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Grounds publishedDecided 11 Jun 2021

General Division of the High Court

National Oilwell Varco Norway AS (formerly known as Hydralift AS) v Keppel FELS Ltd (formerly known as Far East Levingston Shipbuilding Ltd)

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[2021] SGHC 124Case no. Originating Summons No 1543 of 2019 (Summons No 495 of 2020)

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  1. Factual background

  2. [1] The application before me involves three companies: the plaintiff, the defendant and a company known as A/S Hydralift (“Hydralift”). The plaintiff and Hydralift are companies incorporated in Norway. The defendant is a company incorporated in Singapore.

  3. [2] By this application, the defendant attempts to set aside leave which the plaintiff secured under s 19 of the International Arbitration Act (Cap 143A, 2002 Rev Ed) (“the Act”) to enforce an award issued in favour of Hydralift against the defendant.

  4. [3] The defendant submits that the plaintiff’s leave should be set aside on, amongst others, two independent grounds: (a) the plaintiff cannot enforce an award which the tribunal intended to and did issue in favour of Hydralift; and (b) the arbitration and the award are a nullity because Hydralift ceased to exist in 2004, well before the defendant commenced the arbitration in 2007.

  5. [4] The plaintiff rejects both of these grounds, arguing that: (a) Hydralift’s name was used in the arbitration and is used in the award as a misnomer for the plaintiff; (b) the plaintiff is entitled to enforce the award against the defendant even though the award is in favour of Hydralift; (c) Hydralift transferred all of its assets, rights and obligations to the plaintiff as a result of two mergers in 2004 (see [8] below); and (d) the plaintiff was entitled to conduct the arbitration in the name of Hydralift.

  6. [5] I have allowed the defendant’s application and set aside the plaintiff’s leave. The plaintiff has appealed against my decision. I now set out the grounds for my decision. I start by tracing the events from 1996 to 2020.

  7. The Contract, the arbitration and the award

  8. [6] In 1996, the defendant entered into a contract with Hydralift (“the Contract”). The Contract is governed by Singapore law and contains an agreement for disputes to be resolved by arbitration in Singapore.

  9. [7] A dispute under the Contract arose between the defendant and Hydralift in 1999. They attempted in vain to resolve the dispute until 2007.

  10. Hydralift ceased to exist in 2004

  11. [8] While these attempts were going on, Hydralift was struck off the Norwegian companies register in 2004 as a part of the following series of corporate events:

  12. (a) In 2002, Hydralift became a wholly owned subsidiary of a Norwegian company called National Oilwell-Hydralift AS (“NOH”).

  13. (b) On 6 October 2004, Hydralift merged with NOH.

  14. (c) Also on 6 October 2004, upon the merger with NOH taking effect, Hydralift was struck off the Norwegian companies register and ceased to exist.

  15. (d) On 15 October 2004, NOH merged with National Oilwell Norway AS. “National Oilwell Norway AS” is the former name of the plaintiff.

  16. (e) In 2010, the plaintiff changed its name from National Oilwell Norway AS to National Oilwell Varco Norway AS. “National Oilwell Varco Norway AS” is the current name of the plaintiff.

  17. [9] The defendant accepts that it was aware that Hydralift had been acquired in or around 2002, without knowing the details of the acquisition. But the defendant denies that it knew that Hydralift had merged with the plaintiff via NOH in 2004 or that Hydralift had ceased to exist as a result of the merger. The defendant’s case is that it learned only in 2019 that Hydralift had ceased to exist. That was when the plaintiff asked the defendant to satisfy the award by making payment to a bank account in the plaintiff’s name rather than in Hydralift’s name.

  18. [10] The plaintiff does not challenge this denial by the defendant directly. The plaintiff accepts that it did not disclose to the defendant that Hydralift had merged with the plaintiff and ceased to exist. The plaintiff only goes so far as to assert that it believed that the defendant was aware of the merger.

  19. The arbitration

  20. [11] In 2007, the defendant commenced the arbitration against Hydralift. The defendant claimed the equivalent of $5.5m in damages against Hydralift for breach of contract. The plaintiff instructed solicitors to defend the arbitration. In the name of Hydralift, the plaintiff defended the claim against Hydralift and counterclaimed in the name of Hydralift the equivalent of $1.2m in damages against the defendant for breach of contract.

  21. [13] The plaintiff commenced these proceedings in December 2019 under s 19 of the Act read with O 69A r 6 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed). By these proceedings, the defendant sought the court’s leave to enforce the award against the defendant in the same manner as a judgment. The plaintiff secured leave to enforce the award against the defendant in January 2020.

  22. [14] The defendant has not satisfied the award. It did not apply to have the award set aside. Instead, as is its prerogative, the defendant waited for the plaintiff to secure leave to enforce the award and now applies to set that leave aside.

  23. The proper approach on this application

  24. [15] The ultimate issue on this application is whether the plaintiff is entitled to enforce the award against the defendant under s 19 of the Act. The parties, however, adopt diametrically opposed starting points and advocate diametrically opposed approaches to this issue.

  25. [16] The defendant takes the award as its starting point and moves backwards in time through the arbitration and the mergers to the Contract and the arbitration agreement. The plaintiff, by contrast, takes the arbitration agreement and the Contract as its starting point and moves forward in time through the mergers and the arbitration to the award.

  26. [17] I consider the defendant’s starting point and approach to be correct. This is not an application to set the award aside under either s 24(b) of the Act or Art 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (“the Model Law”). If it were, I would agree with the plaintiff that the parties’ arbitration agreement is the natural starting point. This is instead an application to set aside the plaintiff’s leave to enforce the award. This application therefore springs from the award, not from the parties’ arbitration agreement or from events during the arbitration. All of that is now water under the bridge. The correct starting point for determining whether the plaintiff can enforce this award must be the award itself.

  27. [18] I therefore adopt the defendant’s starting point and approach.

  28. The questions to be answered

  29. [19] The defendant’s approach poses the following five questions for me to answer. The first four are substantive questions arising from the award. The fifth is a procedural question arising from the plaintiff’s conduct in the ex parte application for leave to enforce the award. The five questions are:

  30. (a) Did the tribunal issue the award in favour of Hydralift or in favour of the plaintiff?

  31. (b) Is the use of Hydralift’s name for the respondent in the arbitration merely a mistake as to the name of the correct respondent, ie the plaintiff?

  32. (c) Is the plaintiff estopped by representations that it made to the defendant in the arbitration and in certain related litigation (see [125]–[126] below) from denying that the respondent in the arbitration is Hydralift?

  33. (d) Does the Contract prohibit the 2004 mergers from transferring Hydralift’s rights under the Contract to the plaintiff, including its rights under the arbitration agreement in the Contract?

  34. (e) Did the plaintiff make full and frank disclosure to the court when it applied ex parte for leave to enforce the award?

