High Court · Decided 7 January 2020
Ramo Industries Pte Ltd v DLE Solutions Pte Ltd
Feedback & support[2020] SGHC 04 · Case no. Suit No 1170 of 2017
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] This suit arises out of a dispute on a contract for the supply, fabrication, painting and delivery of structural steel (the “Contract”) between the plaintiff (ie, the buyer) and the defendant (ie, the seller), for the construction of an accommodation camp in the Petronas Refinery and Petrochemical Integrated Development Project (the “Petronas Rapid Project”) in Pengerang, Johor Bahru District, Malaysia.
Background Facts
- [2]
[2] The plaintiff is Ramo Industries Pte Ltd (“Ramo”), a Singapore incorporated company in the business of building construction. The following representatives are the plaintiff’s witnesses at trial:
(a) Mr Veerabadran Gunaseharan (“Guna”), a Director of Ramo;
(b) Mr Chidambaram Sribathi (“Sri”), the Senior Contracts Engineer of Ramo;
(c) Ms Parthasarathi Maheswari (“Mahe”), the Senior Sales & Marketing Manager of the plaintiff’s sister company, Ramo Engineering Services Pte Ltd; and
(d) Mr Raji Francis (“Francis”), the Construction Site Engineer of Ramo.
- [3]
[3] The defendant is DLE Solutions Pte Ltd (“DLE”), a company incorporated in Singapore whose principal business activity is “other specialised construction and related activities”. The following representatives are the defendant’s witnesses at trial:
(a) Mr Dennis Leu Yew Onn (“Dennis”), the Managing Director of DLE; and
(b) Ms Elaine Leu Kwai Hing (“Elaine”), the Contracts Manager of DLE and the wife of Mr Dennis Leu.
- [4]
[4] The owner of the Petronas Rapid Project is PRPC Refinery and Cracker Sdn Bhd (“PRPC”) and its main contractor is Punj Lloyd Limited (“Punj Lloyd”). Ramo is a sub-contractor of Punj Lloyd for the Petronas Rapid Project engaged to construct the pre-engineered structure and prefabricated building for an accommodation camp in the Petronas Rapid Project (the “Accommodation Camp”).
- [5]
[5] In turn, Ramo awarded DLE the Contract for the supply, fabrication, painting and delivery of structural steel to the site in Pengerang, Johor (“the Site”). The following diagram sets out the relevant parties involved in the shipment process of the structural steel:
- [6]
[6] DLE engaged the services of Dai Dung to supply and prefabricate the structural steel in Vietnam. It appointed Gateway as the forwarder to collect the prefabricated structural steel from the port upon arrival at Pasir Gudang port, Johor and in turn deliver it to the Accommodation Camp. Upon arrival at Pasir Gudang port, the prefabricated structural steel shipments had to undergo clearance at the Malaysian customs. According to the plaintiff, Gateway introduced JPL to assist DLE with the customs clearance. A key issue that parties are in dispute over is their respective responsibility for customs clearance, which will be further discussed below.
Summary of Issues
- [7]
[7] I will first set out briefly the two main issues that this judgment will deal with, namely the Contract Issue and the Liability Issue.
The Contract Issue
- [8]
[8] The first issue is whether the Contract is contained in or evidenced by the following documents (“the Contract Issue”):
(a) the Letter of Award dated 20 January 2016 (“20 January LOA”);
(c) the Letter of Credit No. 1CMLC592121 on 29 March 2016, including Amendment Nos. 1 to 9 (“Letters of Credit”).
Essentially, the parties are in contention over the applicability and binding nature of the 20 January LOA signed by Dennis and hence, their respective obligations flowing from the Contract. My holding on the binding nature of the 20 January LOA for the Contract Issue would essentially impact three aspects of the Liability Issue:
(a) whether Ramo is contractually entitled to claim for liquidated damages;
(b) whether DLE is entitled to the retention monies currently held by Ramo; and
(c) whether DLE’s scope of works includes the customs clearance at Pasir Gudang port.
Parties’ cases
- [9]
[9] Ramo submits that the 20 January LOA, the PO and the Letters of Credit form the Contract between parties. On the other hand, DLE submits that the 20 January LOA was not a part of the Contract between the parties.
- [10]
[10] DLE initially took the position that the PO alone constituted the Contract in its pleadings and opening statement, but subsequently changed its position at trial: it now says that both the PO and the Letters of Credit constitute the Contract. DLE does not dispute that Dennis had signed the 20 January LOA, but contends that it was not intended to be part of the Contract between the parties. It is DLE’s position that at the stage of signing the 20 January LOA, parties were still in the process of negotiations as the price had not even been agreed upon. DLE’s case is that it was orally agreed between Guna and Dennis that the document to be signed was “only temporary pending finalisation of the actual written agreement between the parties”. DLE submits that the sole purpose of the signed 20 January LOA was to convince PRPC/Punj Lloyd that Ramo had formally engaged a steel supplier (ie, DLE) for the project (the “Punj Lloyd Purpose”) and the said letter of award was not intended to be binding on the parties. As such, the Letter of Award was not a part of the Contract.
- [11]
[11] In short, the parties are essentially disputing over whether the 20 January LOA, specifically, forms a part of the concluded Contract and hence, whether the terms contained within it are binding on the parties.
The Liability Issue
- [12]
[12] After deciding the Contract Issue, I will deal with (a) the question whether DLE is in breach of its obligations under the Contract; and (b) the respective parties’ liabilities under the claim by Ramo and the counterclaim by DLE (jointly referred to as “the Liability Issue”).
Parties’ cases
- [13]
[13] Ramo’s case is that DLE had failed to meet its obligations under the Contract, which includes the fabrication and delivery of 1,328mt of structural steel to the Site, and the responsibility for customs clearance processes. The parties agreed that a total of 14 shipments of structural steel were to be delivered from Vietnam to Pasir Gudang port in Malaysia. DLE failed to comply with its contractual obligations by:
(a) causing a shortfall in the requisite quantities of structural steel delivered under the Contract (“the Shortfall Issue”);
(b) delivering unpainted structural steel (“the Unpainted Steel Issue”); and
(c) failing to fabricate the structural steel supplied in accordance with the specifications provided by Ramo (“the Improper Fabrication Issue”).
As a result, Ramo had to incur costs in rectifying the above issues.
- [14]
[14] In addition, demurrage charges arose from the delay caused by DLE in the customs clearance processes, and DLE’s failure to deliver painted structural steel. First, DLE’s failure to obtain promptly the switch bill of lading, the Certificate of Approval (“COA”) and an import licence from the Construction Industry Development Board in Malaysia (“CIDB”), which were the documents required before the prefabricated structural steel shipments could be released, resulted in the delay of the release of the shipments from Pasir Gudang port. Second, DLE’s failure to deliver painted structural steel (for the first to third and seventh to tenth shipments) resulted in the containers carrying the shipments to be transported first to a yard for painting works to be carried out, before they were delivered to a work site. The shipping liner refused to release the 11th to 13th shipments from the port until the containers for the ninth and tenth shipments were returned to the port. Ramo could not return the containers for the ninth and tenth shipments to the port as the painting works had to be carried out on the unpainted structural steel. As a result, the 28-day laytime under the bills of lading was exceeded and demurrage charges were incurred. Ramo paid the demurrage charges on DLE’s behalf first to ensure the release of the structural steel from the port and now seeks reimbursement of the demurrage payments from DLE (“the Demurrage Issue”).
