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Grounds publishedDecided 21 Jul 2020

High Court

CDM and others v CDP

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[2020] SGHC 141Case no. Originating Summons 1307 of 2019 and Originating Summons 1124 of 2019 (Summons 5816 of 2019)

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] In Originating Summons 1307 of 2019 (“OS 1307/2019”), [CDM] (“CDM”), [CDN] (“CDN”) and [CDO] (“CDO”) are the Plaintiff applicants while [CDP] (“CDP”) is the Defendant and vice versa in Originating Summons 1124 of 2019 (“OS 1124/2019”). CDM, CDN and CDO were the respondents in arbitration proceedings seated in Singapore and CDP was the claimant. For consistency and to avoid confusion, I will, throughout these grounds of decision, refer to CDM, CDN and CDO as the “1st Plaintiff”, “2nd Plaintiff” and “3rd Plaintiff” respectively (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”), and to CDP as the “Defendant”.

  3. [2] The applications before me arose out of a contract for, inter alia, the construction of an offshore drilling rig or more precisely, a Self-Erected Tender Rig and Derrick Equipment Set. Disputes arose between the parties in the course of performance of the contract and arbitration proceedings ensued in Singapore. The arbitration proceedings culminated in a partial arbitration award rendered in the Defendant’s favour. The Defendant sought to enforce the award in OS 1124/2019 and in response, the Plaintiffs applied to set it aside in OS 1307/2019. Whether the arbitral tribunal acted in excess of its jurisdiction or breached the rules of natural justice in the making of the award were among the issues that I had to determine.

  4. [3] The Plaintiffs are companies incorporated in Singapore. The Defendant, a shipbuilder, is a company incorporated in the People’s Republic of China. The 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs entered into contracts with the Defendant, under which the Defendant agreed to design, build, launch, equip, commission, test, complete, sell and deliver to each of the 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs a Self-Erected Tender Rig and a Derrick Equipment Set. The 3rd Plaintiff, which is the holding company of the 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs, issued a Guarantee to the Defendant on behalf of the 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs as security for the performance of the 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs’ obligations under the contracts.

  5. [4] The underlying disputes between the parties arose out of the following agreements (the “Agreements”), the details of which have been anonymised to maintain confidentiality:

  6. (a) a Contract for the Design, Construction and Completion of a Self-Erected Tender Rig and Derrick Equipment Set (“Hull No. X”) between the 1st Plaintiff and the Defendant dated 9 June 2013 as subsequently amended (“Contract X”);

  7. (b) a Guarantee furnished to the Defendant by the 3rd Plaintiff on 9 June 2013 in respect of Contract X (“X Guarantee”);

  8. (c) a Contract for the Design, Construction and Completion of a Self-Erected Tender Rig and Derrick Equipment Set (“Hull No. Y”) between the 2nd Plaintiff and the Defendant dated 9 June 2013 as subsequently amended (“Contract Y”); and

  9. (d) a Guarantee furnished to the Defendant by the 3rd Plaintiff on 9 June 2013 in respect of Contract Y (“Y Guarantee”).

  10. [5] After entering into Contract X, the Defendant and the 1st Plaintiff entered into various addenda. Addendum No. 1 was entered into on 15 April 2014 by the 1st Plaintiff and Defendant. Nothing turns on this addendum. Of relevance to the applications before me was Addendum No. 2 which was entered into by, amongst other parties, the 1st Plaintiff and Defendant on 24 September 2014 (“Contracts Addendum No. 2”). Article 6 of Contracts Addendum No. 2, inter alia, varied the payment terms in Contract X and in particular provided as follows:

  11. [6] Disputes arose in relation to the Agreements and the Defendant commenced arbitration in Singapore, in accordance with the arbitration provisions in the Agreements, under the auspices of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (“SIAC”) and its rules (the “Arbitration”). Following an oral hearing and parties submitting written closing submissions, the Tribunal rendered a Final Partial Award (“the Award”) in the Defendant’s favour on 15 August 2019. The Award dealt with the claims and counterclaims made under both Contract X and Contract Y.

  12. [10] As foreshadowed at [7], in OS 1307/2019, the Plaintiffs applied to set aside the Award pursuant to the provisions of the International Arbitration Act (Cap 143A, 2002 Rev Ed) (“the Act”) (the “Setting Aside Application”). The Plaintiffs relied on the following grounds:

  13. (a) that the Award was made in excess of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, in breach of Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (“the Model Law”) as set out in the First Schedule (“Sch 1”) to the Act; and

  14. (b) that the Award was made in breach of the Plaintiffs’ right to present its case, in violation of Article 34(2)(a)(ii) of the Model Law and/or in breach of the rules of natural justice, in violation of s 24(b) of the Act.

  15. Summary of factual background to the Defendant’s claim and the Award

  16. [12] I take most of the background facts from the Award. In summary, the Defendant as the builder of Hull No. X claimed that it had fulfilled all the conditions for payment under Article 6(d) of Contracts Addendum No. 2 (see [5] above) and was therefore entitled to payment of a Fourth Instalment in respect of the construction of Hull No. X. The Fourth Instalment amounted to US$13.9 million. The Plaintiffs, on the other hand, contended that they were not liable to pay the Defendant as the Defendant had failed to fulfill the conditions precedent necessary for liability on the part of the Plaintiffs to arise. The Plaintiffs further contended that the Defendant was itself in breach of its contractual obligations to complete and deliver Hull No. X to the 1st Plaintiff, and that this gave rise to a counterclaim against the Defendant.

  17. [13] Under Contract X (and specifically under Article 6(d) of Contracts Addendum No. 2), the Defendant was required to, inter alia, launch Hull No. X as one of the conditions to obtain payment of the Fourth Instalment. It is undisputed that on 20 January 2015, the Defendant purported to launch Hull No. X into the water. On the same day, the 1st Plaintiffs’ project manager emailed the Defendant stating, inter alia, that they “[did] not consider the floating as launching”. Whether that launch was proper or valid and whether prior approval had been given by the 1st Plaintiff for the launch (which was another condition under Article 6(d) of Contracts Addendum No. 2) were matters that were hotly contested in the Arbitration. On 7 February 2015, pursuant to Article 6(d) of Contracts Addendum No. 2, the Defendant issued an invoice for the Fourth Instalment.

