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Grounds publishedDecided 23 Jul 2020

High Court

Lavrentiadis, Lavrentios v Dextra Partners Pte Ltd and another

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[2020] SGHC 146Case no. Suit No 106 of 2018

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The plaintiff, Mr Lavrentios Lavrentiadis, was at all material times a client of the first defendant, Dextra Partners Pte Ltd (“Dextra”), a licensed foreign law practice in Singapore. The second defendant, Mr Bernhard Wilhelm Rudolf Weber (“Weber”), managed Dextra at all material times.

  3. [2] It is not disputed that Dextra held the plaintiff’s monies amounting to €39,735,362.82 and US$13,300,160.39 in its clients’ account. The disputes in this action revolve primarily around two broad questions: (a) whether the plaintiff had authorised certain transactions that Dextra claims it had entered into for the plaintiff’s account, and (b) whether Weber is personally liable for any loss suffered by the plaintiff.

  4. Background

  5. Weber and ILC Singapore/Dextra

  6. [3] Weber is a Swiss-qualified lawyer and a Singapore-registered foreign lawyer. He set up ILC International Legal Consultants (Singapore) Pte Ltd (“ILC Singapore”) in 2003 after he left UBS Singapore where he was the head of private banking.

  7. [4] Weber set up ILC Singapore to provide legal services to private clients at the suggestion of Mr Richard Cedric Harry Ritter (“Ritter”), who is a fellow Swiss-qualified lawyer. Ritter ran a law firm in the United Arab Emirates called International Legal Consultants Dubai (“ILC Dubai”) as well as a law firm in Switzerland called Ritter Attorneys-at-Law Ltd (“Ritter Attorneys”). ILC Dubai was a sole proprietorship owned by Ritter. Asia was seen as an upcoming market and Weber set up ILC Singapore as an expansion of ILC Dubai to Asia. According to Weber, ILC Dubai (representing its own clients) would engage ILC Singapore to act for it in respect of transactions in Asia. Ritter became a shareholder of ILC Singapore shortly after it was set up.

  8. [5] At all material times, Ritter and Weber were the directors and shareholders of ILC Singapore until September 2013 when ILC Singapore’s association with ILC Dubai came to an end. Thereafter, ILC Singapore was renamed as Dextra and Weber became its sole director and shareholder. In this judgment, I use both “ILC Singapore” and “Dextra” interchangeably.

  9. [6] ILC Singapore provides legal advice on matters including legal aspects of structuring investments. Weber also set up various companies which render various services to ILC Singapore’s clients. The following are the main companies that are relevant to the present proceedings:

  10. (a) Carnelia Pte Ltd (“Carnelia”) – Weber and one Ms Tracey Casari (“Casari”) set up Carnelia as a multi-family office for ILC Singapore’s high net worth individual clients. Weber and Casari initially each held 42.5% of Carnelia’s shares and became equal shareholders after 23 April 2014. At all material times, Weber, Casari and Ritter (until 12 September 2013) were directors of Carnelia. According to Weber, Carnelia acts as a “concierge” and takes care of clients’ needs for multiple services (for example, legal, tax accounting and asset management) by engaging the necessary service providers. Carnelia outsources all the services that the clients need. The service providers invoice Carnelia, and in turn, Carnelia invoices Dextra.

  11. (b) Straits Invest Pte Ltd (“Straits Invest”) – Straits Invest, formerly known as W&M Wealth Managers (Asia) Pte Ltd (“W&M”), acts as an investment advisor. Weber held 40.2% of its shares until 2014 when his shareholding was reduced to 36%. At all material times, Weber was a director of Straits Invest. Straits Invest was set up to provide private wealth management services and it takes care of all matters relating to asset management. Clients may give Straits Invest a discretionary mandate to make investments, or an advisory mandate under which it merely advises the clients who then make the investments themselves if they accept the advice. “Straits Invest” and “W&M” will be used interchangeably in this judgment.

  12. (c) Pearl Investment Management Ltd (“Pearl Investment”) – Pearl Investment is a fund management company set up in Brunei. It was wholly owned by Dextra until 30 March 2012, after which it became wholly owned by Hadley Global Corporation (“Hadley”). At all material times, Hadley was wholly owned by Weber. At all material times, Weber was a director of Pearl Investment.

  13. (d) Orex Holding Ltd (“Orex”) – Weber and Ritter indirectly owned Orex in equal shares until 11 September 2013, after which Weber became the indirect sole owner. Orex was set up for the purposes of providing financing to a company called Far West Entertainment HK Ltd (“Far West”). ILC Singapore made loans on behalf of its clients through Orex so that Orex appeared as the lender to Far West.

  14. (e) Ruby International Ltd (“Ruby”) – Ruby was controlled by Weber and Ritter until 11 September 2013, after which it was effectively controlled by Weber. ILC Singapore made loans on behalf of its clients through Ruby.

  15. The plaintiff as a client of Dextra/ILC Singapore

  16. [7] The plaintiff is a Greek national. Sometime in 2005, the plaintiff wanted to set up a trust in Singapore and he was referred to Weber. This led to the setting up of a trust called the Calmness Trust pursuant to a Deed of Settlement dated 31 December 2005 (“the 2005 Deed of Settlement”). The plaintiff was the settlor and the primary beneficiary of the Calmness Trust and ILC Singapore was the first trustee. The cash under the Calmness Trust was held in an account with Deutsche Bank Singapore (“DB Singapore”) in the name of Cruise Intertrade Ltd (“Cruise”), a company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands. ILC Singapore controlled Cruise on behalf of the Calmness Trust.

  17. [8] On 1 January 2008, ILC Singapore retired as trustee and appointed WinTrust Asia Pacific Pte Ltd (“WinTrust”) as the trustee of the Calmness Trust. WinTrust was a company set up by Casari. Weber had known Casari for a few years as a trust professional. Casari incorporated WinTrust in 2005 or 2006 but could not act as trustee for the Calmness Trust until after WinTrust obtained licensing approval from the Monetary Authority of Singapore in 2007.

  18. [9] The 2005 Deed of Settlement envisaged a protector being appointed for the Calmness Trust. Under the 2005 Deed of Settlement, the trustee required the protector’s consent for certain limited purposes. However, the 2005 Deed of Settlement omitted to name the protector. On 12 September 2011, ILC Singapore and WinTrust entered into a Deed of Variation to the 2005 Deed of Settlement. Under the Deed of Variation, ILC Singapore confirmed, among other things, that it was the protector of the Calmness Trust with effect from 2 January 2008.

  19. [11] Between 30 November 2011 and 4 January 2012, the remaining funds in Cruise’s account with DB Singapore, amounting to €39,735,362.82 and US$12.67m, were transferred to ILC Singapore’s clients’ account as follows:

  20. (a) on 30 November 2011 – €35m;

  21. (b) on 21 December 2011 – €4m and US$12.67m; and

  22. (c) on 4 January 2012 – €735,362.82.

  23. ILC Singapore held the monies on trust for the plaintiff. These monies form the bulk of the subject matter of this action. The Calmness Trust was terminated thereafter.

  24. [12] In April 2012, Weber met the plaintiff in Athens (“the April 2012 meeting”). According to Weber, the plaintiff signed a General Advisory Mandate dated 20 April 2012 (“the 2012 Mandate”) at the April 2012 meeting. In these proceedings, the defendants rely on the 2012 Mandate as the source of Dextra’s authority to enter into a number of transactions on the plaintiff’s behalf. The plaintiff testified that he did not recall signing the 2012 Mandate. The plaintiff also asserts that the 2012 Mandate did not authorise the defendants to enter into the disputed transactions.

