High Court · Decided 29 September 2020
NSL Oilchem Waste Management Pte Ltd v Prosper Marine Pte Ltd and other suits
Feedback & support[2020] SGHC 204 · Case no. Suit No 1062 of 2017(Consolidated with Suit No 1073 of 2017)
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] These disputes arise from the unfortunate breakdown of a 14-year long commercial relationship between NSL Oilchem Waste Management Pte Ltd (“NOWM”) and Prosper Marine Pte Ltd (“Prosper Marine”). The three suits in question, “Suit 1062”, “Suit 853” and “Suit 1048”, all concern debts owed by Prosper Marine to NOWM.
- [2]
[2] Suit 1062 is a claim on unpaid invoices issued between June 2015 and October 2016, under two contracts concluded by the parties in May 2014 (see [13] below). This debt is contested by Prosper Marine, which counterclaims for damages arising out of alleged breaches of these contracts. Suit 853 is a call on personal guarantees given by Prosper Marine’s directors to satisfy NOWM’s unpaid invoices (see [32] below). Finally, Suit 1048 is a claim for unpaid charter hire and Prosper Marine’s breaches of a charterparty for a vessel known as “Prosper 9” (see [27] below).
- [3]
[3] I find in favour of NOWM on all three suits. My reasons are found in the following:
(a) Suit 1062, which has been consolidated with 1073 of 2017 (“the 2014 Contract suits”) at [55]
(b) Suit 853 (“the Directors’ Guarantee suit”) at [157]
(c) Suit 1048 (“the Charterparty suit”) at [161]
Facts
Background
- [4]
[4] NOWM is a company in the business of treating marine and land-based “slop”, a collective term to describe a liquid mixture of water, hydrocarbons and solids. This is to be distinguished from “sludge", which describes semi-liquid slurry waste oil sediments. At the material time, NOWM did not have its own slop collection operation and relied entirely on contractors to collect and deliver slop to its MARPOL 1 Marine Waste Management Reception Centre (“NOWM’s plant” or “the plant”). Once there, the slop is treated within reactor tanks which separate the sediment, oil and water in the slop via a process involving heating and settlement. Besides the revenue earned from receiving and treating marine and land-based slop, NOWM profits from selling recycled fuel oil (“RFO”) extracted from the slop.
- [5]
[5] Prosper Marine’s commercial relationship with NOWM dates back to the time of its incorporation in 2002. A “one-stop centre” for various maritime services including the collection, transport and disposal of marine slop within Singapore port limits, Prosper Marine had a longstanding practice of treating its marine slop at NOWM’s plant. I pause to observe that the only other National Environment Agency (“NEA”)-approved slop reception facility in Singapore belongs to Singapore Cleanseas Pte Ltd (“Cleanseas”). In addition to disposing marine slop at NOWM’s plant, Prosper Marine would purchase RFO produced at the plant, which it would resell to its customers outside Singapore at a mark-up of approximately 15%.
- [7]
[7] The first notable hiccup arose in 2007 when a fire broke out at NOWM’s plant. NOWM was suspended from receiving marine slop for a year (from 2007 to 2008). During this time, Prosper Marine discharged marine slop at Cleanseas’ facility instead. After NOWM’s licence was restored, Prosper Marine would deposit marine slop at Cleanseas when there was a processing issue at NOWM’s plant. There were also times when Prosper Marine would have more slop to collect from its customers than what its tankers could carry. In those situations, they arranged for Cleanseas, which had its own slop collection vessels, to collect the slop and finally treat it at their plant.
- [8]
[8] Importantly, however, business with Cleanseas was never considered to be a long-term solution. Cleanseas was Prosper Marine’s direct competitor. With its own slop collection vessels, Cleanseas had its own customer base for the sale of RFO and naturally prioritised its own jobs over Prosper Marine’s. Cleanseas’ treatment services were also more expensive than NOWM’s. Up until 2014, Cleanseas charged Prosper Marine $13 per cubic metre (“cbm”) of marine slop discharged at its plant and imposed a minimum charge of $2,400 on the total volume of slop discharged. In contrast, NOWM only charged $3 per cbm of slop.
- [11]
[11] There was one other notable aspect of the parties’ commercial arrangements. Since at least 2003, NOWM had extended multiple lines of credit to Prosper Marine. This had allowed Prosper Marine to, among other things, continue purchasing RFO from NOWM for reselling to its customers. But the credit extended by NOWM had limits. NOWM’s ability to extend this credit depended on how much trade insurance its insurer, Atradius Credit Insurance NV (“Atradius”), was prepared to cover. Atradius’ willingness, in turn, was determined by the size of Proper Marine’s debt to NOWM. In other words, Prosper Marine’s access to credit depended heavily on its ability to manage its debts to NOWM. As I shall explain, Prosper Marine was clearly unable to do so.
- [12]
[12] As of February 2013, Prosper Marine was heavily in arrears, owing NOWM some $10.63m. In an attempt to rectify this, Prosper Marine proposed a payment schedule promising monthly payments of at least $2m between April 2013 to October 2013 (“April 2013 Agreement”). This was done with a view to bringing the accounts receivable balance (“AR Balance”) down to $6m, which would have brought the balance comfortably below the $7m trade credit limit later set by Atradius. However, the plan proved too optimistic, and Prosper Marine eventually failed to honour the agreement. As of January 2014, the AR balance remained at around $9m. This would be the first of many (failed) attempts to manage Prosper Marine’s debts.
The 2014 Contracts
- [13]
[13] Against this backdrop, the parties entered into two contracts on 5 May 2014 (the “2014 Contracts”) to formalise and mirror their business relationship. The first of these pertained to the disposal of marine slop and/or sludge at the NOWM plant (“the Disposal Contract”). The second concerned the sale of RFO (“the RFO Contract”).
The Disposal Contract
- [14]
[14] The Disposal Contract governed Prosper Marine’s discharge of waste slop and sludge at NOWM’s wharf. The 2014 Contract suits centred on four main parts of the contract. The first was a minimum volume obligation. Pursuant to cl 2.6, para 1.1 of Schedule 1 and para 1.5 of Schedule 1, Prosper Marine undertook to deliver for treatment at least 18,000 cbm of waste slop every month (at a rate of $3 per cbm) and further, to pay $3 for every cbm of shortfall. In this sense, the Disposal Contract was very much a continuation of the parties’ May 2010 business arrangement (see [9] above). Clause 2.6 is reproduced below:
Prosper Marine was also obliged, pursuant to cl 4.3, to make prompt payments to NOWM, “without withholding, set-off, counterclaim or any other deduction of any nature whatsoever”.
