High Court · Decided 27 November 2019
Goh Guan Sin (by her litigation representative Chiam Yu Zhu) v Yeo Tseng Tsai and another
Feedback & support[2019] SGHC 274 · Case no. Suit No 463 of 2017
✱ What happened, in plain English
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Official text from eLitigation
- [1]
[1] This is a medical negligence case involving a 70-year-old patient, Mdm Goh Guan Sin (“the Plaintiff”), who has been in a persistent vegetative state (“PVS”) since June 2014 after undergoing surgery to remove a brain tumour. The surgery was performed by Dr Yeo Tseng Tsai (“the First Defendant”), a senior consultant and the Head of the Division of Neurosurgery at the National University Hospital (“NUH”). NUH is managed by the National University Hospital (Singapore) Pte Ltd (“the Second Defendant”). The Plaintiff filed this suit through her litigation representative, PW1 Ms Chiam Yu Zhu (“PW1 Ms Chiam”), who is one of her daughters and her deputy. The Plaintiff commenced the suit against the First Defendant and the Second Defendant (collectively referred to as the “Defendants”) on allegations of negligence before, during, and after the surgery. However, when the trial started, the Plaintiff decided not to pursue her claims for negligence during the surgery. At the end of the trial, the Plaintiff further dropped her allegations of negligence at the pre-operative stage. She now focuses her case of negligence against the Defendants for their failure to care and manage her after the surgery. The Second Defendant counterclaims for unpaid hospital bills.
Facts
Diagnosis of the tumour
- [2]
[2] On 24 April 2014, PW1 Ms Chiam brought the Plaintiff to see an orthopaedic doctor at NUH as the Plaintiff had been experiencing frequent falls due to difficulty in balancing herself. The Plaintiff was advised to have a magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”) scan done.
- [3]
[3] On 2 May 2014, the Plaintiff, accompanied by another daughter, Ms Chiam Li Ling (“Li Ling”), went for a brain MRI scan at RadLink Diagnostic Imaging (S) Pte Ltd (“the RadLink MRI”). The RadLink MRI showed that the Plaintiff had a large tumour and hydrocephalus. Hydrocephalus is a condition that involves an increase in intracranial pressure due to excessive cerebrospinal fluid (“CSF”) accumulation in the four ventricles of the brain. The ventricles produce CSF, which is a clear, colourless fluid that circulates in the brain to protect vital brain components from trauma. CSF is also found in the spinal cord.
- [5]
[5] The tumour had to be removed to prevent further brain damage. This is a serious and a major surgery that carries other risks, including the risk of death. The Plaintiff and her children wanted a second opinion.
- [6]
[6] On 10 May 2014, the Plaintiff, accompanied by PW1 Ms Chiam and another daughter, Ms Chiam Yin Mee (“Carol”), consulted Dr Timothy Lee (“Dr Lee”), a neurosurgeon at Gleneagles Hospital. Dr Lee confirmed that the Plaintiff had a tumour which had to be removed.
Consultations at NUH
- [7]
[7] After consulting Dr Lee, the Plaintiff, accompanied by PW1 Ms Chiam and Li Ling, sought another opinion at NUH on 15 May 2014 (“the 15 May 2014 Consultation”). The doctor who attended to the Plaintiff was DW9 Dr Ho Kee Hang (“DW9 Dr Ho”), a neurosurgeon who is a visiting consultant at NUH. DW9 Dr Ho also practises neurosurgery at Mount Elizabeth Medical Centre. At this consultation, DW15 Dr Gabriel Lu Yeow Yuen (“DW15 Dr Lu”) and DW6 Dr Ng Zhi Xu (“DW6 Dr Ng”) were in attendance. The parties dispute what transpired at the 15 May 2014 Consultation. In any event, it was on 15 May 2014 that surgery to remove the tumour was scheduled for 2 June 2014 (“the First Surgery”) and a second consultation was scheduled for 29 May 2014 (“the 29 May 2014 Consultation”).
- [8]
[8] On 22 May 2014, the Plaintiff, accompanied by PW1 Ms Chiam and Carol, sought another opinion from Dr James Khoo (“Dr Khoo”), a neurosurgeon at Mount Elizabeth Medical Centre. The Plaintiff was prescribed with Diamox, as she had complained of headaches. She was also diagnosed with ataxia, which refers to the lack of muscle coordination resulting in, inter alia, gait abnormality. Also on this day, though unbeknownst to the Plaintiff at that time, the Plaintiff’s case was discussed at the NUH’s Division of Neurosurgery’s weekly peer review pre-operative discussion (“the Department Meeting”). According to the First Defendant, it was at this meeting that he agreed to DW9 Dr Ho’s request to perform the First Surgery.
- [9]
[9] On 26 May 2014, PW1 Ms Chiam brought the Plaintiff to the Accident and Emergency (“A&E”) department at NUH as the Plaintiff was unwell. Coincidentally, this was also the day when PW1 Ms Chiam received a call from NUH about the Plaintiff’s next appointment at NUH. Following the clarifications made by Carol with NUH, the siblings realised that an appointment was scheduled for the Plaintiff to consult the First Defendant on 27 May 2014. The Plaintiff did not attend this consultation.
- [10]
[10] On 29 May 2014, the Plaintiff returned to NUH for her appointment and was attended to by DW6 Dr Ng, a resident at NUH at the material time. As with the 15 May 2014 Consultation, the parties’ accounts of what happened during the 29 May 2014 Consultation differ.
Tumour removal surgery at NUH (the First Surgery)
- [11]
[11] Thereafter, on 1 June 2014 at around 1736 hrs, the Plaintiff was admitted to NUH as a Class B1 private paying patient to prepare for the First Surgery the following day. At around 2100 hrs, DW15 Dr Lu, then a registrar in NUH, attended to the Plaintiff and obtained the Plaintiff’s signature on the consent form for the First Surgery.
Post-operative developments
- [13]
[13] After the First Surgery, the Plaintiff was transferred to the recovery room, also known as the post-acute care unit or PACU, at 1452 hrs. There, it was documented that the Plaintiff had a Glasgow Coma Scale (“GCS”) score of 15, the best possible score, at 1505 hrs, 1510 hrs, 1520 hrs, 1535 hrs, 1550 hrs, 1605 hrs and 1620 hrs. The GCS is an accepted scoring system for measuring a patient’s consciousness level. It comprises three components that check for the patient’s best eye opening response, best motor response, and best verbal response. The maximum score for each component is 4, 6 and 5 respectively, giving a best possible score of 15 (ie, E4 M6 V5) which indicates that a patient has no apparent neurological deficit. The lowest possible GCS score is 3, which signifies deep coma or brain death. The scoring chart for GCS is as follows.
- [14]
[14] At 1655 hrs, the Plaintiff was transferred to the High Dependency Unit (“HDU”) Ward 25. It was recorded by a nurse, DW14 Ms Lee Sok Gin (“DW14 Nurse Lee”), that the Plaintiff’s GCS at 1655 hrs was 13 (E4 V3 M6) and that there was a complete lack of motor power over her right limbs (ie, her motor power for both right limbs was 0 out of 5). In other words, the Plaintiff had right hemiplegia, which refers to the paralysis of the right side of the body. I note here that there is no contradiction between scoring M6 for GCS (ie, a perfect motor component score) and right hemiplegia under the motor score. The former assesses the best motor response in terms of whether the patient understands what is being said and obeys commands, while the latter assesses motor movement of each limb. Hence, if a patient is hemiplegic but can use the limbs on the other side of the body to obey commands, that warrants a score of M6 for GCS but will be reflected as zero power on one side of the body for motor score.
