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Grounds publishedDecided 9 Jul 2020

High Court

OUE Lippo Healthcare Ltd (formerly known as International Healthway Corp Ltd) and another v Crest Capital Asia Pte Ltd and others

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[2020] SGHC 142Case no. Suit No 441 of 2016

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] In this suit, the plaintiffs claim against the defendants for their roles in causing the first plaintiff, OUE Lippo Healthcare Ltd (formerly known as International Healthway Corp Ltd) (“IHC”), to enter into a credit facility (to be referred to as the “Standby Facility”), and to use the funds to indirectly acquire its own shares.

  3. [2] The plaintiffs rely on three causes of action. First, the plaintiffs claim that as officers of IHC, the sixth defendant, Mr Fan Kow Hin (“Mr Fan”) and the eighth defendant, Ms Lim Beng Choo (“Ms Lim”), acted in breach of their duties to IHC. Second, the plaintiffs claim that the first to fifth defendants (the funding entities which are collectively referred to as the “Crest entities”), the seventh defendant, Mr Andrew Ah Kong Aathar (a substantial shareholder of IHC whom I shall refer to as “Mr Aathar”) and Ms Lim provided dishonest assistance to Mr Fan. Third, the plaintiffs claim that all the defendants engaged in a conspiracy by unlawful means to injure IHC. As a result of the defendants’ conduct, the plaintiffs suffered losses in connection with the Standby Facility, as well as another credit facility known as the “Geelong Facility”.

  4. [3] The Crest entities and Mr Lim defend the claims on various grounds. They also brought counterclaims against the plaintiffs. Although Mr Fan is a bankrupt, the plaintiffs obtained leave to continue with the action against him. Mr Fan, however, did not file a defence. He is not represented in the proceedings. Mr Aathar filed a bare defence. However, by the time of the trial, there was a stay of the proceedings against him. This was pursuant to a voluntary arrangement approved by Mr Aathar’s creditors under the Bankruptcy Act (Cap 20, 2009 Rev Ed). Nonetheless, Mr Aathar, as well as Mr Fan, gave evidence before me.

  5. [4] The trial concerns both liability and quantum, save that there is bifurcation in relation to the quantification of one category of loss, ie, loss arising from the termination and sale of the plaintiffs’ Australian business.

  6. [5] I pause to highlight that after the trial, but before the parties filed their closing and reply submissions, the Court of Appeal released The Enterprise Fund III Ltd and others v OUE Lippo Healthcare Ltd (formerly known as International Healthway Corp Ltd) [2019] 2 SLR 524 (“The Enterprise Fund III”), and determined that the Standby Facility which funded the indirect acquisition by IHC of its own shares is void under by s 76A(1)(a) of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) (“Companies Act”) for contravention of s 76(1A)(a)(i) of the same. This determination, as well as some of the observations within the Court of Appeal’s judgment, are pertinent to this case.

  7. [6] Having heard the evidence, and considered the closing and reply submissions of the parties, this is my judgment.

  8. Background

  9. The parties

  10. [7] IHC is a Singapore-incorporated company listed on the Catalist board of the Singapore Exchange (“SGX”). The second plaintiff, IHC Medical Re Pte Ltd (“IHC Medical Re”), is a wholly-owned subsidiary of IHC. IHC Medical Re is the ultimate holding company for IHC’s Australian business through IHC Healthcare REIT (Singapore Trust). The Australian business consisted primarily of three properties in Australia (the “Australian properties”) as follows:

  11. (a) two properties at 541 and 553 St Kilda Road, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia (the “St Kilda properties”); and

  12. (b) a property at 73 – 79 Little Ryrie Street, Geelong, Victoria, Australia (the “Geelong property”).

  13. [8] IHC is also the holding company of two other subsidiaries, namely IHC Management Pte Ltd (“IHCM”) and IHC Management (Australian) Pty Ltd (“IHCM(A)”).

  14. [9] Mr Fan and Mr Aathar were founders of IHC. Both held large shareholdings in IHC, reported as 23.67% and 8.73% respectively in the Annual Report of 2015. On 17 May 2015, by way of a service agreement, IHC appointed Mr Fan as its Group Chief Executive Officer (“Group CEO”). On 30 June 2015, upon the departure of the previous CEO, Mr Chia Kwok Ping (“Mr Chia”), Mr Fan was re-designated as Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”). He remained in this position until 31 January 2016. Mr Aathar did not hold any formal position in IHC.

  15. [10] From 30 October 2013 to January 2015, Ms Lim was the Financial Controller (Corporate Finance and Real Estate Investment Trusts) of OUELH Medical Assets Pte Ltd (formerly known as IHC Medical Assets Pte Ltd). From January 2015, she was appointed IHC’s Vice-President (Investments), and maintained that position until 6 January 2016. On 7 January 2016, Ms Lim was appointed IHC’s CEO and Executive Director. She held those positions until 23 January 2017.

  16. [11] Turning to the Crest entities, the first defendant, Crest Capital Asia Pte Ltd (“Crest Capital”), is a fund administration company. It is the holding company of the second defendant, Crest Catalyst Equity Pte Ltd (“Crest Catalyst”), which is a fund management company that manages affiliated private equity funds. The third to fifth defendants, The Enterprise Fund III Ltd (“EFIII”), VMF3 Ltd (“VMF3”) and Value Monetisation III Ltd (“VMIII”), are three such funds administered and managed by Crest Capital and Crest Catalyst.

  17. [12] Mr Tan Yang Hwee, also known as Glendon Tan (“Mr Tan”), is the Investment Director of Crest Capital. Mr Tan was the main representative handling Crest Capital’s business deals with IHC since its incorporation in 2013, including the deals that resulted in the Standby Facility and the Geelong Facility. Prior to that, Crest Capital had business dealings with a group of companies, which included Healthway Medical Development Pte Ltd, founded by, amongst others, Mr Fan and Mr Aathar. IHC was incorporated to expand the healthcare services offered by the group internationally.

  18. The Standby Facility and the Geelong Facility

  19. [13] The Standby Facility was a short-term credit facility of up to S$20m granted to IHC by EFIII, VMF3 and VMIII. The Standby Facility agreement was executed on 30 July 2015, and the facility was to be used as “general working capital”. It provided for fixed interest (termed “standby fees”) on the full sum of S$20m at 3.5% per month for a minimum of five months with default interest being levied on any sums due and unpaid at an additional rate of 2% per month.

  20. [14] I should add that an initial facility agreement was fully executed on or around 21 July 2015, and backdated to 16 April 2015 (with the maturity date falling two months from the date of disbursement of 16 April 2015, ie, 15 June 2015) . At that time, the three funds involved were EFIII, VMIII and The Enterprise Fund II Ltd (“EFII”). Essentially, the Standby Facility agreement was executed to supersede the initial facility agreement, and to extend the tenure of the facility to five months from 30 July 2015. Additionally, VMF3 replaced EFII as an investing party.

  21. [15] The Geelong Facility was a mezzanine loan of S$11.5 million granted to IHC Medical Re by EFIII and VMIII, with the agreement dated 17 June 2015. The purpose was to partially finance the acquisition of the Australian properties. It provided for interest at the rate of 3.35% per month on the outstanding principal, with default interest on any sums due and unpaid at an additional rate of 3% per annum.

  22. [16] The payments of sums due under both facilities were secured by personal guarantees from Mr Fan and Mr Aathar, as well as charges granted by IHC over all the shares of IHC Medical Re, IHCM and IHCM(A) (the “Charged Shares”). This was done by two Deeds of Share Charges dated 17 June 2015 and 30 July 2015, which secured payment of sums due under the Geelong Facility and the Standby Facility respectively. For convenience, I shall refer to these Deeds of Share Charges as the “17 June Deed of Charge” and the “30 July Deed of Charge”.

