Skip to content
Grounds publishedDecided 7 Oct 2019

High Court

BYX v BYY

Feedback & support

[2019] SGHC 237Case no. Divorce (Transferred) No 4907 of 2008(Summons No 2630 of 2019)15 paragraphs

What happened, in plain English

There is no plain-English summary of this judgment yet.

Ask about this judgment

Laws this judgment relies on

Grounds of decision

Official text from eLitigation

  1. Introduction

  2. (a) whether an execution creditor who wishes to effect the sale of mortgaged immovable property that has been seized under a writ of seizure and sale is required to obtain the consent of the mortgagee, in view of paras 80(1) and 80(2) of the Supreme Court Practice Directions (1 January 2013 release) (“Practice Directions”), reproduced in [11] below; and

  3. (b) the considerations the court should take into account in an application for the sale to proceed in such circumstances.

  4. Facts

  5. [3] The plaintiff and the defendant were previously married and have three children to the marriage (“the children”). Interim judgment was granted in 2009. The plaintiff and the children resided at the Property after the divorce.

  6. [6] The plaintiff’s solicitors wrote to the mortgagee bank on 13 March 2019 to seek the latter’s consent for a sale of the Property. In its letter dated 15 March 2019, the mortgagee bank stated that it did not consent to the WSS. The mortgagee bank maintained in its letter dated 24 May 2019 that it was “entitled to, and does as a matter of practice, withhold consent to the sale of mortgaged properties pursuant to a Writ of Seizure and Sale by a [Judgment] Creditor”.

  7. [7] On 31 May 2019, the plaintiff’s solicitors wrote to the mortgagee bank to invite it to file an affidavit in the present proceedings and to attend the upcoming hearing on 28 June 2019. The mortgagee bank elected not to participate in these proceedings, but clarified by its letter dated 17 July 2019 that the issuing of the WSS and the grant of the Injunction both constituted events of default under its terms of lending. However, it would not take action against the defendant as the defendant is a “valued client” and his “repayment [of the mortgage loan] has otherwise been prompt”.

  8. The parties’ cases

  9. My decision

  10. [12] As a preliminary matter, I considered this case not to fall within the jurisdiction of the Family Division of the High Court: see s 47(1) of the Family Justice Act 2014 (No 27 of 2014) (“FJA”). My decision, however, would have been the same even if I were wrong on this issue. The Family Division of the High Court, when exercising jurisdiction relating to family proceedings, has all the powers of the High Court in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction, including those contained in para 2 of the First Schedule to the SCJA: s 22(2) of the FJA. My reasoning in relation to paras 80(1) and 80(2) of the Practice Directions and O 31 r 1 of the ROC would have been the same; these paragraphs and provisions are, respectively, in pari materia with paras 119(1) and 119(2) of the Family Justice Court Practice Directions (1 January 2015 release) and r 540 of the Family Justice Rules (S 813/2014).

  11. [13] I first considered whether an execution creditor who wishes to effect the sale of mortgaged immovable property that has been seized under a writ of seizure and sale is required to obtain the consent of the mortgagee. The requirement that the mortgagee’s consent be obtained is implied in paras 80(1) and 80(2) of the Practice Directions, which state as follows:

  12. [14] Practice directions are essentially administrative directions and may not subdue the court’s judicial powers: Singapore Civil Procedure 2019 vol I (Chua Lee Ming J ed-in-chief) (Sweet & Maxwell, 2019) at para 1/0/2. However, while practice directions do not have the force of law, they are nevertheless directions from a court, and a court will not normally depart from such directions unless there is good reason for doing so: Citiwall Safety Glass Pte Ltd v Mansource Interior Pte Ltd [2015] 1 SLR 797 at [88].

  13. [17] My interpretation of paras 80(1) and 80(2) of the Practice Directions departs slightly from the High Court’s observations in Peter Low LLC v Higgins, Danial Patrick [2018] 4 SLR 1003 (“Peter Low”). The High Court in Peter Low stated at [114(b)] that “a sale [of immovable property financed by mortgage loans] under a [writ of seizure and sale] is not possible without the mortgagees’ consent”. It suffices to note that the aforementioned statements were made by way of obiter dicta in proceedings relating to immovable property held under a joint tenancy and that the present issues were not before the High Court in Peter Low.

