High Court · Decided 18 May 2020
Neo Chuan Sheng v Public Prosecutor
Feedback & support[2020] SGHC 97 · Case no. Magistrate’s Appeal No 9236 of 2019 · 37 paragraphs
✱ What happened, in plain English
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] The appellant, Mr Neo Chuan Sheng, pleaded guilty to an offence of dangerous driving under s 64(1) of the Road Traffic Act (Cap 276, 2004 Rev Ed) (“RTA”). The charge alleged that on 7 December 2017 at about 2.10am, he drove his car
Facts
- [4]
[4] On 7 December 2017 at about 2am, police officers were performing road blocks at Bukit Batok East Avenue 6 towards Bukit Batok Central along lamp post 86A. Bukit Batok East Avenue 6 was a two lane road, ie, there were two lanes in each direction.
- [5]
[5] At about 2.10am, the appellant was driving his car on the left lane of Bukit Batok East Avenue 6 towards the road block. He stopped his car about 176m from the road block and reversed for about 203m before turning into Jalan Jurong Kechil towards the Pan Island Expressway: see the sketch plan at Annex A.
- [6]
[6] The appellant stated that he did not see the road block but was sure that there was one because road blocks in that area were usual and he noticed that a taxi in front of him had braked.
- [7]
[7] A closed-circuit television (“CCTV”) camera at Park Natura Condominium, located at 33 Bukit Batok East Avenue 6 (“the Condominium”), captured the appellant’s car as it reversed past the Condominium.
The DJ’s reasons for the disqualification order
- [8]
[8] The DJ’s Grounds of Decision (“GD”) can be found at Public Prosecutor v Neo Chuan Sheng [2019] SGDC 236.
- [9]
[9] The DJ applied the sentencing framework laid out in Public Prosecutor v Koh Thiam Huat [2017] 4 SLR 1099 (“Koh Thiam Huat”), which involved a single charge of dangerous driving under s 64(1) of the RTA. In that case, the High Court held as follows (at [41]):
- [10]
[10] The DJ’s findings were as follows:
(a) No actual harm had resulted but the potential harm to other road users and pedestrians “could be great or serious” (GD, at [28]).
(c) The appellant’s culpability was at the very least medium (GD, at [31]).
(b) A search for cases involving the offence of dangerous driving decided after 20 June 2017, in which a fine of between $4,000 and $5,000 was imposed, turned up 22 cases which showed that:
Cases decided before 20 June 2017 were ignored because the maximum fine that could be imposed for offences under s 64(1) RTA was increased with effect from 20 June 2017.
- [12]
[12] The DJ accepted the appellant’s plea of guilt as a sign of remorse, but considered the following as aggravating factors (GD, at [39]):
(a) the appellant’s compounded traffic offences between August and November 2017 for speeding, failing to stop after an accident, failing to report an accident within 24 hours, inconsiderate driving and causing a vehicle to remain at rest in a position likely to cause danger to other road users; and
Disqualification orders: relevant principles
- [15]
[15] Section 42(1) RTA provides as follows:
- [16]
[16] In Edwin s/o Suse Nathen v Public Prosecutor [2013] 4 SLR 1139 (“Edwin Nathen”), the court held as follows:
- [20]
[20] Next, it is clear that the period of disqualification should increase in tandem with the severity of the offence: Edwin Nathen at [14]. In this respect, Koh Thiam Huat provides useful guidance in evaluating the severity of an offence under s 64(1) RTA. In Koh Thiam Huat, the court held as follows (see [9] above):
(a) The two principal parameters which a sentencing court would generally have regard to in evaluating the seriousness of a crime are (a) the harm caused by the offence, and (b) the accused’s culpability.
(b) In the context of s 64(1) RTA, the primary factor relating to the harm caused would be the extent of injury or damage caused. A related and equally important consideration would be the potential harm that might have resulted.
(c) The factors increasing the accused’s culpability include a particularly dangerous manner of driving, eg, speeding, drink-driving, sleepy driving, driving while using a mobile phone, and deliberate dangerous driving (for instance, in “hell riding” cases).
