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Grounds publishedDecided 5 Dec 2019
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High Court

Wang Xiaopu v Goh Seng Heng and another

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[2019] SGHC 284Case no. Suit No 686 of 2015

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The plaintiff, Mdm Wang Xiaopu (“Wang”), commenced Suit No 686 of 2015 against the first defendant, Dr Goh Seng Heng (“Goh”), and the second defendant, Dr Goh Ming Li Michelle (“Michelle”), for misrepresentations in relation to two agreements for the purchase of shares in Aesthetic Medical Partners Pte Ltd (“AMP”).

  3. [2] Wang had entered into three agreements to purchase shares in AMP:

  4. (a) a memorandum of understanding with Goh dated 17 October 2013 and signed on or about the same day (“the 1st MOU”);

  5. (b) a memorandum of understanding with Goh signed on 21 October 2013 but backdated to 17 October 2013 (“the 1st MOU (as amended)”); and

  6. (c) a memorandum of understanding with Goh and Michelle dated 25 September 2014 (“the 2nd MOU”).

  7. Since the 1st MOU (as amended) superseded the 1st MOU, Wang’s claims are in respect of the 1st MOU (as amended) and the 2nd MOU.

  8. [3] In the alternative, Wang claimed against Goh for breach of contract in respect of the 1st MOU (as amended) and against both defendants for breach of contract in respect of the 2nd MOU. None of the parties dispute that these agreements were binding on the parties thereto and meant to have legal effect. The defendants’ counterclaim against Wang is for repudiatory breach of the 1st MOU (as amended) and the 2nd MOU.

  9. Dramatis personae

  10. [4] For easy reference, I set out a table of the dramatis personae involved in these proceedings:

  11. [5] I mention at the outset that Sun was also involved in the discussions before the signing of any agreement by Wang and played a substantial role in these discussions. This was despite the fact that Wang was the named purchaser in the agreements. I will elaborate on Sun’s involvement at [71] and [72] below. I will also make certain preliminary findings regarding Goh and Lin below at [70] and [73]–[75].

  12. [6] AMP was incorporated by Goh on 12 August 2008 to operate his medical practice in Paragon Shopping Centre, Singapore. Goh then incorporated Aesthetics Medical Holdings Pte Ltd (“AMH”) in 2010 to operate a chain of aesthetic clinics under the “PPP” brand. In or around 2012, AMH became a wholly-owned subsidiary of AMP. Goh served as Group Executive Chairman and director of AMP from 1 September 2008 to 2 February 2016. Michelle served as CEO of AMP from October 2011 to June 2015, and as a director of AMP from 1 January 2012 to 8 June 2015.

  13. [7] I also set out below the other companies that were involved in the events leading up to the legal proceedings:

  14. The undisputed facts

  15. Events relating to the 1st MOU and the 1st MOU (as amended)

  16. [8] Wang was introduced to Goh sometime in October 2013 by Lin, who was then the relationship manager in charge of Wang’s bank account with Standard Chartered Bank (Singapore) Ltd (“SCB”).

  17. [9] It was agreed that Wang, Sun, Goh, Lee and Lin were all present at a meeting held on board Goh’s yacht (“the yacht meeting”). Michelle was not present. Although it was initially agreed that this meeting took place on 15 October 2013, the defendants changed their case partway through trial after Goh was called as a witness. This was when Lee gave his evidence to say that the yacht meeting took place on 14 October 2013 instead. The defendants subsequently maintained in closing submissions that the yacht meeting occurred on 14 October 2013. My finding as regards this issue is set out below at [62] et seq.

  18. [10] Following the meeting, preparations were made for an investment by Wang and Sun in AMP. Several drafts of a memorandum of understanding were prepared by Lee and circulated to Lin and Goh. This culminated in Wang signing the 1st MOU. The 1st MOU was superseded by the 1st MOU (as amended), which was signed on 21 October 2013 (but backdated to 17 October 2013) following a meeting in Guangzhou, China. The details of the discussions leading to the signing of the 1st MOU and then the 1st MOU (as amended) were disputed and will be discussed below.

  19. [11] Under the 1st MOU and also the 1st MOU (as amended), Wang was to purchase 20,000 shares in AMP from Goh at the price of S$500 per share, for a total consideration of S$10m. The 1st MOU (as amended) was in both the English and Mandarin languages, with both versions stipulated to have equal force. The crucial provisions of the 1st MOU (as amended) for these proceedings are cll 1–3 and 6–7 of Annex A, which I will set out later.

  20. [12] The English version of the 1st MOU (as amended) was drafted by Lee. There was some dispute as to who drafted the Mandarin version that was also signed (see the discussion below at [69]). In any event, for the legal proceedings, Wang obtained English translations of the Mandarin versions of the 1st MOU and the 1st MOU (as amended). I will refer to those translations as the “English Translations” of the 1st MOU and the 1st MOU (as amended) respectively. The English Translations that Wang relied upon were prepared by Li, her expert witness. There were differences between the English version (signed by the parties) and the English Translation of the 1st MOU (as amended), as I will elaborate on later.

  21. [13] The English versions and English Translations of the 1st MOU and the 1st MOU (as amended) are reproduced at Annexes A and B respectively.

  22. [14] At the time of the signing of the 1st MOU (as amended) on 21 October 2013, Goh had already entered into two separate agreements which would potentially reduce his shareholdings in AMP:

  23. (a) First, he entered into a call option on 29 May 2012 granting a three-year call option to Julian Leslie Reis to purchase 32,895 shares in AMP at a price of S$152 per share (“the call option”). Julian Leslie Reis is the brother of Reis, the shareholder and director of AMP who is listed among the dramatis personae at [4] above.

  24. (b) Second, he entered into a share purchase agreement dated 6 September 2013 with Star Titanic, under which Star Titanic agreed to purchase 50,000 shares in AMP for S$300 a share in two tranches (“the share purchase agreement”). The first tranche for 30,000 shares was completed on 18 September 2013, with the second tranche for 20,000 shares still outstanding at the time the 1st MOU (as amended) was signed.

  25. Neither of these agreements was disclosed to Wang prior to the signing of the 1st MOU or the 1st MOU (as amended).

  26. [16] Clause 3 of Annex A to the 1st MOU (as amended) entitled Wang to a certain amount of compensation if AMP’s pre-tax profit in FY 2014 fell short of S$12m. On 1 August 2014, Lin forwarded to Wang an email from Lee stating that AMP’s earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (“EBITDA”) for the financial year was S$11,867,000, entitling her to a payment of S$110,000 under cl 3 of Annex A to the 1st MOU (as amended). Wang was offered an alternative form of compensation in the form of 123 additional shares in AMP. Wang eventually elected not to insist on her right to compensation for the missed EBITDA target.

  27. Events relating to the 2nd MOU

  28. [17] Sometime in mid- to late 2014, Goh and other persons involved in the management of AMP (Loh, Michelle and Lee) discussed buying out a group of minority shareholders in AMP whom the parties referred to as the “angel investors” who collectively held about 20% of AMP’s shares at the time. Reis represented this group of angel investors. Goh, Loh, Michelle and Lee wanted an investor with sufficient funds to buy out the angel investors’ shares, and considered Wang and Sun to be ideal candidates. Goh conveyed this proposal to Lin to pass on to Wang and Sun.

  29. [18] On or around 15 August 2014, Wang and Sun met Lin in Singapore. They were receptive to the idea of investing further in AMP. Further discussions followed. A meeting was held on 8 September 2014 in Guangzhou (“the 8 September 2014 meeting”), which was attended by Wang, Sun, Goh, Michelle, Lee, Loh and Lin. At this meeting, Wang and Sun agreed in principle to purchase the angel investors’ shares in AMP from Goh at S$450 per share. There was also an in-principle agreement for a joint venture to be operated in China.

