General Division of the High Court · Decided 5 May 2021
Prudential Assurance Co Singapore (Pte) Ltd v Tan Shou Yi Peter and another
Feedback & support[2021] SGHC 109 · Case no. Suit No 772 of 2016
✱ What happened, in plain English
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Official text from eLitigation
Introduction
- [1]
[1] It is said that insurance is sold, not bought. This statement underscores the importance of distribution channels used by insurance companies to sell their products. An insurance company may sell its insurance products through the following distribution channels:
(a) a tied agency, ie, agents who sell only its policies; and/or
(b) banks (often referred to as bancassurance);
(c) financial advisory (“FA”) firms, which may sell insurance products from different insurance companies subject to any restrictions in their agreements with the insurance companies; and/or
(d) online platforms.
- [2]
[2] At all material times, the plaintiff, Prudential Assurance Company Singapore (Pte) Ltd (“PACS”), sold its products primarily through a tied agency although it also sold through banks.
- [3]
[3] Between 15 and 17 June 2016, 195 agents of PACS gave notice of termination of their agency agreements with PACS en masse. By the end of June 2016, another 31 agents had done the same. This was followed by another 12 agents in July 2016, and another six agents between August 2016 and 27 February 2017. Of the total of 244 agents, 241 had belonged to what was known as the Peter Tan Organisation (“PTO”) which was run by the first defendant, Mr Peter Tan Shou Yi (“Peter”). PTO was the biggest and most successful group of agents selling insurance products for PACS.
- [4]
[4] Peter himself gave notice of termination of his agency agreement with PACS on 8 July 2016. PACS responded by summarily terminating Peter’s Agency Agreement for breach of the same.
- [5]
[5] In this action, PACS alleges that Peter breached his agency agreement and/or his fiduciary duties by soliciting the 244 agents to leave PACS to join a competitor of PACS, Aviva Limited (“Aviva”), and/or its subsidiary financial advisory firm, Aviva Financial Advisors Pte Ltd (“AFA”). PACS claims damages, alternatively, equitable compensation, in the form of loss of profits which range from about $2.4m to $2.5 billion. Alternatively, PACS claims an account of profits by Peter. PACS also claims damages against the second defendant, PTO Management and Consultancy Pte Ltd (“PTOMC”), for dishonest assistance in relation to Peter’s breach of fiduciary duties. Alternatively, PACS claims an account of the benefits received by PTOMC.
- [6]
[6] Peter counterclaims against PACS for damages for (a) wrongful termination of his agency agreement, (b) inducing certain agents to breach their confidential obligations owed to Peter, (c) breach of confidential obligations owed to Peter, and (d) conspiracy to injure Peter by unlawful means. Peter’s counterclaims for inducement of breach, breach of confidential obligations and conspiracy to injure relate to alleged confidential information obtained by certain agents from Peter during several meetings with him between April and early June 2016. PACS claims that Peter carried out his acts of solicitation during these meetings.
Regulation of the insurance business
- [7]
[7] The Monetary Authority of Singapore (“MAS”) is the regulatory authority of the insurance business in Singapore. The Life Insurance Association Singapore (“LIA”) is a not-for-profit trade association of life insurance companies and life reinsurance companies which are based in Singapore and regulated by MAS. One of its roles is to provide industry guidelines on matters affecting the life insurance business.
- [8]
[8] In March 2000, MAS appointed a private sector-led committee known as the Committee for Efficient Distribution of Life Insurance (“CEDLI”) to propose recommendations to raise standards, transparency and efficiency in the distribution of life insurance products. CEDLI submitted its main report in August 2000 and its supplementary report shortly after. MAS accepted CEDLI’s recommendations in its main report and most of CEDLI’s recommendations in its supplementary report. MAS and LIA jointly implemented CEDLI’s recommendations, which were subsequently rolled out through various LIA guidelines and MAS regulations.
- [9]
[9] On 1 October 2002, MAS issued MAS Notice 306 (“MAS 306”). Among other things, MAS 306 requires direct life insurers to:
(a) cap tier structures to a maximum of three tiers (para 7). A tier exists when overriding benefits are payable by the insurer to a representative for the provision of financial advisory services by another representative (para 8); and
(b) ensure that its representatives are trained and assessed as competent to carry on financial advisory services. Direct life insurers are expected to prepare and implement a Training and Competency Plan (“T&C Plan”) for its representatives and to refer to the Guidelines on Training and Competency issued by LIA (para 10).
- [10]
[10] On 20 October 2011, LIA issued Members’ Undertaking No 31 (“LIA MU 31/11”), which sets out guidelines on the minimum standards for T&C Plans. LIA MU 31/11 also recommended a “span of control” under which a supervisor (Tier 2) operating under a tier structure (defined as a structure in which overriding benefits are payable) should have a maximum of 15 representatives (Tier 1) under him and an agency manager (Tier 3) a maximum of 10 supervisors under him (Section I, para 3.8).
- [11]
[11] On 23 January 2015, LIA issued a further Members’ Undertaking No 59 (“LIA MU 59/15”) which repealed LIA MU 31/11 save for the provision on “span of control”. LIA MU 59/15 sets out guidelines on competency requirements for agents and supervisors. This includes, among other things, requirements for (a) new agents to attend weekly one-on-one coaching with their supervisors and to be accompanied by their supervisors for completed sales to three clients during the first six months, and (b) new Tier 2 supervisors to attend weekly one-on-one coaching with their Tier 3 supervisors for the first three months.
- [12]
[12] On 3 December 2015, LIA issued Members Undertaking No 65 (“LIA MU 65/15”). LIA MU 65/15 repealed LIA MU 31/11 in totality and set out Guidelines on Span of Control (“Span of Control Guidelines”). In summary, the Span of Control Guidelines prescribe a maximum of 176 persons within an agency unit comprising three tiers:
(a) one Tier 3 Agency Manager;
(b) ten Tier 2 Agency Supervisors (an Agency Manager can have up to ten Agency Supervisors); and
(c) 165 Tier 1 Agents (the Agency Manager and Agency Supervisors can each have up to 15 Tier 1 Agents).
Subject to the approval of the insurer, deviations in the mix are permissible (whilst keeping within the limit of 176 persons overall) but a Tier 2 Agency Supervisor cannot in any event have more than 20 Tier 1 agents under him and a Tier 3 Manager cannot have more than 20 Tier 1 Agents or 15 direct Tier 2 Supervisors under him.
- [13]
[13] Thus, MAS 306 (see [9(a)] above) sets a limit of three tiers in any structure in which overriding commissions (“overrides” or “OR”) are paid, and the Span of Control Guidelines (see [12] above) limited the total number of agents within such structures to 176.
- [14]
[14] The obligations set out in LIA MU 59/15 and LIA MU 65/15 are referred to generally as “CEDLI obligations”.
Terminology in this judgment
- [15]
[15] The term “agent” is sometimes used to refer to a Tier 1 agent. However, in this judgment, I shall use the term “agent” (ie, without reference to a tier) in the general sense to refer to agents of all tiers.
- [16]
[16] I shall use the term “agency leader” to refer to all Tier 2 and Tier 3 agency leaders. I shall also refer to each group of agents headed by a Tier 2 AL or a Tier 3 AL, as an “agency unit” or “agency group” or a “unit” or “group”.
PACS’ agency structure
Overview
- [17]
[17] The agents were not employees of PACS. Instead, each agent was an independent contractor. The role of the agent was to “sell” insurance policies for PACS. Technically, the agent only canvassed for insurance policies on behalf of PACS. He could not commit PACS to sell the policy. The agent would submit a proposal from a potential insured to PACS. PACS had the final say as to whether to accept the proposal and enter into an insurance agreement with the potential insured.
- [18]
[18] Another role of the agent was to “recruit” new agents for PACS. Again, the agent had no authority to commit PACS. If PACS accepted the new agent, it then entered into an agency agreement with the new agent.
- [19]
[19] Agents could be promoted to a supervisory or leadership role in which he supervised other agents. In this leadership role, the agent may or may not also continue to sell policies for PACS.