  23. [17] Subsequently, there was a dispute over the Standby Facility. According to IHC, this triggered its default on the Geelong Facility, which in turn led to IHC incurring further consequential losses. As mentioned at [1] above, IHC took issue with the defendants’ respective roles in causing IHC to enter into the Standby Facility in the first place.

  24. The genesis of the Standby Facility

  25. [18] In this connection, the relevant events began on 3 April 2015 when Mr Tan, Mr Fan and Mr Aathar met at Serangoon Gardens, pursuant to arrangements made by Mr Aathar.

  26. [19] On 4 April 2015, at 9.06am, Mr Aathar sent Mr Tan an email, copied to Mr Fan, with the subject stated as “Standby Facility” (the “first 4 April 2015 email”). The email provided a “recap” of the group’s discussion at the meeting and contained a formal request for “a standby line” of S$20m from the Crest entities to combat an imminent short seller’s attack on IHC’s shares. The material portions of the email are reproduced as follows:

  27. [20] At 1.08pm, Mr Aathar sent another email to Mr Tan, copied to Mr Fan, again with the subject stated as “Standby Facility” (the “second 4 April 2015 email”). In it, Mr Aathar stated that, “[he] can give [Tan] a firm undertaking from IHC that all security arrangements will be restored and reinstated by IHC promptly, in the same terms and conditions, to the satisfaction of Crest.”

  28. [21] I now go to four emails dated 9 April 2015, which continue to deal with the subject of “Standby Facility” as follows:

  29. (a) At 9.29am, Mr Tan sent an email to Mr Aathar and Mr Fan, asking them both to review, sign and return an enclosed term sheet dated 6 April 2015. The term sheet provided for a loan amount of “up to S$20 million”, for a tenure of “2 months from first drawdown date”, to be used for “general working capital” and with an “interest coupon of 3.5% p.m.” after the “first draw down date”. It also expressly stated that the facility would be secured, inter alia, by joint and several personal guarantees by Mr Aathar and Mr Fan, as well as a “[p]ledge of IHC shares purchased through Fund”.

  30. (c) Shortly after, at 12.57pm, Mr Fan replied to Mr Tan, and informed him that the relevant persons in charge were Mr Chia and Ms Lim. The email was also addressed to Mr Aathar, Ms Lim and Mr Chia, and was copied to Mr CP Lim.

  31. (d) I should add that Mr Tan had included the first and second 4 April 2015 emails sent by Mr Aathar to his first email at 9.29am, and they remained a part of the chain below Mr Fan’s 12.57pm email.

  32. (e) In response, at 1.36pm, Mr Tan forwarded the term sheet and draft loan documents, namely, loan agreement, personal guarantees, deeds of undertaking, share charges, to Mr Chia and Ms Lim for their review, copying Mr Aathar, Mr Fan and Mr CP Lim.

  33. [22] According to the plaintiffs and the Crest entities, Mr Aathar’s request for the standby line made (on behalf of IHC) at the 3 April 2015 meeting was the genesis of the Standby Facility. The term sheet captured the three key terms as set out in the first 4 April 2015 email. Thereafter, the parties worked towards the finalisation of the legal documents for the Standby Facility.

  34. [23] Mr Fan and Mr Aathar provided a completely different explanation for these events. Mr Aathar asserted that at the meeting and in the first 4 April 2015 email, he merely raised a personal request for the Crest entities to invest in IHC shares to combat a short seller’s attack, with Mr Aathar agreeing to pay the Crest entities a return for doing so. After checking with the Crest entities, Mr Tan informed Mr Aathar that they were not agreeable to the risky private arrangement. Nonetheless, the Crest entities were prepared to extend a working capital facility to IHC, provided that IHC reinstated the security arrangements that it had furnished for a previous facility. In response, Mr Aathar sent the second 4 April 2015 email giving the “firm undertaking from IHC” to reinstate the security arrangements. He was merely giving the “firm undertaking” from the personal guarantors, ie, Mr Fan and himself, and not IHC. In any event, the IHC deal was still “exploratory” in nature. Subsequently, the Crest entities then proposed to IHC, and IHC agreed to, the Standby Facility – a deal quite separate from the private arrangement that did not materialise.

  35. [24] Mr Fan’s evidence was largely similar. However, Mr Fan said that while Mr Aathar purported to give a firm undertaking on behalf of IHC, he was clearly not authorised to do so.

  36. [25] As for Ms Lim, she acknowledged that the first 4 April 2015 email was forwarded to her as part of Mr Fan’s email on 9 April 2015. However, she did not see it as it was at the bottom of the chain. As far as she was concerned, the proposed facility was one for “general working capital”.

  37. Events leading to the execution of the Standby Facility

  38. [26] On 10 April 2015, Mr Chia, Mr Aathar and Mr Fan signed the term sheet, as CEO and the two personal guarantors respectively. This signed term sheet was sent via email to Mr Tan. Later the same day, Mr CP Lim sent the term sheet, now duly signed by Mr Tan via email to Mr Chia and Ms Lim, copying Mr Tan, Mr Aathar and Mr Fan. Separately, in accordance with the term sheet, Mr Aathar and Mr Fan also executed personal guarantees dated 10 April 2015.

  39. [27] On 17 May 2015, Mr Fan was appointed Group CEO. Subsequently, Mr Fan vetted a board paper prepared by Ms Lim. The board paper was dated 29 May 2015 and was meant to be put before the IHC’s board of directors to obtain their approval for the Standby Facility, together with the legal documents prepared based on the draft documents sent by Mr Tan.

  40. [28] On 29 May 2015, the board paper was circulated by email to the members of the IHC board. The email and the board paper stated that the Standby Facility was to be “utilised for general working capital” and “[f]or general working capital purpose[s]” respectively. The only securities listed in the covering email and the board paper were the Charged Shares and the personal guarantees provided by Mr Aathar and Mr Fan. There was no mention of a pledge of IHC shares acquired by drawing down on the Standby Facility.

  41. [29] At the material time, the IHC board of directors consisted of Dr Jong Hee Sen (“Dr Jong”) (who was the Non-Executive Chairman), Mr Dennis Siew Teng Kean (“Mr Siew”) (who was the lead independent director) and Mr Ong Lay Khiam (“Mr Ong”) (also an independent director). Board approval was obtained through a two-thirds majority on 3 June 2015.

  42. [30] Essentially, Dr Jong and Mr Siew approved IHC’s entry into the Standby Facility by way of a written resolution backdated to 29 May 2015. Importantly, Mr Siew’s approval was on the premise that the Standby Facility “with the accompanying interest charge [was] essential for the continued operations of the company”. Mr Ong, however, declined to approve the matter, explaining in an email dated 29 May 2015 that he “[found] it difficult to justify approving a credit facility bearing the proposed high interest rate and fee”. He also questioned whether IHC was “so much in need of funds to raise this type of financing”.

  43. Drawdowns on the Standby Facility to acquire IHC shares

  44. [32] Meanwhile, according to the plaintiffs and the Crest entities, between 16 April 2015 and 24 August 2015, a total sum of S$17,332,081.15 was drawn down from the Standby Facility on 14 separate occasions by the Crest entities to purchase 59,304,800 IHC shares. The mechanism was that the shares were purchased by EFIII through EFIII’s brokerage accounts but were held in the name of VMIII.

  45. [33] Of these 14 occasions, eight occurred before the board paper had even been put to the IHC board of directors for their approval on 29 May 2015 and involved the sum of S$12,833,234.40. A further five drawdowns, amounting to S$2,788,556.13, had been made before the legal documents were formally executed on 21 July 2015. The transactions were made on Mr Aathar’s instructions to Mr Tan (which Mr Tan asserted were given through telephone calls, SMS messages and WhatsApp text messages).

