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Grounds publishedDecided 22 Dec 2020

High Court

Allenger, Shiona (trustee-in-bankruptcy of the estate of Pelletier, Richard Paul Joseph) v Pelletier, Olga and another

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[2020] SGHC 279Case no. Suit No 50 of 2020

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The jurisdiction of the court refers to “its authority, however derived, to hear and determine a dispute that is brought before it”: Re Nalpon Zero Geraldo Mario [2013] 3 SLR 258 (“Nalpon Zero”). In this case, the Defendants challenge both aspects of that fundamental authority: subject-matter jurisdiction and in personam jurisdiction. The dispute thus presents an occasion to clarify the contours of the two notions of subject-matter jurisdiction and in personam jurisdiction, as well as the interface between these two doctrines. This case also presents an apposite occasion in Singapore jurisprudence to consider the law on Mareva injunctions, specifically the jurisdictional requirements that must be satisfied before such injunctions may be granted.

  3. Background facts

  4. [2] The Plaintiff is the trustee-in-bankruptcy of the estate of Mr Richard Paul Joseph Pelletier (“Mr Pelletier”). The first Defendant, Ms Olga Pelletier, is the wife of Mr Pelletier and the director of the second defendant, PDP Holdings Inc, a company incorporated in the Cayman Islands. At all material times, Mr Pelletier was and continues to be the sole shareholder of Richard Pelletier Holdings Inc (“RPHI”), a company incorporated in Alberta, Canada.

  5. [3] In 2014, pursuant to a share purchase agreement (“SPA”), MasTec Inc (“MasTec”), a company incorporated in Florida, acquired a Canadian company, Pacer Construction Holdings Corporation (“Pacer”), and its related entities from Mr Pelletier, RPHI and various other sellers (“Other Sellers”). It was alleged that Mr Pelletier was the founder and former CEO of Pacer, and also that RPHI owned 47.09% of the shares in Pacer at the time the SPA was entered into, the remaining shares being owned by the Other Sellers. MasTec paid RPHI C$59,296,699.23 for its shares in Pacer.

  6. [4] After completion of the sale of Pacer to MasTec, it became apparent that Mr Pelletier had falsely represented the financial condition of Pacer and its related entities and that the purchase price for Pacer would have to be adjusted downwards substantially from what was provided for in the SPA. In addition, there was a breach of a representation in the SPA made jointly or severally by Mr Pelletier and RPHI, and severally (but not jointly) by the Other Sellers, that certain of Pacer’s related entities would not require or were not reasonably likely to require additional funding from Pacer to maintain their current or planned operations (the “No Additional Funding Representation”). This led to MasTec and Pacer commencing arbitral proceedings against Mr Pelletier RPHI and the Other Sellers in 2016.

  7. [6] The joint and several liability of Mr Pelletier and RPHI under these awards amounted to C$76,833,744.50. The Other Sellers having paid the amounts they were severally liable for, Mr Pelletier and RPHI remained liable to Pacer in the amount of C$33,556,822.50. The amount remains outstanding, save for a small amount of C$4,037.40.

  8. [7] Pacer then sought to enforce the arbitral awards through multiple applications in various jurisdictions. An application against Mr Pelletier was taken out in the courts of the Cayman Islands (the “Cayman courts”) for recognition of the principal award. An application against Mr Pelletier and RPHI was also taken out in the courts of Alberta for recognition and enforcement of all three awards. Applications were also taken in Alberta to bankrupt RPHI and also in the US District Court for the Southern District of California.

  9. [8] The efforts to enforce the awards against Mr Pelletier have not been successful because Mr Pelletier claims that he has no assets and is unable to repay his debt despite having received approximately C$59 million, through RPHI, for the sale of Pacer. Specifically, Mr Pelletier claims to have gifted a sum of between C$20 million and C$25 million to the first Defendant to fulfil a promise he made to split the proceeds with her if he sold Pacer (the “Olga Transfer”). This promise was purportedly made a decade prior to the present events.

  10. [9] The Plaintiff also alleges, based on its own investigations, that Mr Pelletier had subsequently engaged in further suspicious activities. It is alleged that in 2014, Mr Pelletier had incorporated PDP Corporation in the Cayman Islands, with himself as the sole shareholder and director. He also established a trust, STAR Trust, with Butterfield Bank (Cayman) Limited (“Butterfield Bank”) as the original trustee. Mr Pelletier then transferred US$4 million to PDP Corporation. Once this was done, Mr Pelletier then transferred his shares in PDP Corporation to Butterfield Bank. It is claimed that PDP Corporation had utilised the US$4 million to purchase a condominium in Grand Cayman.

  11. [10] That was not the end of it. It is further alleged that Mr Pelletier had then incorporated the second Defendant in the Cayman Islands in August 2015, again with himself as the sole shareholder and director. In a single month, in September 2015, Mr Pelletier then made a series of transfers from bank accounts in his name in Butterfield Bank to bank accounts held by the second Defendant (also with Butterfield Bank). These transfers totalled approximately US$15 million and included:

  12. (a) C$12,798,522.71 transferred on 1 September 2015;

  13. (b) US$4,735,074.03 transferred on 1 September 2015;

  14. (c) US$264,925.97 transferred on 11 September 2015; and

  15. (d) C$1,201,477.29 transferred on 15 September 2015.

  16. [11] The Olga Transfer, the transfers to PDP Corporation, and the transfers to the second Defendant (collectively, save for the transfer set out in [10(b)], the “Disputed Transfers”) were made in circumstances where Mr Pelletier admits he had dissipated the proceeds from the sale of Pacer.

  17. [14] On 14 January 2020, the Plaintiff then commenced the present Suit by filing a writ of summons. That writ was accompanied by three ex parte applications, namely:

  18. (b) HC/SUM 213/2020, by which the Plaintiff sought a stay of all proceedings in the Suit save for (c) below (the “Stay Application”);

  19. (c) HC/SUM 203/2020, by which the Plaintiff sought a Mareva injunction in Singapore (the “Singapore Injunction”) against the Defendants to prohibit them from removing from Singapore assets up to the value of CAN$20m (for the first Defendant) and CAN$20,586,000 (for the second Defendant). Those assets included two Singapore bank accounts with LGT Singapore and Global Precious Metals (the “LGT Account” and “GPM Account” respectively).

  20. [15] I heard the ex parte applications on 16 January 2020 and granted all three applications. The orders of court and cause papers were thereafter served on the Defendants, and the first Defendant filed her first affidavit on 6 February 2020 in compliance with the disclosure requirements of the Singapore Injunction.

  21. [16] On 21 February 2020, the Defendants filed HC/SUM 884/2020 seeking clarification of the Singapore Injunction (the “Clarification Application”). In the Defendants’ view, this was necessitated by certain events, which I will elaborate upon further at [98]. I heard the Clarification Application on 20 April 2020 and dismissed it.

