company that has failed to meet a current demand for a debt already due fails the cash flow test, while a company which presents a deficit on an overall balancing of liabilities against assets fails the balance sheet test: Re Great Eastern Hotel (Pte) Ltd [1988] 2 SLR(R) 276 at [85]. No one test is dominant, and both tests may be relevant depending on the circumstances of the case. Regard must ultimately be given to all the evidence which appears relevant to the question of insolvency: Chip Thye Enterprises Pte Ltd (in liquidation) v Phay Gi Mo and others [2004] 1 SLR(R) 434 (“Chip Thye”) at [20] and Encus at [53].
Disputed debt
- [64]
[64] In response to AS’s application to wind up Connectus Group on account of its insolvency, APBA submits that, Connectus Group, if it were represented, would be able dispute the debt claimed by AS.
- [65]
[65] In this regard, the law is well established that where the company disputes the debt claimed by the creditor on substantial grounds, the court will restrain the winding-up petition as it is an abuse of process for the creditor to try to enforce a disputed debt in such a way: Metalform Asia Pte Ltd v Holland Leedon Pte Ltd [2007] 2 SLR(R) 268 (“Metalform”) at [62], citing Mann v Goldstein [1968] 1 WLR 1091. The applicable standard for determining the existence of a substantial dispute is “no more than that for resisting a summary judgment application, ie, the debtor-company need only raise triable issues”: Pacific Recreation Pte Ltd v S Y Technology Inc and another appeal [2008] 2 SLR(R) 491 at [23].
- [66]
[66] APBA submits that the debt claimed by AS may be disputed as the loan agreements contained “extraordinarily high interest rates” of 10% and were “made without board approval”. It is also submitted that Connectus Group might have already repaid the debts allegedly owing to AS, although this cannot be confirmed as Connectus Group is not legally represented in this case. There is also a suggestion that AS might have utilised the loans for his personal purposes.
- [67]
[67] APBA does not deny that loans had been made by the shareholders, including by AS, in 2013 and 2014. As for the loans made by AS in 2017, which amount to S$275,000, PN does not deny that he was aware that AS was extending short-term loans to the company to keep it afloat, but his position is that there were no board resolutions which approved the taking of these loans at the rate of 10% interest.
- [68]
[68] In my view, it is quite irrelevant that no board resolutions were obtained at the time the loans were extended. All the directors were aware of the grave cash-flow situation of the company, and that AS and SS were extending short-term loans to the company. In fact, APBA was asked to but declined to make any further loans to the company.
- [69]
[69] As for the rate of interest charged, this was provided for in the loan agreements with AS that had been executed by EL, as the CEO on behalf of Connectus Group. PN would surely have been aware that the loans would carry interest, just like the shareholders loans that had been made earlier in 2013 and 2014. The conduct of PN in not having questioned the rate of interest that would be chargeable on these loans despite his awareness of them suggests to me that he was leaving it to EL to decide with AS what was the appropriate interest rate to charge. I find that EL was thus impliedly authorised by the directors to agree with AS on the appropriate rate of interest.
- [70]
[70] As regards the propriety of how the loans which were extended by AS were utilised, PN accepted that EL had explained that Connectus Group was in “desperate need of funds” when the loans were sought. Even if some of the funds had been utilised to pay AS’s salary, such amounts had been owing for five years, and AS was rightly entitled to claim payment of these amounts in his capacity as an employee of Connectus Group. Given the urgency of the loans, and as there is no evidence that it had been utilised in any way other than for the company’s purposes, it cannot be said that the loan amounts had been misused such that Connectus Group has a substantial basis to dispute the debt due to AS.
- [71]
[71] Finally, it is mere speculation that the loans might have been repaid by Connectus Group to AS. It bears remembering that PN remains a director of Connectus Group, while APBA is also the largest shareholder of the company. Even though Connectus Group has not been represented in the present proceedings, APBA and PN are surely in a position to determine if the loans have been repaid to AS, assuming there are even funds that could be utilised to repay such loans. Yet, no such evidence was tendered before me. The bare assertion that Connectus Group could, with representation, tender such evidence to show that the loans might have been repaid, is plainly insufficient to demonstrate a substantial dispute over the loans.