- [15]
[15] Finally, Ramo seeks liquidated damages from DLE based on the rate stated in cl 14 of the 20 January LOA, due to the delay to the construction of the Accommodation Camp resulting from the above issues with the structural steel and DLE’s failure to coordinate the customs clearance processes (“the Delay Issue”).
- [16]
[16] In summary, Ramo submits that DLE’s actions resulted in loss and damage in the following amounts:
(a) US$33,139.20 for DLE’s over-claiming an amount of 34.52mt of structural steel on the Letters of Credit (ie, DLE’s liability arising out of the Shortfall Issue);
(b) S$147,237.25 for DLE’s liability for supplying 439.17mt of unpainted structural steel and the third-party painting costs incurred by Ramo (ie, DLE’s liability arising out of the Unpainted Steel Issue);
(c) S$100,66.17 (ie, comprising S$99,491.78 for the modification works and S$10,574.39 for the materials purchased) for DLE’s liability for fabrication errors listed in Ramo’s Invoice No. 2289/16 and for failing to supply the sag rods and turnbuckles listed in Ramo’s Invoice No. 2291/16 and the costs incurred by Ramo in relation thereto (ie DLE’s liability arising out of the Improper Fabrication Issue);
(d) RM624,420.43, for demurrage charges incurred by Ramo as a result of DLE’s failure to coordinate the customs clearance process (ie DLE’s liability arising out of the Demurrage Issue); and
(e) RM2,889,000, for DLE’s liability to Ramo for liquidated damages for the delay DLE had caused in failing to deliver the structural steel in a timely manner (ie DLE’s liability arising out of the Delay Issue).
- [17]
[17] On the other hand, DLE counterclaims against Ramo for the sum of US$35,936.16, being the retention monies of 5% that the parties agreed in June 2016 to be withheld by Ramo following the dispute over the shortfall and the unpainted steel delivered (“the Retention Monies Issue”). DLE also counterclaims against Ramo for the sum of US$5,040.42 being the value of bolts supplied by DLE to Ramo for the Petronas Rapid Project (“the Bolts Issue”).
The Contract Issue
- [18]
[18] I first deal with the Contract Issue: which documents constitute the governing contract between the parties and hence the nature and scope of the resulting obligations of both parties that follow. The central question that needs to be answered is whether the contract between Ramo and DLE is contained in or evidenced by one or more of the following documents:
(a) the 20 January LOA;
(b) the PO; and
(c) the Letters of Credit.
Facts
Events prior to the signing of 20 January LOA
- [19]
[19] Prior to the Petronas Rapid Project, Ramo and DLE had previously worked on other projects pertaining to the supply of structural steel, such as the project for structural steel works at the Keppel Benoi Yard in Singapore in September 2015 (“Keppel Project”). In the Keppel Project, the material for the steel structure supplied is identical to the one in the Petronas Rapid Project. However, the steel structures for both projects are “almost the same”, “not identical” and with slightly different drawings. DLE also undertook the supply, fabrication, installation and design work for the Keppel Project. This is in contrast to the Petronas Rapid Project, which only required DLE to supply, fabricate and deliver steel structural material to the site, and did not involve installation works.
- [20]
[20] According to Dennis, there were preliminary discussions between Guna and Dennis in January 2016 before signing the 20 January LOA regarding the following: the construction of the Accommodation Camp, the general size of the project and magnitude of the contract (ie, between 800 to 1,000 tonnes of steel), the technical requirements for the Petronas Rapid Project which were discussed with reference to drawings, Ramo’s budget of slightly over US$1,000/mt, the material specifications for the structural steel, the urgency of the project and the schedule that Ramo had to meet for the Petronas Rapid Project for Punj Lloyd. This is corroborated by Guna, who also testified that the scope of work, technical terms and specifications of the steel structure requirements were discussed between the parties prior to signing the 20 January LOA.
20 January LOA
- [21]
[21] I now reproduce the material clauses in the 20 January LOA. The 20 January LOA is titled “Letter of Award – Supply, Fabricate, Painting and Delivery of Structural Steel for the Construction of EPCC Camp for Rapid Project … at Pengereng. For the [Sub-Contract] Works”. The preamble states:
- [22]
[22] At cl 1 of the 20 January LOA, the scope of works and responsibilities of DLE is enumerated: “Supply, Fabricate, Painting and Delivery of Structural Steel Material For The Construction, Testing and Commissioning (If Necessary) of following”. Clause 1 then lists the number and types of buildings that the supply, fabrication, painting of “mild steel structures” would be for. Clause 1 further states that the scope of work includes:
Clause 1(e) specifies that DLE is “[t]o deliver material to site – Duty to be reimbursed by Ramo” [emphasis added].
- [23]
[23] Clause 14 on liquidated damages in the signed copy of the 20 January LOA states:
- [24]
[24] Clause 16 of the 20 January LOA on Retention Monies states:
- [25]
[25] Finally, the Schedule of Works attached to the 20 January LOA states the description of work as: “For Supply, Fabricate, Painting and Delivery of Structural steel material under the main contract …” for the quantity of 1295 mt. The rate charged was “to be [n]egotiated” and the price was also left blank.
Signing of the 20 January LOA
- [26]
[26] On 20 January 2016, a representative from Ramo’s office informed Dennis that he could come down to the office. Guna testified that Dennis arrived at the office and they had some final discussions on “some items related to the scope of work”. Parties also agreed upon the main contract completion date before Dennis signed the 20 January LOA. Sri made the necessary amendments to the terms and conditions of Ramo’s standard contract. Thereafter, Sri printed a copy of the 20 January LOA. Guna testified that after he reviewed the amendments, he passed it to Dennis to review. Thereafter, Dennis proceeded to sign two copies of the 20 January LOA without any objections to the terms. Sri testified that Dennis had brought along his company stamp to the meeting and stamped the company stamp on every page beside his signature. It is Guna’s testimony that after Dennis had signed the 20 January LOA, Guna then informed Dennis that Guna needed the copy of the signed LOA to show PRPC/Punj Lloyd that Ramo had secured a steel supplier for the project.
- [28]
[28] Dennis said that Guna assured him that the 20 January LOA was “only temporary pending finalisation of the actual written agreement between the parties” [emphasis added] and “its sole objective was to convince [PRPC/Punj Lloyd] that [Ramo] had engaged a supplier for the structural steel”. Dennis also testified that Guna informed him that “[l]ook, if you’re not comfortable, let’s leave it blank on the items that [mean] something to you”, which was the reason why the price and the quantum for the liquidated damages clause (cl 14) in the 20 January LOA had been left blank.