  18. [14] After the purported launch on 20 January, various meetings involving the parties’ representatives were held on 21 January, 7 April and 28 April 2015 (“Construction and Progress Meetings”). The purpose of the Construction and Progress Meetings was, among others, to iron out and update various outstanding items or deficiencies in the construction of Hull No. X that the 1st Plaintiff required the Defendant to remedy. These meetings were minuted and the minutes contained the following question - “Launching Condition: [Defendant] asked what items remaining to be considered Launching condition and not Floating condition?” Immediately under this question was a notation “Owner [1st Plaintiff] reply the following remaining items must be completed before can consider to be Launching condition”. The minutes then listed a number of items that the 1st Plaintiffs required the Defendant to complete.

  19. [15] Simply put, the abovementioned question in the meeting minutes contained under it a list of outstanding items or deficiencies that had to be rectified by the Defendant following the purported (and disputed) launch of Hull No. X on 20 January 2015. In the minutes of each of the Construction and Progress Meetings, the list was updated to reflect items that had been rectified and items that were still outstanding. This list would feature significantly, not just in the Arbitration, but as will be seen below, also in the Plaintiffs’ application in OS 1307/2019.

  20. [16] The minutes of the meeting held on 28 April 2015 were of particular importance. These minutes contained the notations “Undocking is planned for 3rd May” and “Undocking on 13:30, 3rd of May, 2015” after the list of items. In the Award, the Tribunal found that by that date (ie. 28 April 2015), all outstanding items in the list had been resolved and the 1st Plaintiff had approved that Hull No. X was in launching condition (see [25] below). Hull No. X was undocked and launched a second time on 3 May 2015. As I mentioned at [13], apart from physically launching Hull No. X, the prior approval of the 1st Plaintiff to launch Hull No. X was another condition that needed to be met under Article 6(d) of Contracts Addendum No. 2 before the Defendant would be entitled to payment of the Fourth Instalment. For completeness, under Article 6(d) of Contracts Addendum No. 2, in addition to the 1st Plaintiff’s prior approval, the prior approvals of the Defendant and the Classification Society of Hull No. X were also required for the launching of Hull No. X.

  21. [17] Following the second launch on 3 May 2015, the Defendant again demanded payment of the Fourth Instalment on 5 May 2015. As payment was not forthcoming, the Defendant issued a default notice on 3 August 2016 pursuant to the terms of the X Guarantee requesting that the Plaintiffs pay the Fourth Instalment. Payment was still not forthcoming. That led to the Defendant commencing the Arbitration against the Plaintiffs. The Defendant issued its Notice of Arbitration (“NOA”) on 26 September 2016.

  22. [18] The 1st Plaintiff subsequently sought to terminate Contract X by a letter dated 27 October 2016, approximately a month after the Arbitration had been commenced. The 1st Plaintiff accused the Defendant of repudiatory breach of Contract X and purported to accept its repudiation. In response to this, by its letter of 4 November 2016, the Defendant treated the 1st Plaintiff’s letter as itself a repudiation of Contract X by the 1st Plaintiff. The Defendant accepted the 1st Plaintiff’s repudiation as “bringing [Contract X] to an immediate end without prejudice to all [the Defendant’s] rights under the Contract and in law including [the Defendant’s] right to damages for wrongful repudiation”.

  23. [19] Following the constitution of the Tribunal, the Arbitration progressed to an oral hearing which took place between 21 and 25 May 2018. Both parties called factual and expert witnesses. After the conclusion of the oral hearing, the parties submitted to the Tribunal detailed written closing and reply submissions.

  24. [20] In the Arbitration, the Defendant’s case was that Hull No. X was launched on 20 January 2015 in accordance with Contract X. The 1st Plaintiff, having witnessed and not objected to the launch, was not entitled to claim that it did not approve it. Further, the 1st Plaintiff was not entitled to unreasonably withhold approval for the launch since the launch conditions had been met. In any event, the Defendant had worked with the Plaintiffs to resolve the outstanding issues that the Plaintiffs had raised in relation to the launch, and these issues were resolved by the time of the second launch on 3 May 2015. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs were liable to pay the Fourth Instalment.

  25. [21] As for the Plaintiffs, the essence of their case in the Arbitration was that Hull No. X had not been launched by the Defendant on 20 January 2015, 3 May 2015 or at all. Further, the Defendant, the 1st Plaintiff and the Classification Society of Hull No. X had not collectively approved the launch of Hull No. X. Specifically, the 1st Plaintiff did not give its prior approval for the launch on 20 January 2015. Further, even if the Defendant had completed the outstanding works and launched Hull No. X in May 2015, the Defendant had still failed to request and obtain the 1st Plaintiffs’ prior consent or approval for that second launch. Therefore, the Plaintiffs were not obliged to pay the Fourth Instalment as the conditions precedent in Article 6(d) of Contracts Addendum No. 2 were never complied with by the Defendant.

  26. [22] Before delving into the finer details of the parties’ pleadings, submissions and their conduct of the Arbitration culminating in the Award which I cover later in these grounds, it would be useful at this point to set out briefly, as an aide memoire, the key issues the Tribunal considered in the Arbitration and its conclusions on those issues.

  27. [23] In the Award, the Tribunal set out 17 issues which it had to determine in relation to the claims for both Hull No. X and Hull No. Y, having regard to the parties’ Agreed List of Issues (the “ALOI”). Issues 1 to 3, which bear specific relevance to the Defendant’s Hull No. X claim and the Plaintiffs’ application in OS 1307/2019, are reproduced below:

  28. (1) In respect of [Contract X], what are the conditions that must be satisfied before [the Defendant] is entitled to payment of the Fourth Instalment in the sum of USD13.9 million pursuant to Article 6(d) of Contracts Addendum No. 2? [Issue 1];

  29. (2) In respect of [Contract X], did [the Defendant] satisfy the conditions for payment of the Fourth Instalment in the sum of USD13.9 million pursuant to Article 6(d) of Contracts Addendum No. 2? [Issue 2];

  30. (3) In respect of [Contract X], was there any valid reason for [the 1st Plaintiff] to withhold payment of the Fourth Instalment in the sum of USD13.9 million? [Issue 3];

  31. [24] On Issue 1, the Tribunal found that one of the conditions that must be satisfied before the Defendant would be entitled to payment was for the Defendant, the 1st Plaintiff and the Classification Society of Hull No. X (namely, the American Bureau of Shipping or “ABS”) to collectively approve the launch of Hull No. X. The Tribunal came to this conclusion “in light of the clear wording of Article 6(4) of Contracts Addendum No. 2”.

