High Court · Decided 13 August 2020
Public Prosecutor v Azlin bte Arujunah and another
Feedback & support[2020] SGHC 168 · Case no. Criminal Case No 47 of 2019
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] Azlin binte Arujunah (“Azlin”) and Ridzuan bin Mega Abdul Rahman (“Ridzuan”) were jointly tried on multiple charges for various acts of abuse from July 2016 to October 2016 against their five-year-old son (“the Child”). In respect of a series of four scalding incidents which resulted in the Child’s death on 23 October 2016, they were charged with murder under s 300(c) read with s 34 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) (“Penal Code”). After trial, I amended these murder charges and convicted Azlin and Ridzuan on newly framed charges based on the scalding incidents. I also convicted Azlin and Ridzuan on the charges for the acts of abuse, save for one on which they were acquitted. Azlin was sentenced to 27 years’ imprisonment and 12 months’ imprisonment in lieu of caning, while Ridzuan was sentenced to 27 years’ imprisonment and 24 strokes of the cane. I now furnish the grounds for my decision.
Background
- [2]
[2] At the time of the offences, the accused persons, then 24 years of age, were the parents of six children. Azlin and Ridzuan lived together with four of their children at the material time: their oldest son, who was turning seven years old at the time, the Child, who was their second son, and two younger daughters, who were three and two years old respectively.
- [3]
[3] The Child had lived with a friend of Azlin’s, [Z], since March 2011, when he was a few months old. In time, [Z] sought to make childcare and schooling arrangements for the Child near her home, but was unable to secure the parents’ consent. As a result, the Child was returned to Azlin and Ridzuan in May 2015. [Z] and her family also sought to see the Child from time to time, but were denied access after January 2016.
- [4]
[4] The offences in this case came to light when the Child was admitted to the Emergency Department at KK Women’s and Children’s Hospital (“KK Hospital”) on 22 October 2016 at around 7.57pm. He received emergency intensive care, but was pronounced dead on 23 October 2016 at 9.13am. Subsequent investigation revealed a series of offences from July to 22 October 2016. At trial, the Prosecution proceeded on six charges against Azlin, and nine charges against Ridzuan. The charges against Azlin were as follows:
(a) one charge under s 300(c) read with s 34 and punishable under s 302(2) of the Penal Code, for incidents spanning 15 to 22 October 2016 (as amended on the second day of trial and marked “C1A”);
(b) two charges under s 5(1) punishable under s 5(5)(b) of the Children and Young Persons Act (Cap 38, 2010 Rev Ed) (“CYPA”) for incidents in August 2016 (marked “C2” and “C3”);
(c) one charge under s 324 read with s 109 of the Penal Code for an incident in end August to early September 2016 (marked “C4”) corresponding to Ridzuan’s charge for the same act below marked D4; and
(d) two charges under s 5(1) punishable under s 5(5)(b) of the CYPA read with s 34 of the Penal Code for incidents in October 2016 (marked “C5” and “C6”) and corresponding to Ridzuan’s charges marked D7 and D9 respectively.
- [5]
[5] Ridzuan was tried on the following charges:
(a) one charge under s 300(c) read with s 34 of the Penal Code for incidents spanning 15–22 October 2016 (as amended on the second day of trial and marked “D1A”);
(b) three charges under s 5(1) punishable under s 5(5)(b) of the CYPA for incidents in July 2016 and October 2016 (marked “D2”, “D3”, and “D6”);
(c) three charges under s 324 of the Penal Code for incidents in end-August to early September, early October, and 18–19 October 2016 (marked “D4”, “D5”, and “D8”); and
(d) two charges under s 5(1) punishable under s 5(5)(b) of the CYPA read with s 34 of the Penal Code for incidents in October 2016 (marked “D7” and “D9”).
- [6]
[6] In these grounds of decision, I refer to charges C1A and D1A as “the Murder Charges”. The other charges are referred to as “the Abuse Charges”.
Joint trial of Abuse and Murder Charges
- [7]
[7] Prosecution initially informed parties that they would stand down the Abuse Charges until after the trial of the Murder Charges. On 19 September 2019, however, they notified defence counsel of their decision to try all the charges together. Counsel for Ridzuan did not object. Counsel for Azlin objected, on the basis that the joinder would be prejudicial to Azlin’s defence; alternatively, counsel requested for a vacation of the first tranche of trial dates fixed for 15–17 and 22–25 October 2019. At the subsequent pre-trial conference on 7 October 2019, I vacated the October trial dates but allowed the joinder of the charges at a single trial. The trial then convened on the allocated dates in November 2019, with subsequent dates added in 2020.
- [8]
[8] The objection to the joining of the charges was renewed by counsel for Azlin in closing submissions and I deal with the objections here. It was not disputed that the grounds for joining of those offences under s 133 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) (“CPC”) were satisfied. Azlin objected to the trial of these offences together on the basis that the she would be prejudiced or embarrassed in her defence as the evidence amounted to similar fact evidence and argued for the need for separate trials by virtue of s 146 of the CPC.
- [11]
[11] Counsel for Azlin raised a further argument in closing submissions that was not raised prior to trial. This is that Azlin would have testified in her defence for the Abuse Charges, but chose not to because of the Murder Charge. To the contrary, Azlin did not dispute three of the Abuse Charges, and the source for the evidence for the remaining charges was her own statements, which she had conceded were voluntary. In my view, the facts well show that Azlin was not prejudiced by her election not to give evidence on any of the charges.
- [12]
[12] I start, then, with the Abuse Charges, which inform the context for the Murder Charges.
The Abuse Charges
July and August CYPA charges
- [13]
[13] The series of offences commenced in July, with CYPA offences committed by Ridzuan against the Child.
- [14]
[14] Section 5(1) of the CYPA reads:
- [15]
[15] Section 5(2) of the CYPA provides a list that defines the scope of “ill-treats” under the CYPA. For the present case, the relevant provisions are s 5(2)(a) and s 5(2)(b) of the CYPA, which provide:
- [16]
[16] It was not disputed that the Child was a child in the “custody, charge or care” of the Azlin and Ridzuan.
Ridzuan’s offences in July 2016
- [17]
[17] In July 2016, the Prosecution alleged that Ridzuan had used pliers to pinch the Child twice. These charges, D2 and D3, were similar. D2 read as follows:
- [18]
[18] The Prosecution’s case was based on Ridzuan’s statements which were admitted by consent. In his statement recorded on 27 October 2016 (marked P201), Ridzuan admitted to this first incident in July 2016, as follows:
- [19]
[19] Ridzuan also gave an account of the second incident in July 2016 in the same statement:
- [20]
[20] Ridzuan did not dispute that these incidents occurred, nor did he deny that these were incidents of ill-treatment. I found that these charges, as admitted in his statement, amounted to ill-treatment under s 5(2)(a) of the CYPA and I convicted Ridzuan of charges D2 and D3.