  25. [13] In November 2012, Ritter and Weber met the plaintiff in Athens (“the November 2012 meeting”). The subject matter of the discussions at this meeting is disputed. The defendants allege that the plaintiff needed help to unfreeze his funds in Switzerland and that he also had problems with blocked assets and his bank in Liechtenstein. The defendants also allege that they discussed how ILC Singapore could protect the plaintiff’s assets in Singapore and that the plaintiff “specifically authori[s]ed the use of asset protection structures”. The plaintiff denies these allegations and claims that he met Ritter and Weber to discuss the sale of Lamda Privatbank AG, a Liechtenstein-based private bank that he owned.

  26. [14] On 13 December 2012, the plaintiff was arrested and remanded in custody.

  27. [15] In December 2013, a senior associate at Dextra, Mr Alexander Ressos (“Ressos”), met the plaintiff’s Greek lawyer, Mr Vasilios Athanasiou (“Athanasiou”) in Munich to provide an update of the plaintiff’s affairs.

  28. [16] In June 2014, the plaintiff was released from remand.

  29. Statements of account given to the plaintiff

  30. [17] In August 2014, Athanasiou requested an update on the funds held by Dextra. On 26 August 2014, Weber sent a statement of the plaintiff’s EUR account to the plaintiff (“August 2014 EUR Statement”). Weber did not send any statement of the plaintiff’s USD account. The August 2014 EUR Statement showed that as at 12 August 2014, the balance amount due to the plaintiff was €23,622,524.09. This amount remained unchanged as at 20 August 2014.

  31. [18] In October 2014, the plaintiff and Athanasiou met Ressos in Athens. Ressos gave the plaintiff statements of the plaintiff’s EUR and USD accounts with Dextra (“the September 2014 EUR and USD Statements”) which he had obtained from Dextra’s accountant, Ms Song Wai Mun:

  32. (a) The September 2014 EUR Statement showed that as at 12 September 2014, the balance was €2,812,773.47. The statement also showed that as at 12 August 2014, the balance due to the plaintiff in EUR was €4,510,611.79, which was far less than the €23,622,524.09 shown in the August 2014 EUR Statement.

  33. (b) The September 2014 USD Statement showed that as at 8 July 2014, the balance due to the plaintiff in USD was US$177,935.43 and this amount remained the same as at 12 September 2014.

  34. [19] According to Athanasiou, the September 2014 EUR and USD Statements included 115 transactions that were not reflected in the August 2014 EUR Statement and which involved a net outflow of about €12,354,936.17 and a credit of US$379,030.87.

  35. [20] On 5 November 2014, Athanasiou met Weber in Singapore and queried about the discrepancies between the August 2014 EUR Statement and the September 2014 EUR Statement. Weber gave Athanasiou a handwritten note setting out the major deposits, withdrawals and investments that Dextra had undertaken on the plaintiff’s behalf (“the November 2014 Note”). According to Athanasiou’s unchallenged testimony, the note showed that:

  36. (a) Dextra received about €50.5m;

  37. (b) the total amount of transactions authorised by the plaintiff was €18.15m; and

  38. (c) the total amount paid based on the plaintiff’s written instructions was €7.29m.

  39. [21] Shortly thereafter, Weber asked Athanasiou for proof of his authority to act for the plaintiff. Athanasiou provided the proof of his authority on 8 November 2014.

  40. [22] In an e-mail on 10 November 2014, Weber sent Athanasiou a third statement of the plaintiff’s EUR account with Dextra (“the November 2014 EUR Statement 1”). This statement showed a balance of €5,132,042.89 due to the plaintiff as at 5 November 2014. In an e-mail sent later that same day, Weber sent yet another statement of the plaintiff’s EUR account (“the November 2014 EUR Statement 2”) which showed a balance of €18,207,796.52 due to the plaintiff as at 5 November 2014. In this e-mail, Weber said that the cash balance had changed due to “some reconciliation”.

  41. [23] On 31 January 2018, the plaintiff commenced this action.

  42. [24] In the course of these proceedings, Weber produced the following further statements of account:

  43. (a) A statement of the plaintiff’s EUR account showing a balance of €40,013.02 due to the plaintiff as at 22 May 2018 and remaining unchanged as at 24 May 2018 (“the May 2018 EUR Statement”).

  44. (b) A statement of the plaintiff’s USD account showing a balance of US$128,699.67 due to the plaintiff as at 30 April 2018 and remaining unchanged as at 24 May 2018 (“the May 2018 USD Statement”).

  45. (c) A statement of the plaintiff’s EUR account showing a balance of €111,864.28 due to the plaintiff as at 22 May 2018 and remaining unchanged as at 6 July 2018 (“the July 2018 EUR Statement”).

  46. (d) A statement of the plaintiff’s USD account showing a balance of US$142,557.36 due to the plaintiff as at 31 August 2018 (“the August 2018 USD Statement”). The last line in this statement refers to the date “06/07/2018” but that appears to be a mistake as the statement includes payments made up to 31 August 2018.

  47. [25] In addition, pursuant to directions given at a pre-trial conference, the defendants’ solicitors confirmed by way of a letter dated 30 May 2018 that the plaintiff’s cash balances in Dextra’s clients’ account as of 30 May 2018 were €40,013.02 and US$128,699.67. These amounts are the same as those found in the May 2018 EUR and USD Statements.

  48. The parties’ positions

  49. Plaintiff’s claim against Dextra

  50. [26] The plaintiff’s claim against Dextra is that as a trustee and fiduciary, Dextra has to account for the use of his monies. In his Statement of Claim, the plaintiff claims that the investments and payments made purportedly on his behalf were not authorised and that Dextra breached its duty (a) to act in his best interests, (b) to avoid any conflict of interests (“the no-conflict rule”) and (c) not to profit from its position as a fiduciary (“the no-profit rule”).

  51. [27] Dextra does not dispute that it held the plaintiff’s monies on trust for the plaintiff. Dextra accepts that it has to account for the same. Dextra claims that it has discharged its duty to furnish accounts and that the monies were properly applied, with the plaintiff’s authorisation, towards investments on the plaintiff’s behalf and payments to third parties in respect of fees or expenses incurred on behalf of the plaintiff. Dextra denies any breach of its duties as a trustee or fiduciary.

  52. Plaintiff’s claim against Weber

  53. [28] As for Weber, the plaintiff claims that Weber:

  54. (a) is liable for the losses caused by Dextra because Dextra was his alter ego; and/or

  55. (b) dishonestly assisted Dextra in its breaches of its duties as trustee and fiduciary; and

  56. (c) owed fiduciary duties to the plaintiff and breached (i) his duty to act in the interest of the plaintiff, (ii) the no-conflict rule and (iii) the no-profit rule.

  57. Taking of accounts

  58. [29] One of the reliefs sought in the Statement of Claim is for Dextra to give an account of the plaintiff’s monies. Dextra accepts that it has to give an account and asserts that it has discharged its duty to furnish accounts. Dextra engaged Mr Abuthahir Abdul Gafoor (“Gafoor”) as its expert to “provide for an account of how [the plaintiff’s] funds received were utilised by [Dextra]”. Gafoor’s report was based on the July 2018 EUR Statement and the August 2018 USD Statement, and was filed with his affidavit of evidence-in-chief (“AEIC”) dated 13 August 2019.