- [15]
[15] The Plaintiff was then reviewed by DW15 Dr Lu together with DW5 Dr Yang Ming (“DW5 Dr Yang”) at 1730 hrs. The Plaintiff’s GCS, as recorded at 1730 hrs, was 15. The Plaintiff was noted to be able to move all four limbs, although there was weakness on the right side. The motor power recorded for the right upper and lower limbs were 3 and 1 respectively. The motor power of her left limbs was normal for her, this being a score of 4 out of 5 due to pre-existing weakness of her left leg. The Plaintiff was observed to be alert.
- [16]
[16] At about 1805 hrs, the Plaintiff’s GCS declined to 12. The Plaintiff was reviewed again by DW5 Dr Yang at 1820 hrs. It was noted that her level of consciousness had deteriorated rapidly with right-sided weakness in her limbs. Her GCS score was recorded as 10 with motor power of 0 out of 5 for her right upper and lower limbs. The Plaintiff’s blood pressure was 200/90 mmHg, her heart rate was 55 bpm and she was experiencing laboured breathing. In other words, the Plaintiff was exhibiting signs of Cushing reflex, which is a nervous system response to critically elevated intracranial pressure. The symptoms for Cushing reflex are increased blood pressure, irregular breathing, and abnormally slow heart action (bradycardia). Cushing reflex is very serious and will lead to death if untreated.
- [17]
[17] An urgent computed tomography (“CT”) brain scan was carried out at 1829 hrs (“the First CT Scan”). The parties hotly contest the correct interpretation of the First CT Scan. It suffices here to state that the First Defendant decided, based on his interpretation of the First CT Scan, to insert an external ventricular drain (“EVD”) in the Plaintiff’s brain to relieve the acute hydrocephalus. PW1 Ms Chiam signed the consent form for this procedure. The EVD was inserted by Dr Mohammad Rashidul Hassan (“Dr Rashidul”), under the First Defendant’s supervision, at around 1925 hrs on 2 June 2014 (“the Second Surgery”). Dr Rashidul was not called in these proceedings. The Second Surgery concluded at 1945 hrs.
- [18]
[18] A second CT scan was performed at around 2013 hrs and it is not disputed that this scan showed haemorrhage (ie, bleeding) in the brainstem (“the Second CT Scan”).
- [19]
[19] At around 2015 hrs, the First Defendant introduced himself to the Plaintiff’s family. He informed them that the Plaintiff had developed a haematoma (ie, a blood clot) at the site of the initial surgery and that an EVD had been inserted. The First Defendant also informed the Plaintiff’s family that regardless of whether the haematoma was surgically evacuated or conservatively managed, the Plaintiff would have an equally poor prognosis and thus be likely to end up in a PVS or comatose state.
- [20]
[20] Following the events on 2 June 2014, the Plaintiff suffered irreversible brain damage and is now in a PVS. She depends on ventilator support and will require lifelong care. The Plaintiff remains a patient at NUH to this day.
The parties’ cases
The Plaintiff’s case
- [21]
[21] The Plaintiff’s allegations of negligence were initially confined to the pre-operative and post-operative stages. At the close of the trial, the Plaintiff abandoned her action against the Defendants for pre-operative negligence. Nevertheless, I shall state the Plaintiff’s case for pre-operative negligence.
- [22]
[22] At the pre-operative stage, the Plaintiff alleges that the First Defendant breached his duty of care to her for these reasons:
(a) The First Defendant failed to obtain the Plaintiff’s informed consent for the First Surgery because he had not provided adequate information to her regarding the intra- and post-operative risks of the First Surgery. In particular, he had not told her that “bleeding is the commonest complication of a cystic VS [ie, vestibular schwannoma] and is known to have increased risk of post-operative bleeding”. He also failed to present to the Plaintiff the range of options available for her appropriate management, including advising on his “management plans and strategy in the event of post-operative bleeding, including careful and vigilant monitoring of her condition by the [First] Defendant and by the [Second] Defendant and its servants and/or agents at acceptable intervals so that appropriate and timely intervention [can] be carried out”.
(b) The First Defendant failed to personally review the Plaintiff’s case through good history-taking and appropriate clinical examination and did not:
(i) personally see the Plaintiff to inform her he would be taking over from DW9 Dr Ho and confirm the diagnosis for which surgical care was proposed; or
(ii) inform the Plaintiff that he would be leaving the country the day after the surgery and tell her of a surgeon who would be taking over her post-operative management in his absence.
- [23]
[23] In relation to the above, the Plaintiff also alleges that the Second Defendant similarly breached its duty of care to her (under an express or implied term of the agreement with the Plaintiff, or a tortious duty of care) and was vicariously liable for any breaches on the part of the First Defendant.
- [24]
[24] At the post-operative stage, the Plaintiff alleges that the First Defendant was negligent because:
(a) The First Defendant misinterpreted the First CT Scan and diagnosed the haematoma (ie, blood clot) as an intra-axial one in the brain substance rather than an extra-axial one outside the brain substance. In particular, he did not compare the First CT Scan with the RadLink MRI.
(b) The First Defendant failed to evacuate the Plaintiff’s extra-axial haematoma to address the severe brainstem compression arising therefrom, which consigned her to a PVS.
(c) The First Defendant failed to obtain the Plaintiff’s informed consent for inserting the EVD and did not advise on the option of evacuating the extra-axial haematoma.
- [25]
[25] The Plaintiff alleges that the Second Defendant was, in addition to being vicariously liable for the First Defendant’s breaches, also negligent at the post-operative stage because:
(a) The Second Defendant failed to adequately monitor the Plaintiff’s neurological parameters and clinical condition post-operatively.
(b) The Second Defendant failed to carry out a CT scan urgently when the Plaintiff was observed by DW14 Nurse Lee at the HDU to have complete right-sided weakness and a GCS of 13 at 1655 hrs.
(c) The Second Defendant failed to implement a proper system to ensure that critical neurological parameters were recorded in a manner that made the Plaintiff’s neurological trends available to every successive doctor who dealt with the Plaintiff.
- [26]
[26] The above breaches by the Defendants allegedly “caused or materially contributed” to the Plaintiff’s PVS; alternatively these resulted in a “loss of chance” for the Plaintiff to obtain a better medical outcome.
- [27]
[27] Separately, the Plaintiff alleges that the Second Defendant failed to take reasonable care of her post-operatively while she was in a PVS in the HDU, causing her to suffer a fractured right knee (right tibial tuberosity). She pleaded res ipsa loquitur to establish negligence and breach of duty of care.
- [28]
[28] The Plaintiff, initially, also alleged that: (a) she was symptomatic of hydrocephalus which the First Defendant ought to have addressed through a EVD or shunt before the First Surgery; and (b) the Second Defendant’s negligence caused her left middle finger to swell and her fingernail to fall off, as well as a 2mm cut on her neck that had to be stitched up. These claims were later withdrawn at the start of the trial.
- [29]
[29] The Plaintiff called the following experts:
(a) PW3 Dr Peter Gan (“PW3 Dr Gan”), a clinical director and consultant neurosurgeon at Waikato Hospital in New Zealand;
(b) PW5 Dr Tang Kok Kee (“PW5 Dr Tang”), a consultant neurosurgeon at Mount Elizabeth Novena Specialist Centre;
(c) PW2 Dr Chua Gim Chuah (“PW2 Dr Chua”), a senior consultant radiologist at Gleneagles Hospital; and
(d) PW4 Dr Pay Khim Hui (“PW4 Dr Pay”), a consultant radiologist at Gleneagles Hospital.
