High Court · Decided 27 February 2019
MCH International Pte Ltd and others v YG Group Pte Ltd and others and other suits
Feedback & support[2019] SGHC 43 · Case no. Suits No 107 of 2017
✱ What happened, in plain English
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Official text from eLitigation
Introduction
- [1]
[1] These four suits arise out of a joint venture to acquire certain Chinese companies in the cold chain logistics business (“the Target Companies”). The Target Companies were owned by a Singapore registered company, Yong Gui Investment Pte Ltd (“YGIPL”). The plan of the two key players, Henry Wong Kok Hwee and Simon Liong Chung Yee, was to acquire YGIPL, and to deploy a core group of personnel experienced in cold chain logistics, led by Mr Wong, to exploit its business potential. YG Group Pte Ltd (“YGG”) was incorporated in Singapore on 27 January 2015 for this purpose. The two shareholders of YGG were YG Logistics Pte Ltd (“YGL”), a company whose majority shareholder is Mactron Holdings Pte Ltd (“Mactron”), an investment holding company in which Mr Liong is a shareholder and the sole director; and MCH International Pte Ltd (“MCH”), a company whose majority shareholder is Mr Wong.
- [2]
[2] In Suit No 104 of 2016, YGL first sued Mr Wong and MCH for an alleged failure to deploy certain personnel to YGG as promised. Subsequently in Suit No 337 of 2016, YGL sued MCH, Mr Wong and his wife in relation to a S$4,500,000 loan made to MCH. YGG then sued Mr Wong in Suit No 80 of 2017 for breach of his directors’ duties. Finally, Mr Wong brought Suit No 107 of 2017 alleging conspiracy and requesting the court to wind up YGG. These were the four suits that were tried together.
Background
- [3]
[3] The Target Companies were owned by Lim Chee Kian, Cai Yong Cheng and Koh Chaik Ming (“the Vendors”). Mr Wong was first introduced to the Vendors in 2013. In-depth discussions between Mr Wong and Mr Lim commenced in early 2014 to structure a trade sale. Pursuant to these discussions, the Vendors incorporated YGIPL, and transferred control of the Target Companies to YGIPL for the purposes of acquisition.
- [4]
[4] Sometime in November 2014, Mr Wong presented a business plan to Mr Liong. The plan proposed the setting up of a joint venture company to acquire the Target Companies. The “information pack” prepared by Mr Wong contained detailed profiles of Dennis Seen, Lou Lin and Maglin Chng, who were identified as “Industry Veterans and key specialists” in the cold chain logistics industry. Mr Wong proposed that he could, together with the three individuals introduced, form a core management team which would make the Target Companies more profitable. Mr Wong also introduced Mr Liong to Mas Iskandar, an individual whom Mr Wong described as having extensive experience in the logistics field and an ideal candidate to be a neutral director for the proposed joint venture.
- [5]
[5] Mr Liong expressed interest, and parties negotiated between December 2014 and January 2015. Mr Wong required a loan of S$4,000,000 to be made to MCH, to enable MCH to have sufficient cash to put in its initial contribution to the joint venture. Mr Wong explained to Mr Liong that he needed cash as his assets were tied up at the time. Because this placed the financial risk of the venture wholly on Mr Liong, Mr Liong emphasised that in the circumstances he needed full confidence on the due diligence that was to be conducted on the Target Companies. Mr Wong reassured Mr Liong that he had 14 years of industry and mergers & acquisitions experience and the firms he had chosen to lead the financial and legal due diligence were “the best in the market”.
- [6]
[6] In a meeting on 19 January 2015, the parties recorded their agreement on several key terms:
(a) The purchase price for the acquisition of the Target Companies would be US$11,000,000.
(b) A joint venture company would be incorporated in Singapore for the purposes of acquiring the Target Companies. MCH would own 70% of the shares in the joint venture company, and YGL would own the remaining 30% of shares.
(c) Mr Wong, would take the lead in “hiring and forming the Core Management Team” which would be “responsible for the overall management” of the joint venture company’s business and operations in China. The “Core Management Team” included Mr Wong, Mr Seen, Mr Lou, Ms Chng and an employee of Mactron, Michael Ang Chee Siong. Mr Seen, Mr Lou and Ms Chng would be hired by MCH and seconded to the joint venture company. Mr Ang would be hired directly by the joint venture company.
(d) YGL would extend a loan of up to S$4,000,000 to MCH “to assist MCH for its portion of the purchase price”, and this would be secured by the guarantees of two directors of MCH, namely, Mr Wong and his wife, Madam Sing Lee Mee Yoke (“Mrs Wong”). The first disbursement of the loan would be in January 2015, in the amount of S$500,000. This was to help MCH cover the cost of, inter alia, legal and financial due diligence expenses, and the payment for the deployment cost of the core management team members. In the event that the financial due diligence was unsatisfactory, MCH would return the S$500,000. If the financial due diligence was satisfactory, the rest of the loan would be disbursed according to a specified disbursement schedule.
- [7]
[7] On 27 January 2015, YGG was incorporated and Mr Wong was appointed as the managing director. Mr Liong was appointed a director, and Mr Iskandar took on the role of a “neutral director” and chairman of the YGG board.
- [8]
[8] Parties then entered into a series of written contracts to reflect their agreement, including:
(a) A Shareholders Agreement dated 29 January 2015 between YGG, YGL and MCH.
(b) A Subscription Agreement dated 29 January 2015 between YGG, YGL and MCH.
(c) A Call Option Agreement dated 29 January 2015 between YGL and MCH.
(d) A Deed of Undertakings dated 29 January 2015. The Deed of Undertakings contained, inter alia, an undertaking to “procure” Mr Seen, Mr Lou and Ms Chng to be hired by MCH and seconded to YGG.
(e) A Loan Agreement dated 29 January 2015 between YGL and MCH. Clause 7.1 of the Loan Agreement stated that MCH would be obliged to return all outstanding loan amounts if YGL did not wish to proceed with the proposed acquisition of the Target Companies, upon completion of due diligence.
(f) A Deed of Personal Guarantee dated 29 January 2015, by which Mr and Mrs Wong guaranteed the payment obligations of MCH under the Loan Agreement.
- [9]
[9] The scope of a last document required discussion between parties. This was a deed of share charge signed by YGL and MCH on 30 January 2015 and dated 19 August 2015 (“the Deed of Share Charge”). The Deed of Share Charge was registered with the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority of Singapore (“ACRA”) on 1 September 2015. The purpose of the Deed of Share Charge was to secure the loan granted by YGL to MCH with a charge over MCH’s shares in the joint venture company. Clause 3.8 of the Deed of Share Charge granted YGL the right to “exercise (in the name of [MCH] and without any further consent or authority on the part of [MCH]) any and all rights with respect to the [charged shares]”, including the voting rights of the charged shares. In an email dated 25 January 2015, Mr Wong requested that Mr Liong insert a clause into the Deed of Share Charge which would qualify clause 3.8 and only allow YGL to exercise voting rights in MCH’s shares in the “event of a default”. Mr Liong responded in an email dated 28 January 2015 (“the 28 January 2015 Email”), stating that even though MCH’s shares were pledged to YGL, he would not interfere with the operations or obstruct Mr Wong in discharging his duties. The effect of the 28 January 2015 Email is in contention in these suits.
