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Grounds publishedDecided 21 Jan 2021

General Division of the High Court

Pang Moh Yin Patricia and another v Sim Kwai Meng

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[2021] SGHC 11Case no. Suit No 980 of 2019

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  1. Background

  2. [2] The ex-wife is an architect and runs an architectural consultancy firm. The ex-husband works as a part-time property agent and a resident engineer. They have two adult children, namely, Mr Christopher Sim and Ms Stephanie Sim (“Children”). At the material time, the family (together with the Mother before her passing) resided at a property located at 79 Mulberry Avenue Singapore 348452 (“Mulberry Property”). The Mulberry Property was owned by the following parties as tenants-in-common in the proportions as listed:

  3. (a) 50% by the ex-wife;

  4. (b) 33.3% (ie, one-third) by the ex-husband; and

  5. (c) 16.7% (ie, one-sixth) by the Mother.

  6. [3] The ex-wife and ex-husband also owned another property (“Signature Park property”) as joint tenants. The property’s mortgage was fully paid in September 2014. In February 2015, the joint tenancy was severed. The ex-wife and ex-husband then became co-owners of the said property as tenants-in-common in equal shares.

  7. [4] The oral agreement that is the subject of the present dispute allegedly concerns the Mulberry Property and the Signature Park property. Both parties have given conflicting versions of the events leading up to the entering of the said agreement. These will be discussed later below.

  8. [5] It is undisputed that on 22 June 2015, the ex-husband proposed to the ex-wife a sale of the Signature Park property. In connection with this proposal, they had a discussion in the master bedroom of the Mulberry Property and entered into an oral agreement (“Oral Agreement”). The terms of this Oral Agreement are contested. The ex-husband says that all that was agreed was that the Signature Park property would be sold. His account is hereinafter referred to as the “ex-husband’s Pleaded Oral Agreement”. According to the ex-wife, however, the agreed terms were as follows:

  9. (a) The ex-wife would consent to the ex-husband's request for the Signature Park property to be sold.

  10. (b) The ex-husband would transfer all his rights, title and interests (ie, his one-third share) in the Mulberry Property to the ex-wife.

  11. (c) The ex-wife would then transfer her half-share of the sale proceeds of the Signature Park property, less $180,000, to the ex-husband. The deduction of $180,000 (“$180,000 Deduction”) was meant to compensate the ex-wife for the estimated rental proceeds which she would forgo as a result of the sale of the Signature Park property.

  12. (“ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement”).

  13. [6] On either pleaded version of the Oral Agreement, the Signature Park property was to be sold. To this end, the ex-husband procured the services of his brother, a real estate agent, to sell the Signature Park property. In July 2015, an option to purchase the said property for $1.35m was granted. On 23 July 2015, the option was exercised. On 27 August 2015, both the ex-wife and ex-husband attended at the conveyancing solicitor’s office to sign the relevant sale documents. On 17 September 2015, the sale of the Signature Park property was completed. The ex-wife and ex-husband each received a half-share of the proceeds, amounting to about $675,000.

  14. [7] Thereafter, on 5 October 2015, the ex-wife approached the ex-husband to ask him to transfer his one-third share in the Mulberry Property to her. The ex-wife says that this was pursuant to the ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement. The ex-husband denies this. It is undisputed that on that day, the ex-husband made it clear that he would not be making the transfer. The ex-wife then drafted a handwritten note (“Handwritten Note”) purporting to reflect the terms of the ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement (as set out at [5] above), although the note omitted to include the $180,000 Deduction. The Handwritten Note stated:

  15. The ex-wife and the ex-husband had a heated exchange during which the former attempted to get the latter to sign the above note. A scuffle broke out. The ex-husband was on one side. The ex-wife and their son, Mr Christopher Sim, were on the other side. When all was said and done, the Handwritten Note remained unsigned by the ex-husband.

  16. [8] Subsequently, on 4 November 2015, the ex-husband filed for divorce by commencing FC/D 4974/2015 against the ex-wife (“Divorce Suit”). In April 2016, whilst the Divorce Suit was still ongoing, the ex-wife commenced a separate action, Suit No 364 of 2016, against the ex-husband (“Previous Suit”). The facts pleaded by the ex-wife in the Previous Suit are materially similar to those pleaded in the present Suit. In the Previous Suit, the ex-wife essentially sought to enforce an alleged oral agreement which was, in all material aspects, identical to the ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement. However, the ex-husband successfully applied to the High Court for a stay of the Previous Suit on account of the ongoing Divorce Suit. The ex-wife eventually discontinued the Previous Suit.

  17. [9] Thereafter, the two individuals continued with the proceedings in the Divorce Suit. The relevant events are set out below:

  18. (ii) Alternatively, “parties shall jointly sell the [Mulberry Property] in the open market and complete the sale within 6 months from the date of the Final Judgment”. The net proceeds of sale shall be apportioned 50% to the ex-wife, 33.3% to the ex-husband and 16.7% to the Mother.

  19. (iii) The ex-wife and ex-husband shall “retain assets in each sole name and/or possession”.

  20. (b) On 14 November 2017, the certificate of final judgment of divorce was issued.

  21. [12] On 1 April 2019, the ex-husband filed Registrar’s Appeal No 104 of 2019 (“RA 104”) against the AR’s decision in SUM 937. On 6 August 2019, Lee Sieu Kin J dismissed RA 104. Thereafter, parties filed their pleadings for this Suit in the usual course. The plaintiffs are represented by counsel in this Suit. The ex-husband is a litigant-in-person although he has apparently received some form of legal assistance in these proceedings.

  22. The plaintiffs’ case

  23. [13] By way of background to the Oral Agreement, the plaintiffs paint a picture of the ex-husband as a compulsive gambler under pressure from his creditors. According to them, the ex-wife discovered in early 2008 that the ex-husband had been gambling regularly on casino cruise ships and in Genting Highlands casinos. The ex-husband secretly continued his gambling activities over the next several years despite his repeated promises to stop. In 2010, for example, the ex-husband purchased an annual entrance membership to gamble at the Resorts World Sentosa casino. These gambling activities led to a deterioration of the ex-husband’s personal financial situation and strained the marital relationship between the couple. The ex-husband faced mounting debts which caused him to borrow heavily from banks and moneylenders. Between 2014 and 2015, the ex-husband sought to borrow money on at least two occasions from the ex-wife, but these requests were rejected. He also attempted to refinance the Signature Park property to obtain more funds but was unsuccessful.

