General Division of the High Court · Decided 16 November 2021
6DM (S) Pte Ltd v AE Brands Korea Ltd and others and another matter
Feedback & support[2021] SGHC 257 · Case no. Suit No 951 of 2020 (Summons No 665 of 2021)
✱ What happened, in plain English
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Grounds of decision
Official text from eLitigation
- [1]
[1] The plaintiff, 6DM (S) Pte. Ltd. (“6DM”), commenced Suit No 951 of 2020 (“Suit 951”), alleging that the defendants had made fraudulent misrepresentations, engaged in a lawful and/or unlawful means conspiracy, breached an implied agreement and/or a collateral contract and/or were liable for unjust enrichment. 6DM previously distributed the first three defendants’ beer products pursuant to three distribution agreements. The nub of 6DM’s case is that the defendants acted in concert to induce 6DM to invest in promoting, marketing and distributing more of the defendants’ beer products by representing that the first three defendants would acquire shares in 6DM and/or partner with 6DM to set up a joint venture company to distribute the said products in Singapore (“the Arrangement”). Pursuant to these representations, the defendants allegedly assured 6DM that any debts owed by 6DM to the first three defendants under the distribution agreements need only be paid when the Arrangement was finalised. Instead of finalising the Arrangement with 6DM, the first three defendants terminated the distribution agreements in early July 2020 and demanded that 6DM pay the debts owed.
- [3]
[3] On 15 February 2021, 6DM filed an application, Originating Summons No 138 of 2021 (“OS 138”), seeking the grant of an injunction against the defendants to restrain the Asahi Entities and a fourth entity Asahi Brands Germany GMBH (“ABGG”, formerly known as Asahi Brands Europe A.S. or “ABE”) from commencing winding-up proceedings against the plaintiff on the basis of a statutory demand dated 22 January 2021 (the “Statutory Demand”). Based on the Statutory Demand, the Asahi Entities and ABGG were owed sums totalling more than USD 790,000.00 and EUR 570,000.00.
Facts
The parties
- [7]
[7] I start by summarising the key background facts. 6DM is a Singapore incorporated company, in the business of (inter alia) the wholesale of liquor, soft drinks and beverages. Its sole director and shareholder is Sim Yew Meng Adrian (“Adrian Sim”). The first, second and third defendants in Suit 951 and OS 138 (AEBK, ABA and APB – collectively “the Asahi Entities”) are incorporated in South Korea, Hong Kong and the United Kingdom (“UK”) respectively. The Asahi Entities are part of a group of companies which has been referred to in affidavit evidence as “the Asahi Group”. Within the Asahi Group, ABA and APB are subsidiaries of Asahi International Ltd (“AIL”), whereas AEBK is wholly owned by another parent company within the Asahi Group. The fourth defendant in OS 138, ABGG (formerly known as ABE), is a private company under German law. The fourth defendant in Suit 951 is an individual named Federico Bogna (“Bogna”). He is the Regional Markets Development Manager Asia Pacific at ABA and was at all material times the main point of contact between 6DM and the Asahi Entities.
The distribution agreements
- [8]
[8] According to 6DM, it started distributing Peroni Nastro Azzuro (“Peroni”) brand products in Singapore in 2013 pursuant to an exclusive distribution agreement dated 8 March 2013 with SABMiller Brands Europe a.s. (“SABMiller”) (the “2013 Distribution Agreement”). The 2013 Distribution Agreement contains the following clause on governing law and jurisdiction:
- [9]
[9] On 1 April 2016, 6DM and SABMiller entered into an exclusive distribution agreement (the “AEBK Agreement”), to renew their existing distribution agreement. On 31 July 2017, SABMiller was acquired by the Asahi Group, and SABMiller changed its name to ABE. On 1 January 2018, AEBK took over the business from ABE and assumed all of ABE’s rights, benefits, obligations and liabilities under the AEBK Agreement. In the AEBK Agreement, the clause for governing law and jurisdiction is as follows:
- [10]
[10] On 15 March 2017, 6DM and Asahi Europe Ltd (“AEL”) entered into a third party distribution agreement; and subsequently, on 1 April 2017, APB assumed all of AEL’s rights, benefits, obligations and liabilities under the agreement (the “APB Agreement”). The APB Agreement contains the following clause on governing law and jurisdiction:
- [11]
[11] On 1 February 2020, 6DM and ABA entered into a third party distribution agreement (the “ABA Agreement”). The ABA Agreement contained the following clause on governing law and jurisdiction:
- [12]
[12] I will refer to the AEBK Agreement, the APB Agreement and the ABA Agreement as the “distribution agreements”; and to clause 22.2 in each of the agreements as the “exclusive jurisdiction clause” (the “EJC”).
Termination of the AEBK, APB and ABA Agreements
- [13]
[13] Between 6 and 7 July 2020, the Asahi Entities terminated the AEBK Agreement, the APB Agreement and the ABA Agreement on the basis that 6DM had neglected and/or failed to make full payment on invoices under the distribution agreements dating back to 2017. According to 6DM, the termination of these agreements was (inter alia) contrary to the representations made by the Asahi Entities, ie, that debts owed by 6DM to the Asahi Entities need only be paid when the Arrangement was finalised, and/or in breach of the implied agreement and/or collateral contract between the Asahi Entities and itself.
- [14]
[14] On 2 October 2020, 6DM commenced Suit 951 for the loss and damage allegedly caused by the Asahi Entities’ and Bogna’s various breaches. On 4 December 2020, 6DM was granted leave to serve the writ out of jurisdiction on the defendants. The Asahi Entities issued the Statutory Demand to 6DM on 22 January 2021. On 10 February 2021, the Asahi Entities filed SUM 665 in Suit 951. 6DM commenced OS 138 on 15 February 2021 to injunct the Asahi Entities and ABGG from commencing winding-up proceedings against 6DM on the basis of the Statutory Demand (see [3] above).
The parties’ cases
- [15]
[15] 6DM’s position on whether the dispute in Suit 951 is one “arising under or in connection with” the distribution agreements has shifted more than once in the course of the proceedings before me. In its written submissions of 20 May 2021, 6DM argued that the dispute in Suit 951 fell outside the scope of the distribution agreements and that the EJCs in these agreements were therefore irrelevant to the dispute. However, in its further submissions of 3 June 2021, 6DM stated that it would no longer pursue this argument. In the light of this express concession, it was surprising that in its final submissions on 13 September 2021, 6DM again reprised the argument that the dispute in Suit 951 did not arise under or in connection with the distribution agreements. 6DM did not explain in its submissions of 13 September 2021 the reasons for this volte-face. I will approach its case in SUM 665 on the basis that it is alleging that the present dispute falls outside the scope of the distribution agreements and that the EJCs in these agreements are irrelevant to the dispute.