- [11]
[11] On 29 January 2015, Mr Wong emailed Mr Liong, Mr Iskandar and the core management team with a copy of the financial due diligence report (“First Due Diligence Report”) for up to October 2014, prepared by a company called Shanghai Certified Public Accountants (“SCPA”) in respect of the Target Companies. The original First Due Diligence Report was written in Mandarin, and Mr Wong forwarded a copy that was translated by SCPA into English.
- [12]
[12] Mr Wong then proceeded to finalise the acquisition with the Vendors. Throughout the negotiation process, the negotiations were managed by Mr Wong. On the side of the Vendors, Mr Lim was the primary point of contact. The other two Vendors were not active in the negotiations.
- [13]
[13] As a condition for the transfer of full control as suggested by the Initial Acquisition Model, the Vendors required YGG to provide security in the form of banker’s guarantees for the second and third tranche amounts of US$5,000,000 and US$4,000,000. MCH was, however, unable to provide banker’s guarantees for MCH’s portion of the second and third tranche payments. Parties therefore agreed on an amended plan (the “Revised Acquisition Model”). In the Revised Acquisition Model, no security was necessary. The Target Companies were to be purchased in two phases, with full control of the companies deferred to the second phase. The first tranche would be a payment of US$4,400,000 for 40% of the issued share capital in YGIPL with an option to purchase the remaining 60% for US$6,600,000 within 12 months. By 30 March 2015, Mr Wong and Mr Lim had reached in-principle agreement on key terms of the acquisition. A first draft of the Share Purchase Agreement between YGG and YGIPL was sent to Mr Wong on 28 April 2015.
- [15]
[15] Sometime in July 2015, Mr Wong mentioned to Mr Liong that he had found a private equity investment firm, KV Asia Capital Pte Ltd (“KV Asia”) which had expressed interest in participating in the joint venture. While Mr Wong proposed to involve KV Asia in their deal, Mr Liong did not follow up on this proposal.
- [16]
[16] On 4 August 2015, Mr Liong received an email from Mr Wong attaching a document titled “Yong Gui Investment – Commission Letter 150730”. The document appeared to be a commission agreement between Mr Wong and the Vendors. Mr Wong sent a further email on 5 August 2015 at 1.12am that stated:
Mr Liong replied on 8 August 2015 thanking Mr Wong for his openness and integrity.
- [18]
[18] Arising from the change in the acquisition model and to the loan between YGL and MCH, amendments to the written contracts the parties had signed in January 2015 became necessary. Several amendment agreements were executed, including:
(a) An Amendment Agreement (in respect of the Shareholders Agreement) dated 18 August 2015.
(b) An Amendment Agreement (in respect of the Subscription Agreement) dated 18 August 2015.
(c) An Amendment Agreement (in respect of the Call Option Agreement) dated 18 August 2015.
(d) An Amendment Agreement (in respect of the Loan Agreement) dated 18 August 2015. The total loan amount was amended to be S$450,000.
(e) A Side Deed (in respect of the Deed of Personal Guarantee) dated 18 August 2015.
The Deed of Undertakings dated 29 January 2015 was not amended.
- [19]
[19] The Sale and Purchase Agreement (“SPA”) between YGG and the Vendors was executed on 19 August 2015. Under the SPA:
(a) On 19 August 2015, YGG purchased 40% of YGIPL shares from the Vendors for US$4,400,000;
(b) YGG was granted a Purchaser’s Call Option to purchase the remaining 60% of YGIPL shares from the Vendors at the price of US$6,600,000. YGG could exercise this option by issuing the Purchaser’s Exercise Notice to the Vendors by no later than 19 August 2016, failing which the Purchaser’s Call Option would lapse;
(c) In the event that YGG did not successfully exercise the Purchaser’s Call Option, the Vendors were granted a Vendors’ Call Option to buy back the initial 40% of YGIPL shares purchased by YGG for US$3,960,000, a 10% discount on the purchase price paid by YGG;
(d) Under clauses 7.1, 7.7 and 7.8 of the SPA, YGG was granted certain benefits between the completion of the SPA and the exercise of the Purchaser’s Call Option (“the SPA benefits”) including the rights to:
(i) Nominate two persons to be appointed as directors of YGIPL;
(ii) Nominate one person to be a signatory for YGIPL’s bank accounts for amounts in excess of RMB10,000;
(iii) Nominate an Understudy to Ms Mao; and
(iv) Have the wages and accommodation of the Understudy be paid for by YGIPL.
- [20]
[20] In a manner complementing the SPA, the subscription of shares in YGG by MCH and YGL was also designed to be effected in two tranches. The first tranche corresponded to the entry into the SPA and the second tranche corresponded to the exercise of the Purchaser’s Call Option. The total subscription payments received by YGG in each tranche matched the amount that was due to the Vendors in each tranche. In this way, YGG would have had enough cash to pay the Vendors for the shares in YGIPL. For the first tranche, MCH was obliged to subscribe to US$2,859,950 worth of shares, and for the second tranche, MCH was obliged to subscribe to US$4,290,000 worth of shares. The combined effect of the Loan Agreement (as amended on 18 August 2015) and the SPA was that the cash for YGG’s purchase of the first 40% of the YGIPL shares came entirely from YGL.
- [21]
[21] Without Mr Liong’s knowledge, on the same date the SPA was executed, Mr Wong also signed three further documents (which I shall refer to collectively as the “Secret Arrangements”):
(a) A letter written by Mr Lim on behalf of the Vendors, which promised to Mr Wong a commission of US$380,000, for the referral of YGG to the acquisition deal (“the Commission Letter”). The commission was expressed to be paid in two tranches, the first being US$300,000 upon YGG’s purchase of 40% of the YGIPL shares, the second being US$80,000 upon YGG’s purchase of the balance of the YGIPL shares. (I shall refer to this arrangement as the “Secret Commission Agreement”); and
(b) Two declarations of trust, one in favour of Mr Lim and the other in favour of Ms Mao. These declarations purported to create trusts over shares in MCH in favour of Mr Lim and Ms Mao. (I shall refer to these as the “Secret Trust Deeds”).
Mr Wong received US$300,000 pursuant to the Commission Letter approximately nine days later.
- [22]
[22] On 25 August 2015, Mr Liong sent an email to Mr Wong and Mr Iskandar proposing to amend the Memorandum and Articles of Association of YGG to bring them in line with the Shareholders Agreement (as amended on 18 August 2015). No response was given; subsequent requests were also ignored. On 28 August 2015, Mr Wong discovered that Mr Liong had amended the terms of the SPA at the last minute, such that in the event the Vendors exercised the Vendors’ Call Option, the purchase money would be paid to YGL instead of YGG. Mr Wong was deeply unhappy about this change, and Mr Wong and Mr Liong had an exchange on this issue via email.
- [24]
[24] On 3 October 2015, Mr Wong sent an email with a Letter of Offer from KV Asia dated 2 October 2015 (“KV Asia Offer”) to Mr Liong. In the KV Asia Offer, KV Asia proposed to inject more capital into YGG, to allow YGG to purchase other companies in the logistics industry on top of YGIPL in exchange for shares in YGG. This would have resulted in a dilution of YGL’s shareholding in YGG. The deal also involved two individuals by the name of Troy Shortell and Paraj Kakkar. They were Mr Wong’s “acquisition advisors” and were directors in a consultancy company called Assurance Box Pte Ltd (“ABPL”).