Azlin’s offences in August 2016
- [21]
[21] Azlin followed up Ridzuan’s abuse with two offences in August. Charge C2 read:
- [22]
[22] Azlin’s account was that sometime in August 2016, Azlin and Ridzuan returned to their residence with the other children. The Child had been left in the house. Azlin saw that there were biscuits on the kitchen floor, and she asked the Child how they were scattered. Azlin believed that it was the Child who had toppled the container which held the biscuits, so when the Child denied doing it and blamed the cat instead, Azlin took a broom from inside the kitchen and, in her words:
- [23]
[23] On Azlin’s admission, I found the offence under s 5(1) of the CYPA proven beyond reasonable doubt and convicted Azlin on C2.
- [24]
[24] Charge C3 read as follows:
- [25]
[25] The charge was preferred on the basis of Azlin’s admission that she had pushed the Child after he had made her angry. She stated:
- [26]
[26] I was satisfied that Azlin had pushed the Child in the manner described. This push was sufficiently forceful to cause the Child to fall sideways and to hit his head, which, beyond doubt, constituted physical abuse. Therefore, I convicted Azlin of C3.
Alleged incident in end August to early September 2016
- [27]
[27] Charges C4 and D4 alleged that Ridzuan burned the Child’s right palm with a heated metal spoon sometime between end August and early September 2016, and that Azlin abetted this offence by instigation. I acquitted Azlin and Ridzuan of these charges.
- [28]
[28] I deal first with Ridzuan’s charge under s 324 of the Penal Code:
- [29]
[29] Ridzuan’s defence was that there was no such incident at the end of August or early September. His cautioned statements (P179 and P180 ) specify two incidents where he used a heated spoon on the Child. These were in October 2016, and the subject of D5 and D8. The medical evidence was also inconclusive as to the timing of the burns found on the Child’s right palm given the scalding from the later incidents.
- [30]
[30] The case against Ridzuan (in relation to D4) rested solely on Azlin’s statement. In my view, Azlin’s statement did not amount to a “confession” for the purposes of s 285(5) of the CPC and therefore could not be used: see [32] below. Even putting that aside, I was of the view that it would not, in any event, be safe to convict Ridzuan on this charge purely on the basis of Azlin’s statement. There were multiple incidents, and she could easily have been confused about the timing of each occurrence. More fundamentally, I considered Ridzuan’s omission to mention an end-August incident to be exculpatory. This was because his statements had been largely truthful, and his convictions on the Abuse Charges rested on the inculpatory parts of his statements. An accused’s statements have to considered in their whole context: see Chan Kin Choi v Public Prosecutor [1991] 1 SLR(R) 111 at [34]. There was therefore a reasonable doubt as to whether there had indeed been a heated metal spoon incident at the end of August and it was unsafe to convict Ridzuan of this charge.
- [31]
[31] Azlin’s charge (“C4”) was for instigation of the above offence, and read as follows:
- [32]
[32] I acquitted Azlin on this charge for the following reasons. First, what was alleged to be her instigation was framed in P207 as a request to Ridzuan to discipline the Child: “… I just could not control [the Child]. I just told Ridzuan and told Ridzuan to deal with [the Child]”. There was no “‘active suggestion, support, stimulation or encouragement’ of the primary offence”: Chan Heng Kong and another v Public Prosecutor [2012] SGCA 18 at [34]. In this context, Ridzuan’s understanding of what Azlin intended by her request to “deal with” the Child did not involve the specifics of a heated spoon. In his statement, he stated: “She knew that I would shout and hit [the Child] and that was the reason why my wife had asked me to deal with [the Child]. She thinks that [the Child] would be scared”. Second, an abettor must intend the person abetted to perform the act abetted, with knowledge of the circumstances constituting the offence: Balakrishnan S and another v Public Prosecutor [2005] 4 SLR(R) 249 at [64]. There was no evidence that she asked Ridzuan to use a heated spoon or even envisaged that he would do so. This would have been the first time a heated spoon had been used as a form of abuse. Her statement was ambivalent. At highest, it only suggested indifference (“When Ridzuan was doing all this, I did not care as I just wanted him to deal with [the Child]” ). The statement, looked at as a whole, could not be said to lead to an inference that she committed the offence and therefore could not amount to a confession: see also Anandagoda v R [1962] MLJ 298 at 291, quoted in Public Prosecutor v Tan Aik Heng [1995] 1 SLR(R) 710 at [26]. Neither could the cautioned statement in P197, where Azlin “admit[ted] to the mistake [she] made” in relation to C4. This admission was consistent with her prior evidence that incidents with a heated spoon had taken place, but it was not an admission of legal sufficiency with respect to all the elements of the offence with which she was charged.
First half of October 2016
- [33]
[33] In October, there was an escalation of violence. Ridzuan was charged for causing hurt to the Child using a heated metal spoon. D5 read:
- [34]
[34] Ridzuan admitted to this incident in his statements:
The hurt was inflicted voluntarily, using the heated spoon as a heated substance. No defence was raised. The charge under s 324 of the Penal Code was made out, and I convicted Ridzuan of D5 accordingly.
- [35]
[35] Ridzuan also admitted that he flicked ashes from a lit cigarette onto the Child’s arm as a threat, and that he had used the hanger to hit the Child on his palms. The two acts, taken together, were sufficient to constitute ill-treatment under s 5(1) of the CYPA. I convicted Ridzuan of D6, which read:
After 15 October 2016
- [36]
[36] Three of the Abuse Charges took place at around the time when the scalding incidents, which grounded the Murder Charges, started. The first, involving injury with a heated spoon, was in the same period as the second scaling incident, which was between 17 and 19 October 2016.
- [37]
[37] Charge D8 read as follows:
- [38]
[38] Ridzuan admitted to this incident in his statements:
Ridzuan clearly had voluntarily caused hurt to the Child using the heated substance. I therefore convicted Ridzuan of D8.
- [39]
[39] Next followed injuries to the Child’s head. This was also identified by Ridzuan to have occurred around the time of the second scalding incident, sometime around 18–19 October 2016. The Prosecution alleged that Azlin pushed the Child’s head against a wall, and thereafter Ridzuan punched the Child on the face, causing a laceration and comminuted fractures of his nasal bone, and that these acts were done in furtherance of the common intention of them both. As C5 and D7 mirrored each other, I set out D7 for reference:
- [40]
[40] The Prosecution’s primary source of evidence for this incident is Ridzuan’s account, as follows:
- [41]
[41] Azlin contended in her statement P208 recorded on 29 October 2016 that this incident did not occur in October 2016, and that the only time she had pushed the Child and caused him to hit his head was in August 2016 (see [24]–[26] above). She also elaborated, implying she was not present at the time of the offence:
- [42]
[42] Azlin did however admit to pushing the Child against the wall in October in her cautioned statement P196 recorded on 27 April 2018:
- [43]
[43] I had to consider which version of events to accept, and whether Azlin could be convicted on the basis of Ridzuan’s statement. Section 258(5) of the CPC permitted such use of Ridzuan’s statement as Azlin and Ridzuan were charged for the same incident under s 34 of the Penal Code and were tried jointly for the same offence, and Ridzuan’s statement amounted to a confession.
