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Grounds publishedDecided 23 Jun 2021

General Division of the High Court

Reignwood International Investment (Group) Co Ltd v Opus Tiger 1 Pte Ltd and other matters

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[2021] SGHC 133Case no. Originating Summons No 1513 of 2018 (Summons No 5458 of 2019)

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] Reignwood International Investment (Group) Co Ltd (“Reignwood”) commenced these four originating summonses in December 2018. The sole defendant in each originating summons is a subsidiary of a company called Opus Offshore Ltd (“OOL”). The four defendants are somewhat unimaginatively called Opus Tiger 1 Pte Ltd (“OT1”), Opus Tiger 2 Pte Ltd, Opus Tiger 3 Pte Ltd and Opus Tiger 4 Pte Ltd. I shall refer to the defendants collectively as the “Opus Tiger Companies” and to each defendant as an “Opus Tiger Company”.

  3. [3] By four interlocutory summonses filed in October 2019, SHSY has applied under O 15 r 6(2)(b) of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) to be joined as a party to the s 216A applications. SHSY’s joinder applications present two questions which are novel, at least in Singapore. Both questions lie at the intersection of company law and procedural law. The first question is whether the intended defendant in proposed derivative proceedings may be joined under O 15 r 6(2)(b) as a party to the s 216A application which seeks leave to bring the derivative proceedings. The second question is, if so, whether the intended defendant may be so joined even after the court has granted the leave.

  4. [4] SHSY advances three arguments in support of its joinder applications. First, the intended defendant in proposed derivative proceedings has an obvious interest in the subject-matter and outcome of the s 216A application. SHSY therefore satisfies the requirements for joinder set out in O 15 r 6(2)(b). Second, even though I have already granted Reignwood the leave which it sought, the s 216A applications have not yet concluded. Therefore, I continue to have the power under O 15 r 6(2) to join SHSY as a party to the s 216A applications. Third, SHSY is not to blame for bringing its joinder applications only after I had granted leave to Reignwood. Reignwood deliberately concealed the s 216A applications from SHSY and misled SHSY to prevent SHSY from opposing them.

  5. [5] Reignwood advances two arguments in response to SHSY. First, these s 216A application concluded when I granted the leave to Reignwood or, at the very latest, when the time expired for the Opus Tiber Companies to appeal against my grant of leave. Therefore, I no longer have any power under O 15 r 6(2) to join SHSY to the s 216A applications. Second, the subject matter of the s 216A applications – leave to bring proposed derivative proceedings under s 216A(2) of the Act – raises only issues which are internal to the company and which are no concern of the intended defendant in the proposed derivative proceedings. Therefore, SHSY cannot satisfy the requirements of O 15 r 6(2)(b).

  6. [6] I have dismissed SHSY’s joinder applications. I accept SHSY’s submission that I still have the power under O 15 r 6(2)(b) to join it to the s 216A applications even though I have already granted leave to Reignwood. However, I accept Reignwood’s submission that an intended defendant in proposed derivative proceedings cannot satisfy the requirements of O 15 r 6(2)(b) simply by virtue of its status as the intended defendant.

  7. [7] Further, on the facts of this case, I decline to exercise my inherent jurisdiction, preserved by O 92 r 4, to join SHSY to the s 216A applications, or even to allow Reignwood to be heard on certain interlocutory applications which are pending in the s 216A applications (see [34] below).

  8. [8] Given that the questions which arise on SHSY’s joinder applications are novel (see [3] above), I have granted SHSY leave to appeal. I now set out the grounds for my decision.

  9. Background

  10. The parties

  11. [9] Reignwood is a company incorporated in Hong Kong. It owns 70% of the shares of OOL. Together with a related company, Reignwood is also a substantial creditor of OOL, claiming a total debt of US$79.2m.

  12. [10] OOL is a company incorporated in Bermuda. It is the ultimate holding company of a group of companies called the Opus Group. The Opus Group is an offshore drilling contractor: it owns offshore drilling rigs, constructs and owns drill ships and provides offshore drilling services to the oil and gas industry.

  13. [11] As its full name suggests (see [2] above), SHSY is a shipyard incorporated in and carrying on business in Shanghai in the People’s Republic of China (“the PRC”).

  14. [12] The Opus Tiger Companies are wholly owned subsidiaries of OOL and are all incorporated in Singapore. Each Opus Tiger Company exists for the sole purpose of owning a single drill ship to be built by SHSY. Each Opus Tiger Company therefore has its own shipbuilding contract with SHSY (the “Contracts” and each a “Contract”) under which it was to pay SHSY a substantial sum of money in exchange for a drill ship to be constructed and delivered by SHSY.

  15. OOL’s insolvency

  16. [14] Each Opus Tiger Company is entirely dependent on OOL for funding. As a result of OOL’s insolvency, the Opus Tiger Companies are therefore also themselves insolvent. Unlike OOL, the Opus Tiger Companies are not subject to any formal insolvency proceedings. But the JPLs have taken direct control of the Opus Tiger Companies by appointing their nominees to form a majority on each Opus Tiger Company’s board.

  17. [16] Soon after their appointment in February 2017, therefore, the JPLs started negotiations with the creditors of OOL and of the Opus Group. These negotiations broke down in late 2018, in large part because SHSY and Reignwood could not agree how to treat SHSY’s claim against OT1 (see [18]–[20] below) in the Opus Group’s restructuring.