  46. [34] In relation to these events, the consistent position of Mr Aathar, Mr Fan and Ms Lim was that there was no drawdown on the Standby Facility at all, and certainly not to purchase shares on IHC’s behalf. Instead, Mr Aathar claimed that the Crest entities had used their own funds to purchase IHC shares for themselves. To explain the messages exchanged with Mr Tan concerning share purchases, Mr Aathar said that from time to time, he advised Mr Tan in relation to investing in IHC’s shares.

  47. Negotiations for repayment

  48. [35] On 9 September 2015, SGX announced that investors should exercise caution when dealing with IHC’s shares. Its investigations revealed that from April to August 2015, 60% of IHC’s traded share volume was conducted by a handful of individuals. This triggered a plunge in IHC’s share prices down to S$0.10 per share.

  49. [36] On 19 October 2015, Crest Capital demanded repayment of sums due under both the Standby Facility and the Geelong Facility. In the letter of demand to IHC for the Standby Facility addressed to Dr Jong, and copied to Mr Fan and Mr Aathar, Crest Capital requested repayment of standby fees due and owing in the sum of S$2,754,850 for 16 June to 15 October 2015. While it stated that the disbursement was made on 16 April 2015, there was no mention of the principal sum due under it. I should add that the standby fees were paid for the period of 16 April to 15 June 2015.

  50. [37] In the letter of demand to IHC Medical Re for the Geelong Facility, addressed to Ms Lim, and copied to Mr Fan and Mr Aathar, Crest Capital requested for payment of S$11,885.250, comprising of the principal of S$11,500,000, together with interest of S$385,250 accruing from 19 September 2015 (which was the maturity date of the facility).

  51. [38] On 23 October 2015, Mr Aathar wrote an email to Crest Capital, as well as Mr Fan and Ms Lim, stating as follows :

  52. [39] I should explain that the term “IHC Placement” refers to 20.83m IHC shares purchased by EFII prior to IHC’s listing in 2013, for which Mr Aathar, Mr Fan and Dr Jong had given a profit warranty (the “placement shares”). This transaction gave rise to a separate set of proceedings in which EFII obtained judgment against Dr Jong for the profit: see The Enterprise Fund II Ltd v Jong Hee Sen [2020] 3 SLR 419.

  53. [40] Negotiations over repayment involving Mr Aathar, Mr Fan and Mr Tan commenced on 27 October 2015. In an email to Mr Tan, copied to Mr Fan, Mr Aathar set out proposals concerning the placement shares, “market shares of $17.2m or 59.3m shares” and “Geelong loans” (referring to the amount outstanding under the Geelong Facility). The exchange of emails with Mr Tan continued until end 2015, which consistently included discussions on the sum of S$17m used to purchase the 59,304,800 IHC shares. No other IHC representatives appear to have been privy to these settlement discussions.

  54. [41] In the course of the negotiations, there was never any dispute over the intent and purpose of the Standby Facility, as Mr Fan and Mr Aathar well knew about the drawdowns. This was the position of IHC and the Crest entities. However, Mr Aathar asserted that after suffering losses in their investments in IHC shares, the Crest entities decided to pin their losses on IHC, by claiming that there were disbursements under the Standby Facility. By way of his proposals, he was merely assisting the Crest entities to find an “exit plan”. As for Mr Fan, he said that he found out only on 21 October 2015 that Mr Tan had improperly used funds from the Standby Facility to purchase IHC shares.

  55. Dispute over the Standby Facility

  56. [42] In December 2015, IHC made two payments to the Crest entities. The first payment of a sum of S$3.5m was made on 4 December 2015. It was applied towards the Geelong Facility (which IHC did not take issue with). The second payment of S$3,883,950 was made on 18 December 2015. The Crest entities applied this payment towards the Standby Facility. IHC took issue with this, and contended that the payment was always intended for and should have been applied to the Geelong Facility, and not the Standby Facility.

  57. [43] From 11 February 2016, a flurry of correspondence between the finance team of IHC (represented by Ms Tan Siew Yee) and the finance team of the Crest entities (represented by Ms Evelyn Ordinario) took place. In general, IHC denied having drawn down on the Standby Facility, and requested the Crest entities to provide supporting evidence of any alleged drawdowns. In response, the Crest entities generally asserted that drawdowns had taken place, while refusing to provide further particulars to IHC. Instead, IHC was asked to check with Mr Fan and Mr Aathar for the details.

  58. [44] On 7 April 2016, the solicitors for the Crest entities, WongPartnership LLP (“WongPartnership”) served a letter of demand on IHC to claim for sums due under the Standby Facility and a letter of demand on IHC Medical Re to claim for sums due under the Geelong Facility. These claims were resisted by IHC’s then solicitors, Pinnacle Law LLC (“Pinnacle”), responding by way of a letter to state that IHC did not record any liability under the Standby Facility. IHC also stated that the Crest entities had wrongly attributed the payment of S$3,883,950 to the Standby Facility instead of the Geelong Facility, and asked the Crest entities to rectify that error. IHC also stated that unless the Crest entities did so, it would not be making any further repayments toward the Geelong Facility.

  59. [45] On 13 April 2016, WongPartnership replied by way of a letter stating that the Crest entities would provide “their substantive response shortly”. However, on 15 April 2016, pursuant to cl 8 of the 17 June Deed and the 30 July Deed, the Crest entities appointed receivers over the Charged Shares (the “Crest Receivers”), thereby gaining control over IHC Medical Re and the Australian properties.

  60. The present action

  61. [46] On 28 April 2016, the present action was commenced by IHC seeking, inter alia, to remove the Crest Receivers.

  62. [47] On 23 January 2017, IHC held an extraordinary general meeting in which the then incumbent board of IHC (which included Ms Lim) were removed.

  63. [48] Since then, there have been two significant developments in the proceedings. On 7 June 2017, IHC departed from its initial stance that there were no drawdowns from the Standby Facility to purchase IHC shares, and agreed with the Crest entities that IHC shares were acquired on the instructions of Mr Aathar for IHC using the funds. The plaintiffs also brought in Mr Fan and Mr Aathar as the sixth and seventh defendants. Thereafter, on 8 May 2018, Ms Lim was joined as the eighth defendant.

  64. [49] I should also mention some related proceedings.

  65. [50] On 28 April 2016, the same day this action was commenced, IHC transferred IHC Medical Re’s sole unit in IHC Healthcare REIT (Singapore Trust) (which held the Australian properties) to IHC Japan for S$1. Upon discovering this, on 5 August 2016, the Crest entities commenced High Court Suit No 856 of 2016 (“Suit 856”) against, inter alia, IHC, Mr Fan, Mr Aathar and Ms Lim for unlawful conspiracy in relation to the transfer. On 8 August 2016, the Crest entities obtained injunctive relief to prevent IHC from interfering with the Crest entities’ security. On 16 August 2016, the asset was transferred back to IHC Medical Re.

  66. [51] Shortly after, on 25 August 2016, the Australian properties were placed in receivership. The Australian properties were subject to senior mortgages held by three Australian financial institutions, National Australia Bank Limited (“NAB”), Westpac Banking Corporation Limited (“Westpac”) and Qualitas Real Estate Finance Pty Ltd (“Qualitas”). According to the plaintiffs, the appointment of the Crest Receivers triggered notices of default under these mortgages. NAB and Westpac then appointed their own receivers from KPMG Australia and KordaMentha (the “Australian Receivers”) over the Australian properties. Eventually, the Australian Receivers proceeded to sell the Australian properties.

