High Court · Decided 6 May 2020
Day, Ashley Francis v Yeo Chin Huat Anthony and others
Feedback & support[2020] SGHC 93 · Case no. Suit No 454 of 2015
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] This case revolved around a business venture (“Rock Business”) involving the sale of plant nutrients and associated products (“Rock Products”). The parties were all persons and entities related to this business. The plaintiff sued his former business partners and their related entities, on the grounds of breach of contract, proprietary estoppel, conspiracy and deceit. All the claims were dismissed and the plaintiff has appealed.
Names of Parties
- [2]
[2] As a preliminary point, I noted that counsels in their submissions referred to the parties and witnesses by their first names; this has also been done on some occasions in some judgments. I do not consider it appropriate to do so, and would discourage counsel, at least those before me, from doing so.
- [3]
[3] The first names used by counsels have been substituted with their last names in this grounds of decision. A table setting out the abbreviations of parties used in this grounds is set out here for ease of comparison with the submissions:
Role
Full Name
Abbreviation in this grounds of decision
Plaintiff
Ashley Francis Day
“plaintiff”
First Defendant
Anthony Yeo Chin Huat
“Yeo”
Second Defendant
Shane Andrew Tainton
“Tainton”
Third Defendant
Warren Tyler Reid
“Reid”
Fourth Defendant
Michael O’Brien Biggs
“Biggs”
Witness
Cherise Tainton
“Mrs Tainton”
Witness
Con Caracoussis
“Caracoussis”
Witness
Kristopher Ryan Kaminski
“Kaminski”
Witness
Mark Minczanowaski
“Minczanowaski”
Expert Witness
Hugh Sutcliffe Martin
“Mr Martin”
Expert Witness
Iain Cameron Potter
“Mr Potter”
Undisputed Facts
- [4]
[4] Tainton and Reid own an Australian company named Rock Holdings (SA) Pty Ltd (“Rock Australia”), through which they sold Rock Products from around 2004. Since then, the Rock Products have been manufactured by Biggs through his various entities in Australia, including through the 6th defendant (“Aoraki”), a company of which Biggs is the sole director.
- [6]
[6] Rock Singapore was incorporated as per the April 2011 Agreements, with the legal shareholding as per the agreement. In addition, Rock Holdings Pte Ltd (“Rock Holdings”) was incorporated shortly thereafter, with Yeo as the sole registered shareholder. Several USA-registered trademarks of some Rock Products (“Rock Marks”) were transferred by Rock Australia to Rock Holdings.
- [7]
[7] Around April 2014, the Principal Parties fell into dispute with each other. The plaintiff and Yeo appointed Biggs as their proxy in Rock Singapore, in an attempt to resolve the dispute. This failed, and the plaintiff withdrew his proxy shortly around December 2014. Biggs then ceased to be involved in the running of the Rock Business. Subsequently around March 2015, Yeo informed the plaintiff that the plaintiff was no longer authorised to handle matters regarding the corporate affairs of Rock Singapore. Around the same time, Tainton and Reid incorporated the 7th defendant, (“Rock Nutrients International”). About a month later, Tainton and Reid instructed Yeo to transfer the cash holdings and contractual rights of Rock Singapore to Rock Nutrients International. In addition, Yeo was to transfer the Rock Marks from Rock Holdings to the 5th defendant (“Rock IP”). The transfers were done accordingly.
- [8]
[8] The plaintiff commenced these proceedings in May 2015.
Parties’ cases
- [9]
[9] The plaintiff claimed damages for breach of two agreements allegedly made in 2012 and 2014, which he claimed transferred beneficial ownership in Rock Singapore and Rock Business to him. The plaintiff alternatively claimed that he was entitled to such damages and/or shares due to the doctrine of proprietary estoppel, as he had detrimentally relied on representations by the defendants that he would have such shares. Finally, the plaintiff also claimed damages for conspiracy and/or deceit.
- [10]
[10] The defendants denied all of these claims for reasons elaborated below.
The Decision
- [11]
[11] I found that that the plaintiff did not discharge his burden of proof of proving the various agreements pleaded, as the evidence did not show on a balance of probabilities that there was any such agreement actually formed. There was thus no breach, and no basis for the damages or sums claimed. The other claims put forward on grounds of proprietary estoppel, conspiracy or deceit, were similarly not made out against the relevant defendants.
- [12]
[12] The plaintiff may have been, in his own mind, convinced that the agreements were formed as he had said; his testimony and the various emails and messages he adduced showed that he of the view that the various defendants were subject to the various obligations he claimed. He also did clearly believe in the Rock Business and in his future in the endeavour. However, such subjective belief, no matter how strong, is not sufficient to lead to a verdict in his favour.
- [13]
[13] There were substantial differences in the accounts of facts proffered by the differing parties; extensive portions of the submissions, especially that of the plaintiff, traversed the various conversations, emails, and meetings between the parties. The plaintiff’s closing submissions ran to more than 340 pages, most of which comprised extracting various parts of the testimony of the witnesses. The plaintiff’s description of the background facts alone already ran to about 188 pages. The total of the defendants’ closing submissions ran to about 570 pages. Each party’s written reply to the closing submissions similarly went into many pages. But in the end, despite the sheer volume of testimony covered, the plaintiff could not draw together enough to make out his case, even on a balance of probabilities. The sheer volume could not overcome the deficiency that none of the evidence, even looked at as a whole, established any agreement. As noted by the defendants, at its best, the plaintiff’s case appeared to primarily invoke statements which were cherry-picked and divorced from the context and background.
- [14]
[14] In these grounds, some areas will receive greater attention, but it suffices to note that the lengthy testimony and affidavit evidence of the various meetings, email discussions, and conversations did not assist the plaintiff. They were all in the end, assertions by the plaintiff, or statements reacting to the plaintiff’s one-sided proposals, plans or assumptions. There was nothing raised that could be taken as a positive statement of agreement, or of a representation of fact by any of the defendants.
Issues
- [15]
[15] Due to the overlap between the issues, they will be discussed in this sequence to minimise the repetition between the analysis:
(a) Whether an agreement was formed in 2012, and if so, on what terms;
(b) Whether an agreement was formed in 2014, and if so, on what terms;
(c) Whether the plaintiff can rely on any estoppel arising out of representations made by the defendants;
(d) Whether the claim in conspiracy is established;
(e) Whether the claim in deceit is established;
(f) If any of the above claims are established, what the quantum of damages should be; and
(g) Notwithstanding the above, whether any successful claim should be barred due to illegality.
Whether any agreement existed
Plaintiff’s submissions
2012 Agreement
- [16]
[16] The plaintiff claimed that there was an agreement made between the Principal Parties in 2012 (“2012 Agreement”). This was allegedly an oral agreement made after a series of negotiations and meetings; as will be seen below, the plaintiff vacillated continually on the alleged date of formation. The agreement was allegedly inspired in light of the plaintiff’s contributions of time and expense to growing Rock Singapore and the Rock Business; the need for the plaintiff to relocate from Australia to the US to expand the Rock Business; and for purposes of security that Rock Singapore would continue to have the use of the Rock Marks to carry on the business. The material terms of the 2012 Agreement included, inter alia, that:
(a) the plaintiff would have the authority to act as the Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of Rock Singapore and the Rock Business;
(b) he would be granted equity in Rock Singapore by Tainton and Reid, proportionate to the value of services contributed or monies advanced by the parties to Rock Singapore;
(c) the Rock Products would not be sold other than through Rock Singapore; and
(d) the Rock Marks were to be transferred to Rock Holdings and remain registered in the name of Rock Holdings.