- [20]
[20] Consistent with MAS 306 and the Span of Control Guidelines, PACS’ agents worked within a group structure which comprised three tiers with payment of overriding benefits:
(a) Tier 1 agents – Tier 1 agents generally worked under the supervision of a Tier 2 agency leader (“AL”) but may also work under the supervision of a Tier 3 AL. These Tier 1 agents held different ranks – Financial Consultant (“FC”), Senior FC, Executive FC, and Master FC. They earned commissions from selling insurance policies. They also recruited new agents to join PACS. These new agents would then join the group of Tier 1 agents working under the supervision of the recruiting agent’s AL.
(b) Tier 2 ALs – Tier 2 ALs had supervisory responsibilities for Tier 1 agents working under them. These Tier 2 ALs also held different ranks – Financial Services Supervisor (“FSS”), FS Manager (“FSM”), Senior FSM, FS Director (“FSD”), Senior FSD/Group FSD. They earned commissions from the insurance policies that they sold, as well as ORs from the policies sold by their Tier 1 agents. Tier 2 ALs usually worked under a Tier 3 AL.
(c) Tier 3 ALs – PACS had two types of Tier 3 ALs – Group Agency Leader (“GAL”) and Group Agency Manager (“GAM”). A GAL had Tier 2 ALs and Tier 1 agents under his direct supervision whereas a GAM had only Tier 2 ALs under his direct supervision. Both GALs and GAMs also had supervisory responsibilities for the agents in their GAL/GAM units. Both GALs and GAMs earned commissions from insurance policies that they sold (if any) and overrides from sales by their Tier 2 ALs’ units. GALs also earned overrides from sales by the Tier 1 agents under their direct supervision. Payments by PACS to Tier 3 ALs differed according to whether they were GALs or GAMs.
- [21]
[21] A percentage of the premiums paid by the insured is paid (a) as commission to the agent who sold the policy, typically over a period of six years (on a reducing scale), and (b) as overrides to that agent’s Tier 2 AL and GAL/GAM. The combined override paid to a Tier 2 AL and GAL/GAM in respect of a policy sold by a Tier 1 agent could be as much as 48% of the premiums paid.
- [22]
[22] PACS also rewarded its agents with other pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits and incentives, such as shopping vouchers and incentive trips. These rewards were paid pursuant to ad hoc incentive campaigns.
- [23]
[23] The designations of the agents in PACS have changed over the years. The various designations referred to in [20] above have been in use in PACS since 2002. Different designations were used before 2002.
The GAM scheme
- [24]
[24] As mentioned earlier, a GAL unit comprised a GAL, his own Tier 1 agents, and Tier 2 ALs (and their Tier 1 agents). When a Tier 1 agent was promoted to become a Tier 2 AL, the Tier 2 AL that he was under automatically became a GAL with his own separate GAL unit. The GAL that the newly promoted GAL was previously under would cease to receive overrides from the newly promoted GAL’s unit. A GAL therefore had no incentive to help his Tier 2 ALs advance their careers. On the other hand, the Tier 2 AL may not wish to be promoted to a GAL. As a Tier 2 AL, he enjoyed structural and administrative support from his GAL. As a GAL, he would be the one providing the structural and administrative support to his team. If his team is small, he would not achieve economies of scale.
- [25]
[25] To address the above issues, the GAM scheme was introduced in 2006 to (a) provide “selected top agency groups with a new agency structure that promotes growth and greater autonomy”, and (b) ensure that PACS’ agency force “remains competitive and relevant”. Under the GAM scheme, when a Tier 1 agent was promoted to a Tier 2 AL, he would become a Tier 2 AL under the same GAM. His former Tier 2 AL could remain a Tier 2 AL. The GAM would continue to earn overrides from the Tier 2 ALs’ units and the Tier 2 ALs continued to enjoy the GAM’s structural and administrative support. A GAM did not have any Tier 1 agents directly under him, so that he could focus on supervising and managing the ALs under him.
Master GAM scheme
- [27]
[27] The Span of Control Guidelines meant that the size of each GAL unit or GAM unit remained limited to 176 agents.
- [28]
[28] In 2011, PACS started a Master GAM scheme. This scheme envisaged a Master GAM unit as an alliance of GAMs managed by a Master GAM. The Master GAM did not receive any overrides from sales by the other GAM units within the alliance although he could receive overrides from sales by the agents within his own GAM unit. The Master GAM structure kept the overrides within three tiers and therefore complied with MAS 306 (see [9(a)] above). This also meant that the Master GAM structure was not subject to the Span of Control Guidelines (see [12] above) and therefore could grow beyond 176 agents. Each GAM unit within the Master GAM structure would however continue to be subject to the Span of Control Guidelines.
Prudence
- [29]
[29] Prudence was a representative body comprising some agency leaders. Its purpose was to represent the interests of the agency force in PACS. The management in PACS would consult Prudence if it wanted the views of the agency force on specific matters. The composition of Prudence was decided entirely by the agency leaders at large.
Agreements, Agency Instructions and Agency Circulars
- [30]
[30] All agents who contracted with PACS signed a basic agreement known as the “Agency Agreement” or the “Adviser’s Agreement” depending on when it was signed. An agent who was appointed as an AL also signed a “Field Manager Agreement”. ALs continued to be bound by their respective Agency or Adviser’s Agreements. In this judgment, unless the context shows otherwise, I will use the term “Agency Agreement” to refer to both the Agency Agreement and the Adviser’s Agreement.
- [31]
[31] Since around 1989, PACS’ practice was to use Agency Instructions (“AIs”) to communicate a wide range of matters to its agents. These matters included PACS’ rules, guidelines and policies, as well as regulatory, compliance and compensation issues. Since around 1998, PACS’ practice was to deposit copies of each AI, labelled with the agent’s name, in the mailbox of the agent’s agency unit. From around 2006, PACS disseminated AIs via email to its agents.
- [32]
[32] PACS also communicated with its agents through Agency Circulars. These Agency Circulars were meant to inform PACS’ agents of company-related announcements and/or to announce ad hoc agency incentive campaigns.
Background facts
From agent to Master GAM
- [33]
[33] Peter first joined PACS as a probationary agent on 27 December 1996 and was confirmed as a Tier 1 agent on 18 February 1997. He signed an Agency Agreement dated 24 February 1997 (“Peter’s Agency Agreement”).
- [34]
[34] By way of AI No 004/98 dated 13 March 1998 (the “March 1998 AI”), PACS
(a) informed its agents that it had “formalised Agency Instructions as a medium of communicating new rules and regulations which may be declared from time to time”; and
(b) enclosed an addendum to all existing Agency Agreements, which sought to amend certain clauses in the Agency Agreements with effect from 13 March 1998.
- [35]
[35] In January 2001, Peter was appointed as a Tier 2 AL, with the rank of Field Manager, and he signed a Field Manager Agreement dated 1 February 2001 (“Peter’s Field Manager Agreement”). Peter was promoted in January 2003 and again in January 2004 when he became a Financial Services Director (“FSD”). As a Tier 2 AL, Peter reported to one Mr Jack Cheong (“Cheong”) who was then a GAL.
- [36]
[36] Peter’s agency unit grew in size and in January 2005, his agency unit was spun off from Cheong’s agency unit and became a standalone GAL unit known as “Peter Tan Organisation” or “PTO”, headed by Peter as a GAL. As a GAL unit, the size of PTO was limited to 176 agents as prescribed by the Span of Control Guidelines.
- [37]
[37] In January 2006, Peter jointed PACS’ GAM scheme. PTO became a GAM unit and Peter was re-designated as a GAM with the rank of Group FSD. As a GAM, Peter ceased to have any Tier 1 agents reporting directly to him. As a GAM unit, the size of PTO remained limited to 176 agents as prescribed by the Span of Control Guidelines.