  35. [20] Before I answer these five questions, I make three observations on the expert evidence before me.

  36. The expert evidence on Norwegian law

  37. [21] The effect of a merger is a matter relating to the status of the companies involved. Hydralift, NOH and the plaintiff are all companies incorporated in Norway. The effect of the 2004 mergers is therefore governed by Norwegian law (JX Holdings Inc and another v Singapore Airlines Ltd [2016] 5 SLR 988 (“JX Holdings”) at [21]–[22] and [43(b)]–[43(c)]).

  38. [22] Both parties have adduced substantial expert evidence on the applicable Norwegian law. The plaintiff’s expert is Mr Robert Sveen. The defendant’s expert is Mr Olav Fredrik Perland.

  39. [23] I make the following three observations about the expert evidence on Norwegian law before me.

  40. [24] First, it is undisputed that Hydralift ceased to exist as a legal person from the moment it was struck off the Norwegian companies register as a result of its merger with NOH taking effect on 6 October 2004.

  41. [25] Second, there is no evidence that the effect of a merger under Norwegian law is that the transferee acquires the name of the transferor. In other words, there is no evidence that Norwegian law deems any use of Hydralift’s name on and after 6 October 2004 to be a reference to NOH and, on and after 15 October 2004, to be a reference to the plaintiff (cf the effect of a change of name under s 28(6) of our Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed)).

  42. [26] Mr Sveen places great emphasis on the principle of “continuity” under Norwegian company law (see [158(b)] below). But he does not go so far as to say that the principle of continuity means that, once a merger takes effect under Norwegian law and the transferor ceases to exist, the transferor’s name is deemed by Norwegian law to point to the transferee. As soon as Hydralift ceased to exist, therefore, its name no longer pointed to a legal person.

  43. [27] Third, on the evidence before me, the only name by which the plaintiff has ever been “formerly known” is the name “National Oilwell Norway AS” (see [8(d)]–[8(e)] above). Although the plaintiff merged with NOH, the plaintiff was never “formerly known” by NOH’s name. And although NOH had merged with Hydralift a few days earlier, the plaintiff was never “formerly known” by Hydralift’s name.

  44. [28] It is therefore factually wrong for the plaintiff to describe itself, as it does in the title to these proceedings, as being “formerly known as Hydralift AS”. Hydralift never changed its name to “National Oilwell Varco Norway AS”, whether directly or by any intermediate steps. It is, of course, true that the plaintiff absorbed the entire business of Hydralift via NOH. But that is not at all the same thing as the plaintiff having been formerly known by Hydralift’s name.

  45. [29] I now turn to consider the five questions which I must answer to determine the ultimate issue on this application (see [19] above).

  46. Did the tribunal issue the award in favour of Hydralift or the plaintiff?

  47. [30] The first question the defendant poses is whether the tribunal issued the award in favour of Hydralift or in favour of the plaintiff. I find that the tribunal intended to and did issue its award in favour of Hydralift and not in favour of the plaintiff. I make that finding for two reasons.

  48. [31] First, the award describes the respondent in the arbitration as the legal person who entered into the Contract with the defendant in 1996. As a historical fact, it was Hydralift who entered into the Contract with the defendant in 1996. The plaintiff did not. The plaintiff may have acquired Hydralift’s rights and obligations under the Contract by reason of the 2004 mergers. But the mergers do not change the historical facts of 1996 or operate to bring the plaintiff within this description.

  49. [32] Second, the award describes the respondent in the arbitration as being a legal person other than the plaintiff. The award refers to the respondent as simply “the Respondents”. And the award refers to the plaintiff by its full name, “National Oilwell Varco Norway AS”. The award therefore uses a different term for each, thereby indicating that it sees the plaintiff and Hydralift as two different legal persons. This is also evident from the way the award describes Hydralift’s sole factual witness in the arbitration, one Mr Frode Jensen:

  50. [33] This is the only capacity in which the award refers to the plaintiff: as the respondent’s parent company. The award does not refer to the plaintiff as the legal person who subsequently acquired all of Hydralift’s rights and obligations under the Contract following the 2004 mergers. That is for the simple reason that the plaintiff never told the tribunal about the 2004 mergers.

  51. [34] Paragraph 133 of the award (see [32] above), coupled with the award’s description of the plaintiff only as the respondent’s parent company, establishes that the award rests on the following premises: (a) that Hydralift is the respondent in the arbitration; (b) that Hydralift is still in existence; and (c) that Hydralift is a subsidiary of the plaintiff. All of this necessarily implies that the award: (a) treats Hydralift as a different legal person from the plaintiff; and (b) does not consider the respondent in the arbitration to be the plaintiff. The award does not rest on either of the following premises: (a) that “National Oilwell Varco Norway AS” and “Hydralift AS” are alternative names for the same legal person; or (b) that the plaintiff is a transferee of Hydralift’s rights and obligations under the Contract.

  52. [35] For both of these reasons, I find that the tribunal intended to and did issue the award in favour of Hydralift, and not in favour of the plaintiff. The question which follows from this finding is whether the plaintiff is entitled to enforce an award which the tribunal intended to issue and did issue in favour of another legal person. The fact that Hydralift did not exist as a legal person even when the defendant commenced the arbitration is not material to this question.

  53. [36] Answering this question requires me to consider the proper approach to enforcement under s 19 of the Act.

  54. The mechanical approach to enforcement

  55. [37] As it stood at the time of the plaintiff’s application, s 19 of the Act read as follows:

  56. [38] Enforcement under s 19 is a two-step process. In the first step, the court grants the creditor leave to enforce the award. In the second step, the court enters judgment against the debtor on the award. It is only when judgment is entered that the award is formally put on the same legal footing as a judgment of the court.

  57. [40] Such a mechanical approach to enforcement under s 19 may appear unduly narrow and technical. But a mechanical approach is, in my view, dictated by the policy imperative of party autonomy. I say that for two reasons. First, parties who choose arbitration ought not to have any more or any fewer rights or obligations as against each other than those which have been determined in the award produced by their reference to arbitration. Second, no legal person can be held liable on an award unless it is a contracting party to the arbitration agreement invoked in the reference which has produced the award.

  58. [42] The only way to advance both of these policy imperatives is for the court to grant leave to enforce an award and to enter judgment thereafter in terms which mirror, precisely and mechanically, the dispositive terms of the award. That is why s 19 of the Act gives an enforcing court no power to vary or deviate from the dispositive terms of an award, however well-intentioned the desire to do so might be.