  67. [53] In the meantime, on 6 April 2017, under its new management, IHC commenced the proceedings against the Standby Facility investors in High Court Originating Summons No 380 of 2017 (“OS380”) which culminated in The Enterprise Fund III ([5] supra), where the Court of Appeal held that the Standby Facility, as well as the acquisition of shares using the funds drawn down from it, were void by virtue of s 76A(1)(a) of the Companies Act, and that IHC did not owe any contractual liability under the Standby Facility (at [134]).

  68. [54] With this context in mind, I turn to the parties’ cases.

  69. The parties’ cases

  70. The plaintiffs’ case

  71. [55] As pleaded in Statement of Claim (Amendment No 4) (the “SOC4”), there are three causes of action against the defendants.

  72. [56] First, the plaintiffs allege breach of duties by Mr Fan and Ms Lim. Mr Fan was the Group CEO of IHC from 17 May 2015 to 30 June 2015 and subsequently acted as CEO of IHC from 30 June 2015 to 31 January 2016. He was also, at all material times, the shadow director of the plaintiffs. He thus owed the following six duties to the plaintiffs:

  73. (a) A duty to act bona fide in their best interests;

  74. (b) A duty to exercise his powers for proper purposes;

  75. (c) A duty of fidelity;

  76. (d) A duty to avoid any conflict between his duties and his personal and other interests;

  77. (e) A duty to exercise due skill, care and diligence in the discharge of his duties; and

  78. (f) A statutory duty under s 157(1) of the Companies Act imposed on directors to act honestly and use reasonable diligence in discharging the duties of office.

  79. [57] As an officer of IHC during the material period of time, Ms Lim owed the first five duties as set out above at [56(a)] - [56(e)] to IHC.

  80. [58] At all material times, the defendants intended, and in fact, used the Standby Facility for the purpose of acquiring IHC shares for IHC in contravention of s 76 of the Companies Act. There was no commercial purpose for the Standby Facility, and it served mainly to benefit the substantial shareholders, namely, Mr Fan and Mr Aathar. In addition, the terms of the Standby Facility were disadvantageous to IHC.

  81. [59] In breach of their duties, Mr Fan and Ms Lim caused IHC to enter into and draw down on the Standby Facility to purchase IHC shares. I pause to observe that while the plaintiffs plead that Mr Fan owed IHC Medical Re duties, they only allege breach of duties towards IHC.

  82. [60] Second, the Crest entities, Mr Aathar and Ms Lim knew or ought to have known that Mr Fan was acting in breach of his duties to IHC. They dishonestly assisted in his breach of duties as follows:

  83. (a) The Crest entities agreed to extend the Standby Facility to IHC.

  84. (b) Mr Aathar negotiated with the Crest entities on the Standby Facility with the knowledge and authority of Mr Fan, and extended his personal guarantee to the Crest entities to facilitate the grant of the Standby Facility.

  85. (c) Ms Lim prepared and finalised the Standby Facility documents, and prepared and circulated the board paper to recommend IHC’s approval of the Standby Facility.

  86. [61] Third, all the defendants engaged in an unlawful means conspiracy to injure IHC by means of Mr Fan’s breach of duties and the contravention of s 76 of the Companies Act, in causing IHC to enter into and draw down on the Standby Facility.

  87. [62] Accordingly, the defendants are jointly and severally liable by way of damages and/or equitable compensation for losses sustained by IHC and/or IHC Medical Re as a result of entering into and drawing down on the Standby Facility, and consequential losses connected with the Geelong Facility. I shall set these out in detail at [219] below.

  88. The Crest entities’ case

  89. [63] In the Crest entities’ Defence (Amendment No 6) and Counterclaim (Amendment No 3) (the “D6CC3”), they plead that the Standby Facility was for general working capital, and was widely worded to allow the IHC to use the funds for any purpose (including the purchase of IHC’s own shares).

  90. [64] Thus, the Crest entities deny that they had “intended” to use the Standby Facility for the specific purpose of IHC acquiring its own shares. They admit, however, that Mr Fan and Mr Aathar had indicated that they intended for the funds to be used to acquire IHC’s shares, and eventually that the funds were disbursed for such a purpose. They granted the Standby Facility because of the long-standing business relationship with IHC (and its associated companies), as well as IHC’s ability and willingness to provide sufficient security.

  91. [65] The Crest entities deny that the terms of the Standby Facility were disadvantageous to IHC, and assert that given the short-term and urgent nature of the facility, its terms (eg, the high interest rates imposed) are not out of line with comparable short-term working capital loan facilities of a similar nature.

  92. [66] Further, the Crest entities claim that they were not obliged to enquire into whether there was any non-compliance with the Companies Act, and were not alerted to any contravention in relation to the Standby Facility. They were not aware of any contravention of s 76 of the Companies Act by IHC.

  93. [67] Also, the Crest entities claim that they relied on IHC’s actions and representations that all necessary actions or steps to ensure that the obligations in the Standby Facility would be legally enforceable, and that the performance of the obligations would not violate any law or regulation.

  94. [68] As such, the Crest entities were not aware of any breach of duty by Mr Fan to IHC. They did not dishonestly assist in any such breach of duty by Mr Fan. Also, they did not conspire with Mr Aathar and Ms Lim to injure IHC by unlawful means. At all material time, there were other officers and employees of IHC who were involved in the transaction, including Mr Chia and Dr Jong, which only reinforced the impression given to the Crest entities that there could not have been anything amiss.

  95. [69] Turning to the losses allegedly suffered by the plaintiffs, the Crest entities deny such losses.

  96. [71] In the alternative, the Crest entities seek to recover the drawdowns on the Standby Facility on the ground of unjust enrichment.

  97. [72] Finally, on the ground of mistake, the Crest entities seek to rectify the default interest clause in the Geelong Facility which expressly provided for default interest charge at 3% per annum to 3% per month.

  98. Ms Lim’s case

  99. [73] In her Defence (Amendment No 2) and Counterclaim (the “D2CC”), Ms Lim admits that she owed the same duties to IHC as Mr Fan allegedly did (as per the plaintiffs’ pleadings). However, she pleads that there were, inter alia, two implied terms of her employment:

  100. (a) that she would obey and co-operate with IHC to carry out all lawful and reasonable directions given by IHC; and

  101. [74] As far as Ms Lim was concerned, at the material time, the Standby Facility was a credit facility for IHC’s working capital. There was no drawdown on the Standby Facility for any purpose in which she was involved or of which she had any knowledge. The Crest entities had bought the IHC shares with the funds drawn down from the Standby Facility for themselves without the authority of IHC.

  102. [75] Therefore, Ms Lim’s case is that she did not dishonestly assist or procure Mr Fan’s breach of his fiduciary duties. She prepared and finalised the legal documents for IHC’s entry into the Standby Facility and circulated the board paper to the IHC board of directors for the purpose of seeking their approval for the Standby Facility upon the instructions of Mr Chia (and then Mr Fan). She acted honestly and reasonably in carrying out the assigned tasks, taking into account fiscal considerations (eg, repayment, security and other requirements), and IHC’s cash flow situation. She also denies that she had engaged in an unlawful means conspiracy with the other defendants to injure IHC.

  103. [76] Ms Lim also avers that IHC had paid money erroneously toward the Standby Facility, and therefore she was not liable for principal, standby fee or default interest claimed by it as losses under the Standby Facility.

  104. [77] As for losses under the Geelong Facility, Ms Lim avers that IHC had sufficient means to pay off the outstanding amount and interest under the Geelong Facility, even after erroneously paying down the Standby Facility. IHC could and ought to have deployed available funding to do so. In the alternative, liability was incurred solely because of IHC’s impecuniosity.

  105. [78] Ms Lim denies liability for the remaining categories of losses.

