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Grounds publishedDecided 10 Aug 2021
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General Division of the High Court

Crescendas Bionics Pte Ltd v Jurong Primewide Pte Ltd

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[2021] SGHC 189Case no. Suit No 477 of 2015

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Grounds of decision

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The plaintiff is Crescendas Bionics Pte Ltd, a Singapore registered entity that was incorporated as a property developer. The defendant is Jurong Primewide Pte Ltd, a general building contractor registered as a Grade A1 contractor with the Building and Construction Authority (“BCA”).

  3. [2] On 30 June 2008, the parties signed a four-page Letter of Intent dated 26 June 2008 (the “LOI”) under which the plaintiff engaged the defendant as the management contractor to build Biopolis 3, a seven-storey multi-tenanted business park development at Biopolis Drive/Biomedical Grove in One-North. Biopolis 3 was positioned as a research and development (“R&D”) hub for biomedical sciences (“BMS”) institutes and organisations, offering specialised facilities such as wet laboratories, chemistry laboratories and an animal facility. It is the third phase of the Biopolis hub after Biopolis 1 and Biopolis 2.

  4. [3] After the LOI was signed, the parties’ relationship deteriorated as they disagreed on their respective obligations and the scope of their responsibilities under the LOI. In addition, there were delays in the completion of Biopolis 3, which was eventually certified as completed by the Superintending Officer, Jurong Consultants Pte Ltd (the “SO”), on 12 January 2011. It was undisputed that the time taken for completion exceeded the time period of 18 months stipulated in the LOI for the defendant to complete Biopolis 3. The plaintiff thus brought this Suit against the defendant and the defendant also brought various counterclaims against the plaintiff.

  5. [4] The trial was bifurcated on 19 February 2018 and I made my findings on the liabilities of the parties in Crescendas Bionics Pte Ltd v Jurong Primewide Pte Ltd [2019] SGHC 4 (the “Liability Judgment (HC)”). The Liability Judgment (HC) was affirmed on appeal in Jurong Primewide Pte Ltd v Crescendas Bionics Pte Ltd and another appeal [2019] SGCA 63 (the “Liability Judgment (CA)”), save in relation to one point material to the present proceedings: namely, the time taken for the capping beams work (see the Liability Judgment (CA) at [16]–[20]).

  6. [5] For the purposes of the present proceedings, the most relevant findings made in the Liability Judgment (HC) and the Liability Judgment (CA) are that the plaintiff was responsible for 173 days of delay in the completion of Biopolis 3 caused by its acts of prevention (see the Liability Judgment (HC) at [352]), while the defendant was responsible for 161 days of delay (see the Liability Judgment (CA) at [14]–[20]). On this basis, the defendant was found to be liable to the plaintiff for general damages for 161 days of delay.

  7. [6] In these proceedings, the plaintiff seeks an assessment of the general damages due to it in respect of the 161 days of delay for which the defendant was responsible, as the contractual provision on liquidated damages in the LOI was rendered inoperative as a result of the acts of prevention by the plaintiff.

  8. Background to the dispute

  9. [7] The background facts have been set out in detail in the Liability Judgment (HC). I shall, therefore, summarise only the most salient facts which are relevant to these assessment of damages proceedings.

  10. Date on which Biopolis 3 was deemed completed under the LOI

  11. [8] Clause 5.0 of the LOI provided that the commencement date of the construction of Biopolis 3 was 23 July 2008 and the date on which Biopolis 3 was to reach “substantial completion” was 22 January 2010 (18 months from 23 July 2008). The contract period was the period from 23 July 2008 to 22 January 2010. Biopolis 3 was certified to be completed on 12 January 2011. The parties agreed that the contractual completion date was 22 January 2010, but disagreed on the meaning of “substantial completion” in cl 5.0.

  12. [9] In the Liability Judgment (HC), I found that contractual completion was reached when Biopolis 3 was ready for Temporary Occupation Permit (“TOP”) application and inspection, and not when the TOP was granted. The BCA had directed the SO to apply for the TOP on 22 December 2010. Hence, under cl 5.0 of the LOI, Biopolis 3 was deemed to be completed on 22 December 2010 (see the Liability Judgment (HC) at [223]–[244]). Therefore, the completion of Biopolis 3 was delayed by a total of 334 days, from 22 January 2010 to 22 December 2010.

  13. Liabilities for the delays in the completion of Biopolis 3

  14. Delays attributable to the plaintiff

  15. [10] In the Liability Judgment (HC), I found that the plaintiff had committed several acts of prevention which caused the completion of Biopolis 3 to be delayed by a total of 173 days (see the Liability Judgment (HC) at [351]–[352]). I also found that the plaintiff had embarked on a subtle campaign to slow down the completion of Biopolis 3 while attempting to avoid having to bear any financial responsibility for doing so. This was largely because the global financial crisis (“GFC”) in late 2008 moderated construction prices and threw a pall of uncertainty over the demand for space in Biopolis 3 at that time (see the Liability Judgment (HC) at [378]–[385]).

  16. [11] I shall now briefly outline each of the acts of prevention committed by the plaintiff.

  17. (1) Delay arising from the termination of the Resident Engineer without immediate replacement

  18. [12] On 23 December 2008, the plaintiff terminated the Resident Engineer without providing an immediate replacement. Without a Resident Engineer on site for any period of time, piling works could not proceed. This caused a delay of six days, from 26 to 31 December 2008 (see the Liability Judgment (HC) at [255]–[268]).

  19. (2) Delay in the award of the reinforced concrete works

  20. [13] In emails dated 13 December 2008 and 19 December 2008, the plaintiff directed the defendant not to award any more trade contracts without the plaintiff’s endorsement and approval. This instruction was not revoked by the plaintiff (see the Liability Judgment (HC) at [271]–[290]).

  21. [14] Further, on 7 January 2009, at the last stage of the tender process, the plaintiff introduced Chang Hua Pte Ltd as a tenderer for the reinforced concrete works (“RC works”). The defendant required additional time of about a month to consider Chang Hua Pte Ltd’s tender submissions (see the Liability Judgment (HC) at [291]–[294]).

  22. [16] But for the plaintiff’s delaying actions, the RC works trade contract could have been awarded on 4 January 2009 (see the Liability Judgment (HC) at [308]). If the RC works trade contract had been awarded on 4 January 2009, the Biopolis 3 site would have been ready for the RC works trade contractor to start work (see the Liability Judgment (HC) at [326]).

  23. [17] Therefore, I found that the plaintiff had caused 147 days of delay in the award and subsequent commencement of the RC works, for the period from 4 January 2009 to 1 June 2009 (see the Liability Judgment (HC) at [327]).