- [72]
[72] Hence, I find that APBA has failed to demonstrate a substantial dispute in respect of the debts due and owing to AS.
Cross-claim for breaches of fiduciary duties
- [73]
[73] Next, APBA submits that Connectus Group can raise a cross-claim against AS for his breaches of fiduciary duties, and that the amount claimable under such a cross-claim would easily exceed the debt claimed by AS.
- [74]
[74] Establishing a distinct possibility of a cross-claim that may exceed the debt claimed for by the creditor is a sufficient basis for resisting a winding-up application. As the Court of Appeal stated in Metalform at [82]:
- [75]
[75] Various breaches of fiduciary duties are alleged by APBA, key of which are:
(a) AS refused to remit the profits from the Chinese joint venture (“the China profits”), which belong to Connectus Group, thus harming Connectus Group financially;
(b) AS failed to capitalise Connectus WFOE and Connectus Shanghai, thereby putting the China profits at risk; and
(c) AS cancelled the “consultancy fee agreement” with SLTS without board approval or consultations with other directors of Connectus Group.
- [76]
[76] I will deal with the respective allegations of breaches in turn, as each would provide an independent basis for a cross-claim against AS. As for the points raised by APBA that AS and SS were in breach of their duties by refusing to allow Connectus Group legal representation and that they were complicit with EL’s numerous advances, I will deal with them in greater detail at [146]–[149] below.
Profits of the Chinese joint venture
- [77]
[77] APBA’s main plank in its submissions in relation to the cross-claim is that Connectus Group would have the funds to repay its debts if profits which are due from its China joint venture are repatriated back to Singapore. APBA argues that the joint venture operations in China have been doing well and generating profits. These profits can and should be repatriated to Singapore, but instead, AS has been deliberately taking steps to frustrate attempts to repatriate these profits to Singapore. Accordingly, AS’s conduct is engendering the very situation (ie, inability to pay its debts) which he is trying to rely on to wind up Connectus Group. The winding up application ought therefore to be dismissed, as AS’s conduct is an abuse of process which should not be countenanced.
- [78]
[78] More particularly, APBA’s contention is that the amounts of RMB 3,335,090.98 and RMB 3,747,888.15, which represent the Chinese joint venture’s profits from the years 2013 to 2015 and the year 2016 respectively, should be repatriated from China to Connectus Group to alleviate the cash flow issues of the company and pay off its creditors, including AS. In addition, it points out that there was also approximately RMB 1.6m in profits generated by Connectus Shanghai (which took on the business of the Chinese joint venture) in 2017 and 2018, which should rightfully be repatriated.
(1) Insufficient cash for repatriation
- [79]
[79] AS is in charge of the Chinese operations. His explanation is that SLTS has been acting as the payroll agent for Connectus Shanghai since it commenced operations in 2016. This is because, even though Connectus Shanghai’s majority owner is Connectus WFOE, the latter company has not been capitalised. As a result, Connectus Shanghai has not received funds from Connectus WFOE to run its business from the time it started its operations in 2016. SLTS has stepped in to finance the operations of Connectus Shanghai. As a result of having paid the salaries and operational expenses of Connectus Shanghai, SLTS is owed about RMB 3.69m by Connectus Shanghai. There is evidence in the form of emails from as late as July 2017 where AS had updated PN about this financing being provided by SLTS for the operations in China, and there is nothing produced by APBA which shows that PN had objected to this arrangement.
- [80]
[80] The operational expenses of Connectus Shanghai have been high and are growing because it has expanded quickly in the past few years. As of 2019, Connectus Shanghai has seven offices across China, including in Beijing, Chengdu, Shenzhen, Suzhou and, of course, Shanghai. While business is growing and Connectus Shanghai employs about 120 to 130 staff as at March 2019, the company is tight on cash due to its growing payroll, which, according to AS, has increased to about RMB 2m a month.