- [38]
[38] In 2010, Peter sought PACS’ support for PTO to become an FA firm. PACS expressed support for PTO to become an exclusive FA firm (“EFA”). As an EFA, PTO would have been able to sell, with PACS’ agreement, products of other insurance companies that were not offered by PACS. Eventually, however, this proposal did not bear fruit and PTO did not become an EFA.
- [39]
[39] On 14 September 2010, PACS issued AI No 017/10 (the “September 2010 AI”), which introduced the following provision (the “Non-Solicitation Clause”):
- [40]
[40] As stated at [28] above, PACS came up with the Master GAM scheme in 2011. The impetus for this scheme was the fact that by March 2011, the size of PTO had exceeded the Span of Control Guidelines. To comply with the Span of Control Guidelines, some of the Tier 2 ALs in PTO had to be promoted to become Tier 3 GALs or GAMs. However, PACS regarded Peter as being central to the growth of PTO. PACS therefore wanted the Tier 2 ALs in PTO to remain as part of PTO under Peter’s management, after they were promoted to become Tier 3 GAMs. The Master GAM scheme achieved this objective.
- [41]
[41] The Master GAM scheme was implemented via a Memorandum of Understanding dated 30 March 2011 (“the 2011 MOU”), as amended by various addenda dated 29 April 2011, 20 May 2011 and 20 September 2011. The 2011 MOU was entered into between PACS and Peter Tan. It was clear that the Master GAM scheme was created for Peter.
- [42]
[42] Pursuant to the 2011 MOU, as subsequently amended:
(a) Two Tier 2 ALs in PTO, Mr Darren Tan (“Darren”) and Ms Cynthia Tan (“Cynthia”), were promoted to become Tier 3 GAMs.
(b) PTO was restructured and became a Master GAM unit, comprising three separate GAM units headed by Peter, Darren and Cynthia respectively.
(c) Another Tier 2 AL, Mr Steven Peh (“Steven”) was also promoted as a Tier 3 GAM. However, unlike Darren and Cynthia who remained within PTO, Steven’s unit was spun off and became a GAM unit that operated independently of PTO.
(d) Peter became the Master GAM of PTO. Concurrently, he was also a GAM within PTO.
- [43]
[43] As a Master GAM, Peter could no longer receive ORs from sales generated by each of the GAM units in PTO (other than his own GAM unit). Peter negotiated for and PACS agreed to pay him the following:
(a) special sell-out payments amounting to about $7m from PACS;
(b) a Master GAM growth bonus for the growth of PTO; and
(c) a Master GAM super bonus of up to $1m if PTO achieved certain sales targets set by PACS.
The Master GAM growth and super bonuses were over and above what Peter was entitled to be paid as a GAM. It was at least unclear whether the Master GAM super bonus breached MAS 306 since arguably, it could be seen as payments of overriding benefits from sales generated by agents under the other GAMs in PTO. As these payments were to be made to Peter as the Master GAM, arguably the payment of overrides involved four tiers. However, this was not an issue that I had to decide.
- [44]
[44] The sell-out payments that Peter negotiated for included sell-out payments in respect of Darren’s and Cynthia’s GAM units. These payments were meant to compensate Peter for his loss of overrides from Darren’s and Cynthia’s units following their promotion to GAMs. The amounts had been fixed in 2011 with no further revisions to the amount (whether upwards or downwards) to take into account the actual performance of these units. In January 2013, Peter asked for an increase in the sell-out payments because Darren’s and Cynthia’s GAM units had performed much better than expected.
- [45]
[45] By way of a letter dated 31 January 2013, PACS agreed to:
(a) re-compute, annually, the sell-out payments in respect of Darren’s and Cynthia’s GAM units based on the actual sales performance of these units and the agency rank achieved by each AL in these units (“true up adjustments”); and
(b) pay Peter 50% of the true up adjustments in five instalments over a five-year period; conversely, PACS would also be able to claw back from Peter 50% of the true up adjustments for any underperformance.
The final true up exercise was to be conducted in April 2016.
- [46]
[46] PTO continued to grow. Pursuant to a MOU dated 23 July 2013, another of Peter’s Tier 2 ALs, Mr Smith Foo, became the fourth Tier 3 GAM in PTO. Pursuant to another MOU dated 28 July 2015, various Tier 2 ALs’ agency units were transferred between the four GAM agency units in PTO.
- [47]
[47] In late 2013, Peter raised the question of the EFA option again. According to Peter, PACS suggested a limited FA (“LFA”) scheme. The LFA was similar to the EFA except that the LFA would be allowed to sell other insurance companies’ products subject to a limit. However, the discussions again did not bear fruit.
- [48]
[48] Although each of the GAM units within PTO had to comply with the Span of Control Guidelines, PTO itself, as a Master GAM unit, could grow beyond 176 agents, which it did, eventually comprising some 500 agents in 2016.
The Pegasus Agreement
- [49]
[49] PTO became the largest agency group in PACS, contributing approximately 10% of PACS’ entire agency force sales production measured in annual premium equivalent (“APE”). The APE is calculated by adding the annualised regular premiums from new policies and 10% of single premiums on new policies written during a specified period. It reflects the value of sales of insurance products and is a sales measure used in the insurance industry. Agents in PTO were also generally more productive in terms of the amount of APE generated per agent as compared to PACS’ overall agency force.
- [50]
[50] On 1 July 2015, Peter entered into an agreement with PACS under which Peter would receive further payments over and above those payable to him as a Tier 3 GAM and as a Master GAM (the “Pegasus Agreement”). The commencement of the Pegasus Agreement was backdated to 1 January 2014. It was for an initial term of six years, renewable for another six years on terms and conditions to be agreed. The agreement would terminate if the parties could not agree on the terms and conditions for its renewal.
- [51]
[51] The Pegasus Agreement was meant specifically for Peter and was intended to incentivise him to remain with PACS and grow PTO. It provided for a deferred profit-sharing arrangement; Peter would be paid certain sums, which depended on PTO’s performance over the initial six-year term.
- [52]
[52] The amounts due to Peter under the Pegasus Agreement were to be paid over a ten-year period as long as Peter remained a Tier 3 GAM with PACS, or upon death or one year after Peter’s retirement provided that Peter did not join a competitor or otherwise compete with PACS during the one-year period. Based on PACS’ assessment at that time (around 2015), the total amount to be paid to Peter under the Pegasus Agreement at the end of the ten-year period was estimated to range from $6.2m (assuming 0% growth year-on-year during the initial six-year term) to $15.9m (assuming 30% growth year-on-year during the initial six-year term).
- [53]
[53] The Pegasus Agreement was terminated upon Peter’s summary termination from Prudential on 12 July 2016.
- [54]
[54] By all accounts, Peter had done extremely well and was highly valued by PACS. Between 2006 and 2016, the total amount of remuneration (comprising commissions, bonuses, incentives and other benefits) paid by PACS to Peter was approximately $56.2m. In 2015 alone, Peter was paid $9.7m by PACS.
Complaint about PACS’ CEO
- [55]
[55] Mr Seah Cheng Chua Philip (“Philip”) took over as Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of PACS in December 2015. In a letter dated 2 February 2016 addressed to the Group Chief Executive of Prudential plc (the holding company of PACS), the chairman of Prudence expressed Prudence’s disappointment with Philip’s leadership and management of PACS.
Events between April and June 2016
Peter’s discussions with Aviva
- [56]
[56] Around mid-April 2016, Peter met with Aviva and explored the idea of being a consultant with Aviva. According to Peter, Aviva had plans to establish an independent financial agency model. On 21 April 2016, Aviva sent the following document to Peter:
(a) A draft letter of intent to engage in exclusive negotiations towards appointment as President and employee of Aviva’s subsidiary.
(b) A draft President Agreement for the appointment as President of a subsidiary of Aviva to control, manage and supervise a group of representatives to be appointed. The Agreement noted that Aviva’s subsidiary was undergoing internal restructuring and that it would accede to the Agreement upon completion of the restructuring.
(c) Schedules 1 to 7 to the President Agreement. These Schedules set out the President’s financial benefits.