- [15]
[15] Second, in the event of non-payment, NOWM was granted several entitlements under the Disposal Contract. These are set out in cl 4.5:
Conversely, cl 5.1 entitled Prosper Marine to challenge invoices issued by NOWM where there was a bona fide dispute. This was subject to Prosper Marine providing written notice of the nature of the dispute within seven days of receipt of the invoice along with any relevant details.
- [16]
[16] Third, the Disposal Contract provided for both a minimum and maximum loading rate for slop discharge at NOWM’s plant (see cl 6.5). The minimum loading rate was 50 m3 per hour while the maximum was 100 m3 per hour. The minimum and maximum loading rates were to form the two poles of a safety range. That is, it was contractually agreed between the parties that, in the interest of safety, slop should be discharged at a rate between 50 to 100 m3 per hour. Prosper Marine also undertook to exercise due diligence in maintaining the rate of discharge between the specified rates and was “liable to [NOWM] for any loss, damage or injury arising out of the failure of [Prosper Marine’s] Vessel to maintain or observe the … maximum discharge rate…”
- [17]
[17] Fourth, certain clauses under the Disposal Contract indemnified NOWM against liability:
The RFO Contract
- [18]
[18] The crux of the RFO Contract is found at Schedule 1 wherein the parties agreed to the following:
- [19]
[19] Several of the provisions in the RFO Contract mirror those in the Disposal Contract. For example, NOWM had the option of charging Prosper Marine late payment interest (under cl 5.5). It was also entitled to “immediately suspend the performance or any further performance of its obligations under [the RFO Contract] without any liability to [Prosper Marine], whatsoever, howsoever caused”.
- [21]
[21] There was no provision for NOWM to give notice of its suspension of performance and cl 6.1 excluded claims against NOWM “arising out of the demurrage, detention or port dues”. Prosper Marine was also entitled to raise any disputes on invoices issued by NOWM within 14 days of receipt by way of notice together with relevant details (cl 5.6).
Managing Prosper Marine’s debts
The UOB guarantees
- [22]
[22] As stated earlier, the April 2013 Agreement ultimately fell through (see [12] above) and by October 2013, the AR balance had ballooned to $9.1m, significantly in excess of the original $6m target (set by NOWM) and the $7m trade credit limit (set by Atradius). Consequently, Prosper Marine sought to secure a bank guarantee from United Overseas Bank (“UOB”) in NOWM’s favour. This was obtained in March 2014 (the “2014 UOB Guarantee”), guaranteeing a sum of up to $2m and being valid from 14 February 2014 to 13 February 2015. Prosper Marine subsequently secured a further guarantee from UOB dated 21 April 2015 (the “2015 UOB Guarantee”). On NOWM’s insistence, Prosper Marine renewed the 2015 UOB Guarantee on 31 March 2016, thereby extending it to 20 April 2017.
The imposition of credit hold
- [24]
[24] Following negotiations, the parties reached an agreement on repayment, the details of which were recorded in the following manner in an email from Mr Lim Teck Kee, NOWM’s finance manager from 2012 to 2015, (the “20 January 2015 Email”):
- [25]
[25] It is not surprising why NOWM was so keen to reduce Prosper Marine’s large AR balance. As noted at [11] above, the credit limit extended to Prosper Marine depended on the amount of trade insurance coverage provided to NOWM by Atradius. Pursuant to the terms of this insurance policy, invoices had to be paid within 210 days (i.e. the sum of a maximum extension period (“MEP”) of 150 days and a maximum credit term of 60 days). Failing this, there would be an automatic stoppage of insurance coverage and NOWM would not be insured for any loss sustained in relation to invoices submitted at the expiry of the MEP .
The sale of Prosper 9
- [27]
[27] By 11 May 2015, Prosper Marine was once again behind on its payment commitments. In another attempt to reduce its AR balance, Prosper Marine executed a deed for “Sale & Purchase of the Vessel ‘Prosper 9’” (“the Deed”) on 12 August 2015. Under cl 3.1 of the Deed, the purchase price of $7.5m was to be applied in the following manner:
(a) $5,817,400 to settle the outstanding mortgage on Prosper 9; and
(b) $1,682,600 to set-off Prosper Marine’s outstanding liabilities as set out in Schedule B of the Deed.
- [28]
[28] NOWM (or its nominee) also agreed to charter Prosper 9 back to Proper Marine for slop/sludge collection operations at a monthly hire of $120,000 for a period of 36 months (cl 8.1 of the Deed). Pursuant to this agreement, NSL Oilchem Marine Pte Ltd (“NOM”), NOWM’s nominee company, entered into the “BIMCO Standard Bareboat Charter, Code Name: ‘BARECON 2001’” (the “Charterparty”) on 27 August 2015. Prosper Marine was to make payment of its monthly charter fees in a lump sum, no later than every 30 running days in advance. Delays would result in a 1% late payment interest (cl 11 of the Charterparty). Moreover, failure to make payment in accordance with cl 11 would entitle NOM to terminate the Charterparty and repossess Prosper 9 (cl 28(a)(i) and 29 of the Charterparty).
- [29]
[29] During the charter period, Prosper Marine was to maintain Prosper 9 in (i) a good state of repair; (ii) efficient operating condition; and (iii) in accordance with good commercial maintenance practice (cl 10 of the Charterparty). Prosper Marine was also required to keep Prosper 9’s “[c]lass fully up to date with the Classification Society” specified in the Charterparty, ie, Bureau Veritas, as well as maintain necessary certificates (cl 10(a)(i)). By way of background, Bureau Veritas is a classification society appointed by the Marine Port Authority (“MPA”) to perform statutory certification and survey services for Singapore-flagged vessels. A certification by Bureau Veritas is necessary for vessels, such as Prosper 9, to legally operate in Singapore waters.
- [30]
[30] Lastly, upon expiration/termination of the Charterparty, Prosper Marine was to redeliver Prosper 9 “in the same state and condition as she was delivered … at the commencement of [the charter], ordinary fair wear and tear excepted” (cl 38 of the Charterparty). This included “all outfit, equipment and appliances” on-board Prosper 9 as at 25 August 2015 (cl 10(f) of the Charterparty).
- [31]
[31] Shortly after signing the Charterparty, NOM came to know of potential maintenance issues with Prosper 9. In that regard, NOM engaged Captain Thanabalasingam s/o Balakrishnan (“Captain Thana”) as a consultant to advise it as well as to liaise with surveyors in relation to the maintenance of Prosper 9 and her class certification. This role extended to monitoring the vessel’s Bureau Veritas survey status reports. A report of particular interest was Bureau Veritas’ attestation to the condition of the ship following an inspection on 19 September 2016 (the “19 September Report”). This report listed some 37 outstanding deficiencies on Prosper 9. Prosper Marine had to address these issues as a condition for class certification. Besides this, OHC Shipmanagement Pte Ltd carried out a separate survey, revealing further problems with Prosper 9, and the inspection report issued by Petrotech Marine Consultants Pte Ltd (“Petrotech”) identified still further issues.