  59. [30] At my direction given during a pre-trial conference on 16 September 2019, the parties prepared a table setting out how the plaintiff’s monies had been applied according to Gafoor’s report, and their respective positions on each item (“the Table of Parties’ Positions”). The table was provided to me on 11 October 2019 and was subsequently updated in December 2019 as appended to the parties’ respective written closing submissions. The plaintiff objected to several items in the table, largely for being unauthorised payments.

  60. [31] It seemed to me that the parties were already prepared for the taking of accounts. As stated earlier, Dextra did not dispute its liability to give an account; in fact, its position was that it had given an account to the plaintiff. The only thing left to be done was the taking of accounts, and this the parties were ready to do. Gafoor’s report provided a detailed account of how the plaintiff’s funds had been utilised by Dextra and the plaintiff had falsified several items in the Table of Parties’ Positions (which was prepared based on Gafoor’s report). In addition, the AEICs that had been filed also dealt with issues that were relevant to a taking of accounts. In the circumstances, I was of the view that it would be more efficient for the taking of accounts to be dealt with during the trial. I indicated accordingly to the parties during a subsequent pre-trial conference. None of the parties objected to this course of action and they proceeded with the trial on this basis.

  61. [32] In his opening statement, the plaintiff described the broad issues as including the following:

  62. (a) whether the monies were in fact applied in the manner as alleged by the defendants; and

  63. (b) whether such application of the trust assets was authorised.

  64. In the last paragraph of his opening statement, the plaintiff asked for the disputed items to be falsified and for all sums found to be due at the end of the trial to be returned to him.

  65. [33] During their opening statement, the defendants did not object to the two issues framed by the plaintiff as set out above, or to the last paragraph of the plaintiff’s opening statement. In fact, the defendants described the issue of whether the various investments entered into by Dextra on behalf of the plaintiff were authorised, as the key issue. They also dealt with the issue of whether Dextra was justified in charging fees and expenses from the plaintiff’s account. In addition, the defendants stated that Dextra relied on the July 2018 EUR Statement and the August 2018 USD Statement “in these proceedings in accounting for the [p]laintiff’s funds” and that they “will show … that the [defendants’] account of the [p]laintiff’s funds is not false”.

  66. [34] The taking of accounts was dealt with during the trial. The witnesses, including Weber, were cross-examined extensively on issues arising from the plaintiff’s falsification of items in the account provided by Dextra (which items were dealt with in Gafoor’s report). The defendants did not object to the fact that the taking of accounts was being dealt with during the trial.

  67. [36] In my view, the defendants’ objection has been made far too late in the day. The position that they now seek to take is clearly inconsistent with the position that they have taken in these proceedings and they cannot be permitted to have a second bite of the cherry.

  68. Dextra’s account – amount received by Dextra

  69. [37] The parties have agreed that Dextra received a total of €39,735,362.82 and US$13,300,160.39 for the plaintiff’s account as follows:

  70. (a) €39,735,362.82 and US$12.67m between 30 November 2011 and 4 January 2012 (see [11] above); and

  71. (b) US$630,160.39 on 10 October 2014.

  72. [38] The defendants further state that on 30 September 2013, Dextra received US$115,574.44 for the plaintiff’s account. According to Weber, this was the amount that the plaintiff had overpaid for one of the investments in an investment swap that allegedly took place on 30 September 2013 (“the Investment Swap”). The Investment Swap is described in greater detail at [46] below. Weber was not able to explain how the overpayment came about. Be that as it may, the plaintiff does not agree with the defendants regarding the receipt of the amount of US$115,574.44 because he denies that the Investment Swap was authorised.

  73. Dextra’s account – disputed transactions

  74. [39] The Table of Parties’ Positions shows that the plaintiff has accepted Dextra’s account of the use of his monies in respect of several items. The items in dispute relate to the following:

  75. (a) investments made by Dextra purportedly on the plaintiff’s behalf, comprising:

  76. (i) the Investment Swap in September 2013 at the cost of €13,315,749.42;

  77. (ii) loans to Far West amounting to €2,768,085.59 and US$824,542 (“the Far West Loans”); and

  78. (iii) a loan to a company called Windris International Ltd (“Windris”) amounting to €1,025,931.58 (“the Windris Loan”);

  79. (b) the sale of assets in the Jade Asia Pacific One Fund (“Jade AP1”). Jade AP1 was a cell under Jade Fund DCC Ltd (“Jade DCC”), which was managed and controlled by Weber;

  80. (c) payment of expenses allegedly incurred on behalf of the plaintiff:

  81. (i) payments to Carnelia;

  82. (ii) payments to Dextra;

  83. (iii) payments to Weber;

  84. (iv) custody fees paid to DBS Bank Ltd (“DBS”);

  85. (v) payments related to Jade DCC (including payments to Pearl Investment);

  86. (vi) payments to Ritter Attorneys;

  87. (vii) payments to Wintrust;

  88. (viii) payments to Straits Invest; and

  89. (ix) payments to Harry Elias Partnership (“HEP”);

  90. (d) payments allegedly made to other third parties:

  91. (i) payment to one Georges M de Bartha (“Bartha”) amounting to €187,303;

  92. (ii) payment of €100,000 as fiduciary fees to a nominee known as Lam, plus €922.50 in bank charges (amounting to a total of €100,922.50); and

  93. (iii) payments to a company known as New Anchor Ltd (“New Anchor”).

  94. The issues

  95. [40] The plaintiff’s case in his closing submissions is narrower in some respects than what he had pleaded. The parties’ closing submissions raise the following issues:

  96. (a) whether the Investment Swap was in fact entered into;

  97. (b) whether the investments, the sale of assets in Jade AP1 and the payments (set out in [39] above) were authorised;

  98. (c) whether Dextra breached its duties as trustee;

  99. (d) whether Weber owed fiduciary duties to the plaintiff, and if so, whether he breached the same; and

  100. (e) whether Weber:

  101. (i) is liable for any losses caused by Dextra because Dextra was his alter ego; and/or

  102. (ii) had dishonestly assisted Dextra in any of its breaches of its duties.

  103. Principles relevant to taking of accounts

  104. [41] It is trite law that trustees are under a duty to keep account of the trusts and to allow the beneficiaries to inspect them as requested: Foo Jee Seng and others v Foo Jhee Tuang and another [2012] 4 SLR 339 at [86]. In that case, the Court of Appeal also cited Pearse v Green (1819) 1 Jac & W 135; 37 ER 327 in which it was held that a trustee has “to be constantly ready with his accounts”.

  105. [42] Accounts may be taken on two bases. The first is that of a common account, which does not require any misconduct on the trustee’s part. The second is an account on a wilful basis, which requires the beneficiary to allege and prove at least one instance of default on the trustee’s part: Cheong Soh Chin and others v Eng Chiet Shoong and others [2019] 4 SLR 714 (“Cheong Soh Chin”) at [80]. Wilful default does not require the trustee to be conscious of his misconduct and it is sufficient that the trustee has been guilty of a want of ordinary prudence: Cheong Soh Chin at [81].

  106. [43] The key differences between an account on a wilful default basis and an account on a common account basis pertain to the scope of the account and the trustee’s liability. As neatly set out in Cheong Soh Chin (at [82]–[83]):

  107. [44] Where the beneficiary falsifies an entry in the account, he challenges or disputes the alleged use of his funds. The burden then falls on the trustee to prove that the disbursement was authorised: Cheong Soh Chin at [78]. Implicit in this is that the trustee also has to properly account for the use of the trust funds by showing that the funds were in fact used for the purpose stated in the account.

