General Division of the High Court · Decided 29 June 2021
Choo Cheng Tong Wilfred v Phua Swee Khiang and another
Feedback & support[2021] SGHC 154 · Case no. Suit No 678 of 2018
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] The plaintiff, Mr Choo Cheng Tong Wilfred (“Mr Choo”), has a Bachelor of Laws degree. He was admitted as an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore in 1989. He had a valid practising certificate under the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed) (“LPA”) from 1 April 1992 to 31 March 2000 and from 1 April 2006 to 31 March 2014.
- [2]
[2] Mr Choo was also a stock dealer in Phillip Securities Pte Ltd (“Phillip Securities”) for a brief period from around August 2000 to 2001 or 2002. In this Suit, Mr Choo claims a total sum of S$2,089,080 from the defendants as payment of his consultancy fees for work done under various alleged agreements made between 2000 and 2012.
- [3]
[3] The first defendant, Mr Phua Swee Khiang Tom (“Mr Phua”), was the plaintiff’s colleague in Phillip Securities and the second defendant, Mr Ding Pei Chai Peter (“Mr Ding”), is a Malaysian businessman (collectively, “the defendants”). The defendants’ primary argument is that Mr Choo infringed the LPA as he did not have a valid practising certificate at the relevant periods when he rendered his legal services for a fee.
- [4]
[4] Further, the defendants dispute the existence of most of the alleged agreements and contend that Mr Choo was to be remunerated in accordance with a contingent arrangement which is void for champerty. In the alternative, the defendants argue that Mr Choo has already been paid the sums to which he claims to be entitled. Moreover, the defendants assert that they had fully and finally settled all the fees payable by them to Mr Choo in 2013. In any event, the defendants submit that Mr Choo’s claims are time-barred under the Limitation Act (Cap 163, 1996 Rev Ed).
- [5]
[5] In addition, Mr Phua counterclaims against Mr Choo and seeks an account and inquiry in respect of the proceeds from the sale of 3.53 million shares in Atech Holdings Limited (“Atech”) which he held on trust for Mr Phua and sold without authorisation. Further or in the alternative, Mr Phua seeks damages in respect of the loss and/or damage caused by Mr Choo’s failure to account for the sale proceeds of these shares. Separately, Mr Ding counterclaims against Mr Choo for repayment of loans which amounted to S$24,000.
The Legal Profession Act
- [7]
[7] The operation and correct application of ss 32, 33 and 36 of the LPA are critical to the findings in the present case.
Background to the dispute
- [9]
[9] Most of the background facts were set out by Belinda Ang Saw Ean J (as she then was) in Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Ding Pei Chai and others [2004] 3 SLR(R) 489 (Originating Summons No 902 of 2002) (“ANZ v Ding”), a related case. Thus, I shall refer to the relevant paragraphs of ANZ v Ding where appropriate.
The Melbourne property investments
- [10]
[10] The defendants and Mr Lee were initially business associates and friends. In 1993 and 1994, they collaborated to invest in and develop several properties in Melbourne, Australia (the “Melbourne Properties”). The Melbourne Properties were held through two trust companies incorporated in the British Virgin Islands (the “BVI”). These were SEAA Enterprises Pty Limited Trust (“SEPLT”) and SEAA Properties Trust (“SPT”) (collectively, the “Trusts”). The Trusts were managed by SEAA Enterprises Pty Limited, a company incorporated in Australia (the “Trustee Company”). Mr Lee held 60% of the beneficial interest in the investment and the defendants each held 20%. At all material times, Mr Lee was the managing director and chairman of the Trustee Company, while the defendants were passive investors (see ANZ v Ding at [4] and [7]).
- [11]
[11] In or around June 1998, the defendants and Mr Lee agreed to contribute working capital for the investments in the Melbourne Properties in the same proportions as their beneficial interests: 60% from Mr Lee, and 20% each from the defendants.
The Atech shares transaction with Mr Yip and the interpleader proceedings in OS 601786/2001
- [12]
[12] To raise funds for his 60% share of the working capital, on or around 17 June 1998, Mr Lee entered into an agreement to sell 14 million ordinary shares and 4 million options of Atech to Mr Yip and his nominees, Mr Xiao Yongle and Tartan Capital Limited, for A$3.65m (the “Yip Atech Shares Transaction”). Ms Mei Leong, a lawyer at M/s Mei Leong, Lam & Co (“M/s Mei Leong”), which was then a law firm in Hong Kong, acted for Mr Yip and his nominees. Under this agreement, Mr Yip and/or his nominees paid A$750,000 to Phillip Securities to be held as a deposit for the Yip Atech Shares Transaction.
- [13]
[13] Subsequently, in or around December 1998, Mr Yip and his nominees agreed to accept 3.4 million Atech shares (the “3.4 million Yip Atech Shares”) as part-performance of the Yip Atech Shares Transaction, in exchange for an advance payment of A$820,000 from Mr Yip (the “A$820,000 Advance”). Accordingly, in or around January 1999, the scrips for the 3.4 million Yip Atech Shares were delivered to M/s Mei Leong and Mr Yip paid the A$820,000 Advance to Mr Lee. However, M/s Mei Leong were unable to effect the transfer of the 3.4 million Yip Atech Shares because, around that time, the Atech shares became scripless and could only be transferred electronically. At this point, Mr Phua got involved in this transaction. and executed two letters of indemnity dated 15 January 1999 and 8 July 1999 in favour of Mr Yip and his nominees in relation to the delivery of the 3.4 million Yip Atech Shares and the return of the A$820,000 Advance (the “Letters of Indemnity”).
- [14]
[14] The Yip Atech Shares Transaction was eventually aborted in or around December 1999. Subsequently, on 15 October 2001, Mr Phua and M/s Mei Leong (acting on behalf of Mr Yip and his nominees) entered into a settlement agreement regarding the Letters of Indemnity (the “2001 Mei Leong Settlement Agreement”). Under cll 1–3 of the 2001 Mei Leong Settlement Agreement Mr Phua was relieved of his obligations under the Letters of Indemnity; a settlement sum of A$900,000 was to be paid to Mr Yip; and the physical scrips of the 3.4 million Yip Atech Shares were to be returned to Mr Phua. With regard to the settlement sum of A$900,000, A$820,000 had already been set aside by the defendants and Mr Lee to repay Mr Yip (as I shall explain further at [18] below), and the balance of A$80,000 was to be paid by the defendants. However, as I shall elaborate on shortly, the actual repayment of the A$820,000 did not go smoothly.
- [15]
[15] The sum of A$750,000, which was initially paid by Mr Yip and/or his nominees to Phillip Securities pursuant to his agreement with Mr Lee (see [12] above), eventually became the subject of interpleader proceedings before the High Court in Originating Summons No 601786 of 2001 (the “OS 601 Interpleader Proceedings”). The OS 601 Interpleader Proceedings were commenced on 30 November 2001. On the advice of Mr Choo, the defendants were represented by JC Ho & Kang LLC (“JCHK”) in the OS 601 Interpleader Proceedings. I shall describe how Mr Choo came to be involved at [28] below. The OS 601 Interpleader Proceedings were eventually settled in February 2004 with the A$750,000 being fully returned to Mr Yip and/or his nominees.