The Directors’ Guarantee
- [32]
[32] Even with the sale of Prosper 9, Prosper Marine’s AR balance as of August 2015 remained significantly above its stipulated credit limit. It was also unable to catch up with its running breaches of the MEP on outstanding invoices. NOWM therefore considered it necessary to take even greater steps to minimise its exposure. In line with these considerations, Mr Raymond Tay Chun Yee (“Mr Raymond”), who had taken over as NOWM’s finance manager in June 2015, secured confirmation (via an email dated 17 September 2015) that Prosper Marine would (i) give a joint and several guarantee by its shareholders and directors in NOWM’s favour (“deed of guarantee”); and (ii) allow a second charge on its properties as collateral on the outstanding AR balance.
- [33]
[33] Accordingly, Mr Ong Cheng Ho (“Mr Ong” or “Albert Ong”), Miss Eileen Ong (“Miss Ong”) and Mr Daniel Lee (collectively, the “Prosper Directors”) executed a “Deed of Guarantee and Indemnity of the Obligations of Prosper Marine Pte Ltd to NSL Oilchem Waste Management Pte. Ltd.” (the “Directors’ Guarantee”), the key terms of which are reflected in cll 1 and 2:
Beyond this, it was agreed that the Directors’ Guarantee would be a continuing guarantee until all moneys and obligations owed by Prosper Marine to NOWM had been “satisfied and discharged in full” (per cl 3 of the Directors’ Guarantee).
- [34]
[34] As for Prosper Marine’s agreement to have a second charge on its properties (at [32] above), little follow up action was taken for several months. It was only in March 2016 that the parties reached a decision that NOWM would address “up to $2m of the outstanding AR with [its] net equity” in three commercial units located at WCEGA Tower (“the Properties”).
The March 2016 restructuring
- [35]
[35] Some of these measures (the UOB Guarantees, the sale and chartering of Prosper 9 and the second charge placed on the Properties) were eventually collated and recorded by Mr Jeffrey Fung (“Mr Fung”), NOWM’s chief executive officer, in a letter dated 24 March 2016 (the “24 March letter”). Beyond this, the 24 March letter recorded a formal restructuring of the parties’ business relationship. The main change in respect of the Disposal Contract was that the fixed monthly sum of $54,000 which Prosper Marine had been paying for slop treatment (see [14] above) was replaced with a new fee structure based on the amount of marine slop discharged each month. The relevant changes to Schedule 1 of the Disposal Contract are reproduced below.
The 24 March letter clarified that all other terms within the Disposal Contract would remain valid.
- [36]
[36] Schedule 1 of the RFO Contract also saw notable changes. While Prosper Marine had previously been obliged to purchase, at NOWM’s option, 4,000 to 4,500 cbm of RFO per month (see [18] above), the 24 March letter stipulated that Prosper Marine would only have to purchase as much RFO as that extracted from the slop it discharged at NOWM’s plant every month:
- [37]
[37] As acknowledged by Mr Ong in cross-examination, the effect of the above changes was to link the amount of slop discharged by Prosper Marine to its monthly RFO collection.
Subsequent developments
- [38]
[38] Despite all of this, Prosper Marine continued to fall behind on payments due to NOWM/NOM. Additionally, it continually tried to renegotiate the terms that had been set out in the 24 March letter. It also transpired that the Properties were not worth $2m, as initially represented. They were therefore insufficient forms of security. NOWM then suggested that Prosper Marine could pledge an alternative five properties “as second charge against [NOWM’s] credit line” but Prosper Marine turned down this proposal. Mr Ong explained that all of Proper Marine’s properties “ha[d] bank commitment[s] which may not be ideal to resolve”.
- [39]
[39] Separately, on 1 August 2016, NOM issued a letter of demand via its solicitors for $400,000, representing over three months’ worth of unpaid charter hire as well as interest at a rate of 1% per month. Prosper Marine was informed that unless this sum was paid by 4 August 2016, NOM reserved its rights to commence legal proceedings and/or terminate the Charterparty. Despite some attempts to make payment, Prosper Marine ultimately could not repay significant portions of these invoices. NOM therefore proceeded to terminate the Charterparty and repossess Prosper 9 on 16 September 2016.
- [42]
[42] Finally, on 14 October 2016, Bureau Veritas carried out another survey of Prosper 9 and certified her fit for use.
The parties’ cases
The 2014 Contract suits
- [43]
[43] As mentioned earlier, Suit 1062 relates to invoices issued between June 2015 and October 2016 under the 2014 Contracts. Prosper Marine also filed its own suit (“Suit 1073”), claiming damages for alleged breaches of contract. Suit 1073 was eventually consolidated with Suit 1062 and I have referred to them collectively as the 2014 Contract suits. NOWM’s claim for unpaid invoices under the 2014 Contracts amount to $6,429,105.74 before interest and $7,629,613.70 with interest (calculated up to 23 February 2017).
- [44]
[44] Prosper Marine’s primary defence is that the invoices on which NOWM bases its claim have already been paid. This is because payments that were made to NOWM after 1 April 2015 were applied to invoices issued by NOWM from that date. Prosper Marine claims that this was pursuant to a mutual understanding between the parties (the “Allocation Agreement”) which is evidenced by email correspondence and NOWM’s conduct. In addition, Prosper Marine claims that it never agreed to pay late payment interest on the relevant invoices.
- [45]
[45] NOWM squarely rejects the existence of the Allocation Agreement. The clear understanding between the parties was that outstanding invoices would be settled on a “first in, first out” (“FIFO”) basis, in line with general accounting practice. Besides the fact that Prosper Marine’s case is wholly unsupported by evidence, there is no commercial reason for why NOWM would have wanted to enter into the Allocation Agreement. Further, Prosper Marine’s own payment vouchers expressly instructed NOWM to apply Proper Marine’s payments to older invoices, on a FIFO basis.
- [46]
[46] In the alternative, the Prosper Marine argues that it has a right of set off against NOWM for damages sustained as a result of breaches of the 2014 Contracts. According to Prosper Marine, NOWM was subject to three express contractual obligations. Firstly, it had an obligation to receive a minimum volume of 18,000 cubic metres of waste slops per month. Secondly, NOWM was to ensure a loading rate between 50 m3 and 100 m3 per hour. Prosper Marine pleads that, even if such obligations were not borne out by express contractual terms, these were also implied terms of the 2014 Contracts. Thirdly, Prosper Marine argues that NOWM was contractually obliged to sell at least 3,200 mt of RFO to Prosper Marine every month. Moreover, the RFO offered for sale was of insufficient quality.