- [21]
[21] The level of harm depends on the severity of the injury or damage actually caused or the severity of the potential harm. Potential harm refers to the harm that could have been caused but was not. The assessment of potential harm necessarily involves an assessment of the likelihood of the harm occurring. This assessment must be made against the relevant factual matrix and not in a vacuum. This very point is underscored in s 64(1) RTA itself, which requires the court to “[have] regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the nature, condition and use of the road, and the amount of traffic which is actually at the time, or which might reasonably be expected to be, on the road” [emphasis added].
- [22]
[22] The level of potential harm would be assessed against facts which would include (among other things) the condition of the road, the volume of traffic or number of pedestrians actually on or which might reasonably be expected to be on the road at the relevant time, the speed and manner of driving, visibility at the relevant time, the type of vehicle, and any particular vulnerabilities (eg, a truck or car colliding into a motorcycle or pedestrian). There would not be any potential harm to other vehicles or pedestrians if there were no other vehicles or pedestrians that were on or that might reasonably have been expected to be on the road at the relevant time. The volume of traffic and number of pedestrians might also be so minimal that the potential harm can only be assessed to be low, even if serious damage or injury could be caused if that unlikely possibility were realised.
- [23]
[23] As for culpability, it would be increased by factors such as a particularly dangerous manner of driving or where the dangerous driving was deliberate: Koh Thiam Huat at [41].
Whether compounded offences are relevant for purposes of sentencing
- [26]
[26] As mentioned at [12(a)] above, the DJ viewed the appellant’s history of compounded traffic offences as an aggravating factor. While a criminal record is relevant for the purposes of sentencing, it does not include compounded offences: ss 228(2)(a) and 2(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) (“CPC”). However, the Prosecution may also address the court on any relevant factors which may affect the sentence: s 228(2)(c) CPC. As pointed out in Koh Thiam Huat (at [59]), s 228 CPC applies to plead guilty proceedings and, by virtue of s 230(1)(x), to trial proceedings as well. The question, then, is whether a compounded offence is relevant for the purposes of sentencing.
- [27]
[27] In my view, a compounded offence is relevant for the purposes of sentencing only if it can be said to amount to an admission of guilt. After all, it would be unjust to sentence an offender by taking into account conduct which he cannot be said to be guilty of.
- [28]
[28] In Koh Thiam Huat, the court concluded (at [56]) that an offence under the RTA (or its subsidiary legislation) which has been compounded can be taken into account for sentencing purposes. The court reasoned as follows:
(a) It was fair to say that, for the most part, composition of less serious traffic offences amounted to an admission of guilt (at [57]–[58]).
(b) Allowing a court to take into account a compounded offence allows for a more holistic approach in sentencing by “having regard to all relevant factors” [emphasis added], and better gives effect to the need to deter bad driving (at [59]–[60]).
- [29]
[29] Both of the reasons given in Koh Thiam Huat are connected. A compounded offence cannot be a relevant factor in sentencing unless the anterior question of whether a compounded offence amounts to an admission of guilt is answered in the affirmative.
- [30]
[30] In Koh Thiam Huat, the court referred (at [57]) to Public Prosecutor v Lim Niah Liang [1996] 3 SLR(R) 702. In the context of an offence under the Environmental Public Health Act (Cap 95, 1988 Rev Ed) (“EPHA 1988”), the court held in that case (at [23]) that:
The court in Koh Thiam Huat accepted that the above passage “may not apply in its entirety to all traffic offences” but was of the view that “it [was], for the most part, applicable to less serious traffic offences for which composition is offered” (at [58]).
- [31]
[31] I am respectfully unable to agree with the proposition that compounded offences can be taken into consideration for the purposes of sentencing, absent legislative intervention. In my view, it is wrong to assume that composition of an offence amounts to an admission of guilt.
- [32]
[32] Section 135(1A) RTA provides that on payment of the composition sum, “no further proceedings are to be taken” against the alleged offender in respect of the offence. It is true that s 135(1A) RTA does not state that payment of the composition sum amounts to an acquittal. In comparison, under the CPC:
(a) Where an offence is compounded in the course of investigations, “no further proceedings shall be taken against the person reasonably suspected of having committed the offence”: ss 241(4) and 242(3) CPC.
(b) Where an offence is compounded after the accused has been charged in court, the composition results in or has the effect of an acquittal: ss 241(5) and 242(4) CPC.