  24. [16] As a consequence of the above, the plaintiffs seek to enforce the ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement and obtain, inter alia, the following reliefs:

  25. (a) A declaration that the ex-wife and the ex-husband entered into the ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement (as set out at [5] above).

  26. [17] In reply to the ex-husband’s Res Judicata Defence and Formality Defence (as defined at [18] and [21] below), the plaintiffs further contend the following:

  27. (a) The ex-husband has previously raised the Res Judicata Defence before Lee J in RA 104 and is precluded on the ground of issue estoppel from raising the defence again before this Court.

  28. (b) Certain WhatsApp messages exchanged between the ex-wife and ex-husband satisfy the formality requirements of s 6(d) of the Civil Law Act (Cap 43, 1999 Rev Ed) (“CLA”).

  29. (c) Even if s 6(d) of the CLA is not satisfied, the ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement has been performed in part by the ex-wife and is therefore enforceable on that ground.

  30. The defendant’s case

  31. [18] The ex-husband’s preliminary objection is that the issue of what the terms of the Oral Agreement were (ie, the “Agreed Terms Issue” as defined in [24(a)] below) had already been argued and decided in prior legal proceedings. Before this court, the said issue is therefore res judicata (“Res Judicata Defence”).

  32. [19] As to the crux of the dispute, the ex-husband claims that the background to the Oral Agreement as painted by the plaintiffs is misleading. He denies their allegations that he was a compulsive gambler. He accepts that he did purchase an annual membership to enter the Resorts World Sentosa casino but claims that this was allegedly only for leisure, networking and client entertainment purposes. The ex-husband admits that he did ask to borrow money from the ex-wife on two occasions.

  33. [20] According to the ex-husband, he had proposed the sale of the Signature Park Property to the ex-wife simply because condominium prices in the vicinity of the said property had peaked. There were many upcoming condominium projects nearby, which would eventually lead to falling prices for older condominium estates (such as the Signature Park property). This was the reason that the parties agreed to the ex-husband’s Pleaded Oral Agreement on 22 June 2015 and there was nothing more to it. None of the additional terms in the ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement were even mentioned, much less agreed to. The eventual sale price of the Signature Park property of $1.35m was above its market value at the time. The ex-wife’s allegation that she was not consulted on the buyers’ offer was untrue as she had agreed in advance to a sale price of not less than $1.3m. The ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement is, in truth, a scheme concocted by her to deprive him of his rightful share of the Mulberry Property.

  34. [21] The ex-husband also argues that even if the ex-wife and he had entered into the ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement, the said agreement is unenforceable on account of a failure to comply with the formalities required by s 6(d) of the CLA. (“Formality Defence”).

  35. (a) At the time of the hearing before the DJ in 2017, “[t]he agreed market value for the [Mulberry Property] was $2,520,000” and the ex-husband’s one-third share was worth $840,000.

  36. (b) If “the [Mulberry Property] were to be sold today, it would fetch about $3,150,000”. The ex-husband’s one-third share would be worth “about $1,048,950”.

  37. (c) The ex-husband has “lost out in terms of capital appreciation and interests [sic]”, a sum of $208,950 (being the difference between $1,048,950 and $840,000). He is thus entitled to “damages of $208,950” plus interest and costs.

  38. Issues that arise for my consideration

  39. [23] There are three preliminary issues for me to deal with:

  40. (a) Whether the ex-wife, in her capacity as the Personal Representative of her late Mother’s estate, has any locus standi to seek the reliefs sought (“Locus Standi Issue”).

  41. (b) Whether the plaintiffs are precluded by the doctrine of res judicata from raising before this Court the issue of what the terms of the Oral Agreement are (ie, the “Agreed Terms Issue” as defined at [24(a)] below) (“Res Judicata Issue”).

  42. (c) In respect of the affidavits of evidence-in-chief (“AEICs”) filed by the parties’ witnesses, whether any contents thereof are inadmissible or objectionable on any basis (“Admissibility Issue”).

  43. [24] The main issues that arise for my consideration are as follows:

  44. (a) What were the terms of the Oral Agreement entered into by the ex-wife and ex-husband on 22 June 2015? (“Agreed Terms Issue”)

  45. (b) If the terms of the Oral Agreement are as per the ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement, whether the said agreement is enforceable (“Enforceability Issue”). This comprises the following sub-issues:

  46. (i) Does the Oral Agreement fulfil the formality requirements of s 6(d) of the CLA? (“Formalities Sub-Issue”)

  47. (ii) If not, is the Oral Agreement nonetheless enforceable on the ground that the ex-wife has performed the agreement in part? (“Part Performance Sub-Issue”)

  48. (c) Whether the ex-husband’s counterclaim against the ex-wife succeeds (“Counterclaim Issue”).

  49. Analysis of the issues

  50. Locus Standi Issue

  51. [25] The ex-wife claims to be a party to her Pleaded Oral Agreement in her own name. If I accept that the said agreement is sufficiently proven, it is clear that she has the locus standi to apply for the reliefs sought as a contracting party to the agreement. It is not, however, alleged by either side that the Mother was a party to either the ex-wife’s or ex-husband’s Pleaded Oral Agreement. That being the case, I fail to see what standing the ex-wife has as the Personal Representative of her late Mother’s estate to apply for the reliefs sought. All that the ex-wife said in her AEIC is that her late Mother’s “[e]state will be guided by the…Court’s decision in this case as the [e]state is a part owner of the [Mulberry] Property but is not a party to the Oral Agreement”. This does nothing to address the aforesaid difficulty. I therefore dismiss the action by the ex-wife qua the Personal Representative and decline to grant the reliefs sought by her in that capacity. For consistency, however, my analysis below will continue to refer to the case run collectively by the “plaintiffs” despite my finding that the ex-wife’s action qua the Personal Representative fails.

  52. Admissibility Issue

  53. [26] Before trial, each side filed a Notice of Objections to Contents of AEIC (“Notice of Objections”) in respect of the AEICs of the other side’s witnesses. As some of these objections go to the admissibility, and not merely the weight, of the witnesses’ evidence, I deal with both Notices of Objections as a preliminary issue.