- [29]
[29] After reviewing the document, Dennis said he had raised objections to various clauses, including cl 1(e) of the 20 January LOA. According to Dennis, he could not agree to “deliver material to site” in cl 1(e) and informed Guna that DLE did not want to be involved in the delivery of the materials to site since that would include clearing customs. Further, Dennis testified that DLE did not agree to paying the customs duty first and then seeking reimbursement from Ramo in cl 1(e) because DLE, as the shipper and not the importer of the steel, could not pay the duty. Only the importer of the goods could pay the customs duty. Further, Dennis had an issue with cll 1(h) and 9, which specified that DLE had “to ensure to abide with [Ramo’s] programme schedule” as Dennis did not see any programme schedule in the documentation. Dennis was allegedly informed that all the details would be discussed later, and that he just needed to sign the document so that it could be submitted to PRPC/Punj Lloyd to evidence that Ramo had awarded the contract to DLE.
- [30]
[30] Dennis also allegedly objected to cl 14 on liquidated damages, noting that he was in principle not agreeable to the entire liquidated damages clause being imposed on DLE, despite his testimony that the quantum of the liquidated damages in cl 14 was left blank when he signed it. Dennis also allegedly raised objections regarding various clauses, including cl 4 on Price and Rates, cl 6 on Sub-Contract Work, cl 11 on indemnifying Ramo, cl 12 on the certificate of warranty, and cl 13 on the defects liability period. Dennis did not raise any concerns as regards the price (which was left blank) and the scope of work under cl 1(b).
- [31]
[31] Dennis further testified that he did not make any handwritten comments for any of the issues that he did not agree with in the 20 January LOA as he was told not to make any comments. Instead, Dennis was told to leave the disputed areas “blank” and “[Ramo and DLE would] come back and sign another agreement with both sides agreeing on the terms and conditions”. According to Dennis, the 20 January LOA contains no reference to the price quantum or the chargeable amount of liquidated damages.
- [32]
[32] After assurances from Ramo that the 20 January LOA was “just formality documents for them to show [their client]” and having considered that a document “without the value, without dates, without the [liquidated damages] amount” would not be a binding document based on his experience, Dennis accepted and signed the 20 January LOA without making any handwritten amendments to the document. As such, DLE argues that the 20 January LOA was not intended to be a binding agreement due to the circumstances in which Dennis had signed the 20 January LOA.
- [33]
[33] A fax dated 22 January 2016 was sent from Ramo to Punj Lloyd in which Sri forwarded a copy of the 20 January LOA, titled “Submission of Unpriced LOA – Structural Steel Works – [DLE]”. Sri also agreed that he needed to “submit an unpriced contract document to [his] client” as a confirmation that he had finalised the contract with his subcontractor for the scope of work.
Correspondence before the Oral Price Agreement by 14 February 2016
- [34]
[34] As at 20 January 2016, the price for the structural steel had not been agreed upon. The parties could not agree on the unit price of the structural steel as Dennis had to check with Dai Dung, its supplier in Vietnam, on the price and material specifications of steel that Dai Dung could supply to DLE, which DLE charged a small mark-up on. After the signing of the 20 January LOA, which dealt principally with the scope of the works, parties continued negotiating on the unit price of the structural steel.
- [36]
[36] On 4 February 2016 at 10.57am, Dennis sent an email (“4 February Email”) to Rohit, a staff of Ramo, inquiring about the following:
On 4 February 2016 at 12.05pm, Dennis sent Guna three Whatsapp messages (“4 February Messages”):
- [38]
[38] I note that Dennis’ initial offer for “CIF to Malaysia $90/MT” in the 4 February Email and “CIF $90MT Pasir gudang” in the 4 February Messages suggests that DLE’s obligation was only limited to delivery of the steel to Pasir Gudang port, and not to the Site in Pengerang. This is confirmed by Guna, who testified that this was DLE’s initial offer to deliver the steel to Pasir Gudang port, and not the Site in Pengerang. Eventually, the parties agreed upon DLE’s obligation to “deliver to site” for US$960/mt, which comprised US$900/mt for the steel works and another US$60 for delivery to the Site in Pengerang. This was recorded in the PO (see below at [59]) which describes DLE’s obligations as “Supply and fabrication … delivery of pre engineering steel structural material to site … under the main contract scope … for the construction of epcc camp for Rapid project package #22 at pengereng” [emphasis added]. This is also consistent with cl 1(e) of the 20 January LOA.
- [39]
[39] On 12 February 2016, Dennis sent Sri an email to request for the following information for DLE’s planning and execution purposes (“12 February Email”):
Oral Price Agreement before 14 February Email
- [41]
[41] Dennis could not remember the exact date on which the oral agreement on price was made. At the very least, both Ramo and DLE are in consensus that the unit price of US$960/mt was agreed upon before Sri sent an email to Dennis dated 14 February 2016 at 10.34pm (“14 February Email”). This agreed fact is crucial as the oral agreement on price is the point in time at which the Contract was crystallised, as elaborated below at [69]. This was before Ramo issued the PO to DLE, which was signed by parties on or around 28 to 29 March 2016.
Parties’ Correspondence from 14 February 2016 onwards
- [42]
[42] Since the Contract was crystallised the moment the Oral Price Agreement was made before 10.34pm on 14 February 2016, all subsequent actions by the parties after the Oral Price Agreement are efforts to amend the Contract. In determining whether the parties subsequently succeeded in amending the terms of the 20 January LOA and the Oral Price Agreement, I will assess if their subsequent correspondence had evidenced both a request of change of terms by one party and a clear acceptance by the other party, without either of which there would be no amendment to the Contract already formed. With that in mind, I now proceed to detail the parties’ correspondence from 14 February 2016 onwards.
- [43]
[43] On 14 February 2016 at 10.34pm, Sri sent Dennis a draft of the Letter of Award dated 14 February 2016 (“14 February Draft”) by way of an email to DLE, stating “[p]lease find herewith enclosed Contract document for your kind perusal”. The 14 February Draft was not signed by DLE. Sri testifies that the major differences between the 20 January LOA and the 14 February Draft are (a) the price which was inserted in the Schedule of Works at US$960,000 (based on US$960/mt for 1000 mt); (b) the schedule for delivery at cl 9; and (c) the address of the site for delivery. Ramo submits that the 14 February Draft evidenced an oral agreement between parties on the following terms: the unit price of US$960/mt, the delivery schedule with the final shipment date of 10 April 2016 and the grade material of the structural steel being SS400.