- [16]
[16] Even if the present dispute is found to arise under or in connection with the distribution agreements, 6DM argues that:
(a) The EJC in the AEBK Agreement which refers to “local courts” is a reference to the “Singapore courts” and is therefore an EJC in favour of the Singapore courts. 6DM argues that this means sections 11(1) and 11(2) of the CCAA apply; and that properly construed, these provisions require the Singapore courts to exercise jurisdiction over the entirety of the present dispute, notwithstanding the EJCs in the APB and ABA Agreements which are expressly in favour of the courts of England and Wales. Indeed, according to 6DM, the EJC in the AEBK Agreement should be enforced “at the expense of” the EJCs in the APB and the ABA Agreements. 6DM claims that to do otherwise would be “[t]o split up this dispute for different courts to hear, and risk inconsistent findings of fact” which “would constitute manifest injustice and/or would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of Singapore, within the meaning of the CCAA”.
(b) 6DM further argues that even if I were to find that the reference to “local courts” in clause 22.2 of the AEBK Agreement is a reference to the “courts of England and Wales”, I should nevertheless decline to stay or dismiss Suit 951. Again, this is because (according to 6DM) a stay or a dismissal of Suit 951 would result in a multiplicity of proceedings and/or constitute a breach of natural justice: “there would be no certainty that 6DM would be able to join [Federico Bogna], or that the courts of England and Wales would assume jurisdiction over [Federico Bogna]”.
(c) If all else fails, I should decline to stay or dismiss Suit 951 on the basis that the Asahi Entities have submitted to the Singapore courts’ jurisdiction when they issued the Statutory Demand under Singapore law and sought recourse in the Singapore courts.
(d) As for OS 138, 6DM contends that there are triable issues warranting the grant of an injunction against the commencement of winding-up proceedings by the Asahi Entities.
- [17]
[17] As for the Asahi Entities, they argue that:
(a) Their service of the Statutory Demand and/or their invitation to the Singapore courts to make a finding whether any triable issues exist in OS 138 and/or Suit 951 do not constitute a submission to the jurisdiction of the Singapore courts.
(b) In any event, according to the Asahi Entities, the dispute in Suit 951 clearly arises under or in connection with the three distribution agreements. This means that the EJCs in all three distribution agreements are engaged; and it is the Asahi Entities’ case that all three EJCs are in favour of the courts of England and Wales. Section 12(1) of the CCAA therefore applies to the EJCs in question; and 6DM has not shown that giving effect to the EJCs would lead to manifest injustice or would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of Singapore within the meaning of section 12(1)(c) of the CCAA. The Asahi Entities contend that in the circumstances, I am required by section 12(1) to dismiss or stay Suit 951 in favour of the courts of England and Wales.
(c) As for OS 138, the Asahi Entities say that there are no triable issues to justify the injunction sought by 6DM; and that in any event, I should exercise my discretion to refuse the injunction sought because 6DM has not come to the court with clean hands.
Parties’ further submissions on full and frank disclosure
- [18]
[18] In addition to the above, an issue arose in SUM 665 as to whether 6DM had breached its duty of full and frank disclosure in the course of its ex parte application for leave to serve the writ out of jurisdiction in HC/SUM 5295/2020 (“SUM 5295”). The supporting affidavit of 3 December 2020 – filed by Adrian Sim (the “3 December 2020 Affidavit”) – stated at [42]:
The issues in contention
- [21]
[21] Having regard to the case put forward by 6DM and by the Asahi Entities respectively, the following issues arise for my determination:
(a) In SUM 665:
(i) Whether the dispute in Suit 951 arises under or in connection with the distribution agreements;
(ii) Whether the EJC in the AEBK Agreement is in favour of the Singapore courts or the courts of England and Wales. Inter alia, this raises the question of whether the standard of a “good arguable case” – which is the standard of review at common law for a stay of proceedings based on an EJC – also applies to applications for a stay or dismissal of proceedings pursuant to section 12(1) of the CCAA;
(iii) If the EJC in the AEBK Agreement is found to be in favour of the courts of England and Wales (ie similar to the EJCs in the APB and the ABA Agreements), whether 6DM is able to show that giving effect to the EJCs in the distribution agreements would lead to manifest injustice or would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of Singapore within the meaning of section 12(1)(c) of the CCAA;
(iv) Conversely, if the EJC in the AEBK Agreement is found to be in favour of the Singapore courts, whether sections 11(1) and 11(2) of the CCAA apply in such a way that this EJC should be enforced “at the expense” of the EJCs in the APB and the ABA Agreements;
(v) Whether the Asahi Entities had submitted to the Singapore court’s jurisdiction by reason of their service of the Statutory Demand and/or their conduct in OS 138 and/or in Suit 951;
(vi) Whether 6DM had breached its duty to make full and frank disclosure when seeking leave to serve the writ out of jurisdiction in SUM 5295;
(b) In OS 138:
(i) Whether 6DM has raised triable issues in OS 138, ie, that there exists a substantial and bona fide dispute, whether in relation to a cross-claim or disputed debt, warranting the grant of an injunction restraining the Asahi Entities from commencing winding-up proceedings.
SUM 665
The applicable legal principles under section 12 of the CCAA
- [22]
[22] Turning to SUM 665 and the Asahi Entities’ prayer for a stay of dismissal of the Suit 951 proceedings pursuant to section 12 of the CCAA, I consider first the legal principles governing such an application.
- [23]
[23] At common law, where an application is made to stay proceedings on the basis that the dispute is subject to an EJC in favour of a foreign jurisdiction, the court will engage in a two-stage analysis to determine if a stay ought to be granted. At the first stage, the party seeking to rely on the EJC bears the burden of showing a “good arguable case” that an EJC exists and governs the dispute in question: Vinmar Overseas (Singapore) Pte Ltd v PTT International Trading Pte Ltd [2018] 2 SLR 1271 (“Vinmar”) at [45]; Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore vol 6(2) (LexisNexis, 2020 Reissue) (“Halsbury’s”) at para 75.112. To establish a “good arguable case” that a jurisdiction agreement governs the dispute in an EJC application, the applicant must have the better of the argument, on the evidence before the court, that the agreement exists and applies to the dispute. This formulation reflects that the threshold is more than a mere prima facie case, but is different from the standard of a balance of probabilities given the limits inherent in the stage at which the application is being heard. In determining whether the applicant has established a good arguable case, the court may grapple with questions of law but should not delve into contested factual issues: Vinmar at [45] and [46]. As for the second stage of the analysis, this requires the party in breach of the EJC to demonstrate “strong cause amounting to exceptional circumstances” why he should not be held to the jurisdiction agreement: Vinmar at [112]; Halsbury’s at para 75.121.
