General Division of the High Court · Decided 3 June 2021
Liquidators of Ace Class Precision Engineering Pte Ltd (in members’ voluntary liquidation) v Tan Boon Hwa and others and other matters
Feedback & support[2021] SGHC 134 · Case no. Originating Summons No 736 of 2020 (Summons No 310 of 2021)
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] The applicants in Summons No 310 of 2021 (“SUM 310”), Summons No 303 of 2021 (“SUM 303”) and Summons No 330 of 2021 (“SUM 330”) were the liquidators of Ace Class Precision Engineering Pte Ltd (“Ace Class”), Qing Lian Precision Pte Ltd (“Qing Lian”) and Apex Precision Engineering Pte Ltd (“Apex”). Mr Lau Chin Huat (“Mr Lau”) and Mr Yeo Boon Keong of Technic Inter-Asia Pte Ltd were appointed as the joint and several liquidators of Ace Class, Qing Lian and Apex on 30 March 2020. I shall refer to the applicants collectively as the “Liquidators” and Ace Class, Qing Lian and Apex collectively as the “Companies”. The first respondent in each summons was a director of one of the Companies: Mr Tan Boon Hwa (a director of Ace Class), Mr Sim Chee Wei (a director of Qing Lian) and Mr Hay Chiak Buang (a director of Apex). The second respondent in each summons was Ms Chin Suling (or Ms Chin Shuling) (“Ms Chin”), an accounts executive employed by Yangbum Engineering Pte Ltd (“Yangbum”) whose duties included book-keeping for the Companies. The third respondent in each summons was Mr Su Desheng Jacob (“Mr Su”), a human resource and administrative manager employed by Yangbum. The fourth respondent in SUM 310 was Alan Ng & Partners (“ANP”), an independent contractor that provided accounting and filing services to Ace Class. The Liquidators and ANP had reached an amicable settlement before the hearing. Thus, it was unnecessary for me to address the issues concerning ANP. I shall, therefore, refer to the first to third respondents in the summonses collectively as the “Respondents”.
- [2]
[2] On 29 July 2020, the Liquidators filed Originating Summons No 736 of 2020 (“OS 736”), Originating Summons No 737 of 2020 (“OS 737”) and Originating Summons No 738 of 2020 (“OS 738”) to seek the orders of the court for the Respondents to deliver up and surrender all monies, property, books, papers and other documents belonging and/or relating to the Companies, which were in their possession, custody or power, to the Liquidators (the “s 313(5) Applications”). These applications were made under s 313(5) of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) (the “Companies Act”) and not s 188(5) of the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (Act 40 of 2018) (the “IRDA”) because the latter came into force on 30 July 2020, one day after the Liquidators’ s 313(5) Applications were filed. Section 313(5) of the Companies Act was repealed and re-enacted as s 188(5) of the IRDA. On 2 October 2020, I made the orders under s 313(5) sought by the Liquidators (the “October 2020 Orders”). On 20 January 2021, the Liquidators filed SUM 310, SUM 303 and SUM 330, to apply for orders for the Respondents to comply with the October 2020 Orders within five days from the date of the orders sought.
- [3]
[3] The plaintiffs in Originating Summons No 1061 of 2020 (“OS 1061”) were Yangbum and Mr Loong Soo Min (“Mr Loong”). The first and second defendants were the Liquidators and the third to fifth defendants were the Companies. In OS 1061, Yangbum and Mr Loong applied for the removal of the Liquidators as the liquidators of the Companies. Yangbum and Mr Loong also applied for one Mr Lin Yueh Hung and one Mr Ng Kian Kiat of RSM Corporate Advisory Pte Ltd to replace the Liquidators.
- [4]
[4] On 5 April 2021, I heard SUM 310, SUM 303 and SUM 330 together with OS 1061. After having considered the parties’ written submissions and the oral submissions at the hearing, I granted the Liquidators’ applications in SUM 310, SUM 303 and SUM 330, save that I allowed the Respondents four weeks (instead of five days) from the date of the orders to produce the documents as requested by the Liquidators. I dismissed Yangbum and Mr Loong’s application for the removal of the Liquidators in OS 1061. At the conclusion of the hearing, I gave brief reasons for my decision.
- [5]
[5] The Respondents in SUM 310, SUM 303 and SUM 330, and Yangbum and Mr Loong in OS 1061, have appealed against my decision. I now set out my reasons in full.
Background to the dispute
Relationship between Mr Loong and Ms Liang
- [6]
[6] Mr Loong married Ms Liang Xihong (“Ms Liang”) in 1994. In 1997, Yangbum was incorporated with Mr Loong and Ms Liang each holding 50% of its shares. Mr Loong was Yangbum’s sole director. Subsequently, Mr Loong and Ms Liang obtained a divorce in 2014 and Ms Liang married one Mr Zhang Shengqiang (“Mr Zhang”) in 2015.
The Companies
- [7]
[7] Six companies were incorporated to undertake subcontract work exclusively for Yangbum. These included Ace Class and Apex (incorporated on 1 July 2008) and Qing Lian (incorporated on 8 October 2008). The registered offices of the Companies were located in the same building as Yangbum’s registered office.
- [8]
[8] Ms Liang was the sole registered shareholder of the Companies. However, Mr Loong claimed to be the beneficial owner of the Companies. The issue of whether Mr Loong is the beneficial owner of the Companies is the subject of separate proceedings in Suit No 345 of 2020 (“S 345”), which are still ongoing.
- [9]
[9] On 12 March 2020, Ms Liang and Mr Zhang were appointed as directors of the Companies. The other directors of the Companies were the first respondents in SUM 310, SUM 303 and SUM 330. These other directors had been appointed by Mr Loong and took instructions from him.
Liquidation of the Companies
- [10]
[10] On 30 March 2020, extraordinary general meetings of the Companies were held and special resolutions were passed placing the Companies in members’ voluntary liquidation.
- [11]
[11] Yangbum was the most significant creditor of each of the Companies. On 23 October 2020, Yangbum submitted proofs of debt of $4,144,448.40 for Ace Class, $3,257,258.71 for Qing Lian and $3,483,440.64 for Apex. The provisional debt owed by the Companies to Yangbum, therefore, amounted to more than $10.8m. However, the Liquidators had yet to adjudicate these proofs of debt.