- [25]
[25] Mr Wong strenuously tried to persuade Mr Liong to accept the offer, but Mr Liong was hesitant to do so. In Mr Liong’s view, the KV Asia Offer would have benefited individuals or entities close to Mr Wong (such as Mr Iskandar, all the members of the core management team except for Mr Ang, and Mr Wong’s acquisition advisors) at the expense of YGL. It involved a dilution of YGL’s share in YGG, while MCH and a company owned by Mr Shortell would enjoy share premiums. The core management team would benefit from additional management incentives, but Mr Ang was left out of any such incentives. Mr Iskandar would be made President Director of one of the other logistics companies while Mr Liong would lose his seat on the Board of Directors of YGG. In an email dated 20 October 2015 sent at 9.08pm, Mr Liong refused the KV Asia Offer. Within that email he listed several reasons why he felt the offer was a bad deal for YGL. He expressed the view that YGL was being short changed by the deal while MCH would enjoy “huge premiums”. Mr Liong stated that Mr Wong’s attempt to pressure him into signing the deal suggested that Mr Wong was “not look[ing] after [his] interest as [his] partner in [YGG]”.
- [26]
[26] Mr Wong replied in an email sent on the same day at 11.26pm. He stated that Mr Liong’s “argument [was] very one sided”. He gave his reasons why the deal was a fair one for all parties and listed several instances where he felt Mr Liong had not acted as a good partner in their joint investment. After receiving this email and several related WhatsApp messages in a similar vein from Mr Wong, Mr Liong was concerned that Mr Wong was going to abandon the joint venture, make a deal with KV Asia without him and take away the core management team that was promised to YGG.
- [27]
[27] In an attempt to resolve the situation, Mr Ang and Mr Iskandar jointly came up with a modified version of the KV Asia Offer. The intent was to create a deal that would satisfy both Mr Wong and Mr Liong. This was presented by Mr Ang and Mr Iskandar to Mr Wong at a meeting on 25 October 2015. However, during the meeting, Mr Wong instead confirmed that he was no longer intent on pursuing the KV Asia Offer and the acquisition of YGIPL would proceed as planned.
- [28]
[28] On 6 November 2015, Mr Liong sent an email reminding Mr Wong that the parties had planned to exercise the Purchaser’s Call Option around September and October 2015, and this date was later pushed to December 2015. Mr Liong expressed the desire to not have the exercise of the Purchaser’s Call Option pushed back any further. He also reminded Mr Wong that they had envisioned that Mr Ang, Mr Seen and Mr Lou would be involved in YGG’s operations shortly after the signing of the SPA, but this had yet to be done. Mr Wong did not want to exercise the Purchaser’s Call Option by December, stating in a WhatsApp group conversation between Mr Wong, Mr Liong, Mr Iskandar and Mr Ang on 19 November 2015 that “[u]nless asset tagging is done, unless I am comfortable of the business, we should not exercise”.
- [29]
[29] On 15 December 2015, Mr Ang started travelling across various cities in China to conduct the asset tagging of the Target Companies. Mr Ang completed the asset tagging exercise on 22 December 2015.
- [31]
[31] Mr Liong was not impressed with these reasons. He sent an email on 26 January 2016 giving Mr Wong a deadline of 29 January 2016 to second the core management team to YGG. The parties could not resolve their dispute and on 3 February 2016, YGL commenced Suit 104/2016 against MCH and Mr Wong for various breaches under the Deed of Undertakings, primarily for the failure to hire and second the core management team to YGG.
- [32]
[32] On 16 February 2016, YGG held a board meeting attended by Mr Iskandar, Mr Wong, Mr Liong and Mr Ang. In the meeting, Mr Wong put forward his position that YGG would not exercise the Purchaser’s Call Option until a second financial due diligence exercise (“Second Due Diligence”), commenced by the same auditors who led the first financial due diligence exercise, was completed. The Second Due Diligence could only commence after 15 March 2016, as the particular auditors that Mr Wong wanted to lead the due diligence exercise was not available till that date. Mr Liong objected to a delay in the due diligence exercise and expressed the view that the Purchaser’s Call Option had to be exercised as soon as possible. Mr Wong’s rebuttal was that it was his duty as the Managing Director of YGG to ensure that proper due diligence was done before exercising the option. Mr Wong noted several concerns found in the YGIPL’s financial reports that he felt needed to be addressed before the exercise of the option.
- [33]
[33] In late February 2016, without Mr Liong’s knowledge, Mr Shortell and Mr Kakkar approached a company by the name of Yang Kee Logistics Pte Ltd (“YKL”), to solicit for the potential acquisition of YGIPL.
- [34]
[34] In the meantime, Mr Liong did not agree with Mr Wong’s reasons for the refusal to exercise the Purchaser’s Call Option and suspected that it was a further attempt to stymie the acquisition process. He was concerned that if the Purchaser’s Call Option lapsed, the Vendors would buy back the 40% of YGIPL at a 10% discount, causing loss to YGG. He was also worried that given that Mr Seen had yet to be deployed to Shanghai, there would be insufficient time left for YGG to learn and take over the business of the Target Companies. Mr Liong resolved to take control of the situation. He emailed his desire to have YGG be immediately involved in the operations of the Target Companies, by having Mr Ang be deployed to China in Mr Seen’s intended role, since Mr Seen had yet to be seconded to YGG. However, Mr Wong rejected this suggestion. Mr Wong and Mr Liong also sparred over whether the Second Due Diligence needed to be conducted before YGG exercised the Purchasers’ Call Option.
- [35]
[35] On 18 March 2016, YGL purported to exercise its rights under clause 3.8 of the Deed of Share Charge to appoint Mr Bernard Tan Keng Beng (“Mr Tan”), an employee of Mactron, as the proxy for MCH. On 22 March 2016, YGG held an extraordinary general meeting (“EGM”). Mr Wong and Mr Iskandar were invited to the EGM, but the parties had a dispute over whether Mr Seen should have been allowed into the EGM. Mr Wong wanted to appoint Mr Seen as the proxy for MCH, but Mr Liong insisted that Mr Tan had already been appointed in that capacity, and hence there was no reason for Mr Seen to attend. The parties were unable to resolve their dispute and Mr Wong and Mr Iskandar left the EGM. From this point onwards, Mr Tan was the party who voted on behalf of MCH in the general meetings of YGG.
- [36]
[36] Mr Iskandar and Mr Wong refused to accept the legitimacy of the EGM of 22 March 2016, as well as the appointment of Mr Tan as the corporate representative of MCH. On 29 March 2016, Mr Iskandar and Mr Wong held an EGM without Mr Liong or any representative from YGL, claiming that the EGM on 22 March 2016 was “adjourned” and the EGM of 29 March 2016 was the “reconvened” version of the EGM.
- [37]
[37] On 6 April 2016, YGL commenced Suit 337/2016 against MCH for allegedly defaulting on the Amended Loan Agreement. Mr and Mrs Wong were joined as defendants because of the personal guarantees they had provided for the loan in the Amended Loan Agreement.