  106. [79] In her counterclaim, Ms Lim seeks an indemnity against IHC for any sums she might be found liable for on the basis of Art 153 of IHC’s Articles of Association, or alternatively, an implied indemnity arising out of the terms of her employment with IHC. She also seeks relief under ss 391(1) and 391(3) read with s 76A(13) of the Companies Act.

  107. The positions of Mr Fan and Mr Aathar

  108. [80] Mr Fan did not file a defence to the action, while Mr Aathar filed a four-page defence comprising mainly of bare denials on 18 April 2018. They each filed an affidavit of evidence-in-chief (“AEIC”), and testified at the trial. I have set out their evidence on the key matters above at [23]–[24], [34] and [41]. Their general position is that the Standby Facility was not intended for, and was not used to purchase IHC shares.

  109. Issues to be determined

  110. [81] Based on the above, the following issues fall for determination in relation to each of the plaintiffs’ claims:

  111. (a) Breach of duties towards IHC

  112. (i) whether Mr Fan owed and breached any duties to IHC; and

  113. (ii) whether Ms Lim owed and breached any duties to IHC.

  114. (b) Dishonest assistance

  115. (i) if Mr Fan acted in breach of his duties to IHC, whether the Crest entities, Mr Aathar and/or Ms Lim assisted in such breach; and

  116. (ii) whether such assistance was dishonest.

  117. (c) Conspiracy by unlawful means

  118. (i) whether the contravention of s 76 of the Companies Act for IHC to enter into and draw down on the Standby Facility to purchase its own shares and/or Mr Fan’s breach of duties are/is unlawful for the purposes of the tort of unlawful means conspiracy;

  119. (ii) whether the Crest entities, Mr Fan, Mr Aathar and/or Ms Lim had acted in combination with and/or in furtherance of an agreement to cause IHC to enter into and draw down on the Standby Facility to purchase its own shares and/or Mr Fan’s breach of duties; and

  120. (iii) whether the Crest entities, Mr Fan, Mr Aathar and /or Ms Lim had the intention to cause loss or damage to IHC.

  121. [82] Should any party be found liable for any of the three causes of action, further issues arise as to whether such party caused any of the losses, as well as the proof and quantification of such losses (save for the quantification of any loss of the Australian business held through IHC Medical Re which will be dealt with separately).

  122. [83] As for the counterclaim by the Crest entities, the issues are:

  123. (a) whether IHC is liable for the claim for unjust enrichment for the sums disbursed by them pursuant to the Standby Facility, which was void for illegality by virtue of s 76A(1)(a) of the Companies Act;

  124. (b) whether the default interest clause under the Geelong Facility should be rectified; and

  125. (c) whether the Crest entities are entitled to an indemnity from IHC.

  126. [84] In relation to Ms Lim’s counterclaim, the issue is whether IHC should indemnify her in respect of any loss she may be found liable for.

  127. The underlying factual disputes

  128. [85] Prior to dealing with the issues, it is necessary to resolve two underlying factual disputes between the plaintiffs and the Crest entities (on the one hand), and Mr Fan, Mr Aathar and Ms Lim (on the other hand). These concern the purpose of the Standby Facility, and whether IHC shares were acquired on behalf of IHC using funds from the Standby Facility on the instructions of Mr Aathar.

  129. Purpose of the Standby Facility

  130. [87] To reiterate, according to the Crest entities, the Standby Facility came about because of Mr Aathar’s request made to Mr Tan at the 3 April 2015 meeting, followed up by the two 4 April 2015 emails, for up to S$20m to combat a short-selling attack on IHC’s shares. To that end, the Crest entities could directly buy and hold the IHC shares as security. The plaintiffs adopt Mr Tan’s account.

  131. [88] Mr Fan and Mr Aathar, however, contend that the discussion on 3 April 2015 and Mr Aathar’s first email of 4 April 2015, related to Mr Aathar’s personal request for the Crest entities to invest directly in IHC shares. Mr Aathar said that the second 4 April 2015 related to the Standby Facility which was proposed by Mr Tan, after the Crest entities refused to invest directly in IHC shares: see [23]–[24] above. Thereafter, it was the board of directors who approved the entry into the Standby Facility.

  132. [89] While Ms Lim did not throw light on the 3 April 2015 meeting or the two 4 April 2015 emails, she agrees with Mr Fan and Mr Aathar that the Standby Facility had nothing to do with the acquisition of IHC shares, and was one for “general working capital” only: see [25] above.

  133. [90] Having reviewed the evidence, I accept Mr Tan’s version of events, and reject that given by Mr Aathar and Mr Fan for these reasons:

  134. (a) Mr Tan’s version is consistent with the contents of the first 4 April 2015 email which I reproduced at [19] above. Throughout the email, Mr Aathar used “we” instead of “I”. Specifically, he wrote that “[w]e look to Crest to provide a standby line of $20m for use against this activity.” As one of the terms of the standby line, he added that “[s]hares can be bought and held by Crest directly.” Three points are evident:

  135. (i) First, Mr Aathar did not make the request in his personal capacity. His explanation that “we” referred to Mr Tan and himself makes no sense. It was clearly a request by Mr Fan and him, on behalf of IHC.

  136. (ii) Second, the request was to avail IHC of funds by way of a standby line to combat the short-selling activity.

  137. (iii) Third, there was no mention of the Crest entities investing in the shares. The Crest entities were being asked to buy and hold the shares pursuant to the standby line.

  138. (b) Mr Tan’s evidence is also consistent with the contents of the second 4 April 2015 email. Given the proximity in time of the two emails, it seems to me they concerned the same deal. Indeed, they both carried the same subject title of “Standby Facility”. In it, Mr Aathar gave a firm undertaking on behalf of IHC in respect of the security arrangements for the facility, once again reinforcing the position that at all times, the request was for IHC.

  139. (c) Subsequently, the term sheet and the Standby Facility captured the key terms within the first 4 April 2015 email, and required the security arrangements set out in the second 4 April 2015 email.

  140. (d) Moreover, as I shall discuss later, in accordance with the first 4 April 2015 email, the Crest entities proceeded to purchase IHC shares and hold them as security.

  141. [91] In contrast, the version proffered by Mr Fan and Mr Aathar would require a strained reading of the emails, and is inconsistent with the surrounding facts and circumstances. Therefore, I find that the Standby Facility originated from the 3 April 2015 meeting and the two 4 April 2015 emails. Its purpose was to avail IHC of funds for the acquisition of IHC shares. The Crest entities, Mr Fan and Mr Aathar well knew of this purpose for the standby line – which was eventually formalised as the Standby Facility.

  142. [92] While I thus reject Ms Lim’s position that the Standby Facility was merely one for “general working capital”, her knowledge of the state of affairs remains to be considered. In due course, at [197] below, I shall also consider the Crest entities’ arguments that, in any event, they did not intend the acquisition of the shares to be the sole purpose for the Standby Facility, and that they did not know of any contravention of the Companies Act.

  143. Whether IHC shares were acquired for IHC with funds from the Standby Facility

  144. [93] According to the Crest entities, from April to August 2015, Mr Aathar instructed Mr Tan to purchase IHC shares. A total sum of S$17,332,081.15 from the Standby Facility was used to purchase 59,304,800 IHC shares (which were held on behalf of IHC). Again, the plaintiffs adopt this account: see [32] above. However, Mr Fan and Mr Aathar assert that the Crest entities invested in IHC shares for themselves, but decided to pin the losses on IHC by claiming that there were drawdowns from the Standby Facility. Similarly, Ms Lim says that there were no drawdowns: see [34] above.