- [24]
[24] The question then is whether the common law test as set out above should apply to applications under section 12 of the CCAA. I reproduce below section 12 of the CCAA:
Adopting the “good arguable case” standard
- [25]
[25] Following from the manner in which section 12 of the CCAA is formulated, it would appear applications under section 12(1) for a stay or dismissal of proceedings fall to be considered in two stages. First, the court has to consider whether there exists an exclusive choice of court agreement (which, for ease of reference, I will also refer to as an “EJC”) which does not designate Singapore as a chosen court and which applies to the case or proceeding in which the section 12(1) application is made. This is the first stage of the analysis. If the court is satisfied that there is such an EJC before it, it must stay or dismiss the case or proceeding, unless it is shown that one of the five exceptions set out in section 12(1) applies. This is the second stage of the analysis.
- [26]
[26] I asked both parties for submissions on whether the “good arguable case” standard at the first stage of the Vinmar test should apply to the first stage of the analysis for applications under section 12(1) of the CCAA. A possible alternative approach to Vinmar is the approach taken by our courts in the context of arbitration, whereby a court hearing a stay application should grant a stay in favour of arbitration if the applicant is able to establish a prima facie case (per the Court of Appeal (“CA”) in Tomolugen Holdings Ltd and another v Silica Investors Ltd and other appeals [2016] 1 SLR 373 (“Tomolugen”) at [63]) that:
On the Tomolugen approach, once this burden has been discharged by the party applying for a stay, the court should grant a stay and defer the actual determination of the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction to the tribunal itself (at [64]).
- [27]
[27] In considering the standard of review to be applied in the context of section 12 of the CCAA, it should be remembered that section 12 was based on Art 6 of the 2005 Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (the “Hague Convention”); and in interpreting the various provisions of the Hague Convention, a highly relevant and useful source of reference is the Explanatory Report on the 2005 Hague Choice of Court Agreements Convention (2013) published by the Hague Conference on Private International Law (“the Hartley/Dogauchi Report”).
- [28]
[28] On the question of the standard of review to be adopted in determining whether there is an EJC which applies to the proceedings before the court seised and which does not designate the court seised as the chosen court, the Hartley/Dogauchi Report is inconclusive as to the appropriate approach. Para 144 of the Hartley/Dogauchi Report describes the obligations of a court not chosen under Art 6 of the Hague Convention as such:
- [29]
[29] While para 144 of the Hartley/Dogauchi Report makes it clear that the court seised (but not chosen) is responsible for deciding whether an EJC exists and whether it governs the dispute in question, it does not indicate the standard of review to be adopted by the court in coming to its decision. The parties have also been unable to locate any authorities that address this issue. Accordingly, I rely on first principles in considering the appropriate approach in the context of section 12(1) of the CCAA.
- [30]
[30] In Tomolugen, one of the key reasons for the adoption of the prima facie approach was the kompetenz-kompetenz principle found in Art 16 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (at [26] and [67]). The CA in Tomolugen was of the view that allowing (and, indeed, obliging) the court seised of jurisdiction to make a full determination on the existence and scope of the arbitration clause would deprive the putative arbitral tribunal of its kompetenz-komptenz (at [67]). Instead, the CA held that “the arbitral tribunal is to be the first arbiter of its own jurisdiction, with the court having the final say” [emphasis added] (at [66]). Thus, while the arbitral tribunal will determine the existence and scope of its own jurisdiction, its determination will “nonetheless remain subject to overriding court supervision in the form of an appeal under s 10(3) of the [International Arbitration Act (Cap 143A, 2002 Rev Ed) (“the IAA”)] against the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdictional ruling” (at [64]).
- [31]
[31] Quite apart from the fact that there is no equivalent principle of kompetenz-kompetenz in the context of EJCs, there is also no equivalent appeal process. It is simply not possible in the context of EJCs to say that the chosen court – defined in section 2(1) of the CCAA as “a court, of a Contracting State, designated in an exclusive choice of court agreement” – is to be the first arbiter of its own jurisdiction and for the court seised (but not chosen) to have the final say. Once a court seised decides to stay or dismiss the proceedings on the grounds of section 12 of the CCAA, the chosen court’s determination of its jurisdiction cannot be appealed by way of recourse to the court seised.
- [32]
[32] In addition to the above considerations, it should be remembered that the initial question of whether an EJC exists and if so, which jurisdiction it favours, not only determines whether the CCAA is applicable in the first place, but also determines whether section 11 of the CCAA (where the EJC is in favour of a Singapore court), or section 12 of the CCAA (where the EJC is in favour of another court, not a Singapore court), applies. As the CA in Vinmar explained (at [44]), “[i]n an EJC Application, the context is that the applicant is inviting the court not to exercise its otherwise valid jurisdiction over the dispute. In the circumstances, a relatively robust test is apposite, albeit it must require less than the test of a balance of probabilities given the interlocutory nature of the application.”
- [33]
[33] I add that in the first stage of a stay application under section 12(1) of the CCAA, the issue to be considered by the court is similar to the issue to be considered under the common law in the first stage of an application for a stay based on an EJC. It makes sense, therefore, that a similar approach is applied in both instances. In this connection, I note that in the context of recognition of foreign judgments, the CA in Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp (formerly known as Merck & Co, Inc) v Merck KGaA (formerly known as E Merck) [2021] 1 SLR 1102 has held that “[w]here the defences to the recognition of foreign judgments are concerned … it is in principle desirable that there be broad convergence in the defences available under the common law and under statutes such as the CCAA and the REFJA”; and this is “especially so in respect of the CCAA, which gives effect to the [Hague Convention]” (at [37]).
- [34]
[34] For the above reasons, I find that in the context of section 12(1) of the CCAA, a relatively robust approach is appropriate at the first stage of the analysis when determining whether an EJC exists and whether it governs the dispute in question. I therefore adopt the same approach as that set out in Vinmar. This means that the party applying under section 12(1) for a stay or dismissal of the case of proceedings has to show a “good arguable case” that an EJC exists and governs the dispute in question.