  24. (3) Delay arising from the fabrication and installation of additional signage following the Registered Inspector’s inspection

  25. [18] On 4 November 2010, the Registered Inspector (“RI”) conducted a mechanical, electrical and architectural inspection of the Biopolis 3 site. On 9 November 2010, the SO informed the defendant that certain follow-up works had to be done, enclosing a list of the RI’s comments. In particular, the defendant was instructed to fabricate and install additional signage.

  26. [19] I found that the fabrication and installation of the additional signage were additional works outside the scope of the defendant’s work under the LOI, as the defendant had followed the architectural drawings provided by the SO. Further, I found that a reasonable time to complete the additional signage works was seven days (see the Liability Judgment (HC) at [341]–[344]).

  27. [20] Therefore, I found that the plaintiff had caused seven days of delay in relation to the fabrication and installation of additional signage following the RI inspection (see the Liability Judgment (HC) at [345]).

  28. (4) Delay arising from the additional railing works following the BCA inspection

  29. [21] On 9 December 2010, the BCA conducted a pre-TOP inspection of Biopolis 3. On the same date, the SO wrote to the defendant enclosing a list of the BCA’s comments for the defendant to follow up on. In particular, the defendant was instructed to install additional railings.

  30. [22] I found that the installation of additional railings, like the fabrication and installation of additional signage, were additional works outside the scope of the defendant’s work under the LOI as the defendant had constructed the building pursuant to the architectural drawings prepared by the SO. I also found that the delay caused by the additional railing works was 13 days (see the Liability Judgment (HC) at [346]–[349]).

  31. [23] Therefore, I found that the plaintiff had caused 13 days of delay in relation to the additional railing works following the BCA inspection.

  32. Liquidated damages for the delay in completion

  33. [24] Clause 6.0 of the LOI provided that, in the event of a delay in completing the construction and maintenance of Biopolis 3, the defendant would be liable to pay the plaintiff liquidated damages for late completion. The applicable rates of liquidated damages were $30,000 per day for the first 30 days that the works remained incomplete after the contract period; $70,000 per day for the next 30 days that the works remained incomplete after the contract period; and $50,000 per day for each day that the works remained incomplete beyond the 60th day after the contract period.

  34. [25] However, as the plaintiff was responsible for 173 days of delay due to its acts of prevention, the defendant was no longer bound to complete Biopolis 3 within 18 months as stipulated under cl 5.0 of the LOI. Consequently, the plaintiff’s right to claim liquidated damages under cl 6.0 of the LOI no longer applied (see the Liability Judgment (HC) at [353]–[354]).

  35. Delays attributable to the defendant

  36. [26] In view of the plaintiff’s acts of prevention, the Court of Appeal found that a reasonable time for the completion of Biopolis 3 was 18 months and 173 days from the commencement date of 23 July 2008. Hence, for Biopolis 3 to be completed within a reasonable time, it should have been completed by 14 July 2010. However, Biopolis 3 was in fact only completed on 22 December 2010. Therefore, the delay attributable to the defendant was 161 days (see the Liability Judgment (CA) at [17]–[20]).

  37. The parties’ cases

  38. The plaintiff’s case

  39. [28] The plaintiff engaged three expert witnesses to support its case: Mr Andre Toh Sern (“Mr Toh”), Dr Annie Woo Yen Lee (“Dr Woo”) and Mr Dennis Yeo Huang Kiat (“Mr Yeo”). Mr Toh prepared two expert reports. Dr Woo also prepared two expert reports, the first of which was prepared jointly with Mr Yeo.

  40. Loss of net rental revenue

  41. [29] The plaintiff claims that the delay in the completion of Biopolis 3 caused it to lose a real and substantial chance of earning its projected net rental revenues from leasing the units in Biopolis 3. According to the plaintiff, there is ample evidence that it would have had such a real or substantial chance, based on the 70 expressions of interest from prospective tenants before the completion of Biopolis 3 and data from comparable developments. The plaintiff claims this loss of net rental revenue as expectation loss. It had entered into the LOI in anticipation of earning rental revenue from Biopolis 3, but due to the delay in the completion of Biopolis 3, no rental revenue was earned before completion and less rental revenue was earned after completion.

  42. [30] The plaintiff submits that the delay in completion caused three forms of loss of net rental revenue:

  43. (a) First, the loss of one year’s net rental revenue for the period of delay itself (ie, for the period of 334 days from 22 January 2010 to 22 December 2010).

  44. (b) Second, where the delay caused the loss of a prospective tenant who would otherwise have leased a unit in Biopolis 3 for a term of several years, the loss of net rental revenue for each year of the lost tenancy.

  45. (c) Third, the loss of net rental revenue arising from the additional time required for Biopolis 3 to achieve stabilised occupancy as a result of the delay. Stabilised occupancy refers to the occupancy levels reached by a new property that are reasonably expected to continue into the future with the proper marketing, management and maintenance (Denise Evans and O William Evans, The Complete Real Estate Encyclopedia (McGraw-Hill, 1st Ed, 2007) at p 387), though it does not require 100% occupancy. Stabilised occupancy is the “market potential” of the property. In particular, the plaintiff claims that the delay in completion led to two events which prolonged the time required for Biopolis 3 to achieve stabilised occupancy:

  46. (i) First, the delay resulted in Biopolis 3 having zero pre-commitment tenants after its completion. This is because the delay made the completion date for Biopolis 3 uncertain, which in turn hindered negotiations with prospective tenants and the plaintiff’s marketing efforts. This delay caused the loss of five major pre-commitment tenants which the plaintiff had aimed to secure for occupation in January 2010, namely, the Institute of Chemical and Engineering Sciences (“ICES”) under the Agency for Science, Technology and Research; Abbott Laboratories (Singapore) Pte Ltd (“Abbott”); the Nanyang Technological University (“NTU”); PetNet Solutions Private Limited (“PetNet”); and Philip Morris Products SA (“Philip Morris”). I shall refer to these five major pre-commitment tenants collectively as the “five pre-commitment tenants”. According to the plaintiff, the loss of these pre-commitment tenants had a direct impact on the rental revenue that the plaintiff could have earned and it also undermined the market’s confidence in Biopolis 3.

  47. (ii) Second, the delay reduced the monopolistic advantages enjoyed by Biopolis 3 as the sole building of its kind on the market before competition increased following the award of the land tender for Biopolis 5. The land tender for Biopolis 5 was awarded to Ascendas Venture Pte Ltd (“Ascendas Venture”) in March 2011, and the award of the tender was announced in May 2011. The plaintiff submits that if the delay had not occurred, Biopolis 3 would have reached stabilised occupancy of 90% before the completion of Biopolis 5 in February 2014.