- [44]
[44] I preferred Ridzuan’s version of events over Azlin’s. Azlin’s answers in P208 appeared to indicate that she was not aware of when the October head injury incident happened. However, it was clear that the injuries arising from that incident were serious ones. Dr Chan had observed lacerations on the upper lip, comminuted fractures of the nasal bone, and fractures of the alveolar process of the maxilla. Azlin herself noted that the Child’s nose was flat and he was missing two front teeth. In the light of such obvious injury, her assertion, “I cannot remember when”, could not be believed, especially given her ability to remember when the other incidents occurred, and appeared to be an attempt to distance herself from a serious incident. This would be consistent with her change of mind in April 2018 when she admitted to pushing the Child’s head against the wall in October. Coming to Ridzuan’s statement in this context, as mentioned at [30] above, Ridzuan’s account in his statements appeared to be largely truthful. He was clear, from the outset, that he was responsible for the various acts of abuse that he was charged with, and cooperated with investigations from the first approach of the police. His account of the incident in his statement was consistent with Dr Chan’s medical evidence. Ridzuan also had no motive to falsely implicate Azlin; no such motives were alleged or proved (see Norasharee bin Gous v Public Prosecutor and another appeal and another matter [2017] 1 SLR 820 at [59], citing Khoo Kwoon Hain v Public Prosecutor [1995] 2 SLR(R) 591). I therefore accepted as proven beyond reasonable doubt that Azlin had pushed the Child, causing him to hit his head against the wall, and that Ridzuan had punched the Child on the face. The physical injuries thus caused amounted to ill-treatment under s 5(1) of the CYPA. I noted, however, as counsel for Azlin pointed out, the words “pushing his head against the wall” in the charge suggested that Azlin had pushed the Child’s head against the wall, rather than simply having pushed the Child causing him to hit his head. I agreed that the charges conveyed a false impression and amended the charges C5 and D7 accordingly to read “by pushing him, causing his head to hit the wall” instead of “pushing his head against the wall”. The amended charges (marked C5A and D7A respectively) were read to the accused persons on 19 June 2020. Defence counsel confirmed that no further evidence was required. Azlin claimed trial to the charge while Ridzuan pleaded guilty.
- [45]
[45] I turn to the issue of common intention. Azlin and Ridzuan were present at the same time and disciplined the Child together. The common intention could be inferred from the following:
(a) This act occurred in the context of an escalation in acts of violence against the Child. Both had used physical force against the Child by 15 October 2016. They were both present at the scene at this incident, and clearly acting in concert towards a common objective.
(b) Regarding Azlin’s push which started the incident, Ridzuan’s statement revealed that he knew Azlin was likely to push the Child. He was angry as well and wanted an answer to the question. He not only acquiesced in Azlin’s act while participating in disciplining the Child, but then escalated it further by punching the Child.
(c) Ridzuan’s punch was in furtherance of their common intention. Azlin acquiescence supported this inference. There is no evidence that she tried to distance herself or to stop Ridzuan while the discipline was on-going. The inference is buttressed by the fact that Ridzuan’s act was directed at the same goal that Azlin had, namely to get the Child to answer the question.
- [46]
[46] Therefore, I found the elements of s 5(1) of the CYPA read with s 34 of the Penal Code satisfied. I convicted Azlin and Ridzuan of C5A and D7A (as amended), respectively.
- [47]
[47] The final Abuse Charge took place between 21 and 22 October 2016, the period in which the third and fourth scalding incidents took place. Azlin and Ridzuan put the Child in a cat cage. Charges C6 and D9 mirrored each other. I set out D9 here for reference:
- [48]
[48] Azlin and Ridzuan explained in their statements that they kept the Child locked in the cage so that he would not get into any more trouble and so they would not have to cause any more hurt to the Child. Azlin admitted that “at the rate [they had been] hitting him, [they] were scared something bad was going to happen”. The Child readily complied with their request. He was locked in the cat cage, which was secured with a leash or twine, and he was let out to be fed. The Child was in the cage from around 7pm to around 10pm on 21 October 2016, and from around 4am to 12pm on 22 October 2016. By this time, the Child was in a sickly state. Azlin knew that the Child was having a fever. While he was inside the cage, the Child complained that he was cold. Azlin noted in her statements that she saw the skin peeling off the Child’s face, hands, back, thighs, and the back of his legs. The colour of his skin was red and white, and she could see “whitish flesh”. Ridzuan admitted that he saw blood stains in the cat cage.
- [49]
[49] The cat cage measured 0.91m (L) x 0.58m (W) x 0.70m (H). The Child was 1.05m in height at the material time. The cat cage was not large enough for the Child to stand or lie stretched out, except maybe diagonally. Dr Chan was given the opportunity to inspect the cage and she commented that it was possible that the lacerations on the Child’s face and scalp “might have been a result of being confined in a cage.” She had observed that the cage had a few areas where the ends of the metal bars were sharper, running along the cage and not protruding out. Injury could result if someone confined inside moved around. Given Ridzuan’s admission that there were blood stains in the cat cage, the size of the cage, and Dr Chan’s observations, I found that it was beyond reasonable doubt that the Child would have suffered emotional injury, unnecessary physical suffering, and injury to his health, all relevant forms of injury under s 5(2)(b) of the CYPA. Their joint and agreed action constituted ill treatment under s 5(1) of the CYPA. I convicted Azlin and Ridzuan of C6 and D9 respectively.
Conclusion on the Abuse Charges
- [50]
[50] The various convictions on the Abuse Charges shed light on the suffering of the Child in the lead up and during the time of the Murder Charges. In summary, Ridzuan first applied pliers to the Child twice in July. This was followed in August by Azlin hitting the Child with a broomstick so hard that he was limping thereafter. Later in August, she pushed him so hard that he fell, hitting his head on the edge of a pillar; this injury resulted in his bleeding from the head. In October, there was an escalation of abuse, with Ridzuan using a heated spoon on the Child’s palm, flicking ash from a lit cigarette, and hitting him with a hanger. After 15 October, Ridzuan again injured him with a heated spoon. In the same period of time that the scalding events were taking place, Azlin and Ridzuan acted in concert to cause the Child further injury. In one incident, the Child was punched so hard his nasal bone was fractured. Towards the end of the period, he was put into a cat cage, where he suffered further injury. These offences set important context for the Murder Charges, to which I now turn.