The dispute with Mr Lee and the court proceedings in OS 902/2002, Australia, the BVI, and S 420/2014
- [16]
[16] At this point, I return briefly to the year 2000. The Melbourne Properties were sold in or around July 2000 for about A$15m, and the sale was completed on 28 September 2000. On or around 3 October 2000, Mr Lee made unauthorised transfers of about A$8.4m from the sale proceeds of the Melbourne Properties to various accounts under his control. Thereafter, from 25 to 27 October 2000, Mr Lee returned A$5.25m out of the A$8.4m to the defendants and himself in the proportion of 20%, 20%, and 60% respectively. This was the return of the capital that they had invested in the Melbourne Properties.
- [17]
[17] The defendants were initially unaware of the unauthorised transfers made by Mr Lee at the time the transfers were made. The defendants only found out about these transfers one or two months later, after their capital had been returned to them. Even after the return of the capital, there were still moneys under Mr Lee’s control which he refused to remit to the Trustee Company (see ANZ v Ding at [13]). This gave rise to disputes between the defendants and Mr Lee who refused to disclose the accounting records showing the expenses and sale proceeds from the Melbourne Properties.
- [18]
[18] On 8 December 2000, the defendants and Mr Lee entered into an agreement to set aside A$1.8m of the sale proceeds from the Melbourne Properties to meet various contingent liabilities arising from their investments in the Melbourne Properties and the Yip Atech Shares Transaction. In or around January 2001, this sum of A$1.8m was deposited in an Asian Currency Unit account (the “ACU Account”) placed with the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited, Singapore branch (“ANZ Bank”). I shall refer to the moneys in the ACU Account as the “ACU Account Moneys”. The accountholder of the ACU Account was Gracedale Technology Limited (“Gracedale”), a BVI company. The original authorised signatories of the ACU Account were Mr Lee and his wife in one group, and Mr Ding’s nominee and Mr Phua in the other (see ANZ v Ding at [11]).
- [20]
[20] On 8 December 2000, Mr Lee also agreed to make available to the defendants the financial accounts of the two Trusts. In December 2001, Mr Ding requested the auditing of these financial accounts and the inspection of the financial records of the Trustee Company. However, Mr Lee was not forthcoming with the audited accounts and the financial records. This led the defendants to assert control over Gracedale and the ACU Account in March 2002 by removing Mr Lee’s wife as a director of Gracedale and withdrawing Mr Lee and his wife as authorised signatories of the ACU Account (see ANZ v Ding at [9] and [15]–[29]).
- [21]
[21] Subsequently, around June 2002, the defendants instructed ANZ Bank to remit A$820,000 of the ACU Account Moneys to M/s Mei Leong and A$150,000 to Mr Choo for his consultancy services. However, these instructions were countermanded by Mr Lee’s wife. These conflicting instructions led ANZ Bank to file for interpleader relief in Originating Summons No 902 of 2002 (the “OS 902 Interpleader Proceedings”) on 1 July 2002. On the advice of Mr Choo, the defendants were also represented by JCHK in the OS 902 Interpleader Proceedings.
- [22]
[22] The issue to be decided in the OS 902 Interpleader Proceedings was who had the authority to act for and on behalf of Gracedale in operating the ACU Account. The defendants’ position was that Mr Lee had agreed to relinquish control of Gracedale and the ACU Account to them. Hence, they had the authority to act for and on behalf of Gracedale in operating the ACU Account. Therefore, they had the authority to pay the A$820,000 to M/s Mei Leong as Mr Lee had previously agreed to this payment (see ANZ v Ding at [10]). On the other hand, Mr Lee’s wife argued that she and Mr Lee had never agreed to cede control of Gracedale and the ACU Account to the defendants (see ANZ v Ding at [11]).
- [25]
[25] On or around 18 October 2012, the defendants commenced proceedings against Mr Lee and Gracedale in the High Court of the BVI to seek ratification of the issuance of the 144 Gracedale bearer shares (the “BVI Proceedings”). On the advice of Mr Choo, the defendants were represented by M/s Farara Kerins in the BVI Proceedings. The BVI Proceedings concluded on or around 9 July 2013, when the defendants and Mr Lee agreed to stay these proceedings and have their disputes determined by the Singapore courts.
- [26]
[26] On or around 16 April 2014, the defendants commenced Suit No 420 of 2014 in the High Court against Mr Lee (“S 420”). S 420 was the defendants’ claim against Mr Lee for, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duties and for the recovery of the ACU Account Moneys. On the advice of Mr Choo, the defendants were represented by Rajah & Tann Singapore LLP (“R&T”) in S 420.
- [27]
[27] In 2016, the defendants entered into a settlement agreement with Mr Lee (the “2016 Lee Settlement Agreement”). Pursuant to the 2016 Lee Settlement Agreement, the defendants recovered a sum of approximately US$1.04m from the ACU Account, and S 420 was discontinued in or around August 2016.
Mr Choo’s involvement
Appointment of Mr Choo
- [28]
[28] Mr Choo was first appointed by Mr Phua sometime in 2000, and by Mr Ding sometime in 2001, to provide them with advice and assistance in relation to the legal disputes outlined above. The precise nature of this advice and assistance is one of the key issues in dispute between the parties and will be analysed in detail below.
- [29]
[29] First, it is not disputed that in July 2001, the defendants agreed to pay Mr Choo a fixed fee of A$50,000 if he successfully negotiated a settlement with M/s Mei Leong regarding the Letters of Indemnity which had been executed by Mr Phua in 1999 (the “Mei Leong Indemnity Agreement”). The terms of engagement under this agreement were set out in an e-mail from Mr Choo to Mr Phua dated 25 July 2001 (the “25 July 2001 E-mail”). The sum of A$50,000 comprised an initial deposit of A$20,000 and a further A$30,000 if the negotiation was successful. The negotiation was successful and culminated in the 2001 Mei Leong Settlement Agreement, the terms of which are outlined at [14] above.
- [30]
[30] It is also common ground that the parties entered into the following written agreements relating to Mr Choo’s services and remuneration, both of which were drafted by Mr Choo:
(a) A Consultancy Agreement dated 14 February 2003 was signed by the defendants and Mr Choo (the “Consultancy Agreement”). Under the Consultancy Agreement, Mr Choo was to receive 20% of all moneys recoverable from the two Trusts (including the ACU Account Moneys), which represent the profits of the investments in the Melbourne Properties, less all expenses and allowances already paid to Mr Choo (including overseas allowances and expenses). I shall refer to this particular arrangement under the Consultancy Agreement as the “20% Remuneration Arrangement”. Further, Mr Choo was to be paid: (i) A$6,000 per trip for a four-day period to Hong Kong or Australia, and A$500 per day for any length of stay greater than four days; and (ii) A$600 per trip to Kuala Lumpur.