- [47]
[47] To this, NOWM argues that the terms under the 2014 Contracts which constitute Prosper Marine’s counterclaim are “hopelessly flawed” because:
(a) the terms were not within the parties’ intentions and did not exist;
(b) in any event, NOWM did not breach these terms;
(c) even if there were, the losses claimed by Prosper Marine have been contractually barred, excluded or subject to an indemnity; and
(d) Prosper Marine has failed to adduce adequate evidence to prove its supposed losses, which are grossly inflated.
The Directors’ Guarantee suit
- [48]
[48] Pursuant to cl 1 of the Directors’ Guarantee (see [33] above), NOWM seeks to hold the Prosper Directors personally liable for the same debt which is the subject of the 2014 Contract suits.
- [49]
[49] Prosper Marine does not contest the enforceability of the Directors’ Guarantee but submits there are no moneys owing to NOWM under the same. Its reasons are threefold: (i) Prosper Marine’s counterclaims in the 2014 Contracts suits extinguish and/or exceed NOWM’s claim; (ii) the Directors’ Guarantee does not apply to moneys or liabilities incurred before 1 April 2015; and (iii) pursuant to the Allocation Agreement, the payments made by Prosper Marine after 1 April 2015 exceed the total value of NOWM’s issued invoices.
- [50]
[50] On the first point, NOWM repeats its contentions with Prosper Marine’s counterclaims in the 2014 Contracts suits. As for the latter arguments, although NOWM agrees that the Directors’ Guarantee only applies to invoices issued after 1 April 2015, it reiterates that these invoices have not been settled. There was no Allocation Agreement and Prosper Marine’s monthly repayments were applied on a FIFO basis. NOWM’s invoices therefore remain outstanding and the Prosper Directors, having failed to make good on their guarantee to pay these invoices, must be held liable for their breach.
The Charterparty suit
- [51]
[51] Lastly, the Charterparty suit concerns NOM’s claim for its outstanding charter hire for the period between 27 May and 16 September 2016, this being $261,290.32, as well as damages in respect of Prosper Marine’s breaches of the Charterparty, with interest on these amounts.
- [52]
[52] Prosper Marine alleges that it was induced by NOWM and NOM to enter into the Deed and Charterparty by way of false representations made in an email dated 31 July 2015 (the “31 July 2015 email”). It submits that having relied on these misrepresentations, Prosper Marine has accordingly suffered loss and damages which must be set off against NOM’s claim for the outstanding charter hire. As for the claim for various breaches under the Charterparty, Prosper Marine argued, among other things, that (i) NOM has not proven that Prosper Marine was responsible for the damage caused to and/or the condition of Prosper 9 as at its repossession; and (ii) NOM has failed to mitigate its losses for its claim for loss of hire.
- [54]
[54] I turn now to my decision proper.
The 2014 Contract suits
- [55]
[55] The issues for my consideration in these suits are as follows:
(a) What are the parties’ obligations to each other under the 2014 Contracts?
(i) Was a “Minimum Volume Term” (see [58] below) and “Loading Rate Term” (see [63] below) part of the Disposal Contract?
(ii) Was a “Minimum RFO Term” (see [69] below) part of the RFO Contract?
(iii) Did the 2014 Contracts entitle NOWM to late payment interest (see [74] below)?
(b) Was there a breach of the aforementioned obligations (see [95] below)?
(c) Was liability under the 2014 Contracts excluded by a contractually incorporated exemption clause (see [148] below)?
The Parties’ obligations to each other under the 2014 Contracts
- [56]
[56] The principles of contractual interpretation are well established. Briefly, the purpose of interpretation is to give effect to the objectively ascertained intentions of the contracting parties as it emerges from the contextual meaning of the relevant contractual language: Yap Son On v Ding Pei Zhen [2017] 1 SLR 219 at [30]. To that end, while both the text and context must be considered, the written agreement remains of first and primary importance. Extrinsic evidence is admissible where it is “relevant”, “reasonably available to all the contracting parties” and relates to a “clear or obvious context” (Zurich Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd v B-Gold Interior Design & Construction Pte Ltd [2008] 3 SLR(R) 1029 at [125], [128]–[129]). With these principles in mind, I shall first consider the tenability of Prosper Marine’s counterclaims, which are founded on its own particular construction of the 2014 Contracts. It is argued that, on a proper reading of these contracts, NOWM was:
(a) by cl 2.6 read with cl 1.5 of Schedule 1 of the Disposal Contract, obliged to receive or accept a minimum volume of 18,000 cbm of marine slops from Prosper Marine per month (the “Minimum Volume Term”);
(b) by cl 6.5 of the Disposal Contract, obliged to ensure a minimum loading rate not below 50 cbm per hour and not exceeding 100 cbm per hour when receiving marine slops from Prosper Marine’s vessels (the “Loading Rate Term”); and
(c) by cl 2.2 read with cll 1.1 and 1.2 of Schedule 1 to the RFO Contract, obliged to supply Prosper Marine with a minimum volume of 3,200 mt of RFO per month (the “Minimum RFO Term”).
- [57]
[57] I find that none of these are terms of the 2014 Contracts, expressly or impliedly.
(1) The Disposal Contract
- [58]
[58] I first discuss the Minimum Volume Term. Prosper Marine argues that if it had been obliged to provide at least 18,000 cbm of marine slop a month, NOWM must have agreed to receive at least 18,000 cbm of marine slop every month as well. This reciprocal arrangement, according to Prosper Marine, is detailed in the Preamble of the Disposal Contract which reads: “[Prosper Marine] wishes to engage [NOWM] for the provision of, waste slops and sludge disposal services and [NOWM] is willing to provide such services…” [emphasis added]. This implies an undertaking on NOWM’s part to ensure that it would have capacity for Prosper Marine’s slops on delivery. This, Prosper Marine avers, was a necessary part of their business arrangement.
- [59]
[59] As discussed at [6] above, their business arrangement depended on capacity management. A backlog of slop or RFO would have a knock-on effect on every other part of the arrangement, from discharge of slop, receipt and treatment of said slop to ultimate sale and handover of RFO. Such terminal congestion, known as “tank top situation”, can only be prevented with the cooperation of the parties. Prosper Marine accordingly submits that cl 2.6, read with cl 1.5 of Schedule 1, captures a two-way obligation. Not only was Prosper Marine required to supply at least 18,000 cbm of slop per month but NOWM had to be prepared or able to receive and treat this minimum quantity of slop. Otherwise, the entire objective of the Disposal Contract would have been nullified.