- [33]
[33] Section 241 CPC applies to composition by victims of offences specified in the Fourth Schedule to the CPC while s 242 CPC applies to composition of prescribed offences by the Public Prosecutor. It seems to me that “acquittal” is referred to in ss 241(5) and 242(4) CPC only because the accused has been charged in court. Where he has not been so charged, the question of an acquittal does not arise and all that can be said is that no further proceedings shall be taken. In my view, the fact that s 135(1A) RTA does not use the word “acquittal” makes no difference to the effect of the composition. Whether the alleged offender has been charged in court or not, the effect of compounding an offence must be the same, ie, the compounded offence cannot be regarded as an admission of guilt. As highlighted by the High Court in Re Lim Chor Pee [1990] 2 SLR(R) 117 (“Lim Chor Pee”) in the context of alleged tax evasion (at [84]):
- [34]
[34] The fact that composition of an offence, after the accused has been charged in court, results in or has the effect of an acquittal makes it clear that it would be wrong to take that compounded offence into consideration for the purposes of sentencing. In my judgment, it would be wrong in principle to treat the composition of an offence, where the alleged offender has not even been charged in court, less favourably.
- [35]
[35] Further, as the court held in Lim Chor Pee (at [55]–[56]), composition of an offence cannot be regarded as an admission of guilt as people may choose to compound an offence for a host of other reasons without admitting liability:
Lim Chor Pee did not appear to have been cited to the court in Koh Thiam Huat.
- [36]
[36] Lim Chor Pee concerned the effect of compounding an offence under the Income Tax Act (Cap 141, 1970 Rev Ed). Koh Thiam Huat concerned the effect of composition of offences under the RTA. However, in my view, whether a compounded offence can be taken to be an admission of guilt is a matter of principle that must apply to all offences. It would also be curious if, absent statutory intervention, compounded RTA offences were relevant to sentencing but not compounded offences under other legislation which are of a similarly regulatory and/or straightforward nature.
- [37]
[37] In my respectful view, it is wrong to assume that acceptance of an offer of composition is tantamount to an admission of liability. Even if an offer of composition is accepted in many instances because the offender in fact admits to the offence, the same cannot be said in respect of all cases. This much was in fact acknowledged in Koh Thiam Huat (at [58]). How is a sentencing court to decide whether a particular compounded offence amounts to an admission of guilt and can therefore be taken into consideration? It would be unsafe to simply assume so; one may accept an offer of composition purely on grounds of “practicality and expediency” without admitting liability (Lim Chor Pee at [56]). Whether the compounded offence is a less serious or more serious offence is irrelevant. Apart from the ambiguity as to what constitutes a “less serious” traffic offence, the relative severity of an offence bears no rational nexus to the question as to whether that offence should be taken into account for sentencing purposes once compounded.
- [38]
[38] Can the court not first ask an accused person whether he admits to the compounded offence? In my view, doing so would be unproductive. If the accused does not admit to the offence that has been compounded, there is little that the Prosecution can do. The position is very different from that involving previous convictions or offences to be taken into consideration for the purposes of sentencing (“TIC offences”). Where antecedents are disputed, the Prosecution is expected to provide proper proof of what they have alleged: Kow Keng Siong, Sentencing Principles in Singapore (Academy Publishing, 2nd Ed, 2019) at para 07:016. Proof of conviction is proof of the fact that the accused had committed the offences that he was convicted of. However, proof that an offence has been compounded is not proof that the accused committed the compounded offence. As for TIC offences, the Prosecution can simply proceed with charges if the accused does not admit to them. In contrast, once an offence has been compounded, the Prosecution has nothing left to proceed on.
- [39]
[39] It may perhaps be argued that composition of an offence does not prohibit the Prosecution from proving that the compounded offence was committed, if this is done for the purposes of sentencing only. In my view, this cannot be correct as a matter of principle. The effect of composition is that there is an acquittal or that no further proceedings may be taken. It seems clear that once an offence has been compounded, the alleged offender can no longer be said to have committed the compounded offence. It cannot be right that the Prosecution can still seek to prove the commission of the compounded offence. In any event, leaving aside whether the Prosecution would still be able to prove the offence when evidence may have been lost with the passage of time, having to do so defeats the very purpose of composition.