  48. [31] In quantifying its loss of net rental revenue, the plaintiff submits that the appropriate method is what I shall refer to as the “multi-year model”, which was adopted by Mr Toh. This is because its loss of net rental revenue was incurred over several years, from the date on which Biopolis 3 ought to have been handed over to the date on which stabilised occupancy was achieved (the “alleged loss period”). Hence, under the multi-year model, the plaintiff claims, in its pleadings and opening statement, the difference between the projected net rental revenue that the plaintiff could have earned over the alleged loss period if there had been no delay in completion, and the actual net rental revenue earned by the plaintiff during the alleged loss period, with a discount of 8% applied to take into account project risks. However, in the plaintiff’s oral submissions at the end of the trial, it informed the court that it would not rely on the actual net rental revenue figures originally used by Mr Toh.

  49. [32] Further, the plaintiff submits that its claim for loss of net rental revenue was not too remote. This loss arose naturally and according to the usual course of events from the defendant’s delay in completing Biopolis 3. At the time the LOI was signed, it was within the defendant’s reasonable contemplation that such loss of net rental revenue would ordinarily follow from the defendant’s delay, because the defendant was aware that Biopolis 3 was intended to be a multi-tenanted development for the BMS R&D sector (ie, it had a limited tenant pool drawn from a narrow sector of the real estate market) and that the plaintiff’s revenue stream from Biopolis 3 came from the leasing of premises. Therefore, the defendant was aware (or ought to have been aware) that the delay would prolong the time needed for Biopolis 3 to achieve stabilised occupancy.

  50. [33] In any event, prior to the signing of the LOI, it was expressly made known to the defendant that any delay in completion would deprive the plaintiff of a chance to earn rental revenue. Thus, the plaintiff would seek to recover its loss of net rental revenue from the defendant in the event of such a delay. In particular, the defendant had special knowledge of the facts that would have alerted it to this type of loss. First, the defendant agreed to the liquidated damages rates stipulated in cl 6.0 of the LOI. Applying these rates, the liquidated damages payable for one-year delay would be approximately $18.25m, which was close to the actual gross revenue earned by the plaintiff at around 90% occupancy. Second, the plaintiff and Jurong International Holdings Pte Ltd (“JIHPL”) (of which the defendant is a wholly owned subsidiary) had prepared revenue projections for Biopolis 3. This would have required JIHPL to conduct due diligence to project the future rental revenue stream for Biopolis 3.

  51. [34] Finally, the plaintiff submits that it made all reasonable efforts to market Biopolis 3 and to secure tenants. These efforts included setting up a dedicated in-house marketing team which worked closely with property agencies, government agencies and other industry players to market Biopolis 3. Therefore, the plaintiff argues that it took all reasonable steps to mitigate its loss of net rental revenue.

  52. [35] Consequently, the plaintiff claims it suffered a loss of net rental revenue of approximately $21.16m as a result of the delay in completion. The plaintiff used the multi-year model to compute this loss of net rental revenue. After apportioning this sum based on the period of delay attributable to the defendant (ie, 161 days), the plaintiff claims that the defendant is liable for a sum of $10.2m. Alternatively, if damages are awarded only in respect of the loss of net rental revenue for the period of delay in 2010 (which I shall call the “single-year model”), the plaintiff claims that it suffered a loss of net rental revenue ranging from $12.58m to $12.65m and that the defendant is liable for a sum of approximately $2.89m to $2.91m.

  53. Holding costs

  54. Site staff expenses

  55. [39] The plaintiff submits that it was obliged to engage the relevant site staff for the duration of the construction of Biopolis 3, and that these site staff had to be deployed for the duration of the delay. The relevant site staff comprised Resident Engineers and Resident Technical Officers. The plaintiff had to pay the salaries of these site staff (the “site staff expenses”) for the period from 23 January 2010 to 12 January 2011. The site staff expenses incurred by the plaintiff during this period amounted to $284,142.14. The plaintiff claims that the defendant is liable for the portion of these site staff expenses that is attributable to the defendant’s delay as these site staff expenses were wasted and additional expenditure incurred by the plaintiff. The plaintiff contends that the site staff expenses are not too remote to be recoverable from the defendant because the defendant knew or should have known that the plaintiff would have to bear these expenses until Biopolis 3 was certified complete.

  56. The defendant’s case

  57. [40] The defendant engaged only one expert witness, Assoc Prof Yu Shi Ming (“Assoc Prof Yu”), who prepared two expert reports on the plaintiff’s loss of net rental revenue.

  58. Loss of net rental revenue

  59. [41] The defendant denies that the plaintiff was deprived of a real and substantial chance to lease units in Biopolis 3 and hence to earn rental revenue. Further, the defendant argues that the loss of net rental revenue allegedly suffered by the plaintiff was not caused by the 161 days of delay attributable to the defendant. Instead, the defendant contends that any such loss of net rental revenue suffered by the plaintiff may be attributable to other causes such as the GFC, or was caused and amplified by the plaintiff’s own actions. In particular, the defendant argues that the alleged loss of net rental revenue was because the plaintiff’s asking rental rates were unrealistically high. The plaintiff had failed to take into account the prevailing market conditions at the relevant time (including the GFC), which prevented the plaintiff from achieving higher occupancy rates for Biopolis 3. Thus, the unduly long time to achieve stabilised occupancy was not attributable to the defendant’s delay. The defendant argues that the alleged loss of net rental revenue was also caused by the plaintiff’s failure to effectively market the units to other prospective tenants and the plaintiff’s own campaign to slow down the completion of Biopolis 3.

  60. [42] In any event, the defendant disputes the plaintiff’s quantification of its loss of net rental revenue. The defendant submits that, if the multi-year model is to be applied, a more appropriate quantification of this loss is $362,183.83.

  61. [43] Alternatively, under the single-year model, the defendant submits that it should only be liable for a sum between $308,045.33 and $627,987.17 (depending on the parameters adopted by the court).

  62. [44] In addition, the defendant contends that the losses allegedly suffered by the plaintiff are too remote because they were not reasonably foreseeable and/or not within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time when they signed the LOI, and/or that they are extraordinary losses. The defendant submits that the plaintiff’s loss of net rental revenue did not flow naturally from the defendant’s breach of contract, but rather arose from many variables and circumstances outside the defendant’s control, such as the plaintiff’s pricing and marketing strategy, the negotiations between the plaintiff and its prospective tenants, and market conditions. Further, the defendant contends that the plaintiff never informed the defendant that it would claim its loss of net rental revenue from the defendant in the event of a delay in completion.

  63. [45] The defendant also argues that the plaintiff’s loss of net rental revenue was caused by the plaintiff’s own actions and the plaintiff’s failure to take all reasonable steps to mitigate its alleged loss of net rental revenue. According to the defendant, Biopolis 3 took an inordinate amount of time to achieve stabilised occupancy because the plaintiff persisted in adopting pricing and marketing strategies that did not match the market. In particular, the plaintiff’s asking rental rates for Biopolis 3 were unrealistic in view of the prevailing market conditions. If the plaintiff had asked for more realistic rental rates, it would have achieved higher occupancy rates and this would have significantly reduced its alleged losses.