(d) A draft Accession Agreement to admit Aviva’s subsidiary as a party to the President Agreement.
- [57]
[57] On the same day, Aviva also sent the following documents to Peter:
(a) A draft letter of intent to engage in exclusive negotiations towards appointment as an Advisor of Aviva’s subsidiary.
(b) A draft Advisor Agreement for appointment as a representative of Aviva’s subsidiary;
(c) A draft appointment letter for appointment as an Advisor Manager to supervise a team of Advisors; and
(d) Schedules on commissions, overrides and other financial benefits.
- [58]
[58] Peter met with Aviva again in early May 2016, during which they discussed a FA model. According to Peter,
(a) Aviva told him that for any agents or ALs who wished to join, it would work out the terms of engagement with them directly and that they would be given a transition package, as was the standard practice in the industry, since they would be foregoing future commissions and/or overrides; and
(b) Aviva subsequently sent him template draft contracts for agents and ALs and he continued to engage Aviva to discuss the template contracts up to around mid to late May 2016.
- [59]
[59] Rumours were circulating in the insurance industry that Peter was leaving with ALs and agents from PTO to join another insurance company. In late May 2016, PACS’ then Chief Agency Officer (“CAO”), Mr Jon Sandham (“Jon”) spoke to Peter. Peter assured Jon that he was not going anywhere. On 26 May 2016, Peter sent the following WhatsApp message to Philip:
Peter’s meetings with ALs
- [60]
[60] In May and June 2016, Peter held several meetings attended by ALs from PTO (the “Attendee ALs”). Each of the Attendee ALs signed a non-disclosure agreement with Peter (the “NDAs”). One of these meetings was held in Guangzhou, China (the “Guangzhou meeting”).
- [61]
[61] At these meetings, Peter spoke to the Attendee ALs about, among other things, the move to AFA, the advantages of joining AFA, the financial package offered by AFA, and what the Attendee ALs should say to their agents.
- [62]
[62] Two of the Attendee ALs, Ms Wendy Ho Xiang Yu (“Wendy”) and Mr Royston Ng Youliang (“Royston”) secretly made audio recordings of some of these meetings. The transcripts of these audio recordings were heavily relied upon by PACS in these proceedings.
- [63]
[63] On 31 May 2016, Peter met with the CEO of another insurance company, AXA Singapore (“AXA”). According to Peter, discussions did not progress with AXA because AXA did not offer a FA model.
Peter incorporates PTOMC and meets the Chief Executive, PCA
- [64]
[64] On 1 June 2016, Peter incorporated PTOMC; he was PTOMC’s sole shareholder and director. On 2 June 2016, Peter updated Aviva on the intended timelines for the move and signed a non-disclosure agreement with Aviva.
- [65]
[65] On the same day, Peter asked to meet with Ms Lilian Ng, the Chief Executive of Insurance in Prudential Corporation Asia (“PCA”), before deciding whether “to stay or go”. According to Philip, PCA (a Hong Kong company) is the “regional entity” of which PACS is a part. The meeting took place in Hong Kong on 4 June 2016. Among other things, Peter agreed that he would meet his managers on 16 June 2016 “to affirm Pru support and continuity”.
Exodus of PTO agents begins
- [66]
[66] On 15 June 2016, agents from PTO started giving notice of termination of their agreements with PACS en masse. Jon met with Peter in the afternoon that day. In his WhatsApp message to the PACS Exco after the meeting, Jon said that:
Within two and a half hours after that, the number of Tier 1 agents from PTO, who had terminated their agreements with PACS, had increased to 140.
- [67]
[67] Between 15 and 17 June 2016, a total of 216 agents from PTO terminated their agreements with PACS. By the end of June 2016, another 10 agents had done the same, bringing the total number to 226 agents.
Peter leaves PACS
- [68]
[68] On 4 July 2016, The Business Times reported that Aviva had received in-principle approval to set up a new FA firm and that about 200 agents from PTO were expected to join the new firm.
- [69]
[69] On 6 July 2016, Aviva announced at its Capital Markets Day Webcast that it had just taken “250 top advisors from another company”.
- [70]
[70] On 8 July 2016 (by which time 232 agents had terminated their agency agreements with PACS), Peter gave 14-days’ notice of termination of his agreements with PACS. Peter also stated that his last day with PACS would be 22 July 2016. In his defence, Peter asserted that before 8 July 2016, he had not made any decision to leave PACS to become a consultant with Aviva and that he never intended to join the independent FA entity owned by Aviva.
- [71]
[71] On 12 July 2016, PACS terminated Peter’s Agency Agreement on the ground that Peter had breached the Non-Solicitation Clause (see [39] above). Peter’s Field Manager Agreement was automatically terminated forthwith upon the termination of Peter’s Agency Agreement, pursuant to cl 11(a) of the former.
PACS had to deal with Orphan Agents and Orphan Policies
- [72]
[72] Some of the agents, whose Tier 2 and/or Tier 3 ALs had terminated their agency agreements with PACS, stayed on with PACS. PACS had to re-assign these agents (“Orphan Agents” or “Orphan ALs”) to either form new agency groups or join other agency groups within PACS. The re-assignment exercise was completed by around October 2016.
- [73]
[73] As for the policies that were previously sold by the agents who had terminated their agreements with PACS (“Orphan Policies”), the policyholders were left with no agents to service them. PACS re-assigned the Orphan Policies to the Orphan Agents and to other agents from other agency groups (collectively, “New Servicing Agents”). With effect from October 2016, PACS paid the New Servicing Agents an allowance as an incentive for servicing the Orphan Policies.
The Distribution Advisory Agreement with Aviva
- [74]
[74] On 23 July 2016, Aviva, Peter and PTOMC entered into a Distribution Advisory Agreement (“DAA”). Under the DAA:
(a) PTOMC was the exclusive provider of certain services to Aviva’s wholly owned subsidiary, AFA, for a period of 10 years from 23 July 2016. These services included:
(i) providing strategic direction and assisting in the development of business plans to grow AFA;
(ii) providing group training sessions to AFA’s representatives;
(iii) providing strategic advice and know-how to Aviva on recruitment. All recruitment of representatives by AFA would be referred to PTOMC for advice and recommendation, and Aviva was to ensure that AFA abided by PTOMC’s recommendations; and
(iv) providing strategic advice to Aviva on how to increase Aviva’s market share through AFA and to improve its competitiveness in the market.
AFA is a financial institution regulated by the MAS and licensed to advise on life policies, among other things. It was first incorporated on 26 June 2000 and changed its name to AFA on 10 June 2016.
(b) PTOMC was to engage Peter to perform the services. At all times, Peter had to be the sole legal and beneficial shareholder, sole director and a key employee of PTOMC. Peter guaranteed PTOMC’s due performance of its obligations.
(c) PTOMC could not perform engagements for other companies without AFA’s prior written approval.
(d) Aviva was to pay the following fees (“Aviva Payments”) to PTOMC:
(i) a signing on bonus;
(ii) monthly fees;
(iii) an annual bonus; and/or
(iv) a franchise bonus.
- [75]
[75] On the same day that the DAA was signed, Peter received (through PTOMC) the first part of the sign-on bonus of S$9m.
- [76]
[76] For the period from 1 June 2016 to 20 June 2017, PTOMC received a total of S$7,796,496 from AFA.
- [77]
[77] Between September 2016 and January 2018, PTOMC paid Peter S$5.7m in the form of salary payments and payment of dividends.
The parties’ claims and counterclaims
PACS’ claims against Peter
- [78]
[78] PACS’ claims against Peter are as follows:
(a) From around April 2016, Peter took preparatory steps to leave PACS and to bring with him other agents in PTO to join a competitor of PACS, Aviva and/or AFA (“Preparatory Steps”), including having discussions with Aviva on procuring agents in PTO to leave PACS to join Aviva and/or AFA.
(b) Between May and June 2016, Peter solicited agents in PTO to leave PACS and join AFA (the “Acts of Solicitation”).
