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Grounds publishedDecided 3 Jan 2020

High Court

Bloomberry Resorts and Hotels Inc and another v Global Gaming Philippines LLC and another

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[2020] SGHC 01Case no. Originating Summons No 1432 of 2017

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] Bloomberry Resorts and Hotels Inc. (“Bloomberry”), and Sureste Properties, Inc (“Sureste”), the first and second plaintiffs in Originating Summons 1432 of 2017 (“OS 1432”), are challenging a Partial Award on liability issued by a three-member arbitral tribunal (“the Tribunal”) on 20 September 2016. The first and second defendants in OS 1432 were the claimants in a Singapore-seated arbitration that was commenced in 2013 and governed by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) Arbitration Rules 2010 (“the Arbitration”). The plaintiffs were the respondents in the Arbitration. The Tribunal found in favour of the first and second defendants, Global Gaming Philippines LLC (“GGAM”), and GGAM Netherlands B.V. (“GGAM Netherlands”) respectively, for wrongful termination of the Management Services Agreement dated 9 September 2011 (“the MSA”).

  3. [2] By the Partial Award, the Tribunal found, inter alia, that there were no misrepresentations by the defendants that induced the plaintiffs to enter into the MSA. The Tribunal noted that to justify rescission of the MSA on account of causal fraud under Philippines Law, the fraud must be serious, and must have operated at the time of the making of the MSA. In addition, evidence of fraud must be “full, clear and convincing” (see [127] of the Partial Award). The Tribunal also held that the plaintiffs’ grounds for termination of the MSA were not made out and thus, their purported termination of the MSA was wrongful.

  4. [4] Basically, the plaintiffs’ substantive applications in OS 1432 are:

  5. (a) To set aside the Partial Award under s 24 of the International Arbitration Act (Cap 143A, 2002 Rev Ed) (“IAA”) and Art 34(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (“Model Law”) as set out in the First Schedule of the IAA;

  6. (b) Alternatively, to resist the enforcement of the Partial Award in Singapore. The challenge to enforcement of the Partial Award is on the main ground that the Partial Award is contrary to Singapore public policy under Art 36(1)(b)(ii) of the Model Law. The secondary ground that is relied upon is Art 36(1)(a)(ii), ie, the plaintiffs were unable to present its case by reason of the fraud committed by the defendants in the conduct of the arbitral proceedings in multiple respects such as the suppression of critical evidence and deception of the Tribunal.

  7. [5] The first substantive issue concerns the validity of the Partial Award in that the Partial Award was induced or affected by fraud or the way in which it was procured is contrary to public policy in that the defendants had concealed documentary evidence or committed perjury with the dishonest intention to deliberately mislead the Tribunal and/or the plaintiffs. The alternative substantive issue for this court in the present proceedings to determine is whether, if the plaintiffs’ fraud allegations are established on the new evidence (ie, the FCPA Findings), it would be contrary to Singapore public policy to permit enforcement of the Partial Award in this jurisdiction.

  8. [7] I propose to deal with the extension of time applications before considering the applicable legal principles, the details of the evidence before the court on the substantive applications and my decision on the issues. It is fair to state that the time extensions to set aside the Partial Award and challenge to the enforcement orders, if granted, will shape the grounds of challenge in the present application.

  9. [8] Mr Alvin Yeo, SC (“Mr Yeo”) represents the plaintiffs and Mr Cavinder Bull, SC (“Mr Bull”), represents the defendants.

  10. Background Facts

  11. [9] A brief outline of the parties and the procedural history is helpful before turning to consider the extension of time applications.

  12. Parties

  13. [10] The first plaintiff, Bloomberry, and second plaintiff, Sureste, are the owners of the Solaire Resort & Casino (“Solaire”), a luxury hotel and gaming resort located in Manila, Philippines. The second plaintiff is wholly owned by Bloomberry Resorts Corporation, a listed company in the Philippines.

  14. [11] The first defendant, GGAM is the sole owner of the second defendant, GGAM Netherlands. During the period in issue, the defendants had four senior executives: Mr William P. Weidner (“Mr Weidner”) as the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”), Mr Bradley Stone (“Mr Stone”) as the President, Mr Garry W. Saunders (“Mr Saunders”) as the Executive Vice President and Mr Eric Chiu (“Mr Chiu”), President for Asia.

  15. [12] In turn, GGAM is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Global Gaming Asset Management LP, a firm that develops, invests, manages and advises hospitality companies and projects, with an emphasis on the casino sector. Global Gaming Asset Management LP is a joint venture between an entity owned and controlled by Mr Weidner, Mr Stone and Mr Saunders, and a subsidiary of Cantor Fitzgerald LP (“Cantor Fitzgerald”), a global financial services firm.

  16. Procedural history

  17. [13] The plaintiffs and GGAM entered into the MSA on 9 September 2011 “to provide management and technical services in the development and construction, and to manage the operation of” Solaire for a period of 10 years. GGAM subsequently transferred all its rights, titles, benefits, privileges, obligations and interest under the MSA to GGAM Netherlands, the second defendant, under an Assignment and Assumption Agreement dated 8 March 2013. For ease of reference, GGAM, where used in the judgment below, is taken to refer to GGAM Netherlands as well as no distinction needs to be made between the two for the present case.

  18. [14] Subsequently, for reasons that will be explained below, the plaintiffs sought to terminate the MSA. The defendants duly commenced arbitration against the plaintiffs pursuant to cl 19.2 of the MSA. On 20 September 2016, following the hearings on liability in October 2015, the Tribunal decided in the Partial Award that, inter alia, there was no causal fraud or misrepresentation by the defendants in relation to the MSA and that the plaintiffs’ termination of the MSA was not justified and constituted a breach of the MSA.

  19. [16] As highlighted earlier, HC/ORC 6609/2016 was made in OS 979 on 27 September 2016. HC/ORC 6609/2016 was served on the second plaintiff and the first plaintiff on 4 January 2017 and 10 March 2017 respectively. The defendants filed the Enforcement Judgment in terms of the Partial Award on 20 June 2017.

  20. [17] On 21 December 2017, the defendants filed OS 1432 seeking to, inter alia, set aside the Partial Award or, in the alternative, to challenge the enforcement of the Partial Award.