  30. [19] The terms of what was to become the 2nd MOU were the subject of various emails and discussions in the days following the 8 September 2014 meeting. At the same time, Goh (through Lee) was concurrently in discussions with Reis on the sale of the angel investors’ shares to him. As it turned out, Goh intended to buy the shares of the angel investors first, and then onsell them to Wang at a higher price than what he would have to pay for the angel investors’ shares.

  31. [20] On 15 September 2014, Reis proposed selling 56,049 shares in AMP held by the angel investors to Goh at S$350 per share. On the other hand, the price Goh offered to Wang was S$450 per share. The fact that Goh would be making a profit of S$100 per share from purchasing AMP shares from the angel investors and onselling them to Wang was not disclosed to Wang.

  32. [21] The 2nd MOU was eventually signed on or around 25 September 2014. Clause 1 provided that Wang was to purchase 50,000 shares in AMP (owned by the angel investors) from Goh. Clause 7 of the 2nd MOU obliged Goh and Michelle to work “fulltime” in AMP for a period of five years and not to compete with it for five years thereafter.

  33. [22] There were some differences as to the mechanics of how the transfer of the shares in AMP from the angel investors to Wang through Goh was to take place. It was eventually agreed that the shares were to be transferred and paid for in three tranches comprising 24,000, 22,000 and 4,000 shares respectively. Only the first two tranches were completed, with Wang taking the position on 10 March 2015 that she did not have to proceed with the purchase of the third tranche of 4,000 shares due to various breaches by Goh of the 1st MOU (as amended).

  34. [23] The relevant provisions of the English version of the 2nd MOU are reproduced below at Annex C. Wang also provided an English translation of the Mandarin version of the 2nd MOU, but I do not include it in Annex C as the terms of the 2nd MOU are not in dispute and the parties’ cases do not turn on any difference between the English and Mandarin versions of the 2nd MOU.

  35. The parties’ cases

  36. The plaintiff’s case

  37. [24] Wang’s case against the defendants in relation to the 1st MOU (as amended) and the 2nd MOU was for misrepresentation and/or breach of contract.

  38. The 1st MOU (as amended)

  39. (1) The misrepresentation claim

  40. [25] Wang claimed that Goh made fraudulent misrepresentations under common law that induced her to enter the 1st MOU (as amended). Further, or in the alternative, the misrepresentations fell under ss 1 and 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act (Cap 390, 1994 Rev Ed) (“MA”). She sought a declaration that the 1st MOU (as amended) was validly avoided and rescinded, or alternatively sought its rescission.

  41. [26] Wang’s position was that Lin introduced Goh to Sun and her on 15 October 2013 at AMP’s office at Paragon Shopping Centre. They were also introduced to Michelle and Lee, following which they were given a tour of AMP’s office and Goh’s clinic. During this, Dr Goh was generally conversant in Mandarin and all conversations between those present were conducted in Mandarin. Following this, Wang and Sun accepted Goh’s suggestion that they tour some of the “PPP” clinics with Lee. Wang and Sun eventually met up again with Goh that evening for a meeting on board Goh’s yacht.

  42. [27] Wang alleged three misrepresentations that were made by Goh during this meeting which induced her to enter into 1st MOU and later the 1st MOU (as amended):

  43. (a) First, Goh informed Wang that he had previously sold his shares in AMP for S$600–S$700 per share to other doctors and minority shareholders and that he was willing to sell Wang 20,000 shares at a discounted price of S$500 per share (“the discounted share price representation”).

  44. (b) Second, Goh told Wang that he would not sell his shares in AMP to any other third party before AMP’s initial public offering (“IPO”) without Wang’s consent (“the no further sale of shares representation”).

  45. (c) Third, Goh stated that AMP had made pre-tax profits of S$10m in the previous year (ie, financial year 2013 (“FY 2013”)), and that its pre-tax profit was growing at a rate of more than 30% a year (“the AMP business growth representation”).

  46. [28] The no further sale of shares representation was repeated by Goh once again during the meeting on 21 October 2013 in Guangzhou prior to the signing of the 1st MOU (as amended).

  47. [29] While Michelle did not directly make any of the alleged misrepresentations, Wang’s position was that Michelle should be deemed to have impliedly made them on the basis of her involvement in the transaction as the CEO of AMP.

  48. (2) The breach of contract claim

  49. [30] In the alternative, Wang claimed for breach of contract against Goh in respect of his contractual obligations under the 1st MOU (as amended), for breaches of cll 1–3, 6 and 7 of Annex A.

  50. [31] The English versions of cll 1–3 of Annex A stated as follows:

  51. [32] Clauses 1–3 of Annex A operated essentially as a profit guarantee to compensate Wang with a percentage of her investment if AMP’s pre-tax profit (ie, EBITDA) for financial year 2014 (“FY 2014”) fell short of S$12m. The term “EBITDA” referred to EBITDA calculated on an accrual basis, as was required by Singapore’s accounting standards. Wang’s case was that the figure of S$11,867,000 that Lin presented to Wang as AMP’s EBITDA for FY 2014 was erroneous as it was calculated on a cash accounting basis and further inaccurately omitted Goh’s remuneration of S$3.5m in FY 2014 as an expense (see [76] below for an elaboration on the two bases of calculating EBITDA). Properly calculated, AMP’s true EBITDA shortfall was S$7,847,853, entitling Wang to compensation of S$6,539,877.50 from Goh under cl 3 instead of S$110,000.

  52. [33] Clause 6 of Annex A to the 1st MOU (as amended) stated:

  53. Wang’s case was that Goh breached cl 6 on multiple occasions. Under cl 6, Goh could issue (under AMP) 10,000 new shares. He did so on 18 November 2014 but for a nominal price of S$1 for all the 10,000 shares rather than a fair price and without obtaining Wang’s permission. Goh also caused AMP to issue a total of 700 new shares to three employees of AMP without obtaining Wang’s consent.

  54. [34] Clause 7 of Annex A to the 1st MOU (as amended) stated:

  55. Wang’s case was that Goh breached cl 7 by selling shares on seven different occasions without Wang’s permission.

  56. The 2nd MOU

  57. (1) The misrepresentation claim

  58. [35] Wang’s claim in respect of the 2nd MOU was likewise premised on both fraudulent misrepresentation under common law and misrepresentation under ss 1 and 2(1) of the MA. She alleged three misrepresentations made by the defendants that induced her to enter into the 2nd MOU:

  59. (a) First, the erroneous EBITDA figure for FY 2014 (see [32] above) and compensation calculation for the EBITDA shortfall under the 1st MOU (as amended) was conveyed to Wang by Lin on Goh’s behalf on 1 August 2014. The FY 2014 EBITDA figures that were communicated by Lin were presented on a cash accounting basis and also omitted Goh’s remuneration for that year (see below at [42]). Taken together with the parties’ agreement that the term “EBITDA” in the 1st MOU (as amended) would be calculated based on Singapore’s accounting standards, this presented a false picture of AMP’s financial health to Wang to persuade her to purchase the angel investors’ shares in AMP (“the August 2014 EBITDA representation”).

  60. (b) Second, Goh represented to Wang at the meeting on 8 September 2014 that the angel investors were only willing to sell their shares at S$450, when in reality they were content to sell at a price of S$350 (“the AI share price representation”).

  61. (c) Third, Goh impliedly represented that he would continue to adhere to his previous undertaking not to sell any more of his shares in AMP without Wang’s permission (“the second no further sale of shares representation”). Lin had informed Wang on behalf of Goh on 1 September 2014 that following the purchase of the angel investors’ shares, Wang, Goh and RSP would be the three major shareholders of AMP with 25.8%, 39.5% and 34.8% shareholdings respectively. This representation was false as Goh, having sold some of his shares in AMP, held 21.91% of AMP’s shares when the 2nd MOU was entered into. Goh sold more of his AMP shares on several occasions after entering into the 2nd MOU.