- [81]
[81] AS’s evidence is that SLTS has been using the cash that it holds from the joint venture (established by the Cooperation Agreement) to partially pay off the debts due to it from Connectus Shanghai. He also testified that the cash received from the China business has primarily been used up to fund Connectus Shanghai’s growing payroll, and hence there is no available money to be repatriated to Singapore. In short, the cash being generated by Connectus Shanghai is being used as its working capital. The audited accounts of Connectus Shanghai show that the company only had RMB 586,770 of “Cash and cash equivalents” as at 31 December 2017. This supports the contention that the company does not have sufficient cash on hand for dividends to be declared so that such sums can be repatriated through Connectus WFOE to pay off Connectus Group’s debts in Singapore.
- [82]
[82] While APBA does not accept these explanations by AS, there is little evidence before me to show that AS is not telling the truth. APBA refers to the joint venture’s P&L Statements from 2013 to 2018, which show that the total amount of gross profits earned by the joint venture in the period is approximately RMB 8.5m. However, there is a difference between acknowledging that there are profits arising from the operations in China that accrue to the joint venture or to Connectus Shanghai, and whether there is available cash that can be repatriated to settle Connectus Group’s debts in Singapore.
- [83]
[83] APBA also refers to some WhatsApp messages in a group chat between SS, AS and EL in January 2017, which PN had obtained from EL. In these messages, AS wrote that a potential investor was “[s]till keen” to invest in Connectus Group as AS had said that he would “settle all the debts via profit in [Connectus Shanghai]”. APBA argues that this shows that AS could repatriate cash from China if he wanted to. In my view, given that there is no timeline stated as to when such debts would be paid off, AS’s message does not necessitate the conclusion that there is sufficient cash at present that can be repatriated to settle Connectus Group’s debts. This is especially when it is undisputed that the business in China has been growing since January 2017, and AS’s evidence is that cash generated by Connectus Shanghai has been channelled to support the Chinese business’s growing working capital.
- [84]
[84] PN has experience in doing business in China. He has business interests there. The evidence before me was that he was one of the shareholders of SLBC and SLTS, although Chary was the majority owner and controller of these companies. Apart from his shareholding, PN is also a director of Connectus Shanghai. As such, PN would surely be in a position to determine the extent of the business operations of Connectus Shanghai and whether the expansion of the operations in China is being financed by SLTS using the profits of the joint venture, which is now operating out of Connectus Shanghai. Despite this, there was nothing substantive placed before me by APBA which contradicted in any material way AS’s evidence about how the cash from the Chinese operations has been used.
(2) No inappropriate use of joint venture funds
- [85]
[85] Next, APBA argues that AS should not have permitted the joint venture’s profits to be effectively used as the working capital of Connectus Shanghai, and that this is “not the will of Connectus, and there is neither board nor shareholder approval for such usage”. I do not accept this argument as being a realistic one. The directors and shareholders of Connectus Group have permitted AS to build and grow the Chinese business from the time of the inception of the joint venture to its present state in the form of Connectus Shanghai. I do not see any evidence that suggests to me that there were parameters set on how he should run the business in China. In any event, his expansion of the Chinese business can ultimately be only good for the shareholders of Connectus Group. As such, it appears to me that they left AS to deal with the Chinese operations as he deemed fit.
- [86]
[86] From 2014 to 2016, there was no evidence of any email or written correspondence where PN asked AS for the profits from the Chinese joint venture to be repatriated. It was only belatedly, sometime after July 2017, when it became clear that Connectus Group could not sustain its operations because of cash flow issues, that PN started agitating for the Chinese joint venture profits to be repatriated in Singapore. This was because he was not prepared to extend further shareholder loans to Connectus Group, unlike what AS did. As such, at worst, this was a dispute between the directors of Connectus Group as to what was the proper approach to take in terms of how to utilise the available cash in China – to expand the Chinese business or to try to repatriate it to Singapore to take care of cash flow issues here. I do not accept that there is sufficient basis to assert that the China profits were wrongfully withheld from Connectus Group by AS. His evidence, in any event, is that there is insufficient available cash in China to be sent to Singapore to settle all of Connectus Group’s outstanding debts.
