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Grounds publishedDecided 18 Oct 2019

High Court

[2019] SGHC 248

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[2019] SGHC 248Case no. Originating Summons No 419 of 2019(Summons Nos 3666 of 2019 and 3920 of 2019)30 paragraphs

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Grounds of decision

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] By way of Summonses 3666 of 2019, 3563 of 2019 and 3667 of 2019, the defendant in each matter seeks a declaration that it does not require leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal against various disclosure orders (collectively referred to as “the Orders”) made by me pursuant to s 285 of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) (“the Act”). Alternatively, should such leave to appeal be required, the defendants seek leave to appeal against the Orders.

  3. [2] Summonses 3920 of 2019, 3998 of 2019 and 3921 of 2019 (collectively, “the extension of time summonses”) are consequential applications to grant the defendants an extension of time to file their respective Notices of Appeal (“NOA”) in the event that I grant the declarations sought in Summonses 3666 of 2019, 3563 of 2019 and 3667 of 2019 above.

  4. Background

  5. [3] Coastal Oil Singapore Pte Ltd (“the Company”) is at the heart of all the above summonses. The Company is subject to a creditors’ voluntary winding-up, and the plaintiffs were appointed the liquidators of the Company on 10 January 2019.

  6. [4] By way of Originating Summons No 419 of 2019 (“OS 419/2019”), Originating Summons No 420 of 2019 (“OS 420/2019”) and Originating Summons No 421 of 2019 (“OS 421/2019”), the plaintiffs took out applications against the respective defendants, seeking disclosure orders under s 285 of the Act.

  7. [5] After hearing the parties, I granted the Orders as annexed in this judgment, in favour of the plaintiffs against the respective defendants. The present summonses arise from the Orders, as the respective defendants seek to appeal against the Orders made.

  8. The issues

  9. [6] The issues that arise for my consideration in this judgment are:

  10. (a) first, is leave required for the defendants to appeal against the Orders, made under s 285 of the Act?

  11. (b) second, if leave is required, should such leave be granted?

  12. (c) third, should there be a stay of execution of the Orders pending the disposal of any renewed application to the Court of Appeal?

  13. My decision

  14. [7] Having considered the submissions and authorities, I declare that the respective defendants do not require leave to appeal against the Orders. In the alternative, if leave is required, I find that there is a question of importance upon which further argument and a decision of a higher tribunal would be to the public advantage, and accordingly grant such leave to appeal.

  15. [8] In relation to the third issue, subject to the undertakings furnished by the plaintiffs as set out in [45] below, I decline to grant a stay of execution of the Orders pending the disposal of any renewed application to the Court of Appeal.

  16. [9] These are my reasons.

  17. Leave is not required to appeal against s 285 orders made in voluntary winding-up proceedings

  18. [10] Section 34(2)(b) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) (“SCJA”) read with paragraph 1(h) of the Fifth Schedule of the same states that leave of the High Court or of the Court of Appeal is required where the subject matter of the appeal relates to an “interlocutory application”, save in certain cases which are inapplicable in this case.

  19. [11] The issue here is whether the Orders, made pursuant to s 285 of the Act, were orders made “at the hearing of any interlocutory application” [emphasis added] (paragraph 1(h) of the Fifth Schedule of the SCJA), such that leave of the court is required for an appeal against the Orders.

  20. [14] In Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 354 (“Dorsey James”), the Court of Appeal confirmed that an application to administer pre-action interrogatories is not an interlocutory application. This was because (Dorsey James at [60]):

  21. … [An application to administer pre-action interrogatories] is an application made by way of originating summons and its only end is the particular relief sought in the originating summons. Once the application for such relief has been considered and ruled upon by the court, that matter ends and those proceedings are not followed by any other steps leading to any trial or further disposal of that matter. [emphasis added]

  22. [15] In other words, an application for pre-action interrogatories is not an interlocutory application because, unlike an interlocutory application which is “peripheral to the main hearing determining the outcome of the case” (Dorsey James at [58], citing Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd Ed, 2010)), “the entire subject matter of that originating summons is spent and there is nothing further for the court to deal with” once the application to administer pre-action interrogatories is disposed of (Dorsey James at [64]).

  23. [16] In contrast with an application to administer pre-action interrogatories, the Court in Celestial Nutrifoods considered that a s 285 application is an interlocutory application. This was because “unlike that of an application under originating summons for leave to administer pre-action interrogatories, [it] is made in the wider context of ongoing winding-up proceedings” [emphasis added in italics and bold italics] (at [34]).