  64. Holding costs

  65. Site staff expenses

  66. [49] At the end of the trial the defendant admitted the quantum of site staff expenses incurred by the plaintiff. The defendant now accepts that it should be liable for a sum of $132,157.12 for the site staff expenses for its 161 days of delay.

  67. Effect of cl 6.0 of the LOI

  68. [50] Further or in the alternative, the defendant contends that any damages payable by the defendant to the plaintiff due to the delay caused by the defendant cannot exceed the damages that the plaintiff could have obtained under cl 6.0 of the LOI had it not committed the various acts of prevention.

  69. Court expert

  70. [51] In view of the extreme positions taken by the parties on the quantum of the plaintiff’s loss of net rental revenue, the court decided to appoint a court expert to assist in this case. The parties were requested to submit two names for the court to select and the court chose Adjunct Assoc Prof Tay Kah Poh (“Assoc Prof Tay”). He prepared five expert reports on the plaintiff’s loss of net rental revenue.

  71. [52] All the experts used the multi-year model, which is based on ascertaining the stabilised occupancy level that Biopolis 3 would have achieved, to quantify the plaintiff’s loss of net rental revenue. I am of the view that the multi-year model is a mechanical accounting exercise which does not adequately take into account equity, fairness and remoteness of damage. I shall elaborate in greater detail below. Accordingly, the experts were instructed to also consider whether the single-year model could be used to quantify the loss of net rental revenue suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the combined delay by the parties in 2010.

  72. Issues to be determined

  73. [53] The main issues that arise for my determination are, therefore, as follows:

  74. My decision

  75. Effect of cl 6.0 of the LOI

  76. [54] I shall first briefly address the defendant’s argument regarding the effect of cl 6.0 of the LOI. To recapitulate, cl 6.0 provided for liquidated damages to be payable by the defendant to the plaintiff in the event of late completion, at the following rates: $30,000 per day for the first 30 days; $70,000 per day for the next 30 days; and $50,000 per day for each subsequent day. However, the plaintiff’s right to claim liquidated damages under cl 6.0 ceased to apply because the plaintiff had committed various acts of prevention (see [24]–[25] above).

  77. The parties’ submissions

  78. [55] The defendant contends that any general damages payable by the defendant to the plaintiff for the delay caused by the defendant cannot exceed the liquidated damages that the plaintiff could have obtained under cl 6.0 of the LOI had it not committed the various acts of prevention. The defendant submits that the parties’ fixation on the liquidated damages rates during the negotiations indicates that the parties contemplated that the total amount of liquidated damages recoverable under cl 6.0 of the LOI would act as a cap on the total amount of general damages which the defendant would be liable for in the event of a delay. In the alternative, the defendant submits that the amount of liquidated damages recoverable under cl 6.0 of the LOI ought to act as a cap on the defendant’s liability as a matter of law. Applying the rates of liquidated damages set out in cl 6.0 of the LOI, the total sum of liquidated damages payable by the defendant in respect of its 161 days of delay would have been $8,050,000: $30,000 per day for the first 30 days ($900,000), $70,000 per day for the next 30 days ($2,100,000), and $50,000 per day for the remaining 101 days ($5,050,000).

  79. [56] On the other hand, the plaintiff contends that it is entitled to the full extent of the general damages that it is able to prove to the court as there are no expressed exclusions or caps (whether in the LOI or agreed between the parties) on the quantum of general damages the plaintiff can recover. Indeed, as I have noted at [33] above, the plaintiff suggests that cl 6.0 of the LOI indicates that the defendant had knowledge of the possible extent of the loss of net rental revenue that would be suffered by the plaintiff in the event of a one-year delay. The plaintiff, therefore, argues that its loss of net rental revenue was not too remote.

  80. My findings

  81. [57] I am unable to accept the defendant’s submission that the amount of general damages recoverable by the plaintiff should be capped by the amount of liquidated damages that the plaintiff would have been entitled to under cl 6.0 of the LOI had it not committed the various acts of prevention.

  82. [58] In my view, general damages and liquidated damages are underpinned by different considerations. General damages are intended to compensate the innocent party for the actual losses suffered as a result of the breach. In contrast, liquidated damages are intended to be a genuine pre-estimate of the likely losses that would be suffered in the event of a breach (see Denka Advantech Pte Ltd and another v Seraya Energy Pte Ltd and another and other appeals [2020] SGCA 119 at [151]–[152] and [185(b)]). Furthermore, cl 6.0 of the LOI is a contractual term which the parties had willingly agreed to be bound by in the event of a delay. Hence, there is no principled reason for capping the amount of general damages recoverable by the plaintiff in these proceedings at $8,050,000.

  83. [59] The defendant relies on the Canadian case of J G Collins Insurance Agencies Ltd v Elsley Estate [1978] 2 SCR 916 (“Elsley Estate”) for the proposition that the amount of damages recoverable under a liquidated damages clause, such as cl 6.0 of the LOI, should act as a cap on the defendant’s liability to pay general damages. In Elsley Estate, the Supreme Court of Canada held that “an agreed sum payable on breach represents the maximum amount recoverable whether the sum is a penalty or a valid liquidated damages clause”. Elsley Estate was cited in Hudson’s Building and Engineering Contracts (Nicholas Dennys QC and Robert Clay gen eds) (Sweet & Maxwell, 14th Ed, 2020) (“Hudson”). The editors of Hudson opined that even though the liquidated damages clause in Elsley Estate was attacked on the ground that it was a penalty clause, Elsley Estate “must equally be authority for enforcing the [liquidated damages] sum as a limitation on liability in those situations where a liquidated damages clause has been invalidated by reason of Employer prevention … or Employer breach of contract” (at para 6-049). However, the editors of Hudson went on to acknowledge that “the point may be open and a more precise statement of its rationale in construction cases is still awaited” (at para 6-050). In the absence of any decisions by the Singapore courts following Elsley Estate, there is no authority binding upon this court that requires me to find that the amount of general damages recoverable must be capped at the amount of liquidated damages stipulated in cl 6.0 of the LOI.