  145. [94] Once again, it is the Crest entities’ version that I accept for these reasons:

  146. (a) The WhatsApp exchanges from Mr Aathar to Mr Tan clearly showed Mr Aathar activating the standby line, and giving instructions for Mr Tan to buy shares. As highlighted by the plaintiffs, these are some key messages:

  147. (i) On 15 April 2015: “Yes, very very very stressful...If cannot tahan, I may need to activate your line tomorrow. It is the same group selling as what we briefed you.”

  148. (ii) On 15 April 2015: “Thank you. Fan and me also feel if pressure we may have no choice but to seek your lines. Thanks.”

  149. (iii) 16 April 2015: “Hi Glendon, can queue to buy 5 million shares of IHC at 28.5c?”

  150. (iv) 6 July 2015: “Hi Glendon can assist on purchase? Can do 4m at 30c.”

  151. These messages completely undermined Mr Aathar’s explanation that he was simply giving advice to the Crest entities on their investments in IHC shares (see above at [34]).

  152. (b) On 8 May 2015, Mr Tan sent Mr Aathar and Mr Fan a spreadsheet showing the shares “bought on behalf” of IHC which indicated that around 18m IHC shares were bought in three transactions from 16 April to 8 May 2015.

  153. (c) Even though the legal documents were not fully executed until 21 July 2015, Mr Fan approved the payment of standby fees for the one-month period of 16 April to 15 May 2015, made by way of two cheque payments of S$255,850 and S$399,000 dated 17 June 2015 and 2 July 2015 respectively. In this connection, Mr Fan tried to explain that he signed the payment vouchers, which were “cleared by several set of people”, in error. The explanation is not believable. As pointed out by the plaintiffs, on 2 July 2015, when the second cheque payment was made, Mr Tan had emailed Mr Fan and Mr Aathar to chase for the outstanding standby fees, and Mr Fan had forwarded the email to Mr Aathar for discussion. Mr Fan knew that the request for standby fees was in relation to the Standby Facility which had been drawn down.

  154. (d) After Mr Fan insisted that IHC would not pay for the standby fees for 16 May to 15 June 2015, Mr Aathar paid for the standby fees of S$700,000 out of his own pocket on 31 July 2015.

  155. (e) The subsequent conduct of Mr Fan and Mr Aathar in engaging in negotiations for the repayment of the Standby Facility and the Geelong Facility also amply demonstrated that they knew about the drawdowns on the Standby Facility. As stated above at [36], on 19 October 2015, the Crest entities sent Dr Jong (with Mr Fan and Mr Aathar copied) a request for payment for the standby fees of the Standby Facility. In the negotiations, Mr Aathar proposed to the Crest entities, in which Mr Fan must have acquiesced, to restructure the “market shares of S$17.2m or 59.3m shares”. This figure is broadly in accord with the drawdowns on the Standby Facility totalling S$17,332,081.15, which were used to purchase the 59,304,800 IHC shares. Mr Aathar’s explanation (set out at [41] above) was that in the course of the negotiations, he was merely assisting the Crest entities to find an exit strategy. This simply did not ring true.

  156. [95] Thus, the evidence points inexorably towards Mr Fan and Mr Aathar knowing about the drawdowns from the Standby Facility from 16 April 2015 to acquire IHC shares. I should add that Mr Aathar and Ms Lim argue that Mr Aathar was only a shareholder. He did not have the authority to instruct the drawdowns on behalf of IHC. In relation to the claims and the counterclaims, Mr Aathar’s authority is not a relevant legal issue, and would not affect any factual findings I have to make. Whether or not he was authorised to do so (which may be a matter for another day), the evidence showed that Mr Aathar gave the instructions to Mr Tan on the share acquisitions.

  157. [96] Here, again, while I reject Ms Lim’s contention that there was no drawdown on the Standby Facility to acquire IHC shares, the question of her knowledge of these matters remains to be analysed below.

  158. Conclusion

  159. [97] Having determined these two factual disputes in favour of the plaintiffs and the Crest entities, I observe, for completeness, that the Crest entities dispute the dishonesty and/or injurious intent requirements in the two substantive causes of action against them on the basis that Mr Tan’s state of mind should not be attributed to each of the Crest entities. It seems to me that the argument is inconsistent with the Crest entities’ complete reliance on Mr Tan’s acts in relation to the transaction. In any event, as I elaborate below at [138] onwards, based on agency, Mr Tan’s state of mind and intent could (and should) be attributable to each of the Crest entities. I now go to the plaintiffs’ claim against Mr Fan for breach of duties.

  160. Breach of duties by Mr Fan

  161. [98] According to the plaintiffs, Mr Fan owed IHC six duties as set out at [56] above, either as an officer of IHC from 17 May 2015 and/or as a shadow director at all material times. Mr Fan denies that he was a shadow director. While he denies that he breached “any duty [he] owed to IHC as a CEO”, he does not clearly concede that he owed IHC such duties as alleged by the plaintiffs. Meanwhile, Ms Lim argues that Mr Fan owed certain (unspecified) fiduciary duties as CEO, but not in relation to the entry into the Standby Facility.

  162. [99] I pause to observe that fiduciary duties are owed by directors of a company, and imposed on those employees considered to be fiduciaries of a company. The duties of honesty, fidelity and loyalty are core fiduciary obligations, but the duty to exercise due skill, care and diligence is not: Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1 (“Mothew”) at 16C; and Then Khek Koon v Arjun Permanand Samtani [2014] 1 SLR 245 (“Then Khek Koon”) at [104]. As for the statutory duty pursuant to s 157(1) of the Companies Act, it is imposed on directors.

  163. Whether Mr Fan owed duties to IHC as a shadow director

  164. [101] A shadow director is defined by s 4(1) of the Companies Act as “a person in accordance with whose directions or instructions the directors or the majority of the directors of a corporation are accustomed to act”. The policy impetus behind holding a person liable as a shadow director is that persons who are actually responsible for the important corporate decisions of a company should be held accountable regardless of what they are called and their motives or manner in making such corporate decisions: Raffles Town Club Pte Ltd v Lim Eng Hock Peter and others (Tung Yu-Lien Margaret and others, third parties) [2010] SGHC 163 (“Raffles Town Club”) at [47].

  165. [102] To prove a shadow directorship, all that is required is evidence of a “discernible pattern of compliance with the shadow director’s instructions or directions”, with allowances for occasional departures from this pattern “for whatever reason”. It is not necessary for the court to find that the de facto and de jure directors of the company “did not exercise any discretion or judgment” of their own: Raffles Town Club at [45] and [47].

  166. [103] The plaintiffs argue that Mr Fan was a shadow director of IHC based on the following:

  167. (a) Mr Tan’s evidence that he perceived Mr Fan and Mr Aathar to be the “decision-makers” for IHC throughout the Crest entities’ business dealings with IHC.

  168. (b) Mr Fan was privy to information on IHC’s financial position and business operations beyond that normally available to a substantial shareholder, owing to his regular meetings (once every three weeks) with Dr Jong. The plaintiffs contend that this, combined with the fact that Mr Fan had control over IHC’s management, explained his willingness to provide contractual warranties relating to the operational and management aspects of IHC.

  169. (c) On 4 April 2015, Mr Aathar had, after checking with Mr Fan, purported to give the Crest entities a “firm undertaking from IHC” that all security arrangements would be promptly restored. This was in Mr Aathar’s second 4 April 2015 email. This indicated Mr Fan’s decision-making powers over IHC.

  170. (d) The fact that Mr Chia and Ms Lim, as senior members of IHC’s management, had simply followed up to execute and complete the legal documentation for the Standby Facility without raising further queries after Mr Fan had instructed them to do so indicated that they were accustomed to acting on Mr Fan’s instructions.