- [87]
[87] Another difficulty that I have with APBA’s submission that the cash in Connectus Shanghai ought to be repatriated to settle Connectus Group’s debts is that it appears to ignore the interests of the other parties who have an interest in the Chinese operations. First, it is not in dispute that the profits of the joint venture were being held by SLTS. In turn, SLTS was funding the operations of Connectus Shanghai. I am not sure what, if anything, Connectus Shanghai can do to stop SLTS from dipping into the amounts held by SLTS to reduce the debts owed by Connectus Shanghai.
- [88]
[88] APBA argues that SLTS technically has no right of set-off because the joint venture profits are held for Connectus Group, and not Connectus Shanghai. It says that the joint venture profits should be returned to Singapore. But, as pointed out by AS, only a part of the joint venture profits are ultimately due to Connectus Group. The minority partners in the joint venture (Bonnie Wang and Frank Zhang) are entitled to 33.33% of these profits. AS would be disregarding their interests if he asked SLTS to repatriate the profits held on behalf of Connectus Shanghai to Singapore to satisfy the debts of Connectus Group. He would be jeopardising his working relationship with the management of the Chinese operations. It is also commercially unrealistic to expect the minority partners to agree to have their portion of the joint venture profits accounted through Connectus Group, when they would know that the company in Singapore is saddled with debts.
(3) No oral tripartite agreement
- [89]
[89] Another point that APBA raised (through PN) in relation to the China profits is that there was an oral agreement between PN and Chary that the loans extended by TSHK to Connectus Group did not have to be repaid, and that they could be set-off against the joint venture profits that were being held by SLTS on behalf of Connectus Group. APBA had initially raised this point to show that Connectus Group is not as indebted as it appeared to be and that the suit that had been commenced by TSHK against Connectus Group had no basis. However, in its written closing submissions for the winding up, APBA appeared to abandon its reliance on this point. Instead, it relies on the Cooperation Agreement and an agreement confirming that SLTS held “accumulated profits” of about RMB 3.335m on Connectus Group’s behalf (“the Accumulated Profits Agreement”) as the bases to submit that the China profits are due and outstanding, and that they can be recovered by Connectus Group once an end is put to AS’s obstructive conduct with respect to the said profits.
- [90]
[90] Despite this shift in position in the written closing submissions, I will deal with this issue given that it featured heavily as one of the main bases of its submissions in OS 449/2018 to show that there is ample justification for the Court to lend its assistance by permitting an EGM of Connectus Group to be called for resolutions to be passed to remove AS and SS. This is allegedly because of the Seahs’ clear breaches of their duties by denying the existence of this oral tripartite agreement.
- [91]
[91] AS gave evidence that PN and Connectus Group’s auditors had come up with the idea that the joint venture profits held by SLTS could be used as “collateral” for the loans extended by TSHK to Connectus Group. Put in a legal sense, PN was hoping that there could be a tripartite agreement between TSHK, Connectus Group and SLTS where Connectus Group did not have to repay the loans extended by TSHK, and TSHK would just look to joint venture profits held by SLTS for the repayment of the loans. AS testified that, as far as he knew, this was what the board of Connectus Group hoped TSHK and SLTS would agree to, but this never came to pass. Chary simply did not agree to it. He always insisted that the borrowed amounts had to be repaid by Connectus Group to TSHK. According to AS, he told his fellow directors in Connectus Group that Chary had declined to sign a “three-way” or tripartite agreement that he had prepared between TSHK, SLTS and Connectus Group. So, all the directors were aware that the TSHK loans had to be repaid.