- [17]
[17] The plaintiff argued that the objective intention of the parties to enter the 2012 Agreement was supported by the relevant documentary evidence and contemporaneous conduct of the parties. The subsequent conduct of the parties were consistent with the existence of such agreement. Further, this was a legally binding agreement that was not subject to execution of a formal written document. In addition, the defendants were estopped from denying the existence of the 2012 Agreement, either due to estoppel by representation, or estoppel by convention. The 2012 Agreement had not been tainted by illegality as it did not contravene any statute or established common law policy.
- [18]
[18] The terms of the 2012 Agreement had been breached, essentially due to the transfer of the assets of Rock Singapore to Rock IP and Rock Nutrients International, which diminished the value of the 30% of shares which the plaintiff beneficially owned, and which affected his right to receive past and future dividends of Rock Singapore.
2014 Agreement
- [19]
[19] The plaintiff claimed that there was a further agreement in 2014 (“2014 Agreement”), made between the Principal Parties as well as Biggs. The 2014 Agreement was alleged to have been made at a meeting in Seattle around 6 April 2014 (“Seattle Meeting”). The material terms of the alleged 2014 Agreement were, inter alia, that:
(a) the plaintiff was to be paid a compensation amount of US$8,000 per month from April 2011 onwards, as compensation for his services to Rock Singapore;
(b) a part of the US$8,000 was to be set aside and treated as a loan to Rock Singapore and to be applied to increase his beneficial shareholding in Rock Singapore’s shares;
(c) after taking into account the injection of new capital, the proportion of shares that the plaintiff owns beneficially should be 30%; and
(d) the balance of the US$8,000 should be paid to the plaintiff by Rock Singapore as and when funds became available.
- [20]
[20] The plaintiff argued that his account of the Seattle Meeting was more credible than the defendants’, and that it was supported by the documentary evidence. Further, the subsequent conduct of the parties had been consistent with the existence of such agreement. The defendants were estopped from denying the existence of the 2014 Agreement due to estoppel by representation and/or estoppel by convention. The agreement was a legally binding document, not subject to the execution of a formal written document.
- [21]
[21] The 2014 Agreement was not tainted by illegality, and the plaintiff claimed breaches of the 2014 Agreement, for the same reasons as with regards to the 2012 Agreement (at [18]).
Clarification
- [22]
[22] At this juncture, it is important to clarify what the plaintiff meant when he pleaded that pursuant to both the 2012 Agreement and 2014 Agreement, he became the beneficial owner of 30% of shares in the Rock Business. It was not immediately evident what this meant as the Rock Business is not an entity, and was unable to issue shares.
- [23]
[23] The Rock Business was defined in the Statement of Claim (Amendment No. 1) (“Statement of Claim”) as such:
- [24]
[24] The definition offered in the Statement of Claim showed that Rock Singapore carried out the Rock Business, which supported that shares in the Rock Business referred to shares in Rock Singapore.
- [25]
[25] In addition, the context of the pleadings made clear that 30% shares in the Rock Business referred merely to 30% shares in Rock Singapore. One of the terms of the alleged 2012 Agreement was that “[t]he Plaintiff and Yeo became part beneficial owners of the Rock Business through the granting to them of equity in Rock Singapore by Reid and Tainton”. This showed that the reference to ownership of Rock Business was only through the ownership of Rock Singapore. Another term reflected that:
- [26]
[26] These showed that the equity claimed under the 2012 and 2014 Agreements was only in Rock Singapore, and not the other Rock entities such as Rock Holdings, Rock IP or Rock Nutrients International. There was no mention in the pleadings that the plaintiff was to own shares in these other entities as a result of the 2012 or 2014 Agreements. The relevance of this clarification becomes clear especially during the discussion on remedies below.
- [27]
[27] Since the plaintiff continually made reference in the pleadings and submissions to his ownership in the Rock Business, similar reference may be made below, but it should be noted that this was regarded as merely a reference to shares in Rock Singapore.
Defendants’ submissions
- [28]
[28] The defendants argued that no agreement was objectively reached in respect of either the 2012 or 2014 Agreements, as parties were constantly in negotiations and there was no moment of ad idem. The plaintiff’s evidence does not show where and when such agreement was made. Further, the plaintiff himself was uncertain as to when each of the alleged contractual terms were concluded, and how they were to operate.
- [29]
[29] It was also emphasised that the plaintiff was not a credible witness in general and the veracity of his evidence should be doubted.
The applicable general legal principles
- [30]
[30] A binding contract is formed when there is an identifiable agreement that is complete and certain; consideration; as well as an intention to create relations (Gay Choon Ing v Loh Sze Ti Terence Peter [2009] 2 SLR(R) 332 (“Gay Choon Ing”) at [46]). Whether there was an identifiable agreement is an objective test, looking at whether there was ad idem of an offer and acceptance (Gay Choon Ing at [57] to [63]).
- [31]
[31] A contract must also be sufficiently complete. It may be binding even if some terms have yet to be agreed upon, as long as all material terms have been agreed (Grossner Jens v Raffles Holdings Ltd [2004] 1 SLR(R) 202 at [14]; The “Rainbow Spring” [2003] 3 SLR(R) 362 at [21] to [22]). However, what will count as material will vary from situation to situation. The terms must also be certain; however, any possible gaps may be filled by a previous course of dealing between the parties or trade practice (Gay Choon Ing at [50]).
- [32]
[32] An oral agreement may similarly be binding, without the need for it to be reduced to written form. Parties were in agreement as to the principles of ascertaining the existence of an oral agreement, referring to [53] of ARS v ART [2015] SGHC 78:
The 2012 Agreement
- [33]
[33] Applying the principles, I found that there was no agreement reached in 2012. The evidence relied upon by the plaintiff was not enough to establish any agreement. The absence of any documented, express rejection; the fact that money was put in; and the subsequent conduct of the parties, did not show that there was a concluded agreement. Further, I agreed with the plaintiffs that the alleged terms were not certain.
Insufficient evidence of agreement
- [34]
[34] Evidence must be put forward by the plaintiff to discharge his burden of proof on a balance of probabilities of showing that agreement exists (see [32] above). The evidential burden was a primary stumbling block for the plaintiff as the evidence was strongly contested, since the alleged agreement dated back to events several years in the past.
- [35]
[35] The evidential burden was heightened due to the extensiveness of the agreement pleaded. The 2012 Agreement as pleaded by the plaintiff was not simple, containing 12 terms, dealing with a range of issues (see [16] above) including: ownership rights; the plaintiff’s role as CEO; the loan agreement; and transfer of trademarks, amongst others. The plaintiff was unable to prove when each of the 12 terms were agreed upon, with the evidence barely touching upon some of these terms.