  18. The Contracts

  19. [18] The earliest and most advanced of the Contracts between SHSY and the Opus Tiger Companies is the one between SHSY and OT1. The OT1 Contract obliged OT1 to pay SHSY the price of the drill ship in three instalments. OT1 was obliged to pay the third and final instalment of US$170m to SHSY when SHSY delivered the drill ship.

  20. [19] SHSY’s position is that OT1 breached the Contract in late 2016 when it failed to pay SHSY the final instalment under the OT1 Contract and failed to take delivery of the drill ship.

  21. [20] Accordingly, in December 2016, SHSY served a notice to complete on OT1. In January 2017, while the winding up petition was pending against OOL, SHSY served a notice of default on OT1. Finally, in February 2017, on the same day that the JPLs were appointed, SHSY served a notice on OT1 formally terminating the OT1 Contract.

  22. [21] In March 2017, SHSY served notices on the other three Opus Tiger Companies formally terminating their Contracts.

  23. [22] SHSY has the benefit of a guarantee from Reignwood of OT1’s obligation to pay the final instalment of US$170m under the OT1 Contract. In May 2017, SHSY served a demand on Reignwood under the guarantee requiring Reignwood to pay US$170m to SHSY.

  24. [23] In November 2018, SHSY commenced proceedings against Reignwood in the English Commercial Court to enforce SHSY’s rights under the guarantee.

  25. [24] Reignwood’s position on SHSY’s claim under the guarantee is that: (a) OT1 is not obliged to take delivery of the drill ship; (b) the final instalment payable under the OT1 Contract has not fallen due; (c) Reignwood is not liable to SHSY under the guarantee; and (d) SHSY had no right to terminate the OT1 Contract. Indeed, Reignwood’s case is that SHSY’s purported termination of all four of the Contracts is itself a repudiatory breach of the Contracts for which SHSY is obliged to compensate the Opus Tiger Companies.

  26. The relevance of the background

  27. [25] None of this background is directly relevant to SHSY’s four joinder applications which are now before me. But the background does shed light on the motivations of all those involved. In particular, the background explains the proliferation of litigation since late 2018. SHSY has commenced litigation against Reignwood in England (see [22]–[23] above). Reignwood commenced these four s 216A applications against the Opus Tiger Companies in Singapore. Reignwood has commenced the derivative proceedings against SHSY pursuant to the leave I granted to Reignwood on the s 216A applications. The Opus Tiger Companies have filed four applications seeking directions on the scope of the leave I granted (see [34] below). SHSY has filed these four joinder applications. And SHSY has, with my leave, filed four appeals against my dismissal of its joinder applications.

  28. [26] What is going on is, in effect, a battle between Reignwood (who is the single largest shareholder and claims to be a substantial creditor of OOL) and SHSY (who claims to be OOL’s single largest creditor) for influence and advantage as to how the claims and crossclaims arising from the Contracts should be treated in OOL’s insolvency and restructuring.

  29. [27] Be that as it may, SHSY’s joinder applications must be approached and will be determined only in the terms in which they have been presented to me: by applying the principles applicable to the joinder of parties to the specific context of an application under s 216A(2) of the Act.

  30. The s 216A applications

  31. [30] The deadline for the Opus Tiger Companies to appeal against the s 216A orders expired in June 2019. They did not appeal.

  32. Events leading to the joinder applications

  33. [31] In June 2019, under the authority of the s 216A orders, Reignwood started the first arbitration against SHSY in the name of OT1. In its demand for arbitration, Reignwood claimed to exercise two of OT1’s rights under or arising from the OT1 Contract: (a) it exercised OT1’s right to accept what it characterised as SHSY’s repudiatory breach of the OT1 Contract; and (b) it exercised OT1’s right under the OT1 Contract to direct SHSY to send all future notices and other communications in respect of the OT1 Contract to Reignwood’s English solicitors rather than to OT1.

  34. [33] In September 2019, Reignwood started the remaining three arbitrations against SHSY in the names of the remaining three Opus Tiger Companies. In those demands for arbitration, Reignwood did not attempt to terminate the relevant Contract for repudiatory breach. Reignwood did, however, exercise the three Opus Tiger Companies’ rights to direct SHSY to send all future notices and other communications in respect of those Contracts to Reignwood’s English solicitors rather than to the relevant Opus Tiger Company.

  35. [34] On 18 October 2019, the Opus Tiger Companies filed four applications seeking directions from the court as to whether the s 216A orders permitted Reignwood to exercise these rights on behalf of the Opus Tiger Companies. I shall refer to these applications as “the Directions Applications”.

  36. [35] On 31 October 2019, SHSY filed the four joinder applications which are now before me. SHSY’s objective in applying to be joined as a party to the s 216A applications is twofold. Its immediate objective is to be heard on the Directions Applications. But its ultimate objective is to have the s 216A orders reversed and Reignwood’s leave to commence the arbitrations revoked. It intends to achieve this by applying for an extension of time to appeal against the s 216A orders and then by pursuing such an appeal.

  37. Order 15 r 6(2)(b)

  38. [36] SHSY brings its four joinder applications under O 15 r 6(2)(b). That sub-rule provides, in so far as it is material:

  39. [38] In Ernest Ferdinand at [195], the Court of Appeal referred to r 6(2)(b)(i) as “the necessity limb” and r 6(2)(b)(ii) as “the just and convenient limb”. The Court of Appeal of course intended these terms merely to be convenient shorthand for – and not substitutes for or even summaries of – the actual statutory tests set out in each limb. Thus, as Ernest Ferdinand makes clear (at [203]–[204]), r 6(2)(b)(i) is not satisfied merely upon showing that joinder is necessary any more than r 6(2)(b)(ii) is satisfied merely upon showing that joinder is just and convenient. With that understanding, I shall use the Court of Appeal’s terms to describe these limbs.