- [12]
[12] Following their appointment, the Liquidators made repeated requests for the delivery up and surrender of all monies, property, books, papers and other documents belonging and relating to the Companies, and which were in the Respondents’ possession, custody or power. However, these were not forthcoming. On 29 July 2020, the Liquidators filed the s 313(5) Applications (OS 736, OS 737 and OS 738) seeking orders for the delivery up and surrender of these items. Section 313(5) of the Companies Act, which was repealed and re-enacted as s 188(5) of the IRDA) with effect from 30 July 2020, provided as follows:
- [14]
[14] Subsequently, on 21 October 2020, Yangbum and Mr Loong applied for the removal of the Liquidators pursuant to s 302 of the Companies Act (now s 174 of the IRDA), on the ground that this would be in the real, substantial and honest interest of the liquidation of the Companies and would advance the purposes for which they were appointed.
- [15]
[15] At the time of the hearing of the s 313(5) Applications, the Liquidators had not received a complete set of the Companies’ books and assets. Further, although some hard copy documents had been delivered to the Liquidators’ office, these documents were incomplete and soft copies were not provided. Consequently, on 20 January 2021, the Liquidators applied under O 45 r 6 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (the “ROC”) for orders that the Respondents comply with the October 2020 Orders within five days from the date of the orders.
The parties’ cases
SUM 310, SUM 303 and SUM 330
The Liquidators’ case
- [16]
[16] The Liquidators contended that, notwithstanding the clear terms of the October 2020 Orders, the Respondents had contumeliously failed, neglected and/or refused to comply with them. The Liquidators emphasised that six months had passed since the October 2020 Orders, yet they had not received a complete set of all the Companies’ books and assets from the Respondents or Yangbum.
- [17]
[17] In these circumstances, the Liquidators submitted that it would be in the interests of the liquidation process of the Companies for the court to impose a tight deadline for the Respondents to comply with the October 2020 Orders. The Respondents had already been given plenty of time to comply with the Liquidators’ requests for the Companies’ books and assets pursuant to the October 2020 Orders.
The Respondents’ case
- [18]
[18] The Respondents characterised the Liquidators’ requests for the Companies’ books and assets as a “witch-hunt” against Mr Loong and Yangbum’s affiliates, serving “no purpose other than to vex and oppress, rather than to further the liquidation process”. According to the Respondents, there was no relevant contumelious conduct that would warrant granting the Liquidators’ applications.
- [19]
[19] The Respondents further submitted that if the court was, nevertheless, minded to grant the orders sought by the Liquidators, the timeframe for compliance with the October 2020 Orders should be four months. The Respondents argued that the timeframe of five days proposed by the Liquidators would be “unrealistic and oppressive” to the Respondents and Yangbum.
OS 1061
Yangbum and Mr Loong’s case
- [20]
[20] Yangbum and Mr Loong submitted that they had a legitimate interest in the removal of the Liquidators under s 302 of the Companies Act (now s 174 of the IRDA). As Yangbum was a major creditor of the Companies for $10.8m and Mr Loong claimed to be the beneficial owner of the Companies, they argued that they had the greatest interest in the liquidation of the Companies.
- [21]
[21] Yangbum and Mr Loong further submitted that the Liquidators should be removed as they were clearly biased in favour of Ms Liang. This submission was based on seven categories of allegations:
(a) that one of the Liquidators had trespassed into Yangbum’s office together with Ms Liang (the “Trespass Allegation”);
(b) that the Liquidators had a prior professional relationship with Ms Liang as her accountants (the “Prior Relationship Allegation”);
(c) that the Liquidators irrationally targeted Mr Loong and his affiliates at Yangbum for documents while not filing any similar applications against Ms Liang (the “Irrational Targeting Allegation”);
(d) that the Liquidators placed undue reliance on the declarations of solvency made by Ms Liang and Mr Zhang (the “Declarations of Solvency Allegation”);
(e) that the Liquidators refused to withdraw their consent to act as the Companies’ liquidators after being informed of Mr Loong’s claim to be the beneficial owner of the Companies (the “Refusal to Withdraw Allegation”);
(f) that the Liquidators threatened to terminate the employment of all of the Companies’ employees (the “Termination of Employees Allegation”); and
(g) that the Liquidators made no effort to adjudicate Yangbum’s proofs of debt (the “Proofs of Debt Allegation”).
- [22]
[22] In addition, Yangbum and Mr Loong submitted that there were no significant practical obstacles to the removal of the Liquidators.
The Liquidators’ case
- [23]
[23] The Liquidators submitted that Yangbum and Mr Loong did not have standing to apply for their removal under s 302 of the Companies Act (now s 174 of the IRDA). They argued that, in a solvent liquidation, the only parties with an interest in the ultimate distribution of the company’s assets were the contributories of the company, ie, the shareholders. As the Companies were in solvent liquidation, Yangbum (as a purported creditor) had no standing to apply for the removal of the Liquidators. Further, even if Mr Loong were to succeed in establishing that he had a beneficial interest in the Companies in S 345, a beneficial owner of a company’s shares was neither a creditor nor a contributory of a company within the definition in s 4(1) of the Companies Act. As Mr Loong was neither a registered shareholder of the Companies, nor reflected as a shareholder, director or beneficial owner in any of the Companies’ financial statements, he had no real interest in the liquidation of the Companies.
- [24]
[24] With regard to the grounds for their removal, the Liquidators denied each and every allegation of bias made by Yangbum and Mr Loong. The Liquidators contended that they had acted to advance the interests and purpose of the liquidation of the Companies from the outset of their appointment. The acts relied on by Yangbum and Mr Loong to allege bias on the part of the Liquidators did not demonstrate actual bias or create a reasonable perception of bias in the mind of a rational creditor or contributory. On the contrary, the Liquidators argued that the application for their removal was merely another attempt by Yangbum, Mr Loong and the Respondents to frustrate the liquidation of the Companies.
Issues to be determined
- [25]
[25] Two issues arose for my determination in respect of SUM 310, SUM 303 and SUM 330:
(b) If so, what was the appropriate timeframe for the Respondents to comply with the October 2020 Orders?
- [26]
[26] In respect of OS 1061, there were two issues for my determination:
(a) What was the applicable test to determine whether an applicant had standing to apply for the removal of a liquidator? In view of this, did Yangbum and Mr Loong have standing to apply for the removal of the Liquidators?
(b) Did Yangbum and Mr Loong show cause for the removal of the Liquidators?
- [27]
[27] I shall address each of these issues in turn.
My decision
SUM 310, SUM 303 and SUM 330
The applicable law
The parties’ submissions
(1) The Liquidators’ submissions
- [33]
[33] The Liquidators relied on the following facts to demonstrate the Respondents’ contumelious conduct vis-à-vis the October 2020 Orders:
(a) The Liquidators wrote to the Respondents as early as 5 October 2020 and on four occasions since the making of the October 2020 Orders to remind the Respondents of their obligations to deliver up and surrender the Companies’ books and assets. Yet, the Respondents failed, refused or neglected to deliver a complete set of all of the Companies’ books and assets to the Liquidators.