(b) A Tripartite Agreement dated 6 July 2012 was signed by the defendants and Mr Choo (the “Tripartite Agreement”). Under the Tripartite Agreement, Mr Phua’s claim to the ACU Account Moneys was to rank secondary to the claims of Mr Ding and Mr Choo, in consideration of Mr Ding and Mr Choo undertaking to share equally the legal costs of the BVI Proceedings.
- [31]
[31] However, the parties disagree on the existence, terms and effect of the various other alleged oral agreements regarding Mr Choo’s remuneration. These alleged oral agreements, which are outlined at [37] below, form the basis of Mr Choo’s claim.
- [32]
[32] Further, pursuant to a Deed of Agreement of Transfer of Beneficial Interest dated 9 January 2013, signed by the defendants (the “DATBI”), Mr Ding agreed to assume Mr Phua’s liability to pay the fees owing to Mr Choo for services rendered since 2000. In consideration, Mr Phua agreed to unconditionally and immediately transfer his beneficial interest in the ACU Account to Mr Ding. It is undisputed that the DATBI was drafted by Mr Choo. However, Mr Choo argues that the version of the DATBI before this court is not the original version of the DATBI, which he claims was signed together with the Tripartite Agreement and witnessed by him on 6 July 2012. I shall refer to this alleged original version of the DATBI as the “2012 DATBI”. According to Mr Choo, the 2012 DATBI contained an additional clause stating that Mr Ding would pay Mr Choo a sum of S$200,000 as part-payment towards Mr Choo’s fees, but this additional clause was removed from the DATBI dated 9 January 2013.
Transfer of 3.53 million Atech shares from Mr Phua to Mr Choo
- [33]
[33] In 2002, Mr Choo received a total of 3.53 million Atech shares from Mr Phua (which I shall refer to as the “3.53 million Choo Atech Shares”) as trustee under two separate written agreements, which were both drafted by Mr Choo. The 3.53 million Choo Atech Shares were transferred to Mr Choo as security for the payment of his consultancy fees. The two written agreements were:
(a) A Letter of Agreement and Undertaking (the “LOAU 1”) signed on 13 July 2002 by Mr Phua’s nominees (Mr Tan Boh Liang and Ms Alice Phua Mui Kiang) and Mr Choo. Pursuant to the LOAU 1, a total of 1.08 million Atech shares were transferred to Mr Choo to be held on trust for Mr Phua. The LOAU 1 stated that the 1.08 million Atech shares were meant to be security for the payment of Mr Choo’s “legal fee”.
(b) A Trust Agreement (the “Trust Agreement”) signed on 23 November 2002 by Mr Phua and Mr Choo. Pursuant to the Trust Agreement, a further 2.45 million Atech shares were transferred by Mr Phua to Mr Choo to be held on trust for Mr Phua. The proceeds of the liquidation of the shares would be held on trust for several purposes including the payment of A$150,000 to Mr Choo for his “consultancy services”.
- [35]
[35] It is undisputed that the 3.53 million Choo Atech Shares have since been sold by Mr Choo.
Transfers of moneys from Mr Ding to Mr Choo
- [36]
[36] In 2013, Mr Choo received at least S$150,000 from Mr Ding. In or around December 2015, Mr Choo received a further S$15,000 from Mr Ding.
The parties’ cases
Mr Choo’s claim
- [37]
[37] Mr Choo claims that his services were law-related business consultancy services and that he is entitled to be paid consultancy fees by Mr Phua and/or Mr Ding under the following six oral agreements:
(a) An oral agreement made in September 2000 for Mr Phua to pay Mr Choo a fixed fee of S$50,000 for his services in relation to the recovery of the capital from the investments in the Melbourne Properties. These services included advising on possible litigation in Australia relating to the Melbourne Properties (the “Melbourne Capital Agreement”).
(b) An oral agreement made in September 2000 for Mr Phua to pay Mr Choo hourly rates of S$800 per hour for ordinary work and S$1,200 per hour for work on foreign issues and/or urgent matters. These services related to the recovery of the profits from the investments in the Melbourne Properties and advising on possible issues in Australia and the BVI regarding the Melbourne Properties (eg, directors’ duties, taxes, accounts, and breaches of trust) (the “Melbourne Profits Agreement (Phua)”). Mr Choo claims that Mr Phua owes him a total of S$100,750 for work done pursuant to this agreement between September 2000 and June 2001.
(c) An oral agreement made in December 2000 for Mr Phua to pay Mr Choo hourly rates of S$800 per hour for ordinary work and S$1,200 per hour for work on foreign issues and/or urgent matters, for his services in relation to the OS 601 Interpleader Proceedings (the “Interpleader Agreement”). In addition, Mr Choo claims that he is entitled to be paid expenses and overseas fees of S$8,000 for each of his two trips to Hong Kong under this agreement. Mr Choo claims that Mr Phua owes him a total of S$193,880 for work done pursuant to this agreement for four years from December 2000 to 2004.
(d) An oral agreement made in June 2001 for the defendants to pay Mr Choo hourly rates of S$800 per hour for ordinary work and S$1,200 per hour for work on foreign issues and/or urgent matters (the “Melbourne Profits Agreement (Joint)”). Mr Choo’s services under this agreement related to the recovery of the profits from the investments in the Melbourne Properties. These services included advising on possible issues in Australia and the BVI regarding the Melbourne Properties (eg, directors’ duties, taxes, accounts, and breaches of trust). In addition, Mr Choo claims that he is entitled to be paid expenses and overseas fees of A$50,000 per trip to Australia and S$4,500 per trip to Kuala Lumpur. According to Mr Choo, the defendants agreed to pay him these overseas fees as part of the oral Melbourne Profits Agreement (Joint). Mr Choo claims that the defendants owe him a total of S$1,456,550 for work done pursuant to this agreement from June 2001 to June 2018.
(e) The Mei Leong Indemnity Agreement. Mr Choo claims that the defendants have not paid him the fixed fee of A$50,000 to which he is entitled under this agreement for successfully negotiating the 2001 Mei Leong Settlement Agreement.
(f) An oral agreement made in or around April 2002 between Mr Choo and M/s Mei Leong, for M/s Mei Leong to pay Mr Choo a retainer of A$30,000 per year for his services in ensuring that its client’s claim to the A$820,000 set aside in the ACU Account was looked after (the “Lee Claim Agreement”). Mr Choo claims that the defendants owe him a total of A$420,000 for his work in this regard: A$240,000 for eight years of work done pursuant to the oral Lee Claim Agreement during the period from 2002 to 2012 (with breaks in between factored in), and A$180,000 for six years of work done pursuant to the Tripartite Agreement from 2012 to 2018.