Displacing the common law test of “strong cause”
- [35]
[35] At common law, once the party seeking to rely on a purported EJC establishes a good arguable case that the EJC exists and governs the dispute in question, the onus at the second stage of the analysis shifts to the party in breach of the EJC to show “strong cause amounting to exceptional circumstances” why he should not be held to the jurisdiction agreement. Under the CCAA, however, the test applicable at this stage to applications for a stay or dismissal of proceedings under section 12(1) is a different one. In the Explanatory Statement in the Choice of Court Agreements Bill (Bill No. 14/2016) (the “Bill”), it was stated that:
- [36]
[36] From the wording of section 12 of the CCAA as well as the Explanatory Statement, it is clear that where an EJC does not designate any Singapore court as a chosen court, a Singapore court must stay or dismiss the case or proceeding to which the agreement applies, unless one of the five exceptions stipulated in section 12(1) of the CCAA applies. Section 12(2) of the CCAA provides that this does not affect the ability of a Singapore court to stay or dismiss the case or proceeding on other grounds. Reading both subsections together, while a Singapore court may choose to stay or dismiss the case or proceeding on other grounds, the grounds on which it may choose not to stay or dismiss the case or proceeding are closed, ie, limited to the five exceptions set out in section 12(1). I note as well that like section 6(2) of the IAA (and unlike section 6(2) of the Arbitration Act (Cap 10, 2002 Rev Ed)), section 12 of the CCAA is framed in mandatory terms: the court has no discretion to refuse a stay if an applicable EJC does not designate any Singapore court as a chosen court and if none of the five stated exceptions in section 12(1) applies.
- [37]
[37] The above conclusion is supported by Art 6 of the Hague Convention, on which section 12 of the CCAA was based. In the commentary on Art 6 at para 141 of the Hartley/Dogauchi Report, it is stated that:
- [38]
[38] The effect of section 12 of the CCAA is thus to override “any other written law or rule of law” in Singapore that might, in the absence of the EJC, permit the court to exercise jurisdiction over a case or proceeding to which the EJC applies. In other words, for the purpose of an application under section 12(1) of the CCAA, it does not suffice for the party resisting a stay of the Singapore proceedings to show that there is “strong cause” to refuse a stay – or that the applicant had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Singapore courts pursuant to section 16(1)(b) of the SCJA – if he cannot bring himself within one of the five exceptions specified in section 12(1). Paras 145–146 of the Hartley/Dogauchi Report put the position beyond doubt:
- [39]
[39] In sum: in an application for dismissal or stay of proceedings pursuant to section 12(1) of the CCAA, it is for the party seeking to rely on the purported EJC to show a “good arguable case” that an EJC exists and governs the dispute in question. Once the applicant has done so, the Singapore court is required (except in the circumstances specified in section 12(1)) not to hear the case, ie, to stay or dismiss the proceedings – even if it has jurisdiction under national law.
Whether the EJC in the AEBK Agreement is in favour of the Singapore courts or the courts of England and Wales
- [40]
[40] On the issue of whether the EJC in the AEBK Agreement favours the Singapore courts or the English courts, 6DM’s position has also shifted significantly in the course of these proceedings. Paragraph 136 of 6DM’s 1st Written Submissions dated 22 April 2021 stated in no uncertain terms that “6DM does not dispute that the Agreements are governed by English law and contain exclusive jurisdiction clauses in favour of the English courts (Clause 22 in each of the Agreements)”. However, at the oral hearing on 29 April 2021 and in its further written submissions, counsel for 6DM argued that although the contracting parties for the AEBK Agreement had nominated English law as the governing law, the EJC in the AEBK Agreement was an EJC in favour of the Singapore courts because the reference in that EJC to “local courts” was actually a reference to “Singapore courts”. 6DM argued that since the parties to the AEBK Agreement had used the expression “English law” in clause 22.1 of the agreement, they could and would simply have used the expression “the courts of England and Wales” in clause 22.2 had they truly intended to refer to the English courts – and since they did not, they must be taken to have intended to refer to a court other than the English courts. In arguing that the words “local courts” in clause 22.2 must mean the Singapore courts, 6DM pointed to clause 9.3 of the AEBK Agreement in which the expression “Local Regulations” was used. In clause 9.3, “Local Regulations” is defined as “all laws and regulations affecting the distribution of the Products in the Territory”; and “Territory” in turn is defined in clause 1.1 as “Singapore Domestic”. In other words, since the words “Local Regulations” in clause 9.3 refer to laws and regulations affecting the distribution of the products in Singapore, the words “local courts” in clause 22.2 must refer to the courts of Singapore.
- [41]
[41] On the other hand, the Asahi Entities argued that the words “local courts” in clause 22.2 of the AEBK Agreement should be construed with reference to clause 22.1, which provided for the AEBK Agreement to be governed by English law. According to the Asahi Entities, this strongly suggested that the parties always intended for the English courts to adjudicate any disputes arising under or in connection with the AEBK Agreement. The Asahi Entities also argued that 6DM’s attempt to rely on clause 9.3 in the construction of the words “local courts” in clause 22.2 was “an afterthought” without any merit.
- [42]
[42] For the purposes of interpreting the EJC in clause 22.2 of the AEBK Agreement, “[t]he law which governs the contract will also generally govern the jurisdiction agreement” (per the CA in Shanghai Turbo Enterprises Ltd v Liu Ming [2019] 1 SLR 779 (Shanghai Turbo”) at [54]). As seen above, clause 22.1 provides that English law is the governing law. Applying the principles of contractual interpretation established in English law, I note firstly that “the ultimate aim of interpreting a provision in a contract, especially a commercial contract, is to determine what the parties meant by the language used, which involves ascertaining what a reasonable person would have understood the parties to have meant”; and in this connection, the relevant reasonable person is one who has “all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the contract”: Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 (“Investors Compensation Scheme”) at p 912H; Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] 1 WLR 2900 (“Rainy Sky”) at [14]; Hin-Pro International Logistics Ltd v Compania Sud Americana de Vapores SA [2015] EWCA Civ 401 (“Hin-Pro”) at [57].
- [43]
[43] While English law excludes from the admissible background the parties’ previous negotiations and their declarations of subjective intent, it includes prior contracts between the parties: per the English Court of Appeal (Civil Division) in HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd v New Hampshire Insurance Co [2001] EWCA Civ 735 (“HIH Insurance”) (at [81] to [84]). In KPMG LLP v Network Rail Infrastructure Limited [2007] EWCA Civ 363 (“KPMG LLP”), the English Court of Appeal (“English CA”) had to interpret a lease dated 11 July 1985 (“the 1985 lease”) which followed generally the form of a draft lease attached to an agreement dated 13 December 1974 (“the 1974 Agreement”). The English CA held that in interpreting the 1985 lease, “the 1974 [A]greement, including the form and content of the draft lease attached to it, was an important part of the background and is a permissible aid in the construction of the lease in its final form”. It concluded that “something ha[d] gone wrong” with the drafting of the 1985 lease, and that the proposed interpretation based on the 1974 Agreement was “a better reflection of the parties’ intentions”.