(b) The documents that were delivered by the Respondents to the Liquidators were incomplete and deliberately provided in a selective, haphazard and piecemeal manner to frustrate and delay the Liquidators’ work. Instead of providing the Liquidators with the soft copies of the requested documents, the Respondents chose to generate and print hard copies of each and every document. This demonstrated the Respondents’ lack of good faith in cooperating with the Liquidators towards the fulfilment of the October 2020 Orders, and pointed towards the Respondents’ (and Yangbum’s) ultimate objective of stifling the liquidation of the Companies.
(c) Although three months had passed since the filing of these applications in January 2021 and six months had passed since the making of the October 2020 Orders, the Respondents simply sat on their hands and came up with further excuses to delay the delivery of the Companies’ books and assets to the Liquidators.
(d) Notwithstanding my findings in relation to s 313(5) of the Companies Act and the October 2020 Orders, the Respondents insisted on maintaining the position that the Companies’ books and assets are not in their possession or power. Instead, the Respondents claimed that these books and assets were only in Yangbum’s possession, control or power and that they could only act in accordance with Yangbum’s instructions. This was a rehash of the arguments that the Respondents had raised, unsuccessfully, at the hearing of the s 313(5) Applications on 2 October 2020.
- [34]
[34] In view of the above, the Liquidators emphasised that allowing the Respondents to continue their contumelious breach of the October 2020 Orders would be extremely detrimental to the liquidation process of the Companies.
(2) The Respondents’ submissions
- [36]
[36] On the other hand, the Respondents contended that there was no relevant contumelious conduct on their part that would warrant granting the Liquidators’ applications.
- [37]
[37] First, the Respondents submitted that the Liquidators took a targeted approach from the outset whereby they badgered Mr Loong and his affiliates for documents under the guise of attempting to administer the liquidation, while giving Ms Liang and her affiliates a “free pass”. The Respondents alleged that, despite being aware that Ms Liang had wrongfully carted away around 30 boxes of documents belonging to Yangbum in March 2019, the Liquidators were content to simply target the Respondents. These allegations of bias on the part of the Liquidators formed the subject of OS 1061, which I shall deal with later in these grounds of decision. The Respondents submitted that when the Liquidators’ applications were viewed against this background, it was clear that these applications were brought for the extraneous purpose of vexing and oppressing the Respondents and Yangbum.
- [38]
[38] Secondly, the Respondents submitted that the Companies’ sole purpose was to undertake subcontract work for Yangbum. Yangbum had already filed proofs of debt amounting to $10.8m. The Liquidators’ key tasks were to adjudicate Yangbum’s proofs of debt and to value the fixed assets of the Companies for the purpose of liquidating them. It was unclear how the documents sought by the Liquidators related to these key tasks.
- [39]
[39] Thirdly, the Respondents submitted that they acted reasonably and did their utmost to hand over all documents to the Liquidators. The Respondents did not have possession, custody or power over the Companies’ records, which were instead in Yangbum’s possession. This was because the administrative, human resource and book-keeping functions of the Companies were outsourced to Yangbum and entirely undertaken by Yangbum employees. In particular, although Ms Chin and Mr Su (the second and third respondents) were involved in maintaining the Companies’ financial and human resource records, this work was done purely in their capacities as employees of Yangbum. They were never employees of the Companies and they could access the Companies’ books and assets only to the extent necessary to carry out Yangbum’s instructions. Yangbum made clear that it would release these records directly to the Liquidators and designated Mr Su to act as its liaison in this respect. Further, notwithstanding that it was a non-party to the October 2020 Orders, Yangbum had consistently endeavoured to comply with the Liquidators’ requests by preparing and delivering a large proportion of the documents specified in the October 2020 Orders to the Liquidators, at least in hard copy form, on multiple occasions. Yangbum also indicated that further documents were forthcoming and was prepared to continue to assist in the preparation and delivery of the Companies’ records. As such, there was no relevant contumelious conduct that would warrant granting the Liquidators’ applications.
- [40]
[40] The Respondents submitted that if the court was nevertheless minded to grant the orders sought by the Liquidators, the timeframe imposed for compliance with the October 2020 Orders should be four months instead of the shorter timeframe of five days proposed by the Liquidators. According to the Respondents, a timeframe of five days would be “unrealistic and oppressive” to the Respondents and Yangbum. The Liquidators sought a large volume of documents, many of which had not yet been prepared by the Respondents or were otherwise not readily available. Further, Yangbum was operating with seriously diminished manpower due to business continuity measures arising from the COVID-19 pandemic. Therefore, the Respondents contended that a timeframe of five days would occasion significant prejudice to, and cause administrative and logistical difficulties for, the Respondents and Yangbum.
(3) Developments at the hearing
- [41]
[41] During the hearing on 5 April 2021, in view of the stark difference between the timeframes proposed by the Liquidators and the Respondents, I encouraged counsel for both parties to discuss the possibility of a mutually agreed timeframe. I also suggested that the parties consider differentiated timeframes for different categories of documents and property.
- [42]
[42] The parties were unable to reach a consensus. Nevertheless, counsel for the Liquidators was prepared to accept a timeframe of two weeks for the Respondents to hand over the Companies’ fixed assets, Quickbook Pro 2015 accounting software, and server, storage and backup vault for the storage of the soft copy documents sought by the Liquidators, and a timeframe of one month for all other items.
My findings
(1) Whether the court should exercise its discretion to make orders under O 45 r 6(2) of the ROC
- [44]
[44] First, it bears emphasising that the Liquidators’ applications in SUM 310, SUM 303 and SUM 330 were applications for orders under O 45 r 6(2) of the ROC. These were not applications for orders under s 313(5) of the Companies Act. I had made the October 2020 Orders sought by the Liquidators under s 313(5) at the hearing on 2 October 2020 as I was satisfied that the requirements of s 313(5) were satisfied. No appeal was filed against the October 2020 Orders. The present proceedings were, therefore, not the appropriate forum to relitigate the issues raised in the s 313(5) Applications. Instead, the issue to be determined in the present proceedings was whether there was “sufficient material” before me to warrant the exercise of my discretion to make the orders sought by the Liquidators under O 45 r 6(2).
- [45]
[45] After having considered the submissions made by both parties, I was of the view that there was indeed sufficient material to warrant the making of orders under O 45 r 6(2) fixing a time for the Respondents to comply with the October 2020 Orders.