- [38]
[38] Mr Choo further argues that the 20% Remuneration Arrangement in the Consultancy Agreement is limited to work done from February 2002 onwards and work done specifically for the OS 902 Interpleader Proceedings. Hence, Mr Choo’s position is that the Consultancy Agreement was terminated by the judgment in ANZ v Ding in 2004, and the parties agreed to revert to the hourly rates of S$800 and S$1,200 per hour thereafter.
- [39]
[39] In addition, Mr Choo submits that it is undisputed that he expended time and labour in doing work for the defendants. The oral and written agreements between the parties show that he was not providing his services to the defendants gratuitously or out of goodwill. Therefore, he is entitled to fair and adequate compensation as consideration for his work. However, during his oral submissions, Mr Choo’s counsel admitted that no quantum meruit claim had been pleaded and he acknowledged the difficulty of making this claim. It is well established that a claim based on quantum meruit must be pleaded (see Loy Chin Associates Pte Ltd v Autohouse Trading Pte Ltd [1991] 1 SLR(R) 740 at [19]–[22]). Therefore, I shall not consider the issue of whether Mr Choo could have brought an alternative claim based on quantum meruit.
The defendants’ defences to Mr Choo’s claim
- [40]
[40] First, the defendants submit that Mr Choo held himself out to be a lawyer and provided legal advice and services. Thus, Mr Choo proffered the services of an advocate and solicitor for a fee. It is undisputed that Mr Choo did not have a valid practising certificate under the LPA in force from 1 April 2000 to 31 March 2006, and from 1 April 2014 onwards. Consequently, the defendants contend that Mr Choo was an unauthorised person within the definition in s 32(2)(b) of the LPA when he provided these legal services for a fee. Hence, Mr Choo’s provision of these legal services contravened s 33 of the LPA and his claim for unpaid legal fees is barred on the ground of illegality.
- [41]
[41] Second, the defendants contend that none of the oral agreements alleged by Mr Choo existed (save for the Mei Leong Indemnity Agreement). Instead, Mr Choo was to be remunerated in accordance with the 20% Remuneration Arrangement. According to the defendants, this 20% Remuneration Arrangement was based on the following oral agreements (the existence of which Mr Choo disputes), which were eventually reduced to writing in the Consultancy Agreement:
(a) an oral agreement made in November 2000 for Mr Phua to pay Mr Choo 20% of any moneys recovered by Mr Choo for Mr Phua from the profits of the investments in the Melbourne Properties (the “Choo-Phua 2000 Oral Agreement”); and
(b) an oral agreement made in February 2002 for the defendants to pay Mr Choo 20% of any moneys recovered by Mr Choo for the defendants from the profits of the investments in the Melbourne Properties (the “Choo-Phua-Ding 2002 Oral Agreement”).
- [42]
[42] According to Mr Ding, the 20% Remuneration Arrangement agreed on in the Choo-Phua-Ding 2002 Oral Agreement was proposed by Mr Choo in February 2002. The defendants agreed to this proposal in principle and it was then formalised in the Consultancy Agreement in 2003.
- [43]
[43] The defendants argue that this 20% Remuneration Arrangement is champertous or savours of maintenance. It is, therefore, void and unenforceable as it is contrary to public policy. In the alternative, the defendants argue that Mr Choo has been paid more than 20% of the moneys recovered from the ACU Account after deducting expenses, allowances and other sums paid to Mr Choo. As noted at [27] above, the defendants recovered a sum of US$1.04m from the ACU Account. Twenty percent of this sum would have been less than S$290,000, and Mr Choo has already been paid more than this amount.
- [44]
[44] Third, with regard to the Mei Leong Indemnity Agreement, the defendants admit that this agreement existed. However, they argue that Mr Choo’s fixed fee of A$50,000 was fully paid to him by Mr Ding on behalf of both defendants in 2001. This sum was paid in two instalments: an advance of A$20,000 on 21 September 2001 and the balance sum of A$30,000 on 23 and 24 November 2001.
- [45]
[45] Fourth, the defendants submit that they entered into an oral agreement with Mr Choo in or around March or April 2013 whereby Mr Choo agreed to accept S$200,000 from Mr Ding in full and final settlement of all fees payable by the defendants. Mr Choo also agreed to relinquish any and all claims that he might have to the ACU Account Moneys (the “2013 Choo Settlement Agreement”). The defendants’ position is that the full sum of S$200,000 was paid by Mr Ding to Mr Choo in 2013. This was in two instalments: S$150,000 by bank transfer in May 2013 and S$50,000 in cash which was paid to Mr Choo by hand in early June 2013.
- [46]
[46] Further, Mr Phua argues that under the DATBI, any liabilities that he had to pay Mr Choo’s unpaid fees were novated to Mr Ding with Mr Choo’s knowledge, consent and/or acquiescence. In consideration, Mr Phua “irrevocably agree[d] to transfer all his beneficial interest in the Gracedale’s [sic] account to Ding without any conditions attached”. Therefore, Mr Choo has no claim against Mr Phua for these fees.
- [47]
[47] Fifth, the defendants argue that Mr Choo’s claims are time-barred under the Limitation Act in so far as his legal services were rendered more than six years prior to the issuance of the writ of summons in this Suit.
Mr Phua’s counterclaim
- [48]
[48] Mr Phua submits that Mr Choo was only entitled to sell the 3.53 million Choo Atech Shares after the US$1.04m was recovered by the defendants from the ACU Account under the 2016 Lee Settlement Agreement. Furthermore, the conditions in the LOAU 1, the Trust Agreement and the LOAU 2 had to be fulfilled before Mr Choo could sell the 3.53 million Choo Atech Shares. For instance, under the LOAU 1 and the Trust Agreement, Mr Phua must have failed to pay Mr Choo his legal consultancy fees as specified in those documents before Mr Choo could sell the shares. These shares were held by Mr Choo on trust for Mr Phua. Thus, Mr Phua counterclaims against Mr Choo for an account and inquiry into all sums, interests, profits and assets arising from or traceable to the sale proceeds of the 3.53 million Choo Atech Shares and for the same to be paid by Mr Choo to Mr Phua upon the taking of an account and inquiry.
Mr Choo’s defence to Mr Phua’s counterclaim
- [49]
[49] Mr Choo contends that Mr Phua consented to the sale of 2.45 million of the 3.53 million Choo Atech Shares in or around early 2004, and to the sale of the remaining 1.08 million shares in or around 2012. According to Mr Choo, he received A$147,000 from the sale of the first 2.45 million shares at A$0.06 per share, and a further A$64,800 from the sale of the remaining 1.08 million shares, also at an average price of A$0.06 per share. In respect of the latter sum of A$64,800, Mr Choo argues that he is fully entitled to half of this amount (ie, A$32,400) because he was entitled to 540,000 of the 1.08 million shares under the LOAU 2.