  40. Questions to be determined

  41. [39] In light of the Ernest Ferdinand framework, SHSY’s joinder applications raise four questions:

  42. (a) Has SHSY brought these applications “at any stage of the [s 216A] proceedings”, within the meaning of O 15 r 6(2)?

  43. (b) If so, does SHSY satisfy the non-discretionary requirements of either the necessity limb or of the just and equitable limb?

  44. (c) If so, should I exercise my discretion under O 15 r 6(2)(b) to join SHSY as a party to the s 216A applications, after assessing all the factors relevant to the balance of justice?

  45. (d) If not, should I nevertheless exercise my inherent jurisdiction either: (a) to join SHSY as a party to the s 216A applications; or (b) to allow SHSY to be heard on the Directions Applications without being joined as a party?

  46. [40] Before addressing these questions in turn, I deal first with two submissions by SHSY and two points of terminology.

  47. Two of SHSY’s submissions

  48. [42] Second, SHSY suggests that a person can satisfy O 15 r 6(2)(b) merely by showing that joinder is “necessary” or that joinder is “just and convenient”. I reject this submission also. As I have pointed out (see [38] above), these terms are not a substitute for the statutory test set out in each limb of O 15 r 6(2)(b).

  49. Two preliminary points on terminology

  50. [43] I also make two preliminary points on terminology.

  51. [44] First, I shall refer to a person who makes a s 216A application as a “complainant”. I do so because that is the word which s 216A itself uses to describe a person who has standing to bring an application under that section. A complainant will typically be a member of the company who is to be the plaintiff in the derivative proceedings. But as Reignwood’s s 216A applications demonstrate, that will not always be the case (see [29] above). Section 216A(1)(c) gives standing to any person whom the court considers a “proper person” to bring a s 216A application against a company.

  52. [45] Second, the parties in the application before me use the word “intervene” and its cognate expressions throughout their written and oral submissions to describe what SHSY seeks to do by these four joinder applications. In fact, O 15 does not empower the court to allow a person to “intervene” in proceedings at all. The word “intervene” appears nowhere in O 15. What O 15 empowers the court to do is only to sever, add or join parties to proceedings.

  53. [46] There are only two kinds of person whom the Rules of Court call an “intervener”: (a) a person who secures leave under O 70 r 16(2) to intervene in an action in rem on the basis that it has an interest in the property against which that action is brought or in money representing the proceeds of sale of that property; and (b) a person who secures leave to intervene in a probate action under O 72 r 4. A person who applies to be joined as a party to proceedings under O 15 r 6(2)(b) is in neither category. That person therefore is not, strictly speaking, an “intervener”.

  54. [47] The distinction is not merely one of semantics. An intervener in the strict sense of the word does not, simply by intervening, become a party to the proceedings in which it intervenes for all purposes. A person who is joined to proceedings under O 15 r 6(2)(b) does, simply by the joinder, become a party to those proceedings for all purposes. Further, the effect of the joinder relates back to the date on which the plaintiff commenced the proceedings (see [75]–[76] below). Having said that, however, it probably does no harm to use the word “intervene” in connection with joinder under O 15 r 6(2)(b) so long as this distinction is always borne in mind.

  55. [48] I now deal with the four questions in turn.

  56. Existence of the power

  57. [51] The relevant chronology is as follows: (a) I made the s 216A orders in May 2019; (b) the time for the Opus Tiger Companies to appeal against those orders expired in June 2019; (c) the Opus Tiger Companies filed the Directions Applications on 18 October 2019; and (d) SHSY filed its joinder applications on 31 October 2019.

  58. The parties’ arguments

  59. [52] Reignwood’s argument on the first question is as follows. The s 216A applications concluded either in May 2019, when I made the s 216A orders, or at the very latest, in June 2019 when the Opus Tiger Companies allowed the time for appealing against those orders to expire without appealing. In either event, the s 216A orders were final well before October 2019, when SHSY applied to be joined. The s 216A applications have therefore concluded. SHSY has failed to bring its joinder applications “at any stage of the [s 216A] proceedings” within the meaning of O 15 r 6(2).

  60. The orthodox principle or a more liberal standard?

  61. [54] The phrase “at any stage of the proceedings” in O 15 r 6(2) has been part of the rules of civil procedure governing joinder in England, the ultimate source of our Rules of Court, since the Victorian era. The locus classicus in both England and Singapore on the interpretation of this phrase is the decision of the English Court of Appeal in The Duke of Buccleuch.

  62. [55] In The Duke of Buccleuch, a cargo-owner applied to have itself joined to an action as the plaintiff in place of its agent after the defendant had been adjudged liable for a collision at sea. Lord Esher MR (at 211) and Fry LJ (at 212) held that the judgment on liability did not conclude the action because damages had yet to be assessed. As Fry LJ put it, proceedings are not concluded so long as “anything remains to be done in the case”. The cargo-owner’s application was therefore allowed.

  63. [56] In Ernest Ferdinand, the Court of Appeal held (at [198]) that The Duke of Buccleuch represented the current state of Singapore law on the meaning of the phrase “at any stage of the proceedings” in O 15 r 6(2):

  64. The Court of Appeal called this “the orthodox Duke of Buccleuch principle” (at [201]).

  65. [59] The application of the orthodox Duke of Buccleuch principle sufficed for the Court of Appeal to dispose of the appeal in Ernest Ferdinand (at [201]). The Court of Appeal thus held that it was unnecessary for it to decide whether the more liberal standard should be recognised in Singapore law. It expressly left that issue to be “explored on an appropriate occasion” (at [201]).