  22. (a) that the Defendants were to provide the Plaintiff with evidence of payments made from the GPM account since the Singapore Injunction was served on 23 January 2020;

  23. (b) that the funds paid from the GPM Account, which had been repatriated to the client account of Shook Lin & Bok LLP (“Shook Lin & Bok”), be subjected to the Singapore Injunction; and

  24. In the proceedings referred to in [16] and [17] above, the Defendants were represented by Shook Lin & Bok.

  25. [18] The present application was filed on 9 June 2020. Under this application, in which Mr Harpreet Singh SC and Mr Jordan Tan appeared as instructed counsel, the Defendants seek the following orders:

  26. (b) that the Singapore Injunction be discharged; and

  27. [19] The Defendants make this application, challenging the jurisdiction of the Singapore court. In particular, they argue that the Singapore court has no subject-matter jurisdiction and/or that it does not have in personam jurisdiction over the Defendants. In the alternative, the Defendants ask that the Singapore Injunction be set aside as the requirements for granting a Mareva injunction have not been satisfied.

  28. Whether the Singapore court has subject-matter jurisdiction

  29. [20] The subject-matter jurisdiction of the court refers to the court’s authority over the subject matter of that general class of cases: Harvey v Derrick [1995] 1 NZLR 314 at 326. Subject-matter jurisdiction is a concept that is distinct from in personam jurisdiction. This was recognised in Murakami Takako (executrix of the estate of Takashi Murakami Suroso, deceased) v Wiryadi Louise Maria and others [2009] 1 SLR(R) 508 (“Murakami Takako”) at [6] and [8], albeit in the context of the rule in The British South Africa Company v The Companhia de Moçambique [1893] AC 602 (the “Moçambique rule”), which I elaborate on at [54(b)] below. Similarly, this was underscored by the Court of Appeal in Burgundy Global Exploration Corp v Transocean Offshore International Ventures Ltd and another appeal [2014] 3 SLR 381 at [80], drawing on Hoffmann J’s observations in Mackinnon v Donaldson, Lufkin and Jenrette Securities Corporation [1986] Ch 482:

  30. [21] In arguing that the Singapore court has no subject-matter jurisdiction in the present dispute, the Defendants have three main strings to their bow:

  31. (a) that the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) (the “SCJA”) does not grant the necessary jurisdiction over foreign legislation;

  32. (b) that the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (the “UNCITRAL Model Law”) into Singapore law supports this contention; and

  33. (c) that s 107(1) of the Cayman Bankruptcy Law does not confer jurisdiction upon the Singapore court.

  34. [22] While the Plaintiff disputes all three assertions above, it further raises the argument that the doctrine of modified universalism calls upon the Singapore court to exercise jurisdiction. I will address each of these arguments in turn.

  35. Subject-matter jurisdiction generally under the Supreme Court of Judicature Act

  36. [23] The Singapore High Court is a creature of statute, constituted under the SCJA. Its jurisdiction is statutorily conferred and circumscribed by that very same constitutive statute: see Nalpon Zero ([1] supra) at [14] and [20]. Such jurisdiction-conferring provisions must therefore be satisfied before the court has legal basis upon which it may hear the case: Indo Commercial Society (Pte) Ltd v Ebrahim and another [1992] 2 SLR(R) 667 at [48] (“Indo Commercial Society”); Ng Chye Huey and another v Public Prosecutor [2007] 2 SLR(R) 106 at [17]; Blenwel Agencies Pte Ltd v Tan Lee King [2008] 2 SLR(R) 529 at [23]; Law Society of Singapore v Top Ten Entertainment Pte Ltd [2011] 2 SLR 1279 at [42]; Yeo Tiong Min, “Jurisdiction of the Singapore court” in Kevin YL Tan, ed, The Singapore Legal System (Singapore University Press, 2nd Ed, 1999) (Kevin YL Tan, Gen Ed) (“Yeo’s Chapter”) at pp 255–256.

  37. [24] The basis for the Singapore High Court’s jurisdiction is found in ss 16 and 17 SCJA, which provide as follows:

  38. [25] The two questions we are concerned with at this point are (a) which provision of the SCJA deals with subject-matter jurisdiction; and (b) consequently, what the scope and nature of such subject-matter jurisdiction is, ie, whether it is generally unlimited or only exists when conferred by written law.

  39. [26] The Defendants initially advanced the argument that the provision pertinent to the general civil subject-matter jurisdiction was s 16(2) SCJA. They argued that under this section, the words “any other written law” [emphasis added] refer only to Singapore Acts and Ordinances and not foreign legislation. In their view, such an interpretation flows from two other separate pieces of legislation. First, from Art 93 of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore, which provides that:

  40. [27] Secondly, the Interpretation Act, which provides a definition of “written law” as follows:

  41. [28] The Defendants sought to bolster this argument by relying on the court’s specific civil subject-matter jurisdiction under s 17(1)(c) SCJA. As the provision refers to “any written law relating to bankruptcy or to companies” [emphasis added], the Defendants argued that:

  42. [29] There are two ways in which the Defendant’s argument can be interpreted. The first is that the Singapore Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is limited to only causes of action founded upon Singapore Acts and Ordinances. The argument, interpreted thus, would exclude the Singapore court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over common law causes of action, as well as over foreign causes of action. Such an argument would lead to extraordinary results and it is unlikely that the Defendants intended this to be their argument.

  43. [30] More likely, the Defendants intended the following interpretation: that the Singapore Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is limited only to causes of action founded upon Singapore law generally (as opposed to Cayman law in this case). In my view, however, this is inconsistent with the well-established position under common law that the courts generally have jurisdiction over foreign causes of action: see Phrantzes v Argenti [1960] 2 QB 19 (“Phrantzes v Argenti”). I will elaborate on both these points below.

  44. [31] There is another crucial point: the Defendants’ arguments up to this point placed scant weight on s 16(1) SCJA. Indeed, at the first tranche of hearings before me, Mr Harpreet Singh SC remarked that this particular provision could be “skipped” over because the provision was concerned with in personam and not subject-matter jurisdiction of the court. This was picked up by the Plaintiff, who then argued at the second tranche of hearings that s 16(1) SCJA was, in fact, concerned with both in personam and subject-matter jurisdiction. On the Plaintiff’s reading, s 16(1) SCJA conferred unlimited subject matter jurisdiction, subject only to the requirements of s 16(1)(a) and s 16(1)(b) SCJA. In making this argument, Plaintiff’s counsel, Mr Danny Ong, placed great weight on several passages written by Professor Yeo in Yeo’s Chapter ([23] supra); it is to these that I now turn in addressing the first key area of dispute between the parties, ie, the scope of s 16(1) SCJA and whether it deals with subject-matter jurisdiction.