  84. [60] In so far as the defendant contends that allowing the plaintiff to recover general damages exceeding $8,050,000 would allow the plaintiff to benefit from its own breach of contract which rendered cl 6.0 of the LOI unenforceable, this argument is unmeritorious. In this regard, I agree with the views expressed in Edwin Lee Peng Khoon, Building Contract Law in Singapore (LexisNexis, 3rd Ed, 2016). The author considers this argument and then goes on to say (at p 155):

  85. [61] These observations are directly applicable to the present case. Although the plaintiff was responsible for 173 days of delay due to its acts of prevention, the defendant nevertheless exceeded the reasonable time for the completion of Biopolis 3, which was 18 months and 173 days from the commencement date of 23 July 2008 (see [26] above). The defendant is, therefore, still responsible for 161 days of delay. In these circumstances, it would not be inequitable to allow the plaintiff to recover general damages exceeding the amount of liquidated damages provided for in cl 6.0 of the LOI.

  86. Summary on the effect of cl 6.0 of the LOI

  87. [62] In summary, I reject the defendant’s argument that any general damages payable to the plaintiff for the delay cannot exceed the liquidated damages that the plaintiff could have obtained under cl 6.0 of the LOI had it not committed the various acts of prevention, ie, $8,050,000. This is because, notwithstanding the plaintiff’s acts of prevention, the defendant still exceeded the reasonable time for the completion of Biopolis 3 and was responsible for 161 days of delay.

  88. Preliminary points on causation and apportionment

  89. [63] Before I turn to consider each of the three heads of loss claimed by the plaintiff, I would like to deal with some preliminary points regarding causation and the apportionment of liability between the parties. As I have explained at [10] and [26] above, the delay attributable to the plaintiff was 173 days and the delay attributable to the defendant was 161 days.

  90. [64] The plaintiff’s approach is to start by calculating the total losses caused to the plaintiff by the entire period of delay and then apportion liability based on the respective periods of delay attributable to each party.

  91. [65] However, the defendant submits that the plaintiff has failed to prove that the defendant’s delay caused its losses. Instead, since the plaintiff caused more than half of the delay (173 out of 334 days), the plaintiff was the dominant cause of the delay. The defendant raises a primary case and a secondary case on causation, which I shall elaborate on in the next few paragraphs.

  92. Causation

  93. (1) The parties’ submissions

  94. [66] It is not disputed that the usual test of causation to be applied in breach of contract cases is the but-for test, under which the plaintiff must prove that the harm it suffered would not have occurred but for the defendant’s delay (Sunny Metal & Engineering Pte Ltd v Ng Khim Ming Eric [2007] 3 SLR(R) 782 (“Sunny Metal”) at [64]). The defendant contends that the plaintiff has failed to satisfy the but-for test of causation.

  95. [67] First, the defendant submits that the plaintiff must demonstrate a causal link between the specific periods of delay attributable to the defendant (amounting to 161 days) and the alleged losses suffered by the plaintiff. The defendant submits that the plaintiff has failed to do so because the plaintiff’s delay was spread out and intertwined with the defendant’s delay. Hence, both parties jointly contributed to the delay and neither was principally responsible. Consequently, the defendant submits that the plaintiff has failed to prove that the defendant’s delay was a but-for cause of its losses (the “Defendant’s Primary Case on Causation”).

  96. [68] In the alternative, the defendant submits that since a reasonable date for the completion of Biopolis 3 was 14 July 2010 (see [26] above), the plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s delay during the specific period from 15 July 2010 to 22 December 2010 caused the plaintiff’s losses. According to the defendant, the plaintiff has failed to prove this because the plaintiff asserts that its losses were caused by the entire period of delay (the “Defendant’s Secondary Case on Causation”).

  97. [69] In response to the defendant’s arguments regarding causation, the plaintiff submits that there is a clear causal link between the delay and its losses.

  98. [70] With regard to the Defendant’s Primary Case on Causation, the plaintiff submits that the usual but-for test of factual causation should not be applied in the present case as it would lead to an outcome that defies common sense and logic, ie, the outcome that the defendant is not liable for any of the losses suffered by the plaintiff. Instead, as the plaintiff’s delay and the defendant’s delay were two concurrent causes of loss that were almost equally significant, the plaintiff argues that the court should adopt the approach set out by the UK Supreme Court in Financial Conduct Authority v Arch Insurance (UK) Ltd and others (Hiscox Action Group Intervening) [2021] 2 WLR 123 (“FCA v Arch Insurance”), which the plaintiff refers to as the “modified but-for test”. Applying this modified but-for test, the plaintiff submits that factual causation is established because each delaying event was a discrete event capable of causing loss, and but for all the delaying events, Biopolis 3 would have secured a healthy level of pre-commitment tenants and would have enjoyed a longer monopolistic run.

  99. [71] Further, the plaintiff submits that the Defendant’s Secondary Case on Causation is inconsistent with the Liability Judgment (CA), inconsistent with the facts and inconsistent with common sense, because it requires the court to ignore the actual periods of delay attributable to each party in assessing causation. The plaintiff contends that the Defendant’s Secondary Case on Causation conflates the assessment of a reasonable time to complete (which is merely a tool for the easy computation of each party’s delay) with the assessment of factual causation (which examines the actual events that occurred).

  100. (2) My findings

  101. [72] In my view, the plaintiff has succeeded in establishing that its delay and the defendant’s delay were an effective cause of its losses. I agree with the plaintiff’s submission that the defendant cannot reasonably deny that there was a causal link between the delay and the losses suffered by the plaintiff, and in particular the plaintiff’s loss of net rental revenue.

  102. (A) The Defendant’s Primary Case on Causation

  103. [73] It is well established that the court “approaches the question of causation on a common-sense basis” and that “[taking] the but-for test as the sole indicia of causation can lead one to draw absurd conclusions” (Guay Seng Tiong Nickson v Public Prosecutor [2016] 3 SLR 1079 at [31] and [33]). Similarly, in Sunny Metal at [69], the court acknowledged that the but-for test may be “insufficient to lead to a just result” in cases where it is not clear which of several possible causes was “the cause in fact of the loss”. In my view, the Defendant’s Primary Case on Causation involves an overly rigid application of the but-for test of causation which would lead to the absurd conclusion that the defendant is not liable for any of the plaintiff’s losses despite having been found to be responsible for 161 out of 334 days of delay.

  104. [74] Instead, when the defendant’s breach of contract is one of two concurrent causes of the plaintiff’s losses, the defendant can be held liable so long as his breach was an effective cause of the plaintiff’s losses. It is not necessary for the court to determine which cause was the more effective cause (see Smile Inc Dental Surgeons Pte Ltd v OP3 International Pte Ltd [2020] 3 SLR 1234 (“Smile Inc”) at [25]). In Smile Inc, the plaintiff’s failure to pay the rent timeously and the plaintiff’s failure to resume business at its clinic (which was due to, among other things, the defendant’s delay in completing the fitting-out works at the clinic) were both the operative causes for the plaintiff to incur certain charges. There was “nothing to indicate that one of the two causes was more efficacious than the other” (Smile Inc at [30]). In those circumstances, Chan Seng Onn J found that the defendant was liable for the charges incurred by the plaintiff (Smile Inc at [30]).