The Murder Charges
- [51]
[51] Azlin’s Murder Charge read as follows (Ridzuan’s was substantially similar):
- [52]
[52] The Murder Charges were framed under s 300(c) of the Penal Code, which provides:
- [53]
[53] Culpable homicide is defined under s 299 of the Penal Code:
- [54]
[54] The Murder Charges also rely on s 34 of the Penal Code, which provides:
Summary of issues and decision for the Murder Charges
- [56]
[56] Where two accused persons are both charged under s 34 of the Penal Code, as in the present case, the Prosecution must establish the following three elements for each of them: first, the criminal act element, second, the common intention element, and third, the participation element: Daniel Vijay s/o Katherasan and others v Public Prosecutor [2010] 4 SLR 1119 (“Daniel Vijay”) at [91].
- [57]
[57] A key dispute was the manner in which the three elements of Wang Wenfeng apply where the mechanism of s 34 of the Penal Code is used. In my view, Daniel Vijay requires that where an accused is charged under s 300(c) read with s 34 of the Penal Code, the following three elements would be required for each accused: (a) death has been caused by the criminal act in which both accused participated; (b) the bodily injury so caused is in the ordinary nature sufficient to cause death; and (c) both have the common intention to cause “s 300(c) injury” as defined in Daniel Vijay at [49].
- [58]
[58] Regarding these elements, neither accused person challenged the participation element. Their participation was detailed in their statements, which were admitted. The criminal act element was also not disputed, save for its legal effect. The Prosecution particularised the “criminal act” as “the collective acts of scalding by both accused persons over four incidents within the week that resulted in the [Child]’s Severe Scald Injury [referred to in these grounds as “the Cumulative Scald Injury”] and eventual death.” The use of several incidents forming the actus reus of the offence was also not disputed. What the sufficient common intention for these s 300(c) charges was and whether such common intention could be inferred from the facts were the primary issues in dispute. It was argued that neither Azlin nor Ridzuan intended the Cumulative Scald Injury nor did they share the common intention to cause the Cumulative Scald Injury. The defence also countered that the Cumulative Scald Injury was not, as required under s 300(c) of the Penal Code, the cause of death nor, in the ordinary cause of nature, sufficient to cause death. Lastly, Azlin and Ridzuan argued Exception 7 was applicable, and they were therefore in any event only to be held liable under s 299 of the Penal Code.
(a) whether the Cumulative Scald Injury was the cause of death, and whether it was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death;
(b) whether Azlin and Ridzuan possessed the common intention necessary for the Murder Charges;
(c) if (b) was satisfied, whether either Azlin or Ridzuan could rely on Exception 7of the Penal Code; and
(d) if (b) was not satisfied, whether the charges should be amended.
- [60]
[60] I answered (a) in the positive, but held (b) was not satisfied. I considered the issues raised for (c) nevertheless. In the light of (d), the Murder Charges were amended to charges under s 326 of the Penal Code premised on four incidents.
Cause of death
Factual basis
- [61]
[61] I explain, first, the four incidents which form the factual basis for the Murder Charges. The roles played by Azlin and Ridzuan were largely not disputed and were detailed by both in their statements.
(1) Incident 1
- [62]
[62] Incident 1 occurred sometime between 15 and 17 October 2016. Azlin suspected that the Child had taken milk powder and grabbed the Child by his right ankle. While still holding onto him, Azlin then filled a glass mug to around one-quarter full with hot water from the water dispenser and poured that water onto his right leg. Azlin then re-filled the glass to one-quarter full and poured the water again. She did this two or three times, before letting the Child go. When Azlin questioned the Child again about the milk powder, the Child denied his involvement and Azlin refilled the mug with hot water and poured hot water on the Child’s hand four to five times. When the Child got free of her grip, she refilled the mug and splashed it over his left arm, and some also splashed onto his chest. She stopped when Ridzuan woke up and shouted for them to keep quiet. After the incident, Azlin saw that the Child was limping and that skin was peeling from his hands, arms and chest. She then went to a provision shop to buy some cream for the Child’s skin. She thought the Child was already walking normally the next day. Ridzuan, on the other hand, did not appear to observe any peeling skin, commenting that the Child’s skin was “reddish”, and that the Child was able to “walk normally and run and play with his brother.”
(2) Incident 2
- [63]
[63] Sometime between 17 and 19 October 2016, Azlin splashed the Child’s body with hot water. In response, the Child shouted, “Kau gila ke apa” (translated, “Are you crazy or what?”). Azlin became angry and re-filled the glass mug with hot water and splashed the Child on his face. She then re-filled the glass mug and splashed the Child again, doing this for five to seven times, on his face, body, arms, and legs. Ridzuan also participated in this incident. When he heard the Child call Azlin “crazy”, Ridzuan picked up a green mug and splashed hot water at the Child. The hot water landed on the Child’s face and body. On Ridzuan’s account, splashing was repeated after the Child bathed, but Azlin’s account did not include this. According to Azlin, at some point, Ridzuan apparently told Azlin “to stop and cool down”.
- [64]
[64] After Incident 2, both Azlin and Ridzuan noticed significant injuries. Ridzuan described the Child’s condition as follows:
- [65]
[65] Azlin shared similar observations:
(3) Incident 3
- [66]
[66] On 21 October 2016 at around 9pm, Azlin became angry at the Child again when he kept asking her for drinks and other things. Azlin reacted by chasing the Child with a glass mug filled with hot water, splashing the Child. She splashed water at the Child around nine to ten times, but not all of it hit the Child. Azlin then went to sleep. Ridzuan was not involved.
(4) Incident 4
- [67]
[67] Incident 4 occurred on 22 October 2016. Azlin “told [the Child] to bath […] but when he came to the kitchen, he did not remove his shorts.” Azlin then woke Ridzuan up and informed him about the issue. She then started bathing her two daughters. Ridzuan asked the Child to remove his shorts again. When the Child refused, he took a broom and used the handle to beat the Child two or three times on his legs. Both Azlin and Ridzuan continued to ask the Child to remove his shorts. Frustrated, Ridzuan then went to fill half a glass mug of hot water from the dispenser and threw the hot water on the floor beside the Child as a warning. Some of the water reached the Child’s leg. The scolding escalated and Ridzuan went to refill the mug with hot water and splashed the Child on the left side of his body. When the Child refused to remove his shorts, Ridzuan went to refill half the mug with hot water and poured the hot water on the Child’s back. Ridzuan went to refill the mug a fourth time and splashed the hot water on one or both of the Child’s calves. The Prosecution took the view that Azlin was present throughout the incident. Azlin on the other hand took the stance that she was busy with her daughters. While I accepted that Azlin was not beside Ridzuan at every moment, her statement made clear, nonetheless, that she saw and acquiesced with Ridzuan’s actions, including his splashing the Child with hot water. The Child finally fell and lay on his side, at which point Ridzuan called for Azlin. Ridzuan then rinsed the Child with cold water.