  32. [25] On Issue 2, the Tribunal found that the Defendant, the 1st Plaintiff and ABS had collectively given their approval for the launch of Hull No. X, with the 1st Plaintiff having given its approval on 28 April 2015 for the second launch on 3 May 2015. The Tribunal found that the minutes of the Construction and Progress Meetings that took place on 7 and 28 April 2015 recorded that the Defendant had resolved all the remaining items in the list which the 1st Plaintiff required the Defendant to remedy before Hull No. X was considered to be in “Launching Condition”. The Tribunal also found that the minutes recorded the 1st Plaintiff’s clear acceptance that the outstanding requirements had been met. By its acceptance that the outstanding issues had been resolved, the Tribunal found that the 1st Plaintiff had also given its approval for the second launch. Even if the minutes did not show that the 1st Plaintiff had given its approval for the launch of Hull No. X, the 1st Plaintiff would be treated as having approved it.

  33. [26] In reaching the conclusions at [25] above, the Tribunal accepted the Defendant’s submission that it would have been unreasonable for the 1st Plaintiff to withhold approval for the launch after it had approved Hull No. X as being in “Launching Condition”. The Tribunal made clear that its finding that the launch of Hull No. X was approved was based on the 1st Plaintiff having given its approval on 28 April 2015, and not based on any argument of estoppel. The Tribunal therefore found, in respect of Issue 2, that the Defendant had satisfied the conditions for payment of the Fourth Instalment.

  34. The Stay Application

  35. Whether the Stay Application should have been granted

  36. [28] Given the terms in which the Stay Application was crafted, I will first explain my decision on the Stay Application before moving on to the substantive issues in OS 1307/2019.

  37. [29] There are three possible permutations as far as the ambit of the Stay Application is concerned: the first being a stay pending the hearing of OS 1307/2019; the second being a stay between 6 February 2020 (the date on which I reserved my decision in OS 1307/2019) and the date on which I delivered my decision, ie. 28 February 2020, and the third being to construe the Stay Application as one seeking a stay of execution pending the final disposal of OS 1307/2019 (including any appeals therefrom).

  38. [31] As for the third possible permutation of the Stay Application, I did not read the Stay Application as being so wide as to encompass even a stay of execution pending appeal, as opposed to an application for a more limited interim stay until OS 1307/2019 was heard and determined by me. It is clear from the affidavit filed by the Plaintiffs in support of the Stay Application that they were only seeking a stay or adjournment of enforcement proceedings until OS 1307/2019 was heard and determined at first instance. The supporting affidavit stated that the Plaintiffs were seeking a “stay of the enforcement of the Final Partial Award and the execution of the judgments or Orders of Court… pending the hearing of the [Plaintiffs’] setting aside application, which has been fixed by the Court tentatively on 18 February 2020 at 10.00 am” (emphasis added). The affidavit then went on to state as follows:

  39. [33] In the circumstances, given the Plaintiffs’ clear intention that the orders applied for in the Stay Application were intended to be interim ones pending the hearing and disposal of OS 1307/2019 by me at first instance, there is, in my view, no basis on which to construe the application more widely than what is evinced from the Plaintiffs’ supporting affidavit or counsel’s submissions made during the hearing.

  40. [35] The legal principles governing a stay of execution pending appeal have been pithily summarised by Justice Quentin Loh in Strandore Invest A/S and others v Soh Kim Wat [2010] SGHC 174 (“Strandore Invest”) at [7], referencing the Court of Appeal’s decision in Lian Soon Construction Pte Ltd v Guan Qian Realty Pte Ltd [1999] 1 SLR(R) 1053 (“Lian Soon Construction”), as follows:

  41. (a) While the court has the power to grant a stay, and this is entirely at the discretion of the court, the discretion must be exercised judicially, ie, in accordance with well-established principles.

  42. (b) The first principle is that, as a general proposition, the court does not deprive a successful litigant of the fruits of his litigation, and lock up funds to which he is prima facie entitled, pending an appeal. There is no difference whether the judgment appealed against was made on a summary basis or after a full trial.

  43. (c) This is balanced by the second principle. When a party is exercising his undoubted right of appeal, the court ought to see that the appeal, if successful, is not nugatory. Thus a stay will be granted if it can be shown by affidavit that, if the damages and costs are paid, there is no reasonable probability of getting them back if the appeal succeeds.

  44. (d) The third principle follows, and is an elaboration of the second principle, that an appellant must show special circumstances before the court will grant a stay.

  45. [36] In Strandore Invest, Loh J elaborated on the abovementioned principles in the following terms (at [7]):

  46. All other rules follow and are derived from the application of these three principles to the individual circumstances and facts of each case. For example, the likelihood of success is not by itself sufficient, and a bald assertion of the likelihood of success in an affidavit is inadequate. Otherwise, a stay would be granted in every case because every appellant must expect that his appeal will succeed. Finally, it is neither possible, nor desirable, to give a catalogue of all the circumstances that would qualify to be considered as special. The court in every case will have to examine the facts to see if special circumstances justifying the grant of a stay of execution exist based upon the application of the three principles.

  47. [37] In Strandore Invest, the respondent applied for a stay of execution pending its appeal against the High Court’s decision to grant the applicants leave to enforce a foreign arbitral award. Lian Soon Construction involved an application for a stay of execution pending an appeal against the lower court’s decision to grant summary judgment. Neither case involved a stay on terms similar to the Stay Application.

  48. [39] In my view, conceptually, it is logical that the principles governing applications for stay of execution of judgments or orders pending appeal should also generally be applicable to the more limited type of stay application mentioned at [38] above. In substance, similar considerations arise in both situations: the court seeks, on the one hand, to balance the interests of a successful judgment (or award) creditor in enjoying the fruits of its litigation (or arbitration as the case may be), and on the other, the interests of a judgment (or award) debtor such that the appeal (or setting aside application), if successful, is not rendered nugatory.