  108. [45] The plaintiff submits that the account in the present case should be taken on a wilful default basis. As will be seen later in this judgment, there are several instances of default on Dextra’s part. However, I do not think that whether the account is taken on a common basis or on a wilful default basis makes a difference in this case. There is no dispute as to the amount received by Dextra which has to be accounted for. The plaintiff has falsified several of the entries in the account provided by Dextra. The main dispute is whether the defendant has proved that the application of the plaintiff’s monies, in respect of each of the falsified entries, was authorised. I address the disputed transactions in turn.

  109. The Investment Swap

  110. [46] The defendants claim that on 30 September 2013, a total amount of €13,315,749.42 of the plaintiff’s funds was applied towards the Investment Swap. The description of an “investment swap” used by the defendants is a misnomer. There was no swap of investments involved; the plaintiff was simply buying the investments from the previous investors. Pursuant to the Investment Swap, the plaintiff purportedly bought the following investments:

  111. (a) Loans amounting to €7,428,413.40 from Orex to Far West and entities associated with or providing services to Far West (“the ILC Dubai-Far West Loans”). These loans were made by ILC Dubai’s clients but structured as loans to Orex which, in turn, loaned the monies to Far West and the various related entities. It should be noted that these loans are different from the Far West Loans referred to in [39(a)(ii)] above.

  112. (b) A loan amounting to €2,500,316.12 from Gulf Oriental Investment Co (“Gulf Oriental”) to Ruby. The loan was for the construction of a property in Bali, Indonesia, known as Villa K3 (“the Villa K3 Loan”). Gulf Oriental belonged to ILC Dubai.

  113. (c) A loan amounting to €1,054,242.32 from ILC Dubai’s clients to the owners of another property in Bali, Indonesia, known as Villa K6 (“the Villa K6 Loan”).

  114. (d) A loan amounting to €1,332,638.79 from ILC Dubai’s client to a company known as Belle Vue Property 1 Ltd (“Belle Vue 1”) (“the Belle Vue 1 Loan”). Belle Vue 1 was the owner of a piece of property at Belle Vue Residences, Singapore.

  115. (e) An investment of €1,000,138.79 in Jade Monega by ILC Dubai’s clients. Jade Monega was another cell under Jade DCC (see [39(b)] above). It held investments in a fund known as Monega Short Track T.

  116. [47] These investments formed part of what Weber and Ritter referred to as ILC Dubai’s “Mandate C” investments. According to them, Mandate C referred to a group of clients of ILC Dubai who had interests in Asia. These clients had other investments and assets which had nothing to do with the plaintiff or this present case. Weber and Ritter were involved in picking the investments that went into the Investment Swap. Although the investments were originally made by ILC Dubai’s clients, they appear in Dextra’s records as investments by ILC Dubai because Dextra regarded ILC Dubai as its client.

  117. [49] The plaintiff falsified Dextra’s account with respect to the Investment Swap. The defendants’ case is that the Investment Swap was authorised under the 2012 Mandate. The plaintiff submits that the Investment Swap was not in fact entered into as claimed, and that in any event, it was not authorised under the 2012 Mandate.

  118. Whether the Investment Swap was in fact entered into

  119. [50] Dextra’s case is that the Investment Swap was entered into on 30 September 2013. The plaintiff disputes this and submits that the Investment Swap was simply a convenient accounting fiction created ex post facto to provide a plausible explanation for the misappropriated assets. I agree with the plaintiff. The evidence supports his submission.

  120. [51] First, the various statements provided by Dextra show that the Investment Swap did not take place on 30 September 2013. The entries that allegedly reflect the Investment Swap (see [46] and [48] above) did not appear in the August 2014 EUR Statement, the September 2014 EUR Statement and both of the November 2014 EUR Statements (together, “the 2014 EUR Statements”). These entries first appeared in the May 2018 EUR Statement and subsequently in the July 2018 EUR Statement (together, “the 2018 EUR Statements”). I find it incredulous that the 2014 EUR Statements did not reflect the Investment Swap, if indeed it did take place as alleged. As for the 2018 EUR Statements, I do not accept these statements as credible evidence of the Investment Swap; both these statements were prepared for the purposes of these proceedings. In particular, the July 2018 EUR Statement was prepared for the defendants’ expert to prepare his report.

  121. [52] Weber explained that each client’s statement of account kept by Dextra comprises three different types of statements:

  122. (a) An “overall statement” that shows monies coming into the account and payments for anything “non-investment” or for investments that were not managed by Dextra. The balance amount in this statement represents the cash balance and the value of the portfolio but without showing the detailed positions.

  123. (b) A “cash statement” that shows the movement of monies in and out of the client’s account. The balance amount in this statement represents the amount of cash left, ie, the balance amount did not include the value of the investments. Subsequently, Weber said that there are two types of cash statements, one including investments (which shows the “total position”) and one excluding investments (which shows the “cash position only”). Later still, Weber described the cash statement that includes investments as a “net cash statement”, which he then said was also the overall statement. He also then claimed that the cash statement would include investments that were not managed by Dextra but would not include “protective loans” (which were managed by Dextra).

  124. (c) An “investment statement” that shows all the investments. This statement would not show the cash balance. Subsequently, he said that the investment statement shows only “protective loans”.

  125. [53] Weber’s descriptions of the three types of statements vacillated during the course of his testimony. As will be evident from discussions about Weber’s evidence elsewhere in this judgment, Weber was not a credible witness. Returning to the issue at hand, the more important question is whether Weber’s evidence about the three different types of statements can explain why the Investment Swap was not included in the 2014 EUR Statements. In this regard, Weber again vacillated in his classification of each of the EUR Statements provided by Dextra:

  126. (a) In his oral testimony on 20 November 2019, Weber said that:

  127. (i) the August 2014 EUR Statement and the November 2014 EUR Statement 2 were overall statements; and

  128. (ii) the September 2014 EUR Statement, November 2014 EUR Statement 1, the May 2018 EUR Statement and the July 2018 EUR Statement were cash statements.

  129. (b) Subsequently, on 26 November 2019, Weber maintained his previous evidence that the November 2014 EUR Statement 2 was an overall statement and that the May 2018 EUR Statement was a cash statement. However, he changed his evidence regarding the other EUR Statements and said that:

  130. (i) The August 2014 EUR Statement was a cash statement.

  131. (ii) The September 2014 EUR Statement, November 2014 EUR Statement 1 and the July 2018 EUR Statements were overall statements.

  132. (c) During his re-examination on 27 November 2019, Weber again changed his evidence. This time, he did not classify each of the statements. Instead, he gave evidence as to which statements were similar in nature. According to Weber:

  133. (i) the August 2014 EUR Statement and November 2014 EUR Statement 2 were essentially the same type of statements;

  134. (ii) the September 2014 EUR Statement and the November 2014 EUR Statement 1 were essentially the same type of statements; and

  135. (iii) the May 2018 EUR Statement was similar to the September 2014 EUR Statement and November 2014 EUR Statement 1, and the July 2018 EUR Statement was an “update” of these three Statements.

  136. [54] The table below shows Weber’s changing classifications of the EUR Statements.

  137. [20] November 2019

  138. [26] November 2019

  139. [27] November 2019

  140. August 2014 EUR Statement

  141. Overall statement

  142. Cash

  143. statement

  144. September 2014 EUR Statement

  145. Cash

  146. statement

  147. Overall statement

  148. November 2014 EUR Statement 1

  149. Cash

  150. statement

  151. Overall statement

  152. November 2014 EUR Statement 2

  153. Overall statement

  154. Overall statement

  155. May 2018 EUR Statement

  156. Cash

  157. statement

  158. Cash

  159. statement

  160. July 2018

  161. EUR Statement

  162. Cash

  163. statement

  164. Overall statement

  165. [55] Weber’s vacillating evidence about the statements lacks credibility. More importantly, his evidence does not explain why the Investment Swap was not reflected in the 2014 EUR Statements. Whichever version of Weber’s classification of the statements that one takes, the fact remains that in each of the three versions, one or more of the 2014 EUR Statements belong to the same classification as one/both of the 2018 EUR Statements. Yet, the Investment Swap was reflected only in the 2018 EUR Statements.