  59. [43] This is the position in English law. Section 101 of the English Arbitration Act 1996 (c 23) (UK) (“the English Act”) is in pari materia with s 19 of the Act. Section 101 “makes it clear that the enforcement process is a mechanistic one, and that the court may simply give a judgment which implements the award itself”: Robert Merkin, Arbitration Law (Informa UK, March 2021 release) at para 19.48. Thus, for example, an English court has no power to give leave to enforce an award in favour of or against anyone other than the parties to the arbitration (Merkin at para 19.48):

  60. [44] The authority which Merkin cites for the mechanical approach is the decision at first instance of Gross J (as he then was) in Norsk Hydro ASA v State Property Fund of Ukraine and others [2002] EWHC 2120 (Comm) (“Norsk Hydro”). In Norsk Hydro, a tribunal issued an award against a number of legal persons including a single legal person named in the arbitration and in the award as “The Republic of Ukraine, through the State Property Fund of Ukraine”. But the court granted the creditor leave to enforce the award against, inter alia, two separate legal persons: (a) the Republic of Ukraine; and (b) the State Property Fund of Ukraine.

  61. [45] Gross J set aside the leave. He explained that the approach to granting leave to enforce an award must be mechanical for two reasons. First, the mechanical approach avoids the court having to go into the merits of the tribunal’s reasoning. Second, where the question is as to the identity of the person against whom the award is to be enforced, any other approach would amount to the court using the state’s sanctions to compel a legal person who was not a party to the arbitration and who is not the subject of the award to comply with the award (at [17]–[18]):

  62. [46] I therefore accept the defendant’s submission that the court’s approach to an application under s 19 of the Act ought to be and is a mechanical one. The pure mechanical approach is subject only to four qualifications. The first is that which Gross J himself mentions in [18] of Norsk Hydro. The court may deviate from the terms of the award when granting leave to enforce it if the deviation does no more than correct a minor clerical error of the type which comes within the slip rule.

  63. [47] The second qualification is that it must be the case that the court may deviate from the terms of the award when that is necessary to take into account matters which have occurred after the tribunal issued its award and became functus officio. Examples of such matters would be a post-award change of name or a post-award assignment or other transfer of the benefit of the award.

  64. [48] The third qualification is that the court may deviate from the terms of the award with the parties’ consent to the deviation. Arbitration being founded on consent, a deviation from the terms of the award supported by the parties’ consent at the time of enforcement cannot be objectionable.

  65. [49] The fourth qualification is that, quite obviously, the court may deviate from the terms of the award if there is a statutory basis for doing so. There is at present no such statutory basis in s 19 or elsewhere in the Act (cf the express power conferred upon the English courts by s 67(3)(b) of the English Act to vary an award when disposing of a challenge as to the tribunal’s substantive jurisdiction).

  66. [50] These four qualifications must obviously be kept within narrow confines lest they undermine party autonomy and go beyond minimal curial intervention. Furthermore, a creditor will ordinarily be expected to explain why it did not seek the assistance of the tribunal itself to incorporate the terms of the desired deviation directly in the award, whether under Art 33 of the Model Law or in some other way. Subject to these points, however, I do not think that these narrow qualifications contradict the twin policy imperatives which mandate the mechanical approach.

  67. Applying the mechanical approach

  68. [51] The pure mechanical approach applies to this case. The plaintiff, quite correctly, does not suggest that any of the four qualifications I have identified has any possible application.

  69. [52] Applying the pure mechanical approach, the leave which has been granted to the plaintiff to enforce an award in favour Hydralift cannot stand. The tribunal did not intend to issue and did not issue the award in favour of the plaintiff. The leave which the plaintiff has secured goes beyond merely allowing it to enforce the award in the same manner as a judgment to the same effect.

  70. [53] The result of applying the pure mechanical approach is that only Hydralift has standing to apply for leave under s 19 to enforce the award. It is not to the point that Hydralift cannot now make any such application (unless, of course, it is restored to the Norwegian companies register under the Norwegian equivalent of s 208 of our Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (Act 40 of 2018) or of ss 344(5), 344D(1) and 344F of our Companies Act). The mere fact that Hydralift has ceased to exist does not supply a power to deviate from the dispositive terms of the award when s 19 contains no such power.

  71. [54] It is of course true that the rights against the defendant which the award has created spring from the Contract and, in particular from the arbitration agreement in it. It may also be true that the effect of the 2004 mergers has somehow been to project forward in time such that they operated in 2007 (when the arbitration commenced) and 2019 (when the award was issued) to transfer to the plaintiff the contractual benefit of the award. But even that hypothetical prospective transfer cannot supply a power to the court to vary or deviate from the dispositive terms of the award when s 19 contains no such power.

  72. [55] If Hydralift had ceased to exist after the arbitration commenced in 2007, instead of before, the plaintiff could have plausibly made the following argument. By its award issued at the end of the arbitration, the tribunal intended to benefit Hydralift, the legal person whom the defendant had named as the respondent at the start of the arbitration. But that legal person had ceased to exist while the arbitration was going on. As a result, at the enforcement stage, the court should carry the tribunal’s manifest but miscarried intent through to the transferee of Hydralift’s contractual rights, ie, the plaintiff. That could warrant the enforcing court taking a slightly broader view of the tribunal’s intent and construing the use of Hydralift’s name in the award as pointing to the plaintiff, being the ultimate transferee of Hydralift’s contractual rights. On that basis, having regard to substance over form, it could be said that the plaintiff’s leave to enforce nevertheless comes within the strictures of s 19 of the Act. I say only that this argument would have been plausible, not that it would have succeeded.

  73. [56] But on the facts of this case, the plaintiff cannot even begin to make this argument. Hydralift ceased to exist well before the defendant commenced the arbitration. This means that the tribunal’s objective intent, manifest in the award, did not miscarry. To grant leave to the plaintiff to enforce this award against the defendant would be to assume a power to enforce an award that the tribunal never intended to issue, had no reason to issue and did not in fact issue.

  74. [57] This finding is sufficient in itself to set aside the plaintiff’s leave to enforce the award. In case I am wrong on this, however, I go on to consider the four remaining questions the defendant poses.

  75. Is the use of Hydralift’s name in the arbitration a misnomer?

  76. [58] The second question the defendant poses (see [19] above) is whether the defendant’s naming of Hydralift as the respondent in the arbitration was a mere misnomer, ie, a mistake merely as to the name of the respondent.

  77. Proceedings commenced by or against a non-existent legal person are a nullity

  78. [59] The cases on misnomer follow a dismally familiar pattern. First, a party to an arbitration is misnamed. That could be because the party has changed its name and the arbitration is commenced using its former name (Unisys International Services Ltd (formerly Sperry Rand Ltd) v Eastern Counties Newspapers Ltd and Eastern Counties Newspapers Group Ltd [1991] 1 Lloyd's Rep 538 (“Unisys”)). Or it could be because the party transferred its rights under the contract to another legal person and ceased to exist (SEB Trygg Liv Holding AB v Manches and others [2006] 1 WLR 2276 (“SEB Trygg (CA)” and Harper Versicherungs AG v Indemnity Marine Assurance Co Ltd and others [2006] 2 All ER (Comm) 225 (“Harper”)). Or it could be because the party did not enter into the arbitration agreement under which the arbitration is commenced (Internaut Shipping GmbH and another v Fercometal SARL [2003] 2 All ER (Comm) 760 (“Internaut”)). Next, depending on where incentives lie, the claimant (Unisys; Harper; Internaut) or the respondent (SEB Trygg (CA)) claims that the misnaming is merely a misnomer, while the opposing party argues that it is fatal.