- [40]
[40] On a final note, the RTA was amended in 2019 to specifically provide in s 139AA that the court may consider compounded RTA offences as an aggravating factor for the purposes of sentencing a person convicted of an RTA offence. The newly enacted s 139AA took effect on 1 November 2019 and is inapplicable to the present case. However, it bears noting that during the Parliamentary debates, it was specifically pointed out that the amendment related only to the RTA: Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (8 July 2019) vol 94 (Josephine Teo, Minister for Manpower and Second Minister for Home Affairs). In other words, courts have since been given the discretion to consider compounded offences only in sentencing for offences under the RTA. This was an implicit acknowledgment of the general principle that compounded offences are not relevant for the purposes of sentencing. There is in principle no reason why the effect of compounding an offence should differ according to whether the offence is one under the RTA or some other legislation. In my view, the amendment to the RTA shows that the general principle that compounded offences are not relevant in sentencing should be departed from only by way of statutory intervention.
Applying the principles to the facts
- [41]
[41] It was not disputed that no actual injury or damage was caused in the present case. As for potential harm, I disagreed with the DJ’s assessment that the potential harm was “great or serious”. As the appellant pointed out, there were no other vehicles (whether moving or stationary) or pedestrians along the road. There was also no evidence to suggest that other vehicles or pedestrians could reasonably have been expected to be on the road then, at about 2.10am. In my view, the potential harm in this case was low, perhaps at the higher end of low. It bears reiterating that potential harm must be evaluated against the relevant factual backdrop and not in a vacuum – otherwise, it would always be possible to speculate, without more, that there could have been other vehicles or pedestrians on the road at the relevant time.
- [43]
[43] As for aggravating factors, the DJ took the appellant’s history of compounded traffic offences into consideration. I note that she was referred to Koh Thiam Huat but Lim Chor Pee was not cited to her. In my view, the DJ should not have taken the compounded traffic offences into consideration, for the reasons stated earlier. However, as the DJ pointed out, the appellant’s previous convictions for driving whilst underage and without insurance coverage were aggravating factors. There was a heightened need for deterrence as the appellant had committed another traffic offence despite having been previously disqualified from driving for 12 months.
- [44]
[44] The only mitigating factor in the appellant’s favour was that he had pleaded guilty.
- [45]
[45] Based on the above, how should the period of disqualification be calibrated? The possible disqualification period is wide-ranging and may extend to disqualification for life. In deciding on the appropriate period, it would be useful to first consider whether the 12-month threshold has been crossed by assessing the levels of harm and culpability (see [24] above). The DJ did not think that the 12-month threshold had been crossed in this case. I agree and this is consistent with the case precedents on s 64(1) RTA.
- [48]
[48] As for the cases involving disqualification orders of less than 12 months, in my view, no meaningful trend could be discerned from those cases based on the harm and culpability matrix.
- [50]
[50] In my view, both of these cases were of limited assistance because they were decided before the maximum fine for s 64(1) RTA offences had been increased with effect from 20 June 2017. Although the RTA amendment did not affect disqualification orders under s 42(1) RTA, Parliament’s intent to deter offences of dangerous driving is reflected by the increase in the maximum fine that can be imposed for such offences. This heightened need for deterrence means that the court should take a tougher stance in respect of disqualification orders as well. As the DJ noted (GD, at [33]), there has been a concomitant increase in the length of the disqualification orders imposed for offences committed after that date.
- [51]
[51] With respect to the present case, given that the level of harm was at the higher end of low and the level of culpability was medium, I was of the view that the appropriate indicative starting disqualification period was seven months. The fact that the appellant had pleaded guilty did not carry much mitigating weight given that his actions had been caught on the CCTV. Taking the aggravating factor of the appellant’s previous traffic-related convictions into consideration, in my view, the disqualification period of ten months imposed by the DJ could not be said to be manifestly excessive. Accordingly, I dismissed the appeal.
Annex A: Sketch plan
Annex B: Section 64(1) RTA cases referred to by the DJ and tendered by the Prosecution
Annex C: Additional s 64(1) RTA cases tendered by the Prosecution