(c) The Preparatory Steps and Acts of Solicitation were in breach of
(i) Peter’s express contractual obligations under his Agency Agreement and his Field Manager Agreement;
(ii) Peter’s implied contractual obligations under his Field Manager Agreement; and
(iii) Peter’s fiduciary duties owed to PACS.
(d) Peter is liable to PACS for damages suffered as a result of his breach of contractual and/or fiduciary obligations. In the alternative, Peter is liable to account for all profits made by him or PTOMC (as his alter ego) in relation to his breach of his fiduciary duties.
PACS’ claims against PTOMC
- [79]
[79] PACS’ claims against PTOMC are as follows:
(a) PTOMC dishonestly assisted Peter in relation to his breaches of fiduciary duties by:
(i) participating in discussions with Aviva regarding a long-term business partnership with Aviva, when Peter was still contracted to PACS; and
(ii) receiving the benefits of the above partnership by entering into the DAA.
(b) PTOMC is liable to PACS for damages, alternatively, an account of all benefits received by PTOMC as of result of its dishonest assistance.
Peter’s counterclaims against PACS
- [80]
[80] Peter’s counterclaims against PACS are as follows:
(a) PACS’ termination of Peter’s Agency Agreement was invalid and in breach of the Agency Agreement, and PACS is liable for loss and damages suffered by Peter.
(b) PACS wrongfully induced one or more of the Attendee ALs to breach their confidential obligations under their NDAs, and PACS is liable for loss and damages suffered by Peter.
(c) PACS breached its equitable duty of confidence to Peter by disclosing the confidential information obtained from one or more of the Attendee ALs, to third parties, and is liable to Peter for loss and damage suffered by Peter.
(d) PACS and one or more of the Attendee ALs wrongfully, and with the intention of injuring Peter and/or causing loss to Peter by unlawful means, conspired to communicate the confidential information obtained from the Attendee ALs to third parties, thereby causing Peter to suffer loss and damage.
The issues
- [81]
[81] The issues in respect of PACS’ claims are as follows:
(a) Whether Peter carried out the Preparatory Steps and Acts of Solicitation?
(b) If the answer to (a) is “yes”, whether the Preparatory Steps and/or Acts of Solicitation were in breach of any (i) contractual obligations, and/or (ii) fiduciary duties, which Peter owed to PACS? In turn, this issue depended on what were the contractual obligations and/or fiduciary duties that were owed by Peter to PACS.
(c) If Peter did breach fiduciary duties owed to PACS, whether PTOMC dishonestly assisted Peter in the breaches?
(d) If any of the breaches are proved, what are the losses that PACS has suffered? If Peter did breach fiduciary duties, whether Peter is liable to account for profits made by him or PTOMC (as his alter ego) in relation to his breach of his fiduciary duties?
- [82]
[82] The issues in respect of PACS’ claims against PTOMC are as follows:
(a) Whether PTOMC dishonestly assisted Peter in his breaches of fiduciary duties?
(b) If so, whether PTOMC is liable to PACS for damages, alternatively whether PTOMC is liable to account to PACS for the benefits received by PTOMC?
- [83]
[83] The issues in respect of Peter’s counterclaim are as follows:
(a) Whether PACS’ termination of Peter’s Agency was valid?
(b) Whether PACS wrongfully induced one or more of the Attendee ALs to breach their confidential obligations under their NDAs, and if so, what losses is PACS liable to Peter for?
(c) Whether PACS breached its equitable duty of confidence to Peter by disclosing the confidential information obtained from one or more of the Attendee ALs, to third parties, and if so, what damages is PACS liable to Peter for?
(d) Whether PACS conspired with one or more of the Attendee ALs to injure Peter, thereby causing him to suffer loss and damage, and if so, what loss and damage has Peter suffered?
Whether Peter carried out the Preparatory Steps and Acts of Solicitation
Preparatory Steps
- [84]
[84] PACS’ pleaded case is that the Preparatory Steps included having discussions with Aviva on an arrangement which would involve:
(a) Peter procuring PACS’ agents in PTO to leave PACS to join Aviva and/or its subsidiary FA firm; and
(b) Peter joining and/or working with Aviva and/or its subsidiary FA firm to train and manage the agents joining Aviva and/or its subsidiary FA firm.
PACS also pleaded that as part of such discussions, Aviva provided Peter with a draft letter of intent to engage in exclusive negotiations towards appointment as President of Aviva’s subsidiary and a draft President Agreement (see [56] above).
- [85]
[85] Peter’s case, in summary, is that his exploratory discussions with Aviva began because some senior ALs approached him to help them find options for an independent FA model. According to Peter, these senior ALs told him that they were close to a decision to leave PACS for various reasons, including unhappiness at changes introduced by PACS’ new leadership. Peter claims that these discussions with Aviva did not involve any of the arrangements set out at [84] above.
- [86]
[86] In my view, whether Peter’s discussions with Aviva started because some senior ALs in PTO requested his help to find options for an independent FA model, is not the issue. The issue is whether Peter’s discussions with Aviva involved the arrangements set out at [84] above. In my judgment, the answer to this question is a clear “Yes”.
- [87]
[87] The facts relating to Peter’s discussions with Aviva are not in dispute. On 21 April 2016, Aviva sent Peter draft documents relating to the appointment of (a) a President, (b) Advisors, and (c) Advisor Managers, of Aviva’s subsidiary (see [56]–[58] above). Peter testified that he had not discussed details of how his involvement with Aviva will be like, and that Aviva had simply sent him the draft documents for his consideration and to “keep the conversation going”. I reject Peter’s assertions.
- [88]
[88] The contents of the draft documents speak for themselves. They show that by April 2016, Peter was already involved in discussions with Aviva on his and PTO’s potential move to join Aviva. In my view, it is unbelievable that Aviva would have sent those draft documents to Peter if they had not discussed the matters contained in the drafts. In this regard, the following matters are telling:
(a) The draft letter of intent relating to the proposed appointment as President required the appointee to furnish documents providing 2015 income and production information of the appointee and the agents to be appointed as advisers, as well as any adverse market conduct issue or complaints relating to them.
(b) The draft letter of intent relating to the proposed appointment as Advisor also required the appointee to furnish documents providing 2015 income and production information and information on adverse market conduct issues or complaints.
(c) The draft President Agreement contained a first year APE sales target of S$50m. As PACS submitted, based on the average annual production of a PTO agent in Prudential for the years 2014 and 2015, the new Aviva firm would have to commence with a base of 232 to 246 agents to achieve this first year APE sales target of S$50m. This target closely mirrored the sales target of S$55.5m in the DAA (subsequently entered into by Aviva, Peter and PTOMC), which contemplated that AFA would commence from a base of 250 agents. Peter testified that this was a reasonable target given the 200 to 300 agents that would follow him to AFA.
- [89]
[89] I find that Peter did carry out the Preparatory Steps, ie, that he did discuss with Aviva an arrangement involving him (a) procuring PACS’ agents in PTO to leave PACS to join Aviva and/or its subsidiary FA firm, and (b) joining and/or working with Aviva and/or its subsidiary FA firm to train and manage these agents.
Acts of Solicitation
- [90]
[90] PACS’ pleaded case with respect to the Acts of Solicitation is that on various occasions in around May and June 2016, Peter carried out various acts of direct or indirect solicitation of PACS’ agents in PTO for and/or on behalf of AFA:
(a) In meetings held in Singapore and Guangzhou, on at least six occasions in May and June 2016, Peter expressly and directly solicited and enticed and/or attempted to solicit and entice the Attendee ALs to leave PACS to join AFA.
(b) On at least five occasions in May and June 2016, in Singapore and Guangzhou, Peter asked and/or encouraged the Attendee ALs to persuade PACS’ other agents in PTO to leave PACS and join AFA.
- [91]
[91] Peter does not dispute having the meetings with the Attendee ALs or that the move to AFA was discussed during these meetings. However, he denies soliciting agents in PTO to leave PACS to join AFA. In essence, Peter’s case is as follows:
(b) The Guangzhou trip was for ALs who had already decided that they wanted to leave PACS.