  66. [60] The parties’ arguments on the first question require me to decide whether it is the orthodox Duke of Buccleuch principle or the more liberal standard which represents Singapore law on the meaning of “at any stage of the proceedings” in O 15 r 6(2). If it is the orthodox Duke of Buccleuch principle, SHSY’s joinder applications fail at the first stage of the Ernest Ferdinand inquiry (see [39(a)] above). On the other hand, if it is the more liberal standard, SHSY succeeds at the first stage.

  67. [61] As the Court of Appeal made clear in Ernest Ferdinand (at [201]), it is not the ratio of that case that Singapore law does not recognise the more liberal standard. I am therefore not obliged by stare decisis to reject SHSY’s arguments on the first question. I am conscious, however, that the Court of Appeal did express serious doubts about the desirability of recognising the more liberal standard, calling it a “bold proposition” (at [200]) with “troubling implications for finality in litigation” (at [201]).

  68. [62] Even bearing those points in mind, I consider with respect that Singapore law should recognise the more liberal standard. I say that for three reasons: (a) it is correct as a matter of statutory interpretation; (b) it permits the court to take a more pragmatic approach to joinder; and (c) it is the more conceptually appropriate approach to joinder.

  69. [63] I deal with each reason in turn.

  70. Statutory interpretation

  71. [64] The Rules of Court are subsidiary legislation. Section 9A of the Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed) establishes that the starting point for ascertaining the meaning of O 15 r 6(2)(b) is the ordinary meaning of its words, taking into account its context: Tan Cheng Bock v Attorney-General [2017] 2 SLR 850 at [37].

  72. [65] The ordinary meaning of the phrase “at any stage of the proceedings” is wide enough to accommodate the more liberal standard. The words “any stage” are words of unrestrained width. Further, the word “proceedings” is not a legal term of art. Instead, it is a protean word, whose meaning depends on the context in which it is used. I therefore turn to consider that context.

  73. [66] The purpose of O 15 r 6 is set out very clearly in O 15 r 6(1): to prevent civil proceedings from being defeated by misjoinder or nonjoinder of parties. The purpose of O 15 r 6 is therefore to give the court a wide discretion to deal with misjoinder and nonjoinder by elevating substance and pragmatism over form and technicality. In that context, the intent of the phrase “at any stage of the proceedings” is clearly to expand the scope of the power under O 15 r 6(2) so as to advance its purpose rather than to restrict that scope. In other words, the intent of the phrase is to eliminate technical arguments about whether or not proceedings are concluded rather than to generate such arguments.

  74. [67] This suggests to me that the phrase “at any stage of the proceedings” should be interpreted with an inclination towards keeping the court’s power under O 15 r 6(2) alive, to ensure that it can be exercised whenever issues of misjoinder and nonjoinder can arise. Those issues may arise whenever there remains an avenue for the parties to return to the court for its assistance even after the lis between the parties has been fully and finally determined. This in turn suggests to me that the phrase ought to be given the widest meaning which remains consistent with its ordinary meaning. That widest meaning is the more liberal standard.

  75. [68] Thus, in my view, the more liberal standard is the correct interpretation of the phrase “at any stage of the proceedings” in O 15 r 6(2) because it is the interpretation which better advances the purpose of O 15 r 6(2).

  76. Pragmatic considerations

  77. [69] That leads me to my second reason for preferring the more liberal standard: pragmatism. The case which the Court of Appeal cited in Ernest Ferdinand ([38] above) as establishing the more liberal standard in English law is the decision of Aikens J (as he then was) in C Inc plc v L [2001] Lloyd’s Rep 459 (“C Inc”).

  78. [71] Aikens J held that “the word ‘proceedings’ should be given a broad interpretation … [and] should embrace all stages of an action from the time it has been started until it becomes finally complete or moribund”. As Aikens J pointed out in C Inc (at [83]), there are any number of reasons the court’s assistance may be needed even after a final judgment has been entered:

  79. Aikens J therefore joined the husband as a party to the proceedings and granted the Mareva injunction against him.

  80. [72] I consider it almost certain that if a case like C Inc came before our courts, we would incline towards Aikens J’s pragmatic approach. On the facts of C Inc, it would be the height of technicality to decline joinder – and thereby to decline post-judgment relief against a non-party in aid of execution – simply because the court had already entered final judgment against the defendant.

  81. [73] It may be said that the application of the more liberal standard in C Inc is not surprising. C Inc was a case in which it was the plaintiff who was asking the court to join an additional defendant to the proceedings. In that sense, the outcome of C Inc is merely an application of the general principle that it is the plaintiff’s prerogative to choose its defendants (see [91] below). C Inc was not a case, such as the present, in which a person was asking to be joined as a party against the plaintiff’s wishes.

  82. [74] I do not consider that that distinction of fact makes any difference of principle. Whether joinder is consistent with or contrary to the plaintiff’s wishes has no bearing on the meaning of the phrase “at any stage of the proceedings”. Proceedings are either concluded or not concluded. The outcome of that inquiry is independent of who it is who is seeking the joinder. Thus, Aikens J interpreted the phrase in C Inc on its own, in terms independent of who was seeking the joinder. So too, O 15 r 6(2)(b) is framed in terms which are independent of who is seeking the joinder. A plaintiff’s attitude towards joinder is, at most, a factor which goes to the discretionary assessment at the second stage of the Ernest Ferdinand inquiry, not to the first stage.

