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Grounds publishedDecided 19 Jan 2021

General Division of the High Court

Noor Azlin bte Abdul Rahman and another v Changi General Hospital Pte Ltd and others

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[2021] SGHC 10Case no. Suit No 59 of 2015

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] This court is required to consider issues relating to damages following the decision of the Court of Appeal (reported in Noor Azlin bte Abdul Rahman v Changi General Hospital Pte Ltd and others [2019] 1 SLR 834 (“CA Judgment”)) that the first defendant, Changi General Hospital Pte Ltd (“CGH”), is liable in negligence to the first plaintiff, Ms Noor Azlin binte Abdul Rahman (deceased) (“Ms Azlin”). The second plaintiff, Mr Azmi bin Abdul Rahman (“Mr Azmi”), who is Ms Azlin’s older brother, is the executor of her estate, and he was added as a party to HC/S 59/2015 (“Suit 59”) so as to continue with the action in his capacity as executor of the estate. Mr Azmi is not pursuing any separate cause of action in his own right against CGH.

  3. [2] Ms Azlin passed away on 1 April 2019, about a month after the CA Judgment in February 2019. As she was still alive at the time of judgment, the Court of Appeal’s inquiry did not extend to whether CGH’s negligence caused or contributed to her death. In the CA Judgment, the Court of Appeal was only concerned with the delay in diagnosis and treatment in the light of the progression of her lung cancer from stage I to stage IIA, the growth of the nodule in her lung, and nodal metastasis (CA Judgment at [117]–[123]).

  4. [3] With her passing, Ms Azlin’s estate, as a general rule, bears the burden of proving a causal link between CGH’s negligence and her death. Bearing in mind that similar principles apply to causation of damage and quantification of loss, the loss in issue (ie death) crucially results from the Court of Appeal’s finding of damage that had given rise to a cause of action. Hence, Ms Azlin’s death is a matter going to quantification of loss. I will elaborate more on this point later. Essentially, this judgment will consider whether the heads of damages as claimed are caused by CGH’s negligence and, if so, the next step in the inquiry is the quantification of damages in respect of it. I should mention that, despite Ms Azlin’s death, the issues raised by the Court of Appeal for consideration for the assessment of damages remain relevant, namely, the impact of the stage at which the cancer was at, the size of the nodule, and the presence of nodal metastasis on the effectiveness of a lobectomy performed in March 2012 and the risk of relapse after treatment (CA Judgment at [125]). These issues are relevant because, while the Court of Appeal has found that Ms Azlin’s nodule in July 2011 was malignant, the Court of Appeal has left the degree and type of malignancy to be assessed by this Court.

  5. [4] The assessment of damages (“AD”) was conducted in a six-day trial over the course of two weeks from 24 August to 4 September 2020. The parties called one expert witness each. These are the same experts who had earlier testified at the trial in the High Court (“HC trial”). The evidence of witnesses of fact led at the trial are also being relied upon for the AD.

  6. [6] At the hearing of the application for interim payment and again on appeal, counsel for CGH, Ms Kuah Boon Theng SC (“Ms Kuah”) pointed out that the evidence adduced at the HC trial was insufficient to support some of the pleaded heads of claim. Yet, the estate did not seek leave to call further evidence to make good the deficiencies in readiness for the hearing to assess damages. For instance, no evidence has been led on Ms Azlin’s expected full life expectancy. In addition, no justification has been given for the calculation of Ms Azlin’s medical expenses post-trial. Neither has the estate amended the statement of claim to reflect heads of claim that are consonant with Ms Azlin’s death. Consequently, both the quantum and the heads of claim have not been tidied up. For instance, a pleaded claim for loss of earnings has been retained when it should have been changed to a claim for loss of inheritance. Again, no leave has been sought to include a plea for aggravated and punitive damages that are now advanced in closing submissions. I have set out the foregoing because it provides an overall view of the background to the assessment of damages and how the shortcomings have impacted the damages recoverable.

  7. Summary of CA Judgment against CGH

  8. [7] The facts and issues in dispute are reported in Noor Azlin bte Abdul Rahman v Changi General Hospital Pte Ltd and others [2019] 3 SLR 1063 (“HC Judgment”) as well as in the CA Judgment. The setting for Ms Azlin’s various claims for damages against CGH arose from her visits to CGH’s Accident and Emergency (“A&E”) department on different occasions over a period of several years with different presenting medical complaints on each visit. During one visit, a nodule in her right lung was picked up in an X-ray. Whilst she sued three doctors employed by CGH, two of whom were doctors in the A&E department, all three doctors were found not to be negligent, and as such there was no vicarious liability on the part of CGH. However, Ms Azlin succeeded on an independent cause of action against CGH for, inter alia, its failure to have in place an adequate system in respect of patient management to ensure that incidental findings in radiology reports are followed up. Given CGH’s failure to maintain such an adequate patient management system, there was delay in the diagnosis and treatment of Ms Azlin’s lung cancer.

  9. [8] Specifically, the Court of Appeal found that CGH breached its duty of care to Ms Azlin. CGH had failed to ensure that there was proper follow-up in Ms Azlin’s case even though radiological reports in April 2010 and July 2011 recommended follow-up on the opacity of a nodule in the right mid-zone of her chest. There were also serious inadequacies in CGH’s patient management system (see [24] below and CA Judgment at [96]–[100]).

  10. [9] The events that led to the April 2010 and July 2011 radiological reports were as follows.

  11. [13] The July 2011 X-rays were sent for reporting and the report was prepared on 1 August 2011 (ie, the July 2011 radiological report). Dr Soh did not receive this report and was unaware that the radiologist had detected the opacity in the right mid-zone of Ms Azlin’s lung, noted that it was stable and had been there since April 2010, and recommended a follow-up of the opacity in the report.

  12. [14] As highlighted in the HC Judgment at [30], the nodule as shown in the four X-rays taken of Ms Azlin from 2007 to 2011 were measured by CGH’s radiologists and Ms Azlin’s witness, Dr Andrew Tan (Dr Tan”), and the defendants’ expert, Dr Lynette Teo (“Dr Teo”). Their measurements were:

  13. October 2007 X-ray (cm)

  14. November 2007 X-ray (cm)

  15. April 2010 X-ray (cm)

  16. July 2011 X-ray (cm)

  17. Radiological reports

  18. 1.537 x 1.44

  19. No measurement

  20. 1.9

  21. 2.6 x 2.2

  22. Dr Tan

  23. 1.5

  24. 1.5

  25. 1.9

  26. 2.3

  27. Dr Teo

  28. 1.72 x 1.88

  29. 1.77 x 1.77

  30. 1.73 x 2.38

  31. 2.13 x 2.47

  32. [15] I now turn to the events that led to Ms Azlin undergoing a biopsy of the nodule in February 2012 and subsequently a lobectomy in March 2012.