- [60]
[60] I disagree. The contract was never about guaranteeing 18,000 cbm of slop every month. It was to ensure that $54,000 was regularly paid on a monthly basis from Prosper Marine to NOWM. Whether this sum was in the form of liquidated damages or payment for slop treatment was entirely irrelevant. The contract was agnostic in that regard. In fact there was no expectation that Prosper Marine would ever be able to deliver 18,000 cbm of slop a month – it only ever achieved this once in the three years of the contract (2014 – 2016). The intention of the parties was to ensure a monthly cash flow of $54,000 to NOWM and references to 18,000 cbm per month were in truth, reasoned backwards (at a rate of $3 per cbm) from the desired $54,000/month.
- [62]
[62] But more importantly, I agree with NOWM that the express wording of cl 2.6 and cl 1.5 to Schedule 1 speaks of only one obligation – Prosper Marine’s obligation to discharge a specified minimum volume of slop or, failing which, to pay liquidated damages of $3 for every cbm of shortfall. This reading is bolstered by cl 2.13 of the Disposal Contract, which draws a distinction between the discharge of slop and NOWM’s acceptance of the same. Under cl 2.13, NOWM reserved its right to “refuse to take delivery of the waste slops and/or sludge and perform the Services” in certain circumstances. More significantly, “in no circumstances [was Prosper Marine’s] discharge of waste slops and/or sludge at [NOWM’s plant] [to] constitute unconditional acceptance of delivery of the same by [NOWM].” Thus, it is not open to Prosper Marine to extrapolate an obligation of acceptance from the wording of cl 2.6.
- [63]
[63] I turn now to the Loading Rate Term. Prosper Marine avers that the stipulation that its vessels had to discharge waste slops and/or sludge at specified minimum and maximum volume rates (per cl 6.5 of the Disposal Contract) should apply with equal force to NOWM. While the pumps to discharge slop and/or sludge were located on Prosper Marine’s vessels and were controlled by Prosper Marine’s crew, it was actually NOWM who gave instructions as to the rate of discharge depending on the storage availability in its tanks. Thus, both the parties had to work together to ensure compliance with cl 6.5. Clause 6.5 is therefore a dual obligation, made up of Prosper Marine’s undertaking as well as the Loading Rate Term.
- [64]
[64] I reject this for two reasons. First, the express words of the Disposal Contract specifically lays the responsibility for the rate of discharge of slop with Prosper Marine and not NOWM (see cl 6.5).
- [65]
[65] Second, the parties intended for Prosper Marine to hold sole responsibility for the rate of discharge, since it had control over the discharge process. I acknowledge that NOWM was involved but ultimately find that its role was limited. While connecting the hose between Prosper Marine’s vessels and NOWM’s plant was a joint effort, it was Prosper Marine who would initiate the slop discharge process. It was also Prosper Marine who maintained primary control over when the pumping of slops started and stopped as well as the specific pumping rate. Although NOWM’s ground operators participated in the discharge process, this participation was limited and they would only issue instructions when the discharge rate had to be reduced for safety reasons. Even then, it was Prosper Marine who determined the proper, ie, safe discharge rate to be adopted since this depended on the quality of the slops brought in by Prosper Marine.
- [66]
[66] It was therefore intuitive for Prosper Marine, as opposed to NOWM, to take on the risk of maintaining the rate of slop discharge within an appropriate range. If there was any foul play by NOWM, Prosper Marine was fully entitled to disclaim liability, provided that it “prove[d] that [the failure to adhere to clause 6.5] was due to the acts or omissions of [NOWM] or its servants, agents and/or employees”. There is no need to conjure a new Loading Rate Term.
- [67]
[67] For completeness, I also consider whether the Minimum Volume Term and Loading Rate Term should be implied into the Disposal Contract. The Court of Appeal in Sembcorp Marine Ltd v PPL Holdings Pte Ltd and another and another appeal [2013] 4 SLR 193 characterised the implication of terms into a contract as an exercise in giving effect to the parties’ presumed intentions by filling the gaps in their contract (at [93]). Terms are not to be implied into contracts lightly and should only be done where necessary (at [100]). To that end, the Court laid out a three-stage process to determine whether the implication of a term is necessary (at [101]):
(a) First, the court should consider whether there is a “true gap” in the contract. A gap is only remediable by implication where the parties did not contemplate gap. This is to be contrasted against situations where the parties contemplated the gap but chose not to provide for it because (i) they mistakenly believed it would be addressed by the express terms of the contract; or (ii) they were unable to agree on a term to fill the gap.
(c) Third, the court must apply the official bystander test. In other words, the proposed term must have been so obvious to the parties that had it been suggested at the time of contracting, the parties would have responded “[o]h, of course!”
- [68]
[68] Prosper Marine’s case fails at the first hurdle. As I have already said, the parties never envisaged that NOWM would have to receive 18,000 cbm of slops per month and saw no need to include a term to that effect. Separately, the parties made a conscious decision to assign Prosper Marine sole responsibility over the rate of slop and/or sludge discharge because it was in a better position to ensure these specified rates would be adhered to. As such, there are no “true gaps” in the Disposal Contract which require remedying. Indeed, implying the Minimum Volume Term or the Loading Rate Term would directly contradict the express terms and the parties’ objectively ascertained intentions.
(2) The RFO Contract
- [69]
[69] Prosper Marine’s case is that NOWM had an obligation under the RFO Contract to sell a minimum volume of 3,200 mt of RFO per month, an obligation which it failed to meet from May 2014 to September 2016. This requirement (the Minimum RFO Term) is supposedly found in clauses 1.1 and 1.2 of Schedule 1 of the RFO Contract. I reproduce them here again for convenience:
- [70]
[70] According to Prosper Marine, cl 1.1 obliged NOWM to sell at least 4000 mt of RFO to Proper Marine every month. Clause 1.2 qualified this, allowing NOWM to deliver 20% less every month. This flexibility in quantum was to give NOWM some leeway in case it was unable to meet the required levels of RFO production. NOWM’s nett obligations therefore, according to Prosper Marine, were to sell at least 3,200 mt of RFO to Prosper Marine every month.
- [71]
[71] I do not accept this argument. Clause 1.1 of Schedule 1 to the RFO Contract plainly provided that the sale of RFO was “at [NOWM’s] option” [emphasis added]; there was never an obligation to sell Prosper Marine RFO. Prosper Marine has misconstrued clause 1.2 of Schedule 1 as well. The range of 3,200 to 5,400 mt of RFO therein merely afforded NOWM the option of selling less or more RFO as required, rather than a fixed quantum. Crucially, this remained an option rather than an obligation. As such, I find that that the express words of the contract do not support Prosper Marine’s interpretation.