  83. Conceptual considerations

  84. [76] Further, the joinder does not operate only prospectively. It relates back to the commencement of the proceedings. The joined party is therefore treated as though the plaintiff had named it as a party from the outset. The relation back can defeat the effect of an expired limitation period. It can permit a joined party to appeal against orders made before it was joined. If the joined party is out of time to appeal, it can apply for an extension of time. That is one of SHSY’s objectives in seeking to be joined to these originating summonses (see [35] above).

  85. [78] SHSY’s objectives for seeking joinder illustrate my point (see [35] above). One of its objectives is to seek an extension of time to appeal against the s 216A orders. Any such application carries precisely the “troubling implications for finality in litigation” which caused the Court of Appeal in Ernest Ferdinand (at [201]) to express grave misgivings about the more liberal standard. But SHSY would, I think, readily accept that it will face an uphill task in at least two respects: (a) on the discretionary assessment for joinder, if its only objective in seeking joinder were to reverse the s 216A orders; and (b) if it is joined, on its application to extend time to appeal against the s 216A orders. No doubt, SHSY would insist bravely that it can and will crest both hills. But that does not detract from my conceptual point as to where the strain of addressing that risk should fall.

  86. [79] The desire to prevent an unintended and undesirable consequence of joinder should not result in an artificially narrow interpretation of the phrase “any stage of the proceedings”, contrary to its ordinary meaning. After all, there is a risk even now that the Opus Tiger Companies will themselves seek an extension of time to appeal against the s 216A orders. Any such application would have equally troubling implications for finality in litigation. But those implications are addressed by the principles which govern an application for an extension of time to file an appeal. The risk that SHSY will pose to finality, if joined, is no different conceptually from the risk which the Opus Tiger Companies now pose to finality. The principles which govern the application to extend time for appeal suffice to address and mitigate that risk, whoever it is who is posing it.

  87. [80] In conclusion, for the foregoing reasons, it is my view that the more liberal standard best advances the purpose of O 15 r 6(2) by focusing the inquiry on the merits of the joinder application rather than on the technical question as to whether the proceedings in which the joinder application is made are or are not concluded. I therefore consider with respect that the more liberal standard represents Singapore law on the meaning of “at any stage of the proceedings” in O 15 r 6(2).

  88. [81] I now turn to consider how the more liberal standard should be applied to a s 216A application.

  89. Applying the more liberal standard to a s 216 application

  90. Applying the more liberal standard to the facts of this case

  91. [87] Applying the more liberal standard to the facts of this case, I hold that SHSY has brought its joinder applications “at any stage of the proceedings” as required by O 15 r 6(2). As SHSY points out, the s 216A orders expressly grant the parties liberty to apply. There is also the common law right under Lew Kiat Beng to apply for orders which are necessary to bring the derivative proceedings in a fair manner. Neither avenue will close until the arbitrations themselves conclude. As the Directions Applications themselves show, this is not merely theoretical.

  92. [88] Reignwood submits that I have: (a) addressed with finality all of the relief that Reignwood sought in its s 216A applications; and (b) disposed fully of each lis that Reignwood and the Opus Tiger Companies placed before me in the s 216A applications. All of that is, of course, true. But all of that is simply irrelevant on the more liberal standard.

  93. [89] Reignwood next submits that it is wrong in principle that SHSY should have the opportunity to reverse the s 216A orders at any time before the arbitrations against SHSY conclude. I have dealt with this objection at [75]–[78] above. This is indeed an undesirable and unintended consequence of the more liberal standard. But, for the reasons I have given, the proper place to address this consequence is not in artificially restricting the meaning of “at any stage of the proceedings”. In any event, the inquiry at the first stage is whether the s 216A proceedings have concluded, not whether an issue that SHSY wishes to contest in the s 216A proceedings upon being joined has been finally decided.

  94. [90] For these reasons, I accept that my power to join SHSY as a defendant to the s 216A applications continues to exist even though I have made final orders in Reignwood’s favour under s 216A(2) and even though the time for appealing against those orders has expired. So long as the arbitrations against SHSY have not concluded, the power of joinder remains alive. This approach puts the true focus of the court’s inquiry on a joinder application where it should lie: on the second stage of the inquiry. I therefore turn now to consider the second stage.

  95. The non-discretionary requirements

  96. [92] In addressing the second stage of the inquiry, I shall consider whether SHSY satisfies the non-discretionary requirements of each limb of O 15 r 6(2)(b) before undertaking the discretionary assessment. This approach is in accordance with the guidance of the Court of Appeal in ARW v Comptroller of Income Tax and another and another appeal [2019] 1 SLR 499 (“ARW (CA)”) at [40]–[41].

  97. [93] SHSY accepts that O 15 r 6(2)(b) does not allow a person to be joined as a party to proceedings simply because it has an interest in the proceedings. SHSY also accepts that s 216A does not give an intended defendant any right be heard on a s 216A application, let alone to be joined as a party to it. SHSY’s case for joinder therefore turns on whether SHSY can satisfy the non-discretionary requirements of one or both limbs of O 15 r 6(2)(b).

  98. [94] In my view, SHSY cannot satisfy the non-discretionary requirements of either limb. I consider that neither limb of O 15 r 6(2)(b) allows a person to be joined as a defendant to a s 216A application simply because it is the intended defendant in the proposed derivative proceedings.