  54. The ex-husband’s Notice of Objections

  55. [27] Shortly after the Oral Agreement of 22 June 2015, the ex-wife says that she separately told the Mother (who was still alive at the time) as well as several other family members and relatives that she had entered into the ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement with the ex-husband. The other family members and relatives (collectively the “Third Parties”) that the ex-wife allegedly spoke to are as follows:

  56. (a) Ms Stephanie Sim, the elder child of the ex-wife and ex-husband.

  57. (b) Mr Christopher Sim, the younger child of the ex-wife and ex-husband.

  58. (c) Mr Kevin Tan, a cousin of the ex-wife.

  59. (d) Ms Corinna Ann Jonathan, the wife of the ex-husband’s brother.

  60. (e) Ms Adelina Pang, a cousin of the ex-wife.

  61. [28] About a year later, in August and September 2016, the Mother and the Third Parties each signed a statutory declaration detailing their separate conversations with the ex-wife (“Statutory Declarations”). During the said conversations, they were allegedly told that the ex-wife had agreed with the ex-husband to give up her half-share in the Signature Park property in return for his one-third share in the Mulberry Property.

  62. [29] As the Mother had passed away by the time of trial, the ex-wife exhibited the late Mother’s Statutory Declaration in her own AEIC. She filed a Notice to Admit Documentary Hearsay Evidence (dated 17 August 2020) and relied on the exception for hearsay evidence in s 32(1)(j)(i) of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) (“EA”) to admit the said Statutory Declaration. Although the ex-husband did not object to the admissibility of the Mother’s Statutory Declaration in his Notice of Objections (see [30] below), he appears to have done so in his AEIC on the ground that it constitutes hearsay. I reject such an objection. Under s 32(1)(j)(i) of the Evidence Act, a statement of relevant facts (ie, a statement relating to the terms of the Oral Agreement) is itself relevant and therefore admissible where the maker of the statement has passed away. The Mother’s Statutory Declaration plainly falls into this category of statements and is therefore admissible pursuant to the said provision.

  63. [30] As for the Third Parties, they each filed their own AEICs and exhibited their own Statutory Declarations to their respective AEICs. On 11 August 2020, the ex-husband filed his Notice of Objections to the following contents:

  64. (a) Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the AEIC of Ms Stephanie Sim, and her Statutory Declaration exhibited thereto.

  65. (b) Paragraph 4 of the AEIC of Mr Christopher Sim, and his Statutory Declaration exhibited thereto.

  66. (c) The AEICs of Ms Corinna Ann Jonathan, Ms Adelina Pang, and Mr Kevin Tan, and their respective Statutory Declarations exhibited thereto.

  67. (d) Various paragraphs of the ex-wife’s AEIC.

  68. For the record, on 25 August 2020, I granted the plaintiffs’ application in Summons No 3466 of 2020 to strike out part of the ex-husband’s Notice of Objections which referred to certain “without prejudice” correspondence.

  69. [31] The ex-husband’s objections to the ex-wife’s AEIC (referred to [30(d)] at above) can be briefly dealt with. His objections are essentially factual rebuttals disputing the ex-wife’s evidence. These are not grounds for refusing to admit the ex-wife’s evidence entirely and will simply be taken into consideration in my overall assessment of the evidence below. The ex-husband also raised an objection on the ground of res judicata, which will be dealt with in the next section.

  70. [32] My present focus is instead on the ex-husband’s objections at [30(a)-(c)] above. These objections are made on the basis that the specified evidence of the Third Parties (“Objected Third-Party Accounts”) is hearsay and thus inadmissible. The Objected Third-Party Accounts mainly (but do not exclusively) comprise accounts given by the respective Third Parties in relation to what the ex-wife had told him/her about the alleged terms of the Oral Agreement.

  71. [33] The plaintiffs, unsurprisingly, reject the ex-husband’s objection. They do not deny that the Third Parties were not present when the ex-wife entered into the Oral Agreement with the ex-husband and that the Third Parties thus do not have personal knowledge of the conversation that took place. However, this supposedly only goes to the weight to be ascribed to the Objected Third-Party Accounts and not their admissibility. It is argued by the plaintiffs that the rule against hearsay only excludes out-of-court statements where the maker of the statement is not produced in court. In the present case, however, all of the Third Parties were called as witnesses at trial.

  72. [34] In Orion-One Development Pte Ltd (in liquidation) v Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 3556 (suing on behalf of itself and all subsidiary proprietors of Northstar @ AMK) and another appeal [2019] 2 SLR 793, the Court of Appeal (citing Soon Peck Wah v Woon Che Chye [1997] 3 SLR(R) 430 at [26]) endorsed the following definition of hearsay evidence (at [9]):

  73. [35] In the plaintiffs’ submissions, they argue that the Objected Third-Party Accounts “speak to…the conduct of [the ex-wife] after the Oral Agreement was entered into, i.e. a relevant factor for the Court to take into account in deciding if the Oral Agreement [as alleged by the ex-wife] exist[s]”. In other words, the plaintiffs are relying on the Objected Third-Party Accounts for the purpose of proving the truth of the ex-wife’s out-of-court statements in relation to the alleged terms of the Oral Agreement. To that extent, I agree with the ex-husband that the Objected Third-Party Accounts constitute hearsay evidence. The fact that the Third Parties were produced in court to confirm their respective AEICs as their own and to be cross-examined does not change this. The point remains that the Third Parties were still testifying as to what another party had told them and their testimony is being relied upon to prove the truth of that other party’s out-of-court statements. This is impermissible unless the plaintiffs establish that some exception to the hearsay rule (ie, under s 32(1)(a)-(k) of the EA) applies. The plaintiffs, however, made no attempt to do this.

  74. [36] I thus hold that the Objected Third-Party Accounts are inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth of the ex-wife’s statements in relation to the alleged terms of the Oral Agreement. That being said, there are certain statements in the Objected Third-Party Accounts that the plaintiffs are relying on for other purposes. For example, in their Statutory Declarations, some of the Third Parties gave evidence on matters which they apparently had direct personal knowledge of, ie, matters which were not simply told to them by the ex-wife. These matters relate largely to the ex-husband’s gambling activities and debts and will be discussed later below.