(c) Peter provided his views on how ALs may respond if certain questions were raised by their Tier 1 agents, concerning the move to an independent financial agency; these views were expressed only to Attendee ALs and not directed at any Tier 1 agent.
(d) The ALs who decided to join AFA arranged to meet privately with AFA’s representatives to discuss their personal financial packages; he was not involved in these negotiations.
- [92]
[92] I reject Peter’s claim and find that he did carry out the Acts of Solicitation, ie, that he did solicit the Attendee ALs to leave PACS to join AFA and that he did ask and/or encourage the Attendee ALs to persuade PACS’ other agents in PTO to leave PACS and join AFA.
- [93]
[93] First, the evidence shows that Peter’s role could not have been as innocent as he claimed.
(a) As mentioned at [88(c)] above, there were discussions in April 2016 for a first year APE sales target of S$50m. Based on the average annual production of a PTO agent in Prudential for the years 2014 and 2015, the new Aviva firm would have to commence with a base of 232 to 246 agents to achieve this first year APE sales target of S$50m.
(b) According to Peter, during his meeting with Aviva in May 2016, Aviva agreed in-principle to Peter joining it as a consultant to help in setting up and developing the FA model. Sometime after that meeting, Aviva sent template draft contracts for agents and ALs to Peter.
(c) A draft consultancy agreement dated 31 May 2016 contemplated that Peter would be providing his services to Aviva through a private limited company that was to be incorporated. Peter also testified that he had instructed lawyers in May 2016 to draft an agreement between Aviva and Peter in relation to the receipt of business allowance from Aviva.
(d) Peter continued to engage with Aviva to discuss the template contracts for agents and ALs up to around mid-late May 2016. Email correspondences between Peter and Aviva in May 2016 confirm that Peter was negotiating the Advisor and Advisor Manager contracts with Aviva. Peter also confirmed that there were further drafts of these contracts arising from his meetings with Aviva’s CEO from 28 May 2016 to 9 June 2016, which he claimed to have destroyed. Peter told the Attendee ALs that he had put in significant effort to review and negotiate the terms of their agreements with Aviva, and even falsely asserted that he was legally trained.
(e) Peter asked the ALs in PTO to provide him with information on their and their agents’ projected earnings based on their past performance in PACS, so that he could compute the budget required for the Aviva transition package.
The above evidence shows that Peter’s plan to move to Aviva involved him bringing PACS’ agents in PTO with him to Aviva. It stands to reason that Peter would be taking steps to solicit (directly or indirectly) PACS’ agents in PTO to leave PACS to join Aviva.
- [94]
[94] Second, the evidence shows that pursuant to the DAA, Aviva agreed to pay PTOMC a sign-on bonus that was tied to Peter having secured the mass exodus of over 200 of PACS’ ALs and agents in PTO to join AFA. Such an arrangement made it necessary for Peter to solicit PACS’ agents to join AFA.
(a) The draft consultancy agreement dated 31 May 2016 provided that Aviva would pay PTOMC a total sign-on bonus of $13.8m. Aviva was entitled to clawback the entire amount if the agreement was terminated within three years, and 60% if the agreement was terminated within the fourth year. Aviva was entitled to terminate the agreement immediately if AFA failed to meet at least 70% of its business plan, which meant that if this happened, Aviva could clawback 60% of the sign-on bonus.
(b) In the final draft consultancy agreement dated 27 June 2016, the total sign-on bonus was increased to $15.3m. However, the clawback provision was watered down. If Aviva terminated the agreement on the ground that AFA’s performance failed to meet the agreed targets, Peter merely had to agree not to participate in the financial service industry from the time of termination of the agreement until 31 July 2020, and there would be no clawback. This revised clawback provision remained unchanged in the DAA.
- [95]
[95] PACS submitted that the reason for the difference in the clawback provisions was the exodus of more than 200 agents in PTO from PACS to AFA which took place after the 31 May 2016 draft agreement and before the 27 June 2016 draft agreement. I agree with PACS. The inference is irresistible. I reject Peter’s denial that there was such a link between the sign-on bonus and the exodus of agents from PACS to AFA. Peter claimed that the sign-on bonus was tied to the services that he would provide, the restrictions to be imposed on him, the value that he would bring to Aviva and the income he could have earned if he had stayed on in PACS. However, this does not explain why the clawback for AFA’s failure to meet performance targets was changed from 60% (before the mass exodus of PACS’ agents to AFA) to zero (after the mass exodus of PACS’ agents to AFA).
- [96]
[96] Third, it is clear that Aviva viewed Peter as the key-man under the DAA. Aviva was entitled to terminate the DAA if Peter was no longer (a) the sole legal and beneficial shareholder of PTOMC, or (b) the sole director of PTOMC, or (c) a key employee of PTOMC and was not actively involved in the provision of the services under the DAA. Given Peter’s success with PTO, it is more likely than not that the understanding was that Peter would try to bring over at least a substantial number of PACS’ agents in PTO to join AFA.
- [97]
[97] Fourth, Peter informed the Attendee ALs that he told Aviva that he would leave PACS to join AFA only if Aviva gave him a budget “for the entire organisation” and that a budget for only three-quarters of the organisation would not be enough because then he would have to “pump up 25%”. Clearly, Peter was negotiating with Aviva on the basis that he would bring PACS’ agents in PTO over with him to join AFA.
- [98]
[98] Fifth, I agree with PACS that Peter sought to convince the agents in PTO that they should no longer remain with PACS by painting a false picture of a bleak future if they continued to stay in PACS. Peter also extolled the advantages of joining AFA.
(a) Peter informed the Attendee ALs that PACS was seriously considering starting a FA distribution channel, thereby implying that the tied agency force in PACS would soon have to also compete with the new FA agents. Peter admitted on the stand that he failed to mention to the Attendee ALs that PACS’ senior management had already confirmed that PACS had no intention of starting a FA distribution channer. Peter also admitted that he had conveyed untruths to two of his ALs at a meeting on 16 May 2016 about PACS starting a FA distribution channel.
(b) Peter admitted that he had exaggerated to the agents in PTO on more than one occasion about PACS’ likely downfall upon the departure of Peter and PTO from PACS, with the intention of persuading them that their future would be bleak if they remained in PACS.
(c) Peter admitted to persuading the agents in PTO to leave PACS to join AFA, by telling them that those who remained with PACS would not be assigned to service the Orphan Policies, and therefore there would be little benefit for them to stay on with PACS after Peter and the rest of the agents in PTO left PACS.
(d) Peter emphasised the fact that Aviva did not have any bancassurance or tied agency distribution channels that AFA would have to compete with, and that agents joining AFA would be able to sell a wider range of products. Peter represented that as he would be in Aviva’s product committee, he would be able to ensure that they had products in AFA that were easy to sell. Peter also represented that the agents could be three to four times more productive at an independent FA firm like AFA. Peter also asserted that by moving to AFA, the PTO brand could be monetised and may be worth $400m.
(e) Peter further claimed that he would have significant control and influence over Aviva’s senior management, that he would sit on the Aviva board of directors, that the choice of the CEO in AFA was under his control and that they would have enough leverage over Aviva in about seven to ten years’ time to strong-arm Aviva into giving AFA another “super bonus” by threatening to sell products of other insurers.
(f) Peter claimed that the terms of the AFA agreements were better than those of PACS or other independent FA firms.
- [99]
[99] Sixth, I agree with PACS that Peter used the financial offerings from Aviva to entice agents in PTO to leave PACS to join AFA. To this end, Peter told the Attendee ALs the following:
(a) Aviva had given him a budget of up to $100m to set up a competing FA firm owned by Aviva, of which $50m would be distributed to agents in PTO who moved over with him to join AFA. Peter also told the Attendee ALs to tell other agents who expressed interest in moving to AFA, that there was a budget of $100m.