  79. [60] The analysis which follows raises multiple metaphysical issues. Among them are three. What does it mean to speak of “a non-existent legal person”? What does it mean to speak of an act being done by or to “a non-existent legal person”? And how can “a non-existent legal person” be a party to an arbitration? I gloss over these issues by using the phrase “non-existent legal person” to mean simply “a name which does not point to a legal person at the time the name is used”.

  80. [61] It is common ground that, where an arbitration is commenced by a non-existent legal person, the arbitration is a nullity unless the use of the name can be characterised as a misnomer. Both parties accept as authority for this proposition the decision of the English Court of Appeal SEB Trygg (CA) at [50]:

  81. [62] The proposition at [50] of SEB Trygg (CA) as framed applies to proceedings commenced by a non-existent legal person. It is possible to argue that proceedings commenced against a non-existent legal person, such as this arbitration, are in a category outside this proposition and are therefore not a nullity. The argument would proceed as follows. Proceedings commenced by a non-existent legal person, for that reason alone, lack completely any legal foundation. The defect is therefore fundamental and renders the proceedings a nullity. They are in truth, not proceedings at all. On the other hand, proceedings commenced against a non-existent legal person do not, for that reason alone, lack a legal foundation. Those proceedings lack only a target. The defect is not fundamental and does not, in itself, render the proceedings a nullity. They are in truth proceedings, albeit misdirected.

  82. [63] Despite this possible argument, I proceed on the basis that the proposition at [50] of SEB Trygg (CA) applies to proceedings which are both commenced by and against a non-existent legal person. I do so for three reasons.

  83. [64] First, the plaintiff does not advance this argument. Thus, the plaintiff accepts that if the defendant’s use of Hydralift’s name for the respondent in the arbitration cannot be characterised as a mere misnomer, the arbitration is a nullity and the award is unenforceable.

  84. [65] Second, the court in SEB Trygg (CA) stated the proposition in terms of proceedings commenced by a non-existent legal person simply because that was the factual situation in the case before it. I do not detect in SEB Trygg (CA) any intent to draw a distinction between these two categories. The lack of any such distinction is also consistent with authority, including the first instance decision from which SEB Trygg (CA) arose (SEB Trygg Holding Aktiebolag v Manches and others [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 129 (“SEB Trygg (HC)” at [28]).

  85. [66] Finally, I consider to be artificial any attempt to draw a distinction between the foundation and the target of legal proceedings. It is axiomatic that all proceedings must be brought by a legal person against a legal person. It is only if both of those conditions are satisfied that the proceedings are in truth proceedings. A name recognised by law under which one can both sue and be sued is one of the defining features of legal personality (see s 24(2) of the Building Maintenance and Strata Management Act (Cap 30C, 2008 Rev Ed), s 19(5) of the Companies Act and s 2(2) of the Minister for Finance (Incorporation) Act (Cap 183, 2014 Rev Ed)). Both of these conditions must be satisfied for proceedings to be, in truth, proceedings. If it were otherwise, the concept of legal personality would lose one of its defining and distinguishing features. That is even more true when the proceedings in question are arbitration rather than litigation. Only a legal person can be party and counterparty to an arbitration agreement. Therefore, only a legal person can assert a right to arbitrate and be subject to an obligation to arbitrate.

  86. [67] The plaintiff submits that the arbitration is not a nullity because the use of Hydralift’s name to describe the respondent in the arbitration was a mere misnomer for the plaintiff. This submission fails in limine. A finding of misnomer is not sufficient in itself to save an arbitration by or against a non-existent legal person from being a nullity. A finding of misnomer saves the arbitration only if the misnomer is corrected within the arbitration itself. That is clear from the proposition in SEB Trygg (CA) itself (at [50], cited at [61] above). The plaintiff itself accepts that this is the position in law. In this case, even if the use of Hydralift’s name for the respondent was a misnomer for the plaintiff, the plaintiff made no attempt whatsoever to have the tribunal correct the misnomer before it delivered its award. On that ground alone, this award is outside the scope of the proposition from SEB Trygg (CA) on which the plaintiff relies.

  87. [68] Furthermore, the plaintiff appears to suggest that a finding of misnomer suffices to allow the plaintiff to enforce an award which the tribunal intended to and did issue in favour of Hydralift even if the misnomer is not corrected within the arbitration. I do not accept this proposition as correct. It contradicts the mechanical approach to enforcement and the twin policies underlying that approach which I have analysed above (at [37]–[50]).

  88. [69] Nevertheless, I analyse the plaintiff’s submissions on misnomer in the terms in which they are made. The threshold issue for analysing this submission is formulating the test to determine whether the use of a name is a misnomer.

  89. The test for identifying a misnomer

  90. [70] The plaintiff submits that the test is this: who would the party standing opposite the misnamed party in the arbitration reasonably understand is the correct legal person to participate in the arbitration? Thus, if the misnamed party is the claimant, the test is whom the respondent would reasonably understand is the correct claimant. On the other hand, if the misnamed party is the respondent (as in this arbitration), the test is whom the claimant would reasonably understand is the correct respondent.

  91. [71] The defendant proposes a different test. The defendant submits that the test is this: who is the legal person that both parties would reasonably have understood the misnamed party to be?

  92. [72] There are several material differences between the parties’ formulations. The most obvious is that the plaintiff’s test is unilateral whereas the defendant’s test is bilateral. Despite these differences, both parties claim to derive their formulations from the same passage in the judgment of the English Court of Appeal in SEB Trygg (CA).

  93. [73] In SEB Trygg (CA), four corporate vendors sold shares to a purchaser. One of the vendors: (a) transferred to a subsidiary the beneficial interest in its rights under the contract of sale; (b) merged with its parent, thereby transferring to the parent its obligations under the contract and the bare right to sue on the contract; and (c) ceased to exist (at [5]–[6] and [8]). All four vendors commenced an arbitration against the purchaser (at [2]). The purchaser brought a counterclaim against the four vendors. When the purchaser discovered that one of the vendors had ceased to exist even before commencing the arbitration, it sought a declaration from the court that the tribunal had jurisdiction over the parent, and that the parent would be bound by any award on the counterclaim against the non-existent vendor (at [12]). The parent argued in response that it had never been a party to the arbitration.