  75. The plaintiffs’ Notice of Objections

  76. [37] On 11 August 2020, the plaintiffs also filed a Notice of Objections to Contents in respect of the ex-husband’s AEIC. The objections are that the statements in question are:

  77. [38] The ex-husband did not respond to any of these objections. Although I agree with some of the said objections, I do not consider them to raise any particularly significant issues. As such, I will not individually address each objection but will make the following general comments:

  78. (a) As to the objections in [37(a)] and [37(d)] above, I approach them by simply discussing below what is relevant to the disputed issues raised in the pleadings. Insofar as the ex-husband’s statements were irrelevant to the said issues, they do not factor into my analysis.

  79. (b) In respect of the objections at [37(b)] above, I am cognisant of the rule against the admissibility of opinion evidence and thus do not rely on the ex-husband’s statements insofar as they constituted such evidence.

  80. (c) Similarly, as for the objections at [37(c)] above, I disregard the ex-husband’s statements in his AEIC insofar as they were in the nature of legal submissions. In any event, most of the statements in question were repeated in one form or another in his closing and reply submissions. Where this is not the case, I will point it out below.

  81. Res Judicata Issue

  82. [39] The ex-husband’s Res Judicata Defence is that the doctrine of res judicata precludes the ex-wife from raising the Agreed Terms Issue again before this Court. In support of this argument, the ex-husband elaborates as follows:

  83. (a) The Agreed Terms Issue had already been argued before the DJ in the Divorce Suit. The DJ had decided that the terms of the Oral Agreement, as alleged by the ex-wife at the time, were not sufficiently proven.

  84. (b) In the HCF Appeal, the ex-wife raised the Agreed Terms Issue again but her counsel apparently dropped the said issue in the course of the appeal.

  85. (c) It is thus clear that both the DJ and the HCF Judge have already adjudicated on the Agreed Terms Issue in the Divorce Suit. Furthermore, the ex-wife had commenced the Previous Suit to litigate this very issue but then discontinued the action. Instead, she elected to raise the said issue in the HCF Appeal (although she ultimately decided to drop it). She ought to be estopped from raising the same issue again before this Court.

  86. [40] The substance of the ex-husband’s Res Judicata Defence was set out in his AEIC but was not repeated in his submissions. This was one of the ex-husband’s arguments which the plaintiffs objected to as being a legal submission, rather than evidence as to the facts in dispute. I am, however, not minded to foreclose this entire line of argument insofar as the ex-husband did have some personal knowledge of the factual matters underlying it (ie, the proceedings in the Divorce Suit and the Previous Suit). The “legal submission” that these underlying facts gave rise to res judicata was but a small step that inexorably followed from the said facts. I will thus consider the Res Judicata Defence on its merits.

  87. [41] The plaintiffs’ response is that the ex-husband is himself precluded on the ground of issue estoppel from raising the Res Judicata Defence again before this Court. They allege that Lee J in RA 104, in allowing the OS to be converted to the present Suit, had already heard and conclusively rejected this argument. In my view, the plaintiffs’ response cannot be sustained. The simple reason is that the plaintiffs failed to point me to any part of the court’s decision in RA 104 that supposedly dealt with the Res Judicata Defence. While it appears from the parties’ submissions in RA 104 that the point was argued, there is no evidence that it was actually decided. The first and fourth requirements of issue estoppel, as set out at [43] below, are not made out.

  88. [42] In Goh Nellie v Goh Lian Teck and others [2007] 1 SLR(R) 453 (“Goh Nellie”) at [17]–[19], Sundaresh Menon JC (as he then was) explained that the doctrine of res judicata encompasses three conceptually distinct, though interrelated, strands – namely, cause of action estoppel, issue estoppel, and the “extended doctrine of res judicata” (also known as “abuse of process”). I understood the ex-husband’s Res Judicata Defence to mainly rely on the second of these strands (ie, issue estoppel).

  89. [43] The four requirements for issue estoppel, as enumerated by the Court of Appeal in Lee Tat Development Pte Ltd v Management Corporation of Strata Title Plan No 301 [2005] 3 SLR(R) 157 (at [14]-[15]), are as follows:

  90. (a) There must be a final and conclusive judgment on the merits.

  91. (b) That judgment must be of a court of competent jurisdiction.

  92. (c) There must be identity between the parties to the two actions that are being compared.

  93. (d) There must be an identity of subject-matter in the two proceedings.

  94. [45] I make the following observations about the DJ’s GD:

  95. (a) It appears from the DJ’s GD (at [3], [7] and [8]) that the Agreed Terms Issue was argued before her, although the exact terms alleged by the ex-wife in the Divorce Suit were somewhat different from the terms in the ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement. Before the DJ, the ex-wife alleged that the ex-husband had agreed to transfer his one-third share in the Mulberry Property to her in exchange for her consent to sell the Signature Park property urgently. Each of them would supposedly get an “equal share of the net sale proceeds”, save that the ex-wife was “entitled to deduct…$180K and [other sums]” from the ex-husband’s share. The ex-wife had argued that as a result of this alleged oral agreement, the Mulberry Property was no longer subject to division as a matrimonial asset. In response, the ex-husband had argued, inter alia, that the court should not take into account the ex-wife’s allegations because the said agreement was not made “in contemplation of divorce”.

  96. (b) At [9] of the DJ’s GD, the DJ “accepted [the ex-husband’s arguments], as supported by section 112 of the WC”. I note that s 112(2)(e) of the Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed) (“WC”) provides that in dividing the pool of matrimonial assets, the court may take into account “any agreement between the parties with respect to ownership and division of the matrimonial assets made in contemplation of divorce” [emphasis added]. The DJ referred to this subsection, saying that “[according to s 112(2)(e) of the WC,] any agreement between the parties with respect to ownership and division of the matrimonial assets must be made in contemplation of divorce which was not the case here” [emphasis added].

  97. (c) The DJ also found that in any case, the “evidence on paper” (which included certain text messages, a “hand-written agreement” and the parties’ affidavit evidence) was not conclusive evidence proving the terms of the oral agreement as alleged by the ex-wife in the proceedings (at [9]).

  98. (d) Lastly, the DJ ruled that “[m]ore importantly, [she] had no powers under the relevant matrimonial laws to adjudicate on such property disputes” (at [9]).