- [92]
[92] PN’s evidence on this issue of the oral agreement was most unsatisfactory. He initially testified that he did not approve of AS and EL going ahead in 2015 to borrow funds from TSHK, and that he did not have any discussion himself with Chary about these loans. However, when he appeared to realise that this was not consistent with his allegation about the oral agreement with Chary, he caught himself and belatedly explained that he, in fact, had an oral agreement with Chary in 2014 about these loans and that they were “collateralised” by the joint venture profits held by SLTS.
- [93]
[93] I pause here to just point out that the term “oral collateral agreement” was inaptly used by PN and both counsel on this issue given that the “collateral” referred to was in its true sense a form of security, and not that there was a “side agreement” of sorts. I also note that the use of the word “collateral” was also confusing because, as I understand APBA’s case, the agreement was that TSHK had to look to SLTS for recovery of its loans made to Connectus Group. There was no question of TSHK being permitted to sue Connectus Group for the recovery of these loans.
- [94]
[94] In any event, when PN was then pressed in cross-examination as to why he was unable to give particulars of this “oral collateral agreement” to Connectus Group’s lawyers in the course of the defence of the suit that had been commenced by TSHK for recovery of the loans, he could not give any coherent or sensible answer except to say that his computer had broken down. I was not able to understand how a computer breaking down had anything to do with giving particulars of an oral agreement that he had allegedly reached with Chary.
- [95]
[95] I also find that there was a glaring internal inconsistency with PN’s evidence. His insistence that he always wanted AS to repatriate the joint venture profits to Singapore and, at the same time, his objection to the company borrowing money from TSHK, directly conflicted with his allegation that there was an oral agreement between him and Chary, on behalf of TSHK and SLTS, that the money borrowed from TSHK could be treated as the repatriation of the joint venture profits held by SLTS. The evidence that emerged during the cross-examination showed quite clearly that no such oral agreement existed and that was probably why this issue was not seriously pursued in APBA’s post-hearing submissions for the winding up.
- [96]
[96] There was also evidence before me that, in a WhatsApp group chat between PN, AS, SS and EL in August 2016, PN had posed the question as to whether he was right in thinking that the loans had to be repaid to TSHK. After being informed that Chary was indeed chasing for the repayment of the loans to TSHK, PN then told AS to implement a repayment plan soon. All this completely contradicts his claim about the oral agreement with Chary that the loans repayments would be set-off against the profits of the joint venture held by SLTS.
- [97]
[97] In sum, I find that there is insufficient evidence to support a conclusion that the China profits are being wrongfully withheld by AS to manufacture the cash flow insolvency of Connectus Group.
Failure to capitalise Connectus WFOE and Connectus Shanghai
- [98]
[98] As for AS’s failure to capitalise Connectus WFOE and Connectus Shanghai, APBA submits that this puts the China profits at risk. However, it is not immediately clear why this is the case, as there appears to be no dispute that Connectus Group has a 66.67% interest in the China joint venture.
- [99]
[99] More fundamentally, from the evidence, it does not appear to me that Connectus Group has sufficient cash at hand to capitalise Connectus WFOE and Connectus Shanghai. The initial capital investment of RMB 900,000 for the Chinese joint venture that had been collectively contributed by the shareholders of Connectus Group in 2013 was returned to the company over several tranches from January to August 2017. PN claims that these moneys should have been used to capitalise Connectus WFOE. However, the evidence before me is that these moneys were largely used by EL, and later AS, to pay off various debts and expenses of Connectus Group, including the unpaid salaries of AS and SS, which had been outstanding for several years. Whether priority should instead have been given to the capitalising of Connectus WFOE was a judgment call on the part of EL and AS. In the absence of evidence that these payments were improper or unlawful, the Court will be slow to impugn the business decisions of directors and management. As such, I find that there is no breach of fiduciary duty by AS in this respect.