  45. Whether s 16(1) SCJA deals with subject-matter jurisdiction

  46. [32] In Yeo’s Chapter on jurisdiction, Prof Yeo first sets out at least six different ways in which the word “jurisdiction” can be understood or has been employed. The learned author then deals with the jurisdiction of the Singapore High Court with reference to the then-current provisions of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322) (1993 Reprint) (the “1993 SCJA”), which provided as follows:

  47. [33] Section 16(2) of the 1993 SCJA was removed pursuant to the Administration of Muslim Law (Amendment) Act 1999 (Act 20 of 1999) (“1999 AMLA Amendments”). This was done to provide the High Court and the Syariah Court with concurrent jurisdiction over specified matters: Haniszah bte Atan v Zainordin bin Mohd [2016] SGHCF 5 at [6]. Consequently, the Administration of Muslim Law Act (Cap 3, 2009 Rev Ed) was also amended, while s 17A(1) SCJA was introduced. This is a point to which I will return at [56].

  48. [34] What is material at this juncture is the fact that ss 16(1) and 16(3) of the 1993 SCJA are identical with ss 16(1) and 16(2) SCJA respectively. Why this is crucial is because Prof Yeo then goes on to state that:

  49. [35] In making the statements underlined in the extract above, Prof Yeo relied on the case of Emilia Shipping Inc v State Enterprises for Pulp and Paper Industries [1991] 1 SLR(R) 411 (“Emilia Shipping”). Ironically, this case formed the basis of the Defendants’ next argument.

  50. [36] Mr Jordan Tan (as second instructed counsel for the Defendants) was quick to point out that in Emilia Shipping, Chan Sek Keong J (as he then was) had stated at [23]:

  51. [38] Notwithstanding the ingenuity in this argument, I am unable to agree with the Defendant’s reading of the case. The statement of Chan J must be seen in context bearing in mind the specific dispute considered in Emilia Shipping. In that case, the plaintiff, Emilia Shipping Inc (“Emilia”), had discharged its cargo in Singapore after economic sanctions were imposed against Iraq as a result of the Gulf War. The defendant, State Enterprise for Pulp and Paper Industries (“State Enterprise”) was the notify party of a cargo of wood pulp carried under bills of lading on board Emilia’s vessel. Emilia then commenced Admiralty in Rem No 422 against State Enterprise for freight, back freight and expenses incurred in connection therewith. The cargo was then arrested, and Emilia obtained default judgment. The cargo was advertised for sale and bids were obtained although State Enterprise objected to the sale. State Enterprise then applied to set aside the arrest on the grounds that the court had no in rem admiralty jurisdiction to hear the case (see The Ocean Jade [1991] 1 SLR(R) 354).

  52. [40] In Gopal’s article, the author embarked on an analysis of the changes in the Singapore court’s jurisdiction at different points in history. This began from the “English past” pre-1964, to when Singapore became a part of the Federation of Malaysia, and finally to the jurisdiction post-1965 when Singapore separated from Malaysia. Through this historical examination, the learned author sought to demonstrate that Singapore had initially adopted the general, unlimited jurisdiction of the English High Court and that this had changed when Singapore became part of the Malaysian federal system, with the existence of jurisdiction being subject to “pre-conditions” that required the dispute to have a specific link (or “contacts” as the author termed it) with the territory. The reason for this was to prevent any “potential for inter-state jurisdictional conflict”: Gopal’s article at p lxviii. The author then argued that these limitations were maintained when Singapore left the Malaysian federation and the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap. 15, Act 24 of 1969) was enacted. The thrust of his argument was therefore as follows at p lxvii:

  53. [41] Flowing from this, the author then went on to deal with what he regarded as the “implications of the demise of unlimited general jurisdiction”. One of these “implications” concerned the question whether the court was obliged to exercise jurisdiction if s 16 SCJA was satisfied. The author argued that it was, stating at p lxxi as follows:

  54. [42] It was this particular extract, specifically the issue whether the Singapore High Court has inherent discretion to decline jurisdiction, that was the subject of debate in Emilia Shipping ([35] supra). It was not, strictly speaking, whether s 16 SCJA concerned subject-matter jurisdiction.

  55. [43] Two further points must be emphasised from the analysis in Gopal’s article. First, as seen from the extract above at [40], what the author was truly concerned with was the bases upon which jurisdiction could be established. Secondly, throughout the article, the author appears to have been dealing solely with in personam jurisdiction. The question of “jurisdictional competence” was answered with reference to connections between the defendant, cause of action and the state. There was never any mention of subject-matter jurisdiction.

  56. [44] The first sentence in [23] of Emilia Shipping therefore cannot be read in vacuo. When seen in context, it is clear that Chan J was simply referencing the (now) trite proposition that one of the bases under s 16(1) SCJA must be satisfied before the High Court has in personam jurisdiction. The only specific meaning that should be ascribed to the phrase “not concerned with” is that s 16 SCJA is not concerned with limiting subject-matter jurisdiction. The prefatory words in s 16(2) SCJA “[w]ithout prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) …” confirm this.

  57. [45] In fact, the clear implication to be drawn from Gopal’s article is that the only “limitations” to the court’s previously unlimited jurisdiction are to be found in s 16 SCJA. In all other respects, the court’s unlimited jurisdiction remains. To put it another way, s 16(1) SCJA limits the extent to which in personam jurisdiction can be exercised. Section 16(1) SCJA, however, places no such fetters on the exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction of the High Court (I will further expand on the issue of the scope of the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction in the next section at [51] below). That is not to say that subject-matter jurisdiction is completely divorced from in personam jurisdiction and the limits imposed thereupon. It must be borne in mind that in jurisdictional proceedings, both aspects of jurisdiction must be satisfied for the court to be seised of the matter. The two heads of jurisdiction are in this sense intertwined. Accordingly, notwithstanding this absence of limitation to subject-matter jurisdiction within s 16(1), the High Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is only material and relevant in so far as in personam jurisdiction exists. They are conjunctive and inseparable requirements. One is expressly circumscribed in s 16(1), while the other is not. Seen in this light, Prof Yeo’s statement that s 16(1) refers to both is perfectly explicable.

  58. [46] To complete the picture, I make a further observation as regards an even older edition of the SCJA and related (albeit vintage) jurisprudence. These authorities are pertinent in two respects: first, the significance of submission to the Singapore High Court’s jurisdiction, and second, the manner in which the SCJA has since evolved. I note that in stating that s 16 SCJA refers to both subject-matter jurisdiction and in personam jurisdiction, Prof Yeo also referred to Indo Commercial Society ([23] supra). In that case at [44], Hwang JC first referred to an unreported judgment dated 31 October 1986 where Wee Chong Jin CJ stated as follows:

  59. [47] Dealing with this quote by Wee CJ, Hwang JC stated as follows at [48]–[49]:

  60. [48] Hwang JC made the observations he did based on reference to the provisions of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 1985 Rev Ed) (the “1985 SCJA”). As the case was heard on 31 August 1992, that was the version of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act then in force. In that version, there was no provision for submission to jurisdiction. Instead, the 1985 SCJA provided as follows:

  61. [49] It was only in the 1993 SCJA that the proviso as to submission to jurisdiction was introduced. It is therefore clear that Hwang JC’s objections to Wee CJ’s reliance on submission as a basis for jurisdiction have been met by statutory amendment. That said, the observations in Indo Commercial Society that the court’s jurisdiction is founded on statute, and that the requirements in ss 16 and 17 SCJA must be satisfied, remain good law as I observed above at [23].