  49. [40] The High Court in Man Diesel Turbo SE v IM Skaugen Marine Services Pte Ltd [2019] 4 SLR 537 (“Man Diesel Turbo”) alluded to this similarity in the applicable legal principles. In Man Diesel Turbo, Man Diesel Turbo obtained leave of the Singapore High Court ex parte to enforce an arbitral award issued in arbitration proceedings prosecuted in Denmark. IM Skaugen sought to challenge the enforcement of the award and sought, as an alternative prayer, to adjourn enforcement of the award pending the determination of its application to set aside the award which had been filed in the Danish courts. The High Court stated at [37] in relation to s 31(5) of the Act (which applies to enforcement of a foreign award) that:

  50. [45] The first line of authority was found in Far East Shipping v AKP Sovcomflot [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 520 (which was also cited in Strandore Invest ([35] supra) at [16]). In that case, Potter J noted that, having elected to convert an award into an English judgment, the plaintiff ought in principle to be subject to the same procedural rules and conditions as generally apply to the enforcement of such judgments (see BSG Resources at [50]). The second line of authority was found in Socadec SA v Pan Afric Impex Co [2003] EWHC 2086 (Comm) (“Socadec”), where the English court held that the principles which a judge should apply were (a) firstly, the strength of the argument that the award was invalid, assessed on a “brief consideration” and not a mini trial; and (b) secondly, the ease or difficulty of the enforcement of the award and whether if enforcement was withheld or delayed it could become more difficult by the movement of assets, problems of trading, disappearance of the defendant (see BSG Resources at [52]).

  51. [47] Returning to the case at hand, the Defendant pointed out that the following factors militated against the grant of a stay. First, there was no evidence that the Defendant would be unable to return the monies paid to it under the Award. On the contrary, the Defendant was a shipyard of means. Second, the Plaintiffs have displayed conduct that showed its attempts to delay and frustrate the enforcement of the Award. This included the fact that the 2nd and 3rd Plaintiffs had not paid the sums awarded to the Defendant under that part of the Award concerning the Contract Y claim which was not being challenged. Third, there were no special circumstances present to justify granting a stay.

  52. [48] As for the Plaintiffs, their supporting affidavit contained a bare assertion that if a stay was refused prior to the disposal of OS 1307/2019 or if the Stay Application was only to be heard at the same time as OS 1307/2019, it would render a successful outcome in OS 1307/2019 nugatory (see [31] above). The Plaintiffs also stated in their affidavit that their application to set aside the Award had a reasonable prospect of success, and that a stay would not be prejudicial to the Defendant as it could proceed with the enforcement proceedings after the determination or disposal of the Setting Aside Application.

  53. [49] Applying the principles at [46] above and considering the circumstances of this case, I did not find any basis on which to allow even the second permutation of the Stay Application.

  54. [50] First, as submitted by the Defendant, the Defendant was a shipyard of means and there is no evidence that the Defendant would be unable to repay any amount paid to it under the Award should the Plaintiffs prevail in OS 1307/2019. This was not challenged by the Plaintiffs. Second, even on a brief assessment of the Plaintiffs’ application in OS 1307/2019, it could not be said that the Plaintiffs’ case was of such merit that a temporary stay of enforcement should be granted.

  55. [51] Finally, there were no special circumstances that militated in favour of granting such a stay. In fact, no evidence was adduced by the Plaintiffs of any special circumstances.

  56. [53] Finally, as highlighted at [30] above, the Plaintiffs had agreed for the Stay Application and OS 1307/2019 to be heard together. The Plaintiffs did not request for the hearing of the Stay Application to be brought forward and heard before the hearing of OS 1307/2019. This was, in my view, indicative that there was little merit in the Stay Application and that it had been filed merely as a tactical move to try and stall the enforcement proceedings instituted by the Defendant. For the foregoing reasons, I dismissed the Stay Application.

  57. [54] I now turn to OS 1307/2019.

  58. OS 1307/2019 - The Setting Aside Application

  59. [55] As summarised at [10] above, the Plaintiffs applied to set aside the Award on two grounds: first, that the Award was made in excess of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, and second, that it was made in breach of the Plaintiffs’ right to present its case and/or in breach of the rules of natural justice. I shall address each of these grounds in turn.

  60. Preliminary Issue - Time Limit for making the application

  61. [56] The Defendant initially asserted that the Plaintiffs had filed OS 1307/2019 out of time. This was incorrect.

  62. [57] It is common ground that the parties received the Award on 16 August 2019. As stipulated in Article 34(3) of Sch 1 to the Act and O 69A r 2(4) of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (“ROC”), any application to set aside an award must be filed (barring any request made under Article 33 for an award to be corrected) within three months after the parties receive the award. OS 1307/2019 was filed by the Plaintiffs on 18 October 2019, well before the three-month time limit expired.

  63. Did the Tribunal act in excess of its jurisdiction and determine matters that were outside the scope of submission to arbitration?

  64. [59] When a party seeks to challenge an arbitral award on the ground that the award (or part thereof) determined matters that were not within the scope of submission to arbitration, as noted in Sui Southern Gas Co Ltd v Habibullah Coastal Power Co (Pte) Ltd [2010] 3 SLR 1 at [34], the task of the court is to ascertain:

  65. (a) the matters which were within the scope of submission to the arbitral tribunal; and

  66. (b) whether the arbitral award (or the part being impugned) involved such matters, or whether it was a “new difference” which would have been “irrelevant to the issues requiring determination” by the arbitral tribunal.

  67. [61] In addition to the pleadings of the parties, the court may also refer to the list of issues agreed by the parties, as a reference point for determining what issues or matters were within the scope of submission (see for example, GD Midea Air Conditioning Equipment Co Ltd v Tornado Consumer Goods Ltd and another matter [2018] 4 SLR 271 at [43]).

  68. Application and analysis

  69. [62] The Plaintiffs submitted that the Tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that the 1st Plaintiff had, on 28 April 2015, approved the launch of Hull No. X thereby fulfilling that condition precedent that the Defendant needed to fulfill prior to the (second) launch on 3 May 2015. The Plaintiffs contended that this was not the Defendant’s pleaded case in the Arbitration. The Plaintiffs submitted that, based on the NOA and the Defendant’s Statement of Claim, the Defendant’s pleaded case was that the launch had taken place on 20 January 2015. It did not mention any other event or launch date. It was also contended by the Plaintiffs that the Tribunal, in arriving at its conclusion that the condition precedent for the launch had been met, in effect found that the 1st Plaintiff had given its approval on 28 April 2015 for the launch of Hull No. X and then transposed that approval as retrospective consent to the earlier launch that had taken place on 20 January 2015. This, according to the Plaintiffs, was not the Defendant’s case in the arbitration, was not a case that the Plaintiffs were asked to meet and was not an issue placed before the Tribunal for determination.