  33. [16] On 28 November 2011, Ms Azlin attended at the Raffles Medical Clinic and was seen by Dr Melvyn Wong (“Dr Wong”). She complained of cough, breathlessness and blood in the sputum (ie, haemoptysis). On 1 December 2011, Ms Azlin returned to the Raffles Medical Clinic for a chest X-ray (“the December 2011 X-ray”), which showed a lesion in the right mid-zone of the lung. Dr Wong informed Ms Azlin that the X-ray would be sent for reporting before determining the next steps. The radiological report, which was prepared by Dr Yeong Kuan Yuen, confirmed the presence of a round patch and ill-defined shadows at the mid-zone of the right lung and suggested that “this is likely to be the result of infection”. After another return visit on 7 December 2011, Dr Wong then referred Ms Azlin to a respiratory physician at CGH’s SOC for further evaluation.

  34. [18] On 16 February 2012, a biopsy of the nodule was performed by Dr Tan. The biopsy confirmed that the nodule was malignant, and that Ms Azlin had cancer that originated from the lung. The stage of the lung cancer was not yet known then.

  35. [19] On 1 March 2012, Prof Sridhar explained to Ms Azlin that there was a good chance that she could have a complete cure with a lobectomy. Ms Azlin was clinically staged as having stage I lung cancer. On 29 March 2012, she underwent a lobectomy and one-third of her right lung was resected. The tumour measured 3.0cm and was pathologically diagnosed as stage IIA non-small cell lung cancer (“NSCLC”) because one out of ten lymph nodes – a level 10 lymph node – was positive for micro-metastasis. Ms Azlin underwent four rounds of adjuvant chemotherapy for about three months and CT scans every four months.

  36. [20] In August 2014, a recurrence of her lung cancer occurred. This was discovered on a CT scan dated 26 August 2014. A biopsy confirmed that the lung cancer had progressed to stage IV. In December 2014, an analysis of the tumour that was resected via lobectomy in March 2012 was done to determine its mutation type. The resected tumour from 2012 was retrospectively found to be positive for a rare echinoderm microtubule-associated protein-like 4 (“EML4”)-ALK gene rearrangement. In other words, Ms Azlin was retrospectively diagnosed in 2014 to have been suffering from ALK-positive lung cancer in 2012. Prof Goh opined that ALK-positive lung cancer is caused by a rare mutation whereby there is a translocation (relocation or rearrangement) of a part of a chromosome, which brings together two genes which are usually not together, which results in the expression of a signalling receptor called the ALK. He also opined that it is not known what induces this genetic event or transformation. When the ALK gene is activated, two receptors called the tyrosine kinase will bind to each other and can stimulate cell proliferation (ie, cause an increase in the number of cells). When the ALK gene is expressed on the cell membrane and activated, it is oncogenic (has the potential to cause cancer) and can transform what were initially benign cells into malignant or cancerous cells. Additionally, Prof Goh explained that the ALK gene is usually silenced in a normal human tissue. What this means is that the ALK gene is not expressed except under malignant conditions.

  37. [21] From 22 January 2015 to 8 July 2015, Ms Azlin was treated with a first-generation ALK-inhibitor, Crizotinib. In July 2015, she started on second-generation ALK-inhibitors, Ceritinib and Nivolumab, as part of a clinical trial. She remained on those drugs until October 2016, when the cancer progressed to her brain and mediastinal lymph node. She was then taken off the clinical trial and managed with radio surgery, chemotherapy and Ceritinib. From March 2017, Ms Azlin was treated with a third generation ALK-inhibitor, Lorlatinib.

  38. [22] The pertinent findings of the Court of Appeal are summarised as follows.

  39. [23] The key factual finding was that, while the nodule was more likely than not to have been benign as of November 2007, Ms Azlin was, on the balance of probabilities, suffering from lung cancer by July 2011. This is primarily due to two reasons, as explained by the Court of Appeal. First, Ms Azlin’s lung cancer must have gone through stage IA as well as stage IB before progressing to stage IIA by March 2012. This is because, according to Prof Goh, an ALK-mutation positive tumour must progress through stages I to IV. Second, given the extremely short interval of time (eight months) between August 2011 and March 2012, it is unlikely that the progression of the lung cancer from stage IA to IIA happened within that time. Reasoning backwards in a “logical and principled fashion”, the Court of Appeal concluded that it was more likely than not that Ms Azlin did have lung cancer by July 2011, an inference which the Court of Appeal also drew from the objective fact that the growth of the nodule between 2010 and 2011 was more significant than that between 2007 and 2010: CA Judgment at [104]–[114]. Pausing here, the Court of Appeal in effect is saying that, by July 2011, Ms Azlin’s lung cancer could not have been at stage IA. It suffices for me to say for now that the size of the nodule, based on X-rays in July 2011, suggests a stage IB cancer (see [44] below for elaboration).

  40. [24] The Court of Appeal found that CGH breached its duty of care to Ms Azlin. CGH had failed to ensure that there was proper follow-up in Ms Azlin’s case even though both the April 2010 and July 2011 radiological reports recommended follow-up. There were also serious inadequacies in CGH’s patient management system because (i) it was unreasonable that all incidental findings were followed-up by the A&E department instead of a specific outpatient clinic; (ii) the system did not allow for a comprehensive management of a patient because there was no appropriate mechanism for the consolidation of what was already known of a patient; and (iii) there was no system to properly record decisions that were made, so any doctor further down the line would have no reference to check why a decision had been made: CA Judgment at [96]–[100].

  41. [25] On causation and damage, the Court of Appeal found that Ms Azlin would have been referred to a respiratory physician if there had been a proper system to ensure that the appropriate follow-up on Ms Azlin’s case was carried out. By July 2011, the radiological report for the July 2011 X-rays would obviously show that the nodule was not of an infective nature, having persisted over a period of four years. It was thus more likely than not that the CT scan conducted in December 2011 and biopsy conducted in February 2012 would have been conducted earlier beginning in July 2011. Thus, CGH’s negligence caused a delay in diagnosing Ms Azlin with lung cancer: CA Judgment at [115]–[116]. In turn, this delay in diagnosis caused the following damage to Ms Azlin: the progression of the lung cancer from stage I to stage IIA, the growth of the nodule, and nodal metastasis: CA Judgment at [117]–[123].

  42. [26] The Court of Appeal then observed that, whilst the HC trial was not bifurcated, the evidence and submissions were not directed to the specific facts as found by the Court of Appeal. Issues such as the impact of the stage at which the cancer was at, the size of the nodule, and the presence of nodal metastasis on the effectiveness of a lobectomy and the risk of relapse were not fully explored. Therefore, the Court of Appeal remitted the issue of loss and damage, including quantification (if any), to the trial judge (this court) with leave for the parties to refine or revise their evidence so as to address the specific factual findings made by the Court of Appeal: CA Judgment at [124]–[125].

  43. The Estate’s quantification of damages

  44. [27] The plaintiffs (hereafter referred to as the “Estate”) have put forward a total claim of $13,464,100.75 in damages, with the following breakdown.

  45. (a) General damages: $4,471,523.35, comprising the following items.

  46. (i) Pain and suffering and loss of amenity: $1,051,000.

  47. (ii) Medical expenses (from 2015 to 1 April 2019): $1,501,703.50.

  48. (iii) Transport expenses (from 2015 to 1 April 2019): $35,700.

  49. (iv) Loss of take-home earnings:

  50. (A) living years from 2016 to 2018: $142,265.13; and

  51. (B) lost years from 2019 to 2044: $605,057.46.