  99. [95] I now analyse the non-discretionary requirements of each limb of O 15 r 6 (2)(b) in turn. It is easiest to carry out that analysis first on the assumption that SHSY had applied to be joined to the s 216A applications before I made the s 216A orders. I do that for two reasons. First, nothing in O 15 r 6(2)(b) turns on the precise stage in the proceedings at which an application for joinder is made. Second, even if I am wrong on that point, if SHSY would have been unable to satisfy the non-discretionary requirements of O 15 r 6(2)(b) before I made the s 216A orders, it cannot be better off because it applied for joinder after I made the s 216A orders.

  100. The necessity limb

  101. [96] I begin my analysis of O 15 r 6(2)(b) with the necessity limb before turning to the just and convenient limb.

  102. The scope of the necessity limb

  103. [97] A person who seeks to be joined to proceedings under the necessity limb must satisfy one of two alternative non-discretionary requirements: (a) the person must be one who ought to have been joined as a party to the proceedings; or (b) joining the person must be necessary to ensure that the court determines and adjudicates all issues in the proceedings effectually and completely.

  104. [98] The scope of the necessity limb is narrower than the scope of the just and convenient limb (see Singapore Court Practice 2021 (Jeffrey Pinsler gen ed) (LexisNexis, 2021) at para 15/6/9). A textual analysis and a comparison of the limbs reveal three ways in which this is true.

  105. [99] First, the necessity limb (as the term suggests) requires joinder to be necessary: Ernest Ferdinand ([38] above) at [203]. Necessity is implicit in the first alternative requirement (see [97] above): the person to be joined must be one whom the plaintiff ought to have joined from the outset of the proceedings, not merely one whom it was desirable for the plaintiff to have joined from the outset. Necessity is explicit in the second alternative requirement, as indicated by the word “necessary”. Joinder being necessary for one purpose is a narrower test than joinder being just and convenient for an analogous purpose.

  106. [101] Finally, only two types of persons may be joined under the necessity limb: (a) a person “who ought to have been joined as a party”; and (b) a person “whose presence before the court is necessary to ensure that all matters…may be effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon”. Thus, building on the second point, the necessity limb applies only to: (a) a person whom the plaintiff could have and should have joined as a party to the proceedings; or (b) a person who has a lis as against a party to the proceedings to be determined and adjudicated upon. In contrast, the just and convenient limb does not restrict the person to be joined in the same way: any person may be joined under the just and convenient limb so long as the non-discretionary requirements of that limb are satisfied (see [137] below).

  107. [103] I deal with each of these reasons in turn.

  108. Reignwood had no obligation to name SHSY as a defendant

  109. [106] In short, a complainant has no obligation whatsoever to name the intended defendant as a defendant to a s 216A application. SHSY is therefore not a person whom Reignwood ought to have joined to the s 216A applications. SHSY cannot satisfy the first alternative non-discretionary requirement under O 15 r 6(2)(b).

  110. There is no lis as between SHSY and the parties

  111. [107] For the reasons I have set out above, the necessity limb requires there to be a lis as between the person seeking joinder and the parties to the proceedings. In my view, there is no lis between an intended defendant and either the complainant or the company in a s 216A application.

  112. [108] The sole lis in every s 216A application is whether the court ought to sanction a deviation from a fundamental principle of company law, ie, the principle of majority rule. That fundamental principle vests: (a) ultimate control of the company in a majority of its shareholders in general meeting; and (b) executive control of the company in a majority of its directors in a board meeting. The fundamental principle of majority rule naturally extends to the shareholders’ and the directors’ decision as to whether the company should litigate and, if so, how much of the company’s resources to commit to the litigation.

  113. [109] The sole issue in a s 216A application is therefore whether (and if so on what terms under s 216A(5)) the court should sanction a deviation from the fundamental principle of majority rule by compelling the company to litigate contrary to the will of the majority of its shareholders and directors. As the Court of Appeal said in Pang Yong Hock and another v PKS Contracts Services Pte Ltd [2004] 3 SLR(R) 1 at [19], the legislative intention of s 216A is to provide “a procedure for the protection of genuinely aggrieved minority interests and for doing justice to a company while ensuring that the company’s directors are not unduly hampered in their management decisions by loud but unreasonable dissidents attempting to drive the corporate vehicle from the back seat”.

  114. [110] When a s 216A application is viewed that way, as I consider it must, the only persons who have a lis as against the complainant or the company are those persons whose concern it is whether the court should sanction a deviation from the fundamental principle of majority rule. Those persons can only be insiders to the company. These insiders will, of course, include the company’s other shareholders, whether majority or minority, and the company’s directors. The shareholders and the directors are, after all, the persons whose ultimate or executive control over the decision to litigate the complainant is inviting the court to override. In the case of shareholders, they are also the persons who will bear the ultimate economic consequence of committing the company’s resources to the litigation.

  115. [111] A “proper person” within the meaning of s 216A(1)(c) may also have a lis against the complainant or the company. A “proper person” can include a shareholder in the company’s parent company, like OOL. Such a person has equal standing with the complainant to bring a s 216A application and may well be able to demonstrate a direct concern in whether the court sanctions a deviation from the fundamental principle of majority rule. A “proper person” may also have a direct concern as to whom – as between itself and the complainant – the court should authorise to exercise control over that litigation and the extent to which the company’s resources should be committed to pursuing it.

  116. [112] The authority for this analysis is Lederer v 372116 Ontario Ltd (cob Hemispheres International Manufacturing Co) (“Lederer”) [2001] OJ No. 565. Lederer is a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal on s 246 of the Ontario Business Corporations Act, RSO 1990, c B-16 (“OBCA”). Section 246 of the OBCA is in pari materia with s 216A of the Act. Indeed, s 246 was one of the models for s 216A.