  62. [36] In the alternative, Wang submitted that in the course of the implementation of the 2nd MOU, Goh offered to transfer 22,000 of his own shares in AMP to Wang first before later acquiring the same amount of shares from the angel investors. This was to avoid any delay in Wang receiving the second tranche of shares. At this time, Goh had no intention of buying back the 22,000 shares in AMP from the angel investors due to the precarious financial situation that AMP was in at that time (“the second tranche representation”).

  63. (2) The breach of contract claim

  64. [37] In the alternative, Wang claimed against the defendants for breach of contract in respect of the 2nd MOU. Her claim rested on two grounds.

  65. [38] First, Goh breached an implied obligation under the 2nd MOU not to sell his shares in AMP without Wang’s consent when he sold 32,049 shares in AMP to Liberty Sky on 11 December 2014.

  66. [39] Second, cl 7 provided that Goh and Michelle would continue working in AMP for five years after 25 September 2014:

  67. The defendants breached cl 7 when Goh and Michelle resigned from AMP on 2 February 2016 and 30 June 2015 respectively.

  68. The defendants’ case

  69. The 1st MOU (as amended)

  70. (1) The misrepresentation claim

  71. [40] Goh initially deposed that his first meeting with Wang took place on 15 October 2013 at his clinic in Paragon Shopping Centre. At trial, Goh similarly testified that he met Wang on 15 October 2013, and that she visited the PPP clinics and boarded his yacht on that day. However, when Lee gave evidence, he said that the initial meetings and the yacht meeting took place on 14 October 2013 instead. I will elaborate later on the reasons for this change of position for the defendants. In their closing submissions, the defendants maintained that the initial meetings with Wang took place on 14 October 2013 instead, and that Goh met Wang and Sun on board his yacht on the same evening with Lee and Lin. During this meeting, the parties discussed going into business together. Lin assisted in translation, as Goh and Lee were only able to speak basic conversational Mandarin.

  72. [41] Goh denied making any of the three alleged representations. Even if he were found to have made the alleged representations, they were not actionable. Wang did not rely on any of the alleged representations in entering into the 1st MOU and later the 1st MOU (as amended). The no further sale of shares representation was true as Goh held the honest intention not to sell his shares without Wang’s permission after the signing of the 1st MOU (as amended). The AMP business growth representation was also substantially true.

  73. (2) The breach of contract claim

  74. [42] Goh’s main defence was that the parties agreed that the term “EBITDA” in cll 1–3 of Annex A to the 1st MOU (as amended) (reproduced above at [31]) referred to EBITDA calculated on a cash basis. Goh argued in the alternative that Wang had waived her right to compensation under cl 3 of Annex A to the 1st MOU (as amended). As for the restructuring of Goh’s remuneration of S$3.5m for FY2014, this was carried out in a transparent manner and disclosed to independent third-party advisors such as Maybank Kim Eng Securities (“Maybank”) and KPMG LLP (“KPMG”).

  75. [43] While Goh admitted at trial that he was in breach of cl 6 of Annex A the 1st MOU (as amended) (reproduced above at [33]) by causing 10,000 new shares in AMP to be issued at the nominal price of S$1 for all the 10,000 shares, he argued in submissions that any breach of cl 6 was a legal question. The plain wording of cl 6 did not impose any restriction on the party to whom the new shares could be issued or the price at which they could be issued. As for the issuance of 700 new shares in AMP to its employees, this was done on 14 July 2015, after Wang had sought to rescind the 1st MOU (as amended) on 18 May 2015. As Goh had himself rescinded the 1st MOU (as amended) on 25 May 2015 based on Wang’s alleged repudiation caused by her attempt to rescind on 18 May 2015, the 1st MOU (as amended) was no longer binding on the parties.

  76. [44] Finally, as for cl 7 of Annex A to the 1st MOU (as amended) (reproduced above at [34]), Goh’s position was that it did not prohibit him from fulfilling his pre-existing contractual obligations under contracts entered into before the 1st MOU (as amended) was signed. Wang was also aware of Goh’s strategy of selling shares in AMP to its employees as an incentivisation strategy and the prohibition in cl 7 was not meant to cover such sales. However, Goh admitted that he had breached cl 7 of Annex A to the 1st MOU (as amended) on two occasions by selling (a) 527 shares to a person named Carolyn Wong on or around 20 December 2013 and (b) 32,049 shares to Liberty Sky on or around 25 November 2014.

  77. The 2nd MOU

  78. (1) The misrepresentation claim

  79. [45] Goh argued that the August 2014 EBITDA representation was true and he had reasonable grounds to believe in it. EBITDA for the purposes of cll 1–3 of Annex A to the 1st MOU (as amended) was to be calculated on a cash basis. As for the omission of Goh’s remuneration of S$3.5m for FY 2014, Goh claimed that this restructuring was done for the purposes of preparing for an IPO and was carried out in a transparent manner, with disclosure being made to third-party advisors. Even if EBITDA for FY 2014 was to be calculated on an accrual basis, it correctly excluded Goh’s remuneration for services rendered in FY 2014. In any event, Wang did not rely on the August 2014 EBITDA representation in entering into the 2nd MOU.

  80. [46] Goh also denied having made the AI share price representation. Goh’s position was that he did not inform Wang that the angel investors were only willing to sell their shares at S$450 per share. Loh was the person who first informed Wang at the 8 September 2014 meeting that the angel investors were seeking an internal rate of return of 25%, which worked out to S$450 per share. Goh merely repeated what Loh had said. Goh also argued that Wang did not rely on the AI share price representation when entering into the 2nd MOU.

  81. [47] For the second no further sale of shares representation, Goh’s position was that Wang’s case had changed in the course of the proceedings. Also, the representation could not be implied based on Wang’s pleaded position. Wang was also in any event not induced by the representation.

  82. [48] Finally, in respect of the alleged second tranche representation, Goh claimed that the representation was true as he held the honest intention to buy back 22,000 shares in AMP from the angel investors after he transferred 22,000 of his own shares to Wang. In any case, the second tranche representation concerned the mechanics of how Wang was to receive the shares and Wang did not rely on it to her detriment, since she did receive the 22,000 shares even though the share did not come from the angel investors.

  83. (2) The breach of contract claim

  84. [49] Goh denied having breached cl 7 of the 2nd MOU (reproduced above at [39]). Wang had committed a repudiatory breach of the 2nd MOU by refusing to complete the purchase of shares in AMP. Goh accepted the repudiation of the 2nd MOU by email on 12 April 2015. The 2nd MOU was thus terminated by the time Goh and Michelle resigned from AMP.

  85. Counterclaim

  86. [50] Goh counterclaimed against Wang for repudiatory breach of the 1st MOU (as amended) and both defendants counterclaimed against Wang for repudiatory breach of the 2nd MOU. In a letter sent by her solicitors dated 18 May 2015, Wang had purported to avoid and rescind both agreements based on Goh’s misrepresentations. According to the defendants, Wang was in repudiatory breach of both agreements as her misrepresentation claims against them were not valid. The defendants accepted her repudiatory breach by a letter dated 25 May 2015.

  87. [51] In the alternative, the defendants submitted that Wang’s refusal to complete the purchase of the third tranche of 4,000 shares in AMP pursuant to cl 1 of the section of the 2nd MOU titled “For [AMP] shares” on 10 March 2015 constituted a repudiatory breach, which was accepted in an email dated 12 April 2015. The defendants counterclaimed against Wang for breach of contract when she refused to complete the purchase of the third tranche of shares.