- [44]
[44] Applying the above principles to the present case, I find firstly that 6DM’s attempt to rely on clause 9.3 as an aid to the interpretation of clause 22.2 is tenuous at best. The term “Local Regulations” is expressly and clearly defined in clause 9.3 itself as the “laws and regulations affecting the distribution of the Products in the Territory” (ie, in Singapore); whereas in clause 22.2, there is no similar definition of the term “local courts”.
- [45]
[45] I find, on the other hand, that the background to the AEBK Agreement – specifically, the 2013 DA between 6DM and SABMiller – provides a helpful guide to the parties’ intention vis-à-vis clause 22.2 of the AEBK Agreement. The 2013 DA is inevitably part of the factual matrix of the AEBK Agreement. 6DM does not dispute that the AEBK Agreement was a renewal of the 2013 DA between 6DM and SABMiller: indeed, it is pleaded as such in 6DM’s statement of claim. It is not disputed that these agreements were based on SABMiller’s standard form template. When the AEBK Agreement was entered into on 1 April 2016, the parties to the said agreement were still 6DM and SABMiller : it was only subsequent to 1 April 2016 that SABMiller changed its name to ABE (in July 2017), and that ABE’s rights and obligations under the AEBK Agreement were assumed by AEBK (on 1 January 2018). 6DM also does not dispute that the 2013 DA contained an EJC in favour of “the courts of England and Wales”. While 6DM has argued that the use of the words “local courts” in clause 22.2 in the AEBK Agreement suggests “the parties made the conscious decision to confer exclusive jurisdiction on a court other than the courts of England and Wales”, this suggestion of a “conscious decision” is not borne out by the affidavit evidence – which includes the multiple affidavits of 6DM’s Adrian Sim. On the contrary, given that the parties agree the AEBK Agreement was an agreement to “renew [the] existing distribution arrangement [between 6DM and SABMiller]” , it does not appear to me to make any commercial sense for the parties to have “consciously decided” – in relation to the choice of court in clause 22.2 – to switch to a court other than the courts of England and Wales.
- [46]
[46] This is all the more so when one considers that the AEBK Agreement continued to adopt English law as the governing law, and that these agreements were based on SABMiller’s standard form template. On the one hand, the English courts have held that England is the best forum for the application of its own law: see for example the judgment of the English CA in Hin-Pro at [66]. On the other hand, the number of courts that might have jurisdiction over a dispute is at least as large as the range of countries in which the relevant beer products might be distributed. Some countries are likely not to apply English law despite clause 22.1; some might apply it in an idiosyncratic manner: SABMiller could not have predicted with any certainty how the courts in each country where its products were distributed would respond. In the circumstances, it made no commercial sense for it to have consciously decided on 1 April 2016 to switch the choice of court in clause 22.2 to a court other than the courts of England and Wales.
- [47]
[47] For the reasons set out above at [40] to [46], I accept that the Asahi Entities have made out a good arguable case that the EJC in clause 22.2 of the AEBK Agreement is an EJC in favour of the courts of England and Wales.
Whether the dispute in Suit 951 arises under or in connection with the distribution agreements
- [48]
[48] 6DM’s next argument is that even if the EJC in the AEBK Agreement is found to be in favour of the courts of England and Wales, section 12(1) of the CCAA is nevertheless not engaged because the dispute in Suit 951 does not arise under or in connection with the distribution agreements, and is therefore not a case or proceeding to which the distribution agreements apply. As I noted earlier, this argument is one which 6DM first advanced in its submissions of 20 May 2021 and then expressly abandoned in its submissions of 13 June 2021 – only to reprise in its final submissions of 13 September 2021. In gist, 6DM argues that the dispute in Suit 951 falls outside the scope of the distribution agreements because “[n]one of 6DM’s causes of action involve the enforcement of any contractual term in the Agreements”. In particular, 6DM argues that its claims in fraudulent misrepresentation and conspiracy should not be governed by the EJCs in the distribution agreements, citing the High Court’s judgment in Ong Ghee Soon Kevin v Ho Yong Chong [2016] SGHC 277 (“Ong Ghee Soon Kevin”). Specifically, 6DM contended that the High Court in Ong Ghee Soon Kevin had “remarked that there is ‘scant authority’ on whether Singapore private international law rules would give effect to contractual choice of law clauses for tort claims”.
- [49]
[49] With respect, in citing Ong Ghee Soon Kevin, 6DM has selectively quoted one line from the High Court’s judgment without referencing the context in which that line appeared or, for that matter, the rest of the judgment and/or the actual outcome in that case. In Ong Ghee Soon Kevin, the dispute was between the customer of a bank (the plaintiff) and the bank’s designated officer (the defendant) who had liaised with the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant had induced him to purchase certain shares by making certain representations. The defendant sought, inter alia, to rely on the choice of law clause in the general conditions of the bank’s contract with the plaintiff, which provided that relations between the bank and its customers were subject to Swiss law, and asserted that under Swiss law, the plaintiff’s claim against him was not actionable. The interpretation of the choice of law clause was governed by Swiss law as the proper law of the contract between the bank and the plaintiff; whereas the question of whether a contractual choice of law clause for torts would be given effect in Singapore courts depended on Singapore private international law rules. It was in dealing with the defendant’s attempt to rely on the choice of law clause that the High Court remarked that there was “scant authority” on whether Singapore private international law rules would give effect to contractual choice of law clauses for tort claims. What 6DM has failed to point out in its written submissions, however, is that the High Court went on to note the existence of academic commentary which supported the view that “when the relationship between the parties is primarily contractual, causes of action relating to the contract should also be governed by the proper law of the contract”. The High Court also noted that in Rickshaw Investments and another v Nicolai Baron von Uexkull [2007] 1 SLR(R) 377, the CA had held that the appellants’ equitable claims centering around allegations of breach of fiduciary duty as well as breach of confidence arose from a legal relationship established by an employment contract and were hence governed by the law of the underlying contract (German law); and that in Thahir Kartika Ratna v PT Pertambangan Minyak dan Gas Bumi Negara (Pertamina) [1994] 3 SLR(R) 312, the CA had referred to the rule that where a restitutionary obligation arises in connection with a contract, the proper law of the restitutionary obligation is the proper law of the contract. On the facts of Ong Ghee Soon Kevin itself, the High Court found that the choice of law clause in the bank’s general conditions was drafted widely enough to encompass tortious obligations, but it also held that in any event, the defendant – being a third party to the bank’s contract with its customer – could not rely on and take the benefit of the choice of law clause. It cautioned, therefore, that the views it had stated on the application of Singapore private international law rules to contractual choice of law clauses for torts were “provisional” (at [107]–[111]).