  105. [75] Although the plaintiff urged the court to adopt the approach set out by the UK Supreme Court in FCA v Arch Insurance, I do not think it is necessary to do so in the present case. While FCA v Arch Insurance discussed the issue of causation at length, this was in the context of interpreting an insurance policy to ascertain whether its clauses covered losses suffered as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. I agree with the defendant’s concern that the insurance context is different from the general contract context and that the principles of causation that are applied in insurance law may not be straightforwardly applicable in other areas of contract law. Nevertheless, even without applying the approach in FCA v Arch Insurance, I am satisfied that the defendant’s delay was an effective cause of the plaintiff’s losses. As in Smile Inc, there is nothing to indicate that either the defendant’s delay (161 days) or the plaintiff’s delay (173 days) were more efficacious than the other as a cause of the plaintiff’s losses. Indeed, the periods of delay caused by the parties are nearly equal, with the plaintiff’s delay being only 12 (out of 334) days longer than the defendant’s delay. In these circumstances, I am unable to agree with the defendant’s submission that the plaintiff’s delay was more efficacious and that it “ha[d] the effect of magnifying the loss disproportionately”.

  106. [76] Therefore, in the circumstances of the present case, I do not think it is appropriate to adopt the defendant’s granular approach of examining the impact of each specific period of delay. As the defendant recognises, the delays caused by the plaintiff were intertwined with the delays attributable to the defendant. Furthermore, both parties’ experts and the court expert all applied the broad approach of calculating the losses caused by the entire period of delay before apportioning liability due to the defendant. While there may be situations where this approach could lead to unfairness (such as where the period of delay caused by the defendant is insignificant compared to the period of delay caused by the plaintiff), that concern does not arise in this case as the periods of delay caused by the parties are almost evenly balanced.

  107. (B) The Defendant’s Secondary Case on Causation

  108. [77] Further, I agree with the plaintiff’s submission that the Defendant’s Secondary Case on Causation should be rejected. As I have explained at [10]–[26] above, I found in the Liability Judgment (HC) that the plaintiff had committed several acts of prevention which caused a total of 173 days of delay. However, these 173 days did not run consecutively. Thus, while it was held in the Liability Judgment (CA) that the reasonable time for the defendant to complete Biopolis 3 was by 14 July 2010, it was not held that the defendant was responsible specifically for the delay from 15 July 2010 to 22 December 2010.

  109. [78] The Defendant’s Secondary Case on Causation is not supported by [375] of the Liability Judgment (HC), which the defendant’s counsel sought to rely on. This paragraph, as modified to reflect the findings made in the Liability Judgment (CA), stated as follows:

  110. [79] As the wording of [375] of the Liability Judgment (HC) makes clear, it was not held that the delay attributable to the defendant was the specific period from 15 July 2010 to 22 December 2010. Instead, the finding made in this paragraph was that the aggregate period of delay attributable to the defendant was 161 days, which was derived by calculating the length of the period from 15 July 2010 to 22 December 2010. This paragraph must also be read in the context of the other findings made in the Liability Judgment (HC). In particular, it was found that the periods of delay attributable to the plaintiff were six days from 26 to 31 December 2008; 147 days from 4 January 2009 to 1 June 2009; seven days in November 2010; and 13 days in December 2010 (see [10]–[23] above). The periods of delay attributable to the defendant were interspersed between these periods of delay caused by the plaintiff. Both before and after the date of 15 July 2010, both the plaintiff and the defendant contributed to the delay.

  111. [80] The authorities relied on by the defendant also do not support the Defendant’s Secondary Case on Causation. First, the defendant cites a passage from Hudson at para 6-028 which states that where the right to recover liquidated damages is invalidated, the right to recover actual damages subject to proof “will operate as from the ending of a reasonable time for completion”. Second, in Chua Tian Chu and another v Chin Bay Ching and another [2011] SGHC 126 at [104], the High Court stated that where liquidated damages are unavailable, “general damages may be recoverable at common law for any delay occasioned after the reasonable date for completion”. While I agree with these statements of principle, they do not assist the defendant. The legal principle that the plaintiff is entitled to recover general damages in respect of the period from the reasonable date for completion to the actual date of completion does not mean that, as a matter of causation, the defendant can only be held liable for the losses caused specifically by this period of time. As a matter of fact, in the present case, the periods of delay attributable to the defendant were intertwined with the periods of delay attributable to the plaintiff.

  112. Apportionment

  113. [81] Having rejected the Defendant’s Primary Case on Causation, I agree with the plaintiff’s submission that the losses caused by the entire period of delay should be apportioned proportionately between the plaintiff and the defendant, based on the duration of delay attributable to each party. The next issue is then to determine the precise proportion of liability that should be borne by the defendant. The plaintiff’s expert, Mr Toh, was instructed by the plaintiff to quantify the expectation losses caused by the defendant on the basis of 161 out of 355 days of delay (ie, 45.35% of the total loss). This was because the plaintiff’s pleaded position was that there had been 355 days of delay (from 23 January 2010 to 12 January 2011) and because no rental revenue could have been earned before the TOP was obtained on 12 January 2011. The defendant’s expert, Assoc Prof Yu, initially quantified the losses based on 161 out of 334 days of delay. Assoc Prof Yu later stated that he was agreeable to applying Mr Toh’s proportion of 161 out of 355 days instead.

  114. [82] In my view, as a matter of principle, the proportion of liability borne by the defendant should be based on 161 out of 334 days of delay (ie, 48.2% of the total losses). Although I accept that no rental revenue could have been earned until 12 January 2011, the Liability Judgment (HC) and the Liability Judgment (CA) have established that the defendant was responsible for 161 days of delay and the plaintiff was responsible for 173 days of delay, amounting to a total of 334 days of delay. Hence, it would be incorrect to apportion the defendant’s liability based on 161 out of 355 days. Instead, the defendant’s liability should be apportioned based on 161 out of 334 days. This would be a fair reflection of the parties’ respective liabilities vis-à-vis the period of delay.

  115. [83] I acknowledge that the impact of 161 days of delay would necessarily be less significant than the impact of the full period of 334 days of delay. However, as I have explained, the duration of the plaintiff’s delay and the defendant’s delay was almost equal in this case. In a more extreme case where the defendant’s delay is merely a fraction of the plaintiff’s delay (for example, 20 days compared to 173 days), the defendant’s delay may be found to have only a de minimis impact on the losses suffered by the plaintiff. For example, a delay of only 20 days may not have been significant enough to cause the loss of pre-commitment tenants. In such a case, as I have alluded to at [76] above, a straightforward apportionment may be inappropriate, or it may be that the losses for which the defendant is liable should be further discounted. Nevertheless, that is not the present case.