(b) Under the transition package offered by Aviva, agents who joined AFA could obtain 50% of the total transition allowance (a component of the Aviva transition package) upfront. The total transition allowance comprised payments to be made to the agents over a 36-month period, subject to various validation targets. Peter admitted that this would have been a huge incentive for PACS’ agents to join AFA. Peter also assured the Attendee ALs that the validation targets were easily attainable as they would be only about 75% of the production level that most of them had achieved in 2015. Peter described the situation as one where Aviva was simply “throw[ing] money” at the agents.
(c) The Attendee ALs would be reimbursed upfront for (i) incentives that they had qualified for in PACS but which PACS would not have to pay once they left PACS, and (ii) any monies that PACS would clawback from them if they left PACS. The Attendee AL’s “senior agent allowance” for the next 12 months would also be doubled.
(d) Only the first batch joining AFA would receive the Aviva transition package; subsequent batches may not receive the Loyalty Bonus (a component of the Aviva transition package) or similar transition packages.
(a) MAS was “very supportive” of the planned move to Aviva and that 200 agents who moved to Aviva would receive their clearances within two to three weeks because MAS was “committed” to pre-clear 200 applications. Clearance from MAS (commonly referred to as “RNF” clearance) was required before the agents could start working with AFA and the process would normally take six to eight weeks. Peter admitted that in fact, he had not spoken to MAS on these matters.
(b) The MAS “current chief”, who was a former colleague of Aviva’s CEO, had told the latter “I’ll help you. Don’t worry, submit all these to us.” In truth, there was no such arrangement with MAS.
- [101]
[101] Eighth, Peter addressed the Attendee AL’s concerns about losing their customer base by assuring them that a budget had been allocated for them to service their customers in AFA and that he would provide them with access to PACS’ customer database. Peter admitted under cross-examination that he had in mind the spreadsheets containing PACS’ customer information that PACS had provided to him for purposes of PTO’s telemarketing campaign. Peter also coached the Attendee ALs to explain to their customers that their move to AFA was to enable them to sell more competitive products, so as to assure their customers that they would be getting a better deal.
- [102]
[102] Ninth, Peter coached the Attendee ALs on how to persuade their agents to leave PACS and join AFA.
(a) Peter told the Attendee ALs that they should tell their agents that he had a budget of $100m to bring the whole of PTO over to AFA.
(b) Peter explained the details of Aviva’s transition package for agents to the Attendee ALs so that the Attendee ALs could share the information with their agents and be able to answer questions on the same. Peter also told the Attendee ALs to assure the agents in PTO who were on the Management Associate Programme (“MAP”) scheme that they would be reimbursed the sums that PACS might clawback under the MAP scheme if they left PACS. Under the MAP scheme, agents with no prior experience in the insurance industry were given a fixed monthly allowance for a specified period, subject to certain conditions.
(c) To encourage the agents to move to AFA as part of the first batch, Peter instructed the Attendee ALs to explain to their agents (who were undecided about leaving) that they would miss out on the loyalty bonus component in the transition package.
(d) Peter told the Attendee ALs that they were to emphasise to their agents that he would definitely resign from PACS. He also told the Attendee ALs that they should use their own departures from PACS as a tool to persuade their agents (who might be undecided) to join AFA.
- [103]
[103] Tenth, Peter spoke to agents, who were undecided, to address their concerns about moving to AFA. This included arranging a private session with the agents who were under one of the Attendee ALs, Wendy, who had told Peter that her agents were not keen to move. Peter admitted under cross-examination that he was attempting to convert the unconvinced at the meeting with Wendy’s agents.
- [104]
[104] Eleventh, Peter took active steps to conceal the move to AFA from PACS. His actions were more consistent with someone who was covering his acts of solicitation than someone who was simply helping the ALs in PTO explore their options.
(a) Peter made the Attendee ALs sign the NDAs and threatened them that they would suffer the consequences if they leaked information about the move to AFA. The NDAs provided that in the event of breach by the Attendee ALs, Peter would be entitled to “equitable relief … estimated at S$50 millions [sic] …”. Peter also warned the Attendee ALs that any whistleblowing attempt would backfire and result in the whistle blower being terminated by PACS.
(b) Peter instructed the agents in PTO to put up appearances in a bid to mislead senior executives who were visiting from PACS’ London headquarters.
(c) Peter continued to convey false impressions to PACS’ senior management that he was not leaving PACS. In late May 2016, he told PACS’ CAO that he was not going anywhere, and on 26 May 2016, he told PACS’ CEO that he “had no intention now to leave [PACS]” (see [59] above). On 4 June 2016, he told the senior management representative of PCA in Hong Kong that he would meet his managers on 16 June 2016 to affirm “support and continuity” for PACS (see [65] above). Even when the mass exodus of agents started on 15 June 2016, Peter was pretending to be disturbed by the exodus, claiming that his senior agents were not leaving but that he could not hold on to the junior ones who were apparently going to different places (see [66] above). In response to a request to meet for an “important meeting”, Peter told PACS’ CEO on 1 July 2016 that he “will probably go for long leave”. On the stand, Peter agreed that he was still being “indirect”; he did not want to convey his decision to leave PACS and join a competitor.
(d) Peter made plans to go on a trip from 9 to 15 June 2016 so that PACS’ CEO would not be able to meet him before the mass exodus started. He also gave instructions for the access rights to PTO’s office to be removed on 15 June 2016 with respect to PACS’ CAO and the Business Development Manager who was assigned to look after PTO, just in case documents relating to the move to Aviva were left lying around in the PTO office.
(e) Peter also instructed the ALs in PTO to bring their agents on a four-day trip to Bangkok, sponsored by Aviva, on 15 June 2016, and to play games with their agents during the trip that would involve their phones being taken away. Peter admitted that this was to prevent PACS from contacting the agents and getting them to change their minds about leaving PACS.
- [105]
[105] Twelfth, Peter coordinated and controlled the mass exodus of agents in PTO to AFA. He instructed the ALs in PTO to ask their agents to sign three undated documents – a template resignation letter, a transition allowance letter and the AFA representative agreement – which were to be handed back to him by 9 June 2016. The “resignation letter” was technically a notice of termination of the Agency Agreement. Peter admitted that he asked for these letters to be undated because he would decide when to submit the letters to PACS.
- [106]
[106] The evidence leaves me in no doubt that every step taken by Peter was taken because he was soliciting the Attendee ALs to leave PACS to join AFA and/or asking the Attendee ALs to persuade PACS’ other agents in PTO to leave PACS and join AFA.
What were the contractual obligations owed by Peter?
- [107]
[107] In its closing submissions, PACS claims that:
(a) Peter was contractually bound by the Non-Solicitation Clause (see [39] above).
(b) Peter was contractually bound to conduct his insurance business with integrity and honesty.
(c) It was an implied term of Peter’s Field Manager Agreement and subsequent appointments as a GAM and a Master GAM that Peter owed a duty not to conduct himself in a manner calculated and/or likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between him and PACS.
Whether Peter was contractually bound by the Non-Solicitation Clause
- [108]
[108] Peter’s Agency Agreement and Field Manager Agreement did not contain any non-solicitation clause. However, the September 2010 AI sought to impose the Non-Solicitation Clause (see [39] above). The Non-Solicitation Clause states as follows:
The present case concerns the restraint in (b) only.
- [109]
[109] PACS’ case is that Peter was obliged to comply with the September 2010 AI pursuant to the terms of his (a) Field Manager Agreement, and (b) Agency Agreement.
Peter’s Field Manager Agreement
- [110]
[110] PACS submitted that Peter was obliged to comply with the September 2010 AI pursuant to the following terms of his Field Manager Agreement:
(a) clause 3(c), which required Peter to
(b) clause 5, which required Peter to
(c) clause 7, which required Peter to
- [111]
[111] Peter argued that the September 2010 AI did not fall within the scope of cl 7 of his Field Manager Agreement because the scope of cl 7 was limited to statutory guidelines and requirements. Peter submitted that the word “otherwise” in cl 7 should be construed ejusdem generis. Peter also referred to the fact that the header for cl 7 was “Statutory Requirements”. I agree with Peter. The language in cl 7 showed that it was intended to apply to statutory guidelines and requirements. This conclusion is also supported by the fact that cl 5 of the Field Manager Agreement had expressly required Peter to comply with “agency instructions”. There was no reason for cl 7 to also apply to agency instructions. In my view, the September 2010 AI did not fall within the scope of cl 7.