The First Defendant’s case
- [30]
[30] The First Defendant accepts that he owed the Plaintiff a duty of care to provide appropriate, reasonable and sound medical advice and treatment. However, he denies that he breached this duty.
- [31]
[31] At the pre-operative stage, his contention is that:
(a) He had conducted adequate pre-operative assessment of the Plaintiff. He had read the RadLink MRI, attended the Department Meeting where the Plaintiff’s case was discussed, reviewed the Plaintiff’s case notes beforehand and personally assessed the Plaintiff in the operating theatre before she was anaesthetised for the First Surgery.
(b) DW9 Dr Ho had told the Plaintiff as early as the 15 May 2014 Consultation that he would not be performing the surgery and that the First Defendant would either perform the surgery himself or appoint a neurosurgeon in the department to do so. The Plaintiff and PW1 Ms Chiam were again informed by DW6 Dr Ng at the 29 May 2014 Consultation that DW9 Dr Ho would not be the surgeon operating on the Plaintiff. On 1 June 2014, the night before the First Surgery, DW15 Dr Lu reiterated that DW9 Dr Ho would not be the surgeon for the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff was also informed at the latter two consultations, ie, 29 May 2014 and 1 June 2014, that the First Defendant would be the surgeon.
(c) While the First Defendant only managed to see the Plaintiff in the operating theatre on the day of the First Surgery, this was because the Plaintiff failed to attend the scheduled consultation with him on 27 May 2014. In any case, in the operating theatre, the First Defendant personally assessed her, told her of the nature and risks of the First Surgery and obtained her consent. Further, he informed the Plaintiff’s family on 3 June 2014 that he would be away from Singapore from 4 June 2014 onwards and that Dr Sein Lwin and Assoc Prof Chou Ning would take care of the Plaintiff in his absence.
(d) Regarding the taking of consent, the Second Defendant, as a public healthcare institution, operates on a system of team-based care. This involved a consultant (here, the First Defendant) assuming overall responsibility for the patient (the Plaintiff), with the care of the patient undertaken by other doctors in the team. This includes consent-taking and pre-and post-operative review. There were three occasions before the First Defendant’s own taking of consent in the operating theatre where the risks, including haemorrhage in the brain, were explained and/or consent obtained, namely: (i) the 15 May 2014 Consultation with DW9 Dr Ho, (ii) the 29 May 2014 Consultation with DW6 Dr Ng, and (iii) the 1 June 2014 consultation with DW15 Dr Lu.
- [32]
[32] The First Defendant also denies that he was negligent in respect of post-operative care and contends that:
(a) He had personally reviewed the Plaintiff at the recovery room after the First Surgery and noted that she was well and alert with her facial nerve fully intact. Subsequently, he was unable to be personally involved because he was in the operating theatre performing a surgery on another patient which ended at or around 1830 hrs.
(c) He had correctly read the First CT Scan, together with DW11 Dr Pang and DW12 Dr Low, to conclude that there was haemorrhage in the operative site which extended to the brainstem (specifically, the pons) as well as acute hydrocephalus due to the brainstem haemorrhage.
(d) The Plaintiff’s prognosis was poor as she had an intra-axial haematoma in the brainstem. In addition, the Plaintiff was comatose and her GCS recorded just before the Second Surgery at 1850 hrs was 3, which is the lowest possible score. It would not have improved her condition to remove the intra-axial haematoma, or the extra-axial haematoma along the surgical tract. The Second Surgery was done to relieve her acute hydrocephalus. The Plaintiff’s poor prognosis, therefore, did not justify the risks of evacuating the haematoma, which might damage the cerebellum, brainstem and cranial nerves and carried a high risk of death.
(e) The haemorrhage in the pons was a rare complication arising from the ligation and sacrifice of the SPV during the First Surgery, which resulted in venous infarction (ie, tissue death) of the pons. The upward herniation of the Plaintiff’s brainstem after the insertion of the EVD was not significant and the haemorrhage in the brainstem was not Duret haemorrhage.
(f) He did not owe the Plaintiff’s family a duty of care to advise them on the alternative options to manage the post-operative haematoma.
- [33]
[33] The First Defendant also denies that causation is made out even if he were in breach of duty and denies that the Plaintiff is entitled to rely on res ipsa loquitur for the injuries she sustained during her hospitalisation after the First Surgery.
The Second Defendant’s case
- [34]
[34] The Second Defendant accepts that it was under a duty of care in tort to provide medical and nursing care, treatment and advice in accordance with the proper standard of care but it denies it was negligent. Because its case is essentially aligned with that of the First Defendant, it is not necessary to outline it separately save for two aspects.
- [35]
[35] Firstly, the Second Defendant has a counterclaim for outstanding hospital bills incurred by the Plaintiff, these being $397,478.78 as of 26 July 2019 and the Plaintiff’s further bills from 27 July 2019 to the date of judgment.
- [36]
[36] Secondly, the Second Defendant alleges it was not negligent in causing the Plaintiff to suffer a fracture in 2016. On 18 August 2016, one of the Plaintiff’s daughters had requested for an X-ray to be conducted on both the Plaintiff’s legs. This was done promptly the next day, 19 August 2016. The X-ray showed a mildly displaced fracture at the right tibial tuberosity. Degenerative changes of the right knee joint were also noted. An orthopaedic doctor had reviewed the Plaintiff on the same day and stated that the fracture looked old and was already healing. It was explained to the Plaintiff’s family on the same day that there were two treatment options: surgery or conservative treatment with a ranger brace. The Plaintiff’s family opted for conservative treatment with a ranger brace. The Second Defendant adds that the cause of the Plaintiff’s fracture could not be conclusively determined. There was no reported history of trauma or falls. Furthermore, the Plaintiff is osteopenic (ie, has decreased bone density) and is therefore at risk of sustaining fractures.
- [37]
[37] The Defendants’ experts were:
(a) DW3 Dr Alvin Hong (“DW3 Dr Hong”), a neurosurgeon at Mount Elizabeth Medical Centre;
(b) DW4 Dr Ivan Ng (“DW4 Dr Ivan Ng”), a neurosurgeon at Mount Elizabeth Novena Specialist Centre;
(c) DW10 Dr Yeh Ing Berne (“DW10 Dr Yeh”), a neuro-radiologist at Lifescan Imaging Pte Ltd; and
(d) DW16 Dr Yu Wai-Yung (“DW16 Dr Yu”), a neuro-radiologist at the National Neuroscience Institute.
Counterclaim and defence to counterclaim
- [38]
[38] In the latest amended version of its counterclaim, the Second Defendant avers that the outstanding hospital bills for the medical treatment and care provided by the Second Defendant to the Plaintiff amount to S$397,478.78 as of 26 July 2019 and these continues to be incurred. The Plaintiff and her family have not made full payment of the outstanding hospital bills. Furthermore, according to the Second Defendant, the Plaintiff’s condition was assessed to be stable and fit for discharge to a stepdown care facility in or around October 2014. This was communicated to the Plaintiff’s family in late February 2015. However, the Plaintiff’s family repeatedly rejected the Second Defendant’s suggested care plans and refused to engage with them. Accordingly, the Second Defendant informed PW1 Ms Chiam on 27 July 2015 that it had no option but to initiate the social over-stayer policy (“the Policy”). This meant that the Plaintiff would not be eligible for government subsidies upon the Policy taking effect. The Policy was eventually initiated on 29 August 2015, although it was suspended on 29 February 2016 as the Plaintiff developed sepsis and required acute inpatient care. The Plaintiff’s sepsis resolved in September 2016 and she was found stable and fit for discharge to a stepdown care facility thereafter.