  99. [46] It is clear from [45(c)] above that the DJ had made a finding of fact on the Agreed Terms Issue. However, based on the DJ’s reasoning set out at [45(b)] and [45(d)] above, it appears that the DJ did not consider it to be within her powers to adjudicate on the said issue because the oral agreement alleged by the ex-wife did not fall under s 112(2)(e) of the WC. That being the case, I do not think that the DJ had at all intended her finding to be a “final and conclusive” judgment in respect of the Agreed Terms Issue. The first requirement of issue estoppel is hence not made out.

  100. [49] I am not convinced by the ex-husband that the present Suit amounts to an abuse of process. Contrary to his suggestion, the plaintiffs are not seeking to have this Court exercise the same jurisdiction as the Family Justice Courts under s 112 of the WC to divide the Mulberry Property as a matrimonial asset. Rather, they are simply seeking to have this Court exercise its independent jurisdiction to determine the Agreed Terms Issue in relation to the Mulberry Property. Insofar as he is arguing that this Court nonetheless ought not to exercise its jurisdiction to hear the Agreed Terms Issue again because it has already been decided in the proceedings for the Divorce Suit, this is in effect an argument founded on issue estoppel which I have dealt with above. I hence say no more on this point.

  101. [50] For completeness, the Previous Suit also does not give rise to any issue estoppel in respect of the Agreed Terms Issue. This is because after the Previous Suit was stayed by the High Court, it was discontinued by the ex-wife before a “final and conclusive judgment on the merits” was rendered. As to the brief point made by the ex-husband in relation to the Previous Suit, as set out at [39(c)] above, I cannot agree that the ex-wife’s decision to discontinue the Previous Suit is, in and of itself, an abuse of process.

  102. [51] For the foregoing reasons, I see no basis to hold that the doctrine of res judicata precludes the ex-wife from raising the Agreed Terms Issue (or otherwise maintaining the present Suit) against the ex-husband. I thus turn to the main issues in this action.

  103. Agreed Terms Issue

  104. [52] The question here is whether the terms of the Oral Agreement are as per the ex-wife’s or the ex-husband’s Pleaded Oral Agreement. The plaintiffs’ account has been set out at [13]–[15] above while the ex-husband’s is at [19]–[20] above. The ex-husband makes the following additional points:

  105. (a) It would not have made any sense for him to enter into the ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement given that his one-third share in the Mulberry Property was worth at least $840,000. This was more than the ex-wife’s half-share in the Signature Park property, which was worth a mere $675,000.

  106. (b) The ex-wife was legally represented throughout the process of selling the Signature Park property. If the terms of the Oral Agreement were as per the ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement, the ex-wife would have instructed the conveyancing solicitor at the time to draft a proper written agreement for signing. Yet, she omitted to do so. She only opted to draft the Handwritten Note and tried to force the ex-husband to sign it on 5 October 2015, almost three months after the sale. The ex-wife is a professional architect and not a naïve person. Even on the ex-wife’s own account, their marital relationship had soured years before 2015 and there was no more trust between them. In such circumstances, the ex-wife’s omission to put the ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement in writing goes to show that the said agreement was never entered into at all.

  107. [53] Having considered all the evidence and the parties’ submissions, my view is that the ex-wife’s account of the terms of the Oral Agreement is to be preferred over that of the ex-husband’s. My assessment of the evidence will broadly cover the following areas:

  108. [54] I start with the general consistency of the parties’ cases, as stated in their pleadings, AEICs, trial testimony and submissions. In her AEIC, testimony and submissions, the ex-wife generally stood by the plaintiffs’ pleaded position in respect of the ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement. On the other hand, the ex-husband seemed to vacillate between saying that on 22 June 2015 there was “no oral agreement at all” and that there was an Oral Agreement, but only on the terms following the ex-husband’s Pleaded Oral Agreement. In submissions, the plaintiffs’ counsel argued that the ex-husband was plainly being inconsistent. Although I can understand the point that counsel is making, it appears that by stating (in his AEIC, at trial and in submissions) that there was “no oral agreement at all” the ex-husband actually meant that there was no Oral Agreement on the terms alleged by the ex-wife. This is demonstrated, for example, by the fact that, during the ex-husband’s cross-examination of the ex-wife, he essentially said in the same breath that there was no “oral agreement at all” and that he and the ex-wife only agreed to the sale of the Signature Park property:

  109. [55] Understood in this manner, the ex-husband’s case was not internally inconsistent although it was somewhat confusing. Nonetheless, it must be borne in mind that the ex-husband was acting as a litigant-in-person. Generally, I accept that the ex-husband’s case throughout these proceedings was that he and the ex-wife only entered into the ex-husband’s and not the ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement.

  110. [56] Turning to the documentary correspondence between the parties, my view is that it clearly supports the existence of the ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement. Crucially, as the sale of the Signature Park property was underway in July 2015, the ex-wife and ex-husband had a WhatsApp exchange on 4 July 2015 (“4 July 2015 WhatsApp Exchange”). It is undisputed that the only property sale going on at the time was that of the Signature Park property. The said exchange is as follows:

  111. [57] I read the above exchange in the following manner:

  112. (a) In the ex-husband’s message at 10.08am, he initially stated that the buyers for the Signature Park property could be requested to issue separate cheques to the ex-wife and himself for their respective half-share in the sale proceeds. The ex-wife agreed to this in her message at 10.18am.

  113. (b) At 10.50am, the ex-husband then attempted to change the arrangement. He stated instead (in the first sentence of his message) that upon the completion of the sale, the ex-wife should be issued a cheque for $180,000 and the balance of the entire sale proceeds of the Signature Park property should be paid directly to him. The second sentence of his message continued, “Our lawyer will do the transfer of share for both properties at the same time as the sale transaction [for the Signature Park property]” [emphasis added]. As the plaintiffs point out, the ex-wife and ex-husband only owned two properties – ie, the Signature Park property and the Mulberry Property. The ex-husband does not deny this. The second sentence must therefore have been referring to these two properties.

  114. (c) At 10.53am, the ex-wife then referred to the fact that the ex-husband also supposedly owed her additional amounts from a “common fund”. It is unclear what this “common fund” was but it is not a live issue between the parties. A number of seconds later, the ex-husband agreed.