  52. (v) Loss of CPF:

  53. (A) living years from 2016 to 2018: $128,488.47; and

  54. (B) lost years from 2019 to 2044: $690,691.29.

  55. (vi) Cost of nursing care, domestic and auxiliary helper (from 2014 to 1 April 2019): $118,617.50.

  56. (vii) Estate claim: $198,000.

  57. (b) Aggravated or punitive damages: $8,943,046.70.

  58. (c) Special damages: $49,530.70, comprising the following.

  59. (i) Pre-trial loss of earnings (2010 to 2015): $26,910.09.

  60. (ii) Medical expenses: $19,620.61.

  61. (iii) Transport expenses: $3,000.

  62. [28] CGH submits that damages are not recoverable from CGH in that, even if Ms Azlin had been diagnosed and treated at stage I of her lung cancer, on the balance of probabilities, she would still have died from the disease. This contention is related to proof of the fact that, even if a given head of loss is one that is recognised in law where death ensued, there was no causal link between CGH’s negligence (the delayed diagnosis and treatment of Ms Azlin’s lung cancer) and her eventual death. CGH’s fallback position in the alternative is that the Estate is only entitled to $20,800 in damages with the following breakdown: $10,000 for pain and suffering and $10,800 for the dependency claim.

  63. Issues to be determined

  64. [29] As mentioned at [25] above, the Court of Appeal determined that CGH’s negligence caused three forms of damage to Ms Azlin – the progression of the disease from stage I lung cancer to stage IIA, the growth of the nodule, and nodal metastasis. At the time of the CA Judgment, Ms Azlin was still alive and, on the question of damages, the inquiry, inter alia, would have been whether the management of the patient in July 2011 and in March 2012 would have been exactly the same, namely surgery followed by adjuvant chemotherapy. Another issue, if she were alive, is whether nodal metastasis was due to a delay in diagnosis and treatment and whether that translates into risk of relapse and a diminution in her full life expectancy. However, before me, the inquiry at the hearing to assess damages is whether there is evidence upon which to find that, on a balance of probabilities, Ms Azlin’s full life expectancy was diminished and that translated to her death in April 2019. In short, these proceedings will examine whether there is a causal link between CGH’s negligence and Ms Azlin’s death. If the answer is in the affirmative, this court will then examine whether the Estate is entitled to claim each of the heads of claim, and the quantum claimed by the Estate as listed at [27] above.

  65. The impact of CGH’s negligence on risk of relapse and death

  66. [30] As highlighted in the introduction and [29] above, Ms Azlin’s death is a matter going to quantification of loss. In applying principles of causation to quantification of loss, the matters to be examined at the AD hearing will be the impact of (i) the stage at which the cancer was at; (ii) the size of the nodule; and (iii) the presence of nodal metastasis. Related to these matters for this court’s consideration will be the management of the patient in terms of the effectiveness of a lobectomy and the risk of relapse after a delay of approximately eight months. Associated with the risk of relapse is the element of diminution in full life expectancy that translated to her eventual death.

  67. [31] There was no list of agreed issues to address the matters outlined in [30] above. Instead, each party submitted its own list. Broadly, the common issues that are relevant to the question of whether CGH’s negligence caused Ms Azlin’s demise are as follows.

  68. (a) Was CGH’s negligence in allowing the lung cancer to progress from stage I to stage IIA likely to have caused Ms Azlin’s death on 1 April 2019 (independent of any pre-existing condition) (“causation question (a)”)?

  69. (b) If the answer to (a) is in the affirmative, was Ms Azlin’s fate already conclusively biologically determined when CGH breached its duty (“causation question (b)”)?

  70. (c) If the answer to (b) is in the negative, were there available treatments that would have prevented Ms Azlin from dying in the way that she did (“causation question (c)”)?

  71. (d) If the answer to (c) is in the affirmative, would Ms Azlin have availed herself of these treatments (“causation question (d)”)?

  72. (e) If the answer to (d) is in the affirmative, would Ms Azlin have been “cured” and would she have lived to her full life expectancy if she had availed herself of the said treatments (“causation question (e)”)?

  73. [32] These five questions are based on the approach set out in the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Armstrong, Carol Ann (executrix of the estate of Peter Traynor, deceased, and on behalf of the dependents of Peter Traynor, deceased) v Quest Laboratories Pte Ltd and another and other appeals [2020] 1 SLR 133 (“Carol Ann Armstrong”) at [72], which comprehensively dealt with the issue of causation in medical negligence.

  74. [33] The parties do not agree on the exact phrasing of causation question (b). The Estate frames causation question (b) as follows: “was [Ms Azlin’s] fate already conclusively biologically determined in October 2007, April 2010 and/or July 2011 when [CGH] had failed in its duty to her?” CGH frames causation question (b) as follows: “was [Ms Azlin’s] fate already conclusively biologically determined when [CGH] failed to refer her to a respiratory physician in August 2011?” Essentially, the difference in the parties’ framing of causation question (b) boils down to the parties’ differing positions on when CGH breached its duty to Ms Azlin. I will address this issue at [36] below. For present purposes, I find that the crux of causation question (b) is whether Ms Azlin’s fate had already been conclusively biologically determined at the time of CGH’s breach (see Carol Ann Armstrong at [72]). As such, I frame causation question (b) in these broader terms, as highlighted at [31(b)] above.

  75. [34] Another critical observation by the Court of Appeal in Carol Ann Armstrong is the distinction between fact probability and belief probability. Fact probability refers to a piece of probabilistic evidence that speaks to the existence (or non-existence) of a causal connection between the defendant’s actions (or omissions) and the pleaded damage. Belief probability is the degree of overall strength and credibility attributed by the decision-maker (such as the court) to the fact probability evidence (ie the statistical study). In establishing belief probability, a court may look at, among other things, the credibility of the study, its authors and the reliability of the study. Statistical evidence “is really just fact probability” and, “while a court could place its belief in the reliability and appropriateness of that piece of fact probability (the statistical evidence), it need not invariably do so. Statistical evidence is but one factor to be weighed in the overall mix”: Carol Ann Armstrong at [97]–[99]. This distinction is important because the assessment of the following causation questions must be made in reference to belief probability.

  76. Staging of the disease at stage I in July 2011 and at stage IIA in March 2012: Difference between clinical and pathological staging

  77. [35] Ms Azlin’s tumour was at stage I in July 2011. Ms Azlin’s tumour was then resected on 29 March 2012 ([19] above), which is when she was pathologically staged at stage IIA. There was a recurrence of the lung cancer in August 2014 and the disease was then staged at stage IV ([20] above). It first bears highlighting that the surgery that would have been done for Ms Azlin at stage I of her cancer is also a surgical “resection”. According to Prof Goh, a resection and a lobectomy “mean the same thing” medically. The main question is whether a surgical resection of the tumour at stage I would have made a difference and “cured” her of lung cancer so that there would, on the balance of probabilities, be no relapse or recurrence during the period that she actually suffered a relapse, which resulted in her death. Put another way, would surgery followed by adjuvant chemotherapy at stage I translate into no diminution in life expectancy?