  24. [17] Hence, while both pre-action interrogatories and s 285 applications seek information which may reveal potential causes of action against errant parties, s 285 applications are interlocutory in nature, as they operate within the winding-up proceedings, and the determination of a s 285 application does not therefore dispose of everything in the proceedings (Celestial Nutrifoods at [32]–[34]).

  25. [20] Given the fundamental differences between a compulsory winding-up and a voluntary winding-up, it is clear that the Court in Celestial Nutrifoods was only focused on a s 285 application made in the context of a compulsory winding-up application, which proceedings necessarily end in the courts. In contrast, in a creditors’ voluntary winding-up, court proceedings need not in fact be initiated, and the liquidation may come to an end without the need to initiate any proceedings. In other words, while a s 285 application in a compulsory winding-up application necessarily occurs within winding-up proceedings, a s 285 application in a voluntary winding-up occurs independently of any winding-up proceedings.

  26. [21] This is reflected by the fact that while a s 285 application is made by way of a summons where there is an ongoing compulsory winding-up proceeding (see, eg, Celestial Nutrifoods at [11]), it is made by way of an originating summons when the company is being voluntarily wound up. This is not a distinction without a difference. As explained in Hengwell Development Pte Ltd v Thing Chiang Ching [2003] 3 SLR(R) 84 at [5], “[a]n originating summons is an originating process. Like the writ of summons it prescribes the plaintiff’s cause of action and prays for judgments or orders, which in their nature (but subject to the avenues of appeal) are determinative and final. A summons in chambers is a subsidiary process which draws its life from the originating process” [emphasis added].

  27. [22] In the circumstances, a s 285 application made in a creditors’ voluntary winding-up is in fact akin to an application for pre-action interrogatories, and is accordingly not an interlocutory application. This is because, like an application for pre-action interrogatories, which is also initiated by an originating summons, “[o]nce the application [is] determined, the entire subject matter of that originating summons [is] spent and there [is] nothing further for the court to deal with” (Celestial Nutrifoods at [33]).

  28. Even if leave is required, a question of importance is raised

  29. [25] Hence, should leave be required, I grant leave for the respective defendants to appeal to the Court of Appeal against the Orders.

  30. Prima facie case of error

  31. [30] I also made clear that the Orders made were not unreasonable in scope:

  32. [32] Nonetheless, this does not change the result given my holding above that leave is not required to appeal against the Orders and, should leave be required, leave is granted as the present matter raises a question of importance upon which further argument and a decision of a higher tribunal would be to the public advantage.

  33. Stay of execution

  34. [33] Finally, I turn to the issue of a stay of execution of the Orders. The defendants seek a stay of execution of my decisions to grant the Orders pending the disposal of any renewed application to the Court of Appeal.

  35. [34] According to the defendants, such a stay is necessary to ensure that the appeal, if successful, will not be rendered nugatory. This is because the plaintiffs will not be able to “un-see” the materials once they are disclosed, such that the effects of the Orders will be irreversible even if the defendants were to succeed in overturning or varying them on appeal.

  36. Applicable principles

  37. [35] As a starting point, the general rule is that the court should not deprive a successful litigant of the fruits of litigation, so that a stay will only be granted where “special circumstances” can be shown (Naseer Ahmad Akhtar v Suresh Agarwal and another [2015] 5 SLR 1032 (“Naseer Ahmad”) at [96], citing Lee Kuan Yew v Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin [1990] 1 SLR(R) 772 at [6]).

  38. [36] Counterbalanced against this general rule is that the court ought also to ensure that the appeal, if successful, is not rendered nugatory (Lee Sian Hee (trading as Lee Sian Hee Pork Trader) v Oh Kheng Soon (trading as Ban Hon Trading Enterprise) [1991] 2 SLR(R) 869 at [5]).

  39. [37] In essence, the task of the court when considering a stay application pending an appeal is to “hold the balance between the interests of the parties (pending the hearing of [the] appeal) to avoid any prejudice to any of the parties” (Celestial Nutrifoods at [19]).

  40. Stay of execution ought not to be granted

  41. [40] Considering the above principles, I am of the view that a stay of execution ought not to be granted in this case.

  42. (a) Pending the conclusion of the respective defendants’ appeal(s),

  43. (i) the plaintiffs will not disseminate any documents and/or information arising from the documents (including any derivative or secondary materials which arise from the primary documents and/or information) which are disclosed by the respective defendants pursuant to the Orders to any third parties; and

  44. (ii) of the documents which fall under the Orders, the plaintiffs shall only seek the disclosure of documents between 1 January 2016 to 31 December 2018.