- [72]
[72] Additionally, I find that it could not have been the parties’ intentions to incorporate the Minimum RFO Term into the RFO Contract. NOWM’s ability to produce RFO depended, at least in part, on the quantity and quality of slop which Prosper Marine delivered. I find it difficult to accept that NOWM would guarantee a quantity of RFO every month, when its supply of feedstock was not assured. In answer, Prosper Marine argues that on the contrary, NOWM had two commercial interests in imposing this positive obligation on itself. First, NOWM needed a reliable way to free up its reactor tanks and prevent tank top situations from developing. Second a large part of NOWM’s revenue stream came from the sale of RFO. Guaranteed RFO sales would be in line with these interests.
- [73]
[73] This was simply wrong. Guaranteed purchases of RFO (by Prosper Marine) would have ensured these benefits. But NOWM could have enjoyed these benefits without locking itself into a commitment to sell a minimum quantity of RFO. It could have simply gotten Prosper Marine to agree to buy whatever NOWM had to sell, generating cash and ridding itself of RFO in the process. That is, in fact, exactly what occurred here. Clause 1.1 of Schedule 1 makes that clear. NOWM’s “agree[ment] to sell” was at its option, while Prosper Marine’s “agree[ment] to buy” was unconditional. Moreover, there was no commercial sense in the suggested Minimum RFO Term. At the material time, Prosper Marine’s AR balance was significantly in excess of its credit limit. Prosper Marine was in no position to make upfront payments. Mandatory monthly sales to such a bad debtor would have been a serious risk. The Minimum RFO Term, with its attendant risks and drawbacks, could not have been within the intention of the parties.
(3) The Late Payment Interest Obligation
- [74]
[74] I now turn to consider NOWM’s claim that it is entitled under both the Disposal Contract and RFO Contract to 18% per annum late payment interest on its unpaid invoices. I find that such an obligation arises in both contracts.
- [75]
[75] In respect of the RFO Contract, cl 1.4 thereof specifically incorporates the “Seller’s Standard Terms and Conditions of Sale”, these being “NOWM’s Standard Terms for Sales”:
- [76]
[76] It follows that, cl 5.5 of NOWM’s Standard Terms is incorporated into the RFO Contract. These terms specify that any late payment would entitle NOWM to interest of 18% per annum:
- [77]
[77] The obligation to pay late payment interest is again, reproduced in cl 5.5 of the RFO Contract :
- [78]
[78] The precise amount of interest to be paid, as set out in Schedule 1 of the RFO contract, refers back to NOWM’s Standard Terms for Sales (see [76] above):
- [79]
[79] As such, I find that the RFO Contract amply incorporates an obligation to pay late payment interest in accordance with NOWM’s Standard Terms, ie, at a rate of 18% per annum.
- [80]
[80] Like its sister contract, the Disposal Contract speaks of an entitlement to late payment interest, “at the rate set out in [the Disposal Contract’s] Schedule 1” (see cl 4.2 of the Disposal Contract). But unlike the RFO Contract, it fails to reference any of NOWM’s standard terms (which contained the precise interest rate) or explicitly specify, in Schedule 1 of the contract, what that interest rate is.
- [81]
[81] To this, NOWM argues that the parties intended the 2014 Contracts to be supplemented by standard terms with which they had already been trading. A reference to these terms can be found in job service orders (“JSOs”), which NOWM issued for its slop disposal services prior to, as well as after, the Disposal Contract came into existence. The cover page of each JSO stipulated that the supply, performance and/or provision of services was subject to NOWM’s standard terms. These standard terms, it will be remembered, specified the interest rate at 18% per annum.
- [82]
[82] Following the Disposal Contract’s execution, NOWM began issuing its monthly invoices under the description of “Wharfage Services”. Similar to the JSOs, these invoices incorporated a set of standard terms from NOWM as well (“NOWM’s Standard Terms for Services”). These were, for all intents and purposes, identical to NOWM’s Standard Terms for Sales. The only difference was that one addressed “Sales” while the other addressed “Provision of Services”. NOWM argued that over time, this consistent course of dealing incorporated NOWM’s Standard Terms for Services into the parties’ business relationship. Thus, even in the absence of an express reference thereto, there must have been an intention to incorporate these terms, including the 18% interest rate, into the Disposal Contract.
- [83]
[83] I accept this argument. The Court of Appeal in Vinmar Overseas (Singapore) Pte Ltd v PTT International Trading Pte Ltd [2018] 2 SLR 1271 (“Vinmar”) set out the test for incorporating terms by a course of dealing. The test is “whether, at the time of contracting, each party as a reasonable person was entitled to infer from the past dealings and the actions and the words of the other in the instant case, that the term was to be a part of the contract” [emphasis in original]: Vinmar at [53]–[54]. NOWM’s Standard Terms for Services had long been adopted by the parties in their course of dealings. They had long been a feature of their business documentation, and subsequently their commercial relationship.
- [84]
[84] Moreover, Prosper Marine was amply aware of NOWM’s entitlement to charge interest. That is why it sought waivers of the late payment interests. On the occasions that NOWM waived the interest payable, it would issue a credit note to Prosper Marine. Appended would be a form entitled “LATE INTEREST WAIVE-OFF APPROVAL FORM”, as well as a table titled “Computation of later interest charge” for the month in question. This table would set out the invoices for which interest was being waived, the date of the invoice, invoiced amount and due date of payment. The fourth column from the right of each table also set out the interest rate of 18% per annum. Prosper Marine was accordingly well aware of NOWM’s entitlement to charge interest at this rate. In that regard, Ms Ong accepted that the credit notes and the tables appended thereto would have been seen by Prosper Marine’s book-keepers.
- [85]
[85] This acknowledgement, to my mind, was the keystone in satisfying the Vinmar test. NOWM was entitled to infer that the term had been incorporated into the contract – Prosper Marine had unambiguously acknowledged its obligations to pay interest in all the previous dealings. Prosper Marine could not have forgotten about these dealings either – they were recent and numerous. There was nothing special that distinguished the previous dealings from those contemplated in the 2014 Contracts. In fact, they concerned exactly the same type of subject matter, handled in consistently the same manner. There was no reason to expect that the 2014 Contracts, which simply formalized a longstanding commercial relationship between the parties, would depart from the earlier dealings. Accordingly, I accept that an obligation to pay late payment interest was incorporated into the Disposal Contract as well.