- [38]
[38] On 15 April 2016, Mr Iskandar was removed as a director of YGG and replaced by Mr Ang. On 19 April 2016, Mr Tan was appointed as a director. Mr Wong and Mr Iskandar protested these actions, and filed a complaint to ACRA in relation to the removals and appointments.
- [39]
[39] After Mr Iskandar’s removal as director of YGG, Mr Wong continued to copy Mr Iskandar in the email correspondences between Mr Wong and Mr Liong relating to YGG, despite being repeatedly warned by Mr Liong that he was in breach of the confidentiality clauses in their contracts. Mr Wong’s reply was that he was entitled to keep Mr Iskandar in the loop. In his view, Mr Iskandar was not validly removed, and remained a director of YGG.
- [40]
[40] On 14 April 2016, the Second Due Diligence was completed and the due diligence report was circulated by Ms Mao. On 27 May 2016, Mr Wong claimed that based on the report, there were outstanding due diligence issues that justified a delay in exercising the Purchasers’ Call Option.
- [41]
[41] While this was ongoing, Mr Wong secretly met with representatives of YKL to negotiate the sale of shares of YGIPL to YKL. During the negotiations, Mr Wong attempted to procure a separate monetary benefit from YKL to himself, if YKL managed to purchase YGIPL. The negotiations were conducted primarily between Ken Koh Kien Chon (“Mr Ken Koh”), Group CEO of YKL, on behalf of YKL, and Mr Wong with Mr Shortell acting as an intermediary. On 5 June 2016, YKL sent an offer via email for the purchase of 100% of YGIPL at the price of US$17,500,000 (“the first YKL Offer”). On 6 June 2016, Mr Wong requested a Letter of Intent from Mr Ken Koh. However, on 8 July 2016, Mr Ken Koh backed out of the acquisition because his repeated requests to meet Mr Cai were ignored and also because he was uncomfortable with the lack of clarity in the shareholding structure of the Target Companies. Mr Shortell urged Mr Ken Koh to reconsider his withdrawal. In response, on 14 July 2016, YKL sent a signed Letter of Intent for the purchase of 100% of YGIPL at the price of US$15,500,000 (“the second YKL Offer”). Mr Liong alleges that neither of the YKL Offers were disclosed to him. The second YKL Offer was not accepted.
- [42]
[42] On 28 July 2016, MCH stopped paying interest due on the loan from 28 July 2016, on the grounds that YGL had “disrupted the business of [MCH] and has engineered [MCH]’s default on interest payment”.
- [43]
[43] Sometime in July 2016, YGG commissioned a fresh legal due diligence (“Second Legal Due Diligence”) on the Target Companies in preparation for the exercise of the Purchaser’s Call Option. This was because Mr Wong refused to give Mr Liong, Mr Ang and Mr Tan access to the final copy of the legal due diligence report that had been conducted previously (see [14] above).
- [45]
[45] On 31 January 2017, YGG commenced Suit 80/2017, alleging breach of fiduciary duties on the part of Mr Wong. On 7 February 2017, MCH, Mr Wong and Mrs Wong commenced Suit 107/2017, alleging that YGG, YGL, Mr Liong, Mr Tan and Mr Ang had engaged in a tortious conspiracy against them, asking for the winding up of YGG.
Parties’ positions and issues
Overview of the four suits
- [46]
[46] In Suit 104, YGL sues Mr Wong, MCH and YGG, arguing that MCH and Mr Wong are liable for breaches under the Deed of Undertakings for failing to hire and second Mr Seen, Mr Lou and Ms Chng to YGG after the acquisition of 40% of YGIPL.
- [47]
[47] In Suit 337, brought by YGL to enforce the loan against MCH, and with Mr and Mrs Wong joined as its guarantors, YGL relies upon the same alleged breach of the Deed of Undertakings as an “Event of Default” under clause 12.1 of the Amended Loan Agreement. YGL also cites the commencement of Suit 104, as a further Event of Default because it had a “material financial effect” on MCH. For good measure, Mr Soh, counsel for YGL, Mr Liong, Mr Tan and Mr Ang, relies additionally on 6 other Events of Default under clause 12.1 of the Amended Loan Agreement, being:
(a) A breach of clause 3.8 of the Deed of Share Charge, by MCH’s refusal to recognise Mr Tan as the duly appointed corporate representative of MCH.
(b) A breach of the Shareholders’ Agreement, by
(i) holding an EGM on 29 March 2016 without the requisite quorum;
(ii) refusing to amend YGG”s Articles of Association to bring them in line with the Shareholders Agreement;
(iii) refusing to accept the vote cast by Mr Liong to adopt a resolution appointing Mr Tan as director of YGG; and
(iv) divulging confidential information pertaining to YGG to Mr Iskandar after Mr Iskandar was removed as director of YGG; and
(c) A failure to pay interest due and payable on the loan from YGL.
- [48]
[48] MCH, Mr and Mrs Wong, contend that:
(a) There was no breach of the Deed of Undertakings as the obligations in the Deed of Undertakings would only take effect once YGG had “full management control” of YGIPL’s operations, and as at the date of filing of Suit 104, YGG did not exercise such control. Alternatively, Mr Wong did use his “best efforts” to carry out the tasks laid out in the Deed of Undertakings.
(b) The commencement of Suit 104 could not be considered an Event of Default within the meaning of clause 12 of the Amended Loan Agreement as the suit itself was commenced by YGL in bad faith.
(c) Clause 3.8 of the Deed of Share Charge could not be relied upon as Mr Liong’s 28 January 2015 Email contained either a collateral contract or formed the basis of a promissory estoppel which would prevent YGL from exercising clause 3.8 of the Deed of Share Charge.
(d) There was no breach of the Shareholders’ Agreement as
(i) the EGM on 22 March 2016 was validly adjourned to 29 March 2016 by Mr Iskandar;
(ii) the amendment to YGG’s Articles of Association sought by Mr Liong ran contrary to the promises made by Mr Liong to Mr Wong to allow Mr Wong to be “the captain of the ship” and there was no obligation for MCH to amend YGG’s Articles of Association; and
(iii) MCH did not breach the Shareholders’ Agreement when it failed to accept Mr Tan’s appointment as director of YGG and when it continued to send confidential YGG information to Mr Iskandar, as YGL was estopped from relying on clause 3.8 of the Deed of Share charge to effect the appointment of the former and the removal of the latter.
- [49]
[49] MCH, Mr and Mrs Wong also argue that there was no breach of the Loan Agreement on the basis of a failure to pay any interest sums, as MCH had not defaulted on any interest sums payable under the Loan Agreement leading up to the filing of Suit 104. By the time of trial, it was not disputed that the loan had reached its maturity date for repayment, being 31 August 2018.
- [50]
[50] A counterclaim brought in Suit 377 by MCH, Mr Wong and Mrs Wong, alleges lawful and unlawful conspiracy on the part of YGL and Mr Liong. Their counsel, Mr Wijaya, argues that the usurpation of board control during the EGM of 22 March 2016 and the filing of Suits 104 and 337 constituted a lawful means conspiracy or alternatively, an unlawful means conspiracy against MCH, Mr Wong and Mr Wong. In reply, Mr Soh submits that there is no evidence of an unlawful act, nor a predominant intention on the part of YGL, Mr Liong, Mr Tan and Mr Ang to cause damage or injury to MCH, Mr Wong or Mrs Wong.