- [47]
[47] In addition, it appeared that the Respondents were attempting to relitigate points in these proceedings that had already been resolved in the Liquidators’ favour when I made the October 2020 Orders. In particular, the Respondents argued that they did not have possession, custody or power over the Companies’ books and assets as Ms Chin and Mr Su performed financial and human resource work for the Companies purely in their capacities as employees of Yangbum (see [39] above). However, this argument had already been raised, unsuccessfully, by counsel for the Respondents at the hearing on 2 October 2020.
- [48]
[48] The Respondents also submitted that the Liquidators’ applications were brought for an extraneous purpose and that it was unclear how the documents sought by the Liquidators related to their key tasks (see [37]–[38] above). I was unable to accept these submissions. Section 313(5) of the Companies Act provided a statutory mechanism for liquidators to obtain the books and assets of a company in liquidation. Such books and assets are necessary for liquidators to discharge their duties. As the requirements of s 313(5) had been satisfied, I made the October 2020 Orders to give effect to this statutory mechanism. The Respondents could not now argue that the books and assets sought were unrelated to the Liquidators’ tasks or that the Liquidators’ applications were made for an extraneous purpose.
- [50]
[50] At this point, I note that the possibility of fixing a time for compliance with the October 2020 Orders was raised by counsel for the Liquidators at the hearing of the s 313(5) Applications on 2 October 2020. Counsel for the Respondents had justifiably resisted this on the ground that the Liquidators had not sought the imposition of a timeframe in the s 313(5) Applications. Counsel for the Respondents had further remarked that if the Respondents failed to comply with the October 2020 Orders, the Liquidators would “have their rights”. In my view, enforcing their “rights” was precisely what the Liquidators were seeking to do by filing SUM 310, SUM 303 and SUM 330.
(2) The appropriate timeframe
- [52]
[52] In my view, the timeframe of five days originally proposed by the Liquidators was unrealistic in the circumstances. However, I agreed with the Liquidators’ submission that acceding to the Respondents’ request for an extended timeframe for compliance might have the unintended effect of further delaying their attempts to enforce the October 2020 Orders. Given that more than a year had passed since the Liquidators’ first request for the Companies’ books and assets (on 31 March 2020) and six months had passed since the making of the October 2020 Orders (on 2 October 2020), I was of the view that a timeframe of four weeks would be fair to both parties. As the Respondents had already had six months to comply with the terms of the October 2020 Orders, I was satisfied that a timeframe of four weeks would not be prejudicial to the Respondents.
Conclusion on SUM 310, SUM 303 and SUM 330
- [54]
[54] For the foregoing reasons, I found that there was sufficient material to warrant the making of orders under O 45 r 6(2) as there was evidence of contumelious conduct on the part of the Respondents. I gave the Respondents four weeks to comply with the October 2020 Orders.
OS 1061
Standing to apply for the removal of the Liquidators
(1) The applicable law
- [56]
[56] As a preliminary point, I wish to comment on the proper statutory provision under which OS 1061 should have been made. This preliminary issue required the determination of the operative date of the IRDA and the date OS 1061 was filed.
- [57]
[57] As explained at the Second Reading of the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Bill (Bill No 32/2018), the IRDA was enacted to consolidate all statutory provisions relating to corporate and personal insolvency and debt restructuring, which were previously found in the Companies Act and the Bankruptcy Act (Cap 20, 2009 Rev Ed), into a single Act. This was to enhance the clarity, certainty and accessibility of these areas of law (Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (1 October 2018) vol 94 (Edwin Tong Chun Fai, Senior Minister of State for Law, for the Minister for Law). Accordingly, the relevant provisions dealing with corporate insolvency and restructuring under the Companies Act, the Bankruptcy Act and other consequential and related statutory provisions were repealed and re-enacted under the IRDA.
- [58]
[58] OS 1061 was filed on 21 October 2020, after the IRDA came into force on 30 July 2020. Thus, Yangbum and Mr Loong’s application for the removal of the Liquidators should have been made under s 174 of the IRDA. In Yangbum and Mr Loong’s submissions, they explained that s 302 of the Companies Act was applicable because the liquidation of the Companies was commenced before 30 July 2020. I disagreed with this reasoning. The relevant time for determining whether the Companies Act or the IRDA applied was the date of the application, ie, 21 October 2020. By this date, s 302 of the Companies Act had already been repealed and s 174 of the IRDA had come into force. Hence, OS 1061 should have been made under s 174 of the IRDA, instead of s 302 of the Companies Act.
- [59]
[59] As s 174 of the IRDA is identical to s 302 of the Companies Act, the same principles regarding standing applied under both provisions. However, I shall refer to s 174 of the IRDA in explaining my findings and decision as the application should rightly have been made under this provision.
- [60]
[60] Section 174 of the IRDA (formerly s 302 of the Companies Act) provides as follows:
- [61]
[61] The plain text of s 174 did not place any restrictions on who could apply for the removal of a liquidator. However, in my view, that did not mean that anyone and everyone who was able to show cause would have standing to bring an application under s 174. In the absence of any decisions by the Singapore courts expressly addressing this point, I found the Privy Council’s decision in Deloitte & Touche AG v Johnson and another [1999] 1 WLR 1605 (“Deloitte”) instructive. Lord Millett, delivering the judgment of the Privy Council, explained that the question of standing required the court to consider two distinct issues. Lord Millett’s remarks (at 1611) are worth setting out in full:
- [62]
[62] Hence, notwithstanding that s 174 did not specifically identify the category of persons who could apply for the removal of a liquidator, the court would nevertheless “act only on the application of a party with a sufficient interest” to make the application, as a matter of “judicial restraint”.
- [63]
[63] Deloitte was decided based on s 106(1) of the Cayman Islands’ Companies Law (1995 Revision), the wording of which was substantially similar to s 174 of the IRDA. The Privy Council held that s 106(1) did not limit the category of persons who could make the application, but that the plaintiff nevertheless had to have a “legitimate interest” in the relief sought (at 1611). On the facts of Deloitte, which concerned the liquidation of an insolvent company, the Privy Council found (at 1611) that:
- [64]
[64] Therefore, in my view, the applicable test for determining whether an applicant had standing to apply for the removal of a liquidator under s 174 of the IRDA was whether the applicant had a legitimate interest in the removal of the liquidator. In ascertaining whether an applicant had such a legitimate interest, the court would consider whether he was entitled to participate in the ultimate distribution of the liquidated company’s assets.
(2) The parties’ submissions
(A) Yangbum and Mr Loong’s submissions
- [65]
[65] Yangbum and Mr Loong submitted that they both had standing to apply for the removal of the Liquidators under s 174 of the IRDA. They accepted that although s 174 was broadly worded, it nevertheless required the applicant to have a legitimate interest in the removal of the liquidator. According to Yangbum and Mr Loong, they had the greatest interest in the liquidation of the Companies as the Companies’ creditor and alleged beneficial owner respectively.