- [86]
[86] To this, Prosper Marine argued that the Standard Terms for Service could not have been incorporated into the Disposal contract. An entire agreement clause (clause 13.6) would have barred that:
- [87]
[87] I rejected this argument. First, the entire agreement clause was intended to pre-empt and prevent variations to the Disposal Contract. Here, late-payment interest was contemplated in clause 4.2 (see [80] above). The only question was the quantum of that late payment interest, on which the contract remained silent. Identifying the relevant rate for late payment interest was not so much a variation inserting new clauses in the Disposal Contract as an interpretation of an existing clause.
- [88]
[88] Second, it seems to me that this entire agreement clause was only intended to exclude “terms and/or conditions made or purported to be made by [Prosper Marine]” (emphasis mine). This is clear from the last line of clause 13.6 – a line which, I should mention, was glaringly omitted from Prosper Marine’s closing submissions. This suggests that the overall tenor of the entire agreement clause was directed to any attempts by Prosper Marine to introduce errant terms or conditions.
- [89]
[89] Prosper Marine’s better argument was that NOWM had waived any entitlement to late payment interest through its conduct (the issuance of credit notes waiving late payment interest and its internal correspondences) and express written agreements (the preamble of the Prosper 9 Deed). I rejected this argument as well.
- [90]
[90] In my opinion, the practice of issuing credit notes showed a consistent and deliberate attempt by NOWM to preserve its right to claim late payment interest. The indulgences it granted to Prosper Marine were purposeful and clearly demarcated – each credit note specifically identified the sums that it was waiving and promised nothing further than that. If anything, the standing arrangement was not to waive all late payment interest due, but to waive them only through credit notes issued through the proper processes. Indeed, I note that each credit note required no less than three sets of approvals - one from a “Requestor”, another from a “Recommender” and finally the “Approver’s” as well. The meticulous (and no doubt, tedious) documentation of precise instances when waiver were granted, leaves little doubt that NOWM sought to guard its entitlement to late payment interest. In that regard, I cannot accept that there had been any implied agreement or promise to waive the late payment interest.
- [91]
[91] NOWM’s concern with its entitlement to late payment interest is evident in its internal emails as well. There, NOWM staff were discussing how the Prosper 9 Deed should frame the outstanding debt owed by Prosper Marine to NOWM. On one hand, including the outstanding late payment interest (as part of the debt stated on the deed) would unquestionably preserve their rights and entitlement to the same. On the other, not reflecting the late payment interest as a component of the outstanding debt would lubricate negotiations. It would also avoid “introducing another issue” when other contractual terms had “yet to be resolved” in discussions. However, at no point did NOWM suggest, even amongst its staff members, that it was willing to concede the late payment interest. If anything, the correspondence suggests the precise opposite – they were keen on getting the deal done (for the sale of Prosper 9) without compromising their legal entitlements.
- [92]
[92] Prosper Marine’s final argument about late payment interest concerns the Prosper 9 Deed. It argues that the Deed explicitly pegs the “Oustanding Debt” at S$10,988,357.73, such sum excluding the interest hitherto accrued. As such, NOWM had effectively waived its entitlement to late payment interest. I disagreed.
- [93]
[93] “Outstanding Debt”, as defined in the Prosper 9 Deed, was really a reference to principal invoices for services rendered and goods sold (see Schedule B of the Prosper 9 Deed ). It was never about late payment interest in the first place. Therefore, the deed’s failure to include or reference late payment interest under “Outstanding Debt” did not change the party’s legal positions/entitlements. The parties were simply using the phrase “Outstanding Debt” as a catch-all term for principal invoices that were due, not making any implicit concessions. Even if there had been a waiver of interest for the “Outstanding Debt”, this is completely irrelevant to the current suit – “Outstanding Debt” was calculated up to and as at 30 June 2015 only. It would not impact upon the 261 outstanding invoices which make up NOWM’s present claim (see [95] below).
- [94]
[94] For these reasons, I found that NOWM was entitled to late payment interest for outstanding debts arising from its Disposal Contract as well.
Breaches of obligations under the 2014 Contracts
NOWM’s Claim
- [95]
[95] An undisputed issue however, is Prosper Marine’s obligation to pay sums due under invoices issued under the 2014 Contracts. NOWM claims that Prosper Marine breached its obligations by failing to make such payment. These invoices, 261 in total, are appended to Mr Fung’s affidavit and clearly enumerated at Annex A of its Statement of Claim. The outstanding amount for all the invoices is the amount invoiced. The only exception is the oldest invoice (NPI029298), for which the amount outstanding would be $210,973.13 rather than the invoiced amount of $229,395.37. Prosper Marine raises several grounds of opposition.
- [96]
[96] First, it doubts the accuracy and correctness of the figures in the NOWM invoices. None of NOWM’s witnesses have testified to the figures’ veracity and there has been no explanation of the methodology behind the figures. In that regard, Prosper Marine offers the alternative calculations of Mr Ong and suggests that NOWM’s claim for $7,736,613.70 “appears to be inflated by an unaccounted amount of $513,628.17”. Mr Ong also claims that Annex A of the Statement of Claim does not include 39 invoices which had been originally included in the 31 October 2016 Statement of Accounts. He questions how these were settled. These, he contends, ultimately cast doubt on the quantification of NOWM’ claim.
- [97]
[97] I do not accept Prosper Marine’s objections. I find that NOWM has produced ample evidence of its claim quantum from Mr Fung and Mr Raymond, who were not cross-examined on this point. NOWM has also exhibited these invoices with relevant supporting documents like delivery orders, job service orders, RFO certificates of origin etc. The invoice figures can also be verified by reference to NOWM’s monthly statement of accounts from 2014 to 2016, which lists invoice numbers alongside the “Credit” and “Accumulative balance” owed by Prosper Marine.
- [98]
[98] Most significantly, Mr Ong accepted at trial that all of NOWM’s invoices are due and payable by Prosper Marine. Indeed, on Mr Ong’s own evidence, Prosper Marine’s only defence is that of a set-off:
From this, it is clear that Prosper Marine had accepted the accuracy of the figures set out in NOWM’s outstanding invoices.
- [99]
[99] Second, Prosper Marine avers that even if NOWM is entitled to payment on its 261 outstanding invoices, full payment has already been made. Pursuant to the Allocation Agreement, Prosper Marine has actually paid NOWM a total amount of $10,323,828.97 since 1 April 2015 and this figure exceeds the total value of invoices issued by NOWM from that date, this being a sum of $8,086,636.62. I find that there was no such agreement at all.