  78. [36] I now come to the Court of Appeal’s finding that CGH had failed to diagnose Ms Azlin in July 2011 (see CA Judgment at [116] and [120]–[123]). I find that July 2011 is referable to the time when the July 2011 X-rays were taken ([12] above). CGH submits that the delay in diagnosis only began from 1 August 2011, since that was when the 2011 radiological report was ready. This argument ignores the point as found by the Court of Appeal, namely, that the 2010 radiological report had already recommended follow-up, but CGH had failed to do so. If CGH had done so, then Ms Azlin’s cancer in July 2011 would more likely than not have been discovered then.

  79. [37] It first bears explaining the distinction between pathological and clinical staging. The clinical staging of lung cancer is derived mainly from impression and a biopsy (see also CA Judgment at [106]). At the HC trial in 2017, Prof Goh provided a clear explanation of how clinical staging is derived, and why Ms Azlin was staged at clinical stage I in March 2012:

  80. [38] Therefore, prior to surgical resection of the tumour, Ms Azlin’s cancer was clinically staged at stage I in March 2012 because the size of her tumour was no more than 3cm and, critically, there was no evidence of lymph node enlargement in the radiological reports available then.

  81. [39] The pathological staging of lung cancer, on the other hand, is a more “accurate” reflection of the stage of the cancer because it is determined after the tumour and affected lymph nodes have been surgically removed, dissected, and analysed by the pathologist to determine “definitively whether any [cancer] cells have gone to the lymph nodes or elsewhere”. As explained by Prof Goh in the HC trial, “what the surgeon usually does” in a lobectomy is to “remove a portion of the lung called a lobe where the tumour is located and he will dissect the lymph nodes around the area of the distribution of the tumour via the lymphatics and based on that, the histopathologist will look under the microscope to see if there are cells that were there”. During the AD hearing, Prof Goh again reiterated that, in a lobectomy, “the surgeon goes in, cuts it out, and … he samples the lymph nodes and the whole pathology goes to the pathologist and then they measure the tumour and then they resect the lymph nodes”. In the present case, the staging of Ms Azlin’s cancer was changed from clinical stage I to pathological stage IIA after the lobectomy in March 2012. This change came about because “one out of 10 lymph nodes in station 10, which is a hilar region, was positive (N1 microscopic pathological stage, Stage II).

  82. What was the pathological stage of Ms Azlin’s lung cancer in July 2011?

  83. [41] However, there is no medical evidence of the pathological stage of Ms Azlin’s cancer prior to March 2012. The best that this court can do is to draw an inference from the testimony of Ms Azlin’s expert, Dr David Breen (“Dr Breen”), who testified that one can fairly assume that the clinical stage equals the pathological stage at the time when a patient is recommended resection.

  84. [42] With that inference in mind and the Court of Appeal’s finding that Ms Azlin’s had stage 1 cancer in July 2011, for present purposes of the assessment of damages, the approach is to ascribe a notional pathological stage for the disease in July 2011. It is possible to deem it as “pathological” stage I because there was no lymph node involvement or distant metastasis in July 2011, even though there is no actual pathological evidence to medically prove this (ie the tumour was not surgically removed and analysed in July 2011).

  85. [43] I now turn to another related preliminary question raised by parties, which is whether the lung cancer can be notionally staged as pathological stage IA or stage IB in July 2011. This question is of some relevance because the rate of relapse is naturally lower at stage IA than at stage IB, so the diminution in full life expectancy would be reduced if the delay in diagnosis caused a progression from stage IA to stage IIA rather than from stage IB to stage IIA.

  86. [44] In my view, for purposes of the assessment of damages, it is not unreasonable to deem Ms Azlin’s tumour at pathological stage IB in July 2011 by drawing inferences from the following evidence. According to Prof Goh and exhibit P2 submitted by Dr Breen, pathological stage IA is where the greatest dimension of the primary tumour is less than 2cm. Pathological stage IB is where the greatest dimension of the primary tumour is more than 2cm and less than or equal to 3cm. Pathological stage IIA is where the greatest dimension of the primary tumour is more than 3cm and/or where there is regional lymph node metastasis or distant metastasis. There is also Prof Goh’s testimony that, from the X-ray measurements of the tumour (based on X-rays taken on 31 July 2011), the staging would be “at least” clinical stage IB, since the greatest dimension of the tumour is between 2cm and 3cm. In fact, even the smallest dimension of the tumour is already more than 2cm in July 2011 (see [14] above). After all that has been said, the notional pathological stage to be ascribed for the disease in July 2011 is thus more possibly pathological stage IB in July 2011 rather than pathological stage IA, as suggested by Mr Rai. This is also what the Court of Appeal in effect was saying (see [23] above). For convenience, unless otherwise indicated, this Judgment will refer to the deemed pathological stage IB as “Stage IB”.

  87. What are the respective relapse rates?

  88. [45] The medical literature relied on by the parties in this AD hearing shows that the survival/cure rate 5 years after treatment at stage IB ranges from 45% to 80%. The survival/cure rate 5 years after treatment at stage IIA ranges from 30% to 64%.

  89. [46] As Ms Kuah pointed out, the problem with the survival statistics in Exhibits P1 to P3 adduced by Dr Breen is that Dr Breen did not provide any references to show the source and basis for the graphs and statistics in Exhibits P1 to P3. When cross-examined on this, Dr Breen’s testimony was unsatisfactory. He stated that the information in Exhibits P1 to P3 were generated from an online calculator on the American College of Chest Physicians' website called staginglungcancer.org. Dr Breen first claimed on day 1 of the AD hearing that the information from this online calculator was based on the 8th edition of the lung cancer staging Atlas publication by Peter Goldstraw. However, on day 3 of the AD hearing, Dr Breen then sought to clarify that the information from the calculator was actually based on “the 7th edition by Goldstraw” because:

  90. [47] Dr Breen could not “find a calculator for the 8th edition easily online”. Dr Breen also did not adduce either the 7th or 8th editions of this “Atlas” publication.

  91. [48] This is problematic because, to determine “belief probability”, ie the degree of overall strength and credibility, of a statistical study, a court looks at “the credibility of the study, its authors and the reliability of the study”: Carol Ann Armstrong ([32] supra) at [97(b)]. In this case, this court is completely unable to do so for Exhibits P1 to P3 when Dr Breen provided no sources for them and no explanation on how he calculated those figures.

  92. [49] Prof Goh also further testified that the online calculator relied upon by Dr Breen was generally not used by lung oncologists. Notably, Prof Goh explained that these online calculators:

  93. [50] Prof Goh’s explanation helpfully reminds the court that the statistics are too general to relate to Ms Azlin’s individual circumstances. Accordingly, it is abundantly clear that Exhibits P1 to P3 are unhelpful. Thus, I place no weight on the figures from Exhibits P1 to P3.

  94. [51] I also do not find the data from the SEER database to be helpful, since these databases include “a lot of heterogeneity in patients” – some “have received treatment, some have adjuvant chemotherapy, some did not, some had poor organ function and some had better organ function” [emphasis added]. I agree with Prof Goh that, for any piece of statistical study to be helpful, its findings should be based on data with characteristics that are similar to the specific circumstances of the patient (ie, Ms Azlin). The SEER database does not account for the individual circumstances of Ms Azlin (eg her age, and the fact that she was a Singaporean female smoker with ALK-positive cancer).