  166. [56] The defendants point to a handwritten note on the August 2014 EUR Statement that states that “[c]urrently all funds are kept in cash and loans (protection)” and submit that this meant that the balance stated in the August 2014 EUR Statement comprised cash and protective loans. In my view, this submission is neither here nor there. It does not explain Weber’s vacillating evidence regarding the various statements. Nor does it explain why the Investment Swap was reflected in the 2018 EUR Statements but not in any of the 2014 EUR Statements when, on Weber’s own evidence, one or more of the 2014 EUR Statements belonged to the same classification as one/both of the 2018 EUR Statements.

  167. [57] Second, accompanying the November 2014 EUR Statement 1 was a note which showed that €3,831,581.31 was paid to ILC Dubai. The November 2014 EUR Statement 1 shows that €2,500,316.12 was paid to ILC Dubai in two separate sums on 3 May 2012. A revised note accompanied the November 2014 EUR Statement 2. In the revised note, the figure of €3,831,581.31 was reduced to €2,500,316.12 and was shown as a payment for “Bali” instead of ILC Dubai. In the November 2014 EUR Statement 2, the two payments to ILC Dubai on 3 May 2012 have been removed but it is not clear how the payment of €2,500,316.12 is reflected (if at all). I agree with the plaintiff that if the Investment Swap did in fact take place, the two notes would not have reflected the above discrepancies.

  168. [59] Fourth, there is no document whatsoever evidencing the agreement to enter into the swap even though many different parties were involved. Again, I find it incredulous that there is no objective contemporaneous record of the Investment Swap, if indeed it took place as claimed.

  169. [60] Fifth, the plaintiff allegedly took over the Villa K3 Loan pursuant to the Investment Swap on 30 September 2013. However, under cross-examination, Weber admitted that the total amount of the loan (€2,500,316.12) was in fact paid from the plaintiff’s monies to ILC Dubai in two payments on 3 May 2012. There is no evidence that these loans were authorised by the plaintiff. Weber claimed that the monies were wrongly paid out of the plaintiff’s account with Dextra and that the payments were subsequently reversed.

  170. [61] The payments were not actually reversed. The September 2014 EUR Statement (about a year after the alleged Investment Swap) continued to reflect the two payments to ILC Dubai on 3 May 2012. It was only in the May 2018 EUR Statement that these two payments were replaced by an entry that referred to the Investment Swap. Under re-examination, Weber claimed that the accountant had erroneously “ported over” the payments into the September 2014 EUR Statement and the November 2014 EUR Statement 1. According to Weber, the payments should have been “consolidated in one position in the swap statements of 30 September 2013”. Clearly, Weber’s testimony did not explain why the payments were recorded as payments from the plaintiff’s account in the first place or how the alleged error in recording them as payments from the plaintiff’s account arose. The defendants did not call the accountant to testify. The fact that the accountant had ported the figures over merely confirmed that the payments continued to be reflected in Dextra’s account as payments from the plaintiff’s account until May 2018. In my view, the evidence shows that the defendants had wrongfully made use of the plaintiff’s monies on 3 May 2012 for the Villa K3 Loan, and the Investment Swap was concocted later in 2018 to explain, among other things, the use of the plaintiff’s monies for the Villa K3 Loan.

  171. [62] Sixth, the plaintiff allegedly took over the Villa K6 Loan pursuant to the Investment Swap on 30 September 2013. Yet in an e-mail to Athanasiou dated 10 November 2014, Weber offered two villas in Bali as security, describing only one of them as being “already with the [plaintiff’s] loan”. On the stand, Weber confirmed that the villa “with the [plaintiff’s] loan” was Villa K3. The alleged Investment Swap is inconsistent with Weber’s e-mail. In addition, the Villa K6 Loan was reflected in the September 2014 EUR Statement and November 2014 EUR Statement 1 as being made using monies from the plaintiff’s account on 22 December 2009. Again, Weber claimed that it was a “wrong entry” and it was “corrected … later”. I do not believe Weber. It is too much of a coincidence that both the Villa K3 and Villa K6 Loans were erroneously recorded as having been paid using monies from the plaintiff’s account.

  172. [63] Seventh, the plaintiff allegedly took over the Belle Vue 1 Loan pursuant to the Investment Swap on 30 September 2013. However, a balance sheet for Belle Vue 1 as at 31 December 2013 reflects the creditor as ILC Dubai and not the plaintiff. Weber conceded that he had no explanation as to why ILC Dubai was reflected as the creditor in the balance sheet. Further, the September 2014 EUR Statement and both the November 2014 EUR Statements show that, in fact, payments were again made from the plaintiff’s account between 18 April 2012 and 3 September 2013 towards the Belle Vue 1 Loan. This time, Weber did not offer any explanation as to why the monies for the Belle Vue 1 Loan came from the plaintiff’s account instead of ILC Dubai’s account. The fact that all three loans (Villa K3 Loan, Villa K6 Loan and Belle Vue 1 Loan) were made using the plaintiff’s monies speaks volumes. It is not disputed that the use of the plaintiff’s monies for these loans was not specifically or expressly authorised. The only conclusion that makes sense is that the Investment Swap was concocted by the defendants to create ex post authorisation for the use of the plaintiff’s monies for these loans.

  173. [65] Weber then explained that if a client (A) had USD but needed to pay in euros, Dextra could first borrow the euros from another client (B) to make payment on behalf of A because a foreign exchange conversion would take two days. Dextra would subsequently convert A’s USD into euros and repay B. However, this still did not explain where the balance amount required for the Investment Swap came from. The May 2018 EUR and USD Statements shed no light on this.

  174. [66] Weber then changed his explanation and claimed that the plaintiff’s account was in a negative position after the Investment Swap had taken place, and that he subsequently redeemed the plaintiff’s investments in Jade AP1 and used part of the proceeds to pay for the shortfall. This claim is inconsistent with his own evidence in his AEIC where he said that the investments in Jade AP1 were redeemed because of a concern that there was a risk of the assets in Jade AP1 being seized. In any event, the objective evidence contradicts Weber’s claim that he redeemed the investments in Jade AP1 to pay for the shortfall. According to the defendants’ expert, the sale of the assets in Jade AP1 took place only in 2014 and funds in Jade AP1 were transferred to Dextra only in October 2014. It is inconceivable that ILC Dubai’s clients would have financed the plaintiff’s acquisition of the investments pursuant to the Investment Swap for more than a year. Weber did not claim that there was any such agreement with ILC Dubai either.

  175. [67] I reject Weber’s explanations as to how the Investment Swap was allegedly funded. I find no credibility in his changing evidence. Absent any credible explanation, the fact that the plaintiff’s account with Dextra did not have sufficient funds to pay for the Investment Swap on 30 September 2013 further supports the plaintiff’s case that the Investment Swap did not take place as claimed.