  115. (d) At 10.56am, the ex-wife added “No[,] only upon successful transfer of the house into my name” [emphasis added]. Given that the Signature Park property was to be sold to third party buyers, this message must have been referring to a transfer to the ex-wife of the ex-husband’s one-third share in the Mulberry Property.

  116. (e) At 10.58am, the ex-husband said that the ex-wife should also transfer her “share” into his name. At 10.59am, the ex-wife replied that there is no need to do so because he is “already selling it”. Immediately after, the ex-husband replies “Okay”. These messages were plainly referring to the Signature Park property.

  117. [58] Based on my above reading of the 4 July 2015 WhatsApp Exchange, it is clear to me that it strongly supports the ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement. I make the following points:

  118. (a) The ex-husband’s 10.08am message (and the ex-wife’s agreement at 10.18am) is consistent with the terms of the ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement, under which each person was to first receive his/her respective half-share of the sale proceeds of the Signature Park property. Read by themselves, the two messages are also consistent with the ex-husband’s Pleaded Oral Agreement (insofar as each person was clearly entitled to receive his/her respective half-share of the sale proceeds).

  119. (b) However, in the ex-husband’s 10.50am message, he then sought to change the arrangement relating to the distribution of the Signature Park sale proceeds. Essentially, he stated that the entire sale proceeds of the Signature Park property (less $180,000) should be paid to him immediately upon the completion of the sale. He went on to state that “Our lawyer will do the transfer of share for both properties [ie, the Mulberry Property and the Signature Park property] at the same time as the sale transaction [for the Signature Park property]”. As the plaintiffs rightly point out, under the ex-husband’s Pleaded Oral Agreement, he had no basis at all for asking to receive the entire sale proceeds of the Signature Park property (less $180,000). This message is only explicable on the ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement, insofar as the said agreement required the ex-husband to transfer his one-third share in the Mulberry Property to the ex-wife in exchange. This is supported by the second sentence of the ex-husband’s 10.50am message, where he refers to the “transfer of share” in respect of the Mulberry Property. The ex-husband’s 10.50am message is also consistent with the ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement insofar as the said agreement required that ultimately (but not immediately upon the completion of the sale), the ex-husband was to receive the entire sale proceeds of the Signature Park property (less $180,000) because the ex-wife would eventually transfer her half-share in the sale proceeds (less $180,000) to him.

  120. (c) As alluded to, however, the suggestion in the ex-husband’s 10.50am message that he should receive the entire sale proceeds of the Signature Park property (less $180,000) immediately upon the completion of the sale is at odds with the ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement. This apparent inconsistency is, however, addressed by the ex-wife’s message at 10.56am. She says “No”, and that the ex-husband would have to transfer his one-third share in the Mulberry Property to her first. In other words, the ex-wife insisted on first receiving her half-share of the sale proceeds of the Signature Park property. This brings the parties’ exchange fully in line with the ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement, insofar as under the said agreement the ex-wife was to transfer her half-share of the sale proceeds of the Signature Park property (less $180,000) to the ex-husband only after she received his one-third share in the Mulberry Property.

  121. (d) The ex-husband’s messages at 10.58am and 10.59am did not contest what the ex-wife had just said. He merely said there that the ex-wife should also transfer her “share” in the Signature Park property to his name. This was, however, quickly corrected by the ex-wife. She said there was no need for such a transfer because the property was already being sold. The ex-husband accepted this. This is again entirely consistent with the ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement (as explained in the last sentence of the preceding sub-paragraph). The said agreement does not involve the ex-wife transferring her half-share in the Signature Park property directly to the ex-husband.

  122. [59] Notwithstanding the fact that the 4 July 2015 WhatsApp Exchange considerably undermines the ex-husband’s case (in the manner just explained), the ex-husband failed to properly address it in his AEIC and at trial. Instead, during the ex-husband’s cross-examination of the ex-wife, he made the belated allegation that the message purportedly sent by him at 10.50am on 4 July 2015 had been “tampered with” and ought to be “expunged”. When he was cross-examined, the ex-husband maintained his allegation. I highlight, however, that the documents evidencing the 4 July 2015 WhatsApp Exchange were in fact disclosed by the ex-husband himself in his List of Documents, which was supported by his verifying affidavit. This was pointed out to the ex-husband when he was cross-examined by the plaintiffs’ counsel. At the time, I asked the ex-husband whether it was his position that he had submitted documents that had been tampered with. Despite maintaining his tampering allegation just moments before, the ex-husband then prevaricated and replied that he was actually saying that he could not recall exactly what he wrote but he did not believe he wrote what was stated in the message in question. When the time came for submissions, however, the ex-husband revived his dispute as to the authenticity of the 4 July 2015 WhatsApp Exchange.

  123. [60] In my view, the ex-husband is not entitled to raise this allegation given that he was the one who had disclosed the messages in question. To this end, I also point out that the 4 July 2015 WhatsApp Exchange was included in the parties’ Agreed Bundle of Documents which was expressed to have been “Agreed as to authenticity, and not as to contents”. Further, nowhere in the ex-husband’s Notice of Objections (or his AEIC) did he dispute the authenticity of the messages in the 4 July 2015 WhatsApp Exchange. To my mind, the ex-husband’s belated allegation is devoid of merit and speaks to his own cavalier attitude in making unsubstantiated claims. This effectively leaves the 4 July 2015 WhatsApp Exchange wholly unexplained by him.

  124. [61] On 30 May 2016, the ex-husband also sent the ex-wife the following WhatsApp message:

  125. [63] First, this message supports the plaintiffs’ case that the Oral Agreement was for the ex-husband to transfer his one-third share in the Mulberry Property to the ex-wife. As the plaintiff’s counsel rightly pointed out, the fact that the ex-husband had to rely on the ex-wife’s purported agreement to let him reside in the Mulberry Property suggests that he had indeed agreed to give up his share (and thus his right to reside) in the same. The reference in the message to the ex-wife allowing the ex-husband to reside in the Mulberry Property is also broadly consistent with the ex-wife’s account that she had at least considered doing so (as set out in the last sentence of [14] above). Second, the message refers to the sum of $180,000 that the ex-wife had apparently “demanded” from the ex-husband. This “demand” does not feature in the ex-husband’s version of the events on 22 June 2015 at all and is instead more consistent with the $180,000 Deduction in the ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement.