- [50]
[50] Further, Mr Choo claims that Mr Phua orally agreed in August 2000 to pay him a fixed fee of S$200,000 for his services in resolving the dispute between Mr Phua and Phillip Securities in relation to contra losses incurred by Mr Phua (the “PS Consultancy Agreement”). Mr Choo’s cause of action under the PS Consultancy Agreement was struck out by an assistant registrar on the ground that it was time-barred. Nevertheless, the PS Consultancy Agreement is relevant in the present proceedings as Mr Choo argues that at least part of the sale proceeds from the 3.53 million Choo Atech Shares was payment due to him for work done under the PS Consultancy Agreement. On this basis, Mr Choo argues that he can set off the sale proceeds of the 3.53 million Choo Atech Shares against his claims for Mr Phua’s unpaid fees in the present Suit.
Mr Ding’s counterclaim
- [51]
[51] Mr Ding submits that he extended loans amounting to S$24,000 to Mr Choo. A loan of S$9,000 was given by Mr Ding to Mr Choo on 30 April 2015. A further loan of S$15,000 was given by Mr Ding to Mr Choo on 15 December 2015. According to Mr Ding, he demanded (by way of a letter dated 9 May 2018 from R&T to Mr Choo’s then solicitors (the “2018 R&T Letter of Demand”)) that Mr Choo repay these loans within 14 days from the date of the letter, but Mr Choo has not done so.
Mr Choo’s defence to Mr Ding’s counterclaim
- [52]
[52] Mr Choo does not dispute that he received S$15,000 from Mr Ding in or around December 2015. However, Mr Choo claims that he did not receive the sum of S$9,000 from Mr Ding.
- [53]
[53] Mr Choo contends that the S$15,000 was not a loan as there are no official loan documents or correspondence between the parties showing that this sum was meant to be a loan. Instead the S$15,000 was part-payment of the outstanding fees owed to him by Mr Ding. Further, Mr Choo submits that Mr Ding’s counterclaim should fail because Mr Ding had not laid claim to this alleged loan since 2015.
Issues to be determined
- [54]
[54] The central issues to be determined in relation to Mr Choo’s claim for unpaid fees are as follows:
(a) First, do the fees claimed by Mr Choo constitute remuneration in respect of legal work done as an advocate or solicitor when he did not have a practising certificate at the relevant time, and is he barred from recovering these fees under s 36(1) of the LPA?
(b) Second, what was the basis on which the parties agreed Mr Choo was to be remunerated?
(c) Third, if Mr Choo was to be remunerated based on the 20% Remuneration Arrangement, is this arrangement void on the ground that it is champertous?
(d) Fourth, if Mr Choo is legally entitled to be remunerated for his services, has he been remunerated by the defendants?
- [55]
[55] The issues pertaining to Mr Phua’s counterclaim regarding the 3.53 million Choo Atech Shares are as follows:
(a) First, was Mr Choo entitled to sell the 3.53 million Choo Atech Shares at the time at which he sold them?
(b) Second, could Mr Choo use the sale proceeds from the 3.53 million Choo Atech Shares to offset Mr Phua’s fees owing to him for the work done under the alleged PS Consultancy Agreement?
- [56]
[56] As for Mr Ding’s counterclaim for repayment of the loans amounting to S$24,000, the issues to be determined are as follows:
(a) First, did Mr Choo receive the loans totalling S$24,000 from Mr Ding in 2015?
(b) Second, were these moneys loans to Mr Choo or part-payments of Mr Choo’s outstanding fees owed by Mr Ding?
My decision
Assessment of the key witnesses
- [57]
[57] The critical issues in this case, particularly Mr Choo’s version of his claims, depend heavily on parol evidence without corroboration. Therefore, it is crucial to evaluate the credibility and reliability of Mr Choo, Mr Phua and Mr Ding before I deal with the specific issues outlined above.
General observations regarding Mr Choo’s credibility and reliability
- [58]
[58] Having heard Mr Choo’s testimony at the trial and measured it against the evidence in this case, I find that he is an extremely unreliable witness. His testimony was like shifting sands and was beset with numerous inconsistencies and vacillations, including frequent departures from positions he had previously affirmed in his affidavits and his pleadings. He claimed that his case was supported by various documents which did not in fact support his claims, or which, upon further questioning, he was unwilling or unable to produce in court for inspection. On numerous occasions, while he was on the witness stand, he sought to correct alleged errors in the documentary evidence he himself had placed before the court.
- [59]
[59] At this point, I shall illustrate the enormously unreliable and sieve-like nature of Mr Choo’s testimony with some examples. I shall also elaborate on Mr Choo’s parsimony with the truth in my judgment below when I discuss the various issues. This will further reveal Mr Choo’s lack of honesty and integrity.
- [60]
[60] The first example relates to an invoice that was requested by Mr Ding to enable him to make a bank transfer of some money to Mr Choo in 2013. Mr Ding’s evidence is that the bank wanted an invoice before it would transfer the money to Mr Choo. This request was conveyed to Mr Choo. Mr Choo claimed that he had deliberately made an addition error in the invoice dated 8 June 2013 (the “8 June 2013 Invoice”) because he found Mr Ding’s instructions suspicious. The 8 June 2013 Invoice stated that the fees owed to Mr Choo for services rendered from 2004 to 2013 were S$120,000 for advice and S$80,000 for attending meetings and discussions, amounting to an (incorrect) total of S$100,000. According to Mr Choo, the actual invoice was for S$100,000, but Mr Ding had instructed Mr Choo to change the fees for advice to S$120,000 and the fees for attending meetings and discussions to S$80,000. Therefore, Mr Choo became suspicious and deliberately left the total as the incorrect figure of S$100,000 because he wanted to invalidate the invoice to prevent Mr Ding from using it. On the witness stand, when asked by Mr Phua’s counsel what the correct dates and figures were, Mr Choo amended the invoice to state that the fees owed to him for services rendered from 2012 to 2013 were S$116,680 for advice and S$65,270 for attending meetings and discussions. This was materially inconsistent with Mr Choo’s affidavit of evidence-in-chief which stated that the original invoice, which he labelled the “$100K Invoice Accurate”, was for services rendered from 2004 to 2013, with his fees being S$60,000 and S$40,000 respectively. Mr Choo was unable to provide any satisfactory explanation for these significant and substantial discrepancies. In my view, if Mr Choo had in fact been so suspicious of Mr Ding’s intentions, he could have declined to issue this invoice entirely, instead of deliberately voiding the 8 June 2013 Invoice. His explanation in court is incredible.
- [61]
[61] In contrast, Mr Ding offers a far more logical and credible explanation for the incorrect figures in the 8 June 2013 Invoice. According to Mr Ding, when Mr Choo first issued the 8 June 2013 Invoice to him, he noticed that the total bill was incorrect. He told Mr Choo over the phone that there was an error in the invoice and Mr Choo told him to return the invoice for correction. Mr Choo then cancelled the figure of S$100,000, wrote the figure of S$200,000 in its place and returned the amended invoice to Mr Ding with the total corrected to S$200,000. Mr Ding exhibited his copy of this amended invoice in his affidavit of evidence-in-chief.
