High Court · Decided 3 February 2020
AB Partners Pte Ltd v Public Prosecutor
Feedback & support[2020] SGHC 12 · Case no. Criminal Revision No 10 of 2019 · 57 paragraphs
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
Facts
- [2]
[2] The Applicant is AB Partners Pte Ltd (“AB Partners”). AB Partners is a company incorporated in Singapore on 3 October 2013 and its sole shareholder at the time of incorporation was Mr Boytsov Alexey Anatolyevich (“Boytsov”).
- [3]
[3] On 2 September 2016, the Commercial Affairs Department of the Singapore Police Force (“CAD”) seized a Credit Suisse AG account number 141469 (“the Account”) which was in the Applicant’s name, pursuant tos 35(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) (“CPC”). This was on grounds that the funds in the Account were the proceeds of criminal conduct in Russia. The Account contains US$2,935,594.62.
- [4]
[4] On 22 February 2017, Boytsov sold all his shares in the Applicant to Ang Hock Chye (“Ang”) for US$10,000.00.
- [5]
[5] On 2 June 2017, counsel for the Applicant wrote to the CAD stating that they acted for the Applicant.
- [8]
[8] On 1 March 2018, all the shares in the Applicant were transferred from Ang to Liu Kaili (“Liu”) for consideration of S$1.00. Liu remains the current sole shareholder of the Applicant.
- [9]
[9] On 13 April 2018, CAD wrote to counsel for the Applicant to give the Applicant notice of the 26 April 2018 court review.
- [10]
[10] On 24 April 2018, counsel for the Applicant informed CAD over a telephone call that the Applicant did not wish to be heard at the court review.
- [11]
[11] On 26 April 2018, CAD made a further report pursuant to s 370(1)(b) CPC (“the 2nd report”) and sought for the matter to be adjourned until investigations were complete or within 12 months, whichever was earlier.
- [15]
[15] Also on 27 February 2019, Tan Ruiyun, a Commercial Affairs Officer of the CAD, interviewed Liu as part of CAD’s investigations into the Applicant. During the interview, Liu could not provide any details or particulars regarding any bank accounts in the Applicant’s name in Singapore and could not provide any information as to the source of the funds in the Account.
- [16]
[16] On 18 April 2019, counsel for the Applicant wrote to CAD stating that Liu, who was also their client, had a right to be heard at all hearings pursuant to s 370 CPC and to further information concerning the seized property.
The parties’ cases
The Applicant’s submissions
- [18]
[18] The Applicant argued that the threshold for the court to exercise its criminal revisionary powers is if there was serious injustice (Rajendar Prasad Rai and another v Public Prosecutor and another matter [2017] 4 SLR 333 (“Rajendar”) at [24]). The wrongful retention of seized property where there is no basis in law for its continued seizure is sufficient to constitute serious injustice (Lee Chen Seong Jeremy and others v Public Prosecutor [2019] 4 SLR 867 (“Jeremy Lee”) at [110]-[115]).
- [19]
[19] The Applicant points to the legal basis for the continued seizure of the Account being s 370 CPC. Before the Magistrate grants continued seizure under s 370 CPC, the Magistrate must be satisfied that there is a reasonable basis for believing that the seized property is relevant for the purposes of any investigation, inquiry or trial (s 370(3) CPC).
- [20]
[20] Serious injustice was argued to be have been caused in the present case as:
(a) A substantial sum of US$2,935,594.62 had been seized. Seizure of a substantial amount of assets is a factor that weighs in favour of finding serious injustice (Rajendar at [68]).
(b) There was no reasonable basis for the second District Judge to believe that the funds in the Account were still relevant for the purposes of any investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceeding, as:
(i) The 3rd Report contained nothing but bare assertions that the seized funds were still relevant for investigations. Such bland assertions are insufficient to constitute such reasonable basis (Jeremy Lee at [122]; Rajendar at [48]).
