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Grounds publishedDecided 22 Jul 2020

High Court

Element Six Technologies Ltd v IIa Technologies Pte Ltd

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[2020] SGHC 140Case no. Suit No 26 of 201613 paragraphs

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Grounds of decision

Official text from eLitigation

  1. Background

  2. [3] In the Judgment, I found that IIa was responsible for manufacturing all three Samples. On the counterclaim for revocation, I found that SG 872 was valid while SG 508 was not. IIa’s confidential process did not withstand scrutiny. E6 was able to show that IIa had used SG 872 to manufacture the Samples, while the result on SG 508 was not conclusive in view of my finding as to its anticipation by prior art. Therefore, infringement was made out on SG 872 while the invalidity of SG 508 functioned as a defence to any infringement of SG 508.

  3. IIa’s offer to settle

  4. [4] I consider IIa’s offer to settle (“OTS”) as a preliminary matter. IIa contended that O 22A r 9(3) of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (“ROC”) applied on the basis of the OTS it served on E6 on 3 March 2017. The material terms of the OTS are as follows:

  5. Costs of the suit

  6. (a) whether the issue-based approach or the Tullio approach was applicable in the present case;

  7. (b) the conduct of IIa, arising out of which E6 asked for indemnity costs, and that of E6, which was also relevant to the issue of costs; and

  8. (c) the importance of proportionality and reasonableness of the parties’ conduct in the court’s exercise of its discretion on costs.

  9. What is the appropriate approach to apply?

  10. E6’s approach

  11. IIa’s issue-based approach

  12. The different forms of the “issue-based approach”

  13. This form of the issue-based approach differs from the Tullio approach in how it approaches the scope of the “event”. It is in this sense that IIa proposed using the issue-based approach, to distinguish between SG 872 and SG 508. I refer to this as the Summit approach.

  14. [20] Second, an “issue-based approach” may refer to the approach used by the English Patents Court in Monsanto Technology LLC v Cargill International SA (No. 2) [2008] FSR 16 (“Monsanto”) at [7]–[8]. I refer to this as the Monsanto approach and a fundamental point of distinction with the Summit approach is that in the Monsanto approach the court still begins by considering who the successful party overall is, and any issues for which the successful party has been unsuccessful is assessed in that context. As I will explain (see [25] onwards), this is the approach now commonly applied in the English Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (SI 1998 No 3132) (UK) (“CPR”).

  15. The Summit approach

  16. [21] I deal first to the Summit approach advocated by IIa. This is not the first time that the Summit approach has been raised in Singapore. In Khng Thian Huat, V K Rajah JC (as he then was) preferred to reserve the approach for the exceptional case, explaining at [21]:

  17. [23] However, Dometic was a case where it was apparently not possible to identify a “winning” or “losing” party: the plaintiff had failed to establish its claim of infringement and the defendant had failed to establish its claim of invalidity. Each side had won and lost something, almost in equal proportions. Both sides failed in the issues that they had brought for the court’s consideration. This was not the situation at hand. All the other patent cases raised by IIa – Schütz (UK) Limited v Werit UK Limited, Protechna SA [2010] EWHC 1197 (Pat), Novartis AG and CIBA Vision AG v Johnson & Johnson Medical Limited and Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc [2009] EWHC 2029 (Pat), Omnipharm Limited v Merial [2012] EWHC 172 (Pat) and Vernacare Ltd v Environmental Pulp Products Ltd [2012] EWPCC 49 – indicate that the courts have taken the Monsanto approach. Summit is not paradigmatic of the issue-based approach; it is better explained, at least in this jurisdiction, as a specific application that has no relevance where an overall winner may be identified, which is the situation at hand.

  18. [24] Summit, therefore, was of no application to this case.

  19. The Monsanto approach

  20. [25] I turn to the Monsanto approach. Colin Birss et al, Terrell on the Law of Patents (Sweet & Maxwell, 19th Ed, 2020) (“Terrell”) at paras 21-231 and 21-233 summarises the Monsanto approach as follows:

  21. The rationale for the Tullio and Monsanto approaches

  22. Patent cases

  23. [33] In a similar vein Jacob LJ in Smithkline Beecham stated at [25]:

  24. The facts of this case

  25. E6’s entitlement as the overall winner

  26. Principles concerning indemnity costs orders

  27. (a) where the action is brought in bad faith, as a means of oppression or for other improper purposes;

  28. (b) where the action is speculative, hypothetical or clearly without basis;

  29. (c) where a party’s conduct in the course of proceedings is dishonest, abusive or improper; and/or

  30. (d) where the action amounts to wasteful or duplicative litigation or is otherwise an abuse of process.