- [44]
[44] On 15 February 2016 at 8.05pm, Elaine replied to Sri, with an email attaching an unsigned draft with handwritten mark-ups on the 14 February Draft (“15 February Draft”). These handwritten mark-ups represent DLE’s comments on the 14 February Draft and the amendments were made by Elaine with the knowledge of Dennis. In the email, Elaine also informed Sri that “there [were] some clauses not applicable to [their] supply contract and would be better omitted from the contract scope to avoid confusion”. In the 15 February Draft, under cl 1(h) which states “Upon completion of fabrication, to deliver material to RAPID Site- Accommodation Camp…” (in the 14 February Draft), Elaine made the following handwritten comments beside cl 1(h): “custom[s] clearance at [port] and duty shall be paid by Ramo upon material arrival”.
- [45]
[45] In an email dated 16 February 2016 to Ramo, Dennis also confirmed receiving “all the structural drawings”.
- [46]
[46] On 26 February 2016, Elaine sent an email to Sri, stating:
- [47]
[47] On 2 March 2016, DLE sent Ramo an email enquiring about seven issues for Ramo to clarify (including item (5) where DLE sought contact details of Ramo’s Malaysian agent from whom DLE could obtain a quotation for performing customs clearance services in Malaysia, presumably on DLE’s behalf). Ramo replied on 3 March 2016 at 9.41am on the seven issues, with the email reproduced as follows (with Ramo’s replies in italics):
- [48]
[48] On 3 March 2016 at 11.58am, Elaine replied to Ramo with an email seeking to negotiate on the payment terms by Letter of Credit:
- [49]
[49] On 3 March 2016 at 1.35pm, Elaine sent an email to Sri stating:
This was with reference to the 15 February Draft of the Letter of Award.
- [50]
[50] On 3 March 2016 at 5.00pm, Ramo clarified the issue of payment terms by letter of credit by sending an email to Elaine which states, “… please try to get 60 days Credit term from the supplier, which was already confirmed with Mr. Dennis”.
- [51]
[51] On 4 March 2016 at 6.26pm, Elaine sent Ramo an email as follows:
- [52]
[52] During the period of 7 March 2016 to 9 March 2016, the relevant Whatsapp correspondence between Dennis and Guna was as follows:
At this juncture, it is apparent that Dennis was attempting to implore Ramo to alter DLE’s obligation for “delivery to site” and to issue the first letter of credit under CIF terms.
- [53]
[53] On 9 March 2016 at 4.00pm, Elaine sent Mahe (from Ramo) an email, referencing the email on 4 March 2016 and a conversation between Dennis and Mahe, stating:
- [54]
[54] On 11 March 2016, Dennis sent the following Whatsapp message to Guna:
- [56]
[56] On 21 March 2016, Sri made further amendments to the 15 February Draft and sent Elaine an email seeking DLE’s approval, enclosing a revised draft Letter of Award dated 21 March 2016. The email states:
Parties however did not ultimately sign or execute the draft Letter of Award dated 21 March 2016.
- [57]
[57] At this stage, I am inclined to take the view that the parties’ correspondence above from 14 February 2016 onwards were mere requests to alter the terms but do not evidence a clear acceptance by the other party. Hence, I find no amendments to the Contract constituted by the 20 January LOA and the Oral Price Agreement as the parties failed to vary the terms of the Contract.
Issuance of the PO by Ramo and acceptance by DLE
- [58]
[58] On 28 March 2016 at 8:24pm, Sri sent an email to DLE enclosing a copy of the PO signed by Ramo, stating:
- [59]
[59] Under the PO, the description of DLE’s obligations are as follows:
This substantively mirrored the scope of works and responsibilities in cll 1 and 1(e) of the 20 January LOA, except that the obligation of “sand blasting” was included in the PO. Sri testified that DLE’s obligation for sandblasting was merely not spelt out in the 20 January LOA but spelt out in the PO. Sri explained that the obligation of sandblasting was not a new item since both parties understood that sandblasting had to be done before the painting of the steel could be done. I accept Sri’s explanation because sandblasting creates a clean surface so that the paint can adhere well to the steel to be painted. In any case, the issue of sandblasting was not disputed between parties.
- [60]
[60] The unit price of US$960/mt in the Oral Price Agreement is stated clearly in the PO, which sets out briefly DLE’s basic scope of work. Under the PO, the contracted quantity is only for 312.50mt of steel structural material at the total amount of US$300,000.00 (based on the same unit price of US$960/mt). Most notably, DLE’s scope of work is described as “delivery of [pre-engineering] steel structural material to site” with no exclusion of “customs clearance”. This remains consistent with cl 1(e) of the 20 January LOA. The terms and conditions of the PO state:
- [61]
[61] On 28 March 2016 at 8.24pm, Dennis replied in an email to Sri, stating “Sri you put in the first term on the PO doesn’t make it easier for me to sign off quickly”. Nevertheless, DLE decided to accept the PO on 29 March 2016 at 5.13pm through an email to Ramo enclosing the PO signed and stamped by both parties. The email states, “Attached signed PO no. RI_PO_15_2754 for you to submit to bank for LC processing. Kindly send us the LC by tomorrow, thank you.” DLE signed and stamped the PO with its company stamp in accordance with cl 2 of the PO, signifying DLE’s acceptance of the terms of the PO on 29 March 2016. The consistency of the essential terms of the PO and the 20 January LOA further reinforces the binding nature of the 20 January LOA and confirms that the parties’ negotiations from 14 February 2016 onwards failed to alter the Contract especially in relation to DLE’s obligation to deliver the fabricated steel structural material to site. I do however accept that where the express terms of the PO are different from that in the Contract, they are only to that extent varied by subsequent agreement of the parties when Ramo issued the PO and DLE accepted it on 29 March 2016.
Letters of Credit
- [62]
[62] The parties agreed that the payments were to be effected by letters of credit issued by United Overseas Bank, Singapore (“UOB”) on a rolling basis.
- [63]
[63] On or around 29 March 2016, UOB issued the first letter of credit for the amount of US$300,000.00 in DLE’s favour.
- [64]
[64] On 1 April 2016, Elaine sent an email to Sri, stating:
- [65]
[65] On 20 April 2016, the shipment process was summarised in an email by Guna seeking Dennis’ confirmation on the procedure, with Dennis’ replies to the said email italicised as follows:
Step 5 of this email confirms that parties were ad idem that DLE is responsible for “delivery to site”, which would encompass customs clearance obligations.
- [66]
[66] On or around 20 June 2016, UOB issued Letter of Credit Amendment No. 4 for the revised amount of US$1,211,136.00 for 1,328 mt of structural steel material at the unit price of US$912.00/mt (see below at [115]). .
- [67]
[67] On 1 August 2016, Sri sent DLE an email stating:
On 5 August 2016, Elaine replied to Sri with an email noting that DLE had already signed the PO since 29 March 2016, and that the PO would be “sufficient as [it was] related to DLE’s scope of work”. Elaine’s view that the PO itself would be sufficient as a contract suggests that by August 2016, it was way past the contract formation stage.