  62. [50] There is a separate gloss to the discussion above: as may be seen from the excerpt of the 1985 SCJA reproduced at [48] above, the Singapore High Court under s 16 had “jurisdiction to hear and try all civil proceedings”. This was amended in 1993 to reflect “jurisdiction to hear and try any action in personam”. This amendment had significant implications on the scope of subject-matter jurisdiction under the SCJA, which I discuss in the next section.

  63. The scope of subject-matter jurisdiction under the SCJA

  64. [51] The question is whether the subject-matter jurisdiction under ss 16 and 17(1) SCJA encompasses the present situation involving a foreign bankruptcy statute. The wording under s 16(1) SCJA suggests that the subject-matter jurisdiction granted to the High Court is unlimited. I alluded to this earlier (see [45] above). In this regard, I agree with the observations made by Prof Yeo at Yeo’s Chapter ([23] supra) at pp 251 and 257 that:

  65. [52] Nevertheless, this unlimited subject-matter jurisdiction, specifically conferred under s 16(1) SCJA, can still be qualified. As Prof Yeo notes in Yeo’s Chapter at p 257:

  66. [53] Prof Yeo’s observations are corroborated by an examination of the legislative history of the SCJA. As noted above at [50], the phrasing of the s 16 SCJA was changed from “jurisdiction to try all civil proceedings” to “jurisdiction to hear and try any action in personam” in 1993. The rationale behind this amendment, according to the then-Minister for Law, Dr S Jayakumar, was so that the jurisdiction of the High Court of Singapore would be brought in line with that of the English High Court of Judicature (Parliamentary Debates Singapore: Official Report (12 April 1993) vol 61 at columns 94 and 95). As the English High Court possesses unlimited subject-matter jurisdiction (a point Prof Yeo also notes in the extract above at [51]), the Singapore High Court’s jurisdiction would now similarly be unlimited. This is a key difference between the 1985 SCJA and the 1993 SCJA.

  67. [54] It follows, from legislative intent as reflected in the amendments, that the limits to the general rule of unqualified subject-matter jurisdiction are a matter of common law, not statute. There are three broad categories of exceptions under common law, referred to also as areas of non-justiciability:

  68. (a) It is well-established that disputes involving foreign revenue laws are deemed as non-justiciable for the reason that they are “an extension of sovereign power which imposed the taxes, and that an assertion of sovereign authority by one State within the territory of another, … is (treaty or convention apart) contrary to all concepts of independent sovereignties”: Relfo Ltd (in liquidation) v Bhimji Velji Jadva Varsani [2008] 4 SLR(R) 657 at [53], citing Government of India, Ministry of Finance (Revenue Division) v Taylor and another [1955] 1 AC 491 at 511.

  69. (b) Similarly, areas such as foreign penal, land and public laws have been regarded as beyond the High Court’s jurisdiction. It has indeed been regarded as a long-standing rule of the common law – under the Moçambique rule – that the Singapore court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over disputes concerning foreign immovable property: see Murakami Takako ([20] supra) at [9].

  70. (c) In some jurisdictions, foreign intellectual property rights are deemed non-justiciable as a matter of subject-matter jurisdiction: see Tyburn Productions Ltd v Conan Doyle [1991] Ch 75; Potter v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd (1906) 3 CLR 479. This area of law is still developing, but the UK Supreme Court has expressed caution (and rightly so) over whether foreign intellectual property rights would be justiciable before the UK courts: see Lucasfilm Limited and others v Ainsworth and another [2011] UKSC 39. This is because such issues, in particular patent rights, may involve sensitive subject matter that may be of great interest or commercial significance to the foreign state in which the intellectual property was created/invented/first registered.

  71. [55] In sum, the position is that: the Singapore court has unlimited subject-matter jurisdiction, unless or until prohibited either by legislation or case law. This interpretation is, in fact, borne out on a plain and ordinary reading of s 16(1) SCJA itself. I disagree with the Defendants’ contention that the Singapore court can only be seised of jurisdiction where such is conferred by some “written law”. Not only would requiring such an enabling statute fly in the face of the wording of s 16(1) SCJA, it raises the question why the common law exceptions were necessary in the first place. In other words, the Defendants’ argument erodes the fundamental dichotomy between a rule and an exception. Another problem is this: if we accept the Defendant’s argument that subject-matter jurisdiction is incrementally developed over time, does that mean the courts are precluded from being seised of jurisdiction over such matters until the legislature acts, even where such matters are linked to our jurisdiction? That cannot be.

  72. [56] In this connection, I note that the Defendants had rightly argued that ss 16(2) and 17 SCJA involved questions of subject-matter jurisdiction. Section 16(2) SCJA deals with both in personam and subject-matter jurisdiction. Section 17 deals in greater particularity with various aspects of jurisdiction, including over subject-matter, person, things and causes: Yeo’s Chapter ([23] supra) at p 256. Neither ss 16(2) nor 17(1)(c), however, serve to limit the subject-matter jurisdiction granted under s 16(1) SCJA. Sections 16(2) and 17(1) make clear that the provisions contained therein are without prejudice to the generality of ss 16(1) and 16 respectively.

  73. [57] The untenability of the Defendants’ position is apparent when one contrasts the language of ss 16(2) and 17(1) with that of s 17A(1) SCJA. As mentioned above at [33], the s 17A(1) SCJA was introduced to delineate the respective jurisdictions of the High Court and the Syariah Court. Section 17A(1) SCJA thus explicitly states:

  74. [58] This is an example of a limiting provision. In contrast, like s 16(1) SCJA, both ss 16(2) and 17(1) utilise the permissive language of “shall have jurisdiction”, and merely spell out with greater specificity instances in which the court has jurisdiction.

  75. [59] Accordingly, I find that as a starting point, the Singapore High Court does have general subject-matter jurisdiction by virtue of s 16(1) SCJA; and its specific subject-matter jurisdiction is in no way circumscribed by s 17(1) SCJA.

  76. Subject-matter jurisdiction in the present dispute

  77. [60] The next step is to inquire whether there is any reason peculiar to the present subject-matter, ie, foreign insolvency laws, in respect of which the court should or should not be seised of jurisdiction. This takes me to the three arguments raised by parties noted above at [21]–[22].

  78. The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency

  79. (a) Under the UNCITRAL Model Law, as partially adopted by Singapore via s 354B of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) (“Companies Act”), a plaintiff is able to apply for an injunction in Singapore if this was in the context of corporate insolvency.

  80. (b) The same legislative developments, however, have not occurred in relation to bankruptcy law. The relevant provisions under the UNCITRAL Model Law do not apply to the personal bankruptcy of individuals, which is the case at hand.