- [39]
[39] In response, the Plaintiff asserts that the negligence of the Defendants have caused the Plaintiff to be in a PVS, for which they are liable to pay all losses and expenses. Accordingly, the Plaintiff is not liable for the unpaid hospital bills, which she would in any event be entitled to set off against any damages awarded in her favour for the Defendants’ negligence. Furthermore, the Plaintiff asserts that she was not fit for discharge as of 29 August 2015 and the Policy should not have been activated.
My decision
- [40]
[40] During oral closing submissions, the Plaintiff’s counsel confirmed that he was not pursing the allegations of negligence at the pre-operative stage. However, he added that this was not because the Plaintiff’s case lacked merits, but because the claim for damages sought would ultimately be traceable to the post-operative issues. Therefore, even though the Plaintiff maintained that there were legitimate issues in relation to the pre-operative stage, it would not be productive for the court to go through those issues.
- [41]
[41] This does not seem to be an unequivocal relinquishment of the claim of negligence at the pre-operative stage. That said, I notice that the Plaintiff’s counsel has not mentioned the pre-operative issues at all in his written and oral closing submissions, which supports the view that the Plaintiff has abandoned these issues.
- [42]
[42] I would like to mention that at the start of the trial the Plaintiff had dropped her allegations of negligence during the surgery. At the end of the trial, she discontinued her allegations of negligence at the pre-operative stage. She now focuses on her allegations of post-operative negligence. Considerable time and resources would have been saved if the Plaintiff had made up her mind early on which issues of negligence she wanted to pursue instead of going on a wild goose chase. Having heard the evidence, I find that the Plaintiff’s true reason for not pursuing the allegations of negligence at the pre-operative stage is that she realised, after hearing the evidence and after the issues were thoroughly ventilated during the trial, the futility of this claim. I shall now explain why the Plaintiff has failed to establish a case of negligence at the pre-operative stage on a balance of probabilities, notwithstanding that she has withdrawn her case against the Defendants. I shall also analyse other issues at the post-operative stage. Let me first identify the various issues.
Issues to be determined
- [43]
[43] The main issues pertaining to the pre-operative stage are:
(a) whether the First Defendant obtained the Plaintiff’s informed consent for the First Surgery; and
(b) whether the First Defendant breached his duty of care by failing to personally see the Plaintiff before the surgery.
- [44]
[44] The main issues pertaining to the post-operative stage are:
(a) whether the Defendants fell below the requisite standard of care in relation to the monitoring of the Plaintiff after the First Surgery;
(b) whether the First Defendant fell below the requisite standard of care in reaching his diagnosis that there was significant intra-axial pontine haemorrhage and, related to this, whether he fell below the requisite standard of care in deciding not to evacuate the haematoma;
(c) whether the First Defendant owed a duty to the Plaintiff’s family to advise them about the option to remove the haematoma, and if so, whether he fell below the requisite standard of care in failing to do so;
(d) whether the Second Defendant fell below the requisite standard of care in its post-operative care of the Plaintiff after the Second Surgery, resulting in the fracture sustained in 2016; and
(e) if there was a breach in relation to the foregoing, whether that breach caused the Plaintiff to suffer the loss for which she now seeks recovery.
- [45]
[45] There is also the issue of the Second Defendant’s counterclaim against the Plaintiff for the outstanding hospital charges, which is straightforward and undisputed.
Pre-operative stage
The Plaintiff’s informed consent for the First Surgery
- [46]
[46] The Plaintiff alleges that her informed consent for the First Surgery was not obtained because:
(a) She was not informed about the risks of the First Surgery.
(b) She was not informed about the First Defendant’s management plans and strategy in the event of post-operative haemorrhage in the brain.
(c) She was only informed on the night before the First Surgery that the First Defendant and not DW9 Dr Ho would operate on her.
(d) She was not informed that the First Defendant would be leaving Singapore on 4 June 2014, ie, two days after the First Surgery on 2 June 2014 and would not be able to provide post-operative care personally until he returned. There was a slight discrepancy between the parties whether it was one or two days after, but that is inconsequential.
Relevant and material information must be disclosed to the patient
- [47]
[47] The applicable law is not in dispute. As stated in Singapore Medical Council v Dr Lim Lian Arn [2019] SGHC 172 (“Lim Lian Arn”) at [48] and [50], and Hii Chii Kok v Ooi Peng Jin London Lucien and another [2017] 2 SLR 492 (“Hii Chii Kok”) at [143] and [184], the first port of call is to ask if the information is relevant and material to the patient. This is to be assessed from the vantage point of the patient, having regard to the matters that he is reasonably likely to attach significance to in arriving at his decision to proceed with the proposed treatment. Next, the information must reasonably be in the possession of the doctor. A doctor may also be justified in withholding information in particular situations and if that is the case, no liability arises for non-disclosure. Ultimately, what has to be disclosed is largely “a matter of common sense”. A reasonable patient would not need or want to know and understand every iota of information before deciding whether or not to undergo the proposed treatment. To overwhelm a patient with minute details will also not be helpful. The following types of information would typically be regarded as material (Hii Chii Kok at [138]):
(a) the doctor’s diagnosis of the patient’s condition;
(b) the prognosis of the patient’s condition with and without medical treatment;
(c) the nature of the proposed medical treatment;
(d) the risks associated with the proposed medical treatment; and
(e) the alternatives to the proposed medical treatment and the attendant advantages and risks.
The broad types of material information identified by the Court of Appeal in Hii Chii Kok are not exhaustive. However, they are highly indicative of what a court would generally consider to be relevant and material information.
Risks of the First Surgery
- [48]
[48] The risks of the First Surgery are relevant and material as they fall within category (d) in Hii Chii Kok.
- [49]
[49] The discussion here focuses on whether the Plaintiff was informed of the risk of post-operative haemorrhage in the brain, because this was the risk specifically pleaded by the Plaintiff. While she pleaded more generally that the First Defendant “failed to advise and provide adequate information to [her] about the possible complications [and] risks” of the First Surgery, such broad allegations are unsatisfactory. A plaintiff must “identify the exact nature of the information that he alleges was not given to him and establish why it would be regarded as relevant and material” (Hii Chii Kok at [132]) [emphasis in original].
- [50]
[50] I accept the Defendants’ submissions that in a public hospital that practises team-based care, it is reasonable for other members of the operating surgeon’s team to explain the risks of the proposed treatment and to obtain the patient’s consent on the operating surgeon’s behalf. It was the evidence of the First Defendant and DW4 Dr Ivan Ng that it is acceptable for an operating surgeon to rely on other members of his team to explain the surgical risks and obtain a patient’s consent, notwithstanding that the patient is a private paying patient. The Plaintiff’s expert PW5 Dr Tang opined that it was his practice, when he was working in the public sector, to personally obtain consent from Class B1 private paying patients and to personally explain the surgical risks to the patient. However, he acknowledged that he was not in a position to opine on the team-based care practised in public hospitals since he left for private practice in 2006. Therefore, I prefer the evidence of the First Defendant.
- [51]
[51] This court had in D’Conceicao Jeanie Doris (administratrix of the estate of Milakov Steven, deceased) v Tong Ming Chuan [2011] SGHC 193 at [171] explained that to state that only a given doctor, out of the other members of a medical team, could advise on the risks of surgery “ignores the reality of how a Medical Team works in practice”, and would lead to “unwanted repercussions, where each doctor has to run through all the risks of a procedure, leading to inefficiencies and an ultimately reduced quality of care”. I note also that the practice of team-based care is consistent with the Singapore Medical Council’s Ethical Code and Ethical Guidelines (2016 Edition) (“the 2016 ECEG”), which states as follows, at Section C6(8):
Although the 2016 ECEG do not apply because they post-date this case, they illustrate that the practice of team-based care, implemented in this case at NUH at least from 2014 when this case occurred, was subsequently endorsed by the medical community in 2016 through the 2016 ECEG. In any case, much the same sentiment was espoused in the 2002 edition of the ECEG (albeit in the context of treatment or care rather than specifically with regard to the taking of consent), which states at Section 4.1.1.4:
- [52]
[52] Thus, quite apart from whether an operating surgeon has an obligation to personally review a patient before a surgery, which I shall address later, as far as obtaining consent is concerned, it is appropriate for other members of the operating surgeon’s team to obtain the patient’s consent and to explain the surgical risks.