- [51]
[51] In Suit 80, YGG sues Mr Wong for breach of directors’ duties owed to YGG by:
(a) Delaying and failing to lead the exercise of the Purchaser’s Call Option;
(b) Failing to disclose that MCH had no money to subscribe for the second tranche of shares in YGG;
(c) Failing to ensure that YGG capitalised on the SPA benefits;
(d) Failing to hire and second Mr Seen, Mr Lin and Ms Chng to YGG;
(e) Failing to disclose the YKL Offers; and
(f) Failing to disclose the Secret Commission Agreement and the Secret Trust Deeds.
- [52]
[52] Counsel for YGG, Mr Lobo, also argues that Mr Wong breached the Deed of Undertakings and was liable to YGG, a party to the deed. YGG is named as a defendant in Suit 104.
- [53]
[53] These breaches of directors’ duties are denied by Mr Wong. Mr Wong brought a counterclaim in Suit 80, which was struck out by an Assistant Registrar on 19 June 2017, on the footing that Mr Wong’s claims were either legally unsustainable, subject to arbitration or to be dealt with in Suit 107.
- [54]
[54] In Suit 107, the conspiracy claims made in the counterclaim in Suit 337 are repeated, together with a prayer for a winding up of YGG on the just and equitable ground pursuant to s 254(1)(i) of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) (“Companies Act”). MCH, Mr Wong and Mrs Wong had previously sought leave to amend the Statement of Claim in Suit 107 to introduce a minority oppression claim under s 216 of the Companies Act. Leave was denied by Assistant Registrar Tan Teck Ping Karen on 31 May 2017 because the claim was not supported by the facts pleaded (see MCH International Pte Ltd and others v YG Group Pte Ltd and others [2017] SGHCR 8 at [41]–[47]).
- [55]
[55] The defendants in Suit 107 deny any conspiracy and argue that the circumstances do not warrant the grant of the winding up relief sought. Mr Lobo also highlights that the acts of conspiracy alleged by MCH, Mr Wong and Mrs Wong do not involve YGG at all. In addition, there is a buyout mechanism for either shareholder to exit found in clause 13 of the Shareholders Agreement. The application of clause 13 in this respect is the subject of arbitration proceedings that have been stayed pending the resolution of the present suits.
Core issues
- [56]
[56] These four Suits have overlapping issues and interlinked prayers for relief. The core issues are the following:
(a) Suit 104 has as its core issue the interpretation of the Deed of Undertakings; first, whether Mr Wong, in failing to secure the assistance of the core management team for YGG, breached the Deed of Undertakings; and second, whether MCH is jointly responsible for this breach.
(b) Suit 337 is concerned with whether any of the incidents highlighted by Mr Soh (see [47] above) constitute Events of Default within meaning of clause 12 of the Loan Agreement such that the loan became immediately payable. Issue (a) is thus relevant here as well, since Mr Soh’s case is that a breach of the Deed of Undertakings is an Event of Default.
(c) The counterclaim in Suit 337 has as its central factual issue whether there was either a lawful or unlawful conspiracy on the part of YGL and Mr Liong.
(d) Suit 80 has as its core a factual query on whether Mr Wong had breached his directors’ duties owed to YGG. These include the alleged breach in issue (a), along with other contended breaches.
(e) Issues (c) and (d) are relevant to the resolution of Suit 107, which poses an additional query as to whether YGG is party to the contended conspiracy, and the larger query as to whether the circumstances merit YGG being wound up on the just and equitable ground.
- [57]
[57] Whether each cause of action is made out, and the remedies applicable, follow from these core issues. I deal with the result in each case in the context of my findings on these core issues.
The Deed of Undertakings
- [58]
[58] The key issue in Suit 104 is whether Mr Wong and/or MCH have breached the Deed of Undertakings. The proper interpretation of the Deed of Undertakings is important to determine whether there has been breach and if so, who should be responsible. The broad principles which guide the court in the interpretation of contracts are well summarised by the Court of Appeal in Yap Son On v Ding Pei Zhen [2017] 1 SLR 219 at [30] as follows:
Whether Mr Wong has breached the Deed of Undertakings
- [59]
[59] It is not disputed that Mr Seen, Mr Lin and Ms Chng were not at any time employed by MCH and seconded to YGG as originally planned. Clauses 1(b)–(d) of the Deed of Undertakings read:
- [60]
[60] At this juncture, I pause to highlight Mr Soh’s argument that even after YGG had fully acquired all the shares in YGIPL on 18 August 2016, the core management team was not hired by MCH and seconded to YGG. Suit 104, however, was filed on 3 February 2016, prior to the exercise of the Purchaser’s Call Option, and this is the determinative date. The proper focus of the inquiry should be whether, as at 3 February 2016, Mr Wong was in breach of the Deed of Undertakings. The important question was, therefore, when the obligation to second the core management team arose, and whether it had crystallised by 3 February 2016.
- [61]
[61] I start with the observation that the term “completion of the Acquisition” is not defined in the Deed of Undertakings. This is because the context in which the document was signed was that there would be full acquisition of the Target Companies on the first disbursement of funds. Thus in recital (B) of the Deed of Undertakings, the word “Acquisition” is defined as the point when “[YGL] cooperated with [MCH] (which is controlled by [Mr Wong]) and established [YGG] to acquire the interest in [the Target Companies] in cold chain logistic businesses … ”. The Deed of Undertakings was not amended just prior to the execution of the SPA, in contrast to the other contractual documents. How was this document to be read in the light of the change of context?
(a) The time when YGG first acquired the 40% interest in the Target Companies; or
(b) The time when YGG acquired the full ownership interest in the Target Companies.
- [63]
[63] I hold, for the reasons below, that interpretation (a) better reflects the objective intention of the parties, because of the other contractual documents signed at the time of the acquisition of the 40% interest, and parties’ conduct.
- [64]
[64] I turn to the issue of the surrounding documents. I deal first with the Loan Agreement, amended on 18 August 2015. In the Amendment Agreement (in respect of the Loan Agreement), the definition of “Transaction Documents” in the original Loan Agreement was deleted in its entirety and substituted with a new list of “Transaction Documents”. The new list included at (h), the Deed of Undertakings. This inclusion suggests that, as at 18 August 2015, the parties intended the Deed of Undertakings to form part of the series of transaction documents that would give effect to their concrete plans for the acquisition of YGIPL.
- [65]
[65] A second relevant document is the SPA, signed the next day on 19 August 2015, which defines “Completion” as completion of the sale and purchase of the “Sale Shares”. “Sale Shares” is furthered defined as the shares comprising 40% of the total issued share capital of YGIPL. Clause 7 of the SPA states:
- [66]
[66] From this it follows that the SPA defined completion as the 40% acquisition mark and this definition was intended to apply to the Deed of Undertakings as well. This intention is evident from the symmetry in the provisions highlighted in the SPA and clauses 1(b)–(d) of the Deed of Undertakings. The SPA suggests that certain nominees of YGG would be granted a role in YGIPL after the purchase of 40% of the YGIPL shares. The Deed of Undertakings, if interpreted in the manner suggested by Mr Lobo and Mr Soh, would facilitate the operation of these provisions, because the core management team would be hired by MCH upon “Completion” as defined in the SPA. The core management team would then be seconded to YGG, whereupon they could be nominated to fill the roles in YGIPL as delineated in the SPA. If, on the other hand, the Deed of Undertakings were to be interpreted in the manner suggested by Mr Wijaya, it would be difficult to imagine how YGG would be able to find appropriate nominees for the roles delineated in the SPA without any employees to send to YGIPL. Further, clause 7.7 of the SPA suggests that the parties contemplated that such nominees would be employees of YGG, since it expressly states that the wages of the understudy would be paid by YGG. Hence, the interpretation put forward by Mr Lobo and Mr Soh appears to be more consistent with the plans envisioned by the parties, as seen in light of the other contracting documents that were signed on 18–19 August 2015.