Cancellation of the consultancy fee agreement
- [100]
[100] APBA also alleges that AS has breached his duties as a director by cancelling the “consultancy fee agreement” dated 1 August 2016 where SLTS confirmed that it would pay a consultancy fee of approximately RMB 3.335m to Connectus Group, which quantum was the whole of the joint venture profits from 2013 to 2015, not just the 66.67% which Connectus Group is entitled to. In truth, there were no consultancy services provided by Connectus Group to SLTS. The evidence was that the auditors of Connectus Group were looking for a way where the profits of the joint venture held in China by SLTS could be recognised in the accounts of Connectus Group. This fiction of a “consultancy fee agreement” was eventually settled upon, after the initial Accumulated Profits Agreement which confirmed that SLTS held “accumulated profits” of about RMB 3.335m on Connectus Group’s behalf had been abandoned.
- [101]
[101] AS was a part of the decision-making on this issue. After he procured the agreement to be signed between SLTS and Connectus Group, he proceeded to give instructions to the staff for an invoice to be raised and issued to SLTS so that the “income” could be booked into Connectus Group’s accounts.
- [102]
[102] His evidence was that he decided to cancel this agreement in October 2017 because he had realised that it was improper to rely on a sham agreement to “dress up” the accounts of Connectus Group, and that the proper way to route money from Connectus Shanghai to Connectus Group was by a declaration of dividends. His evidence was that this “window dressing” was done at the behest of PN, who wanted to be able to get third parties to invest in Connectus Group. AS cancelled the agreement by executing another agreement with SLTS on behalf of Connectus Group, where it is also recorded that no consultancy services had been provided by Connectus Group to SLTS. APBA’s submission is that this was a deliberate act by AS to deprive Connectus Group of sums duly owed to it. It also showed that AS was working in cahoots with Chary.
- [103]
[103] I have some doubts as to whether AS had acted properly when he unilaterally decided, without consulting the rest of the board of Connectus Group, to execute the cancellation agreement. He may have been justified in thinking that this was not a genuine agreement, but this was a matter that probably should have been brought up for discussion at the board level. Having said that, the existence or otherwise of the “consultancy fee” agreement is not quite relevant because it is undisputed that the agreement was a sham, and that no consultancy services had in fact been provided by Connectus Group. Being a sham, it was not an agreement that could have created legally enforceable rights for Connectus Group against SLTS for recovery of the alleged “consultancy fee”. So, in my judgment, the cancellation of the “consultancy fee agreement” does not ultimately affect Connectus Group’s legal rights.
- [104]
[104] In the circumstances, I am of the view that this issue of the cancellation of the “consultancy fee agreement” does not amount to a breach of fiduciary duty on AS’s part.
- [105]
[105] Hence, APBA has failed to show how Connectus Group would have any valid cross-claims against AS on account of a breach of fiduciary duty on his part.
Conclusion on the issue of insolvency
- [106]
[106] In short, when all the evidence is considered, I am satisfied that Connectus Group is unable to pay its debts which have fallen due to AS. In this regard, I have found that there is no valid basis for Connectus Group to dispute the debt due and owing to AS, and further that the company does not have a valid cross-claim against AS. That being the case, Connectus Group is cash flow insolvent.
- [107]
[107] In this respect, I did not consider the other debts of the company, for example, to SS and TSHK. As explained in Roy Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 4th Ed, 2011) at para 4-19, “even debts which are technically due are to be ignored where there is no current indication that the creditors concerned are requiring repayment.” This makes sense in practice, as otherwise, most banks would be insolvent under the cash flow insolvency test, as they “do not keep enough liquid assets to be able to pay all their depositors at the same time”: Wee Meng Seng, “Taking Stock of the Insolvency Tests in Section 254 of the Companies Act” [2011] SJLS 486 at 491. In this case, SS has withdrawn her application to wind up Connectus Group. TSHK did not appear in the hearing before me as a supporting creditor, nor did it file any affidavit asking for Connectus Group to be wound up, even though leave was granted for it to do so. My conclusion is thus limited only to the fact that Connectus Group is unable to pay its debts to AS which have fallen due.