(I) Standing of Yangbum
- [66]
[66] First, Yangbum and Mr Loong submitted that creditors had standing under s 174 even where the liquidation was a voluntary one, relying on Yap Jeffery Henry and another v Ho Mun-Tuke Don [2006] 3 SLR(R) 427 (“Yap Jeffery Henry”). Yangbum was a creditor of the Companies for $10.8m (see [11] above) and was the only party with any credible claim to the Companies’ assets. Hence, Yangbum had standing.
(II) Standing of Mr Loong
- [67]
[67] Further, Yangbum and Mr Loong submitted that Mr Loong had standing as an alleged beneficial owner of the Companies. As I have noted at [8] above, Ms Liang was the sole registered shareholder of the Companies and Mr Loong’s claim to be the beneficial owner of the Companies was the subject of separate ongoing proceedings in S 345. Counsel for Yangbum and Mr Loong acknowledged that Mr Loong’s beneficial interest in the Companies was merely a “contingent interest upon being proved in Court”. However, counsel for Yangbum and Mr Loong argued that Mr Loong nevertheless had a legitimate interest for the purpose of establishing standing as he fell within the definition of a “contributory” in s 2(1) of the IRDA (which cross-refers to the definition in s 4(1) of the Companies Act). This was because Mr Loong was making a bona fide claim, supported by “powerful evidence”, to be the true owner of the Companies’ shares. Consequently, Mr Loong had a legitimate interest in the removal of the Liquidators as he was the only party with a credible claim to any residual assets realised from the liquidation of the Companies.
- [68]
[68] More generally, Yangbum and Mr Loong submitted that a broad approach to standing under s 174 was sensible given the purpose of the provision, which was to give effect to the real, substantial and honest interest of the liquidation. An overly technical approach to standing would be contrary to the very purpose of s 174.
(B) The Liquidators’ submissions
- [69]
[69] The Liquidators submitted that Yangbum and Mr Loong did not have standing to bring the application under s 174 of the IRDA.
(I) Standing of Yangbum
- [70]
[70] The Liquidators submitted that a creditor did not have standing to apply to remove the liquidator of a solvent company. The Liquidators argued that, in the liquidation of a solvent company, the only parties with an interest in the ultimate distribution of the company’s assets were the contributories of the company, ie, the shareholders. Hence, in a solvent liquidation, a creditor had no standing to apply for the removal of a liquidator. In support of this proposition, the Liquidators relied on the following remarks made by the Privy Council in Deloitte (at 1610):
- [71]
[71] The Liquidators also relied on Petroships Investment Pte Ltd v Wealthplus Pte Ltd (in members’ voluntary liquidation) (Koh Brothers Building & Civil Engineering Contractor (Pte) Ltd and another, interveners) and another matter [2018] 3 SLR 687 (“Petroships”). In Petroships (at [132]), Vinodh Coomaraswamy J held that a solvent company is “liquidated primarily in the members’ interest”. Coomaraswamy J observed that the creditors of a solvent company had “no real interest in the liquidation” because their debts would be paid before the final distribution of the surplus to the shareholders.
- [72]
[72] The Liquidators further submitted that, if a creditor had standing to apply to remove the liquidator of a solvent company, this would provide an opportunity for parties with no real interest in the ultimate distribution of the company’s assets to wrest control of the liquidation for their own ulterior motives, and to obtain coercive orders which were adverse to both the interests of those for whom the liquidation was conducted and the purpose of the liquidation itself. According to the Liquidators, this was precisely what Yangbum and Mr Loong were attempting to do in OS 1061.
- [73]
[73] Applying these principles, the Liquidators submitted that Yangbum did not have standing to apply for the removal of the Liquidators. Although Yangbum was a purported creditor of the Companies, the Companies remained solvent. As such, the liquidation of the Companies was conducted in the interests of their shareholders and only the Companies’ shareholders had an interest in the results of the liquidation. During the hearing, counsel for the Liquidators also stressed that the Liquidators had yet to determine that Yangbum was indeed a creditor of the Companies as the Liquidators had not yet adjudicated Yangbum’s proofs of debt.
(II) Standing of Mr Loong
- [74]
[74] The Liquidators submitted that Mr Loong did not have standing to make the application under s 174 of the IRDA as he was neither a creditor nor a contributory of the Companies. Mr Loong was not registered as a shareholder of the Companies in any of the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority (“ACRA”) Business Profile searches carried out by the Liquidators. Nor was he reflected as shareholder, director, or beneficial owner of the Companies in any of the Companies’ financial statements.
- [75]
[75] Even if Mr Loong were to succeed in establishing that he had a beneficial interest in the Companies in S 345, a beneficiary of a company’s shares was not a “contributory” within the definition in either the Companies Act (and, therefore, the IRDA) or at common law. In particular, the Liquidators submitted that the phrase “any person alleged to be a contributory” could not include a self-proclaimed contributory who alleged himself to be a contributory. If that were the case, any person could simply claim to be a “contributory” and become entitled to participate in the ultimate distribution of the company’s assets. Instead, the Liquidators submitted that the phrase referred to persons who were placed on the provisional list of contributories by the liquidator or the court, but whose status was disputed. As for the phrase “a person liable to contribute to the assets of the company in the event of its being wound up”, the Liquidators argued that this referred to: persons who were expressly included by statute as being liable to contribute, ie, past and present members of the company (pursuant to s 250(1) of the Companies Act (now s 121(1) of the IRDA)); past and present directors whose liability was unlimited (pursuant to s 250(2) of the Companies Act (now s 121(2) of the IRDA)); the personal representative of a deceased contributory (pursuant to s 252(1) of the Companies Act (now s 123(1) of the IRDA)); and the trustee of a contributory who has become bankrupt (pursuant to s 252(2) of the Companies Act (now s 123(2) of the IRDA)). A beneficiary for whom the shares of a company are allegedly held on trust was not a “contributory” within this definition.
- [76]
[76] Hence, the Liquidators submitted that unless and until a court determined that Mr Loong was indeed the beneficial and legal owner of the shares of the Companies, Mr Loong’s claim remained a bare assertion and he had no real interest in the liquidation of the Companies.