(ii) The funds had been seized for more than 3 years. The longer the period that the property has been seized and detained, the greater the justification needed to show that the property is still relevant to the investigation or inquiry (Mustafa Ahunbay v Public Prosecutor [2015] 2 SLR 903 (“Mustafa CA”) at [84]).
(iii) The 3rd Report was even less certain than the 2nd Report as to the relevance of the seized funds to the investigations. The 2nd Report stated that: “funds in the… [A]ccount are traceable to criminal proceeds derived from the offences committed in Russia” [emphasis removed], whereas the 3rd Report stated that “the criminal proceeds derived from the said offences may have been transferred to the abovementioned accounts in Singapore” [emphasis in original].
(iv) There is no record that the second District Judge had requested for more information or an explanation which could have led her to conclude that there was a reasonable basis that the Account was still relevant for investigations.
(v) The investigations in Singapore had hit a brick wall as the CAD lacked requisite and critical information which was not forthcoming from the Russian authorities.
- [22]
[22] The amount that the Applicant is seeking for its operational expenses comprise:
(a) S$3,000.00 for the provision of nominee director services (March 2018 to February 2019);
(b) S$1,080.00 for the provision of secretarial service and registered address (March 2018 to February 2019);
(c) S$510.00 for the “preparation of the year ended [sic] 30 September 2017 unaudited report”, annual general meeting documents and filing of annual return;
(d) US$3,700.00 for the provision of the nominee director, secretary, registered address, compilation report, filing of annual return and taxation services (March 2019 to February 2020); and
(e) S$5,000.00 for the provision of legal services by counsel for the Applicant.
The Respondent’s submissions
- [23]
[23] The Respondent’s submissions on the legal framework are similar to the Applicant’s submissions (see [18]-[19] above).
- [24]
[24] The Respondent submits that this court should not exercise its criminal revisionary jurisdiction as there was no substantial injustice caused in this case.
- [27]
[27] In relation to the grounds of granting the extension, the Respondent argues that there was reasonable basis to believe that the funds in the Account are the traceable proceeds of a crime, based on information provided in the 3 reports. The Respondent also argues that “continued seizure is necessary to prevent the dissipation of the funds pending their return to the persons lawfully entitled to them”. In particular, the Respondent emphasises that the 1st, 2nd and 3rd reports “repeatedly state CAD’s intention to return the funds to their rightful owners, which is the basis upon which CAD sought retention of the Account and the funds therein”.
- [28]
[28] The Respondent further argues that the second District Judge should give a wider margin of appreciation in assessing investigations that have a substantial cross-border element, such as the Russian investigations in the present case. Further, it was clear from the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd reports that CAD was making progress in its investigations.
- [29]
[29] Secondly, the Respondent submits that even if the second District Judge had made an error, no substantial injustice was caused as the Applicant is unable to show lawful entitlement to possession of the seized property (Oon Heng Lye v Public Prosecutor [2017] 5 SLR 1064 (“Oon Heng Lye”) at [21]).
- [30]
[30] In relation to the Applicant’s submissions concerning ss 35(7)-(8) CPC, the Respondent submits that this court does not have criminal revisionary powers to grant the relief sought as no application has ever been made under these sections. Alternatively, the Respondent submits that these funds should not be released as there is no evidence to show that the release of funds are necessary for the Applicant’s day-to-day expenses or its legal fees.
Decision of this court
Issues
- [31]
[31] The issues before this court are:
- [32]
[32] I am satisfied that neither of the above should be granted and I set out my reasons below.
The legal framework for criminal revision of an order under s 370 CPC
Criminal revisionary jurisdiction of the High Court
- [33]
[33] It is uncontentious that this court should exercise its criminal revisionary jurisdiction only if there is substantial injustice caused (Oon Heng Lye at [14]). It has been emphasised but bears repeating that a criminal revision is not an appeal. Such substantial injustice will be caused if there is no basis in law for the continued seizure (Jeremy Lee at [112]).