  171. [104] Even taking all of the above at the highest, they do not demonstrate the existence of a pattern of conduct in which the directors of IHC, or a majority thereof, were accustomed to act on Mr Fan’s instructions. There was no evidence showing that Mr Fan had even issued any instructions or directions to any of the directors of IHC. The fact that Mr Fan and Mr Aathar might have held themselves out as authorised deal negotiators whose negotiated terms were accepted by IHC, as Mr Tan alleged, did not in any way suggest that IHC’s directors were accustomed to act on their instructions. In particular, the directors of IHC did not accept or approve the Standby Facility deal blindly, but questioned the basis for it before making their decision. As observed at [30] above, both Mr Siew and Mr Ong queried the need for the Standby Facility given the high interest rates, with Mr Siew approving the Standby Facility only if it was necessary for the continued operations of IHC. Mr Ong rejected the deal. These were plainly not the actions of directors who were accustomed to acting on the instructions of Mr Fan.

  172. [105] Accordingly, I do not think that IHC has successfully proved that Mr Fan was a shadow director of IHC, or that he owed any duties as a shadow director. It follows that Mr Fan did not owe IHC the statutory duty imposed on directors under s 157(1) of the Companies Act.

  173. Whether Mr Fan owed duties to IHC as CEO

  174. [106] I next turn to the question of whether from 17 May 2015, as Group CEO, and then later as CEO, Mr Fan owed the other five duties to IHC. In this connection, I do not find the cases cited by the plaintiffs in the closing submissions to be of assistance, as they involve the imposition of such duties on directors and/or shadow directors of companies (and not on other officers/employees of the companies): see Ho Kang Peng v Scintronix Corp Ltd (formerly known as TTL Holdings Ltd) [2014] 3 SLR 329 (“Ho Kang Peng”); Ng Eng Ghee and others v Mamata Kapildev Dave and others (Horizon Partners Pte Ltd, intervener) and another appeal [2009] 3 SLR (R) 109; Lim Weng Kee v Public Prosecutor [2002] 2 SLR (R) 848.

  175. [107] The starting point is that an employee may owe fiduciary duties to his employer in certain circumstances. For this principle, I turn to Nottingham University v Fishel and another [2000] IRLR 471 (“Nottingham University”) where Elias J said at [97]:

  176. [108] Thus, whether a fiduciary relationship arises in the context of an employment relationship is heavily fact-dependent: Quality Assurance Management Asia Pte Ltd v Zhang Qing and others [2013] 3 SLR 631 (“Quality Assurance”) at [25]. In Clearlab SG Pte Ltd v Ting Chong Chai [2015] 1 SLR 163 (“Clearlab”), a case cited by Ms Lim, Lee Seiu Kin J set out a framework for applying the Nottingham University test as follows:

  177. (a) The court will only regard an employee as a fiduciary if he is placed in a position where he must act solely in the interests of his employer. A mere employment relationship does not support the existence of a fiduciary relationship. It must be shown that there are particular functions of the employee, which requires him to pursue the interests of his employer to the exclusion of other interests, including his own (at [272]).

  178. (b) The conditions for the imposition of fiduciary obligations on an employee are (at [275]):

  179. (i) The employee has scope for the exercise of some discretion or power.

  180. (ii) The employee can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so as to affect the company’s legal or practical interests.

  181. (iii) The company is peculiarly vulnerable to or at the mercy of the employee holding the discretion or power.

  182. (c) An employee will not owe fiduciary duties in respect of all aspects of his employment. There is no wholesale importation of every kind of fiduciary duty into each case. The fiduciary duties that arise are context-dependent and must be accommodated within the terms of the employment contract without altering its intended operation. The real question is whether the employee owed specific fiduciary duties in the particular circumstances in which it is alleged that he had acted against the interests of the employer (at [278]).

  183. [109] It is a question of fact whether senior employees will owe the same fiduciary duties as that of directors. Applying the test in Clearlab, a senior employee who owes such fiduciary duties would need to be vested with broad discretionary powers of management over the company. Thus, in Canadian Aero Service Ltd v O’Malley (1973) 40 DLR (3d) 371 (“Canadian Aero”), the defendants, a president and executive vice-president of a company, were held to owe fiduciary duties similar to directors because they were “top management” employees: at 381.

  184. [110] Similarly, in ABB Holdings Pte Ltd and others v Sher Hock Guan Charles [2009] 4 SLR(R) 111 (“ABB”), the High Court held that the defendant owed fiduciary duties akin to those owed by directors to the third plaintiff which he had breached by failing to inform the third plaintiff of the competitive intentions of potential competitors. This was because the defendant was in charge of all aspects of the third plaintiff’s business, being responsible for its general management as well as business development, marketing and sales. He was also in a position to hire and fire employees, and attended meetings of the Country Management Team where the plaintiffs’ various businesses were discussed. As such, at [42], he was found to have been “a very senior employee indeed” and therefore owed fiduciary duties which “have been formulated in various authorities as the duties owed by a director to his company and there is no reason to formulate the fiduciary duties of a senior employee any differently.”

  185. [111] Fiduciary duties will not be imposed on an employee who is subject to a high degree of supervision and review by a more senior employee. That was the case in Nagase Singapore Pte Ltd v Ching Kai Huat and others [2007] 3 SLR(R) 265 (“Nagase”) where two employees, even though they had some authority to negotiate contracts on the company’s behalf or authorize the payment of invoices, were not held to be fiduciaries because they were members of the company’s middle management and had to obtain their superiors’ sanction for their decisions (at [29]). Similarly, in Griffin Travel Pte Ltd v Nagender Rao Chilkuri and others [2014] SGHC 205 (“Griffin Travel”), the employees in question were heads of their respective departments (one of them being the company’s Chief Financial Officer). Nevertheless, they were not held to be fiduciaries because they had to report to two more senior employees and obtain their sanction for many of their decisions.

  186. [112] It is clear from the authorities that fiduciary duties will likely only be imposed on an employee who is, effectively, the “ruler in his own domain”, subject to minimal levels of supervision and having a wide discretion over critical aspects of the company’s business. Fiduciary duties akin to those owed by a director would likely be imposed on senior employees whose domain extended to all or substantially all of the business of the company, as in ABB and Canadian Aero.

  187. [113] Returning to the present case, I find that, Mr Fan, as Group CEO and subsequently CEO of IHC, was, from 17 May 2015, a member of IHC’s senior management. Indeed, his evidence at trial was that he was the leader of its management:

  188. [114] In my view, this clearly shows that Mr Fan stood in a position analogous to the defendant in ABB in that he had broad powers of management over IHC. Indeed, Mr Fan was not only part of IHC’s top management, he was its top executive. This is a case in which the full range of fiduciary duties owed by the directors of IHC ought to be imposed on Mr Fan, similar to the approach taken in ABB and Canadian Aero.

  189. [115] Imposing fiduciary duties on Mr Fan in respect of IHC would not be inconsistent with the terms of his service agreement with IHC dated 17 May 2015 which requires him to act to promote the interests of the company. I set out the relevant extracts as follows:

  190. [116] By the above, I find that upon his appointment as Group CEO and subsequently as CEO, Mr Fan owed to IHC the duties as pleaded (other than the statutory duty under s 157(1) of the Companies Act), ie, a duty to act bona fide in the best interest of IHC; a duty to exercise power for a proper purpose; a duty of fidelity; a duty to avoid any conflict; and a duty to exercise due skill, care and diligence.

  191. Whether Mr Fan breached his duties to IHC

  192. [117] I now consider whether Mr Fan breached his duties to IHC. According to the plaintiffs, he did so by:

  193. (a) procuring IHC to enter into and draw down on the Standby Facility to purchase IHC shares, which was a contravention of s 76 of the Companies Act; and

  194. (b) actively concealing the illegal nature of the Standby Facility from others at IHC, including IHC’s board.