  81. (c) The Singapore court can thus only have subject-matter jurisdiction if legislative amendments, similar to s 354B of the Companies Act, were made in relation to matters of personal bankruptcy. This is further bolstered by the fact that such legislative deliberations turn on “myriad factors including the question of reciprocity by the foreign state in recognising Singapore proceedings all of which are outside the purview of the [court]”.

  82. [62] To provide context, the UNCITRAL Model Law was introduced into Singapore by way of the 2017 amendments to the Companies Act. Under these amendments, s 354B of the Companies Act was enacted. This section provides that the UNCITRAL Model Law as set out in the Tenth Schedule to the Companies Act has force of law in Singapore. The UNCITRAL Model Law generally applies where “assistance is sought in Singapore by a foreign court or a foreign representative in connection with a foreign proceeding”: Art 1(1)(a) UNCITRAL Model Law. A “foreign representative” is then defined as being a representative appointed by a foreign court to control or supervise the affairs of a debtor: Art 2(1) UNCITRAL Model Law.

  83. [63] The preamble to the UNCITRAL Model Law itself clearly states its purpose to “provide effect mechanisms for dealing with cases of cross-border insolvency”; and to promote the objectives, inter alia, of “greater legal certainty for trade and investment” (UNCITRAL Model Law Preamble (b)) and “facilitation of the rescue of financially troubled businesses” (UNCITRAL Model Law Preamble (e)). This purpose behind the introduction of the UNCITRAL Model Law is also evident from the speech by Mr Edwin Tong at the second reading of the bill to amend the Companies Act (Parliamentary Debates Singapore: Official Report (10 March 2017) vol 94 (Edwin Tong Chun Fai, Member of Parliament for Marine Parade GRC). In Mr Tong’s speech, he stated as follows:

  84. [64] One of the amendments Mr Tong then went on to refer to was the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law. The Defendant thus correctly points out that the UNCITRAL Model Law was introduced into Singapore in aid of corporate insolvencies.

  85. [65] That, however, is as far as I can agree with the Defendants. The logical result of the Defendants’ argument would be that prior to the introduction of the UNCITRAL Model Law, the Singapore court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to render assistance in aid of foreign corporate insolvencies. That simply cannot be the case.

  86. [66] The existence of such jurisdiction was amply demonstrated in a decision pre-dating the introduction of the UNCITRAL Model Law, Beluga Chartering GmbH (in liquidation) and others v Beluga Projects (Singapore) Pte Ltd (in liquidation) and another (deugro (Singapore) Pte Ltd, non-party) [2014] 2 SLR 815 (“Beluga Chartering”). Beluga Chartering concerned a German-incorporated company, Beluga Chartering GmbH (in liquidation), that was initially wound-up in Germany, with a German liquidator appointed. The company was subsequently wound-up in Singapore, with a set of Singapore liquidators appointed. The company’s wholly owned subsidiaries, which were incorporated in Singapore (the “Subsidiaries”) brought a claim against Beluga Chartering GmbH (in liquidation) for agency work performed for the latter and obtained judgment in default. Beluga Chartering GmbH (in liquidation)’s only asset in Singapore was owed by the non-party deugro (Singapore) Pte Ltd to Beluga Chartering GmbH (in liquidation) (the “deugro Asset”). The Singapore liquidators thus filed an application to ascertain whether they were entitled to remit the deugro Asset to Germany, that being the seat of the principal liquidation, notwithstanding the existence of the Subsidiaries’ unsatisfied judgment debt.

  87. [67] What is relevant for present purposes is the Court of Appeal’s discussion of the common law ancillary liquidation doctrine at [56]–[60] as follows:

  88. [68] The extract above from Beluga Chartering makes several points clear. First, the ancillary liquidation doctrine encompasses a wide range of powers allowing the Singapore court to render assistance. This was alongside the power to grant recognition of the title of the foreign liquidator and recognition of the foreign liquidation proceedings: Beluga Chartering at [86]–[99]. The crucial point is that these powers are in relation to foreign insolvency proceedings, indicating that the court does have subject-matter jurisdiction.

  89. [69] Secondly, and more crucially, such powers were long-established as part of Singapore’s common law even before the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law. It thus cannot be said that the UNCITRAL Model Law conferred such jurisdiction on the Singapore court in respect of foreign liquidation proceedings. As the Plaintiff rightly notes, it was a jurisdiction that the Singapore court already had.

  90. [70] What then was the utility of introducing the UNCITRAL Model Law? To answer this, I refer once again to Mr Tong’s speech where he stated as follows:

  91. [71] The phrase of “supplement existing laws” where the “Companies Act [does] not assist in the facilitation of cross-border insolvencies” indicates that a lacuna previously existed under our insolvency regime. That lacuna, however, was not in relation to the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, as evident from Re Pacific Andes Resources Development Ltd and other matters [2018] 5 SLR 125 (“Pacific Andes”), the same decision referred to by Mr Tong.

  92. [72] In Pacific Andes, Pacific Andes Resources Development Ltd (“PARD”), Parkmond Group Limited (“PGL”), Pacific Andes Enterprises (BVI) Limited (“PAE”) and Pacific Andes Food (Hong Kong) Limited (“PAF”) each filed applications under s 210(10) of the Companies act for moratoria against proceedings brought or to be brought against them by their creditors, both in Singapore and elsewhere. The court allowed the applications and granted two sets of orders, the “PARD orders” in relation to PARD, and the “Obligor Orders” in relation to PGL, PAE and PAF. Both sets of orders provided that the moratoria were as regards “actions or proceedings in Singapore or elsewhere”. A question thus arose as to whether the court had powers under s 210(10) of the Companies Act to restrain the commencement or continuation of proceedings elsewhere by creditors within and subject to the jurisdiction of the court. The court held that s 210(10) could not be construed as conferring extra-territorial jurisdiction. This was because “a scheme of arrangement is territorial in nature and therefore the protective relief that s 210(10) offers to facilitate a scheme ought to also be territorial”: Pacific Andes at [18]. Crucially, the court then went on to consider a counter argument raised by counsel, at [19]:

  93. [73] It is apparent from the extract above that the court did, in fact, possess subject-matter jurisdiction over the scheme proposed in Pacific Andes. It also had in personam jurisdiction over creditors who participated in the scheme, and whose debts were legitimately subject to the scheme. I have no reason to doubt the reasoning of Kannan Ramesh JC (as he then was) as to the powers that the court has under s 210(10) of the Companies Act. I note, however, that Ramesh JC noted that “[t]he court has subject matter jurisdiction by reason of s 210 [of the Companies Act]” [emphasis added]. In my view, Ramesh JC was not suggesting that subject-matter jurisdiction was statutorily conferred by the Companies Act. The Companies Act simply clarified or affirmed that the Singapore High Court had subject-matter jurisdiction in the specific context of schemes of arrangement under the Companies Act. This would be in line with the pre-existing unlimited subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to s 16 SCJA (see [34], [45] and [55] above). This point is further bolstered by the fact that the common law ancillary liquidation doctrine is well-entrenched and exists beyond s 210 of the Companies Act.