  95. [52] The statistics from the National Lung Screening Trial (“NLST”) are also not helpful. First, the participants in the NLST were between 55 and 74 years’ old; had a history of heavy cigarette smoking of at least 30 pack-years; and, if they were former smokers, had quit only within the previous 15 years. In contrast, Ms Azlin was only 32 years’ old in July 2011 and had a smoking history of “about four pack years”. Second, it is unclear how Dr Breen derived the numbers from the NLST, since Dr Breen did not disclose the medical literature evidencing the NLST survival statistics. Third, Prof Goh testified that the NLST is not “meant to show you the survival of patients … in different stages of disease”; it is meant to show that “CT used as a form of screening reduced mortality”. In any event, Dr Breen also did not provide the corresponding survival/cure rate for stage IIA for any comparison to be made. Thus, I did not place weight on the NLST statistics.

  96. [53] I find the ANITA and JBR-10 studies relied on by Prof Goh to be more helpful than the statistics relied upon by Dr Breen. As explained by Prof Goh, these two studies were based on the study of adjuvant chemotherapy trials of those with pathological stage IB and stage II NSCLC, and the patients in these studies used the same combination of drugs as Ms Azlin did. However, even these studies are of limited application, because they do not take into account patients with ALK-positive cancer, which is a critical factor in this case. It is also unclear what population these studies are based on. Furthermore, there is no differentiation between stages IIA and IIB in these studies.

  97. [54] In any event, the statistics provided by both parties are consistent in that all the statistics show a general trend of a fall in about 10–15% in the survival rate from pathological stage IB to pathological stage IIA. The critical point, however, is the increase in relapse rate in this case. As explained by Dr Breen, the relapse rate is the converse of the survival rate. That would mean that, in this case, Ms Azlin’s prognosis of a relapse increased by about 10–15%.

  98. [55] Bearing in mind the Court of Appeal’s guidance on belief probability in Carol Ann Armstrong ([32] supra), I now turn to examine the other pertinent factors in this case that might explain why there was a relapse in Ms Azlin’s cancer despite the lobectomy in March 2012.

  99. Reason for relapse

  100. [56] The next important question is why the cancer relapsed in 2014 even though the tumour and affected lymph node had already been resected in March 2012? In addition, no distant metastasis (ie no metastasis outside of the areas already affected and identified, such as the liver, the opposite lung, bones, or brain) was detected at that time.

  101. [57] For the reasons that I will come to, the nub of the issue in relation to Ms Azlin’s cancer relapse has to do with CGH’s delay in diagnosis rather than a delay in treatment. In other words, the problem is, critically, a delay in diagnosis in the first instance which caused Ms Azlin’s relapse. I will now elaborate beginning with patient management in terms of treatment.

  102. [58] On the evidence, the delay in treatment did not change the nature of the treatment. There was no difference in patient management in terms of the treatment that she received in March 2012 (viz, lobectomy and adjuvant chemotherapy) and what she would have received prior to that at stage I. It bears emphasising that pathological stage IIA is ordinarily still considered, medically, a relatively “early” stage, and Ms Azlin still had a chance for “cure” (ie no relapse or recurrence over a given period of time) even when she received her lobectomy and corresponding adjuvant chemotherapy at pathological stage IIA in March 2012. Indeed, the statistics adduced by Prof Goh show that the survival rate for stage II is still above 50% (see [45] above). The evidence also shows that Ms Azlin would not have been prescribed ALK inhibitors prior to March 2012 even if her cancer had been detected earlier, because ALK inhibitors are only given to a patient whose disease is at an advanced stage. Both Dr Breen and Prof Goh agree that ALK inhibitors are not meant to cure ALK-positive cancer, but only to prolong life and to improve the quality of life of a patient in the end stages of the cancer. This explains why, in 2012, ALK inhibitors were only available to patients with stage IV cancer. Even so in 2012, ALK inhibitors were not yet available for clinical trials in Singapore.

  103. [59] The critical explanation provided by Prof Goh as to why the cancer still recurred in 2014 despite the lobectomy in March 2012, which completely removed the nodule and affected lymph node, was as such:

  104. [60] This explanation is critical. The Court of Appeal had already found that CGH’s negligence caused a delay in diagnosing Ms Azlin with lung cancer in July 2011, which caused her to suffer from nodal metastasis and a progression of the lung cancer from stage I to stage IIA (see [25] above). Prof Goh’s testimony provides an explanation to the missing link of whether CGH’s delay in diagnosis caused Ms Azlin’s relapse and death: the answer must be yes. This is because, as explained by Prof Goh, once there was nodal metastasis ie nodal involvement, the cancer cells entered her lymphatic system (as evidenced by microscopic metastasis in the Hilar lymph node) which resulted in a higher risk of relapse even with a lobectomy that removed both the tumour and the affected lymph node. In this case, the removal of both the tumour and affected lymph node in March 2012, coupled with the absence of distant metastasis then, did not stop a relapse of her cancer in 2014.

  105. [61] On the other hand, at Stage IB of the cancer, there would be, by definition, no microscopic node involvement, so the cancer cells would not have entered the lymphatic system yet. In other words, on a balance of probabilities, there would have been no microscopic node involvement if Ms Azlin had undergone lobectomy and adjuvant chemotherapy at Stage IB of the disease. The foregoing is a reminder of the Court of Appeal’s finding (at [122] of the CA Judgment) – if Ms Azlin had been diagnosed with lung cancer in July 2011, it is more likely than not that she would not have suffered from nodal metastasis and any consequences that may follow.

  106. [62] Another critical factor is this case is that Ms Azlin’s lung cancer was an ALK-positive lung cancer. According to Prof Goh’s testimony at the AD hearing, ALK-positive lung cancers are generally “more aggressive” and they “will tend to recur”. Critically, Exhibit D4 adduced by CGH, which is an article (Jin Ho Paik et al, “Clinicopathologic implication of ALK rearrangement in surgically resected lung cancer: A proposal of diagnostic algorithm for ALK-rearranged adenocarcinoma” (2012) Lung Cancer 76 at 403), show that ALK-positive lung cancer also “tended to show more frequent lymph node metastasis despite its lower T stage”. This explains why, despite Ms Azlin’s relatively early clinical staging (of stage I), the cancer cells had entered her lymphatic system, resulting in microscopic node involvement in March 2012.

  107. [63] Ms Kuah placed emphasis on Exhibit D4 and Ms Azlin’s ALK mutation to submit that Ms Azlin’s relapse was not due to any delay in diagnosis, but was due to the ALK mutation of her cancer; hence, even if the lobectomy had been carried out at an earlier point in time, there would already have been nodal metastasis present.