  176. [69] In their closing submissions, the defendants refer to Weber’s e-mail to Ressos on 13 December 2013 in which Weber said that the plaintiff’s “other assets are 95% in PE investments and loan investments”. The defendants submit that the phrase “PE investments and loan investments” refers to the ILC Dubai-Far West Loans and the loans in respect of Villa K3, Villa K6 and Belle Vue 1, and that the e-mail therefore shows that the Investment Swap did occur. However, there is no evidence from Weber that the phrase “PE investments and loan investments” refers to the ILC Dubai-Far West Loans and the loans in respect of Villa K3, Villa K6 and Belle Vue 1. Even if it does, it does not necessarily mean that the Investment Swap took place. It was factually correct that as of December 2013, the plaintiff’s monies had been used for these loans:

  177. (a) The defendants had made the Far West Loans on the plaintiff’s behalf (see [93] below). Six loans had been made to Far West as of 13 December 2013. In fact, the September 2014 EUR Statement and November 2014 EUR Statement 1 show that even the ILC Dubai-Far West Loans were paid from the plaintiff’s account from February 2010 to November 2012.

  178. (b) The plaintiff’s monies were used for the Villa K3 Loan, Villa K6 Loan and Belle Vue 1 Loan (see [60]–[63] above).

  179. The fact that Weber’s e-mail referred to these loans merely means that the loans existed. However, the mere existence of the loans does not mean that the Investment Swap must have taken place.

  180. [70] In my judgment, the defendants have failed to prove that Dextra did in fact enter into the Investment Swap on 30 September 2013 on behalf of the plaintiff. The evidence shows that the defendants concocted the idea of the Investment Swap for the purposes of the present proceedings. Dextra has to make good the amount of €13,315,749.42 that was deducted from the plaintiff’s account for the Investment Swap.

  181. Whether the Investment Swap was authorised

  182. [71] Even if the Investment Swap was entered into on 30 September 2013 as the defendants claimed, the defendants still have to show that it was authorised by the plaintiff. The defendants did not obtain any express authorisation from the plaintiff for the Investment Swap. The defendants rely on the 2012 Mandate as the requisite authorisation. As stated earlier, the plaintiff denies having signed the 2012 Mandate. The plaintiff also asserts that, in any event, the 2012 Mandate did not authorise the defendants to enter into the Investment Swap.

  183. Whether the plaintiff signed the 2012 Mandate

  184. [72] The 2012 Mandate purports to have been entered into among ILC Singapore, W&M (subsequently renamed as Straits Invest) and the plaintiff. Weber testified that the plaintiff signed the 2012 Mandate during their meeting in Athens in April 2012, and that he signed it on behalf of ILC Singapore and W&M on 3 May 2012 after he had returned to Singapore.

  185. [73] The burden is on the defendants to prove that the 2012 Mandate was signed by the plaintiff. The defendants did not adduce any evidence from handwriting experts. Instead, they referred me to s 75(1) of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) (“EA”), which provides as follows:

  186. [74] In the present case, it is fair to say that the plaintiff’s purported signature on the 2012 Mandate looks similar to his other specimen signatures. The plaintiff himself admits that the signature on the 2012 Mandate looked similar to his signature. The defendants invite me to compare the plaintiff’s signature on the 2012 Mandate against other specimens of the plaintiff’s signature in documents that have been admitted into evidence.

  187. [75] It may be that, in an appropriate case, a judge might examine a questioned signature against specimen signatures pursuant to s 75(1) of the EA and conclude that the questioned signature is not genuine because the questioned signature looks very different from the specimen signatures. However, in my view, it would be rare indeed for a judge to conclude that a questioned signature is genuine based solely on his own examination of the questioned signature and the specimen signatures. Visual similarity between two signatures to a non-expert’s eyes does not mean that the questioned signature is therefore genuine. Expert evidence should be adduced for this purpose.

  188. [76] I am not prepared to make a finding that the plaintiff’s signature in the 2012 Mandate is genuine, based solely on my own examination of that signature and other specimen signatures of the plaintiff. However, there is other evidence to consider.

  189. [77] An electronic copy of the 2012 Mandate shows that it was created on 17 April 2012 and last modified on 19 April 2012, just one day before the April 2012 meeting on 20 April 2012 (see [12] above). This supports the defendants’ case that Weber had prepared the 2012 Mandate and brought it with him to the April 2012 meeting. In my view, it is more likely than not that Weber did obtain the plaintiff’s signature to the 2012 Mandate at that meeting. There is no reason why Weber would have prepared the draft shortly before the April 2012 meeting otherwise.

  190. [78] The plaintiff’s pleaded case is that the 2012 Mandate was not executed by him. However, the plaintiff’s evidence did not go as far: he testified that he did not recall signing the 2012 Mandate. The plaintiff neither adduced any evidence from handwriting experts, nor offered any reason as to why the defendants needed to forge his signature on the 2012 Mandate. As will be seen later, the defendants’ reliance on the 2012 Mandate is in fact fraught with difficulties.

  191. [79] The 2012 Mandate also shows that a flat fee of 1% is to be paid to ILC Singapore. The “1%” is handwritten; there are two initials against it. Weber testified that the initials are the plaintiff’s and his. The plaintiff denied having initialled against the handwritten “1%”.

  192. [80] I find that the evidence establishes, on a balance of probabilities, that the plaintiff did sign the 2012 Mandate. I also find that the plaintiff did initial against the handwritten “1%”. It is not likely that the plaintiff would have signed the 2012 Mandate if the fee to be paid to ILC Singapore had been left blank.

  193. Whether the Investment Swap was authorised under the 2012 Mandate

  194. [81] Even if the Investment Swap did take place as the defendants claim, they have to prove that it was authorised. The defendants’ pleaded case is that:

  195. (a) pursuant to the fourth paragraph of the 2012 Mandate, the plaintiff had authorised Dextra to apply a portion of the assets to be structured into asset protection structures; and

  196. (b) pursuant to the plaintiff’s instructions and/or the fourth paragraph of the 2012 Mandate, Dextra proceeded to invest some of the plaintiff’s assets into asset protection structures.

  197. [82] As stated earlier, the 2012 Mandate was entered into between ILC Singapore, W&M and the plaintiff. Under the 2012 Mandate, ILC Singapore is to advise the plaintiff on the “international structuring of legal and tax optimized investment vehicles including structures for charitable causes”. W&M is to advise the plaintiff “in general global investment strategies including an ongoing comparison in the performance and fee/commission structure of the various service providers of [the plaintiff]”.

  198. [83] The fourth paragraph of the 2012 Mandate reads as follows:

  199. [84] The defendants allege that during the November 2012 meeting (see [13] above), the plaintiff authorised Dextra “to take necessary measures to structure a portion of his [a]ssets into asset protection structures but to leave some of his [a]ssets in cash for his family’s use”. The defendants submit that as the plaintiff had approved asset protection structures as a strategy, Dextra could execute the investments within the agreed framework on a discretionary basis.

  200. [85] Clearly, the 2012 Mandate does not support the defendants’ pleaded case. The 2012 Mandate does not authorise Dextra to make investments on the plaintiff’s behalf. Under the fourth paragraph of the 2012 Mandate, the approval of a strategy (if any) is given to Straits Invest and it is Straits Invest that will make the investments in accordance with the approved strategy.

  201. [86] In his oral testimony, Weber claimed that the investment decisions were made by Straits Invest but this is not the defendants’ pleaded case. In any event, I find that the decisions were made by Dextra rather than Straits Invest. In his AEIC, Weber said Dextra “decided, on behalf of [the plaintiff]” to take over the ILC Dubai-Far West Loans and that “Ritter and [he] had deliberately sought to invest in some projects and companies, such as Far West and the K3 and K6 developments …”. Although Weber was a director of Straits Invest, his AEIC was not made on behalf of Straits Invest but on behalf of Dextra and himself. Ritter’s evidence was also that Weber and he decided which investments would go into the Investment Swap. Even in their closing submissions, in relation to the selection of the loans constituting the Investment Swap, the defendants referred to “[Weber’s] and Ritter’s general strategy of selecting loans”. Ritter had no role in Straits Invest. The decisions by Weber and Ritter could not have been made on behalf of Straits Invest.