  195. [118] Contrary to the assertions of Mr Fan, Mr Aathar and Ms Lim, as I found above (at [90]), the purpose of the Standby Facility was for IHC to acquire its own shares. Mr Fan was, alongside Mr Aathar, one of the two key persons involved in negotiating the terms of the Standby Facility with the Crest entities. Furthermore, I also found (at [95]) that Mr Fan knew about the drawdowns of the funds from 16 April 2015 to acquire IHC shares. I should add that in his evidence, Mr Fan admitted that he was aware of the prohibition against a company buying its own shares without a proper share buy-back mandate. Indeed, Mr Aathar admitted to the same.

  196. [119] Not only was such an arrangement illegal, it was prima facie inimical to IHC’s interests, as IHC’s future resources would be diminished by such acquisitions of its own shares: Public Prosecutor v Lew Syn Pau [2006] 4 SLR(R) 210 (“Lew Syn Pau”) at [126]. Indeed, Mr Fan’s conduct demonstrated that he knew that it was illegal and detrimental to IHC’s interests.

  197. [120] With such background knowledge in mind, as Group CEO and subsequently CEO of IHC, Mr Fan vetted, approved and submitted the board paper to the IHC board of directors for their consideration. This board paper did not mention that funds drawn down on the Standby Facility would be used to purchase IHC shares. Instead, the board paper simply (and misleadingly) characterised the Standby Facility as being a loan facility for “general working capital purposes” (emphasis added). In my view, there would be no reason for Mr Fan to omit all mention of the purchase of shares if, to his mind, that was perfectly legal or in IHC’s interests.

  198. [121] This action was significant in causing IHC to enter into the Standby Facility. As I observed at [104], Mr Siew’s vote in favour of the Standby Facility, which broke the tie between the votes cast by Dr Jong and Mr Ong, was given on the basis that the Standby Facility was necessary for operational purposes. As such, it is questionable whether his approval would have been given had he been aware that the Standby Facility would be used to purchase IHC shares, with the result that IHC would likely not have entered into the Standby Facility in the first place.

  199. [122] By entering into the Standby Facility, IHC then incurred substantial liabilities in the form of the standby fees and drawdowns used to purchase its own shares. The plaintiffs argue that, from IHC’s perspective, there really was no commercial purpose at all for IHC to enter into the Standby Facility. Whether or not there was any purpose for IHC to prop up its share price, it was clear that the substantial shareholders (ie, Mr Fan and Mr Aathar) potentially stood to gain from the market interventions by such means. Mr Fan would have been well aware of this.

  200. [123] The above shows that, in breach of his duty to act bona fide in IHC’s interests, Mr Fan caused IHC to pursue a course of action that was inimical to its interests. His duty of fidelity required him to not act for his own benefit or the benefit of any third party without the informed consent of IHC. However, he failed to disclose to IHC’s board of directors that the funds had already been used from the Standby Facility to acquire IHC shares (which was the true purpose of the facility), and that this course of action may be of benefit to Mr Aathar and him. Along the same vein, he also put himself in a position of conflict, resulting in the breach of his duty to avoid conflicts of interest. I, therefore, find that Mr Fan had breached these core fiduciary duties he owed to IHC.

  201. Breach of duties by Ms Lim

  202. Whether Ms Lim owed duties to IHC

  203. [124] The law on the imposition of duties on an employee are set out above: see [107]–[112]. From January 2015 to 6 January 2016, inclusive of the date on which IHC entered into the Standby Facility, Ms Lim was the Vice-President (Investments) of IHC. In that capacity, she was mainly involved with asset management, financing and disposition activities around a portfolio of overseas medical real estate. She also assisted the Chairman (who was Dr Jong at the material time) with loan reviews and cash flow management for IHC. In D2CC, Ms Lim admits to owing IHC the duties as pleaded by the plaintiffs. Comparing Ms Lim’s role and functions with those of the employees in Nagase ([111] supra) and Griffin Travel ([111] supra), I have some reservations as to whether Ms Lim was in such a senior position within IHC (especially in relation to entry into loans) as would justify imposing on her the core fiduciary duties owed by directors. Nonetheless, given the concession, I proceed on the basis that Ms Lim owed such duties to IHC.

  204. Whether Ms Lim breached her duties to IHC

  205. [125] IHC argues that Ms Lim breached her duties to it for the following reasons:

  206. (a) Ms Lim was aware of the purpose of the Standby Facility, and that it had been used to purchase IHC shares in contravention of the Companies Act.

  207. (b) While knowing that the true purport of the Standby Facility was to finance an illegal acquisition of shares, Ms Lim was instrumental in procuring IHC to enter into and draw down on the Standby Facility, by finalising the legal documents and preparing the board paper for the consideration of IHC’s board of directors.

  208. [126] Ms Lim takes the primary position that the Standby Facility was not intended to be used (and was not used) to purchase IHC’s shares. She was aware that to acquire its own shares, IHC would have required an approval for share buyback (or be in contravention of s 76 of the Companies Act). Underlying this is a denial that she knew of the true state of affairs. In addition, Ms Lim contends that she had not breached her duties to IHC for four reasons:

  209. (a) She had acted in accordance with her superiors’ instructions.

  210. (b) She acted honestly.

  211. (c) She had reason to consider the Standby Facility to be in the interest of IHC.

  212. (d) She stood to make no personal gain.

  213. [127] I turn to the question of Ms Lim’s knowledge. In the main, the plaintiffs rely on six pieces of evidence to prove that Ms Lim knew of the true state of affairs:

  214. (a) First, on 9 April 2015, Mr Fan forwarded the first 4 April 2015 email to Ms Lim as part of the chain of emails. To recapitulate, this was the email capturing the key terms of the standby line – including the term “[s]hares can be bought and held by Crest directly”. Shortly after, the term sheet, which stated that the Standby Facility would be secured by a pledge of IHC shares “purchased through Fund” was sent by Mr Tan to Ms Lim. Ms Lim had been informed of the purpose of the standby line.

  215. (b) Second, on 12 May 2015 at 6.15pm, Mr CP Lim sent Ms Lim an email requesting her to follow-up on the preparation of the “loan documents for the standby facility”. For her reference, he attached “the SGX statement on the purchase of shares till date”. The SGX statement, dated 16 April 2015, reflected the purchase of 11,100,000 IHC shares at the price of S$0.285 per share for the sum of S$3,173,316.34. In the same email, Mr CP Lim also stated that the Crest entities’ account team had sent out the debit note to IHC’s finance staff and that as the “first drawdown date is 16 Apr 2015”, “the full interest and principal repayment shall be 15 June 2015”. Ten minutes later, at 6.25pm, Mr CP Lim “recalled” the email.

  216. On 13 May 2015, Mr CP Lim sent another email to Ms Lim, without any mention of the purchase of IHC shares and without attaching the SGX statement. This email, however, retained the references made in his 12 May 2015 email to the first drawdown date (16 April 2015) and the full interest and principal repayment date (15 June 2015).

  217. (c) Third, Ms Lim knew about the two payments that were made to the Crest entities for the standby fees that were accrued from 16 April to 15 May 2015. Again, this pointed to her knowledge of a drawdown on the Standby Facility.

  218. (d) Fourth, Ms Lim was content for the initial facility agreement to be backdated to 16 April 2015, even before the legal documents were finalised.

  219. (e) Fifth, in December 2015, the Crest entities sought to direct IHC’s repayment of S$3,883,000 towards the Standby Facility. In her WhatsApp message to Mr Fan on or about 18 December 2015, Ms Lim stated as follows:

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