  70. [64] I have carefully considered the record in the Arbitration that was put into evidence in OS 1307/2019, including the parties’ pleadings and the ALOI. I am satisfied that the Tribunal did act within the scope of submission and the Award rendered by it did not exceed its jurisdiction. I say this for a number of reasons set out below.

  71. (1) The NOA and Pleadings

  72. [65] First, taking the NOA and the pleadings collectively, whether Hull No. X was launched and whether approval for the launch of Hull No. X was given by the 1st Plaintiff were issues squarely before the Tribunal and which it could (indeed, had to) consider. In this regard, I accept that based purely on the NOA and the Statement of Claim, it would appear that the Defendant’s claim was premised only on the first launch that took place on 20 January 2015. However, the examination does not end there. As submitted by Mr Chia for the Defendant, the pleadings did evolve as the proceedings developed such that the Plaintiffs were put on notice of the Defendant’s position that all conditions precedent, including the approval of the 1st Plaintiffs, were met prior to the second launch on 3 May 2015. When all of the pleadings are considered compendiously, both parties were, in my view, aware that the issue of whether approval had been given by the 1st Plaintiff prior to and for the second launch on 3 May 2015 was in play. I elaborate below and start with the Plaintiff’s Statement of Defence and Counterclaim (“SDC”).

  73. [66] As early as the SDC, the Plaintiffs themselves had already made various references to both the first and second launches and denied that the 1st Plaintiff had given its approval to either launch. This was despite the fact that in the Statement of Claim, the Defendant had only pleaded the first launch as part of its case on compliance with the conditions precedent in Article 6(d) of Contracts Addendum No. 2. This was, to my mind, a clear indication that the Plaintiffs were, from very early on, alive to the relevance of the second launch and the Construction and Progress Meetings that preceded it. Indeed, it appeared to me that the Plaintiffs were seeking to pre-empt the Defendant. I reproduce the relevant parts of the SDC below:

  74. 48. It is important to emphasize the terms relating to payment of the fourth instalment by [the 1st Plaintiff]. Article 5 of the Contracts Addendum No. 2 provided that the fourth instalment shall be paid upon launch and upon receipt of invoice issued by the [Defendant]. However, more importantly, it was further provided that the launch was subject to the [Defendant’s] compliance with [Contract X] with regards to the quality of workmanship and system, and the prior approval by CLASS, [the 1st Plaintiff], and the [Defendant] collectively. No approval was granted by [the 1st Plaintiff] on 20 January 2015, or at all. In the premises, [the 1st Plaintiff] did not become and is not liable to the [Defendant] for the alleged sum of US$13.9 million.

  75. …

  76. 50. Prior to the alleged 1st Launch, and on 20 January 2015 itself, being the date of the alleged launch, [the 1st Plaintiff] had made it known to the [Defendant] that [the 1st Plaintiff] did not agree and/or consider [Hull No. X] to be ready for the launch. It is and was therefore [the 1st Plaintiff’s] position that the [Defendant] did not launch [Hull No. X] in accordance with the terms of [Contract X] on 20 January 2015, or at all to quantify for the fourth instalment, being 10% of the contract price.

  77. …

  78. 53. The [Defendant] had agreed to make the necessary modifications and/or rectifications to [Hull No. X], and had subsequently arranged for a launch to take place on 3 May 2015 (the “2nd Launch”) [RBOD Vol 2 Page 481].

  79. 54. Despite the [Defendant’s] attempt at the 2nd Launch, [the 1st Plaintiff] was still not satisfied with the quality and workmanship of the construction of [Hull No. X], and still did not consider the launch to have been effectively carried out. Numerous Non-Conformance Reports and Punch Lists were still outstanding, and the defects had not been rectified by the [Defendant] as at 20 January 2015 and/or 3 May 2015, or at all. It was therefore unacceptable for the [Defendant] to proceed for the launch of [Hull No. X], and inconceivable for the [Defendant] to believe that [the 1st Plaintiff] agreed to the same.

  80. 55. Given that the Contracts Addendum No. 2 clearly stipulates that payment of the fourth instalment is subject to the quality of workmanship and system being in conformance with [Contract No. X], and the approval by CLASS, [the 1st Plaintiff] and the [Defendant] collectively coupled with the fact that [the 1st Plaintiff] had refused to consider the [Hull No. X] as being launched on 20 January 2015, 3 May 2015, or at all, it is evident that [the 1st Plaintiff] is not obliged to make payment for the fourth instalment, and any demand made for the same by the [Defendant] was baseless. The [Defendant’s] assertion that the launch was confirmed by American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), on 20 January 2015 is and was flawed as the [Defendant] themselves was aware that the launch on 20 January 2015 was improper and not in accordance with the General Specifications and/or terms of [Contract X], as they had attempted to carry out the necessary modifications to rectify the defects, and had attempted to perform a second launch on 3 May 2015. If they had truly considered [the 1st Plaintiff] to be bound by the alleged 1st Launch on 20 January 2015, the [Defendant] would not have taken steps to rectify the defects found and/or made steps to prepare for the 2nd Launch.

  81. 56. The [Defendant] did not launch [Hull No. X] in accordance with the terms of [Contract X], which required the consent of [the 1st Plaintiff], on 20 January 2015 or at all to qualify for the fourth instalment, being 10% of the contract price. It was a clear contingent precedent that was not met by the [Defendant] and for this reason alone, their claim should be dismissed. It also bears mentioning that incredulously the [Defendant] failed to paint [Hull No. X] in accordance with the General Specifications before launching; its bare steel hull was launched into water. This, amongst other factors, rendered [Hull No. X] unfit for launch at the time.

  82. [emphasis in original in bold, emphasis added in italics]

  83. [67] From the paragraphs in the SDC quoted above, it was apparent that the Plaintiffs themselves were alive, at a very early stage in the Arbitration, to the relevance and significance of the Construction and Progress Meetings following the first launch on 20 January 2015, and of the second launch on 3 May 2015. In proactively addressing those issues in the SDC, the Plaintiffs were, in my judgment, clearly aware that they were very much a central part of the dispute. By their own pleadings, the Plaintiffs had placed these issues in the arena. Therefore, based on just the SDC, it was clear to me that those issues were before the Tribunal and would need to be considered and decided by it.