  116. Summary on causation and apportionment

  117. [84] In summary, the defendant’s delay was an effective cause of the plaintiff’s losses. I reject both the Defendant’s Primary Case on Causation and the Defendant’s Secondary Case on Causation as the periods of delay caused by the parties are nearly equal and the delays attributable to the plaintiff were intertwined with the delays attributable to the defendant. The losses caused by the entire period of delay should be apportioned proportionately between the plaintiff and the defendant based on the duration of delay attributable to each party. Hence, the proportion of liability borne by the defendant should be based on 161 out of 334 days of delay.

  118. Loss of net rental revenue

  119. [85] I turn now to the plaintiff’s claim for loss of net rental revenue. There are three main issues to be addressed. First, what losses are recoverable by the plaintiff, bearing in mind the principles of remoteness of damage? Second, what is the appropriate and fair method of quantifying the plaintiff’s loss of net rental revenue for the purposes of assessing the damages payable by the defendant? Third, what parameters should be adopted in quantifying the plaintiff’s loss of net rental revenue? I shall address these issues in turn.

  120. Remoteness

  121. (1) The applicable law

  122. [86] In breach of contract cases, it is well established that loss will be recoverable if either of two tests is satisfied (see Out of the Box Pte Ltd v Wanin Industries Pte Ltd [2013] 2 SLR 363 (“Out of the Box”) at [14]–[18], applying the English rule in Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch 341 (“Hadley v Baxendale”) as restated in Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ld v Newman Industries Ld; Coulson & Co Ld (Third Parties) [1949] 2 KB 528 (“Victoria Laundry”)):

  123. (a) First, loss is recoverable if it flows naturally from the breach of contract, having regard to the consequences that arise naturally according to the usual course of things, or flowing from what may reasonably be supposed to be in the contemplation of both parties when they entered into the contract (the first limb of the rule in Hadley v Baxendale). I shall refer to this type of loss as “direct loss” and loss which does not fall within this description as “indirect loss”.

  124. (b) Second, (indirect) loss is recoverable if the contract-breaker had actual knowledge of special or extraordinary facts and circumstances which made the loss foreseeable as a likely, or at least not unlikely, result of the breach of contract (the second limb of the rule in Hadley v Baxendale).

  125. [87] The final question in the analysis is whether, in the light of the contract-breaker’s knowledge and the circumstances in which that knowledge arose, a reasonable person in the contract-breaker’s situation at the time of the contract would have considered the damages in question to be “foreseeable as a not unlikely consequence that he should be liable for” (Out of the Box at [47(e)]).

  126. [88] If a particular type of loss was reasonably foreseeable at the time of the contract (ie, not too remote), the conventional principle is that the contract-breaker will be held liable for the full extent of the loss (see Out of the Box at [41]). However, it must also be emphasised that the application of this rule depends greatly on the particular facts of each case. As the Court of Appeal explained in Out of the Box at [44]:

  127. [89] This is illustrated by the facts of Victoria Laundry. In that case, the plaintiffs, a company providing laundering and dyeing services, purchased a boiler from the defendants. The defendants knew that the plaintiffs were launderers and dyers and wanted the boiler for use in their business. The delivery of the boiler to the plaintiffs was significantly delayed. The English Court of Appeal held that the plaintiffs could recover its loss of business profits in respect of the laundering and dyeing contracts which could be “reasonably expected”. However, the plaintiffs could not recover their loss of business profits in respect of certain “particularly lucrative dyeing contracts” which the plaintiffs had hoped to enter into, and which depended on the punctual delivery of the boiler. These losses were too remote (see Victoria Laundry at 543). Thus, as noted in Out of the Box at [45], “loss of profits from the laundry business” was not treated as a single type of loss. Instead, a distinction was drawn between losses of profits from contracts which could be reasonably expected, and losses of profits from contracts which could not be reasonably expected. Thus, whether a particular head of loss (such as “loss of net revenue”) is direct loss within the first limb of the rule in Hadley v Baxendale or indirect loss within the second limb of the rule in Hadley v Baxendale may depend on the circumstances (see Singapore Telecommunications Ltd v Starhub Cable Vision Ltd [2006] 2 SLR(R) 195 at [65]).

  128. (2) The parties’ submissions

  129. [90] The plaintiff submits that its claim for loss of net rental revenue was not too remote. According to the plaintiff, its loss of net rental revenue up to the completion of Biopolis 3 was direct loss because the plaintiff could not begin leasing the premises until after completion. After the completion of Biopolis 3, the plaintiff’s loss of net rental revenue was indirect loss. However, such loss is not too remote because the defendant knew of the plaintiff’s intention to claim such losses from the defendant in the event of a delay in completion.

  130. [91] On the other hand, the defendant submits that the plaintiff’s entire claim for loss of net rental revenue is no different from a claim for loss of profits, which is a form of indirect loss. To support this argument, the defendant relies on the Court of Appeal’s decision in PH Hydraulics & Engineering Pte Ltd v Airtrust (Hong Kong) Ltd and another appeal [2017] 2 SLR 129 (“PH Hydraulics”), the New South Wales Supreme Court’s decision in Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd v Abgarus Pty Ltd (1992) 33 NSWLR 504 (“Multiplex Constructions”), and the High Court’s decision in Ajit Chandrasekar Prabhu and another v Yap Beng Kooi and another [2015] SGHC 280 (“Ajit Chandrasekar”). Consequently, the defendant argues that it would only be liable for the plaintiff’s loss of net rental revenue if it had actual knowledge of this loss.

  131. [92] The defendant submits that, while it knew that Biopolis 3 would be leased out to tenants, it was a mere management contractor and did not know the specific details of each lease, such as the rental rate, the duration of each lease and any rent-free periods, and each tenant’s specific needs that were negotiated with the plaintiff. The defendant was not involved in any part of the leasing process between the plaintiff and its prospective tenants, and in any event, information on leases is not typically shared with a builder as it is proprietary information belonging to the developer. Further, the commercial reality is that the risks of leasing and selling a property after completion belong to the proprietor of the property, not the builder. In the present case, there was no evidence that the plaintiff informed the defendant that, in the event of a delay in completion, it would claim loss of net rental revenue until stabilised occupancy was achieved from the defendant.

  132. (3) My findings

  133. [93] In my view, the plaintiff’s claim for loss of net rental revenue comprises two distinct types of losses. First, the loss of net rental revenue during the period of delay in 2010 (“pre-completion loss of net rental revenue”). Second, the loss of net rental revenue after the completion of Biopolis 3, resulting from the prolonged period required for Biopolis 3 to achieve stabilised occupancy following the delay (“post-completion loss of net rental revenue”). I, therefore, disagree with the defendant’s submission that the plaintiff’s entire claim for loss of net rental revenue should be characterised as indirect loss. Although the plaintiff’s pre-completion loss of net rental revenue and post-completion loss of net rental revenue both fall within the broader category of “loss of net rental revenue”, they are in fact different types of loss which should be analysed separately.