  88. The applicable law on misrepresentation

  89. [52] The requirements for a claim in fraudulent misrepresentation were set out by the Court of Appeal in Panatron Pte Ltd and another v Lee Cheow Lee and another [2001] 2 SLR(R) 435 (“Panatron”) at [14]:

  90. (a) there must be a representation of fact made by words or conduct;

  91. (b) the representation must be made with the intention that it should be acted upon by the plaintiff or by a class of persons which includes the plaintiff;

  92. (c) it must be proved that the plaintiff had acted upon the false statement;

  93. (d) it must be proved that the plaintiff suffered damage by so doing; and

  94. (e) the representation must be made with knowledge that it is false; it must be wilfully false, or at least made in the absence of a genuine belief that it is true.

  95. Implicit in the first requirement is that the representation must be false. In this regard, it is sufficient that the representation be substantially false: Ernest Ferdinand Perez De La Sala v Compañia De Navegación Palomar, SA and others and other appeals [2018] 1 SLR 894 (“Ernest Ferdinand Perez”) at [173]. Where a representation is ambiguous and capable of more than one meaning, the representee must prove how he understood it and that, so understood, the representation was false: K R Handley, Spencer Bower & Handley: Actionable Misrepresentation (LexisNexis, 5th Ed, 2014) (“Spencer Bower”) at para 4.14.

  96. [53] The MA supplements the remedies afforded to victims of non-fraudulent representation by the common law. Section 1 of the MA allows for the rescission of such contracts. Section 2(1) enables the victim of a non-fraudulent misrepresentation to claim damages as if the misrepresentation were made fraudulently unless the representor can prove that he had reasonable grounds to believe and did believe up to the time of the contract that the facts represented were true.

  97. [54] It is important to distinguish between a representation and a promise. A representation must relate to a fact which has occurred or exists: see Spencer Bower at para 2.10; see also Bestland Development Pte Ltd v Thasin Development Pte Ltd [1991] SGHC 27. A promise, on the other hand, is simply an undertaking to do something.

  98. [55] As regards the requirement that the representee be induced by the misrepresentation, it is sufficient that the misrepresentation plays a real and substantial part in contributing to the course of action taken by the representee. It is not a requirement for the representee to show that the misrepresentation was the sole cause for entering into the agreement: see Panatron at [23]; see also Spencer Bower at para 6.09.

  99. [56] Several complications arise in the present proceedings as Wang’s case against Goh rested partially on instances of implied representations, silence, omissions and concealment of material facts.

  100. [57] Addressing first the issue of implied representations, it has long been understood that representations can be implied as part of what is stated by a representor. The test for an implied representation is set out in Spencer Bower at para 3.04:

  101. Examples include (Spencer Bower at para 3.04):

  102. [58] One notable scenario in which implied representations have been found to arise involves situations where the representor makes a representation as to the future. While such representations are not, by themselves, actionable misrepresentations, they may amount to actionable implied misrepresentations. For instance, in Ernest Ferdinand Perez at [172(b)], the Court of Appeal, citing Tan Chin Seng v Raffles Town Club Pte Ltd [2003] 3 SLR(R) 307 at [12], opined that a person who states an intention as to the future implicitly represents that he in fact has that intention at the time the statement is made. If it can be shown that, at the time the statement of intention was made, the person who made it had no intention of doing what he asserted he would do, there would be a misrepresentation of that person’s state of mind: The Law of Contract in Singapore (Andrew Phang Boon Leong gen ed) (Academy Publishing, 2012) (“The Law of Contract in Singapore”) at para 11.040.

  103. [59] Mere silence alone will not suffice to found a claim in misrepresentation: Wee Chiaw Sek Anna v Ng Li-Ann Genevieve (sole executrix of the estate of Ng Hock Seng, deceased) and another [2013] 3 SLR 801 at [65]. However, silence may in certain circumstances be capable of amounting to a representation. The following passage from the Court of Appeal’s decision in Broadley Construction Pte Ltd v Alacran Design Pte Ltd [2018] 2 SLR 110 at [28] is instructive:

  104. [60] This makes clear that where a misrepresentation claim is brought on the basis of alleged silence, omission or concealment, the plaintiff must show that a statement made is true only with qualifications known to and withheld by the representor: Spencer Bower at para 4.17. To succeed in his claim on this basis, the representee must show that the omission makes what is stated misleading: Spencer Bower at para 4.19. Ultimately, the court must closely scrutinise the facts to determine that, in the circumstances, a duty to speak on the part of the representor has arisen. It is only in such situations that an actionable misrepresentation may be found from a failure to speak.

  105. The decision

  106. Preliminary findings

  107. [61] I now make some preliminary findings.

  108. [62] First, I find that the date of the yacht meeting, which was an issue of contention between the parties, was 15 October 2013. The date of this meeting is of some importance as it went towards whether certain representations were made on a certain date, as will be elaborated on below.

  109. [63] The parties proceeded on the premise that the yacht meeting took place on the same day that Wang and Sun visited Goh at AMP’s office and Goh’s clinic (“the Paragon clinic”) which were both at Paragon Shopping Centre, before Wang and Sun visited two PPP clinics on the same day. Wang’s position was that the visits were on 15 October 2013, and likewise that the yacht meeting took place on 15 October 2013; they all occurred on the same day. The defendants initially accepted in their pleadings that the yacht meeting took place on 15 October 2013. It was also agreed in the affidavits of evidence-in-chief (“AEICs”) of Goh, Lee and Michelle and in the parties’ lead counsel’s statements that the yacht meeting was held on 15 October 2013, being the same day as the initial meetings and visits. Goh himself testified at trial that the yacht meeting took place on 15 October 2013. It was only after Lee took the stand as a witness during the defendants’ case that the defendants took the position that the yacht meeting took place on 14 October 2013 instead.

  110. [64] Wang submitted that the defendants belatedly changed their evidence in view of the Whatsapp messages sent by Goh on 15 October 2013, which discussed pricing the AMP shares to be sold to Wang at S$650 per share. If the yacht meeting had occurred on 14 October 2014, it would lend credence to the defendants’ argument that the discounted share price representation had not been made, since it would have been “illogical” for Goh to continue discussing a higher share price a day after the representation was made.

  111. [65] However, Goh pointed to several pieces of evidence purportedly showing that the yacht meeting took place on 14 October 2013:

  112. (a) First, email correspondence between Goh, Lee and Lin from 27 September 2013 to 13 October 2013 arranging for Wang and Sun to visit AMP’s office, the Paragon clinic and the PPP clinics on 14 October 2013. Lin also testified at trial to finding an electronic calendar invitation for the yacht meeting that was scheduled for 14 October 2013.

  113. (b) Second, it was unlikely that Wang and Sun’s visit to the AMP office, the Paragon clinic and the PPP clinics (which allegedly occurred on the same day as the yacht meeting) could have taken place on 15 October 2013 as the defendants realised that that day was a public holiday. According to Lee, it was unlikely that Wang would have visited AMP’s office on that day as there would be no air-conditioning in the office, and the Paragon clinic and the PPP clinics would also have been closed. Lee recalled that the Paragon clinic was open for “business as usual” on the day that Wang visited. Since the yacht meeting was on the same day as the initial visits, which must have been on 14 October 2013, the yacht meeting was therefore on 14 October 2013 too.

  114. (c) Third, there were emails and Whatsapp messages showing that the yacht meeting took place on 14 October 2013. First, on 14 October 2013 at 10.34pm, Goh discussed in an email to Lee and Lin his impression of Wang and Sun, stating, “This couple gives good vibes.” Second, a Whatsapp message sent from Lee to Goh on 14 October 2013 at 10.35pm stated that “[Wang and Sun] asking a lot of questions in car on share pricing. Definitely interested.” These suggested that Goh must have met Wang and Sun on 14 October 2013.