  14. [18] For completeness, I record the plaintiff and Ms Tee’s observations that the language in para 80 of the Practice Directions can be refined to provide clearer guidance to execution creditors on the steps they should take if they wish to effect the sale of mortgaged immovable property seized under a writ of seizure and sale but are unable to obtain the mortgagee’s consent to such sale and the mortgagee has no plans to sell the property.

  15. The relevant considerations in an application for the sale of mortgaged immovable property where the mortgagee withholds consent to such sale

  16. [20] Section 18(2) of the SCJA states that the High Court shall have the powers set out in the First Schedule. This includes the court’s power to direct the sale of land where it appears necessary or expedient in any cause or matter relating to land, as provided by para 2 of the First Schedule: Tan Poh Beng v Choo Lee Mei [2014] 4 SLR 462 (“Tan Poh Beng”) at [13]. Paragraph 2 of the First Schedule to the SCJA states:

  17. [23] The plaintiff registered the WSS that attached the defendant’s interest in the Property. Section 135(1) of the LTA did not confer on the plaintiff an interest in the Property; even after the WSS was registered, the Property and the interest in the Property remained with the defendant: Chia Kin Tuck at [10], [12] and [14]. However, s 135(1) allows the “interest in registered land” to be “sold in execution under a writ” as long as such interest “belongs to the judgment debtor at the date of the registration of the writ”. The registration of the WSS conferred on the Sheriff the ministerial power to sell the Property to satisfy the defendant’s judgment debt: s 132(4) of the LTA; Chia Kin Tuck at [14]. The WSS stated:

  18. Since the present application concerned whether the Sheriff should proceed to sell the Property to satisfy the judgment debt, this was a case that involved a matter relating to land and immovable property within the meanings of para 2 of the First Schedule to the SCJA and O 31 r 1 of the ROC.

  19. I did not think that these factors, which are largely limited to the joint ownership context, were applicable to the present case.

  20. (a) whether the expected sale proceeds will be sufficient to redeem the mortgage;

  21. (b) the potential prejudice that the mortgagee and the execution creditor might face in each of the possible scenarios, namely, if a sale is granted and if a sale is not granted; and

  22. (c) the potential prejudice that any third parties (including the mortgagor) may face in each of the possible scenarios.

  23. [27] As regards the consideration at [26(c)], it is trite law that the Sheriff or bailiff cannot by seizure affect the rights of third persons to whom the property has been subject to while in the hands of the debtor: Chia Kin Tuck at [11]. The court would also be entitled to consider, for instance, the fact that a mortgagor-judgment debtor and his family members may face substantial prejudice if they reside at the property in question and are at risk of being evicted pursuant to a forced sale. Similarly, it would be relevant to the court that the judgment debt is being enforced for the benefit of third parties like the parties’ children in the present case. I note, however, that third party interests in this context would have to be considered in the light of the object of Part XIII of the LTA, which is to enable judgment creditors to obtain the fruits of their judgments against registered land: see Chia Kin Tuck at [13], citing John Baalman, The Singapore Torrens System: Being a Commentary on the Land Titles Ordinance, 1956 of the State of Singapore (The Government of the State of Singapore, 1961) at p 211.

  24. [28] Applying this approach to the present case, I considered the following factors.

  25. [29] The evidence showed that the proceeds of sale were likely to be sufficient to redeem the mortgage. The forced sale value of the Property is $4,970,000.00 according to a valuation report dated 22 February 2019. The Property’s outstanding mortgage loan as at 17 June 2009 was $2,944,681.97. While the plaintiff was unable to produce evidence of the present outstanding mortgage sum, this sum was likely to be lower than that in 2009, especially given the mortgagee bank’s confirmation that the defendant has been “prompt” in servicing the mortgage (see above at [7]).

  26. Conclusion

  27. [33] For the reasons above, I granted the following orders:

  28. (a) that the Sheriff proceed with the sale of the Property without the consent of the mortgagee bank; and

  29. (b) liberty to apply.

  30. [34] I would like to record my appreciation to Ms Tee and counsel for the plaintiff for their helpful and comprehensive submissions which greatly assisted the deliberations of the court.