  21. Time extension applications

  22. [18] As mentioned earlier, OS 1432 was filed out of time after the expiry of two different and separate timelines. The first concerns the three-month time limit in Art 34(3) of the Model Law, and the second relates to the fourteen-day timeline stipulated in HC/ORC 6609/2016. In both instances, the plaintiffs seek the necessary time extensions before proceeding with the merits of the substantive matters in OS 1432. I propose to consider the application to extend the three-month time limit in Art 34(3) of the Model Law before turning to the plaintiffs’ non-compliance with the timeline stipulated in HC/ORC 6609/2016.

  23. Time extension for setting aside the Partial Award

  24. [19] OS 1432 was filed on 21 December 2017, approximately one year after the three-month time limit to set aside the Partial Award expired on 20 December 2016. The plaintiffs’ application to set aside the Partial Award is made under s 24 of the IAA and/or Art 34(2) of the Model Law. Other than the three-month time limit in Art 34(3), there is no express provision in s 24 of the IAA stipulating the time within which applications to set aside arbitral awards on s 24 grounds must be made. Before dealing with the court’s powers, if any, to extend time, there are two anterior questions that must first be answered:

  25. (a) Whether applications to set aside awards brought under s 24 of IAA are subject to the three-month time limit in Art 34(3) of the Model Law (“Question (a)”); and

  26. (b) Whether the time limit stipulated in Art 34(3) of the Model Law is an absolute time limit that favours the finality of arbitral awards or, is it extendable in exceptional circumstances like fraud, bribery or corruption (“Question (b)”).

  27. [20] I propose to answer Question (b) first because the case law on Art 34(3) is now fairly settled. Article 34(3) of the Model Law states:

  28. [21] The words “may not” in Art 34(3) have been held to be mandatory in meaning by setting an absolute time limit of three months beginning from the date of receipt of the award, after which all recourse against the award is barred. Such an absolute time limit recognises the need for finality and legal certainty.

  29. [22] Specifically, the rulings of the Singapore High Court on Art 34(3) of the Model Law in ABC Co v XYZ Co Ltd [2003] 3 SLR(R) 546 (“ABC v XYZ”) at [9], PT Pukuafu Indah and others v Newmont Indonesia Ltd and another [2012] 4 SLR 1157 (“PT Pukuafu”) at [30] and Astro Nusantara International BV and others v PT Ayunda Prima Mitra and others [2013] 1 SLR 636 (“Astro Nusantara (HC)”) at [97], is that the time limit prescribed in Art 34(3) Model Law is strict. It is clear that Art 34 is meant not only to limit the grounds for setting aside an arbitral award, but it also prescribes that any challenge made on Art 34 grounds must be brought promptly within the period specified: see Astro Nusantara (HC) at [97]. This legal position is followed in two recent decisions of the Singapore International Commercial Court (“SICC”) in BXS v BXT [2019] SGHC(I) 10 (“BXS v BXT”) at [39]–[41] and BXY and others v BXX and others [2019] SGHC(I) 11 (“BXY v BXX”) at [83] that were published after the hearings for OS 1432 were completed.

  30. [23] Mr Yeo submits that this court should depart from the reasoning in ABC v XYZ and PT Pukuafu and he urges this court to instead adopt the approach of the Hong Kong court in Sun Tian Gang v Hong Kong & China Gas (Jilin) [2016] HKCFI 1611 (“Sun Tian Gang”). The plaintiffs’ position remains the same (ie, the time limit in Art 34(3) is extendable) after parties were invited on 18 July 2019 to address the court on, inter alia, the decision of BXS v BXT where Anselmo Reyes IJ in that case analysed the reasoning of the judge in Sun Tian Gang. Both sides responded on BXS v BXT in writing on 24 July 2019.

  31. [24] Sun Tian Gang held that the Model Law does not preclude the court from regulating the procedure of applications to set aside awards, and therefore the court has the discretion to grant an extension of time under Art 34(3) (at [90]). Like Reyes IJ, I am unpersuaded by the court’s reasoning in Sun Tian Gang which starts with and draws support from the court’s permissive interpretation of the word “may” in Art 34(2) of the Model Law to give a similar permissive interpretation to the words “may not” in Art 34(3). Such an interpretation cannot be correct. A different meaning is convey by the single word “may” in Art 34(2) as compared to the words “may not” in the context of Art 34(3). As rightly analysed by Reyes IJ in BXS v BXT at [31]:

  32. [25] In the context of Art 34(3), the words “may not” take on a mandatory meaning of “cannot”. As Judith Prakash J (as she then was) held in ABC v XYZ (at [9]):

  33. [26] Hence, starting with the decision of ABC v XYZ and, more recently, the decisions of the SICC, the legal position in Singapore is that the time limit in Art 34(3) of the Model Law is strict, favouring the policy of finality of arbitral awards (see BXS v BXT at [40]) and legal certainty.

  34. [27] Mr Yeo in his written response of 24 July 2019, firstly, disagrees with Reyes IJ that Art 34(3) operates as a limitation provision, and secondly, he distinguishes BXS v BXT from the present case. On the first point, I am not persuaded by Mr Yeo that the court in BXS v BXT incorrectly held that Art 34(3) is a written law relating to limitation within the meaning of paragraph 7 of the First Schedule of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed). I agree with Reyes IJ’s comment on the inappropriateness of relying on the court’s power derived from procedural rules of court to extend time prescribed in a primary legislation (at [31] of BXS v BXT quoted in [24]) above). As rightly noted by Roger Giles IJ in BXY v BXX at [88], “a power to extend time under a Rule cannot overcome a time limitation in primary legislation” and the time limitation under Art 34(3) of the Model Law still supersedes the court’s general discretion under the Rules of Court.

  35. [28] In distinguishing BXS v BXT, Mr Yeo argues that BXS v BXT did not involve an award whose making was “induced or affected” by fraud. His argument leads me to the second part of Question (b), namely, whether the usual time limit of three months is extendable where fraud as a ground is raised to set aside an arbitral award. Mr Yeo contends that the time limit in Art 34(3) of the Model Law should be extendable in cases of fraud and, more so, where the fraud is discovered only after the expiry of the time limit. Mr Bull takes a contrary position arguing that the time limit in Art 34(3) is, without exception, strict. He referred to materials from the 18th session of UNCITRAL’s working group for the preparation of the Model Law. At that session, there was a proposal to establish a separate regime that provided for a considerably longer period of time than in Art 34(3) for the setting aside of an award on the grounds of fraud, or where evidence was false or only discovered later. The Report of the UNCITRAL on the work of its Eighteenth Session (A/40/17, 3–21 June 1985) at paras 299–300 states:

  36. This proposal of a separate regime with a different time period to apply to setting aside applications brought on grounds of fraud or corruption was considered but eventually rejected because Art 34(3) was drafted as it is. It is plain that the drafters chose to favour the finality of arbitral awards. The time limit in Art 34(3) is absolute in that all recourse against arbitral awards outside the three-month period (starting from the time of receipt of the award) are barred.