- [62]
[62] The second example of a serious discrepancy in Mr Choo’s evidence is his assertion during his cross-examination by Mr Phua’s counsel that Mr Phua had, in his affidavit and/or Defence and Counterclaim, admitted to the oral Melbourne Capital Agreement alleged by Mr Choo. To appreciate this example, it is pertinent to give some background to the purported oral Melbourne Capital Agreement. As noted at [37(a)] above, Mr Choo alleges that an oral agreement was made in September 2000 under which Mr Phua agreed to pay him S$50,000 in relation to the recovery of the capital from the investments in the Melbourne Properties from Mr Lee. Mr Phua denies that there was such an agreement as Mr Lee was prepared to return the capital to the defendants. It was also in the parties’ second Agreed Statement of Facts that, “[b]etween 25–27 October 2000, Lee returned A$5.25 million out of the A$8.4 million [which Mr Lee had transferred without authorisation] to Lee, Ding and Phua in the proportion of 60%, 20%, and 20% respectively as a return of their capital investment in the Melbourne Properties”. Hence, there was no requirement for Mr Choo’s involvement regarding the return of the Melbourne Property investments as there was no dispute regarding the return of the capital by Mr Lee. Mr Choo initially insisted that Mr Phua had admitted to this oral Melbourne Capital Agreement. Mr Choo said:
- [63]
[63] However, when Mr Phua’s counsel asked Mr Choo to point to the specific paragraphs of these documents that supported his assertion, he was unable to do so. After some resistance, he eventually admitted that these documents did not specifically refer to such an oral agreement and that there was no documentary evidence to support his claim:
- [64]
[64] The third example of Mr Choo’s conflicting testimony of a material nature was when he testified in court and gave the impression that he had made contemporaneous annotations of time spent on work done for the defendants. On the fifth day of his cross-examination by Mr Phua’s counsel, Mr Choo claimed for the first time that, from around 2010 onwards, he had made contemporaneous annotations indicating the time spent on various meetings that he attended for the defendants shortly after these meetings took place. These annotations were not exhibited by Mr Choo, nor were they mentioned in his affidavits. However, even though Mr Phua’s counsel invited Mr Choo to produce these annotations for review, Mr Choo stated that he was reluctant to do so because he might then be cross-examined by Mr Phua’s counsel. He subsequently confirmed that he did not intend to produce these annotations.
- [66]
[66] The fifth example of Mr Choo’s unreliability as a witness was when he misquoted Mr Ding’s affidavit evidence. In Mr Choo’s Reply and Defence to Counterclaim, he claimed that Mr Ding had admitted, in his affidavit filed in the OS 902 Interpleader Proceedings, that the defendants had “agreed to pay [Mr Choo] A$50,000 if he could reach a settlement with M/s Mei Leong and A$50,0000 for each overseas trip” [emphasis added]. However, the corresponding paragraph of Mr Ding’s affidavit did not state that the defendants had agreed to pay Mr Choo A$50,000 for each overseas trip. Mr Ding stated only that the defendants had agreed to pay Mr Choo A$50,000 if he could reach a settlement with M/s Mei Leong, with an advance payment of A$20,000. During his cross-examination by Mr Ding’s counsel, Mr Choo could not offer any explanation for this clear discrepancy apart from stating that it was “a genuine error”, and he admitted that it “ought to be deleted” and was “wrong”. At best, this casts further doubt on the reliability of Mr Choo’s evidence. At worst, as the defendants submit, it may suggest that Mr Choo may have deliberately misrepresented or lied about Mr Ding’s affidavit evidence in an attempt to mislead the court.
- [67]
[67] I am, therefore, of the view that Mr Choo’s evidence is dangerously unreliable and must be treated with extreme caution. It is prudent not to accept his testimony readily at face value without careful evaluation together with other evidence. This does not mean that I have completely rejected Mr Choo’s evidence in toto without careful proper assessment.
General observations regarding the defendants’ credibility
- [68]
[68] In contrast, I find the defendants to be generally reliable, honest and credible. Their evidence was cogent and largely consistent with their pleadings, affidavits and testimony at the trial. I am, therefore, generally more inclined to believe the defendants’ version of the events, particularly where it is supported by corroborative evidence. With this in mind, I shall now consider each of the specific issues which arise for determination.
Mr Choo’s claim for unpaid fees
Nature of the work done by Mr Choo
- [69]
[69] The defendants submit that the services rendered to them by Mr Choo were clearly legal services. Mr Choo did not have a practising certificate in force between 1 April 2000 and 31 March 2006 and from 1 April 2014 onwards. Hence, the services he rendered to the defendants during these periods were rendered in breach of ss 32(1) and 33 of the LPA. Consequently, Mr Choo is not allowed to recover his purported fees for these services pursuant to s 36(1) of the LPA.
- [70]
[70] In addition, Mr Phua submits that even during the period when Mr Choo did have a practising certificate in force (ie, from 1 April 2006 to 31 March 2014), Mr Choo is not entitled to recover his purported fees. When I questioned Mr Choo, he admitted that a condition imposed by the Law Society of Singapore (the “Law Society”) on the renewal of his practising certificate during this period was that he could not take on any clients. Mr Choo stated that he only renewed his practising certificate so that he could attend and experience court proceedings. On this basis, Mr Phua submits that Mr Choo’s provision of legal services to the defendants breached the LPA even during the period when he had a practising certificate in force. The legal services provided to the defendants during this period would not have been covered by his practising certificate. Mr Phua also contends that Mr Choo admitted that he did not use his practising certificate to solicit for clients. Mr Choo also affirmed in his affidavits that he only provided law-related business consultancy services even during the period when he had a practising certificate in force. Thus, Mr Choo made a carefully considered factual and legal concession that he was not relying on his practising certificate to legitimise his services to the defendants. Consequently, if it is found that Mr Choo provided legal services to the defendants, Mr Choo cannot then be allowed to rely on his practising certificate ex post facto as a shield against the provisions of the LPA. In this regard, Mr Phua relies on the Court of Appeal’s decision in Recovery Vehicle 1 Pte Ltd v Industries Chimiques Du Senegal and another appeal and another matter [2021] 1 SLR 342 at [103]–[111].
- [71]
[71] The defendants, therefore, submit that Mr Choo cannot be allowed to claim his purported legal fees for the legal services he provided to them in breach of the LPA. If Mr Choo, who brazenly admitted that he was unregulated by any Bar association and did not have any legal liability or professional insurance coverage, were allowed to claim such fees, this would result in a failure to protect the public from unauthorised persons who carry out acts typically done by advocates and solicitors. This would have grave legal, financial and other implications on their clients.
- [72]
[72] In addition, the defendants argue that Mr Choo’s claim is barred by statutory and common law illegality as follows:
(a) Mr Phua submits that the LPA not only prohibits the conduct of providing legal services without a practising certificate and bars any civil claim for fees arising therefrom, but also impliedly prohibits contracts for such services. This is because ss 32–36 of the LPA were enacted to protect the public from claims to legal services by unauthorised persons. The agreement for Mr Choo’s legal services was formed when Mr Choo did not have a valid practising certificate in force. Mr Choo’s contravention of the LPA strikes at the very root of the contract and such illegality cannot be cured by subsequently obtaining a practising certificate. Thus, Mr Choo is barred from claiming his legal fees for all his legal services rendered to the defendants, including those rendered during the period when he had a practising certificate in force.