  202. [87] In any event, I find that the defendants’ reliance on the 2012 Mandate was an afterthought for the following reasons:

  203. (a) Dextra and Weber amended their Defences to plead reliance on the 2012 Mandate only at the close of the plaintiff’s case. If the plaintiff’s approval had been given as alleged, the Defences would surely have pleaded the 2012 Mandate right from the beginning.

  204. (b) On 5 November 2014, Athanasiou confronted Weber about the discrepancies between the August 2014 EUR Statement and the September 2014 EUR Statement. According to Weber, Athanasiou accused him of stealing the plaintiff’s money and trying to cover it up. Yet, in the e-mails that followed this meeting, Weber did not once mention the 2012 Mandate, much less assert that the investments were authorised under the 2012 Mandate.

  205. (c) As stated at [58] above, the November 2014 Note that Weber gave to Athanasiou does not refer to the Investment Swap that Dextra now claims was made pursuant to the 2012 Mandate. If the Investment Swap had been authorised, there is no reason why Weber would not have included the Investment Swap in the November 2014 Note.

  206. (d) I find Athanasiou to be an independent and truthful witness. I accept his evidence that during his meeting with Weber on 5 November 2014 (see [20] above), Weber was unable to explain why it was necessary to put the plaintiff’s assets in loans, contrary to the plaintiff’s express instructions to hold his assets in cash. Instead, Weber agreed at the meeting to return all of the plaintiff’s assets by finding other investors to take over the loans; Weber repeated this in his subsequent e-mails. If the Investment Swap had been authorised, Weber (with his experience) would surely have said so instead of agreeing to return the plaintiff’s assets. Weber explained that his e-mails were “conciliatory” because he just wanted to resolve matters with the plaintiff and move on. I do not believe Weber’s explanation. Even if he wanted to resolve matters, there was no reason why he could not have mentioned that the Investment Swap was authorised.

  207. (e) Weber testified that he took minutes of the November 2012 meeting with the plaintiff. Yet, these minutes do not include the plaintiff’s alleged instruction to invest in asset protection structures or any reference to the 2012 Mandate. On the stand, Weber claimed that the plaintiff gave his instruction ten minutes before the meeting ended. Even so, Weber could have easily added the alleged instruction then or on the way back to his hotel or soon after he had reached his hotel.

  208. (f) The 2012 Mandate also provides as follows:

  209. It is not disputed that the alleged instruction to invest in asset protection structures was not given in writing. Weber’s explanation was that the plaintiff had given his instruction at the end of the meeting. However, this does not explain why Weber did not confirm the instruction in writing after the meeting. Weber also claimed that he could not, and it was not feasible to, obtain the plaintiff’s instruction in writing after the plaintiff was arrested. However, the plaintiff was arrested only a month later. Weber had a full month to write to the plaintiff and confirm his instruction in writing. When asked several times as to why he did not do so, Weber said that there was no need to because he did not consider the plaintiff’s remark about a potential arrest to be serious. I infer from Weber’s non-responsive answer that he had no credible explanation to give.

  210. (g) Weber testified that he started discussing protective structures with the plaintiff in 2010 and that such protective structures were primarily meant to protect the plaintiff’s identity. According to Weber, these involve the use of companies and trusts to hold investments so that anyone (including authorities) looking at the investments would not know that the investments belong to the plaintiff. However, there is no evidence that the Villa K6 Loan and the Belle Vue 1 Loan involved any structures to protect the plaintiff’s identity. This is clearly inconsistent with Weber’s testimony that the plaintiff authorised the use of asset protection structures to protect his identity.

  211. (h) The defendants were not consistent in explaining what asset protection structures meant. In his AEIC, Weber stated that the ILC Dubai-Far West Loans, the Villa K3 Loan and the Villa K6 Loan had been “selected for their illiquidity”. Further, in their closing submissions, the defendants submit that the ILC Dubai-Far West Loans were uniquely protective because Far West was a start-up company and it is “common for start-up companies to require a substantial number of years to become profitable and, until then, there would be very little or no cash assets”. Therefore, until Far West started turning a profit, there would not be any money to seize. However, investing in investments that are illiquid or with low cash balances as a means of asset protection is very different from investing by using structures that protect the plaintiff’s identity. In any event, selecting investments for their illiquidity or their lack of cash is also inconsistent with Ritter’s evidence that the plaintiff was “very concerned that a prolonged lack of liquidity due to seizure of his assets would stymie his defence against the allegations, as well as his business interests”. Such investments would run contrary to the plaintiff’s concerns about liquidity.

  212. (i) The use of asset protection structures to hide the plaintiff’s identity as the investor has to do with how investments are to be held rather than, for example, the types of investments that may be entered into or an investment mix. It seems to me to be a stretch to describe the use of asset protection structures that would mask the plaintiff’s identity as an “investment strategy” as envisaged under the 2012 Mandate.

  213. [88] Ritter testified that the plaintiff wanted to protect his assets from illegitimate seizure and that he and Weber were of the view that the investments were within the authority given by the 2012 Mandate. The defendants submit that Ritter’s evidence in his AEIC as to the November 2012 meeting must be taken as accepted because the plaintiff did not cross-examine Ritter on it. The relevant paragraphs in Ritter’s AEIC are as follows:

  214. Ritter’s AEIC also referred to a statutory declaration signed by him prior to the commencement of this suit “to confirm the basis on which [Dextra] had acted”, in which he stated the following:

  215. [89] In my view, Ritter’s evidence falls short of saying that at the November 2012 meeting, the plaintiff gave his approval to invest in asset protection structures as a strategy pursuant to the 2012 Mandate. Authorising the use of asset protection structures for investments approved by the plaintiff is not the same thing as authorising the use of asset protection structures as a strategy pursuant to the 2012 Mandate under which Straits Invest would have the discretion to decide on the investments to be made so long as asset protection structures were used.

  216. [90] In fact, Ritter also testified in his AEIC as follows:

  217. [91] In my view, Ritter’s evidence shows that there was no approval given at the November 2012 meeting to invest in asset protection structures as a strategy pursuant to the 2012 Mandate. If such approval had been given and Straits Invest had the discretion to implement the strategy, there would have been no need to further discuss asset protection strategies with the plaintiff, to delay taking steps to implement the strategy, to proceed on the basis that the plaintiff would have expected steps to be taken, or to confirm any proposed asset protection strategies with the plaintiff.

  218. [92] In my view, the plaintiff probably did discuss structuring his investments to mask the fact that the investments belonged to him. He may even have instructed the defendants to do so. However, that is different from authorising asset protection structures as an investment strategy under the 2012 Mandate, pursuant to which Straits Invest would then have full discretion as to what to invest in. I find that the evidence does not establish any such authorisation and that the Investment Swap was not authorised. In any event, as stated at [85] above, the 2012 Mandate does not support the defendants’ pleaded case.

  219. Far West Loans

  220. [93] These loans amount to €2,768,085.59 and US$824,542 and are separate from the ILC Dubai-Far West Loans. The ILC Dubai-Far West Loans were loans that were allegedly made by ILC Dubai’s clients and thereafter taken over by the plaintiff pursuant to the Investment Swap. The Far West Loans were allegedly made on behalf of the plaintiff to Far West, through Orex, between January 2013 and November 2014.