  108. [64] However, even assuming that ALK mutation increases the risk of nodal metastasis, Ms Azlin did not have ALK mutation in July 2011. While Prof Goh last testified in the HC trial that he was of the opinion that it was unlikely that Ms Azlin’s nodule commenced as a non-ALK-positive lung cancer before developing into an ALK-positive lung cancer, this testimony by Prof Goh must be seen in the full context of his evidence in the HC trial, which is that Ms Azlin did not have cancer in July 2011 (ie Prof Goh was of the opinion that Ms Azlin’s cancer developed after July 2011 and that, when it began, it began as an ALK-positive cancer). In this AD hearing, guided by the Court of Appeal’s findings, Prof Goh, who is CGH’s own expert, has now refined his evidence to state that he is of the view that, even if Ms Azlin had cancer in July 2011, this is unlikely to be an ALK-positive one at that time, and that the ALK mutation only developed after July 2011. This is because the dimensions of the nodule show that it underwent “accelerated growth and transformation” after July 2011. Therefore, CGH’s own expert contradicts Ms Kuah’s submission here that Ms Azlin’s lung cancer was by 31 July 2011, an ALK-positive one. Thus, I am unable to accept Ms Kuah’s submission in this regard.

  109. [65] In any event, even if Ms Azlin’s lung cancer had already transformed into an ALK-positive lung cancer by 31 July 2011, this does not necessarily mean that there was already microscopic nodal metastasis then. In this regard, one has to read Exhibit D4 very carefully. Where there is microscopic node involvement, the cancer ipso facto becomes at least pathological stage IIA; at pathological stage I, there is, by definition, no microscopic nodal involvement (see [39] above). Exhibit D4 does not say that ALK-positive lung cancers would necessarily and invariably begin with microscopic nodal involvement. If that were so, it would mean that ALK-positive lung cancers begin from pathological stage IIA, rather than stage I, but this was not Prof Goh’s evidence at the HC trial (which was that ALK-positive lung cancers would definitely start from stage I and progress through stage I to stage IV: see [23] above).

  110. [66] Thus, all Exhibit D4 shows, as Prof Goh clearly explained, is that:

  111. [67] In other words, Exhibit D4 shows that, for patients with ALK-positive lung cancer, there is a stronger likelihood that their early clinical staging of the cancer (of stage I) does not accurately reflect the true pathological staging of the cancer (which could be pathological stage II, even though the clinical staging might be “early” (at stage I), because once there is nodal metastasis, the cancer, by definition, becomes pathological stage II).

  112. [68] However, in this case, the Court of Appeal had already explicitly found that Ms Azlin, more likely than not, had cancer by July 2011, and that CGH’s delay in diagnosis had caused Ms Azlin’s cancer to progress from stage I to stage IIA (see [25] above). In other words, the Court of Appeal’s finding is that Ms Azlin, more likely than not, had stage I cancer in July 2011 and for the reasons explained above may be deemed to be at pathological stage I in July 2011. Consequently, Ms Azlin’s ALK-positive lung cancer, by definition, could not have had nodal metastasis in July 2011, since a cancer that is at pathological stage I, by definition, does not have nodal metastasis.

  113. [69] Thus, Ms Kuah’s submission in this regard is going against the grain of the Court of Appeal’s finding. Exhibit D4 goes no further than to explain why Ms Azlin’s cancer was at pathological stage IIA in March 2012 when she had the lobectomy, even though the clinical staging of her cancer in March 2012 (stage I) was still relatively early.

  114. [70] It also bears reiterating that, when asked why Ms Azlin’s cancer relapsed despite the lobectomy done in March 2012, Prof Goh’s explanation was not that ALK-positive cancers will recur no matter what. Rather, Prof Goh explained that it was because the lobectomy was done at a stage when Ms Azlin’s lymph node had already been affected (stage IIA), which meant that the cancer cells had entered the lymphatic system (see [59] above).

  115. [71] Therefore, the fact that this was an ALK-positive cancer meant that it was even more critical and urgent that the lobectomy be carried out earlier while Ms Azlin was still at (deemed) pathological stage I before the cancer cells entered the lymphatic system. This is consistent with the Court of Appeal’s finding (CA Judgment at [119]) that:

  116. [72] While CGH did not know in 2011 and 2012 that Ms Azlin’s cancer was ALK-positive, that is immaterial because CGH and its doctors must perform their duties to cover for contingencies. ALK was already discovered in 2007, so this is not a situation whereby CGH was dealing with a disease that was unknown in the medical field. In any case, in this AD hearing, confining himself to the Court of Appeal’s findings, Prof Goh refined his evidence to state that, even if Ms Azlin had cancer in July 2011, this is unlikely to be an ALK-positive one (see [64] above).

  117. [73] Therefore, CGH’s failure to detect and carry out a lobectomy while Ms Azlin’s cancer was still at Stage IB is more likely than not to have caused her relapse in August 2014 and her subsequent death on 1 April 2019.

  118. Was Ms Azlin’s fate conclusively biologically determined when CGH breached its duty to Ms Azlin?

  119. [74] In Carol Ann Armstrong ([32] supra), this question was a live issue in that case because the respondents’ case was that there was another, simultaneous, cause of fatal melanoma originating from the primary tumour before the respondents’ negligence (misdiagnosis in September 2009) that would also cause Mr Peter Traynor (“Mr Traynor”) to die. According to the respondents in that case, Mr Traynor was suffering from an aggressive form of malignant melanoma such that, by 2009, the melanoma from the primary tumour had already spread through his blood stream and/or through the lymphatic system into the distant organs.

  120. [75] This is not the situation in the present case. First, this issue is now quite straightforward having regard to the finding and conclusion above that there was no microscopic node involvement at Stage IB of the disease. Second, there is no evidence to suggest that Ms Azlin had some sort of “pre-existing condition” or other issue such that, even if CGH had not been negligent in July 2011, she would have died at the age of 39 in 2019. As such, it is clear in this case that Ms Azlin’s fate was not conclusively biologically determined when CGH breached its duty.

  121. Were there available treatments that would have prevented Ms Azlin from dying in the way that she did, and would Ms Azlin have availed herself of these treatments?

  122. [76] The answer to causation question (c) in this case is in the affirmative. It is undisputed that a lobectomy (and adjuvant chemotherapy) would have been available to Ms Azlin even at pathological stage I. CGH, however, submits that Ms Azlin would not have benefited from ALK inhibitors prior to March 2012, because the first ALK inhibitor, Crizotinib, was only approved by the US Food and Drug Administration in 2012 for treatment for patients “who had metastatic disease” ie stage IV disease.

  123. [77] CGH’s argument misses the point made earlier ie the key and critical difference is surgery at Stage IB before microscopic node involvement. ALK inhibitors do not provide “cure” and are only given to prolong life and improve quality of life (see [57] above).

  124. [78] As for causation question (d), I agree with counsel for the Estate, Mr Vijay Kumar Rai (“Mr Rai”), that on the facts it is readily inferable that Ms Azlin would have availed herself of a lobectomy (and adjuvant chemotherapy) had this been offered to her at stage I of her cancer. Even though Ms Azlin was asymptomatic prior to exhibiting symptoms like cough, breathlessness and blood in the sputum months later, based on X-ray measurements of the tumour on 31 July 2011 (see [14] above), Ms Azlin’s tumour would be “at least” Stage IB, since the greatest dimension of the tumour is between 2cm and 3cm. In fact, even the smallest dimension of the tumour is already more than 2cm in July 2011 ([44] above). Thus, on a balance of probabilities, the tumour size and the fact that it had grown over time would have given cause to Ms Azlin to avail herself of a lobectomy at stage I of her cancer. She also agreed to a biopsy of the nodule in February 2012 on the recommendation of Dr Chan even though the nodule in the CT scan appeared to be a benign lesion (see [17] above). These pointed to Ms Azlin’s concern for her health posed by the size of the nodule and her willingness to follow the recommendation of Dr Chan (in late 2011) and Prof Sridhar (in early 2012).