(b) Mr Ding submits that, applying the factors set out by the Court of Appeal in Ting Siew May v Boon Lay Choo and another [2014] 3 SLR 609 (“Ting Siew May”), it is clear that the court should deny Mr Choo any recovery. The legislative intent of the LPA is to protect the public from claims to legal services by unauthorised persons. Further, the defendants’ agreement to appoint Mr Choo as their legal adviser is for the very act prohibited under the LPA and Mr Choo cannot be allowed to profit from his own wrong. Mr Ding contends that Mr Choo is a menace to society and that the court should not condone his actions by allowing his claim.
- [73]
[73] On the other hand, Mr Choo denies providing legal services in breach of the LPA when he did not have a practising certificate in force. Instead, Mr Choo submits that he only provided the defendants with law-related business consultancy services, which are not governed by the LPA, and in respect of which he is entitled to claim consultancy fees. In response to Mr Phua’s argument that he is not entitled to rely on his practising certificate which was in force from 1 April 2006 to 31 March 2014, Mr Choo clarified that what he was trying to express was that he was not required to maintain and file accounts for his sole proprietorship law firm, “WChoo & Company”, because he did not take on any paying clients during that period.
(1) The applicable law
- [74]
[74] As a preliminary point, I note that Mr Choo’s work was performed over a period spanning from 2000 to (on Mr Choo’s account) 2018. During this period of 18 years, several different versions of the LPA were in force. However, the relevant provisions are in pari materia with the current version of the LPA and the parties have referred to the current version in their submissions, thus I shall similarly refer to the current version.
- [75]
[75] Section 32(1) of the LPA provides that no person shall practise as an advocate and solicitor, or do any act as an advocate and solicitor, unless his name is on the roll and he has in force a practising certificate. If a person does not have in force a practising certificate, he is an “unauthorised person” for the purposes of the LPA (s 32(2)(b) of the LPA).
- [77]
[77] Under s 33(1) of the LPA, an offence is committed by any unauthorised person who acts as an advocate or solicitor or agent for any party to proceedings, or performs certain acts as such advocate or solicitor, or wilfully or falsely uses any title or description implying that he is duly qualified or authorised to act as an advocate or solicitor:
- [78]
[78] Section 33(2) of the LPA lists examples of specific acts that will fall within the prohibition in s 33(1). This includes an unauthorised person who, directly or indirectly, “draws or prepares any document or instrument relating to any movable or immovable property or to any legal proceeding” (s 33(2)(a)), unless he proves that the act was not done for or in expectation of any fee, gain or reward.
- [79]
[79] The LPA does not define what it means to act as an advocate and solicitor for the purposes of ss 32(1), 33(1), and 36(1). However, the tests for determining when a person is acting as an advocate and solicitor were set out by Chan Sek Keong JC (as he then was) in Turner. Chan JC noted that what constitutes acting as an advocate and solicitor could be inferred from the list of specific acts set out in what is now s 33(2) of the LPA, but that this list was not exhaustive of all the acts or services of an advocate and solicitor (Turner at [14]). Having considered the text of the relevant provisions as well as case law from different jurisdictions, Chan JC said (Turner at [20]):
- [81]
[81] While Chan JC’s remarks were made with reference to ss 29 and 30 of an earlier version of the LPA, these provisions are in pari materia with ss 32 and 33 of the LPA (as extracted at [77] above) respectively. Further, in my view, the two Turner tests are equally applicable in determining whether an act was “done by an unauthorised person as an advocate or a solicitor” for the purposes of the current s 36(1) of the LPA. Following Chan JC’s decision in Turner, the LPA was amended to provide that ss 32 and 33 would not extend to arbitration proceedings. This was done through the introduction of what is now s 35 of the LPA. The purpose of this amendment was to overcome the “unintended adverse effects [of Turner] on the commercial reputation of Singapore as a centre for international arbitrations” and to “enable the Singapore International Arbitration Centre to be as competitive as the other centres”, such as Kuala Lumpur and Hong Kong, which allowed foreign lawyers to appear in arbitration proceedings (Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (27 February 1992) vol 59 at col 425 (Prof S Jayakumar, Minister for Law)). However, no other amendments were made to the LPA to alter the effect of the other aspects of the Turner decision. Hence, I disagree with Mr Choo’s counsel, who suggested in his oral submissions that the reasoning in Turner (which was decided in 1988) is no longer applicable in “our current economic and business climate”.
- [82]
[82] Moreover, I accept the defendants’ submission that the two Turner tests should be read disjunctively and not conjunctively. Thus, only one of the tests needs to be satisfied for a person to be found to have acted as an advocate and solicitor.
- [83]
[83] In particular, while the giving of advice on legal rights and obligations is not specifically listed in s 33 of the LPA, it is one of the quintessential services rendered by advocates and solicitors. In the words of the Supreme Court of Victoria in Cornall v Nagle [1995] 2 VR 188 at p 208, “the giving of legal advice, at least as part of a course of conduct and for reward, can properly be said to lie at or near the very centre of the practice of the law, and hence of the notion of acting or practising as a solicitor” [emphasis added].
- [84]
[84] Based on the above, there are three types of work for which an unauthorised person cannot claim any remuneration and which are relevant in the present case:
(a) work that he was employed to do as an advocate and solicitor in any matter connected with the profession of advocates and solicitors (the second Turner test);
(b) work done by him that falls within any of the specific categories set out in s 33 of the LPA (in particular, acting as an advocate or solicitor in preparing any document relating to any legal proceeding); and
(c) work done by him that is customarily within the exclusive function of advocates and solicitors to provide (in particular, giving advice on legal rights and obligations) (the first Turner test).
- [85]
[85] At this juncture, I would like to address Mr Choo’s arguments regarding the interpretation of the above provisions of the LPA. He submits that s 33 of the LPA states exactly the scope of services that an unauthorised person is disallowed from carrying out, and that the list of disallowed acts under s 33 must be exhaustive since they attract potential criminal sanctions. Accordingly, Mr Choo contends that the LPA places no restrictions on the following acts: (a) business consultants referring their clients to professional lawyers to commence legal proceedings; (b) business consultants giving inputs on legal issues during the course of their consultancy services; and (c) all types of consultancy work (eg, mediation, negotiation, and drafting contractual documents) that may contain legal elements. To support this argument, Mr Choo relies on cases such as Public Prosecutor v Bhaskaran Shamkumar [2005] SGDC 147 (“Bhaskaran”), Public Prosecutor v Mahadevan Lukshumayeh [2005] SGDC 129 and Public Prosecutor v Jasvendar Kaur d/o Avtar Singh [2006] SGDC 216, where the accused persons were charged under s 33 of the LPA.