  37. [29] Mr Yeo accepts that national legislation may modify the time limit in Art 34(3). Unlike Malaysia, New Zealand and Ireland (all are Model Law States), Singapore has not expressly allowed for an exception to or extension of the three-month time limit in Art 34(3). There is no provision in the IAA that computes the time limit in Art 34(3) from the date of discovery of the fraud or withheld evidence or discovery of new facts or evidence post-award. The legislative approach taken in New Zealand is to modify the time limit in Art 34(3) to exclude the application of the three-month time limit in specific cases of fraud or corruption. Article 34(3) of the Arbitration Act 1996 (NZ) sch 1 ch 7 reads as follows:

  38. [30] In Malaysia, s 37(5) of the Malaysian Arbitration Act 2005 (Act 646) expressly states that the three-month limit will not apply to setting aside applications based on grounds that the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption. The relevant sub-sections of s 37 read as follow:

  39. [31] In Ireland, s 12 of the Arbitration Act 2010 modifies Art 34(3) of the Model Law as such:

  40. This modification means that the timeline of 56 days for setting aside of the award only starts from the time when fraud as a public policy ground is discovered or ought reasonably to have been discovered.

  41. [32] It is now an appropriate juncture to consider Question (a), which is whether s 24(a) of the IAA is a separate regime with no express time limit for setting aside of arbitral awards on grounds of fraud or corruption. Question (a) also poses the additional query, which is whether, as a matter of construction of s 24, the three-month time limit in Art 34(3) is applicable to applications to set aside arbitral awards based on s 24 grounds. It is not surprising that Mr Yeo and Mr Bull construe the phrase “[n]otwithstanding Article 34(1) of Model Law” in the opening sentence of s 24 of the IAA differently. If Mr Bull’s construction of the phrase is preferred over Mr Yeo’s, then applications brought under subsections (a) and (b) of s 24 of the IAA are subject to the time bar in Art 34(3) of the Model Law.

  42. [33] Section 24 of the IAA states:

  43. [34] Article 34(1) of the Model Law states:

  44. [35] Mr Yeo does not dispute that s 24(a) and s 24(b) of the IAA are additional grounds to set aside an arbitral award. The debate centres on whether s 24 of the IAA creates a regime to set aside an award that is separate from the grounds listed in Art 34 of the Model Law. While Mr Yeo acknowledges the overlap in the grounds of “breach of natural justice” in s 24(b) of the IAA and “otherwise unable to present its case” in Art 34(2)(a)(ii) of the Model Law, he submits that this overlap does not undermine his position that s 24 of the IAA is a separate regime with no express statutory time limit, and that the only applicable time limit is prescribed by O 69A r 4 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (“ROC”). Furthermore, the procedural timelines set by the ROC are extendable at the discretion of the court.

  45. [36] Mr Bull takes the opposite view: there is only one regime and Art 34(3) of the Model Law applies to the two grounds in s 24 of the IAA. He reasons that in the absence of any legislative exclusion or extension, the time limit in Art 34(3) of the Model Law is applicable to applications to set aside arbitral awards on the ground that the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption.

  46. [37] The real issue in the debate is whether, as a matter of construction, the opening words “[n]otwithstanding Article 34(1) of the Model Law” in s 24 of the IAA excludes in effect the time limit set out in Art 34(3) of the Model Law from applications to set aside arbitral awards under s 24. Another perspective is to ask the question whether the three-month time limit in Art 34(3) is incorporated into s 24 by the phrase “[n]otwithstanding Article 34(1)” in s 24.

  47. [38] On Mr Yeo’s interpretation of “[n]otwithstanding Article 34(1) of the Model Law”, applications for setting aside based on s 24 for both fraud and breach of natural justice derogate from both Art 34(2) and Art 34(3). This is because s 24 provides an entirely separate regime for applications to set aside brought under exceptional circumstances such as fraud, corruption, and prejudicial breaches of natural justice, for which Parliament chose not to include an express time limit within which such an application must be brought. According to Mr Yeo, Parliament intended to introduce a distinct remedy in s 24 unconstrained by the limitations in both Art 34(2) and Art 34(3) of the Model Law. This separate, flexible remedy would be available for more egregious cases such as where there had been fraud or corruption in the making of an arbitral award or breaches of natural justice that prejudiced the rights of a party and impugned the arbitral process.

  48. [39] Mr Bull interprets the phrase “[n]otwithstanding Art 34(1) of Model Law” as referring to s 24 of the IAA being in spite of the grounds for setting aside enumerated in Art 34(2) of the Model Law, and not with reference to the time limit in Art 34(3) of the Model Law. Section 24 provides for additional grounds to set aside arbitral awards, in spite of the grounds listed under Art 34(2) of the Model Law. In particular, Mr Bull explains that the phrase “[n]otwithstanding Art 34(1) of Model Law” must be read with the key words expressed in s 24 of the IAA, “in addition to the grounds set out in Art 34(2)”, which is consistent with Mr Bull’s construction: courts may apply s 24 of the IAA in spite of the grounds set out in Art 34(2) of the Model Law, and not in spite of the time limitation set out in Art 34(3) of the Model Law. Hence, an application to set aside an arbitral award on a ground set out in s 24 of the IAA is still subject to the three-month time limitation under Art 34(3).

  49. [40] I digress to mention my earlier obiter views expressed in Astro Nusantara (HC) on the time limit in s 24. In that case, I foreshadowed the possibility of reviewing the obiter views on a future occasion at [120]:

  50. Needless to say, I am open to reviewing the obiter views taken in Astro Nusantara (HC) on this matter.

  51. [41] That said, with the benefit of counsel’s arguments and materials now placed before me, I find that Mr Bull’s interpretation is preferred for the following cumulative reasons.