  84. [68] I next considered the Defendant’s Statement of Reply and Defence to Counterclaim (“SRDC”). In the SRDC, the Defendant pleaded that the launch of Hull No. X had been successfully completed on 20 January 2015, and in any event, the Defendant had resolved all outstanding issues in relation to the launch by May 2015. The Defendant specifically referred to 28 April 2015 as the date on which parties had come to an understanding that all outstanding issues had been resolved and referenced the minutes of the Construction and Progress Meetings in support of its contention. The Defendant’s position was thus also placed before the Tribunal during the arbitral proceedings, and it was within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to make a finding on that position.

  85. [69] Finally, the Plaintiffs’ Rejoinder was a further indicator that they were aware of the Defendant’s position on the Construction and Progress Meetings and the second launch. I reproduce below the relevant paragraphs of the Rejoinder that demonstrate this:

  86. 70. The [Defendant]’s understanding that by 28 April 2015, parties had reached an understanding that all outstanding issues related to [Hull No. X]’s launch were resolved, and that they managed to resolve the outstanding issues highlighted by [the 1st Plaintiff] in relation to [Hull No. X]’s launch meant that they were entitled to payment of the 4th instalment is entirely misconceived. The [Plaintiffs] had at no point in time, limited the launch to the outstanding issues raised and expounded in paragraph 68 above, for the reasons set out below. The [Defendant] is here attempting to re-write the terms of the launch as agreed.

  87. …

  88. 76. In any event, it was merely agreed from a technical perspective that the following outstanding issues raised were to be completed prior to [Hull No. X] being considered [sic] launching condition, instead of floating condition. There was no agreement and/or understanding reached between the technical teams at the meeting that [Hull No. X] would be validly launched after the outstanding issues were resolved. The project managers who had attended the meetings, had at no point in time ever represented that the launch would be successful, and/or that the [Defendant] would obtain the [Plaintiffs’] approval after the outstanding issues raised at the meeting on 21 January 2015 were closed. The minutes of meeting merely provided that the remaining items must be completed prior to [Hull No. X] being considered to be in a “launching condition”. In no way did the [Plaintiffs’] Supervisors and/or the [Plaintiffs] agree that [Hull No. X] was in fact to be considered launched once aforesaid defects had been rectified or closed. The [Defendant’s] understanding was and is clearly misconceived.

  89. 77. In addition, the simple fact of the matter remains that the [Defendant] had not, as at the date of the repudiation of the Contract, obtained the [Plaintiffs’] prior approval for the launch of [Hull No. X], and/or met the conditions precedents set out in Article 6(d) of Contracts Addendum No. 2. …

  90. [emphasis in original in italics, emphasis added in bold]

  91. [70] As can be seen from the paragraphs quoted above, the Plaintiffs sought to undermine the importance of the Construction and Progress Meetings. The Plaintiffs argued that they had not limited their withholding of approval for the launch to only the outstanding issues stated in the meeting minutes. They also contended that the meeting on 28 April 2015 was merely a technical one (as opposed to a meeting attended by representatives with authority to make binding representations) such that any decisions or agreements reached at that meeting were not binding on the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs specifically referred to the Defendant’s secondary position in the Rejoinder and declared it as “misconceived”. In particular, the Plaintiffs expressly rejoined that there was “no agreement and/or understanding reached between the technical teams at the meeting that [Hull No. X] would be validly launched after the outstanding issues were resolved.” The use of the words “would be validly launched” was a reference to a future event, namely, the second launch which eventually took place on 3 May 2015.

  92. [71] Before me, the Plaintiffs asserted that the Defendant’s case was advanced solely on the basis that the launch of Hull No. X had taken place on 20 January 2015, and that any reliance the Defendant placed on the undocking and second launch on 3 May 2015 was only in support of its argument that the Plaintiffs were estopped from withholding consent to the launch.

  93. [72] The Defendant’s alternative case, on a strict reading of its pleadings, did appear to be one based on estoppel. However, this did not, in my view, detract from its consistent position within its alternative case, namely, that all the conditions precedent for launching Hull No. X had been met by 28 April 2015 prior to the second launch on 3 May 2015 and that it was, thereafter, entitled to payment of the Fourth Instalment. The SRDC stated this position.

  94. [73] Further, from the SDC and Rejoinder which I have referred to above, the Plaintiffs were undoubtedly alive, not just to the relevance of the meeting on 28 April 2015 and the second launch on 3 May 2015, but to their contractual relevance as conditions precedent to be met by the Defendant under Article 6(d) of Contracts Addendum No. 2. Thus, by the time the parties had served all of their pleadings, the battle lines in relation to both the first and second launches and the Construction and Progress Meetings had been clearly drawn. Therefore, the Tribunal was in a position, legitimately, to decide whether the conditions precedent in Article 6(d) of Contracts Addendum No. 2 were met prior to the second launch of Hull No. X on 3 May 2015.

  95. [74] Considering all of the pleadings submitted by the parties in the Arbitration compendiously, the Tribunal did, in my judgment, act within the scope of submission and did not exceed its jurisdiction in the Award.

  96. (2) The ALOI

  97. [75] My conclusion at [74] above based on the parties’ pleadings was fortified when I considered the ALOI. On a plain reading of the ALOI including the sub-issues as framed by the parties, whether the 1st Plaintiff had approved the launch on or by 28 April 2015 and whether the Defendant had launched Hull No. X on 20 January 2015, 3 May 2015 or at all were issues which were clearly placed before the Tribunal by the parties.

  98. [76] The first overarching issue in the ALOI was for the Tribunal to determine what conditions had to be satisfied before the Defendant would be entitled to payment of the Fourth Instalment pursuant to Article 6(d) of Contracts Addendum No. 2 (see [23] above).

  99. [77] In response to the first overarching issue, the Plaintiffs and Defendant set out their respective positions as sub-issues in the ALOI. Among the sub-issues to be considered under this overarching issue, the Plaintiffs stated, inter alia, (i) that the Defendant had to launch Hull No. X and (ii) that the 1st Plaintiff, the Defendant and the Classification Society (ABS) had to collectively approve the launch.