- [86]
[86] In my view, this argument is flawed for two reasons. First, in Turner, Chan JC expressly stated that acts other than the specific acts listed in (what is now) ss 33(1) and 33(2) of the LPA may nevertheless be acts of an advocate and solicitor (Turner at [20]). Second, Mr Choo’s argument fails to consider the operation of s 36(1) of the LPA which, as stated at [76] above, has two disjunctive limbs. In this case, Mr Choo was an unauthorised person even though he was admitted as an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court under s 16 of the LPA as he did not have a practising certificate in force during the relevant periods (see s 32(2)(b) of the LPA). Therefore, so long as the work done by him was done “as an advocate or a solicitor”, s 36 operates to bar his civil claim for fees charged in connection with that work. It is not necessary for me to ascertain whether he is guilty of an offence under s 33.
- [88]
[88] During his oral submissions, Mr Choo’s counsel sought to argue that there are alternative forms of recourse against unauthorised persons who act as advocates and solicitors, namely: suing such persons in court, prosecuting them for offences and relying on principles of contract law. This submission misses the point. The LPA and the LP(PC)R form a key part of the regulatory framework governing unauthorised persons who act as advocates and solicitors. To argue that the provisions of the LPA and LP(PC)R should not be given their full effect simply because other forms of recourse might also be available to those in the defendants’ position would severely undermine this regulatory framework.
- [89]
[89] Similarly, Mr Choo’s argument that he was a “legally trained business consultant”, and was, therefore, not governed by the LPA, holds no water. What is crucial is the nature of the work done by the unauthorised person. If the nature of the work done is in fact legal work, then the fact that it is provided by a self-styled “business consultant” is no defence under the LPA.
(2) My findings
- [90]
[90] It is not disputed that Mr Choo did not have a valid practising certificate in force from 1 April 2000 to 31 March 2006, and from 1 April 2014 onwards (see [40] above). Mr Choo was, therefore, an unauthorised person during these periods. With this in mind, I shall now consider whether the work done and services rendered by Mr Choo during the periods when he did not have a valid practising certificate fall within the types of work outlined at [84] above.
(A) Work done in the course of employment as an advocate and solicitor
- [91]
[91] I shall first consider whether Mr Choo was employed by the defendants to act as an advocate and solicitor in any matter connected with the profession of advocates and solicitors.
- [92]
[92] Mr Choo contends that he never held himself out to be a qualified advocate and solicitor. He submits that the defendants engaged him as their business consultant to deal with their business matters, which involved several legal disputes, and not as an advocate and solicitor. He relies on the fact that he was referred to as a consultant in various documents, such as the LOAU 1, the Trust Agreement, the Consultancy Agreement and the Tripartite Agreement. Further, he argues that in so far as terms such as “legal fees”, “legal services” and “legal consultant” were used in the written agreements between the parties, this does not indicate that he was acting as an advocate and solicitor. Instead, Mr Choo said these terms were either used erroneously by him, or indicate only that he expected the business consultancy work he did for the defendants to touch on legal issues.
- [93]
[93] Mr Choo distinguishes the facts of Turner from the present case on two grounds: (a) he did not draft documents for legal proceedings, lead evidence on behalf of the defendants and cross-examine witnesses, or make submissions on the law or the facts in legal proceedings; and (b) there was never a warrant to act or letter of engagement signed between Mr Choo and the defendants formally appointing him as their advocate and solicitor. On this basis, Mr Choo argues that his scope of works for the defendants was nowhere near to the package of legal services provided by the New York attorneys in Turner.
- [94]
[94] In addition, Mr Choo argues that there was no solicitor-client relationship between himself and the defendants. He relies on the case of Rabiah Bee bte Mohamed Ibrahim v Salem Ibrahim [2007] 2 SLR(R) 655 (“Rabiah”), where Judith Prakash J (as she then was) found that the defendant was not the plaintiff’s solicitor because the defendant had not issued any express retainer or other document in which he purported to act as the plaintiff’s solicitor or gave legal advice to the plaintiff in her personal capacity. Prakash J remarked that, in the absence of an express agreement or express assertion of authority to act on the purported client’s behalf, one would need to show that an objective consideration of all the circumstances led to the conclusion that an intention to enter into a solicitor-client relationship ought fairly and properly be imputed to both parties. The implication that a solicitor-client relationship existed must be “so clear that the solicitor ought to have appreciated it” (at [58]). Mr Choo submits that he falls squarely within the facts of Rabiah because there was no formal document or contract, such as a warrant to act or letter of engagement, indicating that the defendants had engaged Mr Choo as their solicitor, and the defendants had also appointed various external counsel during the material time.
- [95]
[95] Further, Mr Choo contends that the defendants ultimately relied on the advice of their instructed solicitors to protect and further their legal interests. He relies on Mr Ding’s testimony that if the defendants’ appointed foreign lawyers gave advice that conflicted with Mr Choo’s, Mr Ding would accept the foreign lawyers’ advice. If the defendants’ appointed local lawyers gave advice that conflicted with Mr Choo’s, Mr Ding would apply his own mind to decide whose advice to follow. On this basis, Mr Choo argues that he was simply providing his views as a business consultant, and that if he had been the primary provider of legal advice to the defendants, there would have been no need for the defendants to engage these instructed solicitors. He further argues that he could not have been providing legal services when these instructed solicitors were already the solicitors in charge doing substantial legal work for the defendants. Moreover, these instructed solicitors would do the final checks and seek the defendants’ clearance before any court documents were filed. There is no written evidence showing that Mr Choo was appointed as the defendants’ “instructing solicitor”. Instead, he acted merely as a business consultant to assist and liaise with the defendants’ instructed solicitors in the legal proceedings, and to “supplement and support” these instructed solicitors.
- [96]
[96] On the other hand, the defendants submit that they engaged Mr Choo to act as their lawyer and legal adviser, to do all things legal in nature relating to the recovery of the profits of their investments in the Melbourne Properties. They always saw Mr Choo as their lawyer and engaged Mr Choo solely for his legal expertise and knowledge. They testified that Mr Choo did not provide them with financial or other services.
- [97]
[97] When Mr Phua and Mr Choo became colleagues in Phillip Securities, Mr Choo shared with Mr Phua that he had previously studied law and practised as a lawyer. During their conversations as colleagues, Mr Choo told Mr Phua that he could provide him with legal advice and help him resolve his legal problems relating to the Melbourne Properties. He also shared with Mr Phua that he had a wide knowledge of the law. Subsequently, at their first meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Mr Choo introduced himself to Mr Ding as someone who was capable of providing legal advice and legal assistance in relation to, among other matters, the aborted Yip Atech Shares Transaction, including the OS 601 Interpleader Proceedings. At this meeting, Mr Choo gave Mr Ding his Phillip Securities name card, which stated “Barrister-at-Law” and “Advocate & Solicitor” under his name.
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