  52. [42] First, the legal position in Singapore with reference to the time limit in Art 34(3) of the Model Law militates in favour of Mr Bull’s interpretation. As explained above, the three-month time limit in Art 34(3) is strict, favouring the policy of finality of arbitral awards and legal certainty. The drafters of the Model Law decided that cases of fraud, bribery or corruption should be subject to the strict time limit in Art 34(3) of the Model Law.

  53. [43] Second, I disagree with Mr Yeo’s contention that the phrase “[n]otwithstanding Article 34(1) of the Model Law” in s 24 of the IAA effectively modified both Art 34(2) and Art 34(3) of the Model Law. As stated earlier, Mr Yeo explains the modification as follows: in the case of Art 34(2), additional grounds to set aside arbitral awards are introduced in s 24; and Art 34(3) is modified in the sense that the three-month time limit does not apply to s 24 grounds. I again refer to the statutory position adopted in Malaysia, New Zealand and Ireland that expressly provide for the exclusion of the three-month time limit in cases of fraud or corruption (see [29]–[31]). This is consistent with the book chapter, Nathalie Voser and Anya George, “Revision of Arbitral Awards” in Pierre Tercier, Post Award Issues (ASA Special Series No. 38, 2012) ch 3, cited in Mr Bull’s bundle of authorities. As the Chapter shows, it is left to national laws to decide whether to adopt the time limit set out in Art 34(3) or to provide separate time limits for setting aside of fraudulently obtained arbitral awards and/or for the situation where there is subsequent discovery of new facts or evidence post award (at p 47). The authors’ comparative law review in continental Europe reveals that if there is to be modification of the time limit in Art 34(3), the approach adopted is to legislate for separate time limits in respect of arbitral awards subsequently found to have been based on erroneous facts or to have been influenced by procedural fraud.

  54. [44] Third, Mr Yeo’s construction of the phrase “[n]otwithstanding Art 34(1) of the Model Law” rests on the assumption that both s 24(a) (ie fraud) and s 24(b) of the IAA (ie, breach of natural justice) are exempt from the time limit in Art 34(3) despite significant overlaps in the scope of the grounds listed in s 24(a) and s 24(b) of the IAA, and Art 34(2)(a)(ii) and Art 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Model Law. It is not disputed that cases of fraud, bribery or corruption fall within the ambit of public policy as a ground for setting aside under Art 34(2)(b)(ii) and there is no exception to the three-month time limit for this ground. The upshot of Mr Yeo’s construction is an internal inconsistency within the legislation: (a) there is a non-extendable three-month time limitation if recourse against an arbitral award is brought under Art 34(2)(a)(ii) and Art 34(2)(b)(ii); and (b) the applicable time limit for an application to set aside an arbitral award under s 24 of the IAA is governed by O 69A r 2(4) of the ROC and this procedural time limit is extendable subject to the court’s general discretion under O 3 r 4(1) and O 92 r 4 of the ROC to prevent injustice. The inconsistency as described will result if the opening words “[n]otwithstanding Article 34(1) of the Model Law” in s 24 of the IAA are construed to have the effect of carving out the time limit in Article 34(3) for s 24 grounds. Parliament could not have intended for such an incongruous and absurd result whereby parties restricted by the non-extendable three-month time limitation under Art 34(2) of the Model Law would be able to circumvent the time bar requirement by resorting to the grounds set out in s 24 of the IAA.

  55. [45] Finally, Mr Yeo’s contention that Parliament must have intended for special and narrow cases of fraud or corruption under s 24(a) of IAA (which could at times be discoverable only three months after the receipt of the award) not to be subject to the three-month time limit in Art 34(3) of the Model Law is untenable. Whilst he has a point that such a construction would prevent fraudsters and corrupt parties from profiting from their own misdeeds on a procedural technicality, his contention runs into difficulty for two reasons when applied to s 24(b) of the IAA for the breach of rules of natural justice. First, most breaches of natural justice ought to be apparent and discoverable at the arbitral hearing, and are thereafter discernible from the award so that any recourse against the award would be within three months of receipt of the arbitral award. Second, the lack of harmonisation within the two limbs of s 24 creates an unsatisfactory situation: s 24 of the IAA becomes a limping provision, where both grounds under s 24(a) and s 24(b) of the IAA are exempt from the non-extendable time limitation even though the aforementioned policy reason only justifies such an exemption in the case of s 24(a). I can find no reason for this, especially where the s 24(b) of the IAA ground for breach of rules of natural justice has such a broad scope and substantially overlaps with the “otherwise unable to present its case” ground in Art 34(2)(a)(ii) of the Model Law.

  56. Time Extension for setting aside the enforcement order

  57. [51] In this case, there was a delay of approximately 11 months and 9 months after the relevant deadline had expired for the second plaintiff and the first plaintiff respectively.

  58. [52] Whilst the length of delay is a factor, the main focus here is on the reason for the extension. The application for an extension is based on new evidence that was discovered post-award. The plaintiffs explained that the FCPA Findings were made after the liability hearing, and they discovered from the FCPA Findings new evidence of the alleged fraudulent and corrupt conduct of Mr Weidner and Mr Chiu and their significance could only be fully appreciated after the relevant timeline had expired. Thereafter, the plaintiffs went to the Tribunal with a Request for Reconsideration of the Partial Award. After that avenue failed, the plaintiffs filed OS 1432 on 21 December 2017.

  59. Overview of the application to resist enforcement of the Partial Award

  60. [55] The next section of this judgment will cover the application in OS 1432 to resist enforcement of the Partial Award under Art 36(1)(b)(ii) of the Model Law (ie, contrary to public policy), and Art 36(1)(a)(ii) of the Model Law (ie, “otherwise unable to present his case”). In this regard, it is necessary to touch on the events leading to the Arbitration, the Tribunal’s findings in the Partial Award as well as explain the FCPA Findings in some detail.