- [67]
[67] The contemporaneous conduct of all parties also confirms the interpretation put forward by Mr Lobo and Mr Soh. Three strands of evidence are of particular relevance.
- [68]
[68] First, the negotiations over the terms of the SPA demonstrate that Mr Wong was operating on the premise that the core management team would be seconded to YGG by the time the 40% stake in YGIPL was purchased. Mr Wong was the main point of contact YGG’s side during the negotiations over the SPA, and it was clear that Mr Wong had expressly negotiated for YGG to have the benefit of the roles set out in clause 7. In an email dated 3 March 2015 sent by Mr Wong to Mr Lim, he asked that upon the purchase of the 40% stake in YGIPL:
(a) YGG be provided “1 signatory to counter sign all payment from [YGIPL] … 1 FC (who will be a local PRC and report directly to [YGG]) will be stationed in [YGIPL] office full time to work hand in hand with your CFO for alignment purpose” [emphasis added]. Mr Wong confirmed in cross examination that he envisioned that Mr Lou would fulfil this role.
(b) YGG be given the opportunity to “second our Ops head to [YGIPL] as an observer / advisor during this period” [emphasis added]. Mr Wong confirmed in cross examination that he envisioned that Mr Seen would fulfil this role.
- [69]
[69] If the parties only intended for Mr Seen and Mr Lou to be hired by MCH and seconded to YGG upon the acquisition of full ownership in YGIPL, the negotiations for a role specially marked for Mr Seen and Mr Lou in the period before this full acquisition would make no sense. In addition, the italicised portions of the 3 March 2015 email suggest that Mr Wong expected that Mr Seen and Mr Lou would be reporting to YGG and/or MCH by the time of the purchase of the 40% stake in YGIPL.
- [70]
[70] Mr Liong’s explanation for the failure to amend the Deed of Undertakings despite the amendment of the other contractual documents also gels with the context. Mr Liong sent an email on 21 September 2015 to Henry Wong at 11.37pm which discussed, inter alia, the amendment of the contracts on 18 August 2015. Paragraph 6 of that email stated:
- [71]
[71] Mr Liong explained in his AEIC that he eventually came to the conclusion that the Deed of Undertakings need not be amended:
- [72]
[72] At trial, Mr Liong further explained that as at 21 September 2015, his primary goal was to remind Mr Wong of his obligation:
- [74]
[74] Third, in an email sent on 21 February 2016 to Mr Liong and Mr Wong, Mr Lim stated:
- [75]
[75] While the Vendors were not party nor privy to the Deed of Undertakings, their frustration with Mr Wong’s delay reflected a common expectation that Mr Seen, Mr Lou and Ms Chng would be embedded with YGIPL soon after the SPA was signed. This reflected that the SPA was concluded on this expectation.
- [76]
[76] Seen in light of the statements which implicitly suggested that Mr Wong thought he was bound to second the core management team to YGG once the SPA was executed on 19 August 2015, coupled with the Vendors’ expectation that the core management team would be hired and working with YGIPL soon after the execution of the SPA, Mr Wong’s sudden shift in position on 21 March 2016 (after the commencement of Suit 104) to the effect that he was not bound by the Deed of Undertakings, was a clear afterthought. In fact, even on 21 March 2016, Mr Wong had yet to articulate the defence that the obligations under the Deed of Undertakings would only come into effect after the full 100% stake in YGIPL was purchased. At the time, his position was that the Deed of Undertakings was not enforceable at all due to the change in the Initial Acquisition Model. Mr Wong’s defence also shifted in the middle of trial, where for the first time, he abruptly claimed that the examples of work done by the core management team was done “in good faith”. During the earlier period between 21 December 2015 to 21 March 2016, Mr Wong had sought to emphasise these examples as evidence of him fulfilling his obligations under the Deed of Undertakings (see [73] above). The shifting nature of Mr Wong’s defence, culminating in its present form, further underscores the fact that Mr Wijaya’s proposed interpretation does not reflect the objective intention of the parties. In my view, this was merely the latest in a series of attempts by Mr Wong to avoid liability under the Deed of Undertakings.
- [77]
[77] Finally, Mr Wijaya mounts an alternative argument on the breach of the Deed of Undertakings: he submits that Mr Wong did carry out some work on behalf of YGG, including procurement of trucking assets, representing YGG in shareholders’ meetings and coaching Mr Ang in the asset tagging exercise. However, clauses 1(b)–(d) of the Deed of Undertakings specify that Mr Wong had to use his best efforts to hire and second the core management team to YGG and the work personally done by Mr Wong had no bearing on these obligations.
- [78]
[78] In the circumstances, I find that the proper interpretation of the phrase “completion of the Acquisition” within the Deed of Undertakings meant, and was understood by all parties to mean, the point when YGG acquired 40% of YGIPL. It follows that Mr Wong’s obligation was to procure the team within a reasonable time thereafter. His continued failure to do so meant that he was in breach of the Deed of Undertakings as at 3 February 2016, when Suit 104 was filed.
MCH’s obligations under the Deed of Undertakings
- [79]
[79] MCH did not sign the Deed of Undertakings. Mr Wong, YGL and YGG are the contracting parties to it. Mr Soh rests his argument, that MCH is a party to the deed, upon Mr Wong’s authority to bind MCH: in particular, that Mr Wong, “being the controlling mind and will and de facto managing director of MCH, had the express and/or implied authority to act for and enter into the Deed of Undertakings”. Authority alone, nevertheless, is not sufficient. There is no doubt that Mr Wong has such authority. If not, the other documents signed by Mr Wong on behalf of MCH, such as the Subscription Agreement, would not bind MCH due to lack of authority. It does not, however, follow that merely because Mr Wong has authority to bind MCH, every contract that he signs does so bind MCH, even where MCH is not expressed as a contracting party. MCH’s responsibility must arise from a proper interpretation of the Deed of Undertakings.
- [80]
[80] YGL makes three arguments to hold MCH responsible. First, the Deed of Undertakings appears to impose obligations on MCH, such as an obligation to hire members of the core management team, and to bear their salaries. Clause 1(d) of the Deed of Undertakings reads:
Similarly, by clause 1(f)(i), Mr Wong is to procure “MCH to bear the balance” of any entitlement of Mr Seen, Mr Lou and Ms Chng during their period of secondment to YGG.