- [36]
[36] The difficulty was compounded as the plaintiff pleaded that this was a purely oral agreement. The plaintiff did not adduce any objective direct evidence to corroborate his claim, such as voice or video recordings of the oral negotiations. There were also no proper minutes of the meetings. As will be seen below, the plaintiff relied solely on subjective testimony of various witnesses and circumstantial evidence. There was a dearth of details in the evidence adduced, which underlined the substantial uncertainty and lack of evidence about the various terms agreed and which showed that there was no agreement on these various matters.
- [37]
[37] Evidential burden aside, even as a matter of practicality and commercial reality, it is relatively more difficult for a relatively extensive agreement with 12 terms to be made completely orally. There is a chance that parties may forget one of those 12 terms, in addition to the risk that parties may easily renege or deny such an agreement. This decreases the likelihood that parties would intend to enter a legally binding contract of 12 terms simply orally, especially on a matter of such importance.
(1) Whether there was a precise point where agreement was reached
- [38]
[38] The plaintiff had been unable to prove a particular point in time in which agreement was in fact reached, despite offering many inconsistent positions as to when the agreement was allegedly reached.
- [39]
[39] The plaintiff’s position vacillated a significant number of times. In the Statement of Claim, the plaintiff did not specify a reasonably certain date, merely stating that the 2012 Agreement was reached after a series of negotiations and meetings (at paras 34 to 35). The negotiations and meetings referred to include various correspondences, calls, and meetings in Docklands, Gold Coast, and Melbourne. This was refined in the plaintiff’s further and better particulars, where the plaintiff claimed that the 2012 Agreement was made over the course of October 2011 to October 2012. However, in the plaintiff’s affidavit of evidence in chief dated 10 September 2018, the plaintiff seemed to be claiming that the 2012 Agreement was reached by phone call(s) around May 2012 (the “May 2012 Calls”), during which Tainton and Reid “agreed to [his] owning 30% of the business”. This changed again in court, where the plaintiff testified that an agreement was reached in late 2011 at a meeting in Docklands between Tainton, Reid and himself (“Docklands Meeting”). This seems to have changed yet again in the plaintiff’s written closing submissions, where he did not seem to have identified a precise point when the 2012 Agreement was formed. The lack of a precise date was criticised by the defendants in their various written closing submissions, to which the plaintiff responded in the reply closing submissions that the court should not be overly concerned about the date, but adopt a flexible and holistic approach. Finally, the plaintiff also made an alternative argument that the 2012 Agreement was actually two agreements, with some terms agreed during the May 2012 Call, and other terms during a meeting in June 2012 in Melbourne (“Melbourne Meeting”).
(A) Whether a precise point of agreement is necessary
- [40]
[40] The plaintiff argued quite forcefully that the court should not be overly focused on the point of agreement, but adopt a flexible and holistic approach. He relied on the Court of Appeal case of Projection Pte Ltd v The Tai Ping Insurance Co Ltd [2001] 1 SLR(R) 798 (“Tai Ping”) which seemed to have had departed from the strict analysis of offer and acceptance. He argued that this should especially be the case for oral agreements based on continuing negotiations, since its nature is such that they may not consist of a single meeting or conversation where parties agree in no uncertain terms (see also Naughty G Pte Ltd v Fortune Marketing Pte Ltd [2018] 5 SLR 1208 at [57]). It would be unduly onerous to insist that the contract will fail unless a precise point is identified, as this would be uncommercial and impractical. Such a holistic approach is eminently sensible as oral agreements may be based on unspoken understandings. This would also be wholly consistent with the overarching aim of contract law, to ensure that the reasonable expectations of honest men are not disappointed (Tribune Investments Trust Inc v Soosan Trading Co Ltd [2000] 2 SLR(R) 407 at [40]).
- [41]
[41] The plaintiff also cited many foreign cases and academic texts in support of his proposition, including from Australia, British Columbia, New Zealand and UK. I found it unnecessary to deal in depth with these foreign cases and materials because, as will be further seen below, the offer and acceptance analysis is well established in Singapore, even for oral agreements and continuing negotiations.
- [42]
[42] The Court of Appeal case of Tai Ping provided strong support for the plaintiff’s proposition, stating that the traditional analysis of offer and acceptance is not helpful in the case of continuing negotiations (at [16] to [17]):
- [43]
[43] However, despite the Court of Appeal’s seeming eschewal of the offer and acceptance model, they had effectively still applied the offer and acceptance model on the facts of the case, finding that there were multiple offers made which was finally accepted via a crucial acceptance document made on a specific date, 31 March 1999:
- [44]
[44] Hence, despite the remarks in Tai Ping, the court still found that there was a precise point where the acceptance was given, which was the letter on 31 March 1999. This was consistent with the offer and acceptance model. The remarks hence did not represent departure from the offer and acceptance model.
- [45]
[45] This issue was subsequently discussed again by the Court of Appeal in Gay Choon Ing (above at [30]), where the court stated that the flexible approach was radical, and that the traditional offer and acceptance model was the approach in Singapore (at [62] to [63]). The court observed (at [63]) that in Butler Machine Tool Co Ltd v Ex-Cell-O Corporation (England) Ltd [1979] 1 WLR 401, Lord Denning MR was alone in advocating the flexible approach, whereas the majority adopted the traditional offer and acceptance analysis. It further noted that Lord Denning MR himself had endorsed the traditional approach, despite advocating the flexible approach (at [63]). The Court of Appeal also noted that the flexible approach “has not really found favour with the [UK] courts and… appear to have been all but rejected” by the House of Lords in Gibson v Manchester City Council [1979] 1 WLR 294 (at [63]). The Court of Appeal then concluded that the traditional offer and acceptance model should still apply, but less dogmatically, by considering the context in which the agreement was concluded, and examining the whole course of negotiations (Gay Choon Ing at [63]):
- [46]
[46] The High Court in various local cases have also accepted that an agreement comes into being as an event, not a process, and there has to be a single point in time when the necessary consensus ad idem is reached (Independent State of Papua New Guinea v PNG Sustainable Development Program Ltd [2019] SGHC 68 (“PNG”) at [149]; Lipkin International Ltd v Swiber Holdings Ltd and another [2015] 5 SLR 962 (“Lipkin”) at [42]).
- [47]
[47] I accepted the guidance from these cases that a flexible approach does not require departure from the offer and acceptance model, but simply requires a deeper appreciation of the context of the agreement, by looking through the whole course of negotiations. This can also be seen in the authorities relied on by the plaintiff. In Edwin Peel, Treitel: The Law of Contract (Sweet & Maxwell, 14th Ed, 2015) at para 2-017, it was observed that:
The text supported that an unqualified acceptance was necessary, and that there is a point where a contract is formed.
- [48]
[48] Having a precise point of formation is also important for many other reasons. The time of formation affects important matters such as the limitation period for contractual actions, the time when obligations begin and the time of expiry of contract. Without a point of formation, it would be impossible for the court to determine these auxiliary matters.