  94. [74] The English Court of Appeal held that naming the non-existent vendor was a mere misnomer. It found that the purchaser, as the respondent in the arbitration, would reasonably have understood that the intended claimants were the four holders of the vendors’ rights under the contract and no other persons. Therefore, naming the non-existent vendor as a claimant was a mere misnomer for the parent, being the transferee of the non-existent vendor’s bare right to sue on the contract. This meant that the arbitration was not a nullity in so far as it involved a claim by and against the non-existent vendor (at [51]–[52] and [54]):

  95. [75] SEB Trygg (CA) thus framed the test for identifying a misnomer in the following proposition at [51]: “…who would reasonably have been understood by the party against whom the claim was asserted to be the entity bringing the claim?”. It is from this proposition that both parties have derived their formulations of the test for misnomer (see [70]–[71] above).

  96. [76] In my view, the plaintiff’s formulation is not supported by the authority of SEB Trygg (CA). In any event, it is also my view that the test as framed at [51] of SEB Trygg (CA) turns on the facts of that case and is not capable of universal application. For the reasons which follow, I consider the defendant’s formulation of the test to be more accurate, to be closer to the authority of SEB Trygg (CA) and also to be capable of universal application.

  97. [77] Every time a party is misnamed in an arbitration, there are two roles on offer: (a) there is the person who introduces the mistaken name into the arbitration; and (b) there is the person who is in a better position (as between the parties) to detect and correct the mistaken name. I use the word “person” here rather than “party” because the subject of the inquiry must extend beyond the party formally misnamed in the foundational documents of the arbitration to the person who instructs agents such as solicitors to do acts on behalf of the misnamed party in the arbitration.

  98. [78] With those two roles in mind, I make two points about SEB Trygg (CA).

  99. [79] First, both roles in SEB Trygg (CA) were played by the same person: the parent. Not only that, but the parent was also the person arguing that its own misnaming of one of the vendors rendered the arbitration a nullity, at least in part. It is exceedingly unattractive for a person to argue that a name which it has mistakenly introduced into an arbitration – being a mistake which it was and is in the better position to detect and correct – renders the arbitration in part a nullity. The English Court of Appeal identified this as one of the singular features of SEB Trygg (CA) (at [50]). That is perhaps one reason why this decision represents the high-water mark of the misnomer cases. It is not unreasonable to think that the analysis, and perhaps even the outcome, could well have been different if it had been the purchaser, rather than the parent, who argued that the arbitration was a nullity.

  100. [80] The second point I make about Seb Trygg (CA) is that the court framed the test solely from the perspective of the party opposite the misnamed party because that was a case in which one person – the parent – played both of the roles I have identified at [77] above. In that sense, there was in SEB Trygg (CA), one party (the parent) who bore all of the notional responsibility for misnaming and another party (the respondent) who bore none of that responsibility. It was therefore entirely correct and understandable for the court to frame and apply the test only from the perspective of the party opposite the misnamed party. But the same person will not always play both roles. The present case is an example. Like SEB Trygg (CA), it was the defendant (as the claimant in the arbitration) who mistakenly introduced Hydralift’s name. But unlike SEB Trygg (CA), it was the plaintiff (as the party instructing solicitors to participate in the arbitration in the name of Hydralift) who was in the better position to detect and correct the mistaken name.

  101. [81] In my view, therefore, it is wrong in principle to attempt to identify a misnomer in a situation such as this where the roles are split by looking at the misnaming solely from the perspective of the party opposite the misnamed person. This approach would result in an incomplete analysis of whether the case is indeed one of misnomer. In a case where the roles are split, the test must consider both parties’ perspectives: to whom did each party intend to refer when it used the non-existent legal person’s name in the arbitration? This is, in essence, the defendant’s formulation of the test (see [70] above).

  102. [82] There are two other conceptual reasons for rejecting the plaintiff’s formulation of the test. First, the plaintiff’s formulation incorporates an external reference point against which the intent of the party opposite the misnamed party is to be assessed. That external reference point is the concept of the “correct” legal person to participate in the arbitration. It appears to me that assessing intent against an external reference point in this way amounts to rigging the test in favour of a finding of misnomer. Conceptually, whether there is or is not a misnomer should turn only on the parties’ intent. I therefore consider the defendant’s formulation, confined as it is to an assessment of each party’s intent, to be preferable. Second, the plaintiff’s test is capable of yielding different answers over time. The “correct” legal person to participate in an arbitration can change, as a result of assignment or by transmission through mergers. This can happen even after the arbitration is well under way. It appears to me to be wrong conceptually to use a dynamic test such as the plaintiff’s to identify a misnomer. In any given arbitration, there is either a misnomer or there is no misnomer. The defendant’s formulation of the test is static, as it should be. It turns on the parties’ intent taken as a whole, assessed from the time the misnamed party is introduced into the arbitration. It can yield only one, unchanging answer.

  103. [83] In terms of applying the test for misnomer, it is common ground that the test turns on objective intent and not subjective intent. In SEB Trygg (CA), the court drew a distinction between litigation and arbitration for this purpose. As the court put it (at [50]), litigation is governed by statute (ie, the rules of court) whereas arbitration is governed by contract (ie, the parties’ arbitration agreement). Whatever may be the position in litigation, therefore, the usual objective contractual approach applies to the intent necessary to identify a misnomer in an arbitration. That is why the court (at [51]) framed the test objectively, ie, in terms of reasonableness. That is also why the court (at [52] and [54]) applied the test objectively, by examining the subject-matter of the arbitration and by scrutinising the pleadings (see the italicised passages cited at [74] above).The test thus turns in the usual contractual way on what the parties said or did, not on what they thought, believed or intended without manifesting it. Relevant evidence of objective intent therefore includes the notice of arbitration and the pleadings (Unisys at 550 and 560; SEB Trygg (CA) at [52]). Uncommunicated (ie, subjective) intent is not relevant (Unisys at 560).

  104. [84] Incorporating objective intent into the test for misnomer, it can be formulated as follows: to whom did each party objectively intend to refer when it used the misnamed party’s name in the arbitration? Because the test is both bilateral and objective, it can also be reformulated without changing its meaning as follows: to whom did each party reasonably understand the other party to be referring when it used the non-existent legal person’s name in the arbitration.

  105. [85] In applying this test from a given party’s perspective, it is legitimate to take into account that party’s knowledge or ignorance of the material facts, provided that its knowledge or ignorance was manifest. This does not amount to turning an objective test into a subjective test. The test still considers the question of intent in objective terms: solely from each party’s outward manifestations of its intent and how those outward manifestations would have been reasonably understood. But it is meaningless to assess how those outward manifestations would have been understood in a vacuum. They can only be reasonably understood in light of that party’s state of manifest knowledge or ignorance.