Scalding resulting from the splashing incidents
- [69]
[69] The temperature of the water that came into contact with the Child would therefore have been at least 70℃, since the span of time from filling the glass or green mug to the time of splashing was not significant in any of the incidents. The temperature of 70℃ is significant because the undisputed medical evidence was that substances with temperatures above 70℃ would cause mid to deep dermal burns, even where the duration of contact is minimal, as in splashing. It was not disputed that the temperature of the water was sufficient to, and did, cause the burns found on the Child.
Medical evidence on cause of death
- [70]
[70] The medical evidence on the cause of the Child’s death was adduced through three experts: Dr Chan Shijia (“Dr Chan”), who performed the autopsy on 24 October 2016; Associate Professor Loh Tsee Foong (“Assoc Prof Loh”), a senior consultant who was a member of the team who first gave the Child emergency treatment on 22 October 2016; and Dr Gavin Kang Chun-Wui (“Dr Kang”), the burn specialist who performed debridement to clean the Child’s wounds later that evening.
- [71]
[71] Dr Chan’s autopsy report concluded that the substantive cause of death was the “severe scald injury”, referring to “all the scald injuries on the body in totality”. Dr Loh’s and Dr Kang’s testimonies corroborated each other and Dr Chan’s evidence. In particular, the following was agreed among the experts:
(a) the Cumulative Scald Injury was the cause of death and it was this totality of injury that was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death;
(b) arising from the nature of burn injuries, it was not possible to tell whether all the burn injuries were sustained on one occasion or over various occasions;
(c) it was not possible to correlate the burn injuries with specific incidents; and
(d) it was not possible to tell which injuries caused by individual incidents were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
- [72]
[72] How the burns led to the Child’s death may be explained as follows. The extent of the Child’s total body surface area (“TBSA”) covered by burns was estimated by Dr Kang at 67% and by Dr Chan at 75% after debridement, which consisted of mid and deep dermal burns. Because skin is crucial to maintain hydration and body temperature, and to protect the body from infection, the burns were “very extensive and life-threatening”. The Child was hypothermic on admission, leading to a low haemoglobin level as the lower temperature prevented clotting. The fluid loss due to the burns led to a lower volume of circulating blood, which induced a “shock state” in which the circulating blood was insufficient to bring oxygen and nutrients to parts of the body and to remove waste. This led to compensation with an increased heart rate, but when this response was inadequate, the blood pressure began to fall in decompensation. The burns also resulted in an intense inflammatory response, resulting in water leaking from the blood vessels into the soft tissue (referred to by Dr Chan as “third spacing”), resulting in fluid in the chest cavity, shown in scans taken at KK Hospital and later during the autopsy. Acute lung injury, as the lungs became flooded with fluids and secretions, resulted in “Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome” (“ARDS”). With insufficient circulation of blood, “a shock state”, followed, and thereafter acute kidney injury. These complications led to multi-organ failure and the Child’s death.
The Defence’s arguments on the cause of death
- [73]
[73] Defence counsel argued that the court should take into account the “multi-factorial causes for the Child’s demise,” including the loss of blood from the “blunt force craniofacial trauma,” the Child’s underlying condition of iron deficiency and anaemia, his subsisting condition of pneumonia, and the “extensive medical intervention” conducted.
- [74]
[74] Dr Chan’s evidence was clear that the operative and proximate cause of death was the Cumulative Scald Injury. First, “blunt force craniofacial trauma” was listed by Dr Chan as a secondary cause of death, but her firm conclusion, both in her report and at trial, was that the cause of death was the Cumulative Scald Injury. The uncontroverted expert evidence was that in the absence of that trauma, the Child would have died from the Cumulative Scald Injury. Second, in relation to the argument about “extensive medical intervention”, this medical intervention was required because of the Cumulative Scald Injury itself and did not break the chain of causation.
- [75]
[75] Third, in relation to the Child’s pre-existing condition of anaemia, Assoc Prof Loh testified that this had little relevance to the Child’s eventual death, and Dr Chan testified that there was nothing to suggest that the Child’s prior anaemic condition would have been severe.
- [76]
[76] This position, in my view, was not shaken in cross-examination of the Prosecution’s various expert witnesses. In particular, the Defence sought to argue evidence that the Child was suffering from pneumonia and that contributed to his death. It was pointed out that a week before the Child’s admission to hospital, sometime between 19 to 20 October 2016, the Child was observed by Ridzuan to have a “chesty and phlegmy cough” and that blood cultures taken after the Child’s death were reported “to be positive for streptococcus pneumonia, pseudomonas aeruginosa and staphylococcus aureus” . Dr Chan was asked, based on “these symptoms, X-ray, [her] histological report, chesty cough”, whether it was probable that the Child suffered from pneumonia. In response, Dr Chan agreed that it was probable. This response, however, was to an abstract question about whether those identified factors would point towards pneumonia. Taking these factors out of their context, given the burns suffered, was not appropriate. As Dr Chan herself stated subsequently in re-examination that any pneumonia was “more likely than not part of the multi-organ failure and the infection that followed the burns”.
- [77]
[77] Reliance was also placed by defence counsel on Assoc Prof Loh’s concession that the Child “might” have had pneumonia based on the “X-ray alone” and that the Child’s symptoms reported by Ridzuan were consistent with pneumonia. This submission used Assoc Prof Loh’s testimony out of context. Assoc Prof Loh maintained that there was insufficient evidence of pneumonia at the time of the Child’s admission. Further, he noted that the presence of three types of bacteria in the Child’s blood culture meant that it was more likely that the bacteria had entered through the wounds in the skin. It was unlikely for there to have been “three concomitant organism[s]” in “community-acquired pneumonia”. Other conditions were important in diagnosis, such as the Child’s state of shock, the metabolic acidosis, the kidney injury and the subsequent ARDS. The chesty cough could have been due to these other conditions. Based on an assessment of all these factors, Assoc Prof Loh concluded that it was “unlikely for the pneumonia to be pre-existing” but “more likely that the pneumonia [was] a consequence of the existing pathology”, in that the burns resulted in blood poisoning, which carried the bacteria into the lungs. The bacteria present in the lungs, and its effect, was a result of the successive burn injuries.