- [81]
[81] Viewing the document as a whole, the obligation to secure the participation of the core management team is the personal undertaking of Mr Wong, and not that of MCH. Recital (A) of the Deed of Undertakings explains that it is Mr Wong who has the “expertise and resources” in the business, and recital (B) explains that MCH is controlled by Mr Wong. The Deed of Undertakings then proceed to spell out Mr Wong’s undertakings. In the context of the acts involving MCH, the obligation is again on Mr Wong to use his best efforts to procure a certain course of action on the part of MCH. Placing such a duty on Mr Wong instead of a corresponding obligation on MCH would still be effective. As recital (B) makes clear, the parties to the Deed of Undertakings were well aware that Mr Wong was in full control of MCH.
- [82]
[82] The second argument involves a past position allegedly taken by Mr Wong. In an email sent to Mr Liong on 30 January 2015 (“the 30 January 2015 Email”), one day after the Deed of Undertakings was signed, Mr Wong stated:
- [83]
[83] Mr Soh thus argues that Mr Wong’s statement affirmed that MCH was a party to the Deed of Undertakings and this was a representation by words or conduct that MCH was bound by the Deed of Undertakings. Mr Wong’s response to the email was that he misspoke when he stated that MCH was a party to the Deed of Undertakings in the 30 January 2015 Email. He explained thus in his cross-examination:
- [84]
[84] The question of contractual liability is one of law, and Mr Wong could easily have been mistaken, as he contended he was. Of note is that while MCH is not named as a party to the Deed of Undertakings, all the other documents signed by parties on 29 and 30 January 2015, such as the Subscription Agreement, the Shareholders Agreement, the Loan Agreement and the Deed of Share Charge, in contrast, expressly identified MCH as a party. The email correspondence between Mr Liong and Mr Wong during the period of 29 and 30 January 2015 makes clear that all the agreements signed during this period were carefully drafted with the benefit of legal advice. Mr Liong was well aware of corporate identity and contracted around it, consciously delineating the different parties in different documents. Thus the loan was made to MCH and then secured with personal guarantees from Mr and Mrs Wong. The obligations contained within the Deed of Undertakings were framed and phrased in terms of obligations personal to Mr Wong. The objective intention of the parties was to have Mr Wong bear personal liability for any breach of the Deed of Undertakings rather than create corporate liability on the part of MCH. This interpretation does not mean that the Deed of Undertakings is commercially unworkable or ineffective. It is Mr Soh’s own case that Mr Wong is in effective control of MCH, and as such, placing obligations on Mr Wong would be sufficient to ensure that MCH would act in a certain manner. Indeed the Deed of Undertaking was itself a device to compel Mr Wong’s action, as a complement to the Shareholders Agreement, Subscription Agreement and Call Option Agreement signed by the relevant corporate parties.
- [85]
[85] YGL’s third argument is that this is an appropriate case to lift the corporate veil and engage in “outsider reverse piercing”. “Outsider reverse piercing” is a situation where a “third party (ie, a party who is not a shareholder or a corporate insider) invites the court to disregard the separate legal personality of the company … to hold the company liable for the shareholder’s obligations” (see Jhaveri Darsan Jitendra and others v Salgaocar Anil Vassudeva and others [2018] SGHC 24 at [47]–[48]). Mr Soh argues that the remedy of outsider reverse piercing may be granted “where the separate personality of a company had been used to enable a person to evade an existing contractual duty” and cites the English case of Jones and Another v Lipman and another [1962] 1 WLR 832 (“Jones”) in support.
- [87]
[87] In my view, unlike in Jones, MCH was not used as a device, sham or facade by Mr Wong to deliberately evade his contractual obligations to YGG and YGL. Mr Wong’s argument is not that he had procured the cooperation of the relevant individuals but MCH somehow prevented the individuals from being hired. His defence is that there was no need to procure their participation until YGG had full control of the Target Companies. Mr Wong has not used MCH to evade his personal contractual obligations. Instead, he is only suggesting that his personal contractual obligations have not arisen at all.
- [88]
[88] Therefore, while the Deed of Undertakings contains within recital (B) an admission that MCH “is controlled by [Mr Wong]” and Mrs Wong’s evidence on the witness stand is consistent this statement, these concessions alone are not sufficient, in light of the clear import of the document itself, to impose liability on MCH. In Sun Electric Pte Ltd and another v Menrva Solutions Pte Ltd and another [2018] SGHC 264 at [142]–[146], Vinodh Coomarawamy J, in the context of a finding that a single individual was the controlling mind behind a company, pointed out aptly that:
- [89]
[89] Mr Wong cannot be found to have abused the corporate personality of MCH merely because Mr Liong had structured transactions in such a way that personal liability was to be incurred in some instances and corporate liability in others. Parties had taken into account the use of the separate legal personality of a company in their consensual allocation of risk. I find, therefore, that MCH is not a party to the Deed of Undertakings.
Judgment in Suit 104
- [90]
[90] Suit 104 was filed in February 2015 primarily to compel Mr Wong to second Mr Seen, Mr Lou and Ms Ching to YGG. While I have found that Mr Wong is in breach of the Deed of Undertakings, with the effluxion of time and the filing of Suits 337 and 80, this primary purpose has largely been overtaken by events. As such, it is no longer appropriate to grant YGL’s prayer for specific performance of the Deed of Undertakings. Neither is the alternative prayer for common law damages arising out of the breach of the Deed of Undertakings apposite save for the two heads of claim elaborated upon in the next paragraph.
- [91]
[91] When making his closing arguments, Mr Soh pressed only two claims in common law damages. The first arose from Mr Ang taking up the understudy role instead of Mr Seen because Mr Seen was not hired by MCH and seconded to YGG as promised. I accept this argument and award damages to be assessed in respect of the expenses incurred by YGL in having Mr Ang understudy Ms Mao. Secondly, under the Deed of Undertakings, Mr Wong had undertaken to take up the role of the chief executive officer and his expenses would not have fallen to YGL. Arising from his dereliction, Mr Liong took over his role. I also accept this submission and award damages to be assessed in respect of the expenses incurred by YGL in having Mr Liong manage the company in preparation for the exercise of the Purchaser’s Call Option.
Events of Default under the Loan Agreement
- [92]
[92] In Suit 337, eight Events of Default are alleged as entitling YGL to consider the loan immediately repayable. These arise out of clause 12.1(a) and (e) of the Amended Loan Agreement:
- [93]
[93] The “Transaction Documents” are defined to include, inter alia, the Deed of Undertakings, the Deed of Share Charge, the Shareholders’ Agreement and the Loan Agreement itself. I highlight that in all the disputes involving Clause 12.1(a) of the Amended Loan Agreement, there is no dispute that written notice was provided for each of the alleged failures to comply. I examine each alleged Event of Default in turn.
Breach of the Deed of Undertakings: Event of Default 1
- [94]
[94] The Deed of Undertakings is a specified document within the Transaction Documents, and its breach is the first Event of Default alleged. I have found that MCH is not a party to the Deed of Undertakings (see [89] above). The breach is that of Mr Wong’s, while the Loan Agreement mandates that Events of Default must be breaches on the part of MCH. Clause 12.1(a) of the Amended Loan Agreement therefore does not apply.
Commencement of Suit 104: Event of Default 2
- [95]
[95] The second alleged Event of Default relies upon the commencement of Suit 104, which YGL contends triggered clause 12.1(e) of the Loan Agreement, as the action had a “material financial effect” on MCH. Mr Soh submits that the commencement of Suit 104 against MCH had a material financial effect on MCH, because MCH had little or no realisable assets and a paid up capital of only $10,000.