- [50]
[50] Before addressing whether the plaintiff’s numerous alternative submissions proved a precise point of formation, I will first briefly address some issues on pleadings.
(B) Whether the pleadings were reasonably certain as to the date of formation
- [51]
[51] The defendants argued in their written closing submissions that the plaintiff’s pleadings were not reasonably certain as to the date of formation, since they merely stated that the agreement was made over the course of October 2011 to October 2012 (see also above at [30], [38]). They argued that although a party does not need to plead the precise date of formation, the date must be pleaded with reasonable certainty (see PNG ([46] above) at [148]).
- [52]
[52] The plaintiff did not contest that the pleadings were not reasonably certain. Instead, the plaintiff argued that notwithstanding the lack of particularisation, the evidence specified when the agreement was reached. The plaintiff argued that defects in the pleadings can be allowed if it does not cause irreparable prejudice, and if it is not a radical departure, such that the defendants’ preparation of the case and conduct of the trial would not have had been different. The plaintiff relied on Nagase Singapore Pte Ltd v Ching Kai Huat and others [2007] 3 SLR(R) 265 (“Nagase”), amongst other cases, for these propositions.
- [53]
[53] I agreed with the defendants, and found that the requirement to plead a reasonably certain date of formation is a necessary corollary of the requirement that a contract has a precise point of agreement. The date must be pleaded with reasonable certainty to set the scope of the issue contested, and to give fair notice to the other party.
- [55]
[55] Nevertheless, it was too late for the defendants to apply to strike out the pleadings when the trial had already concluded (Singapore Court Practice 2017 (Jeffrey Pinsler gen ed) (Lexis Nexis, 2017) at para 18/19/8). The issue was merely whether the court should still consider the plaintiff’s submissions and decide on those issues, despite the defective pleadings.
(C) Whether the court should adjudicate issues based on defective pleadings
- [56]
[56] It is trite that the function of pleadings is to give fair notice of the case which has to be met and to define the issues which the court will have to decide on so as to resolve the matters in dispute between the parties (Lee Chee Wei v Tan Hor Peow Victor [2007] 3 SLR(R) 557 (“Lee Chee Wei”) at [61]). They delineate the parameters of the case and shape the course of the trial (V Nithia (co-administratrix of the estate of Ponnusamy Sivapakiam, deceased) v Buthmanaban s/o Vaithilingam and another [2015] 5 SLR 1422 (“V Nithia”) at [36]). Claims not pleaded will generally not be considered by the court (V Nithia at [38]).
- [57]
[57] However, the court is not required to adopt an overly formalistic and inflexibly rule-bound approach, and departure from the general rule is allowed where no prejudice is caused to the other party in the trial or where it would be clearly unjust for the court not to do so (V Nithia at [39]- to [40]). Evidence given at trial, where appropriate, can overcome defect in the pleadings provided that the other party is not taken by surprise or irreparably prejudiced (OMG Holdings Pte Ltd v Pos Ad Sdn Bhd [2012] 4 SLR 231 at [18]).
- [58]
[58] I considered that it was appropriate to rule on the substantive issues although the pleadings were less than satisfactory. First, this was not a case where the submissions were out of the scope of the pleadings, but it was merely that the pleadings were vague. Although the argument evolved from formation over the course of a year to formation at various points in time, those alleged points in time all fell within the period of October 2011 to October 2012. They were not strictly speaking inconsistent with the pleadings.
- [59]
[59] This approach was also taken in PNG ([46] above). There, the pleadings set out a 20 day period as the duration of formation, which the court found was not reasonably certain. However, the evidence, submissions and pleadings seen together presented three possibilities as to the date of formation (at [149]). The court held that the pleadings were less than satisfactory but nevertheless went on to rule on the substantive issues, finding that neither of those three possibilities proved formation (at [149] to [178]).
- [60]
[60] Nagase, which the plaintiff relied on ([52] above), was not on point with respect to the present case, but the principles provided some guidance. Nagase stands for the proposition that a positive defence must be pleaded via a pregnant denial, but a positive defence may still be raised in relation to a bare denial if the contents to the positive defence in the defendant’s affidavit were not objected to by the plaintiff (at [167] to [177]). In such a scenario, the positive defence can be seen to be a mere development of the pleaded denial (at [175]). In the present case, it was similarly possible for the plaintiff’s evolved case to be seen as a development of the pleadings.
- [61]
[61] Second, I found that there was no irreparable prejudice to the defendants, and they were not taken by surprise, as to the arguments about the date of formation. Since the plaintiff originally pleaded that the 2012 Agreement was formed over October 2011 to October 2012, it would have in any event been necessary for the defendants to prove that no agreement was formed throughout the entirety of this time. Evolution of the plaintiff’s case such that the date of formation was a specific time within this period, thus did not materially change the defendants’ litigation strategy or burden at trial or in submissions. Indeed, the defendants were able to sufficiently raise evidence at trial and make arguments to deal with each of the plaintiff’s alleged points of formation. I was also able to deal with all the issues in relation to each of the alleged point of formation claimed. Further, the defendants did not object to the plaintiff’s evidence at trial and in the plaintiff’s affidavit of evidence-in-chief (“AEIC”).
- [62]
[62] In contrast, not ruling on the issues would have been unjust to the plaintiff as he had already expended significant resources to carry the case through the entire trial. It was in the interest of justice to all parties that the issues were decided once and for all. Further, the challenge to the pleadings was not raised earlier, depriving the plaintiff of a chance to seek amendment of pleadings.
(D) The Docklands Meeting
- [63]
[63] The plaintiff referred to the Docklands Meeting, as the starting point of negotiations leading to the alleged 2012 Agreement. This was where the plaintiff first breached the topic to Tainton and Reid about him wanting equity in the Rock Business.
- [64]
[64] The plaintiff kept vacillating as to whether an agreement was reached at the Docklands Meeting. Initially, the plaintiff testified that an agreement was reached:
- [65]
[65] However, the plaintiff subsequently admitted under cross-examination that he thought that he only got beneficial ownership on 18 May 2012, which was subsequent to the Docklands Meeting:
- [66]
[66] The plaintiff’s closing submissions and AEIC were also equivocal on whether he was submitting that an agreement was reached during the Dockland Meeting. He argued that Tainton and Reid told him that “they were prepared to give [him] 30% equity in the business”, without stating that this was an agreement, instead characterising the statements as “assurances”.
- [67]
[67] Finally, in the plaintiff’s reply closing submissions, he argued that the 2012 Agreement was actually two agreements, with some terms agreed during the May 2012 Call, and other terms during the Melbourne Meeting (above at [39]), which showed that no agreement was made during the Dockland Meeting.
- [68]
[68] From the above, it does not seem that the plaintiff is seriously arguing that the 2012 Agreement was formed at the Docklands Meeting. Indeed, the Docklands Meeting was not even mentioned in the Statement of Claim. It is inconceivable that the plaintiff would have left this out of the pleadings if he genuinely believed that the agreement was formed at that time.