My decision
Crystallisation of Contract
- [68]
[68] The following excerpt from Chow Kok Fong, Law and Practice of Construction Contracts (Sweet & Maxwell, 5th Ed, 2018) (“Law and Practice of Construction Contracts”) at paras 1.051, 1.052 and 1.059 provides guidance on the formation of construction contracts in relation to the parties, price and scope of works, as well as the role of a letter of award:
In the ordinary course of business, it is often the case that the scope of works/services are first discussed, such as the specifications and quality of the steel structural materials in the present case, before the unit price can be agreed upon because the price depends substantially on (a) how extensive the scope of works/services is; (b) how stringent the specifications are; and (c) how onerous the contractual obligations are. As Mr Chow Kok Fong rightly notes in Law and Practice of Construction Contracts at para 1.057: “the description of the works, or what is normally referred to as the scope of works, is critically important. … The terms relating to price and time can only be understood in relation to the scope of works.” Logic dictates that parties would usually negotiate over the price only after they have agreed upon the scope of works/services.
- [69]
[69] It is clear in the present instance that the Contract could not have crystallised at the time when the parties signed the 20 January LOA since the parties had not yet reached agreement on the price, which is clearly an essential term. However when the parties made the Oral Price Agreement for the agreed scope of works as set out in the 20 January LOA, this is sufficient for the formation of the Contract. Taking into account the factual chronology of events, I find that the Contract crystallised when the parties reached an Oral Price Agreement on a certain price per metric tonne for the prefabricated structural steel, and this was before Sri sent the 14 February Draft at 10.34pm on 14 February 2016. While the parties were unable to adduce evidence at trial to determine the exact point in time when the Oral Price Agreement was made, what is crucial is that the price was already agreed upon before the 14 February Draft was sent.
- [70]
[70] In determining the agreed terms of the Contract, the court looks at the signed documentation and the correspondence showing the parties’ negotiations (ie, the 20 January LOA, 2 February Message, 4 February Email, 4 February Messages and 12 February Email) that occurred up till the point when the Oral Price Agreement was made.
- [71]
[71] A variation of contract is “an agreed alteration or modification by the parties of the terms of a pre-existing contract between them” and in construction contracts, may be used by the draftsman for an agreed alteration or for extension of the contract completion date, compensatory provisions, or even the initial quoted contract price: Nicholas Dennys and Robert Clay, Hudson’s Building and Engineering Contracts (Sweet & Maxwell, 13th Ed, 2015) at para 5-017. As such, any subsequent agreement to amend the terms in the 20 January LOA after the Oral Price Agreement would be a variation of contract. Any subsequent unsigned drafts, such as the 14 February Draft and 15 February Draft, are mere evidence of the parties’ negotiations to amend terms established in the 20 January LOA and the Oral Price Agreement. With this methodology in mind, I now turn to deal with the core issue of whether the 20 January LOA is binding.
Whether the 20 January LOA is binding
- [72]
[72] I deal first with the issue of whether the 20 January LOA is part of the Contract and binding.
- [73]
[73] While the Contract was not concluded on 20 January 2016 itself, I find that the terms of the 20 January LOA constitute the agreed scope of works binding on the parties once the price based on that agreed scope of works was agreed. In other words, the terms of the 20 January LOA would form a part of the concluded Contract. I also reject DLE’s case that Dennis had signed the 20 January LOA for the sole reason of the Punj Lloyd Purpose (ie, merely to show PRPC/Punj Lloyd that Ramo had awarded the contract to DLE) and therefore the 20 January LOA was not intended by parties to be binding. I find the 20 January LOA to be a part of the Contract and binding for the following reasons.
Express wording in preamble
- [74]
[74] First, the express wording on the cover page of the 20 January LOA militates in favour of the binding nature of the 20 January LOA: “This letter shall constitute a binding agreement between [Ramo] & [DLE] based on the following terms and conditions …” [emphasis added]. Dennis must be taken to have at least read the preamble in the very first paragraph of the document. Dennis signed the last page that “confirmed and agreed on behalf of [DLE]”. In fact, he signed and stamped every page of the 20 January LOA.
- [75]
[75] I do not believe Dennis’ evidence that Guna assured him that the document was a mere formality in the sense that it would not form a part of the contract even if the parties were to agree on the price subsequently. Dennis tried to explain that the 20 January LOA was only for the Punj Lloyd Purpose and nothing else. If Dennis had genuinely believed that the 20 January LOA was never going to be binding even after the price was agreed, there would be no reason for Dennis to raise objections to 12 clauses on 20 January 2016, namely cll 1, 1(d), 1(e), 1(g), 1(h), 4, 6, 9, and 11–14. Dennis’ explanation of this contradiction was that in the worst-case scenario, he wanted to make sure that there was nothing in the 20 January LOA that could “bind” him, which meant that he must have understood the express wording in the preamble of the 20 January LOA. This, if anything, is an implicit admission of Dennis’ awareness that the 20 January LOA would be binding in that it would form a part of the contract once the parties agreed on the price based on the scope of works set out in that LOA. The 20 January LOA is essentially an incomplete agreement: the terms on the scope of works have been agreed upon, subject to the finalisation of the price.
Circumstances prior to signing of the 20 January LOA
Ramo’s Forgery
- [76]
[76] Next, I turn to deal with a preliminary issue that arose at trial of Dennis’ allegation of Ramo’s Forgery, which is essentially a dispute on the contents of cl 14. Clause 14 of the copy of the 20 January LOA in the Agreed Bundle of Documents states that the “Liquidated Damages shall be RM 10,750.00 (RINGGIT MALAYSIA TEN THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY ONLY) per day.” In contrast, cl 14 of the copy of the 20 January LOA admitted through Dennis’ Affidavit of Evidence-In-Chief (“AEIC”), had the quantum of “RM 10,750.00 … ONLY” left as a blank.
- [77]
[77] I do not believe Dennis’ testimony that the quantum of the liquidated damages in cl 14 had been left blank when Dennis signed the 20 January LOA and the quantum of RM10,750.00 both written in figures and in words was only inserted after Dennis had signed the 20 January LOA. Since it is Dennis’ testimony that the quantum was not present on the original signed copy of the 20 January LOA and every page of the 20 January LOA was signed by Dennis with his company stamp, Dennis is essentially making a serious allegation that Ramo had forged the document by inserting the quantum of RM10,750.00 both in figures and in words in cl 14 after Dennis had signed on the original document (“Ramo’s Forgery”).