Legal basis for the seizure
- [34]
[34] The legal basis for the initial seizure of the Account and the funds therein in the present case is s 35(1)(a) CPC. In comparison, the continued seizure is governed by s 370 CPC.
- [35]
[35] Section 370(1) of the CPC reads:
Which version of s 370(2) of the CPC applies
- [38]
[38] Parties did not make clear submissions on the issue of which version of s 370 CPC applies. The Applicant, in a footnote, submits that the old version of s 370 CPC should apply but did not set out any reasons in support. The Respondent did not make any submissions on which version should apply but simply cites the new version of s 370 CPC in its submissions. For completeness, the issue will be dealt with briefly in this judgment.
- [39]
[39] The new version of ss 370(1) and 370(3) CPC are essentially the same as the old version, however, there are material differences in the two versions of s 370(2) CPC. The two versions of s 370(2) CPC are set out in a table here for comparison:
Old s 370(2) CPC
New s 370(2) CPC
(2) Subject to subsection (3), and to any provisions on forfeiture, confiscation, destruction or delivery in any other written law under which property may be seized, the relevant court must, upon receiving a report mentioned in subsection (1), make such of the following orders as may be applicable:
(i) the deletion of the data from the computer, and the delivery of the computer (after the deletion of the data) to the person entitled to possession of the computer; or
(ii) if that person cannot be ascertained, the deletion of the data from the computer, and the custody and production of the computer (after the deletion of the data);
(i) the delivery of the property to the person entitled to possession of the property; or
(ii) if that person cannot be ascertained, the custody and production of the property.
- [41]
[41] It should be noted that it is not entirely clear which version of s 370(2) CPC applies as s 128 of the CJRA which deals with saving and transitional provisions, the 2nd Reading of the Criminal Justice Reform Bill 2018 (Bill 14 of 2018) found in Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, (19 March 2018) vol 94 at https://sprs.parl.gov.sg/search/fullreport?sittingdate=19-03-2018 (14 January 2020), as well as the Explanatory Statement to the Criminal Justice Reform Bill 2018 (Bill 14 of 2018) are all silent as to which version of s 370 CPC should apply. In the absence of any express provision, and if it had been necessary to decide this issue, I would have been inclined to find that the provision at the time of the latest application for continued seizure should apply.
- [42]
[42] It is not necessary for me to reach a decision on which version ofs 370(2) CPC applies as regardless of which version of s 370 is considered,s 370(2) CPC will not apply if s 370(3) CPC applies, and I find that s 370(3) CPC applies in the present case (see below).
Section 370(3) CPC and the requirement for reasonable basis
- [43]
[43] Under both versions of the CPC, s 370(2) CPC is subject to s 370(3) CPC. Section 370(3) CPC reads:
- [44]
[44] Under s 370(3) CPC, the Magistrate must not dispose of the property if: (a) there is any pending court proceeding under any written law in relation to the property in respect of which the report referred to in s 370(1) is made; or (b) it is satisfied that such property is relevant for the purposes of any: (1) investigation; (2) inquiry; (3) trial; or (4) other proceeding under any written law. This list of four purposes in s 370(3) is exhaustive.
- [45]
[45] It should be pointed out that under the previous version of s 370(3) CPC, the phrase “other proceeding under any written law” was originally “other proceeding under this Code”. This difference is not material, as the Respondent did not make submissions that the seized funds are relevant for either proceedings under the CPC, or proceedings under any written law, and does not appear to be relying on this ground of relevancy.
- [46]
[46] In determining whether the property is relevant for a s 370(3) CPC purpose, there should be enough information put before the court so that the Magistrate can have a reasonable basis for concluding that these statutory requirements are met (Rajendar at [48]):
- [47]
[47] Further, sufficient information has to be put before the court, otherwise, no real purpose is served by the involvement of the court (Rajendar at [49]):
- [48]
[48] The threshold for the information required is higher than that for the initial seizure (Rajendar at [50]):
- [49]
[49] In summary, therefore, an extension should be supported by:
(a) Sufficient information instead of mere bland or bald assertions;
(b) Information on the state of investigations; and
(c) Timelines on the expected progress of the investigations.