(3) My findings
(A) Standing of Yangbum
- [77]
[77] Having considered the authorities cited and the submissions made by both parties, I concluded that there was no rule that only the shareholders of a company could have a legitimate interest in the removal of a liquidator in a solvent liquidation. Such a restrictive rule was not supported by the broad wording of s 174 of the IRDA. As noted in Woon’s Corporations Law (Walter Woon SC gen ed) (LexisNexis Singapore, 2020) at paras 4005–4050, in general, creditors and contributories presumably had standing under s 302 of the Companies Act (now s 174 of the IRDA) as they “would be directly affected by the fact that the liquidator is unfit for the job”.
- [78]
[78] Further, the Privy Council’s decision in Deloitte did not go so far as to support such a restrictive rule. The issue before the Privy Council in Deloitte was whether a debtor of a company in insolvent liquidation, who was neither a creditor nor a contributory of the company, could apply for the removal of a liquidator (at 1607). The Privy Council answered this question in the negative. Notwithstanding Lord Millett’s observation that the English courts had “consistently regarded the creditors (in the case of an insolvent liquidation) and the contributories (in the case of a solvent liquidation) as the proper persons to make the application, being the only persons interested in the liquidation” (at 1610), Lord Millett then went on to state that the threshold for an applicant to be regarded as a proper person to invoke the jurisdiction of the court was whether the applicant had “a legitimate interest in the relief sought” [emphasis added] (at 1611). As the applicant in Deloitte was “not merely a stranger to the liquidation”, but (as a debtor) had interests adverse to the liquidation and the interests of the creditors, the Privy Council held that the applicant lacked standing. In my view, the Privy Council’s reasoning in Deloitte did not preclude a court from finding, in the appropriate circumstances, that a creditor of a company in solvent liquidation had a legitimate interest in the removal of a liquidator.
- [79]
[79] Petroships also did not support the restrictive approach to standing proposed by the Liquidators. In Petroships, Coomaraswamy J held that a solvent company was liquidated primarily in the members’ interest, whereas an insolvent company was liquidated primarily in the creditors’ interest. Hence, the court would give predominant weight to the members’ wishes in ascertaining the real, honest and substantial interest of a solvent liquidation, while giving predominant weight to the creditors’ interest in an insolvent liquidation (Petroships at [132]–[135]). However, Coomaraswamy J did not state that only the members of a solvent company could have an interest in its liquidation. Further, although Coomaraswamy J said that the creditors had “no real interest” in a solvent liquidation because it was obligatory to commence and conduct a solvent liquidation on the basis that the creditors would be paid in full and within one year (under s 293(1) of the Companies Act, now s 163(1) of the IRDA), it should be borne in mind that Coomaraswamy J was considering the meaning of the phrase “interest of the liquidation”. I agreed entirely with Coomaraswamy J’s statement of the applicable principles in that context and applied them in considering whether Yangbum and Mr Loong had succeeded in showing cause for the removal of the Liquidators (see [101] below). However, in Petroships, Coomaraswamy J was not required to specifically consider what it meant for an applicant to have a “legitimate interest” for the purposes of standing. Therefore, in my view, Petroships was not authority for the proposition that the creditors of a solvent company could not have any legitimate interest in the removal of the liquidators, and thus could have no standing to bring an application under s 174 of the IRDA.
- [81]
[81] Be that as it may, on the facts of the present case, I was satisfied that Yangbum had a legitimate interest in the removal of the Liquidators as a major creditor of the Companies.
- [82]
[82] Although Yangbum’s proofs of debt had not yet been adjudicated by the Liquidators, Yangbum had provided detailed descriptions of its claims against each of the Companies as well as supporting documents. I was, therefore, satisfied that Yangbum was a creditor of the Companies for the purposes of establishing standing under s 174 of the IRDA. In my view, it would be self-serving for a liquidator to be able to stymie an application for his own removal by refusing or delaying to adjudicate or accept the proofs of debt submitted by the very creditor seeking to remove him.
- [83]
[83] Further, although the Companies were in voluntary solvent liquidation, the close business relationship between the Companies and Yangbum showed that the latter had a legitimate interest in the conduct of the Liquidators. The reality of this case was that the Companies were incorporated to undertake subcontract work exclusively for Yangbum and that Yangbum was the most significant creditor of each of the Companies, being owed provisional debts amounting to more than $10.8m (see [7] and [11] above). I was unable to agree with the Liquidators’ submission that allowing a creditor such as Yangbum to apply to remove the liquidator of a solvent company would allow parties with no real interest in the ultimate distribution of the company’s assets to wrest control of the liquidation (see [72] above). In this case, Yangbum evidently had an interest in the distribution of the Companies’ assets as it had an interest in its debts being paid in full. Therefore, Yangbum had a legitimate interest in ensuring that the Liquidators administered the liquidation of the Companies properly and fairly.
- [84]
[84] Hence, Yangbum had standing to apply for the removal of the Liquidators under s 174 of the IRDA. However, whether Yangbum could satisfy the court that there was cause for the removal and replacement of the Liquidators was a separate issue that will be discussed in greater detail below.
(B) Standing of Mr Loong
- [85]
[85] I turn now to Mr Loong. In my view, unlike Yangbum, Mr Loong did not have standing to apply for the removal of the Liquidators under s 174 of the IRDA.
- [86]
[86] Mr Loong’s submission that he had a legitimate interest in the removal of the Liquidators was based on his status as the alleged beneficial owner of the Companies. However, whether Mr Loong indeed had a beneficial interest in the Companies was the subject matter of separate proceedings which the court in S 345 had to ultimately decide. It was not disputed that Mr Loong was not reflected as a beneficial owner of the Companies in any of the documents before me. Indeed, during the hearing, counsel for Yangbum and Mr Loong admitted that there were no documents evidencing Mr Loong’s alleged interest before this court. He also admitted that there was no provision permitting the court to take cognisance of such contingent beneficial interests in these proceedings. Therefore, on the facts as they stood at the time of the hearing, Mr Loong did not have a legitimate interest in the removal of the Liquidators for the purpose of establishing standing under s 174 of the IRDA.
- [87]
[87] In this regard, I noted that Mr Loong’s application in Summons No 1698 of 2020 (“SUM 1698”) for an interlocutory injunction restraining Ms Liang and Mr Zhang from taking any further steps as director and/or shareholder of the Companies and from taking any further step in the liquidation of the Companies, which was made in S 345, had been dismissed by Mavis Chionh JC (as she then was). In SUM 1698, Mr Loong had argued that Ms Liang held the Companies’ shares on trust for him. Chionh JC stated that Mr Loong had not satisfied the court that there was a serious question to be tried and observed that there were “a number of deep-seated problems in [Mr Loong]’s case”, primarily because it was “entirely unclear what the nature and the terms of the alleged trust [were]”. As SUM 1698 was only an injunction application, it did not conclusively decide the issue of whether Mr Loong indeed had a beneficial interest in the Companies. However, Chionh JC’s findings undermined Yangbum and Mr Loong’s submission that Mr Loong’s assertion of beneficial ownership was supported by “powerful evidence” (see [67] above).