  100. [78] The second overarching issue in the ALOI was whether the Defendant had satisfied the conditions necessary for payment. On this issue, the parties again stated their respective positions as sub-issues in the ALOI. It would be apposite to set out here the relevant parts of the parties’ respective positions:

  101. 2(a) The [Defendant] takes the position that the [Defendant] satisfied the conditions necessary for payment of US$13.9 million because:

  102. (i) The [Defendant] procured a “Refund Guarantee” for 10% of the Contract Price of [Hull No. X] on 29 April 2015;

  103. (ii) The [Defendant] launched [Hull No. X] on 20 January 2015;

  104. (iii) The timing of the launch of [Hull No. X] was in line with the delivery schedule agreed between the [Defendant] and [the 1st Plaintiff]; and

  105. (iv) The Classification Society (“ABS”) released a statement certifying the launch of [Hull No. X].

  106. (b) The [Plaintiffs] take the position that the [Defendant] did not satisfy the conditions necessary for payment of US$13.9 million because:

  107. …

  108. (iii) The [Defendant], [the 1st Plaintiff] and the Classification Society had not collectively approved the launch of [Hull No. X]. In particular, the [Defendant] had not obtained [the 1st Plaintiff’s] approval for the launch of [Hull No. X]. It is in fact not in dispute that the [Defendant] did not obtain the approval of the [Plaintiffs] to launch;

  109. (iv) The [Defendant] did not launch [Hull No. X] on 20 January 2015, or 3 May 2015, or at all. …

  110. [79] The third overarching issue in the ALOI was whether there was any valid reason for the 1st Plaintiff to withhold payment of the Fourth Instalment. The Plaintiffs’ position in response to this issue (which was, again, set out as a sub-issue in the ALOI) was that the Defendant was not entitled to payment because, among other reasons, the Defendant had not obtained the 1st Plaintiff’s approval for the launch of Hull No. X and failed “to launch [Hull No. X] on 20 January 2015, or 3 May 2015, or at all”.

  111. [80] In my view, based on the ALOI and the sub-issues enumerated by the parties under Issues 1, 2 and 3, whether Hull No. X was launched on 20 January 2015 or on 3 May 2015 and whether, prior to each of these launch dates, the 1st Plaintiff’s approval had been obtained were clearly placed by the parties as issues to be decided by the Tribunal. Therefore, the Tribunal’s finding that on 28 April 2015, the 1st Plaintiff had approved the second launch cannot be said to be new, irrelevant or outside the scope of submission. Similarly, whether Hull No. X was or was not launched with the 1st Plaintiff’s approval on 20 January 2015 or 3 May 2015 was also not a new or irrelevant issue and did not fall outside the scope of submission either.

  112. Conclusion on the scope of submission objection

  113. [81] In the circumstances, having considered all the pleadings filed by both parties in the Arbitration (following PT Prima ([60] supra) at [33]–[34]) and the ALOI (following GD Midea ([61] supra) at [43]), I found that the Tribunal was acting well within the scope of submission to arbitration. In rendering the Award following its findings in the Defendant’s favour on Issues 2 and 3 (see [23]–[27] above), the Tribunal did not, in my judgment, exceed its jurisdiction.

  114. [82] In addition, I was also of the view that there was in any event no prejudice suffered by the Plaintiffs as they had ample notice of all of the issues that were in the arena, at the latest, prior to the commencement of the oral hearing (see PT Prima ([60] supra) at [51]). For the foregoing reasons, there was, in my judgment, no basis for the Award to be set aside pursuant to Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law. I dismissed this ground of the Plaintiffs’ application accordingly.

  115. Was there any breach of the Defendant’s right to present its case and/or a breach of natural justice?

  116. [83] I start with a summary of the relevant legal principles.

  117. [84] It is a well-entrenched principle in our arbitration jurisprudence that any party seeking to challenge an arbitral award on the ground that there has been a breach of natural justice must establish the following (L W Infrastructure Pte Ltd v Lim Chin San Contractors Pte Ltd [2013] 1 SLR 125 (“L W Infrastructure”) at [48], affirming Soh Beng Tee & Co Pte Ltd v Fairmount Development Pte Ltd [2007] 3 SLR(R) 86 (“Soh Beng Tee”) at [29]):

  118. (a) which rule of natural justice has been breached;

  119. (b) how it was breached;

  120. (c) in what way the breach was connected to the making of the award; and

  121. (d) how the breach prejudiced the rights of the challenging party.

  122. [85] A complaint that there has been a breach of natural justice comprises, broadly, two facets. The first is that an arbitral tribunal was biased against a party thereby contravening the rule of equality of treatment of the parties. The second facet is commonly referred to as the fair hearing rule, encapsulated in the well-known Latin maxim audi alteram partem. When the fair hearing rule is invoked, the aggrieved party’s complaint is that it was not given a fair or reasonable opportunity to be heard or to otherwise present its case. The fair hearing rule forms the second ground of objection relied on by the Plaintiffs in this case.

  123. [86] In relation to the fair hearing rule, the Court of Appeal, in its oft-cited decision in Soh Beng Tee, held that parties have, in general, a right to be heard and an arbitrator “should not base his decision(s) on matters not submitted or argued before him”. In other words, the arbitrator “should not make bricks without straw” (at [65(a)]). In essence, an arbitral tribunal should not surprise the parties with its own ideas (at [44]). However, consistent with the policy of limited curial intervention, the courts should only intervene in arbitral awards in limited circumstances. For example, where the “impugned decision reveals a dramatic departure from the submissions, or involves an arbitrator receiving extraneous evidence, or adopts a view wholly at odds with the established evidence adduced by the parties or arrives at a conclusion unequivocally rejected by the parties as being trivial or irrelevant” (at [65(c)–(d)]). Whilst a tribunal should not make bricks without straw, where the factual basis or “building blocks” of the award were present during the arbitral proceedings, it cannot be said that a tribunal reached its own conclusions in breach of natural justice (at [67]).

  124. [87] In addition, a particular chain of reasoning would be open to a tribunal, even if not specifically argued by the parties, if it flows reasonably from a premise argued or actually advanced by either party (TMM Division Maritima SA de CV v Pacific Richfield Marine Pte Ltd [2013] 4 SLR 972 (“TMM Division”) at [65]). Finally, it is also a well-entrenched principle that the court will not set aside an award under the Act simply because an arbitrator made an error of law or of fact. The court should not allow an aggrieved party a second bite of the cherry by engaging the court on what is, in substance, an appeal on the legal merits of the arbitral award disguised as a breach of natural justice challenge (AKN and another v ALC and others and other appeals [2015] 3 SLR 488 at [39]).