  221. [94] The defendants claim that the Far West Loans were also authorised pursuant to the fourth paragraph of the 2012 Mandate (see [83] above) based on their allegation that the plaintiff had authorised ILC Singapore to apply a portion of the assets to be structured into asset protection structures. The reasons stated earlier, for the conclusion that the 2012 Mandate did not authorise the Investment Swap, apply mutatis mutandis to these loans. I find that the 2012 Mandate did not authorise the making of the Far West Loans.

  222. The Windris Loan

  223. [95] Windris is a trading company owned by one of Dextra’s clients. The defendants’ pleaded case is that Dextra made a loan on the plaintiff’s behalf in the sum of €1,025,931.58, without interest, to Windris pursuant to an oral agreement in or around May 2014. It appears that the loan was for US$1.35m but was disbursed to Windris on 28 August 2014 from the plaintiff’s EUR account in the sum of €1,025,931.58. On 12 November 2014, Windris repaid US$832,500, which was credited into the plaintiff’s EUR account as €666,533.23. Windris made two further payments of US$390,000 and US$98,000 on 13 November 2014 and 12 January 2015 respectively. These two payments were credited into the plaintiff’s USD account.

  224. [96] The total amount repaid by Windris was US$1,320,500. This meant that there was a balance of US$29,500 still outstanding. According to Gafoor, the defendants’ expert, this balance amount was recorded as a loss. The defendants’ pleaded case is that this loss was due to “the fall in the USD relative to the Euro between August 2014 and January 2015”. However, Weber’s evidence was that the loss was due to the “aggressive and premature recall of the loan”. Neither explanation made sense. The loss was clearly not due to any foreign exchange loss or “premature recall”; it was simply the shortfall between the loan amount and the amount repaid in USD. Weber himself eventually agreed that the exchange rate had nothing to do with the shortfall. In any event, the loss of US$29,500 is ultimately not relevant because the plaintiff’s submission is that the Windris Loan was not authorised and should thus be falsified. However, neither explanation as to the loss helps Weber’s credibility as a witness.

  225. [97] The defendants claim that the Windris Loan was authorised pursuant to the fourth paragraph of the 2012 Mandate (see [83] above) and their allegation that the plaintiff authorised ILC Singapore to apply a portion of the assets to be structured into asset protection structures. The reasons stated earlier, for the conclusion that the 2012 Mandate did not authorise the Investment Swap, apply mutatis mutandis to the Windris Loan. I find that the 2012 Mandate did not authorise the making of the Windris Loan.

  226. The sale of assets in Jade AP1

  227. [98] The plaintiff invested in the following through Jade AP1, a cell under Jade DCC:

  228. (a) 4,000 units of JB Physical Gold Fund Class A (“the JB Gold Fund units”);

  229. (b) 4,100 units of Anteile ZKB Gold ETF Klasse A (“the ZKB ETF units”);

  230. (c) Geldbuchungem A951 securities; and

  231. (d) 33,018,750 shares in Hellenic Bank (subsequently consolidated to 660,375 shares).

  232. [99] The dispute is over the sale of (a) the JB Gold Fund units and the ZKB ETF units, which resulted in a loss of €2,219,480, and (b) the Geldbuchungem A951 securities. The proceeds from the sale of the JB Gold Fund units and ZKB ETF units were received in March 2014 and June 2014 respectively.

  233. JB Gold Fund and ZKB ETF

  234. [100] The plaintiff says that the sales of the units were not authorised. The defendants claim that the decision to sell was taken in good faith pursuant to the 2012 Mandate. According to Weber, following a discussion with Casari in early 2013, both of them decided that there was a risk of the assets in Jade AP1 being seized and that it was therefore preferable to move the assets to Dextra and to lock them up in protective investments in line with the alleged strategy to invest in asset protection structures.

  235. [101] The reasons stated earlier, for the conclusion that the 2012 Mandate did not authorise the Investment Swap, apply mutatis mutandis to the sale of the JB Gold Fund units and the ZKB ETF units. I find that the 2012 Mandate did not authorise the sale of the JB Gold Fund units and the ZKB ETF units.

  236. [102] Further, Weber’s explanation for the decision to sell the assets in Jade AP1 is suspect. The decision to move the assets in Jade AP1 to Dextra was allegedly made in early 2013. Yet the JB Gold Fund units and the ZKB ETF units were only sold more than a year later and the monies in Jade AP1 were transferred to Dextra only in October 2014. The delay in selling the units and in transferring the funds to Dextra is inconsistent with Weber’s claim that there was concern in early 2013 about the assets in Jade AP1 being seized.

  237. [103] In addition, as stated earlier, Weber gave inconsistent evidence as to the reason for selling the investments in Jade AP1 (see [66] above). The reason given in his AEIC was the risk of seizure of the assets in Jade AP1; in his oral testimony, he claimed that he sold the investments in Jade AP1 because the plaintiff’s account did not have sufficient funds to pay for the Investment Swap.

  238. [104] In the defendants’ closing submissions, the defendants also suggested that another reason was that the units in Jade AP1 were held by Bridgeport Ltd (“Bridgeport”) and Fitzroy Networks Ltd (“Fitzroy”) and the investment could be traced to the plaintiff because he was the ultimate beneficial owner. However, this submission is not supported by Weber’s evidence; Weber did not give this as a reason for redeeming the assets under Jade AP1. This submission also contradicts Weber’s notion of asset protection structures. Weber testified that asset protection structures were meant to make it more difficult and time-consuming to trace the investment back to the plaintiff, even if such tracing would still be ultimately possible. The plaintiff was not the shareholder of Bridgeport or Fitzroy. The fact that Bridgeport and Fitzroy held the units in Jade AP1 appears to satisfy Weber’s notion of asset protection structures and thus militates against his explanation for redeeming the assets under Jade AP1.

  239. [105] The defendants’ inconsistent explanations for the sale of the JB Gold Fund units and the ZKB ETF units are evidence that their reliance on the 2012 Mandate is an afterthought.

  240. [106] In conclusion, I find that Dextra is liable to the plaintiff for the value of 4,000 units of the JB Gold Fund and 4,100 units of the ZKB ETF at their respective prices as at the date of this judgment (less the amounts for which they were sold, and which have been accounted for).

  241. Geldbuchungem A951 securities

  242. [107] Weber stated in his AEIC that Jade AP1 received €16,839.39 from the sale of Geldbuchungem A951 securities. No explanation was given as to why they were sold. The defendants submit that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that there was no authorisation for the sale. This cannot be right. Dextra, as the accounting party, bears the burden of proving that there was authorisation. Given the defendants’ lack of any explanation, they have not discharged this burden.

  243. [108] The plaintiff submits that the defendants therefore have to account for this asset. I agree. Dextra is therefore liable to the plaintiff for the value of the Geldbuchungem A951 securities as at the date of this judgment (less the amount for which they were sold, and which has been accounted for).

  244. Payments to Carnelia

  245. [109] These payments total €664,835.31 and US$194,746.72 and were made between 16 April 2012 and 7 November 2014 against invoices issued by Carnelia. The plaintiff accepts that payments totalling €20,386.43 were authorised. The amounts left in dispute are therefore €644,448.88 and US$194,746.72.

  246. [110] The disputed payments are for:

  247. (a) annual service fees for 2013 and 2014 and related bank charges invoiced to the plaintiff; and

  248. (b) set-up fees, annual fees, trustee fees, disbursements, security deposits, and other charges and expenses invoiced to various entities.

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