- [69]
[69] The plaintiff’s subsequent conduct also clearly showed that he did not believe that an agreement had been reached at the Docklands Meeting. He remained concerned and worried that he did not have any equity in the Rock Business, and continued asking Tainton and Reid for equity. This can be seen from the plaintiff’s testimony:
- [70]
[70] This can also be seen from the plaintiff’s correspondence to Tainton and Reid on 4 May 2012 where he said that: “I invest like an owner and work like a negro … but I have no ownership… Rock stock and Barrel Rock is 100% yours”, and that “It just bugs me a bit I am investing so much money and time but have no upside if the business gets sold”. The plaintiff would not have behaved this way if a legally binding agreement had been previously reached at the Docklands Meeting.
- [71]
[71] The plaintiff’s witness, Kaminski, a former employee of Rock Singapore, also testified that he was never told about any agreement reached in 2011 (the Docklands Meeting happened in late 2011).
- [72]
[72] Finally, as argued by the defendants, there was no email communication referring to any agreement at the Docklands Meeting. Given the importance of the matter, it was strange that there was no follow up to put it in some kind of writing.
- [73]
[73] In comparison, Tainton and Reid had been consistent in their position that there was no agreement reached at all, whether at the Docklands Meeting or otherwise.
- [74]
[74] Given these reasons, I accepted the defendants’ version and found that there was no agreement made at the Docklands Meeting.
(E) The May 2012 Calls
- [75]
[75] The plaintiff argued that an agreement was reached via the May 2012 Calls for him to become part beneficial owner of the Rock Business, although this was not stated in the pleadings. Instead, the pleadings referred to the May 2012 Calls merely as “representations”. This new position was taken in his AEIC, at trial, and in the reply closing submissions.
- [76]
[76] Notably, the plaintiff himself was unclear as to whether the agreement was allegedly made over one call or multiple calls. He testified at trial that “I’m not sure if it was the same conversation or a separate conversation, but there were communications”. The plural term, “May 2012 Calls”, was used for ease of reference.
- [77]
[77] The plaintiff did not provide much elaboration on the specific details of the May 2012 Calls. He argued that “[Tainton] said he and [Reid] had agreed to [the plaintiff’s] owning 30% of the business and were going forward on the basis we had discussed in the Docklands”. This seems to be arguing that the assurances made at the Docklands Meeting were made legally binding through the May 2012 Calls. The plaintiff then said that he had emailed Yeo to prepare documents to record the agreement accordingly. The plaintiff’s case seems to be that the agreement was made binding through the calls, but the documents were merely for documentation purposes.
- [78]
[78] On the other hand, Tainton and Reid denied ever making such statements over the phone.
- [79]
[79] I found that the plaintiff’s evidence failed to prove that any binding legal agreement was made during the May 2012 Calls. First, the plaintiff bore the burden of proof of showing that such statement was made, and he had not done so as there was nothing much to rely on apart from his oral evidence, which was flatly denied by the defendants. I accepted that that the defendant’s version was to be preferred, because the tenor and content of the emails adduced in evidence (see below) pointed against the allegations made by the plaintiff.
- [80]
[80] Second, the circumstances made it unlikely for a binding legal agreement to be made. The plaintiff’s testimony was that the calls were made over speakerphone as he was driving. The decision to transfer shares was an important one that was unlikely to have been made in such a casual and spontaneous manner. There were also 11 other rather important terms which were supposed to have had been made as part of the 2012 Agreement. In that context, the calls seemed more like a casual discussion, rather than a serious one with an intent to enter a binding agreement.
- [81]
[81] Third, and most importantly, the contemporaneous documents pointed against any agreement. If there had indeed been an agreement reached during the May 2012 Calls, the plaintiff would likely have referenced it in his emails. However, the plaintiff did not make any reference to the call in his contemporaneous emails to Yeo, Tainton or Reid. Tellingly, in an email to Yeo made on 18 May 2012, which was shortly after the time of any alleged call, no mention was made of any agreement.
- [82]
[82] Instead, the plaintiffs’ various emails showed that there had been no such agreement. In the email on 18 May 2012, the plaintiff stated that “[t]he only agreement I know of is the side agreement that has [Reid] and [Tainton] listed with 50% each”. In a further email on 19 May 2012, the plaintiff stated that “I know the only way Tainton and [Reid] will agree is if it is presented with a ton of feathers”. In addition, in an email on 24 May 2012 by the plaintiff to Yeo, the plaintiff states unequivocally that “[Tainton] and [Reid] do not want to part with any ownership”. Although the plaintiff tried to characterise that email as referring only to an unwillingness to part with further ownership, this went against the plain words.
- [83]
[83] There was thus a lack of consistency between the evidence of the plaintiff and the objective evidence in the form of the emails. These various inconsistencies showed that there was no such agreement reached. One would have expected the plaintiff to have relayed such agreement to Yeo. However, Yeo testified that he never heard such news from the plaintiff. There were other occasions in which the plaintiff would have been expected to make mention of such agreement, but did not do so.
(F) The Melbourne Meeting
- [84]
[84] After vacillating multiple times, the plaintiff seemed to rest on the position that the agreement was reached at the Melbourne Meeting. This was the position taken in the reply closing submissions, which was the last word of the plaintiff. As stated, this departed from the pleadings, which only mentioned that the Melbourne Meeting confirmed the representations made during the May 2012 Calls, but did not plead that an agreement was reached at the meeting.
- [85]
[85] The problem with this submission is that it inherently admits that no binding agreement had been reached prior to the Melbourne Meeting. It also casts doubt on the evidence adduced to show that a binding agreement was reached at other times. Further, the fact that the plaintiff kept vacillating and submitting multiple conflicting positions showed that the plaintiff was not sure of his own case. This greatly weakened the plaintiff’s coherence and consistency, and hence his credibility. It was also observed in Lipkins ([54] above) that it is vexatious for the plaintiff to experiment by pleading different dates and different bases for the same contract.
- [86]
[86] Out of the various dates submitted, the plaintiff provided the most detail about the Melbourne Meeting. He argued that the parties discussed in detail about the capitalisation, that the parties agreed to hold shares in proportion to their investments, and that he would loan money to Reid to give him time to raise money for his shares, amongst other details.
- [87]
[87] The plaintiff also referred to emails to support that an agreement was reached at the Melbourne Meeting. There was an email sent by the plaintiff to Tainton with a proposal for capitalisation, asking him to consider this before the Melbourne Meeting. There was also an email the plaintiff sent to Tainton and Reid shortly after the Melbourne Meeting, setting out the respective proportions of shares to be owned by them, and the respective amounts they invested or were to invest. The plaintiff also relied on Yeo’s emails and testimony at trial.
- [88]
[88] In response, the defendants argued that there were many inconsistencies in the plaintiff’s testimony as to what happened at the Melbourne Meeting, and that he had changed his position several times as to various facts. Further, it was inconceivable that Reid, who originally beneficially owned 50% shares in Rock Singapore, would agree to reducing it to 0%. They also tried to argue that the subject of equity was not discussed at the Melbourne Meeting and that it was purely a casual dinner.