  125. Application and analysis

  126. [88] The complaints of the Plaintiffs here were, save for some additional objections summarised at [112] below, largely similar to those raised in relation to the scope of submission objection which I considered earlier in these grounds and dismissed. For similar reasons, I was of the view that the Plaintiffs’ objections were without merit.

  127. [89] The record of the Arbitration shows that the Plaintiffs were aware of the Defendant’s case and had, not just reasonable, but ample opportunity to respond to it. Further, the Tribunal’s reasoning and decision in the Award were based on the issues placed before it and arguments advanced by the parties.

  128. [90] With regard to the pleadings and the ALOI, I have already discussed this at length (at [65]–[80] above) and do not propose to say any more than I already have.

  129. [91] Apart from the pleadings and the ALOI, I also considered the Plaintiffs’ and Defendant’s Opening Statements and the conduct of the case by the Plaintiffs in the course of the Arbitration (including the evidence adduced during the oral hearing). When all of these were viewed in the round, it was clear to me that the Plaintiffs were keenly aware that the Defendant was also putting forward a position that approval had been obtained from the 1st Plaintiff on or by 28 April 2015 such that a qualifying launch pursuant to Article 6(d) of the Contracts Addendum No. 2 had taken place when the second launch occurred on 3 May 2015.

  130. [92] Mr Singh accepted, during the hearing before me, that by the time the Defendant had filed its Opening Statement, the Defendant had made known its position, ie. that an agreement or understanding had been reached on 28 April 2015 for the launch on 3 May 2015. I reproduce the relevant extract of the transcript:

  131. Ct: Mr Singh, do you accept that at least by the time the [Defendant’s] Opening Statement had been filed, the point about the vessel being launched on 20 Jan and if not by 5 May (date of the second invoice following the launch on 3 May 2015) and that there was agreement from [the 1st Plaintiff] for that subsequent launch was raised in the [Defendant’s] Opening Statement?

  132. PC: Yes, they do say it.

  133. [93] Further, during the oral hearing, the Defendant’s counsel had cross-examined the Plaintiff’s witness on whether an agreement or understanding on the unresolved issues was reached on 28 April 2015. The Plaintiffs therefore had a clear opportunity to address the issues surrounding this meeting and the second launch during the evidentiary hearing. Those areas of contention had already been laid out in the parties’ pleadings and the ALOI.

  134. [94] Even in the Plaintiffs’ Closing Submissions and Reply Submissions, the Plaintiffs did address their minds to the Defendant’s position on the second launch. In the Plaintiffs’ Closing Submissions, they reiterated that the meetings held on 21 January, 7 April and 28 April 2015 were merely technical in nature and had no contractual significance. As such, the Plaintiffs asserted that the Defendant could not claim that all outstanding matters relating to the launch were resolved in May 2015.

  135. [95] In the Plaintiffs’ Reply Submissions, the Plaintiffs specifically argued that “even if [the Defendant] say [sic] they launched [Hull No. X] correctly in May 2015, after having completed all the outstanding works, [the Defendant] had still failed to request and obtain the [Plaintiffs’] consent to launch, and compliance with all the conditions precedent under Article 6 of Addendum No. 2 had still not been satisfied” (emphasis in original).

  136. [96] It was plainly evident that the Plaintiffs were aware of the Defendant’s position on the second launch and sought to debunk it in the course of their closing and reply submissions. It was also evident that the Plaintiffs did not, contrary to their contentions, limit their response to the Defendant’s alternative case to one only based on estoppel (see [71]–[72] above).

  137. [97] In the Award, the Tribunal noted and rejected the Plaintiffs’ contention that the Construction and Progress Meetings were merely technical in nature. The Tribunal also rejected the Plaintiffs’ submission that any agreement or approval given during those meetings had no contractual relevance or significance and did not constitute approval by the 1st Plaintiff for the launch for purposes of Article 6(d) of Contracts Addendum No. 2. I reproduce the relevant parts of the Award:

  138. … In the Tribunal’s view, there is also no merit in the [Plaintiffs’] contentions that:

  139. 1. since the meetings on 21 January 2015, 7 April 2015 and 28 April 2015 were ‘Project and Construction Meetings’ involving only the Parties’ technical teams and dealt primarily with the technical aspects of the construction, any agreement, decision or understanding reached at such meetings were purely technical in nature and would not be contractually binding on the Respondents particularly so because the attendees at such meetings were the Respondents’ Supervisors who had no authority to bind the Respondents vis-à-vis any financial, commercial or contractual decisions;

  140. …

  141. This is because the questions as to whether [Hull No. X] was in “Launching condition” (emphasis added by the Tribunal) and whether therefore [the 1st Plaintiff] had approved [Hull No. X] as having been launched, are purely technical in nature. These do not concern any financial or legal issues. The [Plaintiffs] have also not identified what financial, contractual, commercial or legal issues would need to be resolved- with Mr [Z]’s involvement- before [Hull No. X] could be considered in “Launching condition”. In the Tribunal’s view, there were none. Whether [Hull No. X] was in “Launching condition”- and hence whether its launch was approved by [the 1st Plaintiff]- turned entirely on a determination from a technical point of view. Even on the [Plaintiffs’] case, the Parties’ technical teams did deal with and were authorised to deal with the technical aspects of the construction. In addition, it would be strange indeed if the Construction and Progress Meetings [relating to Hull No. X] did not import any contractual significance, as the [Plaintiffs] now allege. …

  142. From the extract above, it was, again, plainly evident that the Plaintiffs were aware of the Defendant’s alternative case and were seeking to meet it. On its part, the Tribunal met the parties’ competing arguments head-on and dealt with them as it was entitled to.

  143. [98] In my view, all of the factual “building blocks” for the Tribunal’s findings and its decision were clearly very much in play, having been placed before it in the parties’ pleadings, in the ALOI and during the oral hearing. The Plaintiffs were sensitised to the Defendant’s arguments and were well aware where the battle lines lay in relation to both launches and the Construction and Progress Meetings.

  144. [99] In my judgment, it could hardly be said that in this case, the Tribunal made bricks without straw. On the contrary, it is clear that the Tribunal did so with solid raw materials that were laid out before it during the course of the Arbitration by both parties. This was also not a case where one could conclude that the Tribunal had “conjured up facts or reached a view inconsistent with the facts presented.” (Soh Beng Tee ([84] supra) at [67]). Neither was this a case where the Tribunal’s decision could be said to involve a dramatic departure from the parties’ submissions, or to be at odds with the established evidence.

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