  106. [86] I now apply this test to the facts of this case. I start by making findings about the parties’ manifest knowledge or ignorance of the material facts. I then apply the test from each party’s perspective.

  107. The parties’ knowledge or ignorance

  108. [87] In this case, there are two facts which are material to applying the test for misnomer: (a) the fact that the 2004 mergers transferred Hydralift’s rights and obligations under the Contract to the plaintiff; and (b) the fact that Hydralift ceased to exist upon its merger with NOH taking effect. I make four findings about the parties’ knowledge or ignorance of these two material facts.

  109. [88] First, and quite obviously, I find that the plaintiff knew both of these material facts at all times. The plaintiff does not allege any mistake or oversight on its own part about these two material facts. Indeed, it cannot credibly do so.

  110. [89] Second, I find that the plaintiff’s knowledge of these facts was manifest. Who better to know where Hydralift’s rights and obligations under the Contract resided in 2007 than the plaintiff? In the absence of any contemporaneous indication that the plaintiff was in doubt about either of these material facts, the plaintiff’s knowledge of these facts was manifest.

  111. [91] Fourth, I find that the defendant’s ignorance of these facts was manifest throughout the arbitration. That is established not only by the objective points which I have set out to support my third finding, but also by the plaintiff’s conduct on behalf of Hydralift in 2015 and 2016. That is when the defendant commenced litigation related to the arbitration against various members of the tribunal and Hydralift (see [125]–[126] below). The defendant named Hydralift as a co-defendant in this litigation on the basis that Hydralift was the respondent in the arbitration and ought to be bound by the court’s decision in the litigation. As I find below (at [125]–[126]), the plaintiff actively concealed the merger and Hydralift’s dissolution from the defendant. The plaintiff would not have engaged in this extraordinary conduct if the defendant’s ignorance of these two facts was not manifest and if the plaintiff did not want the defendant to continue with the arbitration in its ignorance. In making this finding, I reject Mr Jensen’s evidence that the plaintiff “always thought that [the defendant] knew that [the plaintiff was] the successor company” of Hydralift.

  112. [92] With these findings in mind, I now apply the test at [84] above to the facts of this case from each party’s perspective. I start with the defendant’s perspective because it was the defendant who mistakenly introduced Hydralift’s name into the arbitration.

  113. The defendant’s objective intent

  114. The defendant objectively intended Hydralift’s name to refer to Hydralift

  115. [93] What I have to determine now, bearing in mind the defendant’s ignorance of the two material facts, is this: to whom did the defendant objectively intend to refer when it used Hydralift’s name in the arbitration?

  116. [94] I find that the defendant objectively intended Hydralift’s name to refer to Hydralift and not to the plaintiff. As far as the defendant knew: (a) Hydralift entered into the Contract with the defendant; (b) Hydralift continued to hold the rights and owed the obligations arising under the Contract; and (c) Hydralift continued to exist as a legal person. The defendant therefore had every reason objectively to intend Hydralift’s name to refer to Hydralift. Further, as far as the defendant knew: (a) the plaintiff was a stranger to the Contract; (b) the plaintiff was not the transferee of any of Hydralift’s rights or obligations arising under the Contract; and (c) the plaintiff was a holding company of Hydralift. The defendant therefore had no reason whatsoever objectively to intend Hydralift’s name to refer to the plaintiff.

  117. [95] The answer is the same, and for the same reasons, if I consider to whom the defendant reasonably understood the plaintiff to refer when the plaintiff used Hydralift’s name for the counterclaim in the arbitration. The defendant had every reason to understand the plaintiff’s use of Hydralift’s name as referring to Hydralift, and absolutely no reason to understand the plaintiff to be using Hydralift’s name to refer to the plaintiff.

  118. The defendant did not objectively intend Hydralift’s name to refer to whoever was then liable to the defendant on the Contract

  119. [96] To counter this finding, the plaintiff argues that the defendant must be taken objectively to have intended Hydralift’s name throughout the arbitration to refer to the plaintiff, the plaintiff being the legal person liable on the Contract and therefore the correct legal person to participate in the arbitration.

  120. [97] In support of this argument, the plaintiff relies on the parties’ correspondence after Hydralift had ceased to exist. From 2001 to 2007, the defendant and Hydralift were attempting in vain to resolve their dispute. During this period, in 2006 and again in 2007, the plaintiff’s performance guarantee under the Contract was extended by agreement. Upon each extension, the issuing bank sent a notice to the defendant confirming that the guarantee had been extended. The bank addressed each of these notices to, amongst others, “National Oilwell Norway AS (Former Hydralift ASA)”. “National Oilwell Norway AS” is the plaintiff’s former name (see [8(d)] above).

  121. [98] The defendant then echoed this description in its own correspondence with the plaintiff. Thus, several days after the defendant issued the notice of arbitration, the defendant’s inhouse counsel sent to an employee of the plaintiff an email with the subject header “B241 (Saga Varg) : KFELS vs. Hydralift (NOV)” [emphasis added]. NOV is one of the possible abbreviations for the plaintiff’s name.

  122. [99] The plaintiff submits that this description of Hydralift in the contemporaneous correspondence shows that, when the defendant chose to name Hydralift in the notice of arbitration, its objective intent was simply to bring in as the respondent in the arbitration whoever was the correct legal person then liable to the defendant under the Contract.

  123. [100] I reject this submission for three reasons.

  124. [101] First, as the defendant submits, the descriptions “National Oilwell Norway AS (Former Hydralift ASA)” and “Hydralift (NOV)” are ambiguous. They could mean, as the plaintiff submits, that Hydralift had changed its name. They could also mean, as the plaintiff submits, that Hydralift had transferred its rights and obligations under the Contract to “National Oilwell Norway AS” or to “NOV”. But they could also mean, as the defendant submits, that “National Oilwell Norway AS” or “NOV” had acquired Hydralift’s shares, with Hydralift continuing in existence as the legal person liable to the defendant for breaches of the Contract. Significantly, the issuing bank’s notices continued to describe the guarantee as having been issued “on behalf of M/S Hydralift ASA” [emphasis added]. According to the defendant, this “accorded with [the defendant’s] understanding (at the time) that Hydralift remained a live entity”.

  125. [102] Second, if the defendant indeed understood these descriptions of Hydralift in 2006 and 2007 in the way the plaintiff now submits it did, the inevitable consequence would have been the complete opposite of what the defendant actually did when it commenced the arbitration. Any reasonable claimant acting rationally with that knowledge would undoubtedly have commenced arbitration using the plaintiff’s name to refer to the respondent instead of Hydralift’s name. As I have already mentioned (at [90] above), the defendant had absolutely no incentive to commence the arbitration against any legal person other than the person it then believed to be liable on the Contract.