  126. [64] At trial, the ex-husband’s explanation was that there was in fact only a “discussion” for him to continue residing at the Mulberry Property and no agreement was reached. Even so, the first point I have made still stands. When the plaintiffs’ counsel put it to the ex-husband that nowhere in this 30 May 2016 message did he say that the $180,000 Deduction was denied, the ex-husband’s reply was that he “[could] not remember” and that he believed the message was tampered with. This was again an unsubstantiated allegation raised for the first time at trial, and which I refuse to entertain. It was not raised when parties filed their Lists of Documents, Notices of Objections, or the Agreed Bundle of Documents (which was expressed to have been “Agreed as to authenticity, and not as to contents”). I thus regard the ex-husband’s evidence as inadequate in addressing the 30 May 2016 message.

  127. [65] The plaintiffs further rely on the Statutory Declaration made by the Mother to prove their case. In her Statutory Declaration the Mother confirmed that in the week of 22 June 2015 the ex-wife told her about the material terms of the ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement except for the $180,000 Deduction. I note, however, that the Mother’s Statutory Declaration was made only on 8 August 2016. This was not contemporaneous at all with the Oral Agreement on 22 June 2015. It was made after the ex-husband had refused to transfer his one-third share in the Mulberry Property to the ex-wife on 5 October 2015 and also after the Divorce Suit and the Previous Suit had already been filed. At the time, the ex-wife’s and ex-husband’s dispute as to the Agreed Terms Issue had already crystallised in both a legal and non-legal form. In the circumstances, even though the Mother’s Statutory Declaration is admissible, I am unable to place much weight on it.

  128. [67] The ex-wife also produced a note given to her by the ex-husband (“Debt Note”) shortly prior to the time of the Oral Agreement in June 2015. In the Debt Note, the ex-husband recorded his debts owed to four different creditors at the time. These debts totalled $63,580 and were stated to be due on either 22 or 24 July 2015. This supported the ex-wife’s claim that the ex-husband was desperately looking for funds in the lead up to the Oral Agreement because he had debts that were going to be due soon. In fact, the ex-husband squarely admitted to this claim under cross-examination.

  129. [68] Further, it appears to me that the ex-husband was indeed the party pushing for the sale of the Signature Park property to be completed as soon as possible. On 5 July 2015, the ex-husband sent the following WhatsApp messages to the ex-wife:

  130. [69] The ex-wife did not even bother to reply to the above messages. Her explanation, which I consider to be reasonable, was that she no longer had any real interest in the sale price of the Signature Park property. This was because ultimately, the ex-wife’s share of the proceeds was capped at $180,000 assuming that the ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement was duly performed. Tangentially, the two messages above also seem inconsistent with the ex-husband’s allegation that the ex-wife had agreed in advance to a minimum sale price of $1.3m (see [20] above). Although he did not specify when the ex-wife’s agreement was procured, this was presumably around the time of the Oral Agreement on 22 June 2015. If the said agreement was procured any time prior to 5 July 2015, there would be no need for the ex-husband to seek the ex-wife’s agreement in these two messages again. At trial, the ex-husband’s account appeared to be that it was in these very two messages that he was seeking the ex-wife’s agreement to the minimum sale price of $1.3m. I have difficulty understanding how this assists him given that the ex-wife never replied to convey her agreement. His allegation was therefore left hanging in the air.

  131. [70] Subsequently, when the option to purchase the Signature Park property was granted, the option fee (of 1% of the purchase price) was paid solely to the ex-husband around 10 July 2020. The remaining deposit (being 4% of the purchase price) was also paid directly to the ex-husband on 23 July 2020 at his specific request, rather than to the conveyancing solicitor as stakeholder. Based on the ex-husband’s email correspondence with the conveyancing solicitor (in which the ex-wife was copied), as well as his WhatsApp messages with the ex-wife, it was clear that the ex-husband was the party driving the sale. This cohered with the fact that there were receipts issued by the four creditors mentioned in the Debt Note, showing that the ex-husband made repayments to them on 22, 24, and 31 July 2015. This was very shortly after the ex-husband either received the option fee or the remaining deposit for the sale of the Signature Park property. All this further substantiated the plaintiffs’ claim (at [66] above).

  132. [71] There was, however, little attempt made by the ex-husband (in his AEIC or at trial) to explain the various pieces of evidence mentioned at [66]–[70] above beyond what I have already described in those paragraphs (ie, by showing that he was living within his financial means, or by accounting for his need or use of the money he borrowed). His responses, eg, denying that he was a compulsive gambler, were generally unsupported by the evidence or otherwise unsatisfactory.

  133. [72] I am therefore inclined to believe the plaintiffs that the ex-husband was indeed under pressure from his creditors at the time he entered into the Oral Agreement. Although not a particularly crucial point, it also seems to me that the ex-husband’s debts were likely incurred as a result of his gambling activities. In such circumstances, there is an obvious reason as to why the ex-husband would give up what he claims to be his more valuable share in the Mulberry Property in exchange for the ex-wife’s share in the Signature Park property (see the ex-husband’s argument at [52(a)] above). Simply put, the ex-husband was in urgent need of funds to stave off his creditors and he needed to procure the ex-wife’s agreement to liquidate the Signature Park property. At trial, the ex-husband claimed that his debts (ie, those recorded in the Debt Note) did not necessitate his sale of the Signature Park property and had “nothing to do” with the terms of the Oral Agreement. According to him, there was “nothing wrong for [him]…to pay off the creditors once [he had] the money”. Contrary to his bare claims, however, I consider the existence of the ex-husband’s debts (especially those recorded in the Debt Note which fell due in July 2015) to be relevant in explaining his likely reason for entering into the ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement on 22 June 2015.

  134. [73] For completeness, some of the Third Parties also stated in their Statutory Declarations that they had personal knowledge of the ex-husband’s gambling habits and debts. I am, however, unable to give their evidence much weight for generally the same reasons stated at [65] above in relation to the late Mother’s Statutory Declaration (ie, the Statutory Declarations were made at a time when the dispute between the ex-wife and ex-husband had already arisen). More importantly, the basis for these Third Parties’ knowledge of the ex-husband’s gambling activities was not stated anywhere.