  94. [74] The only limiting factor was that s 210(10) did not confer the power, or the extra-territorial jurisdiction, to restrain the commencement or continuation of proceedings elsewhere. This harks back to the distinction in the definitions drawn in Indo Commercial Society ([23] supra), between the authority of a court to hear a case (ie, jurisdiction) and the power of the court to grant particular reliefs claimed.

  95. [75] It was this power, or extra-territorial jurisdiction, conferred under the Companies Act that was sought to be expanded through the introduction of the UNCITRAL Model Law. Subject-matter jurisdiction, or the existence thereof, was never the target of the amendments; the courts always had such subject-matter jurisdiction in relation to foreign insolvency proceedings, as explained above at [65]–[69].

  96. [76] The Defendant has thus failed to even demonstrate that the UNCITRAL Model Law conferred subject-matter jurisdiction that did not already exist.

  97. Section 107(1) of the Cayman Bankruptcy Law

  98. [78] Having decided as above, it is not strictly necessary for me to deal with this issue of s 107(1) of the Cayman Bankruptcy Law, as well as the doctrine of modified universalism. For completeness, however, I set out the arguments of parties and also my views on the matter.

  99. [79] The Defendants argue that s 107(1) of the Cayman Bankruptcy Law does not serve to confer subject-matter jurisdiction on the Singapore court to hear the matter for several reasons:

  100. (a) First, only Singapore legislation can confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon the Singapore court.

  101. (b) Secondly, the Plaintiff’s own Cayman Law expert Mr Henderson QC, accepts this in the expert report that he provided because he states at paragraph 14 that:

  102. (c) Thirdly, the jurisdictional provisions under the Cayman Bankruptcy Law themselves only seek to confer jurisdiction on the Cayman courts and not to any foreign courts.

  103. [80] I agree with the Defendants in this respect. A foreign legislation such as s 107(1) of the Cayman Bankruptcy Law cannot be the basis upon which the Singapore court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is founded. Such jurisdiction must be grounded in Singapore legislation, in this case s 16(1) SCJA as stated above at [23]–[59].

  104. [81] This was not a point that the Plaintiff dealt with head-on at the hearing before me. Instead, the Plaintiff argued that the Singapore court is no stranger to adjudicating on matters relating foreign law, and that its powers are not limited simply because a claim or rule arose under a foreign statute. Heavy reliance was placed on the English decision of Phrantzes v Argenti ([29] supra).

  105. [83] This argument, however, was rejected by Lord Parker CJ, who stated at 33–34 that:

  106. [84] As a starting point, Lord Parker CJ thus regarded the English courts as having subject-matter jurisdiction, notwithstanding the fact that the claim was based on Greek legislation. This, in essence, was the reason for the Plaintiff’s reliance on the case: that the mere fact that the cause of action arises under a foreign legislation is no bar to it being adjudicated in Singapore. That surely must be correct. Going beyond this, in my view, Phrantzes v Argenti also demonstrates the point I made earlier at [55] that: the courts have unlimited subject-matter jurisdiction, unless or until that is precluded by some legislation or case law. That position is codified in Singapore by way of s 16(1) SCJA, retaining the general unlimited jurisdiction of the Singapore court: Yeo’s Chapter ([23] supra) at p 257.

  107. [86] Additionally, English law did not provide for the relief sought by the plaintiff, to the extent that the English remedies did not “harmonise with the right according to its nature and extent as fixed by the foreign law”: Phrantzes v Argenti at 35.

  108. [87] These were extremely valid concerns before Lord Parker CJ, and once again emphasise the fact that certain matters have been regarded as non-justiciable (see above at [53]). The Defendants, however, have not demonstrated how rendering assistance in foreign avoidance claims violates any fundamental sense of justice, offends any public policy or involves such a large measure of discretion such that the court should decline to exercise jurisdiction in this instance. Further, unlike the situation in Phrantzes v Argenti, the power to set aside disputed disposal of assets in the context of bankruptcies is a familiar remedy available in Singapore.

  109. The principle of modified universalism

  110. [88] The Plaintiff’s next argument was that the principle of modified universalism calls upon the Singapore court to hear claims involving foreign insolvency proceedings.

  111. [89] Modified universalism refers to the idea of “domestic courts acknowledging the effects and status of foreign insolvency proceedings in the place of a company’s incorporation [and] carries with it a further principle: that the courts will actively assist the foreign insolvency proceeding”: Richard Sheldon QC, Cross-Border Insolvency (4th Ed, Bloomsbury) at 6.11. This principle has been recognised and endorsed by the Singapore court in Beluga Chartering ([66] supra) at [99], Re Opti-Medix Ltd (in liquidation) and another matter [2016] 4 SLR 312 at [17], Re Taisoo Suk (as foreign representative of Hanjin Shipping Co Ltd) [2016] 5 SLR 787 (“Re Taisoo Suk”) at [15]–[18], Re Gulf Pacific Shipping Ltd (in creditors’ voluntary liquidation) and others [2016] SGHC 287 at [10] and Heince Tombak Simanjuntak and others v Paulus Tannos and others [2019] SGHC 216 (“Heince Tombak”) at [21]–[22].

  112. [90] This principle of assistance also applies as much to personal bankruptcies as to corporate insolvencies, as recognised by Aedit Abdullah J in Heince Tombak at [21].

  113. [91] That said, as the Plaintiff candidly acknowledges, the principle of modified universalism only operates as a broad statement of principle. This was explicitly recognised in Beluga Chartering, where the Court of Appeal stated at [99] as follows:

  114. [92] The existence and adoption of the principle in Singapore’s insolvency and bankruptcy laws hence only serves as a general indication that the courts will be less inclined to find that it has no subject-matter jurisdiction. Logically, the existence of such subject-matter jurisdiction is a distinct, and indeed anterior, question that must be answered. The court would be getting ahead of itself by utilising the principle of modified universalism to find such subject-matter jurisdiction. This issue is, in any event, moot in the present case given my findings in the preceding sections of this Judgment.

  115. Whether the Defendants have submitted to the Singapore court’s jurisdiction

  116. [93] As its primary line of argument on in personam jurisdiction, the Plaintiff argues that the Defendants have submitted to the Singapore Court’s jurisdiction for the following reasons:

  117. (a) The Defendants did not object to the Court’s jurisdiction for about four and a half months from the time when they were served with the Singapore injunction until the setting-aside application.

  118. (b) The Defendants invoked the Singapore court’s jurisdiction on multiple occasions.

  119. (c) The application to vary the injunction in this case should uniquely be taken as submission to the court’s jurisdiction as the Defendants specifically chose the Singapore court and made the application without a concurrent jurisdictional challenge.

  120. [94] The Defendants have met the Plaintiff’s arguments head-on, and argue that they have not submitted to the court’s jurisdiction because:

  121. (a) They expressly reserved their right to challenge the Singapore court’s jurisdiction. The burden is thus on the Plaintiff to demonstrate how the Defendants can be considered as having submitted to the Singapore court’s jurisdiction.