- [50]
[50] Having selectively cited one line from the High Court’s judgment in Ong Ghee Soon Kevin, 6DM has also regrettably failed to explain how the judgment supports its argument that the EJCs in the distribution agreements are irrelevant to Suit 951 because the dispute in Suit 951 falls outside the scope of the distribution agreements. With respect, 6DM has also failed to address other relevant authorities.
- [51]
[51] In Fiona Trust & Holding Corporation and others v Privalov and others [2007] UKHL 40 (“Fiona Trust”), the House of Lords held that in interpreting an arbitration clause, it is presumed that parties are rational businessmen and would thus have intended any claims (including non-contractual claims) which arise out of the relationship between them to be decided by the same tribunal. An arbitration clause will be construed in accordance with this presumption unless the language makes it clear that certain questions were intended to be excluded from the arbitrator’s jurisdiction (see Fiona Trust at [13]).
- [52]
[52] Fiona Trust was cited by our CA in Tomolugen. In Tomolugen, the plaintiff, Silica Investors, and the second defendant, Lionsgate, had entered into a Share Sale Agreement whereby the plaintiff acquired from the second defendant certain shares in a company named AMRG. Silica Investors subsequently commenced a minority oppression suit against several defendants, including Lionsgate and AMRG. The CA had to consider whether part of the proceedings fell within the scope of the arbitration clause in the Share Sale Agreement, which provided that “any dispute arising out of or in connection with this Agreement, including any question regarding its existence, validity or termination, shall be referred to and finally resolved by arbitration in Singapore”. The CA held that in determining whether the disputed matters fell within the scope of the arbitration clause, the “court does not adopt a technical approach”, but – per the House of Lords’ stated approach in Fiona Trust – construes the clause based on the presumed intentions of the parties as rational commercial parties. As the CA put it (at [125]), “[w]hen ascertaining whether a given matter is covered by an arbitration clause, the court must consider the underlying basis and true nature of the issue or claim, and is not limited solely to the manner in which it is pleaded”.
- [53]
[53] Applying the above principles, the CA found that one of the disputed matters, which concerned the allegedly improper issuance of AMRG shares, could not fairly be said to arise out of or in connection with the Share Sale Agreement because the central issue therein was whether any commercial justification existed for the issuance of the shares: this was an issue which depended on whether certain liabilities had been discharged by AMRG prior to the conclusion of the Share Sale Agreement and was wholly unaffected by the Share Sale Agreement itself (Tomolugen at [134]). On the other hand, the other disputed matter, which concerned Silica Investors’ claim regarding its alleged exclusion from participation in AMRG’s management, was held to be a matter falling squarely within the ambit of the arbitration clause in the Share Sale Agreement, as Silica Investors’ only basis for asserting that there was an understanding of a legitimate expectation that it would participate in AMRG’s management was the Share Sale Agreement (Tomolugen at [136]). In other words, although Silica Investors’ claim regarding exclusion from management participation was pleaded as part of a minority oppression action, it was found to be a “dispute arising out of or in connection with the [Share Sale] Agreement”.
- [54]
[54] In the present case, it is not disputed that the relationship between 6DM and the Asahi Entities is a contractual one, based on the distribution agreements entered into between them. 6DM’s various causes of action against the Asahi Entities in Suit 951 are pleaded as follows. First, 6DM claims that the Asahi Entities made various fraudulent misrepresentations (through Bogna and one Mr Choo Kinyi) to it: 6DM claims that it entered into the distribution agreements with the Asahi Entities in reliance on these misrepresentations and that it continued to promote, market and distribute the Asahi Entities’ products pursuant to these distribution agreements despite incurring substantial losses. In this connection, 6DM also makes claims of unlawful and/or lawful means conspiracy, alleging that the Asahi Entities and Bogna were party to a conspiracy to make the alleged misrepresentations and subsequently to terminate the distribution agreements. Further or in the alternative, 6DM claims the existence of an implied agreement and/or a collateral contract: whereas the Asahi Entities say the terms of the distribution agreements entitle them to terminate the DAs, 6DM asserts that the Asahi Entities had – pursuant to the alleged implied agreement or collateral contract – agreed not to enforce their rights under the distribution agreements. Finally, 6DM claims that the Asahi Entities are “liable in unjust enrichment”: according to 6DM, it has incurred losses in marketing and distributing the various products under the distribution agreements, while the Asahi Entities have on the other hand “enjoyed the fruit” of 6DM’s efforts and investment in the said products, and thereby enriched themselves.
- [55]
[55] 6DM’s claims against the Asahi Entities plainly require determination of questions relating to the circumstances in which the distribution agreements were concluded, the respective parties’ rights and obligations under the distribution agreements, and whether the express terms of the distribution agreements are exhaustive of their rights and obligations. Applying the principles articulated in Fiona Trust and Tomolugen, I am unable to accept 6DM’s argument that the dispute in Suit 951 does not arise under or in connection with the distribution agreements. Indeed, with respect, having regard to its assertion that the Asahi Entities are precluded from exercising their contractual right to terminate the distribution agreements, inter alia, because of an implied agreement and/or a collateral contract, it seems to me disingenuous of 6DM to say that none of its causes of action in Suit 951 concern the enforcement of any terms of the distribution agreements.
- [56]
[56] Finally, I note that in its submissions of 13 September 2021, 6DM has argued that the EJCs in the distribution agreements do not apply to Suit 951 because one of the parties to Suit 951 – Bogna – was not a party to the distribution agreements and is not bound by the EJCs in these agreements. This argument is also without merit. While it is true that Bogna is not bound by the EJCs in these distribution agreements, the EJCs are still binding as between 6DM and the Asahi Entities – and any case or proceeding which 6DM brings against the Asahi Entities, to which the EJCs apply, must be stayed or dismissed vis-à-vis the Asahi Entities, unless the court determines that one of the exceptions in section 12(1) of the CCAA applies. In fact, para 143 of the Hartley/Dogauchi Report expressly considered how the Hague Convention would work in multi-party cases; and from the example given, it is clear that notwithstanding the presence of a third party who is not bound by the EJC, the EJC will nevertheless be binding as between the parties to it, and a court will be required to suspend or dismiss any proceedings between those parties:
- [57]
[57] Having regard to the reasons set out at [40] to [56], I am satisfied that there is a good arguable case that the EJCs in the three distribution agreements apply to Suit 951. As I have found that the EJC in the AEBK Agreement is in favour of the English courts and as the EJCs in the APB and the ABA Agreements are also in favour of the English courts, section 12(1) of the CCAA is engaged. This means that I must dismiss or stay the proceedings in Suit 951, unless I determine that one of the five stated exceptions in section 12(1) applies.