(1) The Plaintiff and her family were informed of the risks of the First Surgery
- [53]
[53] Once this basic premise is established, whether the Plaintiff’s informed consent was obtained must be seen in the light of what the other doctors she consulted at NUH (and not only the First Defendant) had told her. In this regard, the multidisciplinary progress notes (“MPNs”) record that the Plaintiff was specifically informed about the risk of haemorrhage in the brain, which would include post-operative haemorrhage, as well as other risks pertaining to the First Surgery, on three separate occasions before the First Surgery:
(a) At the 15 May 2014 Consultation, DW9 Dr Ho had very comprehensively set out the risks of the First Surgery to the Plaintiff and her family. Apart from post-operative haemorrhage, this included the risks of general anaesthesia (ie, heart attack and stroke), infection, paralysis, permanent hearing loss, loss of facial control, diplopia (ie, double vision), impairment of swallowing, worsening hydrocephalus, recurrence of tumour and death. The notes for the 15 May 2014 Consultation were recorded contemporaneously by DW6 Dr Ng on the same day. I emphasise that PW5 Dr Tang, the Plaintiff’s own expert neurosurgeon, agreed that DW9 Dr Ho’s advice regarding the risks and complications of the First Surgery was “appropriate”. He had opined that the 15 May 2014 Consultation was “a very thorough, a very comprehensive consultation, with the discussion about all the risks and the benefits of the surgery”. Therefore, I am unable to accept PW1 Ms Chiam’s evidence that DW9 Dr Ho informed her of only the risk of facial nerve palsy.
(b) At the 29 May 2014 Consultation, DW6 Dr Ng had again informed the Plaintiff and her family of the risks of the First Surgery. These risks included general anaesthesia risks (ie, heart attack and stroke) and surgical risks (haemorrhage, infection, paralysis, death, permanent damage to cranial nerves, numbness or shooting pain to the face, permanent hearing loss, leak of CSF and post-operative hydrocephalus). DW6 Dr Ng contemporaneously recorded the notes for the 29 May 2014 Consultation on the same day.
(c) On 1 June 2014, DW15 Dr Lu had, in the process of obtaining the Plaintiff’s written consent for the First Surgery, explained the risks of the First Surgery, including haemorrhage, brainstem damage, leak of CSF, facial nervy palsy, stroke, paralysis, post-operative hydrocephalus and death. DW15 Dr Lu also explained the risk of a post-operative haematoma affecting the brainstem and that the complication rate for the First Surgery was typically 5%.
- [54]
[54] I do not accept PW1 Ms Chiam’s allegation that the MPNs are inaccurate and they contained information that was not actually communicated to the Plaintiff and her family. PW1 Ms Chiam alleges that DW9 Dr Ho had, at the 15 May 2014 Consultation, only informed the Plaintiff about the risk of facial nerve palsy. Furthermore, she alleges that neither DW6 Dr Ng nor DW15 Dr Lu had informed the Plaintiff of any risks pertaining to the First Surgery, including the risk of post-operative haemorrhage, on 29 May 2014 and 1 June 2014 respectively. But when PW1 Ms Chiam was asked in cross-examination why the doctors would write in things that were not said, her answer was simply that she “don’t know why”. I cannot accept her bare denial, which flies in the face of all the contemporaneous documentary evidence recorded before the First Surgery. Further, the MPNs were separately entered by two different doctors, DW6 Dr Ng and DW15 Dr Lu, who at that time did not know this case would result in a lawsuit. There is no suggestion that the MPNs were fabricated after the event to support the Defendants’ position.
- [55]
[55] Accordingly, I find that the Plaintiff was adequately informed of the risks of the First Surgery, which were sufficiently explained.
(2) Risk of post-operative haemorrhage
- [56]
[56] It is convenient to resolve here a separate issue of whether there was a higher-than-usual risk of post-operative haemorrhage in the Plaintiff’s case. I accept that this is the case. The higher-than-usual risk is supported by experts from both sides. This was the opinion of DW3 Dr Hong and PW3 Dr Gan, while PW5 Dr Tang went so far as to say that the risk of post-operative haemorrhage is twice as high in a cystic tumour as compared to a solid tumour. The First Defendant disagreed with PW5 Dr Tang. The First Defendant relied on a systematic review by Dr Anil Nanda et al for the proposition that there were no significant differences in post-operative morbidity and mortality rates between patients with cystic VS and solid VS (“the Nanda article”). However, post-operative morbidity and mortality is not synonymous with post-operative haemorrhage. Thus, I am satisfied that there was a higher-than-usual risk of haemorrhage in the Plaintiff’s case. But should this elevated risk have been specifically conveyed to her, above and beyond the risk of haemorrhage per se? Her family had, after all, been informed before the First Surgery that haemorrhage could be one of the possible consequences. The doctors would have considered that the risk of haemorrhage was one that was relevant and material, having regard to factors such as the likelihood of the risk and the consequences if it actuated (Hii Chii Kok at [40]). It was not as if the risk of haemorrhage was ignored altogether. What was told to the Plaintiff and her family would be adequate for the purposes of seeking informed consent. The Plaintiff’s tumour was very large and all the neurosurgeons whom the Plaintiff went to seek various expert opinions, came to the same conclusion that it had to be removed surgically. She would have died otherwise. I accept the First Defendant’s argument that the Plaintiff has not shown that the elevated risk of haemorrhage, specifically, was relevant and material for her to know.
Strategy for managing post-operative haemorrhage
- [57]
[57] I do not accept that the First Defendant was required to explain to the Plaintiff his strategy for managing post-operative haemorrhage as opposed to the risk of haemorrhage. Regarding the latter, the evidence shows that the Plaintiff and her children who accompanied her were told, on three separate occasions, that post-operative haemorrhage was a known risk of the First Surgery.
- [58]
[58] The Plaintiff identified the “strategy” for dealing with post-operative haemorrhage as “careful and vigilant monitoring of her condition by [the First and Second Defendant] at acceptable intervals so that appropriate and timely intervention [can] be carried out”. But this need not be communicated to the Plaintiff because it is to be expected that a patient who has undergone brain surgery must be monitored closely. Whether or not such monitoring is negligent in the Plaintiff’s case is a separate matter altogether. Furthermore, the First Defendant’s approach to intervention if there were post-operative haemorrhage would turn on numerous factors, including the site of the haemorrhage, the size of any haematoma and the prognosis of the patient. That would, therefore, be speculative at the point of obtaining informed consent for the First Surgery. In this regard, the Court of Appeal’s caution in Hii Chii Kok at [143] bears emphasising:
Identity of the surgeon who would perform the First Surgery
- [59]
[59] I accept that the identity of the surgeon who would perform the First Surgery was relevant and material for the Plaintiff, as the First Defendant rightly conceded. PW5 Dr Tang testified that patients have the right to know who is to perform the surgery. Citing the 2016 ECEG at Section C6(4), the more invasive the surgery the more “specific and detailed must be the information about the persons conducting it”.