  115. I also note that Wang claimed to have visited AMP’s office on 15 October 2013 after collecting her Singapore Permanent Resident card on the same day. However, the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority would have been closed on 15 October 2013 as it was a public holiday.

  116. [66] On the other hand, even if Wang had visited AMP’s office, the Paragon clinic and the PPP clinics on 14 October 2013, it does not necessarily follow that the subsequent meeting at Goh’s yacht was on the same day and not on 15 October 2013, although the parties proceeded on the premise that the yacht meeting was on the same day.

  117. [67] There was evidence suggesting that the yacht meeting had eventually taken place on 15 October 2013 even though the earlier intention might have been to have it on 14 October 2013. Whatsapp messages were sent from Goh to Lee on 15 October 2013 discussing preparations for bringing Wang and Sun on board Goh’s yacht:

  118. The above exchange demonstrates that as of the afternoon of 15 October 2013, Goh and Lee were still making arrangements to have a meeting with Wang and Sun on board Goh’s yacht. This is strong evidence of the yacht meeting having taken place on 15 October 2013. When presented with the transcript of messages, Lee testified that Goh brought Wang and Sun on the yacht on both 14 and 15 October 2013 but acknowledged that there was no other evidence that there were meetings on two days on board the yacht.

  119. [68] In the circumstances, I am satisfied on a balance of probabilities that Wang and Sun had visited AMP’s office, the Paragon clinic and the PPP clinics on 14 October 2013 and that the yacht meeting took place on 15 October 2013. I would briefly add that although both sides seemed to proceed on the basis that Wang’s visits took place on the same day as the yacht meeting, the objective evidence pointed towards Wang having met Goh on both days (ie, 14 and 15 October 2013). Furthermore, the yacht meeting was on one day and not both days. It is unsurprising that both sides mistakenly proceeded on the premise that all the meetings, before the 1st MOU was signed, took place on the same day as the events occurred several years ago. They had overlooked the fact that 15 October 2013 was a public holiday and the emails of 15 October 2013 referring to an intended yacht meeting on 15 October 2013.

  120. [69] There was dispute about the substance of the Mandarin version of the 1st MOU (as amended) and who drafted it. Goh testified that the Mandarin versions that he agreed to had initially been drafted by one Chen Xiaoping. However, the Mandarin version of the 1st MOU (as amended) that he eventually signed was a “fraudulent Chinese edition” that had been amended by a person named Fu Kai. The issue of Fu Kai’s involvement in the events leading to the signing of the 1st MOU (as amended) was first raised at trial only when Goh gave oral testimony. Fu Kai was a Marubi employee who was apparently present at the 21 October 2013 meeting in Guangzhou but his/her exact role was disputed by the parties. Wang was not cross-examined about the identity and role of Fu Kai. When Goh and eventually Lin referred to Fu Kai in their testimonies, Wang’s position, through her counsel, was that Fu Kai was a female temporary staff who was not legally trained and who did not draft the Mandarin version of the 1st MOU (as amended). On the other hand, Lin stated that Fu Kai was a male and was Marubi’s in-house counsel. It is not necessary for me to conclude who Fu Kai was and that person’s role at the 21 October 2013 meeting because, in any event, I disbelieve Goh’s allegation that he did not understand the Mandarin version of the 1st MOU (as amended) that he signed. The allegation was not pleaded and was also only raised at a late stage, after Wang and Sun had given their evidence.

  121. [70] Goh’s allegation that he did not understand the Mandarin version of the 1st MOU (as amended) that he signed was also premised on his alleged lack of proficiency in Mandarin. However, I do not find that Goh’s command of Mandarin was as weak as he suggested, even though I accept that Lin did translate Mandarin terms to him during his discussions with Wang. Loh gave evidence that Goh was proficient in Mandarin and was accustomed to using complex Mandarin words and phrases in his communications and on social media. Loh provided evidence in the form of Facebook posts made by Goh containing Mandarin idioms and poems. As against this, Goh explained that he had obtained the various Mandarin idioms and poems using Google translation software. I do not accept this explanation. Mandarin idioms often convey ideas and concepts which are not readily ascertainable from their literal meaning. It does not appear to me likely that Goh obtained these idioms by translating his intended posts from English to Mandarin with the help of translation software. The use of such software would also not explain why some of Goh’s posts were in a mixture of Mandarin and English. If Goh had indeed been using translation software, it would have made more sense to have the entire post translated, rather than the part of it which was coincidentally translated into a Mandarin idiom. Furthermore, as noted in the plaintiff’s closing submissions, there was an instance of Goh reading out and translating Mandarin terms unaided during cross-examination. Taken together, I am satisfied that Goh was untruthful about his Mandarin ability which was actually fairly good. While he may not have had the proficiency of Lin or Wang, his proficiency in Mandarin was not as poor as he claimed. He was not as incapable of communicating in Mandarin as he was attempting to convey to the court.

  122. [71] I turn now to consider the other persons involved in the case. As stated above at [5], I find that even though it was Wang who entered into the 1st MOU (as amended) and the 2nd MOU, Sun had a substantial part to play in her decisions to do so. While Sun attempted to characterise his role as being essentially passive, with Wang making most of the decisions, this was not borne out by the evidence. Sun was present at all meetings between Wang and Goh and played an active role in negotiations, even by the account of Wang’s witness, Loh. Although some messages were sent between Lin and Wang, and Lee and Wang, it appears from internal emails exchanged between Goh, Lee and Lin that they regarded Sun as the chief decision-maker. To illustrate, an email on 16 October 2013 that was sent from Lee to Lin and Goh (copying Michelle) discussing a draft of the 1st MOU stated:

  123. Similarly, when discussing the sale of shares to Wang that was to be pursuant to the 2nd MOU, Lin sent an email to Loh, Lee and Goh on 14 September 2014 that indicated that it was important that Sun believed that the AMP shares were justifiably priced at S$450 per share:

  124. [72] It follows that Sun’s state of mind is relevant for the purposes of Wang’s misrepresentation claim in determining whether she was induced by any particular representation to enter into the 1st MOU (as amended) or the 2nd MOU. For convenience, this judgment will only refer to the representations as having been made to Wang. Such references to Wang alone should be understood to refer to both Wang and Sun, or to Wang alone but on the assumption that she would have discussed the matters with Sun in any event.

  125. [73] I also find that Lee and Lin were acting as Goh’s agents when they communicated with Wang on Goh’s sale of shares in AMP under the 1st MOU, the 1st MOU (as amended) and the 2nd MOU. This is relevant to Wang’s claim as a misrepresentation can be made on behalf of a principal by his agent: The Law of Contract in Singapore at para 11.008.

  126. [74] As for Lin, she was Wang’s relationship manager and an Executive Director at SCB (see the table at [4]). She resigned from SCB in 2014 and currently resides in Switzerland. On 27 June 2015, Lin corresponded with Wang’s solicitors via emails (which were admitted and marked as Exhibit P18), and discussed a meeting that she attended with Wang’s solicitors. It appears that Wang contacted Lin around this period to ask Lin to assist with Wang’s legal case against the defendants. Lin initially cooperated with Wang and executed a statutory declaration dated 23 July 2015 (“Lin’s SD”, admitted and marked as Exhibit P19). However, Lin was initially reluctant to be a witness for Wang and expressed a preference not to be involved in the legal proceedings. In 2019, Lin changed her mind and contacted Wang’s solicitors to ask if they needed her assistance, copying Goh. After Wang’s solicitors declined Lin’s offer, Goh’s solicitors approached Lin to ask if she was willing to testify for Goh. Lin eventually agreed to be a witness for Goh. She then swore an AEIC dated 21 May 2019 that was admitted at trial and gave oral testimony.