Whether giving effect to the EJCs would result in manifest injustice or would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of Singapore
- [58]
[58] 6DM invokes section 12(1)(c) of the CCAA: it contends that giving effect to the EJCs will “lead to a manifest injustice” or will be “manifestly contrary to the public policy of Singapore”. In invoking section 12(1)(c), 6DM relies in the main on the argument that the grant of a stay or dismissal of Suit 951 vis-à-vis the Asahi Entities will lead to multiple sets of proceedings in more than one jurisdiction and thus the fragmentation of the dispute.
- [59]
[59] At common law, where the grant of a stay would lead to the “fragmentation of a dispute across multiple jurisdictions” because the dispute involves multiple parties, some of whom are not parties to the jurisdiction agreement, “the risk of duplicative proceedings, inconsistent findings and incentivising a rush to judgment may well establish strong cause to refuse a stay”: per the CA in Vinmar (at [139]).
- [60]
[60] However, in an application for a stay or dismissal of proceedings pursuant to section 12(1) of the CCAA, the test is very different. As seen above, 6DM has to establish that the alleged risk of multiplicity of proceedings will “lead to a manifest injustice” or will be “manifestly contrary to the public policy of Singapore” within the meaning of section 12(1)(c); and the threshold for establishing either limb of this exception is a high one. This is made abundantly clear in the Hartley-Dogauchi Report in the commentary on the third exception to Article 6 of the Hague Convention (on which section 12(1)(c) was based) (at paras 151 to 153):
- [61]
[61] Commenting on Article 6 of the Hague Convention and the exceptions to it, the authors of The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: Commentary and Documents (Ronald A. Brand & Paul Herrup, Cambridge University Press, 2008) had the following observations (at pp 91–93):
- [62]
[62] In Motacus Constructions Limited v Paolo Castelli SPA [2021] EWHC 356 (“Motacus”), the claimant – who had been retained by the defendant to supply and install plasterboard and other works relating to the defendant’s fitting-out project – applied in the English High Court for summary judgment to enforce the decision of an adjudicator which had made an award in the claimant’s favour against the defendant. The defendant’s sole defence to the summary judgment application was that it had been brought in breach of a clause in the construction contract which conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the courts of Paris, France: according to the defendant, this meant that the English High Court did not have jurisdiction to determine the summary judgment application. The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (“the 1982 Act”) of the United Kingdom (“UK”) governs the jurisdiction of the English courts where there is a dispute over which national court should entertain jurisdiction over a case. Following its amendment by the Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Act 2020 (“the 2020 Act”), such jurisdictional questions are now determined by the Hague Convention: section 1(2) of the 2020 Act inserted a new section 3D in the 1982 Act by which the Hague Convention has the force of law in the United Kingdom.
- [64]
[64] The claimant’s attempt to invoke Article 6(c) of the Hague Convention was rejected by the court. Noting that the claimant bore the burden of persuading the court that one or other (or both) of the two limbs of that particular exception was engaged, the court held that a high threshold was required for this exception to be engaged – and that the claimant had not met this threshold. In so holding, the court stated (at [54]) that it accepted the defendant’s submissions. These included the submission – citing Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws, 15th Ed - that the public policy exception “is to operate only in exceptional circumstances” [emphasis added] (at [41]):
- [65]
[65] On the evidence before it, the court in Motacus held that if Parliament considered “that the cashflow problems affecting the construction industry, and the consequent need to address this problem by way of a speedy mechanism for settling disputes in construction contracts on a provisional, and interim, basis, warrant a derogation from the binding character accorded to an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of a foreign court so as to enable an adjudicator’s decision to be enforced in the English and Welsh (or Scottish) courts, then it will need to make a declaration in respect of construction contracts under and in accordance with art. 21 of the 2005 Hague Convention”. The claimant had not shown that it would be contrary to public policy or unjust (let alone manifestly so) to require the claimant to enforce its adjudication award in the courts of Paris; and there was “no good reason why the parties should not be held to the bargain that they freely made when they incorporated clause 19 [the EJC] into their construction contract” (at [54]).
- [66]
[66] I add as an aside that ultimately, the court in Motacus decided to deal with the summary judgment application on the basis of the separate and distinct provisions of Article 7, which excludes “interim measures of protection” from the purview of the Hague Convention. In the court’s view, the concept of an interim measure of protection extended to an adjudicator’s decision: the reality of a summary judgment application brought to enforce an adjudicator’s decision “is that the court is being invited to grant an interim, rather than a final and conclusive, remedy” (at [57]). For our present purposes, however, Article 7 of the Hague Convention has no application: the English High Court’s judgment in Motacus is relevant mainly for affirming that a party who seeks to invoke one of the exceptions to Article 6 must exceed a high threshold and demonstrate exceptional circumstances before the exception is engaged.
- [68]
[68] The mere fact that 6DM has commenced proceedings against Federico Bogna in Singapore does not alter the above conclusions. Proceedings against Federico Bogna are still at a preliminary stage: Bogna entered his appearance on 28 April 2021, and it does not appear any substantive steps have been taken by or against him since. Moreover, even assuming for the sake of argument that Bogna cannot for some reason be joined as a party to proceedings against the Asahi Entities in the English courts, it is in principle possible for the risk of parallel proceedings and inconsistent findings to be mitigated via a limited stay of the Singapore proceedings against Bogna pending the resolution of the English proceedings. There is ample authority for the proposition that a Singapore court may grant such a limited stay in the discretionary exercise of its case management powers: see for example the High Court’s judgment in Yap Shirley Kathreyn v Tan Peng Quee [2011] SGHC 5 at [7], cited by the High Court in Ram Parshotam Mittal v Portcullis Trustnet (Singapore) Pte Ltd and others [2014] 3 SLR 1337 at [58], which was in turn cited by the Singapore International Commercial Court in BNP Paribas Wealth Management v Jacob Agam and another [2017] 3 SLR 27 at [34]. I stress that in pointing out the existence of such a discretion on the part of the Singapore courts, I make no judgment on how such discretion might be exercised in the event of any application in the present proceedings vis-à-vis Bogna. The point I am making is simply that 6DM is mistaken when it claims that a stay of the Singapore proceedings vis-à-vis the Asahi Entities will leave the Singapore courts and parties helpless in the face of confusing parallel proceedings and potentially inconsistent findings.