  117. [113] In Lederer, Goudge JA explained why the legislation does not contemplate an intended defendant as a participant in an application for leave to commence derivative proceedings (at [14]):

  118. [114] What is clear is that an intended defendant does not – simply because of its status as the intended defendant – have a lis of any kind against any party to a s 216A application. For the reasons I have already given, the sole issue in a s 216A application concerns only the company’s shareholders, its directors and perhaps “proper persons” within the meaning of s 216A(1)(c) of the Act. It is not necessary for the court to determine or adjudicate – as against the intended defendant – whether to sanction a deviation from the fundamental principle of majority rule.

  119. [116] If any one of these circumstances sufficed in itself to satisfy the non-discretionary requirements of the necessity limb, or indeed of the just and convenient limb, then every intended defendant has a right to be joined to every s 216A application. That would directly contradict the premise of s 216A, which is that no intended defendant is entitled even to notice of the s 216A application, let alone to be joined to it as a defendant. As Griffin J said of this argument in the decision of the Supreme Court of British Columbia in Pierce v Chalice Capital Inc [2016] BCJ No. 892 (“Pierce”) (at [55]):

  120. [117] The decision in Pierce turned on ss 232 and 233 of British Columbia’s Business Corporations Act, SBC 2002, c 57 and rr 6-2(7)(b) and 6-2(7)(c) of British Columbia’s Supreme Court Civil Rules, BC Reg 168/09. Although the British Columbian provisions are not identical to the Singapore provisions, the elements that are material to this case are sufficiently similar (see Woon’s Corporations Law (LexisNexis Singapore, 1999, April 2021 release) at para 406). The reasoning in Pierce therefore carries great force by analogy.

  121. [118] Any one of the circumstances listed at [115] above may be grounds for a court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to hear from the intended defendant on a s 216A application either as an indulgence to the intended defendant or to assist the court in achieving rectitude of decision. But none of these circumstances suffice to satisfy the non-discretionary requirements of the necessity limb.

  122. [119] The structure of s 216A shows a positive legislative intent that the intended defendant’s opportunity to present its case on the merits of the derivative proceedings will come in the derivative proceedings themselves, not on the s 216A application. As Griffin J put it in Pierce (at [89]), when a plaintiff decides to sue a person in the usual way, that person has no opportunity to prevent the plaintiff from commencing suit. It would be exceptional if that person did have such a right simply because it was an intended defendant in proposed derivative proceedings. Goudge JA said much the same in Lederer (at [17]):

  123. [120] For all of the foregoing reasons, I hold that a s 216A application creates no lis as between the intended defendant on the one hand and either the complainant or the company on the other. Accordingly, SHSY cannot satisfy the second alternative non-discretionary requirement under O 15 r 6(2)(b).

  124. No matters which the court will fail to determine and adjudicate

  125. [121] The necessity limb requires that the person to be joined be one whose “presence before the court is necessary to ensure that all matters…may be effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon”. To see whether an intended defendant satisfies this non-discretionary requirement of O 15 r 6(2)(b), it is necessary to identify the issues which a court must determine and adjudicate upon in a s 216A application.

  126. (b) Second, the complainant must establish that it has given 14 days’ notice of its intention to bring the s 216A application to the directors of the company as required by s 216A(3)(a).

  127. (c) Third, the complainant must establish that it is acting in good faith within the meaning of s 216A(3)(b) in bringing the s 216A application.

  128. (d) Fourth, the compliant must establish that bringing, prosecuting, defending or discontinuing the proposed derivative proceedings appears to be prima facie in the company’s interests within the meaning of s 216A(3)(c).

  129. [123] The merits of the proposed derivative proceedings arise on a s 216A application only as a subsidiary issue on the fourth condition precedent, ie only as one factor in establishing that the proceedings will be prima facie in the interests of the company. That is why the threshold for establishing the merits of the proposed derivative proceedings on a s 216A application is deliberately set low. The complainant need only show that the proceedings have a “legitimate or arguable basis” (see Ang Thiam Swee v Low Hian Chor [2013] 2 SLR 340 (“Ang Thiam Swee”) at [58]). A complainant need not establish that there is a serious question to be tried let alone that the intended derivative proceedings are likely to succeed.

  130. [124] SHSY submits that the fact that it has submissions and evidence to contradict Reignwood’s case in the s 216A applications on the third and fourth conditions precedent is sufficient to satisfy the non-discretionary requirements of the necessity limb. In particular, SHSY says that it is better placed than the JPLs to demonstrate to the court that Reignwood’s arbitrations against SHSY in the name of the Opus Tiger Companies lack merit.

  131. [125] I do not accept this submission. First, the third and fourth conditions precedent raise considerations which are all fundamentally internal to the company. An outsider to the company has no basis to insist on being heard on whether the complainant has standing, whether the complainant is acting in good faith or whether the proposed derivative proceedings are prima facie in the company’s interests. In Pierce, Griffin J surveyed the law in Ontario and Manitoba and then held as follows for British Columbia (at [66]):

  132. [126] It is only on the subsidiary issue as to the merits of the proposed derivative proceedings that an intended defendant can even hope to mount an argument that it satisfies the non-discretionary requirements of the necessity limb. Even then, I do not consider that an intended defendant is a person whose presence before the court is necessary on a s 216A application to ensure the effectual and complete determination and adjudication of whether the proposed derivative proceedings have sufficient merit. I say that for three reasons.