- [50]
[50] In determining whether the information disclosed is sufficient to provide reasonable basis for thinking that the seized property is relevant to a specified purpose under s 370(3), the court is entitled to take into account, inter alia, the period which has elapsed since the property was first seized, and the nature of the wrongdoing which gave rise to the investigation or inquiry (Mustafa CA at [84]). The longer the period the property has been seized and detained, the greater will be the justification needed to show that it is still relevant to the investigation or inquiry (Mustafa CA at [84]).
Section 370(2) CPC and the requirement for lawful entitlement
- [52]
[52] Although the relevant provision that was interpreted in Oon Heng Lye was s 392(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed) (“CPC 1985”), I am of the view that the reasoning in Oon Heng Lye can be extended to the present case.
- [53]
[53] Firstly, s 392(1) CPC 1985 appears to be the predecessor provision to s 370(2) CPC as the two provisions are substantially similar. Section 392(1) CPC 1985 reads:
- [55]
[55] Secondly, more than anything else, the reasoning in Oon Heng Lye is persuasive. Oon Heng Lye distinguished actual possession from lawful entitlement to possession and held that a person in actual possession may not be the person in lawful possession, depending on the circumstances (Oon Heng Lye at [49]). A person in actual possession of traceable proceeds of a crime has no basis for asserting any enforceable proprietary interest in such property (Oon Heng Lye at [49]). Instead, the person seeking delivery of the property has the burden of proof of showing such lawful entitlement to possession (Oon Heng Lye at [46]; s 103 of Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed)). The distinction drawn in that case between “actual possession” and “entitlement to possession” is logical and since s 370(2) CPC requires “entitlement to possession”, it should be a requirement for the person seeking delivery to prove lawful entitlement.
- [56]
[56] I also note that the High Court in Jeremy Lee had similarly extended the rule in Oon Heng Lye to apply to s 370 CPC (Jeremy Lee at [115]).
- [57]
[57] For these reasons, I find that the reasoning in Oon Heng Lye is similarly applicable to s 370(2) CPC. Since a person not legally entitled to possession has no legal right to demand delivery of the property to him, substantive injustice will only be caused to a person who can prove that he is legally entitled to possession (Oon Heng Lye at [55]).
Application to the facts
Reasonable basis
- [58]
[58] The first question then is whether the second District Judge had a reasonable basis for believing that the seized funds were relevant for one of the specified purposes under s 370(3) CPC.
- [59]
[59] As set out above at paragraph 27, the Respondent submitted that the seized funds are relevant for the purposes of preventing the dissipation of the assets, and for returning them to their rightful owners.
- [62]
[62] In any event, it is unclear if the Respondent’s newly stated purpose even falls within the ambit of one of the four specified purposes set out in s 370(3) CPC. At face value, the purpose of preventing dissipation of assets and returning assets to their rightful owner does not seem to fall within the ambit of either: (1) investigation; (2) inquiry; (3) trial; or (4) other proceeding under any written law.
- [65]
[65] The issue that has to be resolved is whether the second District Judge had a reasonable basis for believing that the seized funds were relevant for investigations.
- [66]
[66] I do accept that the second District Judge had sufficient information to provide reasonable basis for believing that the seized property is relevant to investigations:
(a) The CAD had provided a report stating that the authorities in the Russian Federation are investigating Boytsov for allegedly embezzling a minimum of RUB 4 billion from a state-owned shipyard construction project;
(b) Boytsov was the sole shareholder of the Applicant at the time that the Account was seized, and the entire sum of US$2,935,594.62 was in the Account at that time;
(c) RUB 4 billion is approximately US$65,360,00.00, and this is significantly more than the US$2,935,594.62 which was seized which means that there is a possibility that the entire sum of the seized funds was from the embezzled Russian funds;
(d) CAD had also commenced an investigation into the Applicant under s 47 of the Corruption, Drug Trafficking And Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation Of Benefits) Act (Cap 65A, 2000 Rev Ed) in relation to the seized funds; and
(e) CAD investigation revealed that the seized funds are traceable to the Russian authorities’ investigation.