  125. Would Ms Azlin have been “cured” and would she have lived to her full life expectancy if she had availed herself of the said treatments?

  126. [79] Causation question (e) entails three cumulative sub-questions, as adapted from the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Carol Ann Armstrong ([32] supra) at [174].

  127. (a) Did CGH’s breach cause Ms Azlin to die in the way that she had on 1 April 2019 (“the first sub-question”)?

  128. (b) But for CGH’s breach, would Ms Azlin not have died on 1 April 2019 at the age of 39 (“the second sub-question”)?

  129. (c) But for CGH’s breach, would Ms Azlin have gone on to live until the age of her full life expectancy (“the third sub-question”)?

  130. [80] The critical question is whether Ms Azlin would not have suffered a relapse thereafter and would have lived to her full life expectancy, if she had availed herself of a lobectomy prior to March 2012 when she was still at Stage IB of her cancer (see Carol Ann Armstrong at [176]).

  131. [81] CGH submitted that its breach did not cause Ms Azlin to die in the way that she had because all of the medical literature adduced by both parties’ expert witnesses shows that the survival rate of a lung cancer patient is never 100% at 10 years or even 5 years after treatment, even if the patient was treated at stage IA or stage IB.

  132. [82] As also explained by Prof Goh while under cross-examination by Mr Rai, when it comes to lung cancer, one cannot speak of “cure” in its absolute sense. In other words, there is no such thing as a “complete cure” when it comes to cancer. Instead, a patient is only “cured” to the extent that the patient does not have a remission of the cancer within a specific timeframe (eg, 5 years, 10 years, 15 years after the treatment):

  133. [83] Thus, CGH submits that, even if Ms Azlin had been treated earlier, there is no “guarantee” that she would be considered completely “cured” and would be expected to have a normal life expectancy, as if she never had cancer.

  134. [84] In my view, CGH’s submission that there is no guarantee of a “complete cure” is beside the point. The statistical evidence showing that there is never any 100% chance of a complete cure is only one factor in the entire mix of factors to consider if Ms Azlin would more likely than not have been “cured” (ie have no relapse within a specified timeframe) and live to her full life expectancy.

  135. [85] For the reasons aforementioned at [35] to [72] above, I find that it is clear that the first sub-question is satisfied in this case, ie CGH’s breach caused Ms Azlin to die in the way that she did – by causing her cancer to progress from Stage IB to stage IIA such that, despite the lobectomy done at pathological stage IIA in March 2012, her cancer cells had entered her lymphatic system which increased the risk of and caused a relapse of the cancer just 2.5 years later in August 2014. This caused her eventual death about 4.5 years later on 1 April 2019, because stage IV lung cancer is generally considered “incurable”.

  136. [86] In this case, the key fact, as highlighted at [61] earlier, is that, at stage I, the cancer cells would not yet have entered Ms Azlin’s lymphatic system. Once the cancer progressed to stage IIA, the cancer cells would have done so. This meant that the chances of a “complete cure” from a lobectomy is not high once the cancer progressed to stage IIA. Indeed, this is Prof Goh’s explanation for why, in this case, Ms Azlin’s cancer relapsed despite the lobectomy.

  137. [87] Furthermore, the crux of the first sub-question is whether CGH’s breach caused Ms Azlin to die in the way that she did, ie for her to suffer a relapse in August 2014 and her eventual death in April 2019 from the cancer. Prof Goh’s clear testimony (at [59] above) makes it plain that this was so.

  138. [88] In these circumstances, I find that, on a balance of probabilities, CGH’s negligence, which caused the cancer to progress from Stage IB to stage IIA, caused the cancer cells to enter Ms Azlin’s lymphatic system, which caused her relapse in August 2014 and subsequent death on 1 April 2019.

  139. [89] I am also satisfied that the second and third sub-questions are, on a balance of probabilities, satisfied in this case. The key fact which leads me to this conclusion is the fact that Ms Azlin was only 39 years’ old when she died on 1 April 2019. Besides the ALK-positive lung cancer, she did not have any other known major illness. Thus, it is self-evident that, on balance, but for CGH’s breach, Ms Azlin would not have suffered a diminution of her full life expectancy, having passed away at the young age of 39 years’ old.

  140. [90] That said, I digress to make one observation. A critical gap in the evidence for the purpose of quantification of her loss in this case, as CGH highlighted, is evidence of Ms Azlin’s full life expectancy having regard to her age, race, smoking habits, obesity and lifestyle. In Carol Ann Armstrong ([32] supra), the appellant called an accounting expert who exhibited life expectancy tables provided by Statistics Canada to show that a Canadian male aged 49 in 2013 would be expected to live until 81.7 years of age (see Carol Ann Armstrong at [180]). This was not even contradicted by the respondents at the trial in that case (see Carol Ann Armstrong at [197]). Even then, the Court of Appeal remitted the issue of Mr Traynor’s life expectancy to the High Court Judge for his determination, since the High Court Judge did not ultimately make a finding on what Mr Traynor’s life expectancy would have been (see Carol Ann Armstrong at [197]). In this case, the life expectancy of a Singaporean female with Ms Azlin’s characteristics (age, smoker, race, obesity and lifestyle) in 2019 was not adduced in evidence. This omission has a bearing on the quantification of loss, for example, the dependency claim.

  141. General Damages

  142. [91] Compensatory damages for personal injuries are of two types, general and special. General damages have two major components: (1) pain and suffering and loss of amenity; and (2) post-trial pecuniary loss such as future earnings. Special damages refer to pre-trial pecuniary loss and include: (a) pre-trial out-of-pocket expenses such as medical, nursing and supportive care, transportation and household expenses; and (b) pre-trial loss of earnings or profits.

  143. [92] If death ensues, the tortious cause of action of the deceased person survives for the benefit of the estate. As regards the claims of the estate of a deceased person, the estate may not recover from the tortfeasor damages for: (a) loss of income in respect of any period after death (s 10(3)(a)(ii) of the Civil Law Act (Cap 43, 1999 Rev Ed)) (“CLA”); and (b) loss of expectation of life. However, in assessing damages in respect of pain and suffering, the court is entitled to consider any suffering likely to have been caused to the claimant by his awareness that his expectation of life had been reduced (s 11(1), CLA).