- [69]
[69] For the reasons set out at [58] to [68], I find that 6DM has not satisfied me that the exception in section 12(1)(c) of the CCAA – or for that matter, any exception under section 12(1) – applies.
The Asahi Entities’ alleged submission to jurisdiction
- [70]
[70] I address next 6DM’s argument that even if they fail on the issues relating to the EJCs and section 12(1) of the CCAA, the court should nevertheless decline to stay or dismiss Suit 951 because the Asahi Entities have submitted to the jurisdiction of the Singapore courts pursuant to section 16(1)(b) of the SCJA.
- [71]
[71] 6DM claims that the Asahi Entities have, by virtue of the Statutory Demand they served on 6DM, voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the Singapore courts in connection with the matters raised in Suit 951. According to 6DM, the service of the Statutory Demand evinced a clear intention on the Asahi Entities’ part to commence proceedings against 6DM in the Singapore courts. The issues in OS 138, including the matters raised in the Statutory Demand, are “inextricably linked” to the issues in Suit 951. It is untenable for the Asahi Entities to separate SUM 665 from the Statutory Demand such that the former is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of England and Wales while proceedings related to the latter are subject to the jurisdiction of the Singapore courts. In the alternative, 6DM says that the Asahi Entities have invited the Singapore courts to make substantive findings of fact in relation to the matters raised in Suit 951 and have thus submitted to the jurisdiction of the Singapore courts in Suit 951, since they are participating in the procedure for resolution of the merits of the case.
- [72]
[72] The Asahi Entities disagree. They contend that they have simply filed the Statutory Demand on the basis of undisputed contractual debts, which is one step removed from the commencement of formal winding up proceedings against 6DM. 6DM cannot raise any triable issues in this regard, and there is no “dispute” for which a submission can be made to the jurisdiction of the Singapore courts. Lastly, the winding-up jurisdiction of the court is not concerned with determining the merits of the parties’ disputes, and the Asahi Entities have filed affidavits only to prove to the court that there are no triable issues in OS 138 or Suit 951 and to demonstrate that there is no “dispute” in respect of which the Singapore courts have jurisdiction. According to the Asahi Entities, there is nothing in their submissions or affidavits which require the court to make substantive findings of fact.
- [73]
[73] The applicable legal principles with regard to submission to jurisdiction are largely undisputed. Both parties referred to the CA judgment in Shanghai Turbo. Whether a defendant’s conduct amounts to a submission to jurisdiction is a question of fact in each case (at [32]). The question is whether the defendant’s conduct demonstrates an unequivocal, clear and consistent intention to submit to the jurisdiction of the court (at [37]). The CA noted that “if a party’s conduct clearly and unequivocally signifies a submission to jurisdiction, we doubt whether it can necessarily be salvaged by a mere reservation. Even the filing of a jurisdictional challenge (in the service context) or a stay application (in the arbitral and forum non conveniens contexts) may not suffice if the challenge is fundamentally inconsistent with the nature of the defendant’s acts” (at [38]).
- [74]
[74] In Shanghai Turbo, the CA found that the respondent’s participation in Summons No 1173 of 2018 (“SUM 1173”) – which was an application filed by two non-parties in the suit – despite his not being compelled to respond to or otherwise participate in it, “amounted to an invocation of the court’s jurisdiction and an implied acceptance that the court had jurisdiction” to try the suit (at [33]). The respondent had taken it upon himself to argue and to support the non-parties’ application by filing written submissions, having his counsel make extensive oral arguments in support of SUM 1173, and filing an affidavit in support of SUM 1173 (at [30]).
- [75]
[75] Other cases have held that a party’s submission to jurisdiction is evinced by its filing of a defence (Reputation Administration Service Pte Ltd v Spamhaus Technology Ltd [2021] 2 SLR 342 (“Spamhaus”) at [22(a)]), a failure to file a prompt jurisdictional challenge/stay application and lack of protest against the court assuming jurisdiction over the parties (Spamhaus at [25], [27]; Allenger, Shiona (trustee-in-bankruptcy of the estate of Pelletier, Richard Paul Joseph) v Pelletier, Olga and another [2020] SGHC 279 (“Allenger”) at [97], [108]), and filing or contesting applications in the suit, eg contesting a summary judgment application and filing a striking out application (Spamhaus at [22(b)–(c)] and [24]; Allenger at [109]–[113]). Submission is established where a party has taken a clear and unequivocal step that is incompatible with the position that the Singapore court does not have jurisdiction (Spamhaus at [20]–[21]).
- [76]
[76] In the present case, after 6DM commenced Suit 951 on 2 October 2020 and was granted leave to serve the writ out of jurisdiction on 4 December 2020, the Asahi Entities issued the Statutory Demand to 6DM on 22 January 2021 and filed SUM 665 in Suit 951 on 10 February 2021. I first address, therefore, the question of whether these steps, either on their own or taken together, demonstrate a clear and unequivocal intention on the part of the Asahi Entities to have the dispute determined by the Singapore courts, or are incompatible with the position that the Singapore court does not have jurisdiction.
Issuance of the Statutory Demand
- [78]
[78] With respect, 6DM has not explained how the decision in Manharlal supports its position in the present case. In Manharlal, Wei JC opined – after a detailed review of certain English authorities – that the formal submission of a proof of debt by a foreign creditor was sufficient basis to allow the court supervising the insolvency administration to make orders against that foreign creditor (at [122]–[123]). In other words, formal submission of a debt to the insolvency administration will generally be adequate to support a conclusion that the court supervising the administration thereafter has jurisdiction to make orders in matters connected with the administration against the creditor who has proved the debt (at [122]). This is in substance an entirely different situation from what we have in the present case, where 6DM is claiming that the Asahi Entities’ issuance of a Statutory Demand amounts to a submission to the jurisdiction of the Singapore courts in connection with the matters raised in Suit 951. It should moreover be noted that in Manharlal, Wei JC held that the issue of whether the defendant could be regarded as having submitted to the jurisdiction of the court when it filed its proof of debt with the Official Assignee was “largely inconsequential” because “Singapore [was] not, in any event, the appropriate forum, and jurisdiction should be declined on the basis of forum non conveniens” (Manharlal at [123]).
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