- [60]
[60] The parties agree that on 1 June 2014, the night before the First Surgery, the Plaintiff and her family were informed by DW15 Dr Lu that the First Defendant would be the operating surgeon for the First Surgery. PW1 Ms Chiam alleges that the Plaintiff and her family did not have sufficient time to react when they were informed by DW15 Dr Lu that the First Defendant would be the operating surgeon. Had they been informed earlier, the Plaintiff and her family would have objected to the First Defendant being the operating surgeon and would have chosen DW9 Dr Ho or Dr Lee from Gleneagles Hospital instead.
- [61]
[61] Since PW1 Ms Chiam alleges that this was the first time the Plaintiff and her family were informed that the First Defendant would be performing the First Surgery, the issue is whether they were told before this (ie, at the 15 May 2014 Consultation or the 29 May 2014 Consultation) that the First Defendant, and not DW9 Dr Ho, would be the surgeon. I shall now review what happened at the preceding Consultations.
(1) The 15 May 2014 Consultation
- [62]
[62] PW1 Ms Chiam alleges that the Plaintiff and her family were told by DW9 Dr Ho at the 15 May 2014 Consultation that he could be chosen as the operating surgeon for the First Surgery scheduled on 2 June 2014, if the Plaintiff was upgraded to a private paying patient in Class B1. Subsequently, the Plaintiff’s family proceeded to make the necessary arrangements for the upgrade. The Plaintiff further alleges that the admission financial counselling form listed DW9 Dr Ho under “Admitting Ward/Bed”. The Plaintiff was also given an appointment card for a follow-up consultation with DW9 Dr Ho on 29 May 2014.
- [63]
[63] I find that DW9 Dr Ho had not, at the 15 May 2014 Consultation, told the Plaintiff that he would be the surgeon, for the following reasons.
- [64]
[64] Firstly, DW9 Dr Ho explained that he had on 22 April 2014 (prior to the 15 May 2014 Consultation) already made arrangements to undergo cataract surgeries on 26 May 2014 and 29 May 2014 for both his eyes. He went for his scheduled cataract surgeries on those dates. This was supported by a letter written from DW9 Dr Ho’s eye surgeon. Therefore, he would have been on medical leave and it would not have been possible for him to conduct such a serious and major surgery on 2 June 2014. I do not accept that DW9 Dr Ho was so remiss that his own cataract surgeries slipped his mind.
- [65]
[65] Secondly, DW9 Dr Ho could not have confirmed on the spot at the 15 May 2014 Consultation that he would be the operating surgeon as he was only a visiting consultant who would have to seek the First Defendant’s approval to perform any surgery at NUH.
- [66]
[66] Thirdly, I do not accept the Plaintiff’s contention that DW9 Dr Ho had told them he would be the surgeon if they upgraded to Class B1. DW9 Dr Ho testified that he was not entitled to take an existing private paying patient from NUH to operate and earn from that surgery. He was only entitled to operate on subsidised patients because of the nature of his clinic.
- [67]
[67] Fourthly, the relevant documents executed by the Plaintiff on 15 May 2014 would not have given the Plaintiff the impression that DW9 Dr Ho was to be the surgeon. It is true that the Plaintiff did sign an admission financial counselling form on 15 May 2014 with DW9 Dr Ho’s name listed under “Admitting Ward/Bed”. DW6 Dr Ng explained that he had written DW9 Dr Ho’s name because it was necessary to indicate a consultant’s name to admit a patient and DW9 Dr Ho was the only consultant neurosurgeon who had met the Plaintiff at the material time. However, that form must be viewed together with a subsequent admission financial counselling form, signed by PW1 Ms Chiam at the 29 May 2014 Consultation, which clearly listed the First Defendant under “Admitting Ward/Bed”. For completeness, I note there was another pre-admission form dated 15 May 2014 that lists the surgeon as “Ho Kee Hang”, with DW6 Dr Ng’s name cancelled out. But DW6 Dr Ng explained that this form was for the hospital’s internal use and would never have been shown to the Plaintiff or her family. Therefore, this latter form could not have affected the deliberation of the Plaintiff’s family.
- [68]
[68] Accordingly, I find that DW9 Dr Ho had not told the Plaintiff that he would operate on her at the 15 May 2014 Consultation. Three doctors (ie, DW15 Dr Lu, DW6 Dr Ng and DW9 Dr Ho) who attended to the Plaintiff at the 15 May 2014 Consultation had categorically and definitively testified that DW9 Dr Ho would not be the Plaintiff’s surgeon. I have no reason to disbelieve these doctors. Against this, PW1 Ms Chiam vehemently asserted that DW9 Dr Ho would be the Plaintiff’s surgeon. There is no evidence for her belief, and I can only attribute this to some unfortunate misunderstanding between the doctors and the Plaintiff’s family. Perhaps, the Plaintiff and her family had jumped to the conclusion that DW9 Dr Ho would be the surgeon without seeking confirmation from him, based on the fact that he had booked the operating theatre on 2 June 2014 and they were told to return to DW9 Dr Ho’s clinic on 29 May 2014. This is illustrated by PW1 Ms Chiam’s response in cross-examination:
(2) The 29 May 2014 Consultation
- [69]
[69] The Plaintiff’s contention is that she was only informed on 1 June 2014 that the First Defendant would be the surgeon operating on the Plaintiff. This was against the evidence that clearly shows that at the 15 May 2014 Consultation the Plaintiff and her family were told that DW9 Dr Ho would not be the operating surgeon. Furthermore, at the 29 May 2014 Consultation the Plaintiff and her family were informed that the First Defendant would be the surgeon.
- [70]
[70] The contemporaneous documents support DW6 Dr Ng’s evidence that he had informed the Plaintiff and her family at the 29 May 2014 Consultation that the First Defendant would be performing the First Surgery. DW6 Dr Ng recorded in the MPN for the 29 May 2014 Consultation that the First Defendant was “agreeable to assist in [the Plaintiff’s] surgery on behalf of [DW9 Dr Ho]”.
- [71]
[71] Furthermore, PW1 Ms Chiam testified that the Plaintiff and her family “were very careful about who [they] wanted to perform the surgery”. This is consistent with the conduct of PW1 Ms Chiam and her siblings in seeking several opinions from other neurosurgeons for the best interests of the Plaintiff before the First Surgery. The WhatsApp messages disclosed by the Plaintiff also revealed that the identity of the operating surgeon was of significant importance to her and her siblings. Given that the First Surgery was four days away, it was logical that the Plaintiff and her family would have discussed with DW6 Dr Ng who the operating surgeon would be.
- [72]
[72] DW6 Dr Ng further explained that during the 29 May 2014 Consultation, the Plaintiff’s family had requested someone senior to perform the First Surgery and that they did not mind paying private class fees, if necessary. The Plaintiff’s family had also enquired about the seniority of the First Defendant, to which DW6 Dr Ng replied that he was the Head of the Division of Neurosurgery. The fact that the First Defendant was the Head of the Division of Neurosurgery must have satisfied and re-assured the Plaintiff and her family that she was in good and capable hands. DW6 Dr Ng’s account is consistent with the documents which show that the Plaintiff was only upgraded to a private paying patient under Class B1 on 29 May 2014 and not on 15 May 2014 as PW1 Ms Chiam had contended. The surgeon who was indicated on the admission financial counselling form recorded on 29 May 2014 was the First Defendant and not DW9 Dr Ho. In contrast, the admission financial counselling form recorded on 15 May 2014 stated that the Plaintiff was a subsidised patient under Class B2. That form clearly states that Class B2 patients are not entitled to choose their doctor.