  127. [75] In her oral testimony, Lin made some amendments to her SD. Even then, Lin’s SD, as amended, differed in various aspects from the evidence in her AEIC and in her substantive testimony at trial, as I will elaborate below (see [92]). For instance, Lin sought to correct the use of certain terms in her SD, replacing “financial figures” (at para 29) with “numbers”, and “EBITDA” (at para 30) with “sales figures”. Although Lin explained that these errors occurred because she was unaware of the need for words to be “accurate” when she executed her SD, I do not find this convincing. As an investment banker holding the senior position of Executive Director at SCB, Lin would have been well-versed in financial concepts, particularly those such as EBITDA. She would also have been aware of the importance of ensuring that whatever she stated in her SD was accurate especially since she was aware that legal proceedings were afoot. It appears to me that Lin was attempting to temper the damage her SD might do to the defendants’ case in the guise of clarifying her evidence. The discrepancies between Lin’s SD and her later evidence led to Wang relying heavily on Lin’s SD to challenge the evidence in Lin’s AEIC and her oral evidence. Generally, I find Lin’s evidence as set out in her SD to be more credible than her evidence in her AEIC and at trial, especially given that she did not adequately explain her changes in position.

  128. [76] I briefly define the accounting terms as used by the parties. Goh’s evidence was that AMP sold its customers packages of a fixed number of skincare treatment sessions. The parties referred to two bases of accounting to calculate AMP’s revenue: (a) the “cash accounting” basis (which the parties also referred to as the “top line sales”, “cash sales” or “package sales” basis); and (b) the “accrual” basis. Which accounting basis was used would affect how AMP’s revenue was calculated:

  129. (a) Revenue calculated on a cash accounting basis takes reference to when cash is received from a customer. In this case, if the cash accounting basis were used, AMP would calculate revenue based on when its customers made lump sum advance payment for treatment packages even if they were yet to be redeemed.

  130. (b) On an accrual accounting basis, revenue is recognised by reference to the stage of completion of a transaction at the end of the reporting period. In this context, the revenue derived from the package sales would be deferred until AMP’s services were redeemed.

  131. [77] Revenue that is calculated on a cash accounting basis would generally be higher than that calculated on an accrual basis. The parties’ understanding of these accounting methods will be discussed further below.

  132. The 1st MOU (as amended)

  133. The misrepresentation claim

  134. [78] Wang’s claim against the defendants for misrepresentation in respect of the 1st MOU (as amended) was based on three alleged misrepresentations: the discounted share price representation; the no further sale of shares representation; and the AMP business growth representation. These alleged representations were made on 15 October 2013 on board Goh’s yacht, with the no further sale of shares representation being repeated on 21 October 2013 in Guangzhou (see [27]–[28] above).

  135. [79] It was not disputed that if Goh had made any of the representations which Wang allegedly relied on when she signed the 1st MOU, the representations and her reliance thereon would also apply to the 1st MOU (as amended). Indeed, there was no suggestion by Goh that if he had made any of the representations and Wang had relied on it, the reliance had ceased when the 1st MOU was signed by the parties thereto. Goh’s main defence was that he had not made any of the representations or that some of them were substantially true.

  136. [80] I address Wang’s contentions in relation to each alleged misrepresentation.

  137. (1) The discounted share price representation

  138. (A) Whether the discounted share price representation was made

  139. [81] I have found that the yacht meeting took place on 15 October 2013. The next issue to be determined is whether the discounted share price representation was made by Goh to Wang.

  140. [82] Wang and Sun were consistent in their testimony that it was Goh who made the discounted share price representation at the yacht meeting. While this was to be expected given that their interests were aligned, I prefer their evidence over that of Goh, whom I find to be an evasive and unreliable witness.

  141. [83] Goh’s testimony was that there was no discussion of AMP’s figures or financials at the yacht meeting as this was a first meeting with potential investors. During this meeting, he claimed to have relied on translations by Lin as he did not speak fluent Mandarin. The price of S$500 per share for 20,000 shares of AMP was only arrived at after the yacht meeting after Wang discussed the price with Lee and Lin.

  142. [84] Goh’s account that the discounted share price representation was not made relied heavily on two pieces of objective evidence:

  143. (a) First, in a Whatsapp message to Lee on 15 October 2013 at 2.39pm, Goh told Lee that “our 650 per share sounds cheap valuing us at near 200 m.”

  144. (b) Second, in an email to Lin on 15 October 2013 at 3.03pm, Goh stated that “with [Wang and Sun’s] recent sale of 10% of their co to LVMH for 50 m usd, our deal to them at 13m for 20k vendor shares is cheap …” Goh was referring to the fact that 10% of Marubi’s shares had been sold to LVMH for US$50m.

  145. [85] The defendants submitted that these messages suggested that as of about 3pm on 15 October 2013, Goh was still holding out for a sale of AMP’s shares to Wang at S$650 per share. As stated above, the defendants’ argument rested on the premise that the yacht meeting had taken place on 14 October 2013. If that were the case, these messages would be strong evidence that Goh did not make the discounted share price representation, as it would have been unlikely that he would have continued to discuss a higher share price a day after he allegedly represented to Wang that the shares would be sold at S$500. However, as I have found that the yacht meeting took place later in the evening of 15 October 2013, the correspondence relied on by Goh does not shed much light on whether the discounted share price representation was made.

  146. [86] I find that Goh’s credibility was severely undermined by his vacillating testimony at trial regarding the discussions between Wang and Goh and/or his agents (Lee and Lin) that led to the agreement on the final price of S$500 per share. As the plaintiff submitted, Goh gave seven versions at trial as to when he was informed that the price of shares was finalised. At one point, Goh stated that information on the purchase price and number of shares was only given to him on the morning of 16 October 2013 when they were included in a draft of the 1st MOU, only to say shortly thereafter that he received that information somewhere between 10pm on 15 October 2013 and the next morning.

  147. [87] Goh’s account that he was not involved in the share price discussions was also contradicted by the objective evidence before the court. As I have stated above, I do not believe that his proficiency in Mandarin was so poor that he could not converse in the language (see [70] above). Also, in a Whatsapp message to Lee at 10.14pm on 15 October 2013, Goh instructed Lee to prepare a sale and purchase agreement, together with the accompanying share transfer forms:

  148. This suggests that some form of in-principle agreement on price had been reached during the yacht meeting on 15 October 2013 at which Goh was present. It would otherwise make little sense for Goh to direct Loh to prepare the sale and purchase agreement at this juncture. I do not find Goh’s explanation that these were standard templates pending numbers being filled in to be convincing. It is unlikely that he would have asked Lee to prepare the 1st MOU first and that he would expect Wang to sign it the next morning with the share price yet to be determined.

  149. [88] Other objective evidence shows that the price at which Goh sold his shares to potential investors was extremely important to him. In an email on 2 August 2013 to Lin, Goh, while discussing the introduction of a potential investor, stated that the AMP shares should be “price[d] at 500 per share to achieve a new benchmark for our investors”. Similarly, in Whatsapp messages and emails sent on 15 October 2013, Goh discussed with Lee and Lin the possibility of selling 20,000 shares to Wang at S$650 per share.

  150. [89] The evidence also does not support Goh’s contention that his modus operandi was not to discuss AMP’s figures or financials at the first main meeting with potential investors. This is plainly contradicted by the objective evidence:

  151. (a) First, in Goh’s Whatsapp messages and emails on 15 October 2013 that were discussed in the preceding paragraph, he had discussed selling shares in AMP to Wang at S$650 per share.

  152. (b) Second, in emails from an earlier unrelated transaction where Lin introduced other potential Chinese investors to Goh, he conveyed that he was willing to sell his shares at S$700 per share and made arrangements for a presentation on board his yacht. This was done without having first met these investors at an introductory meeting.