  61. [56] Before that however, it bears noting that the Partial Award is final and binding on the plaintiffs since it has not been set aside. On the face of the Partial Award, the findings of the Tribunal are that the MSA is not contrary to Philippines Law and thus, in that sense, there is no finding that the MSA and its performance, being lawful, is contrary to the public policy of the Philippines. In this case, the only purpose of the plaintiffs’ allegations of fraud is to use fraud under public policy considerations as a defence to resist the recognition or enforcement of the Partial Award and to set aside the enforcement orders. Whilst public policy exception exists to prevent enforcement in appropriate cases, proving the defence of violation of public policy based on the ground of fraud presents legal and evidentiary challenges that require the court to go behind a valid award. At any rate, the court will not disturb the principles of finality in arbitration without good reason; the court has to be satisfied that some form of reprehensible or unconscionable conduct that is within the spectrum of gravity of public policy considerations had contributed in a material way to procuring the Partial Award or had an important influence on the result. In this case, the public policy question under Art 36(1)(b)(ii) of Model Law hinges on the plaintiffs’ allegations of fraud. If fraud is not proved, that is the end of the inquiry and the application to resist enforcement of the Partial Award fails. Likewise, the outcome of the plaintiffs’ reliance on Art 36(1)(a)(ii) (ie, no opportunity to present their case), which also hinges of the same allegations of fraud, would be the same if fraud is not proved.

  62. The Arbitration

  63. [57] On 12 September 2013, the plaintiffs issued a Notice of Termination of the MSA to the defendants affirming “the termination of the [MSA] with GGAM because of material breach of the MSA under Clause 15.1(a) of the MSA”. Clause 15.1(a) of the MSA states:

  64. [58] GGAM’s material breach of its obligations are recounted in the Arbitration and they are briefly set out in [62(b)] below. On the same day, the defendants commenced the Arbitration as claimants, arguing, inter alia, that the plaintiffs, the respondents in the Arbitration, had materially breached their obligations under the MSA and sought damages for the same.

  65. Arguments before the Tribunal

  66. [59] The Tribunal was broadly faced with two key issues – one relating to whether the defendants had perpetrated causal fraud on the plaintiffs in inducing them into entering the MSA (the “Causal Fraud Issue”); the other being whether the plaintiffs were justified on any ground in terminating the MSA (the “Termination Issue”).

  67. [60] The Causal Fraud Issue was concerned with allegations of various misrepresentations purportedly made by the defendants to the plaintiffs ([72] of the Partial Award), which led the plaintiffs into entering the MSA. The misrepresentations related to, inter alia, the following matters: (a) that GGAM could be equated with LVS; (b) that GGAM had pre-existing relationships with junket operators and guest data; (c) that GGAM was supposed to prepare proprietary documentation for the performance of services under the MSA to be furnished to the plaintiffs; (d) that the directors of GGAM would provide a “hands-on approach” to the management of Solaire; and (e) that the role of Cantor Fitzgerald (one of the owners of the holding company of GGAM) was not fully disclosed.

  68. [61] As to the Termination Issue, the question was whether the plaintiffs had wrongfully terminated the MSA based on the defendants’ purported material breaches, particularly the defendants’ failure to deliver junkets or VIPs to Solaire. Notably, Mr Weidner gave evidence that the defendants had two unique strategies for attracting the junkets and foreign VIPs to Solaire: (a) a “government-led, top-down junket approach”; and (b) a “cross-border trading platform to promote business and gaming visitations between China and the Philippines”. This evidence was intended to refute the plaintiffs’ case that the defendants had failed to perform their obligations under the MSA. In OS 1432, Mr Yeo submits that Mr Weidner’s two strategies came up for the first time and belatedly at the Arbitration. In other words, the so-called strategies were an afterthought.

  69. [62] As such, the plaintiffs sought a declaration that they had rightfully ended the MSA due to GGAM’s material breach of its obligations thereunder. The plaintiffs’ key arguments in the Arbitration can be summarised as follows:

  70. (a) The misrepresentations and/or conduct of GGAM amounted to causal fraud under Philippines Law that led the plaintiffs to enter into the MSA (ie, the Causal Fraud Issue);

  71. (b) The plaintiffs’ termination under cl 15.1 of the MSA (see [211] below) was justified because of the various breaches of the MSA committed by the defendants (ie, the Termination Issue). These breaches include:

  72. (i) The failure to perform its obligations “through the Management Team”;

  73. (ii) The failure to submit business and marketing plans that met prudent industry practice under various clauses of the MSA;

  74. (iii) Breach of the obligation to establish policies and procedures critical to the successful operation of an integrated casino as required under Annex A to the MSA;

  75. (iv) Failure to use commercially reasonable efforts in the performance of its obligations pursuant to cl 2.5 of the MSA; and

  76. (v) Breach of the obligation to provide “hands-on management” as promised by Mr Weidner.

  77. Tribunal’s findings

  78. [63] The Tribunal dismissed the Causal Fraud Issue on the ground that to the extent that any representations were made by the defendants, they were not false or fraudulent at the time they were made. Under Philippines Law which governed the MSA, the Tribunal noted that causal fraud is fraud “present or employed at the time of the birth or perfection of the contract” ([124] of the Partial Award). The fraud in question had to be sufficiently serious and there must be “full, clear, and convincing evidence, and not merely by a preponderance thereof” ([126] of the Partial Award).

  79. [64] Amongst other things, the Tribunal found that:

  80. (a) There was no evidence that the defendants represented themselves as being the same entity as LVS.

  81. (b) The alleged representations about the defendants’ access to junket operators was made after the MSA had been signed, and thus could not constitute inducement ([131] of the Partial Award). In any case, given the standing of Mr Weidner and Mr Chiu in the gaming industry, it was likely that the defendants did have access to the junket operators or “high rollers” that were to be brought to Solaire;

  82. (c) There was simply no evidence of the defendants’ alleged representation that they would prepare proprietary documentation for the plaintiffs ([133] of the Partial Award).

  83. (d) As for the representations about the “hands-on approach” to be provided by the defendants’ directors, the Tribunal found that these were statements of intention that were true at the time they were made and there was insufficient evidence to show the contrary ([138] of the Partial Award). In any case, the plaintiffs themselves had altered the management structure subsequently, which meant that there could not have been any reasonable reliance on those previous statements.

  84. (e) Finally, the Tribunal found that the plaintiffs did not establish that any false statement was made as regards Cantor Fitzgerald’s role. In any event, the plaintiffs have also not demonstrated any legal basis mandating disclosure of information relating to the partnership between GGAM and Cantor Fitzgerald ([147] of the Partial Award).

  85. [65] With respect to the Termination Issue, the Tribunal dismissed all of the plaintiffs’ purported grounds for termination and found that the plaintiffs had wrongfully terminated the MSA. Specifically, the Tribunal found, inter alia, that:

  86. (a) GGAM did perform its obligations through the Management Team in accordance with the MSA.