  135. [74] The plaintiffs also seek to rely on the Handwritten Note to prove the ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement. In my view, however, this note does not carry much independent weight. This is because the note was drafted by the ex-wife on 5 October 2015, which was not contemporaneous with the Oral Agreement that had been made some months before. The note was never signed by the ex-husband. It was in fact drafted almost immediately after the ex-husband stated to the ex-wife that he would not transfer his one-third share in the Mulberry Property to her. At that point, the dispute as to the terms of the Oral Agreement had already arisen. In such circumstances, a note unilaterally drafted by one party for the purpose of forcibly shutting down the dispute would not, by itself, be of much probative value as to the terms of the Oral Agreement.

  136. [75] That being said, taking into account the other evidence discussed (at [54]–[73]) above, I accept that the Handwritten Note and the scuffle which broke out on 5 October 2015 are at least consistent with the plaintiff’s case. Indeed, if the parties did enter into the ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement, the ex-wife’s outrage on learning that the ex-husband was reneging on his obligations would be perfectly explicable. The ex-husband points out that the Handwritten Note did not include the term relating to the $180,000 Deduction in respect of the Signature Park sale proceeds. However, I accept the ex-wife’s explanation that in the heat of the moment it slipped her mind to include the said term because her main concern was with ensuring that the ex-husband honoured his agreement to transfer his one-third share in the family home (ie, the Mulberry Property) to her.

  137. [76] As to the ex-husband’s argument at [52(b)] above, the ex-wife explained at trial that she simply did not think to put the ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement in writing. This was an arrangement between her and the ex-husband as spouses (at the time), not as commercial parties. There was no mention then of any divorce proceedings and she trusted him and did not expect him to go back on his word. She also explained that when she and the ex-husband signed the completion documents for the Signature Park property on 27 August 2015, she did mention to the conveyancing solicitor the transfer of the ex-husband’s share in the Mulberry Property to her. However, there was no discussion as to whether the ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement had to be put in writing. All that the conveyancing solicitor said was that the transfer could be carried out after the sale of the Signature Park property was complete and the parties left it at that.

  138. [77] I generally accept the ex-wife’s explanation above that she did not think it necessary to put the ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement in writing because she did not think that the ex-husband would renege on the said agreement. This was entirely plausible in the context of a private and informal conversation between husband and wife (even if their relationship was strained). The two had been married and lived together for about 34 years and had raised the Children to adulthood. The ex-wife’s shock at realising that the ex-husband had no intention of fulfilling his end of the bargain, as exemplified by her desperate attempt to get him to sign the Handwritten Note on 5 October 2015, is consistent with the reaction of someone who had not expected to be betrayed. I do not believe the ex-husband’s characterisation of the incident as a violent attempt by the ex-wife, out of nowhere, to get him to hand over his one-third share in the Mulberry Property.

  139. Enforceability Issue

  140. [79] Although I have found that the ex-wife and ex-husband entered into the ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement on 22 June 2015, there is an additional question of whether such an oral agreement is enforceable. It is to this question that I now turn.

  141. Formality Sub-Issue

  142. [80] The ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement concerns the disposition of the ex-husband’s and ex-wife’s respective interests in immovable property (ie, the Signature Park property and the Mulberry Property). That being the case, s 6 of the CLA restrains the ex-wife from bringing this Suit against the ex-husband to enforce the said agreement unless certain formality requirements are satisfied. The statutory provision provides:

  143. [81] In Joseph Mathew and another v Singh Chiranjeev and another [2010] 1 SLR 338 (“Joseph Mathew”), the Court of Appeal helpfully summarised the law in relation to s 6(d) of the CLA (at [24]–[26] and [28]–[29]):

  144. [82] As stated above, under s 6(d) of the CLA, the agreement itself need not be in signed writing. If an agreement disposing of an interest in land is purely oral, it is sufficient that the said agreement is evidenced by a signed memorandum or note in writing. The relevant requirements are as follows:

  145. (a) First, there must be a ‘sufficient’ memorandum or note containing all the material terms of the agreement relating to the identification of the parties, the description of the subject-matter, and the nature of the consideration.

  146. (b) Second, the memorandum or note must be “in writing”.

  147. (c) Third, the memorandum or note must be “signed”.

  148. [83] The ex-husband’s Formality Defence is that the above requirements have not been met. On the other hand, the plaintiffs submit that the said requirements are satisfied by the “WhatsApp messages” exchanged between the ex-wife and ex-husband. The plaintiffs did not specify which messages they were referring to or how the said messages identified the material terms of the ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement. Nonetheless, I consider the plaintiffs’ submissions to be mainly relying on the 4 July 2015 WhatsApp Exchange. The ex-wife and ex-husband did exchange several other WhatsApp messages on 5 July 2015, 16 July 2015 and 30 May 2016. However, I do not think that any of these other messages bring the plaintiffs any further than the 4 July 2015 WhatsApp Exchange already does in identifying the material terms of the ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement (see [84]–[88] below).

  149. [84] Starting with the first formality requirement, my view is that the parties to the ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement have been sufficiently identified. This is because in the 4 July 2015 WhatsApp Exchange, the ex-wife and ex-husband are each identified by their own names. Further, the said exchange must identify the material terms relating to the properties in question and the nature of the consideration, as per the ex-wife’s Pleaded Oral Agreement at [5(a)-(c)] above.

  150. [85] The properties in question are the Signature Park property and the Mulberry Property. It is true that the 4 July 2015 WhatsApp Exchange does not specifically state the address of either property. Nonetheless, as observed in Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore vols 14 and 14(2) at para 170.1212, “[w]here the contract contains a description which renders the property ascertainable, oral evidence has been admitted to complete the identification” [emphasis added]. In this vein, the two properties are sufficiently identified based on my reading of the 4 July WhatsApp Exchange as set out at [57]–[58] above. In particular, as stated earlier in [57(b)], the properties being discussed by the ex-husband and ex-wife in the 4 July 2015 WhatsApp Exchange could only have been the Signature Park property and the Mulberry Property given that these were the only properties owned by the couple. Further, as mentioned at [57(d)] above, seeing that the Signature Park property was to be sold to third party buyers, the ex-wife’s message at 10.56am must have been referring to the transfer of the ex-husband’s one-third share in the Mulberry Property to her.

  151. [86] As to the nature of the consideration to be provided by each party, I make the following findings:

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