- [88]
[88] Further, I was unable to accept Yangbum and Mr Loong’s submission that Mr Loong had a legitimate interest in the removal of the Liquidators because he fell within the definition of a “contributory” in s 2(1) of the IRDA (which adopts the definition in s 4(1) of the Companies Act). Section 4(1) of the Companies Act defines “contributory” as:
- [89]
[89] Yangbum and Mr Loong sought to rely on the phrase “any person alleged to be a contributory” to argue that Mr Loong was a contributory because he had made a bona fide claim to be the beneficial owner of the Companies (see [67] above). During the hearing, counsel for Yangbum and Mr Loong relied on the comments made in McPherson’s Law of Company Liquidation (A R Keay gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd Ed, 2013) (“McPherson”) that “contributory” may include “one who, although his or her name does not appear on the register, is prepared to make a bona fide admission that he or she is a member of the company” (at para 10-003). However, in my view, McPherson did not support the proposition that anyone who alleges himself to be a contributory would fall within the statutory definition. On the contrary, the comments relied on by counsel for Yangbum and Mr Loong were made as one of two qualifications of the general statement that (at para 10-003):
- [90]
[90] These requirements were not satisfied by Mr Loong in the present case. The ACRA records did not show that Mr Loong had any interest in the Companies. Neither the Companies’ registers nor their records revealed that Mr Loong was a shareholder, director, or beneficial owner. Indeed, even after recognising the qualification set out above, the view taken in McPherson was that (at para 10-003, footnote 27):
- [91]
[91] Therefore, I agreed with the Liquidators that the phrase “any person alleged to be a contributory” could not include a self-proclaimed contributory who alleged himself to be a contributory, where no evidence was adduced in support of that allegation. Instead, I agreed with the Liquidators’ submission that this phrase would refer to persons who are placed on the provisional list of contributories by the liquidator, or by the court (in the exercise of its function to settle a list of contributories under s 152 of the IRDA), but whose status is disputed. In my view, this was a more logical reading of the statutory definition of a “contributory” in s 4(1).
- [92]
[92] In any event, however, Mr Loong was not alleging himself to be a contributory, in the sense of being “a person liable to contribute to the assets of the company in the event of its being wound up”. He was merely making a bare assertion that he was the beneficial owner of the Companies. The Liquidators submitted that the trustee (and not the beneficial owner, ie, the cestui que trust) was the “contributory” within the definition in s 4(1). For this proposition, the Liquidators relied on the following passage from McPherson (at para 10-005), which is worth setting out in full:
- [93]
[93] This submission was also supported by the English case of In re European Society Arbitration Acts, ex parte Liquidators of the British Nation Life Assurance Association (1878) 8 Ch D 679. In that case, James LJ had remarked that a beneficial owner of shares was, “as between him and his own trustee, the person liable to contribute”, but that this did not make him a contributory vis-à-vis the company as “the equitable liability is to the trustee only, and there is no privity or direct right of any kind as between the company and the cestui que trust” (at 708).
- [94]
[94] Hence, even if Mr Loong had been able to establish that Ms Liang (as the sole registered shareholder of the Companies) held the shares in the Companies on trust for him, Ms Liang would be the “contributory” for the purposes of s 4(1) of the Companies Act (and, therefore, s 2(1) of the IRDA), and not Mr Loong.
- [95]
[95] In view of the above, Mr Loong did not have the requisite legitimate interest to apply for the removal of the Liquidators under s 174 of the IRDA. Mr Loong’s claim to be the beneficial owner of the Companies had yet to be decided in S 345. There was no evidence that Mr Loong was “the holder of fully paid shares in the company” within the definition of a “contributory” in s 4(1) of the Companies Act and s 2(1) of the IRDA. In addition, Mr Loong was neither a “person liable to contribute to the assets of the company in the event of its being wound up” nor a “person alleged to be a contributory” for the purposes of s 4(1) of the Companies Act and s 2(1) of the IRDA. Consequently, Mr Loong failed to establish that he had a legitimate interest in the removal of the Liquidators as a beneficial owner of the Companies or as a contributory.
(4) Conclusion on standing
- [96]
[96] For the foregoing reasons, I found that Yangbum had standing to make an application under s 174 of the IRDA as a major creditor of the Companies, which had a close working relationship with Yangbum. Based on the authorities, there was no rule that only the shareholders of a company in solvent liquidation could have a legitimate interest in the removal of a liquidator. On the facts of this case, I was satisfied that Yangbum had a clear legitimate interest in the distribution of the Companies’ assets and in the removal of the Liquidators.
- [97]
[97] However, I found that Mr Loong did not have standing to make an application under s 174 of the IRDA as he had not established that he was the beneficial owner of the Companies or a contributory. Consequently, on the facts as they stood at the time I heard OS 1061, Mr Loong was unable to establish a legitimate interest in the removal of the Liquidators.
Cause for the removal of the Liquidators
- [98]
[98] Having found that Yangbum had standing to apply for the removal of the Liquidators under s 174 of the IRDA, the next major issue to be determined was whether cause had been shown for the removal of the Liquidators.
(1) The applicable law
- [99]
[99] As noted at [60] above, s 174 of the IRDA empowers the court to remove a liquidator “on cause shown”. The leading case on applications for the removal of liquidators under s 302 of the Companies Act was Petroships. As s 174 of the IRDA is identical to s 302 of the Companies Act, the same principles regarding cause would have applied under both provisions (see [59] above). I summarise below the principles set out by Coomaraswamy J in Petroships in so far as they were pertinent to the present proceedings.
- [100]
[100] First, to show cause under s 174, the applicant had to establish that the removal of the liquidator was “in the real, substantial and honest interest of the liquidation” and would “advance the purposes for which the liquidator was appointed” (Petroships at [109(b)]).
- [101]
[101] The interest and purpose of a solvent liquidation (ie, a members’ voluntary liquidation) was distinct and different from the interest and purpose of an insolvent liquidation (ie, a creditors’ voluntary liquidation or a compulsory liquidation) in two main ways (Petroships at [126]–[138]).
(a) First, to determine the interest of a solvent liquidation, a court would ordinarily take into account the views of the members, and not the views of the creditors (whereas the converse was true in an insolvent liquidation). A solvent company was liquidated primarily in the members’ interest. The creditors of a solvent company had no real interest in the liquidation because it was obligatory to commence and conduct a solvent liquidation on the basis that the creditors would be paid in full and within one year (s 293(1) of the Companies Act, now s 163(1) of the IRDA). Therefore, the court would give predominant weight to the wishes of the members in ascertaining the real, honest and substantial interest of a solvent liquidation.