  87. (b) GGAM fulfilled its obligation to prepare, through the Management Team, the Business and Marketing Plans under cl 2.10 of the MSA, and through the Management Team, started to implement them.

  88. (c) Again, GGAM fulfilled its obligation to produce policies and procedures under Annex A of the MSA, which were done through the Management Team headed by Mr French.

  89. (d) The evidence was insufficient to substantiate a material breach of the obligation to make commercially reasonable efforts to comply with the standard of care enshrined in cl 2.5 of the MSA.

  90. (e) The defendants had provided the necessary hands-on management and in any case, the purported representations in this regard could not have been justifiably relied upon because the management structure of Solaire had been revised.

  91. (f) The above grounds for termination relied on by the plaintiffs do not qualify as material or “substantial and fundamental” violations of the MSA that would justify rescission or annulment of the MSA.

  92. Events that are post-Arbitration

  93. [66] The fraud now alleged by the plaintiffs to resist the enforcement of the Partial Award is premised on the FCPA Findings. On 31 August 2017, the plaintiffs filed a Request for Reconsideration of the Partial Award to the Tribunal in the light of the FCPA Findings. In the request, the plaintiffs sought, inter alia, for the Tribunal to reconsider its Partial Award and make an award finding that the plaintiffs had “rightfully ended the [MSA] due to GGAM’s material breach of its obligations thereunder”.

  94. [67] The Tribunal issued its decision on the Request for Reconsideration on 22 November 2017 (“Decision on the Request”). The Tribunal opined that it did not have the jurisdiction under Singapore law, being the law of the seat, to reconsider its findings on liability in the Partial Award. In summary, this was because s 19B of the IAA provided that the award was final and binding on the parties, subject only to the provisions in Art 33 and 34(4) of the Model Law. The Tribunal found that none of the exceptions applied in the present case.

  95. [68] Nevertheless, the Tribunal made the following observations:

  96. [69] After receiving the Decision on the Request and taking legal advice, the plaintiffs commenced OS 1432 on 21 December 2017.

  97. The FCPA Findings

  98. [70] I turn then to consider in detail the contents of the FCPA Findings.

  99. SEC Order

  100. [75] The conduct by LVS is summarised as follows:

  101. [78] The first transaction concerns a basketball team. In early 2007, Mr Weidner sought to purchase a professional basketball team in China with the purported purpose of improving LVS’ image in China and increasing customer flow to the casinos (“the Basketball Team transaction”). Due to regulations by the Chinese Basketball Association, neither LVS nor its subsidiaries could purchase a team. Hence, the Consultant was used as a “beard” to buy the team through a wholly foreign-owned entity, while LVS entered into “what was ostensibly a sponsorship agreement for the team.” Funds were repeatedly transferred to the Consultant without any supporting documentation. Payments to the Consultant were also falsely recorded in the company’s books and records. In total, between March 2007 and January 2009, pursuant to a series of sponsorship and advertising contracts, approximately US$14.8m was paid to the Consultant in connection with the basketball team. Over one-third of the funds were paid after the accounting firm engaged by LVS to review the transaction had identified significant funds that were unaccounted for, and approximately US$6.9m was transferred without appropriate authorisation or supporting documents.

  102. [79] The second transaction relates to an Adelson Centre in China. Beginning in 2006, Mr Weidner sought to develop a non-gaming resort in Hengqin Island, China (“the Adelson Centre transaction”). Such a development would require the approval of government authorities and the Consultant introduced to LVS a Chinese state-owned travel agency, China International Travel Services Ltd (“CITS”), whose Chairman was believed to have “particular influence in connection with Hengqin”. Mr Weidner authorised using the Consultant as a “beard” to purchase a building in Beijing from CITS and it was named the Adelson Center. Mr Weidner gave little or no thought to agreeing to purchase the Beijing building. Between July 2007 and February 2008, approximately US$43m was transferred to one of the Consultant’s entities for the purchase of the real estate, but none of the payments were approved by an LVS employee with sufficient authorisation.

  103. [80] In August 2007, while significant concerns were raised that the Consultant intended to obtain the basement title to the building by making improper payments to government officials, the company proceeded to lease the basement from the Consultant. However, no documentation was obtained to prove that the Consultant had obtained the title legally or that his entity purchased the basement from CITS.

  104. [81] Among other things, in September 2008, Mr Chiu signed contracts that cancelled the transfer of shares from the Consultant’s entity and agreed to receive in exchange from the Consultant a promissory note for approximately US$43m, which far exceeded Mr Chiu’s authority. The project for the Adelson Centre was shuttered at about the same time. In total, LVS transferred approximately US$61m in connection with the real estate transaction and ultimately received approximately US$44m in settlement from the Consultant.

  105. [82] Third is a transaction concerning the Macau Operations. In 2007, LVS set up a high-speed ferry business to transport customers from China and Hong Kong to Macau (“the Macau Operations transaction”). Under pressure from Mr Weidner, the LVS employees selected a recently-formed ferry company, Chu Kong Shipping (“CKS”), which was indirectly owned by, amongst others, the Consultant and the Chairman of CITS. Mr Weidner stated in an e-mail that the selection of CKS would be politically advantageous to LVS. CKS was also “spending the majority of the entertainment expense on government officials”, providing them meals and giving them “red envelopes containing cash around the Chinese New Year”, which was known to LVS. LVS also did not enforce policies and procedures regarding purchasing and employees were able to use cash advances and expense reimbursements to circumvent them.

  106. DOJ Agreement

  107. [86] The summary of conduct found in the Statement of Facts annexed to the DOJ Agreement states, inter alia, that:

  108. [88] The main body of the DOJ Agreement also provides, inter alia, that the Fraud Section of the DOJ enters into the agreement based on the individual facts and circumstances including:

  109. [89] The consequence of the DOJ Agreement is that LVS would pay a monetary penalty of US$6.96m and the DOJ agreed “not to bring any criminal or civil case…against [LVS] or any of its present or former subsidiaries relating to any of the conduct described in the attached Statement of Facts”. Moreover, LVS was also required to implement or continue a corporate compliance programme with reporting obligations.