- [109]
[109] APBA has repeatedly stressed the point that, while Connectus Group presently has insufficient cash to pay AS, it can and will come into funds because it can seek a repatriation of cash from Connectus WFOE after that company has been capitalised, which parties agree is a pre-condition before the profits earned by the joint venture in China and Connectus Shanghai can be repatriated to Singapore. PN has stated on affidavit that he will be prepared to inject fresh capital into Connectus Group so that it can proceed to use the funds to capitalise Connectus WFOE and take other steps in China to repatriate available cash to Singapore. However, this is conditional upon assurances that PN and the Lim family will have control over the board – hence, the application by APBA in OS 449/2018 for leave of court to call an EGM without the necessary quorum to remove AS and SS as directors of Connectus Group and effectively take control of the board.
- [110]
[110] APBA has also made the point in its submissions that Connectus Group has not been represented by counsel in the winding up application. This is because AS and SS have not agreed to the choice of counsel for Connectus Group suggested by PN and SO. I am at a loss at how AS and SS can be entitled to vote at board level on the choice of counsel for Connectus Group to defend this winding up application that has been started by them. But leaving aside that point, I do accept APBA’s point that, if Connectus Group was represented by counsel in the winding up application, the Court might have been assisted on the issue of the net asset position of Connectus Group and whether the company would, if given time, be in a position to pay off its debts to AS.
Whether it is just and equitable to wind up Connectus Group
- [113]
[113] The alternate ground raised by AS is that it is just and equitable to wind up Connectus Group because of the breakdown of the relationship of trust and confidence between the shareholders.
Applicable principles
- [115]
[115] As explained in Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360 (“Ebrahimi”) at 379–380 (cited with approval in Sim Yong Kim v Evenstar Investments Pte Ltd [2006] 3 SLR(R) 827 (“Evenstar”) at [29]), the court’s just and equitable jurisdiction cannot be invoked at whim, and the pre-requisite to its exercise is where the company has been organised as what has come to be termed a “quasi-partnership”.
- [116]
[116] A “quasi-partnership” may include one or more of the following elements (Ebrahimi at 379, cited with approval in Evenstar at [29]):
However, it is to be cautioned that the three circumstances mentioned in Ebrahimi are non-exhaustive, and the court in Evenstar observed at [30] that “[o]ur courts … have not limited their jurisdiction to superimpose equitable considerations to merely the three circumstances mentioned” in Ebrahimi. Factors analogous to the three factors would no doubt bring into play the just and equitable ground for winding up: see Ebrahimi at 379.
- [117]
[117] Once it is determined that the company is a “quasi-partnership”, it must be shown why keeping the company as a going concern would result in unfairness. As the Court of Appeal observed in Evenstar at [31], “the notion of unfairness lies at the heart of the ‘just and equitable’ jurisdiction in s 254(1)(i) of the [Act]”.
Is Connectus Group a quasi-partnership?
- [118]
[118] Turning first to whether Connectus Group is a quasi-partnership, AS argues that AS, SS, PN and LTH had come together to pursue this business venture of building a human resource services firm. It was to be a joint endeavour in that each of them had a role to play in the building of the business. SS and LTH had their respective areas of speciality and focus in the Singapore market. AS was tasked with building the business in the growing Chinese market. PN was to contribute his know-how and experience when it came to building human resource services businesses, and by introducing other specific human resource services. In short, he stood in the position as an experienced advisor to AS, SS and LTH. None of them were to be just passive shareholders. Each of them were appointed directors so that they would have a say in the management and direction of the business.
- [119]
[119] Not only was it the case that each of the shareholders had board representation, they were also deriving remuneration and benefits from the business. AS, SS and LTH were full-time employees and paid salaries by Connectus Group, or its joint venture in China. APBA was providing accounting and consultancy services to the company. Kwang had been seconded to Connectus Group to act as its CFO. For these services, APBA was paid fees by Connectus Group.