- [78]
[78] Therefore, there was no evidence to support the Defence’s hypothesis that the Child’s death was due to the pre-existing condition of pneumonia, and that the Cumulative Scald Injury would not have resulted in death when objectively assessed in relation to a five-year-old boy without the pre-existing condition. The infection and pneumonia were a result of the burns associated with the scald injuries. There was no doubt that the Child died from the Cumulative Scald Injury.
Sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death
- [79]
[79] Ridzuan also disputed that the Cumulative Scald Injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The following principles govern the inquiry:
(a) The assessment is an objective one, in that it does not matter if the accused does not know or intend that the injury be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death: Wan Wenfeng ([55] supra) at [33].
(b) “Sufficient” means that there must be a “high probability of death in the ordinary course of nature”: Wan Wenfeng at [33] citing Rajwant Singh v State of Kerala AIR 1966 SC 1874 at 1879).
(c) The assessment is to be conducted with regard to “the victim’s apparent age and build”: Ike Mohamed Yasin bin Hussin v Public Prosecutor [1974-1976] SLR(R) 596 at [9].
- [80]
[80] Mr Thuraisingham made two broad submissions. First, he argued that the expert witnesses misunderstood the threshold and only concluded that there was a possibility of death.
- [81]
[81] This argument was misplaced. The submission that Dr Chan was speaking merely in terms of possibility was premised on her use of the “can” in re-examination: “I think this was explained at the start when I explained how scald burn injuries can result in death” [emphasis added]. This was a misrepresentation of the totality of Dr Chan’s evidence, which was, in response to cross-examination, that “there’s a certain percentage whereby there’s a high mortality rate”. She was clear that the requisite percentage was met in the circumstances of the case.
- [82]
[82] Dr Kang’s evidence also supported the conclusion that the Cumulative Scald Injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. He found that the injuries were “very extensive”, being more than 40–50% of the TBSA of the Child. For a five-year-old boy, this would have resulted in a “proportionally worse outcome”, being a higher risk of death, than for an older person, as a child’s skin is thinner and reserves are smaller. The deterioration of the Child’s condition showed that in the absence of medical care, the Cumulative Scald Injury had led him to become “critically ill”, since such burns would usually have required “immediate resuscitation with intravascular fluids”. Dr Kang was able to conclude: “Without adequate and immediate fluid resuscitation, the child would decompensate and go into systemic inflammation and even multi-organ dysfunction”. The legal test requires that the court consider whether death was “highly probable” in the absence of medical intervention. It is worth noting that the legal test does not prescribe a particular percentage risk, but requires the court to make an assessment based on the expert evidence available. In my view, this was satisfied on the evidence presented.
- [83]
[83] Second, Mr Thuraisingam argued that the evidence was not sufficient to show a high probability of death, submitting that there was a chance that the Child could have lived. Dr Chan’s report (P173) stated: “While the scald injuries on the [D]eceased may not definitely cause death, they were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.” Dr Chan clarified in court that she meant that some patients might survive the burns, but that the Cumulative Scald Injury alone would have been sufficient to cause death. During re-examination, she emphasised that, regardless of whether the burns appeared on an average person or a five-year-old boy, they would have been sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. In this case, the Cumulative Scald Injury was so severe as to have resulted in multi-organ failure, low blood pressure, and third spacing (see [72] above). The means by which the Cumulative Scald Injury led to death was confirmed by Assoc Prof Loh’s evidence.
- [84]
[84] The doctors were cross-examined extensively on the risk of death associated with scalding. Assoc Prof Loh was of the view that the risk of death would be high, around 50–60%, for any burns above 50% of the TBSA, whether partial or full thickness or a combination thereof, but this did not preclude a lower surface area being fatal or life-threatening. Dr Chan’s evidence was that there was literature that suggested that burns covering anything more than 20% to 40% of the TBSA would be severe regardless of thickness of the burns.
- [85]
[85] Mr Thuraisingam pointed to Assoc Prof Loh’s testimony that there have been survivors of “80% burns”. The parts of Assoc Prof Loh’s testimony that Mr Thuraisingam quoted must be viewed in context. The exchange was as follows:
- [86]
[86] In this exchange, Assoc Prof Loh’s comment on the possibility of surviving 80% burns was concerned with how the extent of the burns informed the issue of what the patient’s family was to be advised concerning how medical treatment should proceed. It is the role of doctors to attempt life-saving medical treatment after all, and surely, life and death could not, in that context, be a matter to be resolved by statistics. His comments do not detract from the weight of the evidence on the likely outcome of such severe burn injuries. The legal test is not injury that leads inevitably to death, but rather, injury that was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. In my judgment, the evidence established, beyond doubt, that the Cumulative Scald Injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
Conclusion on medical evidence
- [87]
[87] It is useful, at this juncture, to sum up the medical evidence. Three points were accepted by all three doctors. First, the extent of the injuries suffered as a result of each of the four incidents could not be established. Only the resulting Cumulative Scald Injury could be analysed. Second, the contributory effect of each of these incidents to the Child’s death was also not ascertainable. Third, it was the Cumulative Scald Injury, caused over the four incidents, which was sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death. This was the reason that the “act” which was asserted to be culpable homicide in legal terms was a series of acts over the four incidents. Section 33 of the Penal Code as it stood at the time of the offences provided that an “act” included “a series of acts”. While the current s 33(2) of the Penal Code, which provides specifically for causation when it is not known which particular act caused the effect, was not yet in force at the time of the offences, there was no dispute that the acts in this case comprised these four incidents and that the Cumulative Scald Injury was the result of this series of acts.
Did Ridzuan and Azlin possess the requisite intention?
- [88]
[88] Ridzuan and Azlin contended that they did not possess the common intention to inflict the Cumulative Scald Injury. Both Murder Charges relied upon s 34 of the Penal Code, which required such common intention.
When must the common intention be formed?
- [89]
[89] It was common ground that although there does not need to be “a prior plan” to commit the offence, and a plan could arise “on the spot”, the common intention must precede the commission of the criminal act: Shaiful Edham bin Adam and another v Public Prosecutor [1999] 1 SLR(R) 442 at [60], citing Asogan Ramesh s/o Ramachandren v Public Prosecutor [1997] 3 SLR(R) 201 at [34]; see also Samlee Prathumtree and another v Public Prosecutor [1996] 2 SLR(R) 841 at [36]. In the present case, because the Cumulative Scald Injury was caused by a series of four incidents, it was not disputed that the requisite common intention must have existed prior to Incident 1, although it was open to the court to infer from subsequent acts, as a matter of drawing inferences from the evidence, that the common intention existed from the outset. The content of the necessary common intention and whether it could be inferred from the facts were the subject of dispute.
Why was common intention necessary?