- [78]
[78] Having examined the original signed 20 January LOA, I find it near impossible for Ramo to have inserted the quantum of liquidated damages of RM10,750.00 for cl 14 onto the original document which was signed and stamped by Dennis. The allegedly inserted quantum of liquidated damages both in figures and in words appear to be printed at the same time as with all the other words that were printed originally as a page for signature because of the near perfect alignment (based on a visual inspection) of the allegedly inserted figures and words with the rest of the other printed words. The only way Ramo could have done so to achieve such near perfect alignment would be by re-printing a new copy of that page of the 20 January LOA (with the quantum as stated in cl 14), and thereafter, forging Dennis’ signature and somehow obtaining and using the company stamp of DLE to stamp on that page of the document. The objective evidence of the signature and DLE company stamp on every page of the document, including that page which has the quantum of liquidated damage both in figures and words printed therein, coupled with a lack of explanation by DLE on how Ramo could have had possession of DLE’s company stamp, demonstrates the external inconsistency of Dennis’ testimony. Further, Dennis’ bald allegation is unsupported as no expert evidence has been produced by DLE to challenge the authenticity of the original 20 January LOA, despite DLE’s inspection of the original document at Ramo’s solicitors’ office.
- [79]
[79] Moreover, I find Dennis’ testimony to be internally inconsistent with his testimony that he had also objected to cl 14 as a liquidated damages clause being included in the January LOA in principle. Dennis had been allegedly assured that he should “leave the items that meant something to him blank”, which he had testified to be the price and the liquidated damages clause. He also understood that such a document “without value, without dates, without the [liquidated damages amount]” would not to be a binding document in his experience. In fact, Dennis further took the position that since the dates for the programme schedule were absent, the liquidated damages clause is not important. Given that the liquidated damages clause had its quantum left blank and was not important to Dennis, and the document was not binding between parties, it is illogical and inherently inconsistent for Dennis to have raised objections to cl 14 being imposed in principle in the 20 January LOA.
- [81]
[81] For the above reasons, I find Dennis’ allegation of Ramo’s Forgery to be unfounded. Dennis’ testimony is both internally and externally inconsistent, which demonstrates his lack of credibility: Ng Chee Chuan v Ng Ai Tee [2009] 2 SLR(R) 918 at [14]. Dennis blatantly lied on the stand by accusing Ramo of fraudulently inserting words on a signed document in the face of objective documentation to the contrary. The fact that Dennis fabricated a serious allegation of forgery by Ramo for the sheer purpose of supporting his case clearly militates against his credibility, which will be taken into account in other issues addressed in this judgment. As such, I reject Dennis’ testimony that the quantum of the liquidated damages was left blank when Dennis signed the 20 January LOA. I accept the version of 20 January LOA produced in the agreed bundle of documents, where cl 14 of the 20 January LOA states the quantum of liquidated damages amounting to RM10,750 a day.
Punj Lloyd Purpose
- [82]
[82] I now turn to address DLE’s main argument, which is that the sole purpose of the signed 20 January LOA was to convince PRPC/Punj Lloyd that Ramo had formally engaged DLE for the project (ie, the Punj Lloyd Purpose) and therefore the said letter of award was not intended to be binding. I reject DLE’s argument and now explain my reasoning.
- [83]
[83] The fact that Guna had to show Punj Lloyd a document to assure Punj Lloyd that Ramo had secured a subcontractor is an undisputed fact. Most crucially, having to show Punj Lloyd an already binding document (ie, the signed 20 January LOA subject to finalisation of price) does not subsequently make that document non-binding between the parties signing the document. I accept that there were two concurrent reasons for the parties’ signing of the 20 January LOA: (a) to have an agreed scope of works subject to the finalisation of price; and (b) to show Punj Lloyd that Ramo had reached this stage of the agreement with its subcontractor. The fact that the 20 January LOA was signed for the Punj Lloyd Purpose is not mutually exclusive from the parties’ intention to agree first on the scope of works as set out in the 20 January LOA before proceeding to agree on the price based on that agreed scope of works.
- [84]
[84] DLE’s case operates on an erroneous assumption that signing a binding document, subject to the finalisation of price, to evidence a Ramo-DLE relationship to Punj Lloyd would render the document non-binding, despite the express wording of its binding nature in its preamble. DLE is also implying that the parties had agreed to jointly misrepresent to Punj Lloyd that the signed 20 January LOA, which had all the appearances of a binding document (subject to the finalisation of price), was in fact not binding because the parties had a separate secret oral agreement, unknown to Punj Lloyd, that the signed document was never meant to be binding.
- [85]
[85] I am unconvinced that the parties would have agreed to such a joint misrepresentation. There has to be a level of accountability to Punj Lloyd when Ramo submits a signed letter of award to evidence its contractor-subcontractor relationship. To my mind, it is implausible that Punj Lloyd would have been satisfied with being assured with a non-binding document or a document that was purely for show, as Dennis alleges. Punj Lloyd, as the main contractor, would want to be assured with a binding document that evidences certain terms the parties had agreed to, subject to the finalisation of price. After all, the objective of the Punj Lloyd Purpose is to evidence that a subcontractor had been “formally engaged” for the Petronas Rapid Project, which cannot be done simply with a non-binding document. As Sri rightly notes, Ramo could not possibly submit a document ostensibly evidencing its relationship with DLE to Punj Lloyd without Punj Lloyd asking Ramo to account for DLE’s progress. In fact, Punj Lloyd did send a representative with Guna to inspect and conduct a site visit of the materials in Vietnam at or about 25–28 February 2016, after the parties had agreed on the unit price. I do not think that Ramo would be so bold as to mislead Punj Lloyd, its main contractor, with a signed document that in reality was completely non-binding and not worth the paper it was written on.
- [86]
[86] Dennis once again makes an allegation which imputes dishonesty to Guna that Ramo was knowingly sending to Punj Lloyd a document that objectively purports to be binding with express words, when in fact between the parties, it had allegedly been agreed not to be binding in any event. Dennis’ lack of credibility, which has been evidenced by his allegation of Ramo’s Forgery (see above at [81]), is once again exposed by his unfounded allegations of impropriety on the part of Ramo, simply to support DLE’s case.
- [87]
[87] For the above reasons, I do not believe the parties had entered into a separate oral agreement that the signed 20 January LOA was never to constitute a part of their agreement even if they did subsequently agree on a price based on the agreed scope of works set out in the signed letter of award. The parties’ intention to create legal relations was clearly present on 20 January 2016. The Punj Lloyd Purpose does not itself nullify the effect of the express wording of the parties’ intention to be bound by the terms of the 20 January LOA, which was conditional on the finalisation of the price.
Haste in signing
- [88]
[88] DLE further submits that the parties’ “haste” in signing the 20 January LOA, despite the price not being agreed to and no prior draft having been sent to Dennis for his vetting, suggests that the 20 January LOA was signed solely for the Punj Lloyd Purpose. Given that lack of advance notice of the terms, the comprehensive nature of the draft and the large value of the contract, DLE avers that such a “haste” to sign it could only be explained by the Punj Lloyd Purpose. As such, DLE avers that the 20 January LOA is not intended by parties to be binding.