  110. Parties’ cases

  111. The plaintiffs’ case

  112. [90] Mr Yeo relies on two provisions for resisting enforcement of the Award under Art 36 of the Model Law. First, that enforcement in such situations “would be contrary to the public policy of Singapore” under Art 36(1)(b)(ii) of the Model Law; and second, that the party to an award was “unable to present his case” under Art 36(1)(a)(ii) of the Model Law.

  113. [91] The plaintiffs’ attack of the Partial Award is a wide-ranging one. At one level, the plaintiffs argue that in the light of the FCPA Findings, Mr Weidner “committed perjury by testifying about his strategies but omitting the context which would have led a reasonable person to conclude that these strategies were fraudulent and/or corrupt”. This is the procedural fraud argument. In their view, the defendants have perjured themselves by putting forward a positive case of performance without disclosing the true facts involved in bribing Chinese state officials as a key part of their strategy to deliver those junket operators. This perjury or concealment of evidence, the plaintiffs add, was perpetrated in part by the defendants’ counsel in the Arbitration, Paul Hastings LLP (“Paul Hastings”), which was the same law firm that was representing Mr Weidner with respect to the US government’s investigations into LVS. In this vein, the plaintiffs took issue with the adequacy of the document collection process undertaken by Paul Hastings in the Arbitration.

  114. [92] Alongside the argument on procedural fraud, Mr Yeo argues that “new evidence” in the FCPA Findings show that the Partial Award was “tainted by the fraudulent and/or corrupt nature of Mr Weidner’s strategies [in LVS] because… these strategies were deployed in performance of the MSA”. The basis of the plaintiffs’ allegation is the purported striking similarity in the entities implicated in the LVS investigations and those in the MSA. The plaintiffs and the Tribunal were prevented from discovering the fraudulent and/or corrupt nature of Mr Weidner’s strategies deployed in performance of the MSA due to the defendants’ procedural fraud as outlined above. Thus, quite apart from the concealment and perjury that allegedly transpired in the course of the Arbitration (ie, procedural fraud), the plaintiffs argue that the new evidence shows that the defendants had committed actual fraud.

  115. [93] The purported consequence of both the procedural fraud and the new evidence argument (which in my view are inextricably intertwined) on the plaintiffs’ case is broadly twofold: (a) the Tribunal’s decision would have been different on a variety of issues (particularly the Causal Fraud Issue and the Termination Issue) if it had known about the purported fraud disclosed in the FCPA Findings; and (b) the Arbitration would have proceeded on an entirely different basis ie, focusing on different matters altogether. Pausing here, the plaintiffs’ allegation that they did not have an opportunity to present their case was also due to the procedural fraud perpetrated by the defendants. I will deal with this variant of procedural fraud in the context of breach of the rules of natural justice separately in a later part of this judgment.

  116. The defendants’ case

  117. [95] I begin with the decision of PT First Media TBK (formerly known as PT Broadband Multimedia TBK) v Astro Nusantara International BV and others and another appeal [2014] 1 SLR 372 where the Court of Appeal held that the grounds in Art 36(1) of the Model Law are available to an award debtor seeking to resist enforcement of a domestic international arbitral award under s 19 of the IAA (at [84]). Art 36(1)(b)(ii) of the Model Law states that:

  118. [96] While the term “public policy” appears open-ended and is undefined in either the Model Law or the IAA, case law on the scope of the public of policy of Singapore is that it should be construed narrowly and consequently, the threshold for resisting enforcement of an award is a high one. The Court of Appeal in PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (Persero) v Dexia Bank SA [2007] 1 SLR(R) 597 (“PT Asuransi”) held that the public policy ground is invoked when the upholding of the award would “shock the conscience” or is “clearly injurious to the public good or … wholly offensive to the ordinary reasonable and fully informed member of the public” or “where it violates the forum’s most basic notion of morality and justice” (at [59]). While PT Asuransi concerns a setting aside application under Art 34 of the Model Law, the definition and principles therein also apply to the present case of resisting enforcement under Art 36 of the Model Law. A similar observation has been made by the Court of Appeal in AJU v AJT [2011] 4 SLR 739 (“AJU v AJT”) where it was stated that the question of public policy under both the setting aside regime and the enforcement regime for foreign arbitral awards is the same (at [34]). Likewise, there should be no difference in the enforcement regime for domestic international arbitral awards under Art 36(1)(b)(ii) of the Model Law.

  119. Fraud under public policy considerations

  120. [97] Fraud, corruption and bribery would generally fall within the rubric of being “contrary to public policy”: PT Asuransi at [59] citing the Commission Report (A/40/17), at para 297 (referred to in A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration: Legislative History and Commentary by Howard M Holtzmann and Joseph E Neuhaus (Kluwer, 1989) at p 914):

  121. [98] The same point was noted in Beijing Sinozonto Mining Investment Co Ltd v Goldenray Consortium (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2014] 1 SLR 814 (“Beijing Sinozonto”) at [41]:

  122. It thus clear that fraud, whether substantive or procedural, would fall within the ambit of Art 36(1)(b)(ii) of the Model Law.

  123. [100] The plaintiffs rely on the case of Soleimany v Soleimany [1999] 3 All ER 847 (“Soleimany”) where the English Court of Appeal refused to enforce an arbitral award that upheld an illegal contract; the award was tainted with illegality and was found to be contrary to the public policy of England. The plaintiffs submit that just as an arbitral award can be tainted with illegality by virtue of the underlying illegal contract and hence affected by fraud or corruption, a party should be able to resist the enforcement of an arbitral award for being tainted by illegality where the underlying contract was performed using fraudulent or corrupt means. As the Court of Appeal noted in AJU v AJT at [62] with reference to Soleimany, where the law applicable to the impugned contract is Singapore law, “the court cannot abrogate its judicial power to the Tribunal to decide what the public policy of Singapore is and, in turn whether or not [the agreement] is illegal”. The court is entitled to decide whether an underlying contract is illegal and refuse to enforce an award that is tainted by the illegality as such. This broad legal proposition is to be understood in its context: that public policy is a question of law for the enforcing court to determine based on its domestic law (at [67]).

  124. [101] The plaintiffs are seeking denial of enforcement of the Partial Award against them on grounds of violation of public policy based on fraud. Hence, short of establishing fraud as alleged, the public policy ground is not engaged. The strictness of this approach is consistent with the view that a court should not be quick to interfere under Art 36(1)(b)(ii) of the Model Law and a line is drawn at where the court should observe the principles of finality in arbitration.