- [90]
[90] In the present case, common intention was a necessary ingredient for the Murder Charges because the Cumulative Scald Injury was the result of four separate incidents over the course of about a week. Ridzuan was not present for Incidents 1 and 3, and he appeared to have no knowledge, even after Incident 4, of Incident 3. In Incident 2, where both contributed to acts of scalding, their actions would need to be attributed to each other. In Incident 4, while Azlin called Ridzuan’s attention to the scene, it was Ridzuan who was responsible for the acts of scalding. Because of the nature of scalding, the medical evidence was not able to show the extent of burns caused by each particular incident, or how each incident contributed to the Child’s death. As such, it was the Cumulative Scald Injury, resulting from all four incidents, which caused the Child’s death. In that context, both Azlin and Ridzuan were responsible for different physical components of Incidents 1 to 4 that resulted in the Cumulative Scald Injury. The mechanism of s 34 of the Penal Code was required to hold both Azlin and Ridzuan accountable for the entirety of the criminal act that formed the subject matter of the Murder Charges.
Content of the common intention required
- [91]
[91] In Daniel Vijay ([56] supra), the Court of Appeal expressly differentiated between the intention required of an offender individually charged with an offence, and that required in a case where common intention was used to impose liability, holding at [76]:
- [92]
[92] This distinction was made after Chan Sek Keong CJ defined “s 300(c) injury” to refer to the entire concept of “bodily injury that is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death” at [49]. At [146] the Court of Appeal then defined the common intention necessary for s 300(c) as follows:
- [93]
[93] These points were reiterated in Daniel Vijay ([56] supra) at [167]:
- [94]
[94] The Prosecution contended that the common intention only needed to be the common intention “to inflict the particular injury which caused death”, and the question of whether the particular injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death was an objective one. In their reply submissions, the Prosecution stated:
- [95]
[95] If this statement of the law were correct, this would mean that the intention applied to individuals charged with s 300(c) would be applied to participants who, individually, would not be liable under s 300(c) of the Penal Code. But this was exactly the approach that was rejected by the Court of Appeal in Daniel Vijay ([56] supra), and the rationale for this rejection applies equally in the present case. Such an interpretation would render the Court of Appeal’s comments distinguishing the requirement under s 300(c) simpliciter and s 300(c) read with s 34 of the Penal Code superfluous.
- [96]
[96] In oral reply, the Prosecution submitted further that the criminal act that needed to be commonly intended was only the acts of scalding, and if the acts of scalding were intended, there was no need to have an intention as to the specific injuries caused. A distinction was drawn between the criminal act itself and the injury. This distinction was incorrect insofar as it suggested that the common intention required did not require reference to the injury caused. The Court of Appeal throughout Daniel Vijay understood the “very criminal act” that had to be intended under s 300(c) read with s 34 of the Penal Code to be the infliction of s 300(c) injury. This could be seen by the scenarios (b) and (c) used in Daniel Vijay at [168] where, in respect of the “criminal act” to which s 34 of the Penal Code applied, the Court of Appeal again referred to the infliction of “s 300(c) injury”.
- [99]
[99] In Kho Jabing, V K Rajah JA re-stated the applicable test for the co-accused, Galing, who had been charged with s 300(c) read with s 34 of the Penal Code as follows:
- [100]
[100] In Public Prosecutor v Chia Kee Chen and another appeal [2018] 2 SLR 249 (“Chia Kee Chen”), the Court of Appeal summarised the applicable legal test at [46]:
- [101]
[101] The reference to [88] is an important one, where, in the course of explaining that there was no need to identify the person who struck the mortal blow in such cases, Sundaresh Menon CJ held:
- [102]
[102] The Prosecution attempted to rely on the last sentence in Chia Kee Chen at [87]: “But, as long as we were satisfied that the assailants shared a common intention to inflict the injuries in question, the impossibility of identifying of the mortal blow or of attributing it to a particular assailant would be irrelevant” [emphasis added]. The reference, however, to “injuries in question” is expanded and clarified in [88] as extracted above. After thus framing the “particular s 300(c) injury” in [88], Menon CJ concludes with the same reference to s 300(c) injury at [89]:
Did the facts at hand allow such a common intention to be inferred?
- [103]
[103] I come then to the inference to be drawn in the instant case. In dealing with this question, it is useful to consider how the requisite inference has been drawn in previous cases.
- [104]
[104] In Daniel Vijay ([56] supra), the victim had been assaulted on the head by the primary offender with a baseball bat in the course of a robbery and died. The Court of Appeal, in respect of the two secondary offenders, held that even if there was a finding on the evidence that the appellants had a common intention to beat the deceased on the head to render him unconscious, it would not necessarily follow that this common intention was a common intention to inflict s 300(c) injury on Wan, the deceased (see Daniel Vijay at [147]). The Court of Appeal pointed out that there was no scientific evidence that any knock on the head with a baseball bat would be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
- [105]
[105] In Kho Jabing ([55] supra), in the course of a robbery, Jabing (the primary offender) killed the victim with blows to the head with a piece of wood. Galing had also assaulted the victim with a belt buckle. The fatal injuries were inflicted by Jabing: Kho Jabing at [27], [28] and [31]. The Court of Appeal held that it was impossible to infer that Galing had the common intention to cause the s 300(c) injury. The Court of Appeal at [35] went on to discuss the factors that militated against drawing the inference of the common intention to cause s 300(c) injury on the victim, which were as follows:
(a) While Galing and Jabing had a common intention to commit robbery at Geylang, there was no evidence of any prior discussions or planning between the two of them as to how the robbery would be carried out, whether any weapons would be used, what force should be used if the victims resisted, etc.
(b) Galing and Jabing were unarmed when they decided to rob the two victims. Jabing’s picking up and using the piece of wood was opportunistic and improvisational and Galing’s use of his belt was equally so (ie, hardly part of a “pre-arranged plan”).
(c) There was insufficient evidence as to what kind of injury was caused by Galing using his belt buckle and, unless Galing had used it to strike the deceased very hard on the head (and there was no evidence that this had occurred) it could not have been a s 300(c) kind of injury.
(d) Although Galing was in a position, and afforded the opportunity, to inflict more severe wounds on the deceased, the fact that he did not do so suggested that his intention all along was to rob, as well as cause hurt while doing so, and not to inflict a s 300(c) injury.
(e) Galing did not assault the deceased in a manner which would have made it easier for Jabing to cause the s 300(c) injury, eg, by distracting the deceased, or restraining or incapacitating him so that Jabing would have been presented with a more vulnerable victim.