  45. (b) In the event of and to the extent that any of the aforementioned defendants’ appeal(s) succeed, the plaintiffs will return or destroy the documents (including any derivative or secondary materials which arise from the primary documents and/or information) provided by the respective defendant(s) and will not rely on such documents without leave of court.

  46. [46] The plaintiffs are given liberty to apply to deviate or vary from the above undertakings, if necessitated by the circumstances.

  47. Conclusion and consequential orders

  48. [48] If the defendants file their NOAs within two calendar weeks from the delivery of this judgment, the Orders made in the Originating Summonses, being OS 419/2019, OS 420/2019 and OS 421/2019 respectively, shall be complied with within six weeks from the date of this judgment in so far as documents between 1 January 2016 to 31 December 2018 that are subject to the Orders must be provided to the plaintiffs.

  49. [49] If any of the defendants fail to file their NOA within two calendar weeks of this judgment, that defendant shall comply with the Orders which it is subject to in full within eight weeks of this judgment (ie, the documents and information to be produced under the Orders shall not be limited to documents from 2016 to 2018 only).

  50. Annex

  51. (a) that Sinfeng provides, in relation to the period from 1 July 2012 to 13 December 2018:

  52. (i) by way of statutory declaration, a general description of the trading relationship between the Company and Sinfeng, including the nature of the trading activities and periods of time of the relationship;

  53. (ii) copies of sales contracts between Sinfeng and the Company with respect to trading or other activities;

  54. (iii) copies of invoices issued by the Company to Sinfeng and the accompanying delivery documentation eg, Bill of Lading, Bunker Delivery Note.

  55. (iv) copies of Sinfeng’s proof of payment which show the payments Sinfeng made to the Company and/or monthly or any other periodic summary of payments made by Sinfeng to the Company;

  56. (v) invoices, debit notes, credit notes, contracts, delivery documents and payment proof relating to the onward buyer(s) of products supplied by the Company to Sinfeng during the period; and

  57. (vi) invoices, debit notes, credit notes, contracts, delivery documents and payment proof relating to the initial supplier(s) to Sinfeng of products supplied by Sinfeng to the Company.

  58. (b) The liquidators are at liberty to re-apply at a later stage if further documentation, information and/or oral examination are required.

  59. (a) that Costank provides, in relation to the period from 1 July 2012 to 13 December 2018:

  60. (i) by way of statutory declaration, a general description of the trading relationship between the Company and Costank, including the nature of the trading activities, periods of time of the relationship, extent of management involvement of Mr Yeung Wing Sing and/or Mr Tan Sing Hwa over Costank and any other information relevant to explain the relationship and business dealings with the Company;

  61. (ii) copies of sales contracts between Costank and the Company with respect to trading or other activities;

  62. (iii) copies of invoices issued by the Company to Costank and the accompanying delivery documentation, eg, Bill of Lading, Bunker Delivery Note;

  63. (iv) copies of Costank’s proof of payment which show the payments Costank made to the Company and/or monthly or any other periodic summary of payments made by Costank to the Company;

  64. (v) documentation, including invoices, debit notes, credit notes, contracts, delivery documents and payment proof relating to the onward buyer(s) of products supplied by the Company to Costank during the period; and

  65. (vi) documentation, including invoices, debit notes, credit notes, contracts, delivery documents and payment proof relating to the initial supplier(s) to Costank of products supplied by Costank to the Company.

  66. (b) The liquidators are at liberty to re-apply at a later stage if further documentation, information and/or oral examination are required.

  67. (a) that Cosco provides, in relation to the period from 1 July 2012 to 13 December 2018:

  68. (i) by way of statutory declaration, a general description of the trading relationship between the Company and Cosco, including the nature of the trading activities and periods of time of the relationship;

  69. (ii) copies of sales contracts between Cosco and the Company with respect to trading or other activities;

  70. (iii) copies of invoices issued by the Company to Cosco and the accompanying delivery documentation, eg, Bill of Lading, Bunker Delivery Note.

  71. (iv) copies of Cosco’s proof of payment which show the payments Cosco made to the Company and/or monthly or any other periodic summary of payments made by Cosco to the Company; and

  72. (v) invoices, debit notes, credit notes, contracts, delivery documents and payment proof relating to the onward buyer(s) of products supplied by the Company to Cosco during the period.

  73. (b) The liquidators are at liberty to re-apply at a later stage if further documentation, information and/or oral examination are required.