- [112]
[112] It cannot be disputed that the September 2010 AI was an instruction that fell within the scope of cll 3(c) and 5 of Peter’s Field Manager Agreement. However, that is not the end of the matter. Clearly, the September 2010 AI purported to amend the terms of Peter’s Field Manager Agreement by adding the Non-Solicitation Clause to the Agreement. It is doubtful that cl 3 can be said to permit of such an amendment. Clause 3 refers to Peter’s duty to manage the agents under him in a manner consistent with instructions given by PACS. His own obligation to comply with PACS’ instructions is governed by cl 5.
- [113]
[113] In any event, the more important question is whether cll 3(c) and/or 5 permit PACS to make such an amendment unilaterally. Understandably, Peter submitted cll 3(c) and 5 did not permit PACS to do so, and I agree.
- [114]
[114] First, cl 13(a) of Peter’s Field Manager Agreement expressly required any variation or modification of any of the terms of the Agreement to be in writing and signed by the parties to the Agreement. Clause 13(a) provided as follows:
The Schedule and cll 2(a) and (b) dealt with the amounts to be paid by PACS to its field managers for their services.
- [115]
[115] There was nothing in the Agreement that permitted PACS to amend the terms of the Agreement other than in the manner provided in cl 13(a). Nothing in cll 3(c) or 5 detracted from the requirement in cl 13(a) that any amendment to the terms of the Agreement had to be in writing and signed by the parties. It is also significant that cl 13(a) drew a clear distinction between the amendment of “rules, regulations and agency instructions pursuant to Clause 5” (which PACS could amend unilaterally) and “variations or modifications of any of the terms” of the Agreement (which had to be in writing and signed by PACS and Peter). In my judgment, cll 3(c) and 5 must be read in a manner that is consistent with cl 13(a), ie, that cll 3(c) and 5 do not permit PACS to unilaterally amend the terms of Peter’s Field Manager Agreement via the September 2010 AI in contravention of cl 13(a).
- [116]
[116] It may have been convenient to PACS to use the September 2010 AI to unilaterally amend the terms of its agreements with its numerous agents, including Peter’s Field Manager Agreement. However, PACS’ convenience could not override the clear requirements in cl 13(a).
- [117]
[117] Second, I agree with Peter that he did not accept or agree to the Non-Solicitation Clause. The agency force in PACS (including Peter) had objected to the September 2010 AI, describing the contents as “unreasonable and something we cannot adhere to”.
- [118]
[118] Third, PACS’ own conduct showed that there was no mutual intention to incorporate the Non-Solicitation Clause as a term of Peter’s Field Manager Agreement. PACS’ response to the objection raised by the agency force was that “the other items in the AI was just to tighten what is already found in your agency agreements”. The “other items” included the Non-Solicitation Clause. Peter’s Field Manager Agreement did not have any non-solicitation clause. I agree with Peter that PACS’ response shows that PACS did not intend the Non-Solicitation Clause to apply to agents whose agreements did not already contain any such clause. This conclusion is also supported by the fact that the terms and conditions in the September 2010 AI expressly stated that the AI “applies to all Prudential Financial Consultants” and that “Prudential Financial Consultants shall refer to all person who have signed the Adviser/Financial Agreement”. As Peter pointed out, the Adviser Agreement (which replaced the Agency Agreement) contained a non-solicitation clause. The Agency Agreement that Peter signed did not.
- [119]
[119] Fourth, read in context, cll 3(c) and 5 deal with Peter’s conduct during the currency of his Field Manager Agreement. As Peter submitted, the Non-Solicitation Clause included a restraint against solicitation for a period of 24 months after Peter’s Agreement was terminated. This shows that cll 3(c) and 5 were meant for administrative or operational matters and were never meant to be used for the purpose of unilaterally amending the terms of the Agreement.
- [120]
[120] In conclusion, the Non-Solicitation Clause did not become a term of Peter’s Field Manager Agreement.
- [121]
[121] I note that in its closing submissions, PACS made submission on waiver and estoppel but those submission were in connection with cl 15(c) of Peter’s Field Management Agreement and not cl 13(a). Clause 15(c) deals with the making and delivery of notices, demands and other communications required to be given or made under the Agreement. In any event, waiver and estoppel have not been pleaded, whether in connection with cl 13(a) or cl 15(c) of Peter’s Field Manager Agreement.
Peter’s Agency Agreement
- [122]
[122] In the original version of Peter’s Agency Agreement:
(a) clause 5 required Peter to “observe and comply with [PACS’] current rules and regulations from time to time in force”; and
(b) clause 7 required Peter to “observe and comply with all guidelines and requirements, whether statutory governmental regulatory or otherwise, that may apply to him”.
Neither clause referred to agency instructions.
- [123]
[123] As stated earlier, the March 1998 AI enclosed an addendum, which sought to amend certain clauses in the Agency Agreements (see [34] above). In particular, the addendum purported to:
(a) amend cl 5 by requiring agents to observe and comply with “agency instructions” in addition to “rules” and “regulations” (as provided in the original version of cl 5); and
(b) amend cl 7 by requiring agents to observe and comply with “notices” and “directives” in addition to “guidelines” and “requirements” (as provided in the original version of cl 7).
- [124]
[124] PACS submitted that Peter was obliged to comply with the September 2010 AI pursuant to cll 5 and 7 of his Agency Agreement, both in their original and amended forms. However, Peter submitted that:
(a) the March 1998 AI could not unilaterally amend his Agency Agreement; and
(b) even if the March 1998 AI did amend his Agency Agreement,
(i) cl 7 of his Agency Agreement did not apply to the September 2010 A; and/or
(ii) the September 2010 AI could not unilaterally amend his Agency Agreement.
- [125]
[125] Peter argued that neither the March 1998 AI nor the September 2010 AI complied with cl 16(a) of his Agency Agreement, which provided as follows:
The Schedules and cll 2(a) and (b) dealt with the amounts to be paid by PACS to its agents for their services.
- [126]
[126] I have some doubts as to whether the March 1988 AI was effective to amend cll 5 and 7 of Peter’s Agency Agreement. However, it is not necessary for me to decide this because even if it was, I agree with Peter (for reasons similar to those discussed earlier in the context of Peter’s Field Manager Agreement) that:
(a) the September 2010 AI did not fall within the scope of cl 7 of Peter’s Agency Agreement; and
(b) the September 2010 AI could not unilaterally amend the terms of Peter’s Agency Agreement in contravention of cl 16(a) of the Agreement.
- [127]
[127] The Non-Solicitation Clause therefore did not become a term of Peter’s Agency Agreement.
- [128]
[128] In its closing submissions, PACS also made submissions on waiver and estoppel but only in connection with the amendments to cll 5 and 7 of Peter’s Agency Agreement introduced by the March 1998 AI. Waiver and/or estoppel has not been pleaded in connection with the need for the September 2010 AI to comply with cl 16(a) of Peter’s Agency Agreement.
Whether the Non-Solicitation Clause is enforceable in any event
- [129]
[129] Peter submitted that even if the Non-Solicitation Clause did become a term of his Field Manager Agreement and/or Agency Agreement, it is unenforceable in any event. It should be noted that the present case involves only the restriction against solicitation during the currency of Peter’s Agency Agreement.
- [130]
[130] The law is not in dispute. A non-solicitation clause is a restraint of trade provision and as such, is unenforceable unless it:
(a) protects a legitimate proprietary interest; and
(b) is reasonable by reference to the interests of the parties and to the interests of the public.
See Man Financial (S) Pte Ltd v Wong Bark Chuan David [2008] 1 SLR 663 (“Man Financial”) at [70], [75]–[77] and [79].
Whether PACS had a legitimate proprietary interest to protect
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