  122. (b) Apart from mere silence or inaction being insufficient to amount to submission, there were good reasons for the delay in filing the jurisdictional objections.

  123. (c) In any case, the period of delay was within the time limits of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (“Rules of Court”) for mounting a jurisdictional challenge as the Suit had been stayed by the Plaintiff’s own application.

  124. (d) The Defendants cannot be taken to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the Singapore court based on the lack of any objection raised before the Cayman courts.

  125. (e) The application to vary the injunction did not amount to submission as it was consistent with the Defendant’s earlier reservation of rights.

  126. (f) The Plaintiff would not suffer any prejudice should the Defendants be allowed to pursue the jurisdictional challenge.

  127. [95] The principles on submission to jurisdiction have been well-canvassed by the Court of Appeal in Zoom Communications Ltd v Broadcast Solutions Pte Ltd [2014] 4 SLR 500 (“Zoom Communications”) and Shanghai Turbo Enterprises Ltd v Liu Ming [2019] 1 SLR 779 (“Shanghai Turbo”). The general principles may be summarised thus:

  128. (a) Whether a party is taken to have submitted to the court’s jurisdiction is a question of fact in each case: Zoom Communications at [32]; Shanghai Turbo at [32].

  129. (b) A defendant is taken to submit to jurisdiction when he takes a step in the proceedings that is incompatible with the position that the Singapore court has no jurisdiction. This test has been succinctly summarised as follows:

  130. (i) Such submission may be inferred through a “step that is ‘only necessary or only useful’ if: (a) any objection to the existence of the local court’s jurisdiction has been waived; or (b) no such objection has ever been entertained at all”: Zoom Communications at [43]; see also Shanghai Turbo at [44] and Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws (Lord Collins of Mapesbury gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 15th Ed, 2012) at paras 11-129 to 11-130.

  131. (ii) Phrased differently, a party’s conduct only amounts to a submission where it “cannot be explained, except on the assumption that the party in question accepts that the court should be given jurisdiction”: Shanghai Turbo at [37], citing Global Multimedia International Ltd v Ara Media Services [2007] 1 All ER (Comm) 1160 at [27].

  132. (c) Consequently, any conduct amounting to submission must be clear and unequivocal: Zoom Communications at [44]; Shanghai Turbo at [37]–[38].

  133. [96] Having heard parties’ submissions on the matter, I find that the Defendants had indeed submitted to the court’s jurisdiction, for two cumulative reasons: the failure of the Defendants to file a formal jurisdictional challenge until 9 June 2020, coupled with the steps they have taken in these proceedings.

  134. The Defendants’ failure to file a prompt jurisdictional challenge

  135. [97] I note at the outset that the Defendants had reserved their position to challenge the court’s jurisdiction. This was done extremely early in the proceedings, in the first Defendant’s first affidavit filed on 6 February 2020. It was thus clear that by this point in time, the Defendants were aware that it was open to them to object to the court’s jurisdiction, should they choose to do so. This objection, however, did not materialise for nearly four and a half months, when the present jurisdictional challenge was filed on 9 June 2020.

  136. [98] The Defendants explain that there were “good reasons” for this delay, and it was not that they had sat on their hands for the entire period. They claim that at the time, they needed funds for their Singapore lawyers’ advice and representation. As a result, the first defendant directed a funds transfer to the Defendants’ solicitors, Shook Lin & Bok. This transfer was objected to by the Plaintiff, who alleged that it was an improper transfer in breach of the Singapore Injunction. The Defendants thus claim that they were “left with no choice” but to file the Clarification Application. The Clarification Application was only heard on 20 April 2020. In May 2020, the Defendants thus sought counsel’s advice and filed the present application to challenge the Singapore court’s jurisdiction.

  137. [99] This account of impecuniosity and a rush to secure funding for the sole purpose of challenging the Singapore court’s jurisdiction suffers from several defects. First, if the Defendants truly had in mind the aim of challenging the Singapore court’s jurisdiction, the natural course of action would have been to apply to discharge the Singapore Injunction on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction. There was simply no need to take the roundabout route of filing the Clarification Application, purportedly to obtain funds, so that they could then commence the present application.

  138. [100] Secondly, as was rightly pointed out by Mr Ong, the Plaintiff had consented to the payment of US$20,000 to the Defendants’ solicitors on 3 March 2020. Such funds would have been sufficient for the Defendants to bring a jurisdictional challenge before the courts slightly over a month after filing the first Defendant’s 6 February 2020 affidavit.

  139. [101] Thirdly, having personally heard the Clarification Application, I did not believe that the Defendants simply had no access to other funds for their expenses. Indeed, as I held at the Clarification Application, it appeared that apart from the Singapore assets subject to the Singapore Injunction, there were also trust assets outside of Singapore that could be used for the Defendants’ needs despite the first Defendant’s protestation that this was subject to the discretion of the trustee whom she herself appointed. At that time, as I had also considered the possibility that such assets might be subject to the Cayman Injunction, I had provided the Defendants an opportunity to address me on that. Unfortunately, they did not provide any information. My observations in this regard have since been proven to be correct. In the present application, the Plaintiff has exhibited a document indicating that the Defendants had, on 25 May 2020, obtained substantial funds from the Pelletier Family Trust. While this was after the hearing on 20 April 2020, it brings into question the Defendants’ assertion of insufficient funding to meet expenses. When seen in totality, the Defendants’ account of events is far from the cri de coeur that they make it out to be.

  140. [102] The Defendants also argue, in this connection, that they should not be taken to have submitted to the court’s jurisdiction because the present application was within the time limit under the Rules of Court. Specifically, O 12 r 7(1) of the Rules of Court provides as follows:

  141. [103] The relevant sub-provisions are (a), (c), (f) and (g), which are all applications that the Defendants presently seek. In this regard, the Defendants argue that the timelines for the relevant applications have been extended by virtue of the stay granted in the Stay Application (as canvassed above at [14(b)]). As a result, the present applications do not fall afoul of O 12 r 7(1) of the Rules of Court.

  142. Steps taken by the Defendants in the proceedings

  143. [106] Further, and importantly, the policy underlying O 12 r 7 of the Rules of Court is to ensure that a defendant should not be regarded as having submitted to jurisdiction simply because he entered appearance, inter alia, to contest that jurisdiction or seek a stay of proceedings: Singapore Civil Procedure at para 12/7/1. It is for that very policy that, as stated in Singapore Civil Procedure at para 12/7/3(3):

  144. [107] The central question is whether the Defendants had taken a step or steps inconsistent with objecting to the court’s jurisdiction. On balance, I find that the Defendants had taken such steps that were inconsistent with their reservation or challenge to jurisdiction.

  145. [108] First, the Defendants’ failure to raise a formal challenge constituted more than mere inaction. I have alluded to this above. The Defendants had reserved their own rights to challenge the court’s jurisdiction, but failed to exercise the rights in prompt fashion and (as explained) have not offered any good reason why they did not do so. Thus, in my view, there is no other explanation than that they had accepted the court’s jurisdiction at the time.