- [73]
[73] Therefore, even if the Plaintiff and her family had mistakenly believed that DW9 Dr Ho would be the surgeon operating on the Plaintiff at the 15 May 2014 Consultation, they would have become aware by the 29 May 2014 Consultation that the First Defendant would be the operating surgeon for the First Surgery. They accepted this knowing that the Plaintiff was in good hands. It would not be beyond the Plaintiff’s family to search on the Internet the background and track records of the First Defendant to evaluate his competence and skill as a neurosurgeon – in fact, they had done so in respect of Dr Lee and Dr Khoo when seeking other opinions on the Plaintiff’s medical condition. Therefore, I am unable to accept PW1 Ms Chiam’s contention that the Plaintiff was only told that the First Defendant would be the operating surgeon on 1 June 2014. For the same reasons, I find it difficult to accept PW1 Ms Chiam’s assertion that the Plaintiff and her family would have chosen to seek treatment under Dr Lee if the First Defendant had informed the Plaintiff before 1 June 2014 that he would be the operating surgeon. The contemporaneous evidence is consistent with the Defendants’ case that the Plaintiff and her family were, on 29 May 2014, keen for the First Defendant to perform the First Surgery.
- [74]
[74] Separately, regarding the identity of the operating surgeon, the First Defendant contends that an adverse inference should be drawn against the Plaintiff for not disclosing the relevant WhatsApp messages which would show that the Plaintiff was informed on 29 May 2014 that the First Defendant would be the operating surgeon. I am of the view that there is sufficient evidence to support my findings on this issue without having to draw an adverse inference. However, I find that PW1 Ms Chiam has been less than forthcoming with the WhatsApp messages. She refused to disclose the WhatsApp messages, claiming initially that the reason for ignoring the First Defendant’s request for disclosure was that “it’s a personal chat”. Later in her cross-examination she gave various other explanations including that her handphone had broken down, that a new WhatsApp group was created and that her sisters had also changed to new handphones. When confronted about how she could have offered to produce a photograph of the Plaintiff in diapers she claimed that it was in the family group chat, PW1 Ms Chiam vacillated and said that “the photo were definitely in the photo … album but the chat doesn’t -- don’t have in the album what [sic]”. PW1 Ms Chiam’s explanations bordered at times on the incredible, all of which undermines her credibility.
The First Defendant’s availability after the Second Surgery
- [75]
[75] Given the team-based care practiced at NUH, it was not necessary for the First Defendant to have informed the Plaintiff of his availability in particular after the Second Surgery.
- [76]
[76] Generally, in a public hospital which practises team-based care, it is appropriate for a doctor to hand over the post-management care of a patient to other members of his team. However, the doctor retains overall responsibility for the patient and must take reasonable care to ensure that the other doctors are capable of providing care to the required quality and standards (2016 ECEG at Section A4(1)). Seen in this light, the fact that the First Defendant would be on leave from 4 June 2014 was not something that needed to be disclosed to the Plaintiff and her family before the First Surgery. Furthermore, the First Defendant did not foresee before the surgery that the Plaintiff’s condition would take a catastrophic turn for the worse four hours after an uneventful and successful operation. Moreover, his leave only started two days after the First Surgery and he cannot be faulted for believing that the Plaintiff would be well looked after by his team under the system of team-based care. The First Defendant ensured that the Plaintiff was well looked after when he was on leave. He informed the Plaintiff’s family that Dr Sein Lwin, a consultant, and Assoc Prof Chou Ning would care for her. The First Defendant had also apprised Dr Sein Lwin of the Plaintiff’s condition in detail and the future management.
- [77]
[77] The Plaintiff has not shown, prior to the surgery, that it was relevant and material to her that the First Defendant would be going on leave soon after the First Surgery. She did not indicate at any point during the consultations on 15 May 2014, 29 May 2014 and 1 June 2014 that she would only consent to undergoing the First Surgery if the operating surgeon would be present to provide post-operative care on the days after the First Surgery.
Causation for pre-operative stage
- [78]
[78] Hence, there was no failure in securing the Plaintiff’s informed consent before the First Surgery. Even if there had been, causation would not be made out. It is undisputed that surgery to remove the tumour was necessary – in fact it was the only option – for the Plaintiff to survive. The Plaintiff has not proven, on a balance of probabilities, that she would not have proceeded with the First Surgery under the First Defendant if the information she alleges was relevant and material was disclosed. This has to be assessed against the time and financial constraints she and her family faced. In any case, the Plaintiff has not alleged that the First Defendant was negligent in carrying out the First Surgery and that this led to her PVS. It is undisputed that the First Surgery was successfully carried out. Seen in that light, it would not have made a difference if the First Surgery had been carried out by the First Defendant or someone else such as DW9 Dr Ho or Dr Lee. Thus, the Plaintiff would have failed on causation regarding the allegations of pre-operative negligence.
Whether the First Defendant should have personally reviewed the Plaintiff before the date of the First Surgery
- [79]
[79] It is not disputed that the First Defendant saw the Plaintiff at the operating theatre for the first time on the day of the First Surgery, ie, 2 June 2014. According to the First Defendant, he examined the Plaintiff that morning and spoke to her about the nature of the proposed surgery and the attendant risks. He stated that it was his usual practice to examine a patient before the surgery and to explain the surgical risks. This practice is borne out as he had instructed a nurse to arrange for a consultation with the Plaintiff on 27 May 2014, which the Plaintiff and her daughters, unfortunately, had chosen not to attend.
- [80]
[80] The Plaintiff’s complaint is that the First Defendant was negligent because he failed to personally examine and review her before the day of the First Surgery.
- [81]
[81] In my view, this issue cannot be divorced from the preceding issue of whether the Plaintiff had received adequate explanation of the risks of the First Surgery and given informed consent of the same. I find that the First Defendant was not negligent simply because he did not personally examine and review the Plaintiff before the day of the First Surgery, for the reasons given below.
- [82]
[82] Firstly, the Plaintiff was adequately advised about the nature of the First Surgery and its accompanying risks by the Second Defendant’s team of neurological surgeons and doctors at the 15 May 2014 Consultation, 29 May 2014 Consultation and on 1 June 2014. On these three separate occasions, the Plaintiff’s condition was correctly and comprehensively assessed by the respective doctors.
- [83]
[83] Secondly, the First Defendant was familiar with the details of the Plaintiff’s case. Her clinical history was properly documented in the MPNs and the First Defendant had reviewed these notes before the First Surgery. The First Defendant was also apprised of the Plaintiff’s case through the Department Meeting on 22 May 2014. The Plaintiff has not explained what the alleged shortcomings were, arising from the lack of personal review before the day of the First Surgery, that would have made a difference to (for instance) what the First Defendant would have done regarding the Plaintiff’s diagnosis and treatment.
- [84]
[84] Thirdly, the First Defendant’s failure to personally see the Plaintiff before the day of the First Surgery must be seen in the light of the Plaintiff’s failure to turn up for her scheduled consultation with the First Defendant on 27 May 2014. As a matter of good clinical practice and courtesy, the First Defendant ought perhaps to have personally met and reviewed the Plaintiff in the presence of her family members before the First Surgery. When he realised that the Plaintiff had decided to go ahead with the surgery on 2 June 2014 at NUH and this was an elective surgery with significant risks including death, he ought to have at least met the Plaintiff and her family before the patient was sent to the operating theatre for the First Surgery. In this regard, I would like to refer to the opinion of DW4 Dr Ivan Ng, the First Defendant’s own expert neurosurgeon:
This would have been a good clinical practice, and it is heartening to note that the First Defendant said that he always makes it a point to review and meet his patient before the surgery. However, the apparent shortcoming of doctor-patient courtesy arising from the unusual circumstances of this case, in my view, does not amount to negligence.