- [89]
[89] However, the parties had prior discussions on the project before the 20 January LOA was signed. As mentioned above at [20], detailed preliminary discussions between Guna and Dennis took place prior to the 20 January LOA. Dennis admitted in his testimony that the parties had discussed: (a) the construction of the Accommodation Camp; (b) the general size of the project and the magnitude of the contract (ie, between 800 to 1000 tonnes of steel); (c) the technical requirements for the Petronas Rapid Project which were discussed with reference to drawings; (d) Ramo’s budget of slightly over US$1,000/mt; (e) the material specifications for the structural steel; (f) the urgency of the project; and (g) the schedule that Ramo had to meet for the Petronas Rapid Project for Punj Lloyd. According to Guna, when the parties were in negotiations during the meeting on 20 January 2016, they were “almost on the final [stage of] contract negotiation on the pricing”. I believe Guna’s evidence on this point.
- [90]
[90] Further, prior to the Petronas Rapid Project, Ramo and DLE had previously worked on other projects pertaining to the supply of structural steel, including the Keppel Project for similar works (see above at [19]). The standard terms enclosed in the 20 January LOA were not unfamiliar to DLE, especially since there were similar terms in the Letter of Award dated 7 September 2015 for the Keppel Project. I reject DLE’s claims that the fact that no prior draft was sent to Dennis and the “haste” with which the 20 January LOA was signed could only mean that the 20 January LOA was signed solely for the Punj Lloyd Purpose and hence was never intended to be binding.
Guna’s Alleged Reassurance
- [91]
[91] Dennis also makes the bald allegation that Guna had orally agreed with him that the document to be signed was “only temporary pending finalisation of the actual written agreement between the parties”. Even if I accept this allegation to be true (in spite of Dennis’ lack of credibility), this allegation does not suggest that the document was to remain temporary and non-binding even after the price had in fact been finalised based on the scope of works set out in that document. It does not go so far as to negate the existence of an incomplete agreement in the form of the 20 January LOA that was to be subject to the finalisation of price.
- [92]
[92] In contrast, Dennis’ explanation of the definition of “temporary” is unsatisfactory. To Dennis, this meant that the 20 January LOA had no effect whatsoever even after an agreement on the price had been reached, and not that the document was valid pending the parties’ agreement on the price and followed by the issuance and acceptance of the PO. I reject Dennis’ interpretation for the same reasons that I had earlier rejected Dennis’ claim that the parties agreed to mislead Punj Lloyd with the 20 January LOA, which only the parties themselves knew was never meant to be binding under any circumstances (see above at [84]–[85]).
- [93]
[93] Further, Dennis gave inconsistent accounts of Guna’s alleged assurances regarding the nature of the 20 January LOA. In Dennis’ AEIC, he stated that he was told the document was “temporary pending finalisation of the actual written agreement between the parties”, but later stated in cross-examination that he had been told not to worry as “this document is not binding”. In any case, Dennis eventually conceded that he could not recall if Guna had used any of the above exact words, showing further internal inconsistency.
- [94]
[94] For the above reasons, even taking DLE’s case at its highest, Dennis’ bald assertion of Guna’s representation of the 20 January LOA being “temporary” does not support but in fact weakens DLE’s case.
Absence of Price
- [95]
[95] Further, DLE argues that the absence of an agreement on price in the 20 January LOA would be consistent with the notion that parties did not intend to create legal relations, since DLE “could so easily walk away ... by simply refusing … to agree on the price”.
- [96]
[96] If parties had not subsequently agreed on the price, I can accept that there is no final contract. However, given that parties had, after negotiations, come to an agreement on price before the 14 February Email, the agreed scope of works in the 20 January LOA combined with the agreement on price constitutes a final concluded contract. The absence of initial agreement on price does not necessarily imply that parties did not intend to contract on the terms of the 20 January LOA, subject to the finalisation of price. Even in the absence of terms such as price, it is possible to find that parties had intended to contract: Law and Practice of Construction Contracts at para 1.052.
- [97]
[97] The terms in the 20 January LOA represent the scope of works and specifications which the parties had negotiated and eventually agreed to, subject to the finalisation of the price. The 20 January LOA was discussed with reference to the architectural drawings in Annex 2 (“the Drawings”), which define the quantities and dimensions of the structural steel to be supplied. Dennis was also aware of (a) the material specifications of the structural steel; (b) the technical requirements; (c) Ramo’s budget of slightly over US$1,000/mt; and (d) the rough delivery schedule before Dennis signed the 20 January LOA. Further, the PO’s description of DLE’s obligations essentially mirrors the scope of the works stated in cll 1 and 1(e) of the 20 January LOA, and serves to confirm the finding that the 20 January LOA is binding, subject to the finalisation of price.
- [98]
[98] It is therefore untrue that parties had no intention to create legal relations simply because no price had yet been agreed upon. Parties clearly intended to create legal relations on the basis that a contract based on the terms and conditions agreed in the 20 January LOA would come into existence once the parties agreed on the price. The parties agreed to the terms of and signed the 20 January LOA on the understanding that the price was to be agreed subsequently based on the agreed scope of works set out in the LOA.
Brevity of the PO and Letters of Credit
- [99]
[99] Moreover, the brevity of the PO and the Letters of Credit lends weight to the finding that the 20 January LOA is a part of the Contract.
- [102]
[102] Further, the quality of the steel is also not specified in the PO and the Letters of Credit. DLE’s case that the Contract is constituted by only the PO and the Letters of Credit is unbelievable as the description of DLE’s scope of work merely states “[supply] and fabrication … delivery of pre engineering steel structural material to site”. The requirement for SS400 grade of steel is not specified anywhere. On DLE’s case, this would mean that even scrap metal of low grade quality supplied at the unit price of US$960/mt could be covered within the terms of the Contract, if evidenced only by the terms of the PO and the Letters of Credit without the 20 January LOA. Clearly, the parties could not have intended this. DLE’s version of what documents constitute the Contract does not make any sense commercially.
Liquidated Damages Clause (cl 14 of 20 January LOA)
- [103]
[103] DLE further submits that it would be unfathomable for Dennis to agree to the sum of liquidated damages stated when the delivery schedule had not been agreed upon in the 20 January LOA. As such, Dennis signed the 20 January LOA knowing that the clause for the liquidated damages (cl 14) was not intended to be binding on the parties.
- [104]
[104] However, this argument fails as the delivery schedule had been agreed upon as part of the scope of works in the 20 January LOA, subject to the finalisation of price. The delivery schedule is enumerated in broad terms under cll 1(h) and 9 of the 20 January LOA. Clause 1(h) states that DLE’s scope of work is “[t]o ensure to abide with main contractor[’s] programme schedule”. Clause 9 states:
These terms, while seemingly disadvantageous to DLE, nevertheless spell out a delivery schedule which is dictated by and in favour of Ramo. This merely indicates that Ramo was in a stronger negotiating position than DLE and Ramo could dictate the terms that it wanted. Commercial freedom allows for the imposition of advantageous terms for the party with a stronger bargaining power. It is completely up to DLE to accept such onerous terms, which it did once DLE agreed on the price with Ramo. The existence of a delivery schedule dictated by Ramo, coupled with the preamble of the 20 January LOA which states that the document shall constitute a binding agreement between Ramo and DLE on the terms and conditions therein (including cl 14), puts paid to DLE’s argument.