  126. [103] Third, the fact that the defendant chose to commence the arbitration using Hydralift’s name for the respondent despite these descriptions of Hydralift in this contemporaneous correspondence supports the defendant’s case, not the plaintiff’s. Names are treated with a relative degree of informality in correspondence, particularly between lay persons, and with a high degree of formality when commencing proceedings. The defendant’s conduct in naming Hydralift as the respondent despite Hydralift’s description in this contemporaneous correspondence suggests that the defendant made a conscious decision to reject any implication or inference arising from these descriptions and intended objectively to bring in Hydralift – and only Hydralift – as the respondent to the arbitration.

  127. [104] The plaintiff even goes so far as to generalise its proposition and submit that every claimant in every arbitration objectively intends to name as the respondent to the arbitration whoever is the correct legal person then liable to the claimant on the underlying contract. I reject this submission. It puts the analysis at such a high level of abstraction that it renders any use of a name completely otiose.

  128. [105] For this submission, the plaintiff relies on Unisys, SEB Trygg (HC) and The “Sardinia Sulcis” and “Al Tawwab” [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 201 (“The “Sardinia Sulcis””). Given that The “Sardinia Sulcis” is the case which most directly supports this submission, I focus my analysis on that case.

  129. [106] In The “Sardinia Sulcis” a plaintiff had merged and ceased to exist under Italian law before an action was commenced in its name. The defendant argued that the action was a nullity and should be struck out, having been commenced by a non-existent legal person. The English Court of Appeal held that what had happened was a mere misnomer. The plaintiff was therefore granted leave to amend its own name to reflect the name of the legal person which continued in existence after the merger.

  130. [107] Lloyd LJ (as he then was) framed the test in terms of whether there could have been any reasonable doubt as to the identity of the person intending to sue. The plaintiff adopts Lloyd LJ’s formulation and transposes it to apply to a respondent. The plaintiff’s submission is thus that the legal person “intended to be sued” in an arbitration is the legal person in whom the obligations under the contract in question are vested at the material time.

  131. [108] I do not accept the plaintiff’s reliance on The “Sardinia Sulcis” for four reasons.

  132. [109] First, the plaintiff’s submission overlooks the conceptual difficulties with the test which Lloyd LJ himself acknowledged. Thus, Lloyd LJ expressly acknowledged that the concept of “the person intending to sue” or “the person intended to be sued” could be applied at such a high level of abstraction as to render it meaningless as a test for misnomer (at 207 RHC):

  133. [110] He therefore added a gloss to the test which assesses intent by looking at how the misnamed respondent has been described, not simply at whether the person is liable for the wrong. Thus, if the legal person intended to be sued is described in the proceedings in a way which is clear, an error in stating its name will be a mere misnomer (at 207 RHC):

  134. By omitting all reference to the description of the misnamed party, the plaintiff is advocating and applying a test for misnomer for which The “Sardinia Sulcis” is not authority.

  135. [111] Second, on the test for which The “Sardinia Sulcis” is authority, the plaintiff fails. This is not a case where the defendant got the right description for the plaintiff but got its name wrong. All of the historical facts used to describe the respondent in the arbitration point only to Hydralift. None point to the plaintiff. It was Hydralift who entered into the Contract with the defendant. It was Hydralift who carried out the rectification work which was part of the subject matter of the arbitration. It was Hydralift who incurred the loss and expense which was also part of the subject matter of the arbitration. These descriptions are all matters of historical fact. The historical facts do not change when the rights and obligations under the Contract are transferred. These historical facts are incapable of describing the plaintiff.

  136. [112] Third, the test formulated in The “Sardinia Sulcis” is the test for the misnomer necessary to secure leave to amend the name of a party in ongoing proceedings, ie, before the proceedings conclude and before the court becomes functus officio. That is precisely what the plaintiff in The “Sardinia Sulcis” did. So too, in Unisys and SEB Trygg (HC), the party alleging misnomer took the issue to the court while the arbitration was ongoing and before the tribunal became functus officio. That is not the situation in this case. The plaintiff never applied during the arbitration – whether to the tribunal or (to the extent permissible) the court – to adjudicate upon the nature and effect of using Hydralift’s name for the respondent in the arbitration. Instead, the plaintiff permitted the tribunal to issue the award in favour of Hydralift and become functus officio.

  137. [113] The plaintiff complains that, following the award, the defendant refused to consent to the plaintiff taking the question of misnomer to the tribunal under Art 33 of the Model Law outside the 30-day window stipulated in that provision. But the defendant had no duty to consent. The real question is why the plaintiff did not raise this issue with the tribunal before the tribunal became functus officio or, even after it had issued the award but before the plaintiff needed the defendant’s consent to refer the issue of misnomer to the tribunal. All of this, of course, assumes that a change of this nature comes within the limited scope of Art 33 of the Model Law.

  138. [114] Finally, The “Sardinia Sulcis” was decided under the English rules of court and not in the context of arbitration. As the court pointed out in SEB Trygg, the two types of proceedings raise different considerations (see [83] above). In particular, the proper approach in arbitration to an allegation of misnomer is a contractual approach, not a statutory approach.

  139. Conclusion on the defendant’s objective intent

  140. [115] For all of the foregoing reasons, I find that the defendant objectively intended its use of Hydralift’s name, and reasonably understood the plaintiff’s use of Hydralift’s name, to refer to Hydralift and not to the plaintiff throughout the arbitration.

  141. [116] From the defendant’s perspective, therefore, there was no misnomer. Indeed, the defendant’s mistake was neither a mistake as to the name of the respondent nor as to the identity of the respondent. The defendant’s only mistake was as to one of the attributes of its intended respondent, albeit a most fundamental attribute: whether it existed as a legal person. However, it is not the defendant’s mistake as to this attribute which is relevant to whether the arbitration is a nullity. What is relevant is whether the defendant objectively intended to commence the arbitration against a non-existent legal person. From the defendant’s perspective, I have found that that was indeed its objective intent.

  142. [117] I now apply the test at [84] above from the plaintiff’s perspective.

  143. The plaintiff’s objective intent

  144. [118] What I now have to determine, bearing in mind the plaintiff’s knowledge to the extent it was manifest, is this: to whom did the plaintiff objectively intend to refer when it used Hydralift’s name in the arbitration? I find that the plaintiff’s objective intent in using Hydralift’s name in the arbitration was also to refer to Hydralift and not to refer to the plaintiff. I say that for three reasons.

  145. [119] First, the plaintiff made no mistake of any sort in using Hydralift’s name in the arbitration. Quite unlike the defendant, the plaintiff knew both material facts (see [87] above). Despite this, it used Hydralift’s name in the arbitration rather than the plaintiff’s name. The only inference I can draw is that this was a deliberate and a conscious choice. The fact that the plaintiff was merely, at first at least, following the defendant’s lead does not detract from this inference. In these circumstances, the plaintiff’s objective intent in using Hydralift’s name can only have been to refer to Hydralift and not to the plaintiff.