- [120]
[120] In my judgment, this is the key factor which shows that this company was, at its core, a group of like-minded persons who had banded together to carry out a business venture and derive regular payments from the venture. In the case of AS, SS and LTH, this was their career and livelihood, and APBA had associated with them on this basis that the three of them were dependent on the company to earn a living and build their careers. To analyse this in the language of implied terms, if it had been expressly raised to the shareholders at that time when Connectus Group started its life that AS, SS and LTH would be directors and have jobs at this company as part and parcel of their investment, the unequivocal answer would have been “of course”. This implied understanding was the foundation of their association.
- [121]
[121] When LTH left Connectus Group, his shareholding was transferred to PN and then to SO. It is not in dispute that LMF paid for these shares, even though it is a matter of dispute in other ongoing legal proceedings as to whether the shares were intended as a gift to his son, EL, but registered in the name of SO. For the purposes of these proceedings, I will regard this bloc of shares as belonging to the Lim family, without making a specific finding as to who exactly is the beneficial owner.
- [122]
[122] The unchallenged evidence of LMF, when he was cross-examined, was that he would not have paid for the shares in Connectus Group if the other shareholders had not agreed that EL would be appointed as the CEO of the company. This shows that, even with the change of shareholder, there was no change in the nature of the arrangement between the shareholders – each of them was to contribute to the business and be allowed to appoint a director to the board of the company, and also derive remuneration for their services. In the case of the Lim family, EL was the designated representative and beneficiary, in that he was employed by Connectus Group as its CEO.
- [123]
[123] There is little significance to the fact that SO, EL’s wife, was the one who was appointed as the director of Connectus Group. The evidence showed that she had no role at all in the running of the business or on any major decisions of the company. For example, there was a group chat where AS, SS, PN and EL would discuss the affairs of the company and business decisions to be made. SO was not part of this group chat because she was not involved at all in the affairs of the company. She was also not paid any directors fees.
- [124]
[124] APBA makes several arguments as to why Connectus Group is not a quasi-partnership. First, it points out that PN took a larger stake of more than 25% as compared to the other three shareholders from the outset so that he was able to block any special resolutions being passed. Second, the initial shareholders had documented their rights inter se in the form of the SHA. Third, APBA dealt with Connectus Group on a commercial basis by issuing invoices for the services it provided. All these, APBA argues, is indicative of the fact that the parties did not come together on the basis of a personal relationship, involving mutual trust and confidence.
- [125]
[125] I do not accept that these facts negate the existence of a quasi-partnership between the shareholders. The existence of partnership agreements, and partners having differing profit and voting shares is not inconsistent with the existence of a partnership. For example, in Evenstar, two brothers pooled their Sinwa company shares into a company, Evenstar Investments Pte Ltd (“Evenstar”). Their respective shareholding in Evenstar was proportionate to the amount of Sinwa shares they had pooled into Evenstar, namely 86.5% and 13.5% respectively. Notwithstanding their unequal shareholding, the Court of Appeal did not hesitate in concluding that Evenstar was a quasi-partnership, and that the brothers had used the company merely as a vehicle for their object of pooling together their Sinwa shares (at [14] and [45]).
- [126]
[126] Similarly, the fact that APBA was given a slightly larger voting share so that it could have the final say on certain issues, or that parties had chosen to set out their rights in a written agreement, simply show the specific arrangements in relation to the “partnership” that they had agreed to. It does not mean that the parties had not come together with a mutual understanding that they would each participate in and carry out this business venture, instead of one or more of them being passive investors, unless of course, such an understanding was contradicted by the terms of a written agreement. In this case, there is no documented contrary intention whether in the SHA or any other contemporaneous written evidence.
- [127]
[127] Additionally, the fact that APBA may have issued invoices to Connectus Group for its fees is not inconsistent with there being a quasi-partnership. Having a mutual understanding that the shareholders would all actively contribute towards the growth of the business does not mean that all formal documentation becomes redundant. That would not be commercially realistic, especially since PN’s plan for Connectus Group was to grow it with a view of selling or listing it within three to five years.
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