- [100]
[100] As a starting point, standard accounting practice calls for invoices to be paid on a FIFO basis, that is to say, each payment is made towards the bill that is due at the earliest time. The rationale behind this practice is to avoid situations of invoices becoming overdue or, where they are already overdue, to minimise the negative consequences (such as interest accumulating) of being overdue. The issue in dispute is whether the FIFO principle was the accounting practice they had agreed upon for settlement NOWM’s outstanding invoices. While Mr Lim Teck Kee answers this in the affirmative, Miss Ong claims that the practice was to “us[e] [Prosper Marine’s] payments for NOWM’s current invoices first” [emphasis added]. This practice was later (supposedly) formalised by way of the Allocation Agreement.
- [101]
[101] The Allocation Agreement was apparently concluded during the parties’ discussion on 20 January 2015 and its terms are allegedly found in the 20 January 2015 Email. I reproduce it here again for convenience:
- [102]
[102] The effect of this, according to Prosper Marine, was that NOWM’s latest invoices would be paid first and excess payment would be used to reduce the existing AR. Prosper Marine avers that this was the most commercially sensible way of structuring payments. Some of NOWM’s invoices were approaching their MEP and it was concerned about its exposure for future transactions. Earlier transactions were less of a concern since they were covered by trade insurance anyway. The Allocation Agreement therefore protected NOWM from the risk of default on these more recent, uninsured invoices.
Prosper Marine’s case largely rests on its interpretation of the 20 January Email. Yet, on a closer reading, it appears to me that the focus of this email was on the quantum of payments due from Prosper Marine and when those payments would be made. Nothing therein expressly directed how those payments were to be applied, ie, that they should be allocated towards settling the most recent invoices. In fact, there was an earlier email which did address how payments would be applied. In an email dated 16 January 2015 (the “16 January Email”), NOWM’s Mr Lim Teck Kee set out a proposed payment schedule for the next six months:
- [103]
[103] Indeed, NOWM’s statement of accounts clearly show that payments made were always channelled towards the oldest invoices. Payments made in March 2015 paid for invoices from January 2014 to August 2014; April 2015, for other invoices from August 2014; May 2015, for invoices from August 2014 to September 2014; and so on. This went on, even as the latest invoices accumulated in the AR balance, remaining unpaid. With the exception of only one invoice that was settled on cash on delivery terms , Mr Ong continued to approve payment vouchers that instructed the application of Prosper Marine’s payments on a FIFO basis. By way of example, Mr Ong accepted at trial that he had signed two payment vouchers dated 25 February 2015 which were later applied to invoices issued some six to seven months earlier. These were hardly isolated incidents but Prosper Marine’s longstanding practice, as NOWM’s Statement of Accounts demonstrate. In a similar vein, Miss Ong conceded that Prosper Marine had accepted the application of its payment vouchers to NOWM’s invoices on a FIFO basis even as late as January 2016.
- [105]
[105] Even if I accept that Mr Ong only selectively checked Prosper Marine’s payment vouchers, Miss Ong was, from March 2015 onwards, copied on all of the emails from Prosper Marine’s accounts staff to NOWM which attached the relevant vouchers. She accordingly maintained oversight of these vouchers as well as the invoices to which they were being applied. This is illustrated by an email from Miss Ong to NOWM’s Christy Song on 6 January 2016 to verify whether Prosper Marine’s payment of $106,911.84 had been used to clear an invoice dated 7 March 2015. Tellingly, the invoice in question was issued ten months before her email. Moreover, when Christy Song replied affirmatively, Miss Ong raised no objections to such an arrangement. Miss Ong’s conduct demonstrates that she was not only aware but sought to ensure that NOWM’s invoices were settled on a FIFO basis. In the circumstances, it is disingenuous of Prosper Marine to now suggest the arrangement was otherwise.
- [106]
[106] There was of course, a stipulation in the 20 January Email that Prosper Marine would “maintain the payment of previous month’s sales”. But this says absolutely nothing about how the payments would be applied. The reference simply affirms that Prosper Marine would pay for the RFO which NOWM sold to it in the preceding month. It affirms Prosper Marine’s obligation to pay for this RFO. It is not a reference to any particular invoice, much less an indication of which invoice would be settled first. I find support for my interpretation by situating the 20 January Email in its rightful context.
- [107]
[107] The 20 January Email was part of a series of correspondences between NOWM’s Mr. Lim Teck Kee and Prosper Marine’s Ms Ong. They were finalising a repayment schedule with the aim of bringing down Prosper Marine’s AR balance to a satisfactory amount. “[P]revious month’s sales” was simply a reference to the sales described in the 16 January Email, namely the ongoing RFO sales (see the table below, which was appended to the 16 January Email). “[M]aintaining the payment” of these sales simply meant that Prosper Marine would continue to pay for the RFO it purchased from Prosper Marine.
- [108]
[108] When considered holistically, it becomes apparent that the 20 January Email holds no real connection to the Allocation Agreement but simply sets out an agreement that from January 2015, Prosper Marine would make timely and consistent payments in amounts exceeding the total amount of its monthly new sales so as to facilitate the reduction of the AR balance.
- [109]
[109] Leaving aside the 20 January Email, Prosper Marine contends that the Allocation Agreement is still evidenced by subsequent email correspondence. In particular, it places weight on an internal NOWM email dated 12 June 2015 wherein Mr Lim Teck Kee confirmed to Mr Fung that the parties’ agreement in January 2015 was for Prosper Marine “to pay more than the net amount to clear the lapsed payments towards the end of the year 2014 and beginning of 2015” (emphasis added). In my judgment, this reference to the settlement of invoices due at the beginning of 2015 is, in itself, equivocal because there is no indication that the early-2015 invoices were to take precedence over the 2014 invoices.
- [110]
[110] A separate email from NOWM’s insurance broker, Mr Chan Hon Kian (“Mr Chan”), dated 18 November 2015 in respect of ongoing discussions with Atradius to reinstate NOWM’s trade credit insurance, does not take Prosper Marine’s case any further. In this email Mr Chan wrote that:
Prosper Marine appears to rely on Mr Chan’s suggestion that $1m of its monthly payment of $1.25m be used to settle “the preceding month sale”. This is not evidence of the Allocation Agreement. Mr Chan was merely putting forward a proposal of how Prosper Marine’s payments for each month could be computed, as a possible point of negotiation with Atradius. Further, Mr Chan testified at trial that this proposal had been his own suggestion and he was unaware of whether there was an allocation agreement (if any) already in existence. In a similar vein, Mr Raymond maintained that he had not been told, upon assuming the position of NOWM’s finance manager, of a payment arrangement concluded with Prosper Marine in January 2015. Returning to the wording of the 20 January Email, I consider it unlikely that such an arrangement ever existed.
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