- [106]
[106] In Chia Kee Chen ([100] supra), a case where the fatal blow could not be identified, the Court of Appeal held that the requisite common intention could be inferred from the following:
(a) First, the Court of Appeal noted that Chia was the “mastermind of the plan to abduct the Deceased from the car park and to beat him up severely”: Chia Kee Chen at [90];
(b) Second, during the assault, “Chia actively assisted in Febri’s assault by restraining the Deceased’s legs while Febri went ‘crazy’ and repeatedly struck the Deceased’s head with the hammer. At no point did Chia attempt to stop Febri from continuing the assault, even though Chia was in a position to do so, since he had recruited Febri solely to assist him and Febri had no interest in the assault other than to act at Chia’s behest”: Chia Kee Chen at [92]. The reason why Chia did not stop Febri was because he was angry.
(c) Third, Chia also asked Febri to hand him the hammer, and he then struck the deceased on the forehead. He then returned the hammer to Febri, allowing him to continue striking the deceased.
(d) Fourth, the Court of Appeal also noted various parts of the statements that made clear that Chia had wanted the deceased dead: Chia Kee Chen at [94].
- [107]
[107] The facts of Chia Kee Chen deal squarely with counsel for Ridzuan’s submission that there could be no agreement if Ridzuan was unaware of the third incident. I disagreed with that approach. Ridzuan’s ignorance of the third incident would be irrelevant if the common intention could be proved. This is clear from Chia Kee Chen at [89] (extracted above at [102]). It is the common intention that is important.
- [108]
[108] The Prosecution’s argument on the facts upon which to found common intention in this case was summarised at para 69 of their written submissions:
- [109]
[109] In considering whether such common intention existed, it was important to bear in mind the kind of injury at hand, which was the Cumulative Scald Injury, accumulated across four incidents, that was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. In ascertaining intention, it was also important to consider the knowledge that Azlin and Ridzuan would have had, as the awareness of what kind of injury and the seriousness of the injury that would be caused is very relevant for inferring the necessary common intention. In this case, however, the scald injuries were not as obvious as other kinds of injury. It can be contrasted with a blunt force blow to the head with a hammer, which Chia Kee Chen ([100] supra) involved, which injuries would have been obvious. Similar reasoning was employed by the Court of Appeal in Daniel Vijay ([56] supra) when it suggested at [167], regarding the decision of the High Court in Public Prosecutor v Mimi Wong Criminal Case No 17 of 1970, that the combination of the facts that the common intention was to inflict bodily injury with a knife and that the knife injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, likely justified the inference that there was a common intention to inflict s 300(c) injury. By contrast, in other cases, the nature of the weapons or injuries militated against an inference of common intention. In Kho Jabing ([55] supra), for example, the weapons used by the robbers Jabing and Galing were improvisational, and it could not be inferred from Galing’s use of a belt that there was a pre-arranged plan for the victim to suffer head trauma from Jabing’s use of a piece of wood.
- [110]
[110] In my judgment, the Murder Charges were not made out, because there was insufficient evidence upon which I could infer that Azlin and Ridzuan intended to inflict s 300(c) injury (defining such injury in the same way as the Court of Appeal did in Daniel Vijay ([56] supra) at [49]). My reasons were as follows:
(a) There was no evidence of any pre-arranged plan on the part of Azlin and Ridzuan regarding the extent of injury to be caused to the Child. Rather than showing that the acts from the outset were directed at a goal of inflicting s 300(c) injury (ie, fatal injury), the evidence indicates instead that each incident was a reaction to a particular trigger.
(b) If there was such a pre-arranged plan, it should have existed prior to or have been formed on the spot just before Incident 1. Ridzuan, however, did not participate in Incident 1. The evidence indicates that he was aware of it thereafter and did not remonstrate Azlin in respect of it, but, without more, his acquiescence after the fact could not ground an inference that a common intention was formed prior to or just before the fact.
(c) After the second incident, Azlin and Ridzuan rinsed off the Child. Ridzuan also told Azlin to “cool down”. There was no agreement to scald the Child again. Further, after Incidents 1 and 2, Azlin and/or Ridzuan applied medication to the Child, suggesting that each incident was a separate reactive response and that there was no intention to cause any aggregate injury that would be s 300(c) injury.
(d) After the second incident, Ridzuan was aware that Azlin might scald the Child again. Azlin, too, was aware that Ridzuan might do the same. But foreseeability of another scalding incident alone was insufficient to ground the necessary inference that they had come to a common intention to continue scalding the Child to cause injury that was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This was made clear by the departure from Lee Chez Kee v Public Prosecutor [2008] 3 SLR(R) 447 (“Lee Chez Kee”) in Daniel Vijay and the result in Kho Jabing.
(e) The intention to inflict s 300(c) injury could not be inferred from Azlin’s or Ridzuan’s participation in the individual acts of scalding, because a single act of scalding would not be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Further, given the gap in time between each incident and the facts that suggested that each incident was independent, it was not possible to infer an overarching intention to inflict s 300(c) injury.
(f) Azlin’s and Ridzuan’s common intention to discipline the Child with scalding water was, contrary to the Prosecution’s submission, insufficient, because this would not amount to a specific intention to inflict s 300(c) injury. While the Prosecution derived support for their submission that “[the accused persons] were acting in concert at all times in ‘disciplining’ the child” from the accused persons’ accounts to the police and to the psychiatrists, this is not enough. At best, it may elucidate Azlin and Ridzuan’s motives for scalding the Child. But the content of the common intention was still an open question.
(g) Their act of bringing the Child to hospital despite knowing that Ridzuan may be arrested, while not determinative of the issue, pointed away from a common intention to inflict s 300(c) injury. They still held a hope as to his recovery.
Use of an adverse inference to fill the gap?
- [111]
[111] In its reply submissions, the Prosecution argued that at the close of its case, the Prosecution had proven a prima facie case that the common intention was formed from the time of the first scalding incident. The court had called for the Defence at the close of the Prosecution’s case, but both accused had chosen to remain silent. The Prosecution then argued that an adverse inference should be drawn against the accused persons, as their own testimony would be the best evidence as to their state of mind, and yet they failed to take the stand.
Use of second, third and fourth incidents only
- [113]
[113] The Prosecution in reply submissions also put forward an alternative case that the common intention was formed at the time of Incident 2. They argued that the injuries from Incident 1 were relatively minor and would have been “subsumed under the subsequent burns obtained”.
- [114]
[114] In my judgment, this approach was not feasible. This alternative case was advanced for the first time in reply. The Defence would not have reasonably expected this to be an alternative case and allowing this line of argument in reply would not be aligned with the guidance of the Court of Appeal in Mui Jia Jun v Public Prosecutor [2018] 2 SLR 1087 at [89]. Furthermore, the medical evidence did not support it. The evidence of Dr Chan, Dr Loh and Dr Kang was that it was not possible to identify with any degree of precision which injuries eventually contributed to the Child’s death. Infection, too, could have started from the first incident.
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