  134. (A) Pre-completion loss of net rental revenue

  135. [94] It is clear that the pre-completion loss of net rental revenue suffered by the plaintiff during the period of delay is direct loss within the first limb of the rule in Hadley v Baxendale. At the time the parties entered into the LOI, it was within the reasonable contemplation of both parties that Biopolis 3 was a multi-tenanted commercial development which could only be leased to tenants by the plaintiff after completion. The natural consequence of the delay in completion was that the plaintiff would only be able to start leasing units in Biopolis 3 at a later date. Hence, the pre-completion loss of net rental revenue was direct loss caused by the delay. As the editors of Hudson observed at para 7-039:

  136. [95] The three cases relied on by the defendant do not assist it in showing that the pre-completion loss of net rental revenue is indirect loss. In PH Hydraulics, the plaintiff had purchased a machine (a reel drive unit) from the defendant which was to be leased to a third party. The machine malfunctioned and the plaintiff sued the defendant for breach of the sale and purchase agreement, claiming (among other things) its inability to earn revenue from renting out the machine. The Court of Appeal held that this loss of net rental revenue was not a direct loss within the reasonable contemplation of both parties, noting that there was no evidence that the third party was obliged to rent the machine for any fixed period or minimum period (PH Hydraulics at [155]). However, the contract at issue in PH Hydraulics was a sale and purchase agreement, under which the plaintiff could have purchased the machine for its own use rather than for renting to a third party. In contrast, the defendant’s breach of contract in the present case was its delay in completing Biopolis 3 under a building contract between the parties. As Biopolis 3 is a commercial development which was intended to be leased to multiple tenants and from which the plaintiff could only earn rental revenue after completion, the pre-completion loss of net rental revenue flowed naturally from the delay in completion. In this regard, the defendant’s reliance on Ajit Chandrasekar is also misplaced as the plaintiffs in that case appeared to have purchased the property as a home. Consequently, Abdullah JC (as he then was) doubted that the loss of opportunity to rent out the property was within the contemplation of the parties or flowed in the natural course of events (Ajit Chandrasekar at [81]).

  137. (B) Post-completion loss of net rental revenue

  138. [97] However, as the plaintiff acknowledges, its post-completion loss of net rental revenue is indirect loss. For this type of loss to be recoverable, the plaintiff must show that the defendant had actual knowledge that the delay in completion might cause the plaintiff to suffer a loss of net rental revenue even after completion because it would prolong the time needed for Biopolis 3 to achieve stabilised occupancy. This has not been shown.

  139. [98] The plaintiff argues that the defendant was told that the liquidated damages rates agreed upon in cl 6.0 of the LOI were meant to compensate the plaintiff for its loss of net rental revenue in the event of a delay, and that the plaintiff and JIHPL had prepared projections of Biopolis 3’s future rental revenue stream (see [33] above). However, neither of these arguments assists the plaintiff in showing that the defendant had actual knowledge that the plaintiff would incur a further loss of net rental revenue in the period from Biopolis 3’s completion until Biopolis 3 achieved stabilised occupancy. The plaintiff has not adduced any evidence that the defendant had such knowledge. Indeed, Mr Lawrence Leow Chin Hin, the plaintiff’s director (“Mr Leow”), testified that when cl 6.0 of the LOI was being discussed, he was focusing on liquidated damages and did not have in mind the general damages that the plaintiff would seek to claim from the defendant in the event of a delay in completion. Although Mr Leow claimed that the liquidated damages rates had been computed based partly on the plaintiff’s estimations of the anticipated gross rental revenue that it would earn from leasing Biopolis 3 after completion”, he conceded during his cross-examination that none of the contemporaneous documentary evidence showed that the plaintiff had informed the defendant that these liquidated damages rates were an estimation of the plaintiff’s loss of rental revenue in the event of a delay in completion.

  140. [99] The plaintiff also relied on the defendant’s insertion of a liquidated damages clause identical to cl 6.0 of the LOI in its own trade contracts. According to the plaintiff, this shows that the defendant was well aware of the quantum of loss of rental revenue that the plaintiff might suffer in the event of a delay and sought to pass this risk on to its own trade contractors. However, this is a non sequitur as the defendant’s adoption of the same liquidated damages rates in its trade contracts does not indicate that it had actual knowledge that these rates represented the plaintiff’s likely loss of rental revenue in the event of a delay.

  141. [101] In these circumstances, the post-completion loss of net rental revenue incurred by the plaintiff was not foreseeable by the defendant as a likely, or even not unlikely, result of the delay.

  142. [102] Therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to recover the pre-completion loss of net rental revenue that it suffered during the period of delay in 2010. However, the post-completion loss of net rental revenue that the plaintiff suffered after the completion of Biopolis 3 is too remote to be recoverable.

  143. The appropriate and fair method of quantifying the plaintiff’s loss of net rental revenue

  144. [103] As I have found that the plaintiff’s post-completion loss of net rental revenue is too remote to be recoverable as a matter of law, the appropriate method of quantifying the plaintiff’s loss of net rental revenue should focus on the loss of net rental revenue in respect of the period before the completion of Biopolis 3, ie, during the period of delay in 2010. The experts agreed that the legal questions of causation, remoteness and mitigation were for the court to determine. Hence, their proposed methods of quantifying the plaintiff’s loss of net rental revenue are premised on the assumption that the requirements of causation, remoteness and mitigation have all been established in the plaintiff’s favour.

  145. [104] The parties do not agree on the appropriate method of quantifying the plaintiff’s loss of net rental revenue. As I have alluded to at [29]–[31] above, the plaintiff submits that the multi-year model should be used to quantify its loss of net rental revenue. This is what the plaintiff’s primary expert, Mr Toh, described as the “yardstick method” in his first expert report. I prefer to call it the multi-year model as this emphasises the key difference between this model and the single-year model in terms of quantifying the plaintiff’s loss of net rental revenue. The defendant’s expert, Assoc Prof Yu, also used the multi-year model, which he called the “financial model”. All the experts who were asked to consider the single-year model, except for Mr Toh and Dr Woo, agree that the single-year model can be an alternative approach to the calculation of loss of net rental revenue suffered by the plaintiff. Mr Toh, being an accountant from EY Corporate Advisors Pte Ltd, opined that the single-year model was not suitable although he acknowledged that the multi-year model could give rise to an unfair and inequitable result. Dr Woo did not expressly accept the single-year model although she acknowledged the possibility of unfair and inequitable outcomes under the multi-year model. I shall elaborate further on the views of the experts below.

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