- [67]
[67] Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the above information was only just sufficient at this stage of proceedings and by the next court review, more information should be provided given the substantial time that has already passed.
- [68]
[68] I appreciate that it is difficult to estimate the time that may be taken by investigations. But the longer investigations are carried out, the greater the degree of clarity one would expect, unless complications arise. If there are such complications, they should be stated. It would not be either realistic or useful to specify the degree of detail or support that is required. If at one end of the spectrum, bald statements are not sufficient, at the other end, one would not require copious details or extensive support. What is stated should at least show that the extension is bona fide, that there are investigations still ongoing, and what progress has been made or not made since the last report, and at least a brief explanation for any delay or need for further time.
- [69]
[69] It is appreciated that cross-border crimes may be complex, and that there will generally be some delay in communications with foreign agencies, as both the local and foreign investigative and prosecution agencies will need to work through their own structures in requesting and responding to requests, as well as in clarifying matters. In a large jurisdiction such as Russia, this may sometimes require communications between the headquarters or capital and officers further afield, through its own chain of communications. On the other hand, the rights of the persons affected by the seizure also need to be considered; the court needs to balance facilitating investigations while ensuring that any release is not unduly or inappropriately held up.
- [70]
[70] I note that the Applicant argues that the level of certainty in the CAD’s own reports about the traceability of the funds to the subject of the alleged offences appeared to have gone down, as compared to the initial reports. Nevertheless, this did not indicate the lack of reasonable basis by the second District Judge.
- [71]
[71] But on the next round one would expect, if things have not yet been brought to a conclusion, at least such information as would explain the need for further investigations, and what has happened in the meantime. As judgment is issued shortly before the next court review, it may be appropriate for the next Magistrate to consider a shorter extension to allow further details to be given at an intermediate point in time, rather than giving the maximum twelve month extension.
Lawful entitlement to possession
- [73]
[73] I accept the contentions of the Respondent that the Applicant has failed to show that it is lawfully entitled to the possession of the funds. It is insufficient to show that the funds were seized from the Applicant. Some evidence should be disclosed to show that the funds were lawfully obtained, or that there was some legitimate source, whether from investments, trading or otherwise. Without this, the Applicant would not be able to make out a right to the possession of those funds. Such evidence was not presented in the present case.
- [74]
[74] The following factors further cast doubt that the Applicant has lawful entitlement to possession of the funds:
(a) On 22 February 2017, Boytsov sold all his shares in the Applicant to Ang for US$10,000.00, which raises a significant doubt about why Boytsov would sell his company at such a significant undervalue if he had legal entitlement to the funds;
(b) On 1 March 2018, all the shares in the Applicant were transferred from Ang to Liu for consideration of S$1.00, which raises a significant doubt about why Ang would sell his company at such a significant undervalue if he had legal entitlement to the funds; and
(c) Liu was unable to provide any explanation about how the Applicant came to acquire the seized funds and was also unable to explain the business that the Applicant carried out, if any, and was hence unable to provide any support for the Applicant’s legal entitlement to the funds.
Release of funds under ss 35(7)-(8) CPC
- [77]
[77] In any event, I agree with the Respondent that there was insufficient evidence of the need for such payment.
Miscellaneous
- [78]
[78] The Respondent argues that the proper course should have been for the applicant to have sought review by the Magistrate of the current extension at an earlier date. I am not certain that this is a strong enough argument to deflect a criminal revision if the grounds had been made out: if there was substantial injustice in that there were insufficient grounds for an extension, there was no need to go back to the Magistrate; doing so would in effect allow the investigation agency a mulligan.
Conclusion
- [79]
[79] There was no substantial injustice caused to the Applicant and criminal revision is not warranted in this case. The application is hence dismissed.
Aedit Abdullah Judge