  146. [120] Second, the plaintiff’s own description of the respondent in its pleadings in the arbitration matches Hydralift, not the plaintiff. For example, the plaintiff’s defence and counterclaim describes the respondent in the arbitration as the legal person who carried out various rectification works on the subject matter of the Contract. These works were carried out between 1999 and 2001. As a historical fact, the legal person who carried out these works was Hydralift, not the plaintiff. Further, the defence and counterclaim also describes the respondent in the arbitration as the legal person who was put to expense and who incurred loss in investigating and rectifying the problems which formed part of the subject matter of the arbitration. As a historical fact, the legal person who was put to that expense and who incurred that loss was Hydralift, not the plaintiff. And the defence and counterclaim makes no attempt to connect Hydralift to the plaintiff by pleading that Hydralift transferred to the plaintiff its rights against the defendant under the Contract.

  147. [121] Third, the plaintiff went well beyond implied assertions to positive assertions. Thus, for example, Mr Jensen’s witness statement in the arbitration positively asserted that Hydralift was owned by National Oilwell Varco Inc:

  148. [122] It is telling that, in this passage, Mr Jensen discloses that “National Oilwell Inc. merged with Varco” in 2005 but does not disclose that Hydralift merged with NOH in 2004. Instead, he consistently uses the words “acquire” and “own” to describe the corporate changes affecting Hydralift. The only inference I can draw is that Mr Jensen was well aware of the distinction between a merger and an acquisition and chose to misdescribe Hydralift’s merger with the plaintiff via NOH.

  149. [123] In this witness statement, Mr Jensen states by a combination of explicit assertions, implied assertions and silence that Hydralift was: (a) a separate legal person from the plaintiff; (b) an existing legal person, by using the present tense in describing its ownership; and (c) the legal person who was respondent in the arbitration.

  150. [124] A more egregious positive and false assertion came in the related litigation which the defendant commenced in 2015 and 2016 in Singapore. I now describe that litigation.

  151. [127] In each of the three applications before me, one Mr Haavard Endal filed affidavits on behalf of Hydralift. In all of those affidavits, he too referred to the plaintiff having acquired the defendant rather than having merged with Hydralift via NOH. In the following passage from one of Mr Endal’s affidavits, “the 3rd Defendant” is Hydralift:

  152. [128] It could be said that Mr Endal’s assertions are ambiguous because they refer both to National Oilwell Varco Inc acquiring Hydralift (which implies that one legal person purchased the shares in the other, with two distinct legal persons continuing in existence after the purchase) and also to the plaintiff assuming Hydralift’s business portfolio (which could be read as implying a merger where a transferor merges with a transferee company and ceases to exist).

  153. [129] There is no ambiguity, however, in the most egregious of the plaintiff’s positive assertions in the related litigation. Our civil procedure requires the claimant to specify the unique identification number of the parties to the proceedings, to the extent that it can. In the four originating summonses which it filed in 2015 and 2016, the defendant left Hydralift’s unique identification number unspecified. The plaintiff’s affidavits, however, volunteered a unique identification number for Hydralift. The number the plaintiff chose to provide was not Hydralift’s historical identification number, ie the registration number which had been assigned to Hydralift in the Norwegian companies register before it was struck off in 2004. The number was also not the plaintiff’s own identification number, on the basis that any use of Hydralift’s name after it had ceased to exist now pointed to the plaintiff. Instead, the identification number which the plaintiff chose to provide for Hydralift was the identification number of a completely different legal person: a legal person who was neither the plaintiff nor Hydralift and who was entirely unrelated to the Contract and to the dispute which arose from it. This legal person was a Norwegian company originally known as Startfase 80 AS. For unexplained reasons, Startfase 80 AS changed its name to “Hydralift AS” in 2004 and used that name until 2017. The plaintiff’s conduct in volunteering this unrelated company’s identification number in the related litigation is, to say the least, extraordinary. It suggests to me a deliberate decision to prevent the defendant from discovering the 2004 mergers and the dissolution of Hydralift.

  154. [130] Even more extraordinary is the explanation which Mr Jensen now offers for this conduct. In his affidavit filed in this application, Mr Jensen says:

  155. [131] As the defendant points out, this explanation is extraordinary for two reasons. First, it establishes that the plaintiff was well aware during the arbitration and during the related litigation that Hydralift had ceased to exist and therefore no longer had its own identification number. It establishes also that the plaintiff never saw Hydralift’s name as pointing to the plaintiff, ie, as a legal synonym for the plaintiff’s name. This contradicts Mr Jensen’s evidence that the plaintiff never saw Hydralift and the plaintiff as two separate legal persons and instead conducted itself as Hydralift, albeit under a new name.

  156. [133] For all these reasons, I find that the plaintiff’s objective intent in using Hydralift’s name in the arbitration was to refer to Hydralift and not to refer to the plaintiff.

  157. [134] The plaintiff’s objective intent was therefore the same as the defendant’s (see [115] above). From both parties’ perspective, the use of Hydralift’s name in the arbitration was objectively intended to refer to no legal person other than Hydralift. I therefore reject the plaintiff’s submission that the parties’ use of Hydralift’s name in the arbitration was a misnomer for the plaintiff.

  158. [135] In fact, as with the defendant, the plaintiff made neither a mistake as to name nor a mistake as to identity when it used Hydralift’s name to refer to the respondent in the arbitration. The plaintiff was not even mistaken as to any of Hydralift’s attributes, such as whether it was a legal person.

  159. Hussmann

  160. [136] In an attempt to forestall the inevitable conclusion that the arbitration and the award are a nullity, the plaintiff relies on the case of Hussmann. In that case, the English Court of Appeal had to determine whether one Mr Pharaon was the respondent in an arbitration. He had entered into a contract using his unincorporated trading name, “Al Ameen Development and Trade Establishment” (“the Establishment”) and its registration number. He later incorporated a company named “Al Ameen Development & Trade Co” (“the Company”). But Mr Pharaon did not transfer his rights or obligations under his contract with the claimant to the Company.

  161. [137] The claimant named the Establishment as the respondent in its notice of arbitration. But the claimant’s pleading defined the respondent as follows: “Al Ameen Development & Trade Establishment (also known as Al Ameen Development & Trade Co.) a limited liability company”. This was wrong in two respects: (a) it defined the Company’s name as a legal synonym for the Establishment; and (b) it averred that the Establishment was in fact an incorporated legal person. But the registration number given in this pleaded definition was the Establishment’s registration number (at [18]–[19]). Given that the claimant’s contractual counterparty was Mr Pharaon, the Court of Appeal treated the references to the Company in the pleaded definition as a mere mistake as to name and held that the Establishment was the respondent in the arbitration (at [67]–[69]).

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