  31. Conduct of IIa

  32. [44] In the present case, IIa’s main defence lay in its attack on the novelty and inventiveness of SG 872 and SG 508. However, IIa’s overall strategy was to defend every issue, without regard to its merit. For example, the objections it made regarding foreign amendments, post-grant amendments and allegations about E6’s misrepresentations to the Intellectual Property Office of Singapore lacked conviction and were not relevant (see Judgment at [326]–[331]). Numerous and multiple pieces of prior art were raised on the main claims (Claims 1 and 62 od SG 872 and Claim 1 of SG 508), of which only a fraction was key when the experts took the stand.

  33. [45] There were two points, in particular, where it could be said that IIa’s pursuit of certain issues was speculative, hypothetical and without basis. The first was IIa’s pursuit of the issues of the provenance and chain of custody relating to the Samples. As a result of this emphasis, IIa spent 5.5 days out of six days that E6’s witnesses were on the stand cross-examining them on those issues during the first set of trial dates. E6 was forced to establish every single link in the handling of the Samples. There were also aspects of IIa’s conduct that suggested that these arguments were, in part, merely strategic. For example, when E6 initially had difficulty locating its trap purchaser, Mr Pascal Pierra, IIa sought to expunge his affidavit. Subsequently, however, when IIa’s bluff was called and Mr Pierra was located, IIa chose not to cross-examine him. IIa also made various allegations of fraud, evidence tampering, witness collusion and manufacturing of evidence without any basis. I alluded to this stance in the Judgment at [339], [360], [372], [379], [394], and [410].

  34. Conduct of E6

  35. [47] IIa argued that there was also misconduct on E6’s part, for three reasons. First, IIa complained that E6 did not engage in settlement negotiations despite offers to settle sent on 1 February and 3 March 2017. This argument was a non-starter, given my views on the OTS.

  36. [48] Second, IIa also claimed that E6 had ambushed it by disclosing a large number of documents before and during trial, on 18 March 2019 (before the first tranche) and on 22 March 2019 (during the first tranche), which necessitated urgent inspection of the documents during trial. From what I saw of the documents, these related to the minutiae of the provenance and chain of custody of the Samples, comprising documents such as daily records of the Samples, and were the result of IIa’s wide-ranging and undiscerning demand for E6 to prove every link in the chain from the Samples’ origins as if this were a drug trafficking case, relying on Mohamed Affandi bin Rosli v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2019] 1 SLR 440 (in which context the Court of Appeal made clear in any event at [41] that “speculative arguments” about a break in the chain of custody would not be entertained: Judgment at [360]).

  37. [51] The above notwithstanding, E6 could and should have exercised more restraint and greater reasonableness throughout the progress of the suit. The pre-trial process was characterised by lengthy interlocutory and discovery applications on both sides. The assistant registrar’s decisions in [2017] SGHCR 16, concerning E6’s 165 requests for further and better particulars, and [2018] SGHCR 13, which the decision records was heard over four days of oral argument and involved about 400 pages of written submissions, give a flavour of the written submissions, affidavits and oral arguments used by both parties in a wide gamut of interlocutory applications and pre-trial conferences, with much intervening correspondence. The nuggets that were valid in the points taken were accompanied by other matters unreasonably asserted or defended. Every point that could conceivably be argued very possibly was; more consideration for courtesy to fellow members of the Bar and respect for judicial resources would have been appropriate. Coming back to the issue of IVCs, such a practice would be a useful means in patent cases of enabling technical experts to weigh in early and bring efficient definition to issues of validity. In this case, E6 initially asserted 33 claims in SG 872 and 24 claims in SG 508. After I asked E6 in a pre-trial conference to identify the IVCs, it identified 31 claims in SG 872 and 12 claims in SG 508 as IVCs. It was not until after Senior Counsel took over conduct of the case, after experts’ affidavits were filed, and only at the second tranche of trial dates, that arguments on validity focused on Claims 1 and 62 of 872, and Claim 1 of 508.

  38. The court’s discretion on costs

  39. Conclusion