- [105]
[105] I reject DLE’s averment that since there were no discussions of the liquidated damages clause between Guna and Dennis before the 20 January LOA was signed, it would be indicative that “no one was going to enforce the liquidated clause anyway”. This is because DLE had accepted the quantum of RM10,750 per day in cl 14 when Dennis signed the 20 January LOA, which would form part of the Contract the moment the parties agreed on the unit price per metric tonne of prefabricated structural steel for scope of works set out in the 20 January LOA. I have found that Ramo’s Forgery did not take place and that cl 14 of the original 20 January LOA already stated the quantum of RM10,750 per day for the liquidated damages clause when Dennis signed the document (see above at [81]).
- [106]
[106] Further, I accept Sri’s explanation that the quantum was based on Ramo’s standard form contract, which DLE would be familiar with due to their prior projects together. The lack of discussion between the parties on the quantum of liquidated damages is therefore not probative of the parties’ absence of agreement to cl 14 of the 20 January LOA. As explained above at [80], Sri had prepared the 20 January LOA on Guna’s instructions and had inserted the figure of RM 10,750 per day, a calculation arrived at based on 0.2075% of the total contract value (within the range of 0.2% to 0.25%). This is consistent with the previous amount of liquidated damages clause imposed in the Keppel Project, at 0.23% of the contract price. As such, the rate imposed by Ramo for the liquidated damages clause would not have been unfamiliar to DLE.
- [107]
[107] Finally, Dennis even admitted that it would be reasonable to include a liquidated damages clause to protect Ramo from any delay or loss that may arise should DLE fail to supply the steel in a timely manner. For the above reasons, I reject DLE’s averment as regards the parties’ lack of intention for cl 14 of the 20 January LOA to be binding when Dennis signed the document.
Retention Monies Clause (cl 16 of 20 January LOA)
- [108]
[108] I now turn to address DLE’s submissions on cl 16 of the 20 January LOA. Clause 16 on Retention Monies of the 20 January LOA states:
It is undisputed that Ramo did not withhold any retention monies for the first six shipments. On 16 June 2016, parties agreed that the retention monies from the seventh shipment onwards would be 5% on the total value of the structural steel supplied by DLE.
- [109]
[109] DLE submits that the failure of Ramo to withhold any retention monies for the first six shipments and exercise its right under cl 16 for the retention monies of 10% shows that the 20 January LOA was not binding. DLE argues that the agreement on 16 June 2016 for retention monies of 5% only arose because of the disputes in relation to the Shortfall Issue and the Unpainted Steel Issue from the first six shipments. DLE relies on this to argue that the parties never intended for cl 16 to be binding. As Sri had testified, this 5% was “security for any failings on the part of DLE in terms of shortfall and unpainted steel”. DLE argues that Sri’s testimony supports the proposition that the 5% retention sum had a different basis (ie, the Shortfall Issue and the Unpainted Steel Issue) from the 10% retention sum agreed under cl 16.
- [110]
[110] DLE also relies on a Whatsapp message from Guna to Dennis dated 14 May 2016, which states, “How come your girl is asking for 550k LC. I told you on Monday I shall release on 250k LC as final. The balance (10%) as agreed earlier to be claimed by invoice, since, there is no retention for this contract …”, to show that in Guna’s mind, there were no retention sums in the Contract. Guna’s rebuttal to this point at trial was that he had “typed wrongly” and meant that “there is no retention sums clause in the PO” and that the word “contract” in his Whatsapp message refers to the “PO”.
- [111]
[111] On the other hand, Ramo submits that the absence of retention monies for the first six shipments did not mean that the 20 January LOA was not binding on the parties. Ramo’s version of events was that there was an administrative error on Ramo’s part in omitting to “spell out” the 10% retention sum in the PO and in the subsequent Letters of Credit, which were issued based on the PO. Essentially, it was Ramo’s mistake in failing to exercise its right to 10% retention sums in its first six shipments. According to Guna, DLE was only entitled to claim for an invoice amounting to only 90% of the contract sum as per cl 16 of the 20 January LOA. The bank would not reject DLE’s claim if it had claimed 100% of the contract sum, which DLE did for the first six shipments. Thus, DLE allegedly “took advantage” of Ramo’s omission and claimed 100% of the invoice value. By the time Ramo found out about this after reviewing the first invoice, DLE had already made three to four shipments. According to Ramo, while discussions were ongoing on the retention monies in May 2016, DLE continued claiming 100% of their invoice value on further shipments and by 31 May 2016, the sixth shipment had already departed from Vietnam.
- [112]
[112] Thereafter, Sri sent Dennis a letter dated 7 June 2016 expressing Ramo’s disappointment with the Shortfall Issue and the Unpainted Steel Issue in the first 6 shipments and proposing a 10% retention sum to be applied to the entire contract value and not just the remaining shipments:
- [113]
[113] This position is reflected in the Letter of Credit (Amendment No. 3) dated 9 June 2016 which states, “LC to be negotiated to 90PCT of the Contract Value using Shipping Document. Balance 10PCT of the Contract Value USD132,192.00 to be negotiated …”. The Letter of Credit (Amendment No. 3) was not executed as DLE did not agree to it.
- [115]
[115] On or around 16 June 2016, parties further agreed that Ramo would hold 5% retention sum on the total value of structural steel. The Letter of Credit (Amendment No. 4) was revised to reflect the 5% retention sum, noting that the new credit amount was decreased to US$1,211,136.00 for the total contract value for supply of 1,328mt of structural steel material at US$912/mt, which was 95% of the original price of US$960/mt.
- [116]
[116] On the balance of probabilities, I find that Ramo made a mistake in failing to exercise its right to retention monies of 10% under cl 16 of the 20 January LOA. In its letter dated 7 June 2016, Ramo exercised its right under cl 16 to retain 10% of the “whole supply value”. I find it unlikely that DLE would agree to negotiate for a lower retention sum of 5% as reflected in the Letter of Credit (Amendment No. 4) if parties were never bound by cl 16 in the first place. The parties negotiated down the retention sum from 10% to 5% on the basis that Ramo was originally entitled to exercise its right under cl 16 for the 10% retention sum. It would be illogical for Dennis to beg Guna to “reduce” the retention sum to 5% if parties were not ad idem on Ramo’s original right to invoke cl 16 for the retention sum of 10%. On DLE’s case, DLE could have simply refused Ramo’s “proposed” new and more onerous payment terms of 5% retention monies in its letter dated 7 June 2016 if Ramo was not contractually entitled to 10% retention monies in the first place. As such, I find that the parties formed the Oral Price Agreement with the intention to be bound by cl 16 in the 20 January LOA. It is also not uncommon for construction contracts to incorporate a retention monies clause.
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