  153. [90] While Goh would have the court believe that he would screen his investors thoroughly before allowing them to invest in AMP, it is clear that no such practice existed. Also, it is apparent from the evidence above that AMP’s share price was a matter of great concern to Goh. As such, I do not believe that he was not involved in the discussions regarding share pricing. Lin’s testimony at trial that there was another meeting between Goh and Wang where the latter bid S$500 per share while Goh passively listened is unbelievable, appearing in neither her SD nor her AEIC. In any event, even if Lin or Lee had made the representation to Wang, they would have done so on Goh’s behalf as his agents (see above at [73]), and any representation by them would still be attributed to him.

  154. [91] Importantly, Lin’s SD corroborates the evidence given by Wang and Sun that Goh made the discounted share price representation at the yacht meeting. Paragraph 33 of her SD states:

  155. [92] However, in her AEIC Lin recanted the version of events in her SD. The differences between the two accounts are set out as follows:

  156. [93] At trial, Lin corrected the version of events set out in her AEIC and stated that the yacht meeting took place on 14 October 2013 instead of 15 October 2013. She maintained that Goh mentioned that he had sold AMP shares to other doctors and minority shareholders at S$600–S$700 per share only in the context of explaining AMP’s employee incentivisation scheme. She elaborated that there was no discussion on the price of S$500 per share on board the yacht. It was only after the yacht meeting that Lin suggested to Wang that S$500 per share was a good price. There was a follow-up meeting the next day on 15 October 2013 where Wang suggested that she was going to bid S$500 for AMP’s shares, to which Goh merely listened passively with no response.

  157. [94] As stated above at [74] and [75], I find the evidence in Lin’s SD to be more credible than her account at trial. It is clear to me that Lin was not being truthful on disputed matters when giving her AEIC and oral testimony and that she was attempting to tailor her evidence to suit Goh’s case. Lin was also unable to offer any explanation as to why her account of the yacht meeting changed so radically between the time she gave her SD and when she executed her AEIC and testified at trial beyond saying that she was unaware of the importance of being accurate in her SD.

  158. [95] I now turn to consider Lee’s evidence. While Lee’s evidence largely corroborated that of Goh’s, I do not think that that strengthened the latter’s case. Like Lin, Lee appeared to be tailoring his evidence to suit that of Goh’s in an attempt to portray a consistent account. For example, Lee echoed Goh’s account that the latter had to rely on Lin’s translations to communicate with Wang at the yacht meeting even though, as I found above at [70], Goh was actually able to converse in Mandarin. Lee was also found at trial to have what appeared to be a prepared script of answers to issues which may arise at cross-examination. I do not accept Lee’s explanation that they were simply notes he had prepared for re-examination. At the time the note was discovered on 28 May 2019 (which was admitted and marked as Exhibit P17), Lee’s cross-examination had only covered events relating to the 1st MOU (as amended). Exhibit P17, however, contains references to events relevant only to the 2nd MOU. This cast doubts on the reliability of Lee’s evidence and whether the notes were truly his own. I thus give little weight to Lee’s evidence.

  159. [96] Finally, the discounted share price representation would explain how the price of S$500 was arrived at between Wang and Goh.

  160. [97] In the circumstances, I am satisfied that Wang has proved on a balance of probabilities that the discounted share price representation was made by Goh to her at the yacht meeting on 15 October 2013.

  161. (B) Whether the discounted share price representation was false

  162. [98] The discounted share price representation was false. It is undisputed that at the time the 1st MOU (as amended) was entered into on 21 October 2013, Goh had never sold any AMP shares for a price as high as S$600 or S$700.

  163. (C) Whether the discounted share price representation made with intention that Wang would act upon it

  164. [99] I am of the view that the discounted share price representation was made with the intention that Wang would act upon it. By representing to Wang that he had previously sold shares in AMP for a higher price (ie, S$600–700 per share) and that he was willing to sell her shares at a discounted price of S$500, the irresistible inference to be drawn is that Goh intended to induce Wang to purchase shares in AMP at a higher price than she might have agreed to by giving her the impression that she was getting a good bargain.

  165. (D) Whether Wang acted on the discounted share price representation

  166. [100] I also find that Wang relied on the discounted share price representation in entering into the 1st MOU (as amended). Wang was not challenged during cross-examination about her reliance on the discounted share price representation. In closing submissions, Goh submitted that Wang did not rely on the discounted share price representation as: (a) Lin had previously disclosed to Wang that Lin herself had purchased AMP shares for S$350 each; (b) Wang was financially savvy and a highly successful businesswoman who would have asked for proof of historical transactions if they were important to her; and (c) the yacht meeting was the first time Wang met Goh and she had no reason to trust him.

  167. [101] While I accept that Wang might not have been so naïve as to accept the discounted share price representation at face value, the failure to put each of these points to Wang and to cross-examine her on her alleged reliance was fatal to Goh’s case as it violates the rule in Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 (“the rule in Browne v Dunn”).

  168. [102] The ambit of the rule in Browne v Dunn was considered by the Court of Appeal in Sudha Natrajan v The Bank of East Asia Ltd [2017] 1 SLR 141 at [48]:

  169. [103] It is evident from the Court of Appeal’s decision that the rule in Browne v Dunn is essentially one of fairness; a party should not be permitted to advance a case that the witness has not had an opportunity to rebut.

  170. [104] Furthermore, I have found that Goh was trying to induce Wang to agree to a price higher than what she might otherwise have agreed to when he made the representation. In the light of that, it was not open to Goh to suggest that Wang did not in fact rely on the representation, without more.

  171. [105] While Wang’s counsel also failed to cross-examine Lin on her claim of having told Wang in or around 2012 that she had purchased AMP shares for S$350 per share, this does not go towards proving or disproving Wang’s reliance on the discounted share price representation and could not remedy the flaws in Goh’s case.

  172. [106] In summary, at trial, Goh’s counsel had focussed on the argument that the representation was not made and had not raised the point of non-reliance by Wang even if the representation had been made.

  173. (E) Whether the discounted share price representation was made fraudulently

  174. [107] I am satisfied that the discounted share price representation was made fraudulently by Goh.

  175. [108] The following passage from Spencer Bower at para 5.03 illustrates when a misrepresentation will be found to be fraudulent:

  176. Goh would have been aware that he had never sold AMP shares for S$600–S$700 per share at the time the discounted share price representation was made. The highest price at which he had previously sold AMP shares was S$350 per share. Goh would have known that the discounted share price representation was false when he made it; he acted fraudulently in so making it.

  177. [109] It follows that Wang has made out her claim against Goh for fraudulent misrepresentation in respect of the discounted share price representation.

  178. [110] I would add that even if I did not find that Goh had made the discounted share price representation fraudulently, a claim would still have been available to Wang under the MA. However, as she has made out her claim in fraudulent misrepresentation, I need not say more.

  179. (2) The no further sale of shares representation

  180. [111] Wang’s misrepresentation claim succeeds as long as the legal elements for one of the three alleged misrepresentations are made out. I have found that the requirements for misrepresentation in relation to the discounted share price representation have been fulfilled. Nonetheless, I consider Wang’s case on the no further sale of shares representation and the AMP business growth representation for completeness.

  181. [112] Wang’s pleaded case was that the no further sale of shares representation comprised the following representations:

  182. (a) Goh represented to Wang at the yacht meeting on 15 October 2013 that if she invested in AMP, he would not sell any of his AMP shares until AMP was listed on the Singapore Exchange (“SGX”).

  183. (b) On 21 October 2013, Goh represented to Wang at the meeting in Guangzhou that he would not sell any more of his AMP shares without her permission.