- [96]
[96] Mr Wijaya does not dispute that the commencement of Suit 104 put a strain on MCH’s finances. This is unsurprising since Mr Wong had conceded during cross-examination that MCH was a shell company and was not doing any other business at the material time, other than the business related to YGG. It stands to reason that since MCH had no other sources of revenue, and had little or no realisable assets, any law suit would materially affect MCH in financial terms. Mr Wijaya raises two points in reply to Mr Soh’s argument that the commencement of Suit 104 was an Event of Default:
(a) First, that the parties envisioned that clause 12.1(e) of the Loan Agreement would only apply where legal proceedings are commenced by third parties (and not YGL) against MCH; and
(b) Second, that Suit 104 was initiated mala fide as Simon was completely aware of MCH’s financial state as a company with little or no realisable assets as early as 2014, and clause 12.1(e) of the Loan Agreement was invoked in bad faith to seek an earlier repayment of the loan from YGL.
Whether Clause 12.1(e) of the Loan Agreement would only apply to third parties
- [97]
[97] Mr Wijaya’s first argument raises a question of the proper interpretation of clause 12.1(e) of the Loan Agreement. In my view, his proposed interpretation cannot be sustained. There is nothing on the text of clause 12.1(e) that suggests that only legal proceedings commenced by third parties would engage the clause. The phrase “any legal proceedings … of any kind whatsoever” suggests the opposite effect was intended.
Whether Suit 104 was initiated mala fide
- [100]
[100] In support of his contention that Suit 104 was initiated mala fide, to seek an early repayment of the loan from YGL, Mr Wijaya relies solely on the fact that Mr Liong was “completely aware of MCH’s financial state” as a company with “little or no realisable assets”. Mr Wijaya suggests that to consider Suit 104 as having a material financial effect on MCH would have the effect of “affording protection to an individual who had entered into a contractual state of affairs willingly, and seeks now to benefit from the same contractual relationship which was clearly slanted in his favour”.
- [101]
[101] There is no dispute that Mr Liong knew of MCH’s financial position prior to the execution of the Loan Agreement. This fact alone, however, is insufficient to impute improper motives onto Mr Liong and YGL. An examination of the sequence of events leading up the commencement of Suit 104 shows a reasonable basis for its filing, In particular:
(a) Suit 104 was commenced on 3 February 2016. This was more than five months after Mr Wong’s duty to second the core management team within a reasonable time was triggered due to the signing of the SPA.
(b) From Mr Wong’s first presentation, he premised the success of the Target Companies upon the injection of the core management team.
(c) During this five-month period, Mr Wong repeatedly indicated that he did not intend to procure MCH to hire the core management team and second the same to YGG (see [26]–[30] above). Mr Liong thus had legitimate concerns that Mr Wong would not comply with his obligations under the Deed of Undertakings. These concerns required close attention, given that the secondment of the core management team was a critical part of the business strategy that the parties had formulated at the start of their business relationship (see [4] above). The primary remedy sought was a request for specific performance of the Deed of Undertakings, which suggests that the purpose of Suit 104 was to compel Mr Wong to second the team.
- [102]
[102] Seen in light of these facts, Suit 104 was not commenced for the purpose of triggering an Event of Default under the Loan Agreement. Instead it was a legitimate attempt to enforce the obligations under the Deed of Undertakings, in the light of Mr Liong’s well-founded fear that Mr Wong would not hire and second the core management team. YGL’s opinion that Suit 104 had a material financial effect on MCH was therefore a reasonable one.
- [103]
[103] I should explain why I decide thus even though I have held that MCH was not a party to the Deed of Undertakings, and YGL was thus not successful in the litigation they instituted against MCH. Clause 12.1(e) did not limit “any legal proceedings” to those which were ultimately successful, only those which “in the reasonable opinion” of YGL would have a material financial effect. The contention that MCH was party to the Deed of Undertaking was not an implausible one and the institution of proceedings against MCH was a reasonable decision.
Breach of the Deed of Share Charge: Event of Default 3
- [104]
[104] The Deed of Share Charge is one of the Transaction Documents. Mr Soh argues that MCH’s failure to accept the appointment of Mr Tan as the proxy of MCH (see [34]–[35] above), amounted to a breach of clause 3.8 of the Deed of Share Charge, and consequently, there was a failure to “comply with any one or more of its obligations under the Transaction Documents” pursuant to Clause 12.1(a) of the Amended Loan Agreement.
- [105]
[105] Clause 3.8 of the Deed of Share Charge states:
- [106]
[106] Mr Wijaya does not dispute the scope of the powers granted by clause 3.8 of the Deed of Share Charge. Nor does he dispute that if the powers were properly exercised, MCH’s failure to accept the appointment of Mr Tan would have been an Event of Default. However, he argues that YGL was not entitled to exercise the powers granted by clause 3.8 of the Deed of Share Charge, because of the statements made by Mr Liong in the 28 January 2015 Email.
- [107]
[107] Mr Wijaya’s argument is that the statements made in that email amounted to either promissory estoppel or a collateral contract that would bar YGL from exercising clause 3.8 of the Deed of Share Charge on 22 March 2016.
- [108]
[108] It is not in dispute that there are three elements to promissory estoppel (see The Law of Contract in Singapore (Andrew Phang Boon Leong gen ed) (Academy Publishing, 2012) at paras 4.072–4.087):
(a) A clear and unequivocal promise that the promisor would not enforce his strict legal rights;
(b) The promisee must have acted in reliance on the promise; and
(c) It must be inequitable for the promisor to go back on his word.
- [109]
[109] The crux of the dispute on this point centres on the first element of promissory estoppel. Mr Wijaya suggests that there was a clear and unequivocal promise from Mr Liong that YGL would not exercise the voting rights under clause 3.8 of the Deed of Share Charge save on the occurrence of an Event of Default within meaning of the Loan Agreement. Mr Soh argues that there was no such clear and unequivocal promise.
- [110]
[110] In my view, there was no clear and unequivocal promise that YGL would not exercise the voting rights under clause 3.8 of the Deed of Share Charge save on the occurrence of an Event of Default. I have arrived at this conclusion after careful consideration of the text of the 28 January 2015 Email and the context of the discussions surrounding that email.
- [111]
[111] As mentioned (see [9] above), on 25 January 2015, Mr Wong requested for Mr Liong to qualify clause 3.8. Mr Wong stated:
- [112]
[112] As is apparent, what Mr Wong requested was for Mr Liong to vary the express terms of the Deed of Share Charge. The restrictions that Mr Wong requested for Mr Liong to place on the exercise of clause 3.8 mirror the restrictions Mr Wijaya now says is placed by virtue of the representations made in the 28 January 2015 Email. Yet, instead of agreeing to this request, Mr Liong replied in the 28 January 2015 Email as follows:
- [113]
[113] On the face of the email, there is no clear statement from Mr Liong that he would only exercise the voting rights only upon the occurrence of an Event of Default. If Mr Liong intended to inform Mr Wong that he was willing to restrict his use of clause 3.8 of the Deed of Share Charge in the manner requested, he could simply have amended clause 3.8 as Mr Wong requested. Instead, the clause was not amended. This sequence of events suggests that it is far from clear and unequivocal that Mr Liong was suggesting that he would only exercise the voting rights on the occurrence of an Event of Default.
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