  125. Perjury and concealment of evidence during arbitral proceedings

  126. [103] The law concerning perjury and the concealment of evidence has been canvassed in a number of decisions – notably, Swiss Singapore and Dongwoo Mann+Hummel Co Ltd v Mann+Hummel Gmbh [2008] 3 SLR(R) 871 (“Dongwoo”) and more recently considered in BVU v BVX. I will outline the key principles herein.

  127. [104] Perjury and the deliberate suppression or withholding of documents in an arbitration can in a proper case amount to obtaining an award by fraud: Swiss Singapore at [29] and Dongwoo at [139]. Broadly speaking, this means that there has to be fraud in the arbitration itself.

  128. [105] Specifically, where the fraud alleged is perjury by a party in the arbitration, the applicant must prove that:

  129. (a) False evidence is given in a legal proceeding (and similarly in arbitration) which is intended to cause any person in that proceeding to form an erroneous opinion that touches any point material to the result of such proceeding (Koh Pee Huat v Public Prosecutor [1996] 2 SLR(R) 816 at [44]);

  130. (b) The new evidence demonstrating fraud could not have been discovered or produced, despite reasonable diligence, during the arbitration proceedings; and

  131. (c) The newly discovered evidence must be decisive in that it would have prompted the arbitrator to have ruled in favour of the applicant instead of the other party (Swiss Singapore at [29] approving DDT Trucks of North America Ltd v DDT Holdings Ltd [2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 213).

  132. [106] If the fraud concerns non-disclosure or concealment of material documents, the applicant must prove that (BVU v BVX at [47], Swiss Singapore at [25] approving Elektrim SA v Vivendi Universal SA [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 693 (“Elektrim”)):

  133. (a) There is deliberate (as opposed to innocent or negligent) concealment aimed at deceiving the arbitral tribunal or the other party/parties to the arbitration. In other words, there must not have been a good reason for the non-disclosure (Dongwoo at [133], BVU v BVX at [96]).

  134. (b) There is a causative link between the deliberate concealment and the decision in favour of the concealing party (ie, the concealment must have substantially impacted the making of the award). The document (or information) concealed must be so material that earlier discovery would have prompted the arbitrator to rule in favour of the applicant.

  135. (c) There must not have been a good reason for the non-disclosure.

  136. [107] Where new evidence is being introduced to demonstrate fraud, the applicant would have to demonstrate why it was not available or could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence at the time of the arbitration (BVU v BVX at [106] affirming Westacre Investments Inc v Jugoimport-SDPR Holding Co Ltd [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 65 at 77).

  137. [108] While there is a distinction between perjury and concealment of documents (espoused in Swiss Singapore), three core elements are common to either form of procedural fraud: (a) dishonesty or bad faith; (b) the materiality of the new evidence to the decision of the tribunal; and (c) the non-availability of the evidence during the earlier proceeding It is clear that proving fraud, dishonest or unconscionable conduct is essential but not sufficient (Swiss Singapore at [27] and [29] affirming Thyssen Canada Ltd v Mariana Maritime SA [2005] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 640). There must be a causative link between the fraudulent conduct and the claim for enforcement of the Partial Award to justify interference by the court on public policy grounds.

  138. [109] While some decisions such as Swiss Singapore are concerned with concealment of documents, the same principles would generally apply to the concealment of information (whether contained in documents or otherwise) as well. For convenience, I will use the term “concealment of information” to refer to both perjury and concealment of information or documents as has been alleged by the plaintiffs in respect of procedural fraud.

  139. [110] With the principles set out above in mind, in the context of the plaintiffs’ application to resist enforcement of the Partial Award under Art 36(1)(b)(ii), the key questions to be examined are as follows:

  140. (a) Is there procedural fraud that engages Art 36(1)(b)(ii) of the Model Law?

  141. (b) Was the fraud so material that it substantially impacted the award? Put differently, is there a requisite causative link between the alleged fraud and the Partial Award?

  142. [111] As stated, the FCPA Findings were not in existence at the time of the Arbitration. Admissibility of the FCPA Findings was not an issue before me. Thus, as discussed below at [220], the non-availability of evidence requirement does not really arise taking the plaintiff’s case at its highest. The central debate in the present case is on the scope and effect of the FCPA Findings.

  143. Is there procedural fraud?

  144. [112] For the reasons explained below, the plaintiffs’ allegations of concealment of information against either the defendants or Paul Hastings are not made out. In any case, the procedural fraud allegation is short on the materiality requirement ie, it is not so material that it would have substantially affected the Partial Award. Consequently, it cannot be said, as the plaintiffs have so asserted, that Tribunal’s decision would have been different on the Causal Fraud Issue or the Termination Issue, or that the Arbitration would have proceeded on an entirely different footing altogether.

  145. [113] I will deal first with the plaintiffs’ allegations against the defendants before turning to those against Paul Hastings.

  146. Alleged concealment by the defendants

  147. [114] With respect to the plaintiffs’ allegations of concealment of information against the defendants, Mr Yeo argues that the defendants had deliberately concealed the matters disclosed in the FCPA Findings. This deliberate concealment substantially impacted the making of the award in the sense that that their fraud resulted in an award in which the Tribunal’s findings would have been materially different absent GGAM’s fraud. Attention was drawn particularly to (a) a statement given by Mr Weidner on 18 August 2012 (“the 18 August 2012 statement”); and (b) the oral testimony of Mr Weidner in the Arbitration.

  148. The 18 August 2012 statement

  149. [115] The 18 August 2012 statement stems from e-mail correspondence between representatives of the plaintiffs and defendants in August 2012. This correspondence began with the plaintiffs’ encounter with a news article reporting the LVS investigation. According to the plaintiffs, the said statement represents the “start of the lie that perverts the whole arbitration”.

  150. [116] It is necessary to set out the correspondence between the parties to understand the basis of the plaintiffs’ present complaints. In an e-mail from one Ms Estela Tuason-Occena (“Ms Tuason-Occena”) from the plaintiffs on 14 August 2012, states that:

  151. [117] Mr Saunders, one of the principals from GGAM, replied to the email on the same day stating what the plaintiffs consider to be one of many lies:

  152. [118] Ms Tuason-Occena replies thereafter asking:

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