- [89]
[89] I found that it was more likely than not that the subject of equity was discussed. The plaintiff had emailed Tainton to consider his proposal on equity before the Melbourne Meeting, which clearly showed that he intended to broach the topic. The plaintiff had also been persistently asking about equity ever since the Docklands Meeting and the May 2012 Calls. It was clearly something he wanted to discuss. Reid also admitted that the subject may have had been discussed. It did not assist the defendants to try to deny that the subject was discussed, or characterise the meeting as purely social.
- [90]
[90] I also did not give much weight to the defendants’ argument that it was inconceivable for Reid’s beneficial ownership was to be substantially reduced in the alleged agreement. It was not wholly inconceivable, given the plaintiff’s efforts and investments in the business, and was a possible way to reach a fair capitalisation.
- [91]
[91] Nevertheless, the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof of showing that an agreement was concluded. The email the plaintiff sent to Tainton and Reid shortly after the Melbourne Meeting did not show that an agreement was concluded at the Melbourne Meeting. Instead, it seems to be more of a proposal, as it states: “Guys… I think we should run with this as a start… and work out the rest later. If you want to change the percentage then please do…” The email was clearly setting out the plaintiff’s opinion as to what he thought should be done as a start. Further, any proposal in the email was not confirmed, as the plaintiff explicitly stated in the email that Tainton and Reid could change the percentage if they wanted to. If the agreement had been confirmed at the Melbourne Meeting, the plaintiff would likely have had explicitly stated that in writing in the email. The fact that nothing was said about any agreement reached is a glaring omission. The email hence instead goes against the plaintiff, instead of assisting his case.
- [92]
[92] The plaintiff’s reliance on Yeo’s email and testimony was also not convincing. Yeo’s email on 25 June 2012 did not show that there was an agreement, but merely stated that he would “work out a schedule based on a [USD]500,000 capitalisation plan”. As described by Yeo, the negotiations were only a “plan”, and not shown to be a binding agreement. The plaintiff also tried to cherry-pick parts of Yeo’s evidence at trial to argue that Yeo agreed that there was an agreement formed at the Melbourne Meeting. This was disingenuous, as Yeo had unequivocally stated at trial that he did not agree that there was any agreement at the Melbourne Meeting.
- [93]
[93] Finally, even accepting the plaintiff’s testimony at its highest, it did not show that there was a concluded binding agreement. The plaintiff argued that “[Tainton] and [Reid] had agreed to move forward on that basis”, and that Reid “accepted that ownership would be determined in proportion to the percentage of expenses shareholders were prepared to carry moving forward”. However, these do not disclose that there was an intention to enter into a binding legal agreement. Any statement given could have been merely part of negotiations, indicative of willingness to enter a future contract on those terms.
- [94]
[94] The plaintiff argued that the parties had a past history of concluding deals and doing business without written agreements, which showed that any possible agreement reached was not intended to be subject to formalisation. This was not sufficiently proven. The parties had seen the need to enter into a written agreement vis-à-vis the April 2011 Agreements. It was not proven why the parties would depart from such practice in the 2012 Agreement, especially where, as stated above at [35], it was not a simple agreement, containing 12 terms, and which was of rather critical importance.
(G) The Gold Coast Meeting
- [95]
[95] The plaintiff referred to a meeting in Gold Coast on 17 August 2012 between the Principal Parties, Biggs, Kaminski and Minczanowaski, who was Biggs’s former business partner (“Gold Coast Meeting”). The plaintiff accepted that no agreement was reached at this meeting. Instead, the plaintiff argued that the conduct at the meeting suggested that there was an earlier agreement at some point in time. This is pursued further below.
(H) San Francisco Meeting
- [96]
[96] The plaintiff also mentioned a meeting in San Francisco, but this was not mentioned in the pleadings, AEIC or closing submissions and not strongly pursued.
(I) Sub-conclusion
- [97]
[97] Even after going through all the various possible points of formation put forth by the plaintiff, I found that the plaintiff failed to prove that the agreement was formed at any of those points. In light of the earlier finding that it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove a precise point of ad idem (above at [40] to [49]), the plaintiff has failed in the claim and there was strictly no need to discuss the further issues in relation to the 2012 Agreement.
(2) Notwithstanding that there was no precise point, whether an agreement was reached
- [98]
[98] A large amount of the evidence raised by the plaintiff were not tied to any precise point of formation. Instead, they were circumstantial evidence arising from subsequent conduct of parties, documentation over a long period of time, as well as testimony of various parties as to the continuing business negotiations. These did not seem to be used by the plaintiff to argue that there was agreement at a particular time, but were merely used to show that, seen holistically, there must have had been formation. Given the above finding that the plaintiff had failed to prove a precise point of formation, and that such a precise point was necessary, there is no need to discuss this, but I shall do so for completeness. In any case, contrary to the plaintiff’s allegations, some of these documents instead pointed against any agreement.
- [99]
[99] In gist, the plaintiff relied on the following evidence:
(a) The alleged fact that the plaintiff was granted the authority to act as the CEO of Rock Singapore and Rock Business, in accordance with an alleged term of the 2012 Agreement;
(b) Various correspondences allegedly showing that the defendants accepted that the plaintiff beneficially owned 30% of the shares of Rock Singapore;
(c) The lack of any documentation by the defendants refuting that the plaintiff beneficially owned 30% of shares of Rock Singapore;
(d) The alleged fact that the parties, at the Gold Coast Meeting, discussed new investors’ investments in Rock Singapore in exchange for equity;
(e) The fact that the Rock Marks were transferred from Rock Australia to Rock Holdings, in accordance with an alleged term of the 2012 Agreement;
(f) The fact that Tainton and Reid had not repaid themselves the US$100,000 each of them loaned to Rock Singapore, showing that they had intended to capitalize it so as to increase their beneficial shareholding according to the terms of the 2012 Agreement;
(g) Biggs’s testimony that he thought that the plaintiff held 30% ownership in the Rock Business even before the Seattle Meeting; and
(h) A convertible loan agreement where Biggs loaned moneys to Rock Singapore in exchange for an option to convert the moneys to shares.
- [100]
[100] I shall discuss these in turn, before looking at them cumulatively.
(A) The plaintiff acting as CEO
- [101]
[101] The plaintiff argued that the fact that he was granted authority to act as CEO showed that there was an agreement, as one of the terms of the 2012 Agreement was for him to act as CEO. He relied on Tainton’s evidence which showed that he had been effectively acting as CEO from March 2011.
- [102]
[102] I did not see the link between the plaintiff acting as CEO and the 2012 Agreement, since he was already acting as CEO in early 2011. Even if he began acting as CEO only after 2012, it was not shown that this must have been because of the existence of the 2012 Agreement.
(B) Documents showing support of an agreement
- [103]
[103] The plaintiff adduced various documents showing support of an agreement, including: Yeo’s emails recording that the plaintiff beneficially owned 30% of the shares of Rock Singapore; emails showing that Yeo recorded various loans as investments; an email from Tainton and Mrs Tainton seemingly admitting the 2012 Agreement; and emails showing the parties raising funds for the investment.