(b) Second, in deciding whether cause had been shown under s 174, a court had to assess the allegations against the liquidator in the light of the purpose of the liquidation. For instance, a liquidator of a solvent company had only a limited duty to investigate the company’s affairs. Nevertheless, the liquidator still had a duty to conduct such an investigation, with two objectives: (i) to maximise the return to those interested in the liquidation by increasing the company’s assets or reducing its debts; and (ii) to uphold standards of commercial morality by identifying improper or dishonest conduct by officers of the company that should be punished by prosecution or civil action.
- [102]
[102] However, regardless of whether the liquidation was a solvent or an insolvent liquidation, the liquidator had a duty to act impartially in carrying out the liquidation (Petroships at [144]). Thus, to establish that the removal of the liquidator was in the real, substantial and honest interest of the liquidation and would advance the purposes for which the liquidator was appointed, the applicant could attempt to show that the liquidator lacked impartiality. For instance, the applicant could show that the liquidator was biased in favour of any one or more of the members or creditors of the company. To succeed on the ground of partiality, the applicant could show either that the liquidator was guilty of actual bias or that he had so conducted himself as to give rise to a perception of bias (Petroships at [109(c)]).
- [103]
[103] Bias on the part of the liquidator could be demonstrated by the liquidator’s failure to investigate the affairs of a company in liquidation without rational basis, or in not exercising his discretion in good faith (Petroships at [163] and [168]–[169]).
- [104]
[104] The court would give significant weight to an applicant’s perception of bias if the applicant could demonstrate (Petroships at [109(d)]):
- [105]
[105] If the applicant sought to present a decision by the liquidator as evidence of the liquidator’s bias, the burden lay on the applicant to show that the liquidator took that decision without a rational basis (Petroships at [109(e)]).
- [106]
[106] While the liquidator’s lack of impartiality (actual or perceived) was often determinative of the interest of the liquidation, the court would take into account all aspects of the liquidation in arriving at a decision, including the practical consequences of exercising the power under s 174 to remove the liquidator. These included (Petroships at [109(g)] and [174]):
(2) The parties’ submissions
(A) Yangbum and Mr Loong’s submissions
- [107]
[107] Yangbum and Mr Loong submitted that it was in the real, substantial and honest interest of the liquidation that the Liquidators be removed and replaced with impartial and objective liquidators. They alleged that the Liquidators were clearly biased in favour of Ms Liang, based on the seven categories of allegations outlined at [21] above. I shall deal with Yangbum and Mr Loong’s submissions in respect of each specific allegation below.
(B) The Liquidators’ submissions
- [109]
[109] The Liquidators submitted that the shareholders’ interests, and not Yangbum and Mr Loong’s interests, were paramount in ascertaining whether their removal was in the real, substantial and honest interest of the liquidation. This was because the Companies were in solvent liquidation. As such, those entitled to participate in the ultimate distribution of the Companies’ assets were their shareholders, who had the greatest interest in the liquidation. The purpose of the solvent liquidation was to distribute the Companies’ surplus assets to the shareholders in proportion to their shareholding. In this case, the sole registered shareholder of the Companies was Ms Liang (see [8] above).
- [110]
[110] The Liquidators contended that they had acted to advance the interests and purpose of the liquidations of the Companies from the outset of their appointment. Following their appointment on 30 March 2020, the Liquidators made extensive and proactive efforts to obtain the books of the Companies. They continued to examine the books of the Companies that had been delivered to them and to familiarise themselves with the affairs of the Companies. The remainder of their work depended on receiving the complete set of books and assets of the Companies.
- [111]
[111] The Liquidators submitted that Yangbum and Mr Loong’s allegations of bias on the part of the Liquidators were wholly devoid of merit. Yangbum and Mr Loong had not demonstrated actual bias or a reasonable perception of bias on the part of the Liquidators. Yangbum and Mr Loong did not hold a genuine subjective belief that the Liquidators were biased. Nor had the Liquidators conducted themselves in a manner which would create a reasonable perception of bias in the mind of a rational creditor or contributory. Yangbum and Mr Loong had not discharged their burden of establishing that the Liquidators’ decisions were taken without a rational basis. Further, Ms Liang, the sole registered shareholder of the Companies, had not suffered a justifiable loss of confidence in the Liquidators.
- [112]
[112] According to the Liquidators, the application for their removal in OS 1061 was yet another attempt by Yangbum, Mr Loong and the Respondents to frustrate the liquidation of the Companies. The Liquidators submitted that Yangbum, Mr Loong and the Respondents had at all times acted with hostility against the interests and purpose of the liquidations, such as by obstructing the Liquidators from obtaining the Companies’ books from the officers and agents of the Companies. For this reason, the Liquidators argued that their removal and replacement would not cure Mr Loong’s hostility towards the liquidation. The Liquidators also contended that it would amount to an unwarranted tarnish on their professional standing and reputation if they were removed in these circumstances.
(3) My findings
- [113]
[113] As the Companies were in solvent liquidation, I gave predominant weight to the wishes and interests of the members of the Companies in ascertaining the real, substantial and honest interest of the liquidation. In this case, the only member of the Companies was Ms Liang, who was their sole registered shareholder (see [8] above).
- [114]
[114] Having considered the submissions made and the evidence adduced by both parties, I found that Yangbum and Mr Loong had failed to establish bias on the part of the Liquidators on a balance of probabilities. As this was the only ground relied on by Yangbum and Mr Loong to show cause, I concluded that they had failed to show that the removal of the Liquidators was in the real, substantial and honest interest of the liquidation and would advance the purposes for which the Liquidators were appointed.
- [115]
[115] I shall now address each of the specific allegations of bias made by Yangbum and Mr Loong in turn.
(A) The Trespass Allegation
- [116]
[116] First, Yangbum and Mr Loong submitted that on 18 March 2020, one of the Liquidators (namely, Mr Lau) trespassed into Yangbum’s office together with Ms Liang and three other individuals. They demanded to be given documents relating to Yangbum and the six companies that had been incorporated to undertake subcontract work exclusively for Yangbum (which included the Companies).
- [117]
[117] On the other hand, the Liquidators denied that they had committed any trespass. Instead, the Liquidators contended that they had attended at Yangbum’s office for the sole purpose of advancing the interest and purpose of the proposed liquidations by inspecting and obtaining the books of the Companies. They were not acting on Ms Liang’s instructions or under her directions.
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