  146. [109] Beyond their inaction, the Defendants had, in fact, taken an active step in the proceedings, through the Clarification Application. Through that application, the Defendants had sought the court’s determination on, inter alia, (a) the appropriate limit of the first Defendant’s living expenses; (b) whether the Defendants were at liberty to utilise the Singapore assets to pay for legal representation in other jurisdiction; (c) whether the first Defendant could pay for the legal expenses of other parties; and (d) whether the first Defendant could be permitted to pay any future sums of money due to various third parties from funds in her Singapore bank account. The variations sought were wide-ranging and encompassed various issues but the inference to be drawn is clear: they all spoke to an acceptance that the Singapore Injunction would remain in place and that the Defendants were only trying to determine the limits that they could work around. These are acts evincing, in these circumstances, acceptance of the court’s jurisdiction.

  147. [110] The Defendants point to the case of Shanghai Turbo ([95] supra) in support of their case. In Shanghai Turbo, the plaintiff sued the defendant for breach of a service agreement, obtaining leave to serve out of jurisdiction on the defendant in China. The plaintiff also sought, and was granted, two injunctions, one against the defendant and another against two non-parties. The non-parties filed a summons to vary the injunction granted against them, in which the defendant participated, arguing for the injunction to be varied despite not being a party. An issue thus arose as to whether the defendant had submitted to the court’s jurisdiction despite his express reservation of rights. The Court of Appeal held that he had submitted to jurisdiction. This was because the application to vary the injunction brought by the non-parties was, in substance, an application for an injunction against the plaintiff; and the defendant had participated in this despite not being compelled to do so (Shanghai Turbo at [33]). Crucially, the court thus concluded that the defendant’s conduct was not merely defensive and amounted to an invocation of the court’s jurisdiction (Shanghai Turbo at [42]).

  148. [111] With respect, Shanghai Turbo does not support the Defendants’ case here. While that case makes clear that a clearly offensive step in the proceedings will usually be construed as invoking the court’s jurisdiction, that does not mean that that such step is essential for a finding of submission to jurisdiction. The principal inquiry still remains as that set out above in [95(b)(i)]–[95(b)(ii)], as well as the scrutiny of any steps taken by the Defendant, as explained at [107] above.

  149. [112] Relevant, also, is the Application to Restore Funds (see [17] above). This application would not be in and of itself dispositive. But in context, it is clear that the actions of the parties pursuant to that application buttress my finding that the Defendants have submitted to the court’s jurisdiction. It must be remembered that in the Application to Restore Funds, the parties agreed that the Defendants were to, inter alia, provide the Plaintiff with evidence of payments made from the GPM account since the Singapore Injunction was served on 23 January 2020. These matters pertaining to the GPM account, and the parties’ agreement in regard thereto, are substantive matters that are at the heart of the Singapore Injunction, which was issued in exercise of this court’s jurisdiction. One would have expected the Defendants to have adopted an entirely different course of action if they intended to challenge the court’s jurisdiction; they would not have substantively participated in the Application to Restore Funds, or even if they did, they ought not to have given their agreement to facilitate the Plaintiff’s investigation of funds falling within the scope of the Singapore Injunction. Their conduct speaks to their having submitted to the court’s jurisdiction.

  150. [113] In my view, the various steps earlier taken by the Defendants in these proceedings collectively indicate that this challenge to jurisdiction was a much-belated afterthought, after they had already submitted to the court’s jurisdiction. This is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that immediately following the Clarification Application, the Defendants’ first recourse was still not to challenge the court’s jurisdiction. Instead, as mentioned above at [16], they filed the Leave to Appeal Application. That, if anything, was the clearest indication that the Defendants submitted to the court’s jurisdiction, the exercise of which they sought to invoke. In their submissions, the Defendants note that they will be withdrawing the Leave to Appeal Application, indicating that the Singapore Injunction “will stand, or fall” depending on my finding here. In this vein, they have also written to the Plaintiff’s solicitors on 13 July 2020, indicating the same. This belated volte-face does not assist them for the Defendants have now been hoisted by their own petard and have submitted to the court’s jurisdiction.

  151. Whether the Singapore court has in personam jurisdiction over the defendants: forum non conveniens

  152. [114] As a result of the Defendants’ submission to the Singapore court’s jurisdiction, the courts have in personam jurisdiction over the Defendants under s 16(1)(b) SCJA. There however remains a further issue in relation to in personam jurisdiction: that of the proper forum. Where a foreign defendant is sued in Singapore, the issue of proper forum arises at two different stages of the proceedings. The first stage is when the plaintiff applies for leave to serve the defendant out of jurisdiction under O 11 r 1 of the Rules of Court. To obtain such leave, three requirements must be satisfied, namely that:

  153. These requirements are well-established and endorsed in various decisions including Zoom Communications ([95] supra) at [26], Siemens AG v Holdrich Investment Ltd [2010] 3 SLR 1007 (“Siemens AG”) and PT Gunung Madu Plantations v Muhammad Jimmy Goh Mashun [2018] 4 SLR 1420 (“PT Gunung”) at [29].

  154. [115] At the second stage, after a foreign defendant has been served with the originating process, the issue of a proper forum arises again should that defendant seek a stay of proceedings on the ground of improper forum, albeit if the issue was dealt with in the first stage (in an application for service out of jurisdiction), there may not strictly be a need to rehash the issue in the second stage. This is subject of course to any fresh points raised by the foreign defendant, given that as a matter of practicality, applications under the first stage are often heard ex parte.

  155. [116] It is generally accepted that the same test applies at both of these stages, namely, the two-stage test enunciated in Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd (The Spiliada) [1987] AC 460 (the “Spiliada test”). Under the Spiliada test the court will first determine whether, prima facie, there is some other available forum that is clearly or distinctly more appropriate for the case to be tried in. If the court concludes that that there is, the court will deny leave to serve outside jurisdiction or (as the case may be) grant a stay unless there are circumstances by reason of which the justice of the case requires that a stay should nonetheless not be granted: Rappo, Tania v Accent Delight International Ltd and another and another appeal [2017] 2 SLR 265 at [68]–[69]; Rickshaw Investments Ltd v Nicolai Baron von Uexkull [2007] 1 SLR(R) 377; Best Soar Ltd v Praxis Energy Agents Pte Ltd [2018] 3 SLR 423 at [15].

  156. [117] The rare common ground between the parties to this hearing is that Singapore is forum non conveniens in respect of the Plaintiff’s claim under s 107(1) of the Cayman Bankruptcy Act. This was rightly, in my view, conceded by the Plaintiff early in the proceedings where in support of the Singapore Injunction, it stated as follows:

  157. [118] Under stage one of the Spiliada test, the Cayman Islands thus constitute the other forum that is more appropriate for the case to be tried, as per the Plaintiff’s concession. It is at this point that the parties’ arguments diverge.

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