- [104]
[104] These emails showed clearly that there was some kind of proposal for capitalisation. However, they fell short of showing that there was agreement. Prior to and even up until October 2012, it was clear that there was no agreement. The plaintiff himself described the emails as showing that the parties were “working towards finalising the position on equity on 1 October 2012”. The position had clearly not been finalised before October 2012. An email on 30 September 2012 sent by the plaintiff, where the plaintiff discusses with Yeo how to allocate an extra 10% of equity, also supports this:
The matter was clearly left open.
- [105]
[105] Even subsequent to that email, the plaintiff was still discussing about the distribution of shares with the proposed investors. There were many different emails with many different proposed distributions, showing that the 2012 Agreement could not possibly have been agreed upon at that time since nothing was fixed. Further, the distribution of equity reflected in all the emails were different from the alleged 2012 Agreement. Some of these are reflected in the table:
Source/ Party
Email from plaintiff to Yeo on 30 September 2012
Proposal from Minczanowaski to plaintiff on 10 October 2012
Plaintiff’s reply to Minczanowaski on 12 October
Proposal from Yeo to plaintiff on 12 October 2012
Alleged 2012 Agreement
Plaintiff
30%
30%
30%
45%
30%
Yeo
10%
10%
10%
10%
30%
Tainton
20%
20%
20%
15%
20%
Reid
20%
20%
20%
15%
20%
Minczanowaski
10%
20% (shared with Biggs)
10% (shared with Biggs)
15%
-
Extra
10%
0%
10%
0%
-
- [106]
[106] In response to Yeo’s proposed breakdown sent on 12 October 2012, which was very different from all the earlier previous proposals, the plaintiff replied saying “Keep running [Yeo]… Very good thinking”. This clearly showed that he accepted that no fixed agreement had been reached and the position was still shifting.
- [107]
[107] In an email on 17 October 2012, Yeo tells the plaintiff: “I am glad you had a good conversation with [Minczanowaski]… [Minczanowaski] is not going to be easy when we put the shareholders agreement together”, showing that an agreement had yet to be reached and it was pending. Yeo further stated that: “I like to have the agreement agreed upon and signed off by the four of us before we let [Minczanowaski] in so what he will not have too much input in that document”, which also evinced an intention that there should be a written and signed formal agreement.
- [108]
[108] The discussions continued even until the end of October 2012. In an email on 24 October 2012, Yeo sent Minczanowaski a complex shareholding proposal where Tainton and Reid would each have 20% shares of Rock Singapore, with the remaining 60% to be owned by Rock Holdings, which would be then in turn be owned by Yeo, Minczanowaski and the plaintiff. On 25 October 2012, Yeo emailed Minczanowaski stating that “I spoke with [the plaintiff] about your proposal about you and Biggs having 50% and [the plaintiff] and I the other 50%... He wants to sleep on this for a few days”. On 31 October 2012, Yeo forwarded the plaintiff an email from Minczanowaski regarding the shareholding discussions, and said “Talk to you soon”. These correspondences unequivocally showed that discussions were continuing right until the very end of October 2012. This contradicted the plaintiff’s claim that the 2012 Agreement had been formed by October 2012, and that the extent of financial contributions was determined by 1 October 2012.
- [109]
[109] In fact, Yeo testified that the position kept changing even up till at least June 2013. He referred to multiple emails between the plaintiff and himself, and also testified in trial, stating:
- [110]
[110] The emails showed that the discussion on the share distributions were clearly ongoing and not fixed. Further, the shareholders were also continually changing, with new potential investors being discussed from time to time.
- [111]
[111] In addition, the plaintiff did not explain how the shareholding distribution for the 2012 Agreement was reached. The alleged confirmed distribution contradicted the proposed shareholding breakdown in all the emails mentioned above. The distribution was also contrary to the contributions of the parties as at October 2012 (the date where the plaintiff pleaded the 2012 Agreement was finalised). For example, Yeo’s contributions were only made in December 2012 and not before October 2012.
- [112]
[112] I had also found that the plaintiff’s reliance on Yeo’s emails did not assist. Although Yeo, in various emails, recorded the plaintiff as having beneficial ownership and referred to him as a shareholder, these were not final but merely proposed. This was repeatedly explained by Yeo during his evidence at trial and also in his submissions. The emails only reflected a mere starting point that was subject to further discussion and agreement. The fact that Yeo referred to the loans as investments was also not conclusive of an agreement. They could have similarly merely been a starting point. Further, Yeo had admitted that he had used loose language in his emails, but explained that it was because everyone understood that it was merely a discussion and there was no need to be so precise with the language. I agreed that despite the loose language, the plan could be objectively seen as merely tentative.
- [113]
[113] Finally, I disagreed that Tainton and Mrs Tainton’s email sent on 25 January 2015 was conclusive of an agreement. To begin, this was more than two years after the duration when the alleged 2012 Agreement was formed and was of very weak relevance to the 2012 Agreement as it would have been influenced by factors happening between 2012 and 2015. In any case, Tainton testified that the reference to decrease in shares was not agreed, but merely a proposal. The plaintiff failed to prove that it was conclusive of an agreement.
- [114]
[114] The above reflected that the negotiations were ongoing, and any documents relied on by the plaintiff were merely proposals.
(C) Absence of documented rejection
- [115]
[115] The plaintiff argued that despite all the emails he had sent to Tainton and Reid about equity, they had never once documented their rejection of his assertions that he had equity. The defendants argued that this was because they had called the plaintiff to express their refusal orally. The defendants also tried to argue that the emails by the plaintiff were part of an elaborate plot by him to plant a trail of emails to make out his case.
- [116]
[116] I would not go so far as to say that the plaintiff was devising a plot. I found the plaintiff to have genuinely believed in his case and brought his case in good faith. Nevertheless, such subjective belief was not sufficient to meet the objective test of agreement required. While there was some force to the plaintiff’s argument that there was no protest or confrontation by Tainton and Reid, there is a well-established general rule that silence alone cannot be the foundation of an agreement (see Felthouse v Bindley (1862) 142 ER 1037 endorsed in CAA Technologies Pte Ltd v Newcon Builders Pte Ltd [2016] SGHC 246 at [80]). This is because silence is ordinarily equivocal and cannot be construed as an acceptance. In the present context, the lack of response was similarly equivocal, possibly being due to the fact that the emails were merely proposals and negotiations, such that Tainton and Reid felt no need to respond. It could have also been because they were exasperated at the plaintiff’s persistence that they let him say whatever he wanted. It was also possible that Tainton and Reid had communicated their rejections orally.
(D) Gold Coast Meeting
- [117]
[117] The plaintiff argued that the fact that there was a Gold Coast Meeting to discuss new investors’ investments in Rock Singapore in exchange for equity showed that an agreement had been concluded. This argument was tenuous as it could have been equally plausible that the meeting was pursuant to plans and negotiations, and to further the discussion.