  144. [93] It is well-established that the aim of an award of damages is to restore a plaintiff to the same position as if the tortious wrong had not been committed: ACES System Development Pte Ltd v Yenty Lily (trading as Access International Services) [2013] 4 SLR 1317 at [14]. It is equally well-established that a plaintiff claiming damages must do “its level best” to prove both the fact of damage and its amount. A plaintiff cannot make a claim for damages without placing before the court sufficient evidence of the loss it has suffered, even if it is otherwise entitled in principle to recover damages. On the other hand, the court must also adopt a flexible approach and allow for the fact that, in some cases, absolute certainty and precision is impossible to achieve. Where precise evidence is obtainable, the court expects to have it; where it is not obtainable, the court must do the best it can: Robertson Quay Investment Pte Ltd v Steen Consultants and another [2008] 2 SLR(R) 623 at [27]–[31].

  145. Pain and suffering and loss of amenity

  146. [95] The Estate seeks $1,051,000 in damages for Ms Azlin’s pain and suffering and loss of amenity, while CGH submits that an appropriate figure is $10,000. The Estate submits that a component approach – as opposed to a global approach – should be applied in this case, and the breakdown is as follows:

  147. (a) pain and suffering from treatment: $300,000;

  148. (b) pain and suffering from shock and anxiety: $200,000;

  149. (c) pain and suffering from awareness of reduction of expectation of life: $185,000;

  150. (d) pain and suffering from tumour: $300,000;

  151. (e) loss of amenity: $60,000; and

  152. (f) loss of prospects of marriage: $6,000.

  153. [96] “Pain and suffering” refers to the physical pain and emotional and intellectual suffering arising from the injury (Au Yeong Wing Loong v Chew Hai Ban and another [1993] 2 SLR(R) 290 (“Au Yeong Wing Loong”) at [11]), while “loss of amenity” refers to the loss of the ability to enjoy life to its fullest (Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore – Civil Procedure, vol 4 (LexisNexis, 2016 Reissue) at para 50.387). Whether there is loss of amenity is an objective fact that does not depend on an appreciation of the loss by the victim: Tan Kok Lam (next friend to Teng Eng) v Hong Choon Peng [2001] 1 SLR(R) 786 (“Tan Kok Lam”) at [28].

  154. [97] Where non-pecuniary loss – such as pain and suffering and loss of amenity – is concerned, the guiding principle is that of “fair compensation”. This means that compensation ought to be reasonable and just and need not be “absolute” or “perfect”: Lua Bee Kiang (administrator of the estate of Chew Kong Seng, deceased) v Yeo Chee Siong [2019] 1 SLR 145 (“Lua Bee Kiang”) at [9].

  155. [98] There are two methods to determine what is “fair compensation”. The first is the component method, by which the loss arising from each item of injury is individually quantified and then added up to estimate the overall loss that the claimant has suffered. The second is the global method, by which all the injuries sustained by the claimant are considered holistically to arrive at an estimation of his overall loss: Lua Bee Kiang at [10].

  156. [99] The principle behind the component method is that damages should be awarded for losses that may properly be regarded as distinct or discrete. However, a concern regarding the component method is that the overall quantum must be a reasonable sum that reflects the totality of the claimant’s injuries. This latter point is the principle which animates the global method. The two methods are complementary rather than mutually exclusive because they are simply different practical modes of producing a fair estimate of the claimant’s loss. The application of both methods may proceed in two stages. The court should first apply the component method to ensure that the loss arising from each distinct injury suffered is accounted for and quantified. The court should then apply the global method to ensure that the overall award is reasonable and neither excessive nor inadequate: Lua Bee Kiang at [11]–[13].

  157. Stage one: Quantifying individual limbs of pain and suffering and loss of amenity

  158. (1) Pain and suffering from the cancer: tumour, treatment, and shock and anxiety

  159. [100] Bearing in mind the foregoing principles, I begin with the first stage of the analysis and now delve into the specific claims raised by the parties. The Estate has adopted a “component approach” and made specific submissions on each component of Ms Azlin’s pain and suffering and loss of amenity (see [95] above). In respect of Ms Azlin’s pain and suffering from the cancer and treatment (excluding loss of amenity and pain and suffering from the awareness of reduction of life), the total claim amount is $800,000: $300,000 from the treatment; $300,000 from the tumour; and $200,000 from shock and anxiety.

  160. [101] CGH submits that there is no basis to award damages for pain and suffering from the lobectomy and the cycles of adjuvant chemotherapy that followed it prior to the relapse in August 2014. This is because management of the disease in terms of treatment would be the same whether she had surgery and adjuvant chemotherapy either at pathological stage I or stage IIA. I am not persuaded by this submission. Firstly, as a matter of principle, an award of damages for pain and suffering from delay in treatment caused by a tortfeasor’s breach is not novel: see eg Gavalas v Singh [2001] VSCA 23, where the appellant was awarded damages for the interim pain and suffering that the appellant had to endure during the 10.5 weeks without treatment before the actual operation took place, such as headaches, left-sided weakness and other related symptoms.

  161. [102] Secondly, in this case, had treatment been provided at Stage IB before the inevitable onset of symptoms like cough, breathlessness and blood in the sputum that were exhibited in November 2011, Ms Azlin would have felt considerably better than she did as a result of the lack of diagnosis and treatment. Thirdly, Ms Azlin’s associated pain and suffering is also the characteristic progress of lung cancer. At the time of the lobectomy in March 2012, Ms Azlin had to endure the pain and suffering of resecting a nodule that was 3cm in size and the affected level 10 lymph node. If she had undergone a lobectomy while at Stage IB, the nodule that would have been resected would have been smaller in size (as is evident from the table at [14] above). The same analysis applies to the four rounds of adjuvant chemotherapy for three months after the lobectomy.

  162. [103] On the matter of added or extra pain and suffering (whether from delay in initial treatment or from further treatment after a relapse), the observations of Baroness Hale in Gregg v Scott [2005] 2 AC 176 in [205]–[206] are instructive:

  163. [104] I pause here to mention that the parties were invited to make further submissions on the foregoing observations made by Baroness Hale. Mr Rai submits that Baroness Hale’s observations support the Estate’s submission that damages should be awarded for Ms Azlin’s pain and suffering that was made worse by the mental anguish of knowing that her expectation of life had been greatly reduced (see [118] below). CGH submits that the Estate has failed to adduce any evidence to prove that Ms Azlin suffered any extra pain and suffering and loss of amenity as a result of the delay in diagnosis of cancer.

  164. [105] Returning to the analysis, I find that it can be gathered from the evidence outlined above that Ms Azlin did have to suffer extra pain and suffering from the medical treatment as a result of CGH’s delay in detection of the cancer. As stated, her pain and suffering would be associated with disease progression. In this case, ALK-positive lung cancer has to progress from stage IA through IB to IIA (see [23] above). In short, her pain and suffering from a delay in detection and treatment of the cancer would at least be from July 2011 until March 2012.

  165. [106] As mentioned earlier, CGH’s position is that an award of $10,000 for pain and suffering is fair compensation. This quantum is based on CGH’s further assessment of the evidence at the trial that, even after Ms Azlin’s relapse in August 2014, Ms Azlin had minimal symptoms and was able to perform her activities of daily living unassisted. She remained independent and was able to go to work, gather with friends for meals, and attend chemotherapy alone. She was able to cook, socialise and shop, even as of January 2017. Ms Azlin was also given the third-generation ALK inhibitor, Lorlatinib, in March 2017 (see [21] above), which prolonged her life for another two years.

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