  133. [127] First, whether the proposed derivative proceedings have sufficient merit is determined on a s 216A application solely for a purpose which is specific to the s 216A application and which is of no concern to the intended defendant at all. That purpose is to ascertain whether it is prima facie in the interests of the company to compel it to commit its resources and its name to litigation contrary to the majority will of its shareholders and directors. It is for that reason that a complainant need only cross a deliberately low threshold to establish that the proposed derivative proceedings have sufficient merit. This is so that “only the most obviously unmeritorious claims will be culled”: Ang Thiam Swee at [55]. That is also why the court does not adjudicate factual disputes arising from the proposed derivative proceedings on a s 216A application: Jian Li Investments Holding Pte Ltd v Healthstats International Pte Ltd [2019] 4 SLR 825 at [50]. The court determines whether the proposed derivative proceedings have sufficient merit at a very low threshold and only for a very specific purpose.

  134. [128] This point can be illustrated by an example. Assume that a complainant exercises its prerogative and names an intended defendant as a party to a s 216A application. Assume also that the court determines – with the benefit of evidence and submissions from the intended defendant – that the proposed derivative proceedings do indeed have sufficient merit to help establish the complainant’s case on the fourth condition precedent. That determination is made purely for the purposes of and in the context of determining whether the complainant has established that condition precedent. The determination does not result in any adjudication as to the merits of the proposed derivative proceedings. It creates no issue estoppel or res judicata binding the intended defendant, the company or the complainant. The intended defendant remains at liberty in the derivative proceedings to present a full substantive defence to the claim. It even remains at liberty to apply to strike out the derivative proceedings under O 18 r 19 of the Rules of Court. That is simply because the court determined the sufficiency of the merits of proposed derivative proceedings on the s 216A application at an entirely different threshold and for an entirely different purpose.

  135. [129] Now assume instead that the court determines that the proposed derivative proceedings do not have sufficient merit. That determination too does not bind the intended defendant, the company or the complainant. It gives rise to no issue estoppel or res judicata which precludes the company from pursuing the intended defendant on the same claim in the future if the majority of the company’s shareholders or directors resolve to do so. That can happen if the shareholders and directors change. It can also happen if the shareholders and directors do not change, but simply change their minds. Once again, this is simply because the court determined the sufficiency of the merits of proposed derivative proceedings on the s 216A application at an entirely different threshold and for an entirely different purpose.

  136. [131] As I have demonstrated, there is no sense in which joining an intended defendant to a s 216A application prevents a multiplicity of proceedings. That is because the four conditions precedent (see [122] above) are not determined in a s 216A application as forensic ends in themselves but simply as the prescribed statutory rubric for enlivening the court’s jurisdiction to sanction a deviation from the fundamental principle of majority rule. Even if the intended defendant is a party to a s 216A application – whether by being named as a co-defendant from the outset or as a result of being joined under O 15 r 6(2)(b) contrary to the complainant’s wish – none of these four conditions precedent will be determined in a way which binds the intended defendant in any adjudicatory sense, as is required by the necessity limb.

  137. [132] For the reasons I have already given, the sole issue in a s 216A application – and the four conditions precedent for enlivening the court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate on that sole issue – is of no concern to an intended defendant. They are simply not matters on which an intended defendant can or should assist the court. As Griffin J put it in Pierce ([116] above) (at [75]):

  138. The effect of Reignwood initially joining SHSY as a party

  139. [133] There is one fact which may be said to complicate the analysis on the necessity limb. Even though it had no obligation to do so, Reignwood did in fact name SHSY as the second defendant in each s 216A application. Further, on 2 January 2019, Reignwood notified SHSY of the s 216A application against OT1 by pleading a reference to the application in its defence in the English litigation. However, on 3 January 2019, Reignwood applied for and secured leave to discontinue all four of the s 216A applications as against SHSY. On 7 January 2019, Reignwood filed the notices of discontinuance terminating the s 216A applications. It did so without ever having served the s 216A applications on SHSY and without informing SHSY that the applications had been discontinued.

  140. [134] SHSY, quite correctly, does not suggest that Reignwood’s discontinuance of the s 216A applications as against SHSY is in any way procedurally defective. The result of the discontinuance is therefore that SHSY ceased to be a party to the s 216A application on 7 January 2019. SHSY was, from that date, as much a stranger to the s 216A applications as any other person whom Reignwood chose not to name as a defendant to those applications.

  141. [135] The fact that Reignwood initially named SHSY as a party to the s 216A applications and then discontinued the applications against SHSY does not assist SHSY in satisfying the non-discretionary requirements of the necessity limb. Whether a person ought to have been joined as a defendant to a s 216A application is an objective question of law. Its answer does not turn on the complainant’s actual conduct in joining or omitting the intended defendant as a party to the s 216A application.

  142. [136] Having found that SHSY cannot satisfy the non-discretionary requirements of the necessity limb, I now turn to consider whether SHSY can satisfy the non-discretionary requirements of the just and convenient limb.

  143. The just and convenient limb

  144. [137] A person who seeks to be joined to proceedings under the just and convenient limb must satisfy two cumulative non-discretionary requirements: (a) there must be an issue between that person and any party to the proceedings which is connected in some way to an issue between the existing parties to the proceedings; and (b) the court must be of the opinion that it is just and convenient to determine that issue as between that person and that party as well as between the existing parties to the proceedings: Ernest Ferdinand ([38] above) at [204], citing Singapore Civil Procedure 2017, vol 1 (Foo Chee Hock gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 7th Ed, 2016) at para 15/6/8.

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