(E) Transfer of Rock Marks
- [118]
[118] The plaintiff argued that the fact that the Rock Marks were transferred from Rock Australia to Rock Holdings, in accordance with an alleged term of the 2012 Agreement, showed that the 2012 Agreement must have had been concluded.
- [119]
[119] In response, the defendants argued that the transfer was done without their knowledge and consent. Even though the document was signed by Tainton, he thought that the transfer agreement only pertained to a specific Hydro Halo trademark and not the Rock Marks as a whole. Further, none of the contemporaneous documents pertaining to the transfer mention that it was made in accordance with the alleged 2012 Agreement.
- [120]
[120] I found that there were some doubts pertaining to the circumstances of the transfer. At the point of signing, only one page of the full agreement was faxed to Reid for signing. Although the plaintiff alleged that the full agreement had been sent separately via email, there was no evidence that Reid had read it.
- [121]
[121] Even assuming that Reid and Tainton had intended to transfer the Rock Marks, there is no evidence that this was done based on the 2012 Agreement. Instead, the plaintiff’s email to Tainton and Reid explaining the rationale for the transfer mentioned that it was because the trademark had been registered illegally, and that it had to be cleaned up.
(F) Investment by parties
- [122]
[122] The plaintiff argued that the fact that the parties put in money into Rock Singapore and never asked for repayment showed that the money had been put in as investments pursuant to the 2012 Agreement. In response, the defendants argued that the moneys were loans, and that there was no need for any repayment since they remained 100% owners of Rock Singapore and it would obviously not make any difference to them whether the moneys were repaid to them.
- [123]
[123] I accepted the defendants’ arguments. The plaintiff failed to prove that those were investments, since it was equally plausible that the moneys put in were loans which did not have to be repaid. Even if they were investments, they could have been tentative, or a mere starting point, since no resolutions were passed and the required lodgements had not taken place. They did not prove the existence of the 2012 Agreement.
(G) Biggs’s testimony
- [124]
[124] The plaintiff relied strongly on Biggs’s testimony to show that there had been an agreement. Biggs testified that he thought that the plaintiff owned 30% of beneficial shares. Biggs also testified that the plaintiff had represented at the Gold Coast Meeting, in front of Tainton and Reid, that he had such beneficial ownership.
- [125]
[125] I did not find that Biggs’s testimony proved that there was an agreement. As will be shown in this sub-section and the subsequent sub-section, Biggs’s opinion that the plaintiff owned beneficial shares arose because of the one-sided representations that the plaintiff had made to him. His opinion was not based on discussions or agreements between the parties. Hence, his opinion did not prove that there was agreement between the parties.
- [126]
[126] For example, the plaintiff’s reliance on Biggs’s testimony of what happened at the Gold Coast Meeting was insufficient. The plaintiff relied on this section of Biggs’s testimony during cross examination:
- [127]
[127] However, this extract shows precisely why Biggs’s testimony does not help the plaintiff. Biggs testified that it was the plaintiff who had represented to him that he owned 30% beneficial shares. He did not mention that he gained such an opinion from anyone else other than the plaintiff. Biggs believed the plaintiff, which was why he accepted that the plaintiff did own the shares. Hence, Biggs’s opinion was formed in a large part due to the plaintiff’s influence and merely reflects what the plaintiff subjectively thought, without objectively showing that Tainton and Reid had agreed.
- [128]
[128] Although the plaintiff had made the representation in front of Tainton, Reid, and the others who were present at the meeting, Biggs testified that the plaintiff was only talking to himself and Minczanowaski at that material time. There had been other conversations going on at that time, and Tainton and Reid may not have had heard what the plaintiff said.
- [129]
[129] In any case, even if Tainton and Reid had heard the representation, it was not the plaintiff’s case that they positively agreed to the representation. The plaintiff’s case seems to be that they merely kept silent. Such silence did not prove that there was an agreement. It has been established above that silence is ordinarily not an agreement (above at [116]), and the same is true in this case, where the plaintiff’s representation could have been interpreted by Tainton and Reid as merely a representation of the future position, or of negotiations. There could have been many reasons why they kept silent and the plaintiff did not prove that the silence meant that there was an agreement.
(H) The convertible loan agreement
- [130]
[130] The plaintiff referred to a convertible loan agreement (“CLA”) where Biggs loaned moneys to Rock Singapore in exchange for an option to convert the moneys to shares. The plaintiff relied on Biggs’s testimony that during the course of discussions leading towards the CLA, Biggs had thought that the plaintiff had beneficial ownership in Rock Singapore, and that Tainton had never given Biggs the impression that only Tainton and Reid were beneficial owners.
- [131]
[131] However, the discussions referred to by the plaintiff took place in 2013, which was after the period of time where the plaintiff alleged the 2012 Agreement was formed. Even assuming Biggs’s opinion was reflective of the truth, it does not prove that the agreement had been formed by 2012. In any case, although Biggs’s testimony is probative, it is only circumstantial evidence which does not sufficiently prove that agreement had been reached. His opinion that the plaintiff had beneficial ownership was in a large part influenced by the plaintiff. Although Tainton and Reid did not give him any contrary impression, this does not mean that Tainton and Reid had agreed to the terms alleged by the plaintiff.
(I) The cumulative effect of the evidence
- [132]
[132] In certain cases, it may be that individual strands of evidence would not be sufficient to establish a case and a holistic view needs to be taken of the facts. However, in the present case, even taking all these strands of evidence as a whole did not assist the plaintiff. The strength of each was too weak to gain weight when taken together, and there was no mutual reinforcement between them. The facts were equivocal and was not sufficient to discharge the plaintiff’s burden of proof. Many factors relied on could be explained in other ways that were just as plausible, and did not definitively point one way or another. More conclusive evidence than such will be needed to prove formation of a contract.
Certainty
- [133]
[133] The defendants also argued that the terms of the alleged 2012 Agreement were not certain. It is well established that a valid contract must have certain terms (Gay Choon Ing ([30] above) at [38]). In light of the above, it was not necessary to discuss this but I make some remarks for completeness. Some of the pleaded terms of the agreement were that:
- [134]
[134] These terms seemed to allow the plaintiff and Yeo to convert the value of their services to equity in Rock Singapore. However, the terms were uncertain as it was not pleaded how their services were to be valued, or if there is any standard market methodology for valuing such services. The plaintiff argued that the Principal Parties agreed that the value of services was to be “a fair amount of money when and if the business could afford it”. However, a “fair amount of money” and “when… the business could afford it” are equally uncertain and subject to interpretation. The plaintiff alternatively argued that the value of services had been fixed when he started getting paid. However, this was not proven, and all of these allegations were neither in the pleadings nor in his AEIC. Further, clause (d) seemed to contradict clause (f) as clause (d) purported to allow the value of services to be converted to equity as an absolute term, whereas clause (f) purported to allow the value of services to be converted to equity only where the Rock Business became profitable. The definition of “profitable” was also not pleaded or stated. The operation of clause (f) as also unclear since the plaintiff confessed to drawing a salary even though the business had been struggling.
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