  184. [113] Wang pleaded that it was implied through these two representations that Goh did not intend to sell any of his shares in AMP without Wang’s consent until AMP was listed on the SGX. However, he in fact did intend to sell his AMP shares without her consent. He failed to inform Wang at the material time that he had entered into prior agreements with Julian Leslie Reis and Star Titanic which would require him to sell or transfer his AMP shares (see above at [14]).

  185. [114] As mentioned above at [54], a representation must relate to a fact which has occurred or which exists. The alleged no further sale of shares representation, in so far as it was a promise as to future conduct (ie, to refrain from selling shares in AMP without Wang’s permission), could not amount to a representation in law unless it was a statement as to Goh’s intention not to sell his AMP shares in the future.

  186. [115] In closing submissions, Wang put forward an alternative framing of the no further sale of shares representation, asserting that (a) Goh caused to be represented to Wang that he held 121,789 shares in AMP; and (b) his failure to disclose the two agreements with the potential to reduce his shareholdings in AMP (see above at [14]) constituted a misrepresentation by silence which gave rise to a duty to disclose the existence of the contracts to Wang. Wang argued that Goh’s failure to disclose those agreements rendered the initial representation untrue, or at least a half-truth. The defendants responded that Wang did not plead that she relied on Goh’s representation as to his shareholding of 121,789 shares in AMP when entering into the 1st MOU (as amended). I agree with the defendants that this alternative framing of the no further sale of shares representation should not be considered as it was not pleaded.

  187. [116] I now consider if the elements for misrepresentation are made out as regards the representation framed in the pleadings.

  188. (A) Whether the no further sale of shares representation was made

  189. [117] I find that Wang has proved that the no further sale of shares representation was made on 21 October 2013. Goh’s representation that he would not sell AMP shares in the future without Wang’s permission contained an implied representation that he had no intention of selling AMP shares without Wang’s permission at the time.

  190. [118] As with the discounted share price representation, Wang and Sun’s evidence was consistent that Goh represented that he would not sell his shares in AMP prior to AMP’s listing on the SGX during the yacht meeting and on 21 October 2013. Their evidence was importantly corroborated by Lin’s SD at para 49 as regards the meeting on 21 October 2013 (as amended by Lin at trial):

  191. [119] Lin’s SD corroborates Wang and Sun’s evidence as to the representation that Goh allegedly made in Guangzhou on 21 October 2013. I thus find that Wang has discharged her burden of proving that such a representation was made on 21 October 2013. However, Wang has not proved that a similar representation was earlier made during the yacht meeting on 15 October 2013.

  192. [120] The incorporation of the no further sale of shares representation in cl 7 of the 1st MOU (as amended) (as reproduced above at [34]) also supports Wang’s case that the representation was made at least on 21 October 2013. This clause was not included in the earlier 1st MOU.

  193. [121] Goh submitted that the mere fact that cl 7 incorporated an obligation similar to that under the no further sale of share representation did not mean that he made the representation. He further argued that it could not be that every term in a contract would be the subject of a misrepresentation claim, since this would blur the distinction between tortious and contractual remedies. This submission misses the point. A mere representation is not a contractual term. It is only where Goh falsely represented that he in fact did not intend to sell the shares in the future and where the other limbs of fraudulent misrepresentation are made out that Wang is entitled to rescission. Contractual remedies and any breach of contract by Goh would then cease to be an issue.

  194. (B) Whether the no further sale of shares representation was false

  195. [122] The next question is whether Goh’s statement that he intended not to sell his shares in AMP in the future was false. Wang argued that the representation was false as Goh had existing obligations under the call option with Julian Leslie Reis and the share purchase agreement with Star Titanic (see above at [14]) to sell a total of 52,895 shares, which he did not disclose to her.

  196. [123] The defendants argued that even if the no further sale of shares representation were made, it did not cover the sale or transfers of shares pursuant to Goh’s pre-existing legal obligations. In any event, Goh was not aware that the call option would be exercised at the time.

  197. [124] At trial, Goh was asked whether he recalled in October 2013 that he had obligations to transfer his shares in AMP if the call option were exercised:

  198. [125] Goh was also asked about his knowledge of the outstanding transfers under the share purchase agreement on 21 October 2013. By this date, the transfer of the first tranche of 30,000 shares had been completed, but the transfer of the second tranche of 20,000 was still outstanding:

  199. [126] It is clear from Goh’s testimony that when he implicitly represented on 21 October 2013 that he did not intend to sell his shares in AMP in the future, that representation was false. I find, to the contrary, that he intended to sell his shares pursuant to the share purchase agreement, and that he intended to sell his shares under the call option if the option was exercised by Reis after the 1st MOU (as amended) was entered into.

  200. [127] While Goh claimed that the call option and the share purchase agreement were not at the forefront of his mind on 21 October 2013, I do not believe him. The deed of novation for the call option was dated 8 May 2013 and the share purchase agreement was dated 6 September 2013. These dates were sufficiently proximate to 21 October 2013 that it is more likely than not that Goh would have had them in mind.

  201. [128] By Goh’s own account, he told Wang during the yacht meeting that he “made strategic sacrifices to sell shares to various people and that was articulated to her without specific [sic]”. When asked why he did not tell Wang about the call option or the share purchase agreement, his only response was that he would have told Wang about these agreements if she had asked about them. This was an unreasonable position for Goh to take given that Wang had no reason to know or suspect that there were any specific or relevant agreements in force. Goh’s evidence indicates to me that he did have in mind the call option and share purchase agreement when he made the no further sale of shares representation on 21 October 2013, and that he intended to sell his shares in AMP after the 1st MOU (as amended) was entered into.

  202. (C) Whether the no further sale of shares representation was made with the intention that Wang would act upon it

  203. [129] Wang’s evidence in her AEIC was that Goh “said that if [Wang and Sun] bought his shares, he would not sell any more of his shares in [AMP] to other people prior to listing”. Lin’s SD also stated at paras 44 and 46 as follows:

  204. It was in this context that the no further sale of shares representation was made (see also Lin’s SD at para 49 as reproduced above at [118]).

  205. [130] Having accepted Wang’s evidence and Lin’s evidence in her SD, the irresistible inference to be drawn is that Goh made the no further sale of shares representation with the intention to induce Wang’s entry into the 1st MOU (as amended).

  206. (D) Whether Wang acted on the no further sale of shares representation

  207. [131] Wang claimed she informed Goh that she and Sun did not want Goh “to sell anymore of his shares to anyone since … he was the main driver and person behind [AMP]”, and that Goh made the representation in response to her concerns. Wang was not challenged on this at trial.

  208. [132] The defendants submitted that Wang did not rely on this representation, as she did not know how many shares Goh had in AMP at the time of the alleged representation. The defendants also argued that Wang knew that Goh sold AMP shares to his employees pursuant to an incentivisation scheme, and she could not have relied on Goh’s statement that he did not intend to sell any shares.

  209. [133] I prefer Wang’s evidence to Goh’s and find that she did rely on the no further sale of shares representation. Even if Wang had been aware of any incentivisation scheme, the representation here concerned Goh’s statement that he did not intend to sell his AMP shares, which was rendered false by his intention to sell his shares pursuant to the call option and the share purchase agreement.

  210. (E) Whether the no further sale of shares representation was made fraudulently

  211. [134] As I have found above, Goh was aware at the time he made the representation that he would: (a) sell the second tranche of 20,000 shares in AMP to Star Titanic pursuant to the share purchase agreement; and (b) sell 32,895 shares in AMP pursuant to the call option if it were exercised. He deliberately omitted to bring these agreements to Wang’s knowledge. At best, he made the representation as to his intent not to sell the shares with reckless indifference as to its truth or falsity (see [108] above). This fulfils the final element for fraudulent misrepresentation in respect of the no further sale of shares representation.

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