- [85]
[85] This was an unfortunate situation where the Plaintiff did not turn up on 27 May 2014 for the scheduled consultation with the First Defendant and the First Defendant was subsequently occupied with a conference in Bangkok until just before the First Surgery on 2 June 2014. The First Defendant was scheduled to meet the Plaintiff on 27 May 2014. The Plaintiff’s family decided not to bring the Plaintiff for this consultation as they had mistakenly believed that DW9 Dr Ho was the operating surgeon. But even if the Plaintiff and her family had thought that DW9 Dr Ho was to be the surgeon they should have, nevertheless, turned up for the appointment, especially when NUH had called PW1 Ms Chiam and later spoken to Carol on 26 May 2014 to inform the family to bring the Plaintiff to see the First Defendant. They should have accorded importance and urgency to the call from the Second Defendant’s staff because the First Surgery was imminent. Furthermore, the Plaintiff was unwell to the extent that it was necessary for her family to send her to the A&E department at NUH on the same day as the telephone call, ie, 26 May 2014. Anyone in these circumstances would have been worried that there were urgent or serious developments regarding the Plaintiff’s condition, as NUH wanted the Plaintiff to see the First Defendant on 27 May 2014. Instead, PW1 Ms Chiam and her family unilaterally decided not to bring the Plaintiff to NUH on 27 May 2014. In my view, it was wrong of the Plaintiff and PW1 Ms Chiam to have completely ignored this consultation on 27 May 2014 even though they might have the mistaken belief that DW9 Dr Ho was the Plaintiff’s surgeon. If the Plaintiff had turned up on 27 May 2014, she and her family would have known that the First Defendant would be the Plaintiff’s surgeon and any misunderstanding about DW9 Dr Ho being the Plaintiff’s surgeon would have been cleared up. I attribute this failure to keep the consultation on 27 May 2014 as a serious negligence on the part of the Plaintiff and PW1 Ms Chiam. The latter cannot now turn around and accuse the First Defendant for being negligent as he had not seen the Plaintiff personally before 2 June 2014.
- [86]
[86] Accordingly, the fact that the First Defendant only personally reviewed the Plaintiff on the morning of the First Surgery does not amount to any inadequacy or breach of patient care or negligence on the part of either of the Defendants. Nor has the Plaintiff explained how the First Defendant’s approach towards her treatment would or could have differed if he had reviewed her personally before the date of the First Surgery.
Conclusion on negligence alleged at the pre-operative stage
- [87]
[87] To summarise, the First Defendant was not negligent at the pre-operative stage. Firstly, I find that the Plaintiff’s informed consent was obtained for the First Surgery. While the Plaintiff alleges that the risks of the First Surgery were not communicated to her, apart from facial nerve palsy, this is flatly contradicted by the contemporaneous documents entered by two different doctors. The entries in these documents show that on three separate occasions, the risks of the First Surgery, including haemorrhage in the brain, were communicated to the Plaintiff and her family. I reiterate that the Plaintiff’s own expert witness, PW5 Dr Tang, agreed that the advice given by the various doctors to the Plaintiff and her family regarding the risks of the First Surgery was correct and comprehensive. I also accept that in a public hospital that practises team-based care, it is reasonable for other members of the operating surgeon’s team to explain the risks of the proposed treatment and to obtain the patient’s consent on the operating surgeon’s behalf.
- [88]
[88] The Plaintiff also alleges that the First Defendant should have informed her about his strategy for managing post-operative haemorrhage. No expert evidence or guidelines were adduced to show why such information must be explained to the patient before consent for surgery is sought from the patient. Such information would also be speculative as it would depend on various factors, including the site of the haemorrhage, the size of any haematoma and the patient’s prognosis. This speculative deluge would have overwhelmed and confused the Plaintiff and her family.
- [89]
[89] In addition, I also do not accept the Plaintiff’s contention that the First Defendant should have advised her that he would be on leave two days after the First Surgery. This is not information that would have been relevant and material, particularly when the Second Defendant practised team-based patient care. Furthermore, the First Defendant’s leave only started two days after the First Surgery. It was appropriate for the First Defendant to hand over post-management care to other members of his team. The First Defendant had retained overall responsibility for the Plaintiff and taken reasonable care to ensure that the other members of his team were capable of providing the requisite care.
- [90]
[90] The Plaintiff contends that she was only informed one day before the First Surgery that the First Defendant would be the operating surgeon. In the circumstances, there was insufficient time for them to react. If this was communicated to the Plaintiff and her family members earlier, the Plaintiff would have sought treatment under DW9 Dr Ho or Dr Lee instead. However, I find that the evidence is clear that the Plaintiff and her family members were, in fact, told during the 29 May 2014 Consultation that the First Defendant would be the operating surgeon for the First Surgery. Thus, there was sufficient time for the Plaintiff to back out of the First Surgery, an elective surgery, if she did not wish to proceed.
- [91]
[91] Secondly, the First Defendant was not negligent in failing to personally review the Plaintiff before the date of the First Surgery, 2 June 2014. He was well apprised of the Plaintiff’s case through the Department Meeting on 22 May 2014. He had also examined the RadLink MRI. While he did not personally review the Plaintiff before 2 June 2014, the three doctors who attended to her on three separate occasions ie, DW9 Dr Ho, DW6 Dr Ng and DW15 Dr Lu, had: (i) advised her about the nature and risks of the First Surgery, (ii) adequately assessed her condition, and (iii) documented her clinical history. The First Defendant had reviewed the clinical notes of the three consultations before the First Surgery.
- [92]
[92] As a matter of good clinical practice, the First Defendant ought, perhaps, to have personally reviewed the Plaintiff before the First Surgery. However, this has to be balanced against the unique circumstances in this case. The Plaintiff was originally scheduled to meet the First Defendant on 27 May 2014 but did not turn up for the consultation. In addition, the First Defendant had to attend a conference in Bangkok very shortly thereafter and only returned the day before the First Surgery. In the light of these circumstances, I find that there was no negligence on the part of the First Defendant in failing to personally review the Plaintiff before 2 June 2014.
- [93]
[93] It follows from my finding that the First Defendant was not negligent at the pre-operative stage that the Second Defendant cannot be vicariously liable for negligence. Considering the strength of the evidence supporting this conclusion, it was unsurprising that the Plaintiff decided, belatedly, at the close of the trial not to pursue her claim of negligence against the Defendants at the pre-operative stage.
Post-operative stage
- [94]
[94] The Plaintiff concentrates her action against the Defendants for acts of negligence at the post-operative stage and the following are the issues:
(a) failing to adequately monitor and care for the Plaintiff after the First Surgery;
(b) misreading the First CT Scan and diagnosing a significant intra-axial haematoma;
(c) failing to evacuate the haematoma; and
(d) failing to advise the Plaintiff’s family of the option to evacuate the haematoma.
- [95]
[95] Before I deal with the above issues in seriatim, I shall first address the Plaintiff’s arguments that factual witnesses who are neurosurgeons cannot give expert opinions on issues concerning medical practice. The Plaintiff further urges that such expert views must be rejected or given little weight because these factual witnesses have not complied with O 40A of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (“Rules of Court”).
Can medical factual witnesses give expert opinions on medical practice that are within their domain of proficiency?
- [96]
[96] The factual witnesses that the Plaintiff objects to their giving of expert views are, primarily, the First Defendant and DW11 Dr Pang. The Defendants were content to withdraw the relevant portion of DW9 Dr Ho’s affidavit that was opinion evidence.
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