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Grounds publishedDecided 17 Aug 2021
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General Division of the High Court

Jason Grendus v Stephen David Lynch and others

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[2021] SGHC 191Case no. Suit No 1007 of 2018

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] A long drinking session is not the best occasion for a discussion on investments.

  3. [2] The plaintiff (“Mr Grendus”) sued in respect of US$200,000 in investments (the “Investments”) he made: US$100,000 into DataCore Innovations LLC (“DataCore”) (the “DataCore Subscription”), and another US$100,000 into DataCore’s holding company CorePlus Innovations LLC (“CorePlus”) (the “CorePlus Debenture”). He says the Investments turned out to be worthless, or worth far less. He claims he had been induced to invest by fraudulent or negligent misrepresentations, and that he was the victim of a conspiracy to defraud.

  4. [3] This judgment deals with Mr Grendus’ claims against the second defendant (“Mr Dawkins”) and the fourth defendant (“Aryan Search”), which is Mr Dawkins’ employer. Mr Grendus had earlier obtained default judgment against the first and third defendants, Mr Lynch and Mr Dale.

  5. Background

  6. The parties

  7. [4] Mr Grendus is a trained accountant. At the material time, he was on garden leave from his full-time employer, and was teaching part-time at the National University of Singapore (“NUS”).

  8. [5] Mr Dale is the chairman and Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of both DataCore and CorePlus. Mr Lynch was, at the material time, DataCore’s Chief Operating Officer (or equivalent).

  9. [6] Mr Dawkins is a recruiter, the head of the IT and Technology recruitment department of Aryan Search, a company that has been in the recruitment business since 2008. Aryan Search’s director and shareholder, Shervani Vikram (“Mr Vikram”), testified on its behalf.

  10. [7] Mr Dawkins told Mr Grendus about a potential opportunity for Mr Grendus to work for DataCore. Mr Dawkins also mentioned that DataCore was looking for investors. Mr Grendus expressed interest in investing in DataCore. Mr Grendus and Mr Dawkins then met with Mr Lynch, who told Mr Grendus more about DataCore. The meeting lasted from the evening of 24 May 2016 till the early hours of 25 May 2016 (the “24 May 2016 Meeting”). They all drank a lot of alcohol, smoked cigars, and evidently enjoyed themselves.

  11. [8] On 10 June 2016, Mr Lynch emailed Mr Grendus information and documents about investing in DataCore (the “10 June 2016 Email”). This included a document titled “DataCore Innovations LLC: Financial Pro Forma and Business Assumptions: 2016”, which contained pro forma financial statements of DataCore (the “Pitch Document”). On 24 June 2016, Mr Grendus made the Investments.

  12. [9] Mr Grendus’ case against Mr Dawkins is largely based on what happened at the 24 May 2016 Meeting. He claims that Mr Dawkins made certain representations orally, and certain other representations by remaining silent in the face of what Mr Lynch said.

  13. The proceedings

  14. [10] Mr Grendus sued in October 2018. He claimed that Mr Lynch and Mr Dawkins had induced into him making the Investments, by fraudulent or negligent misrepresentations. He also claimed that Mr Lynch, Mr Dawkins, and Mr Dale had conspired to defraud him. Mr Grendus claimed against Aryan Search on the basis that it was vicariously liable for Mr Dawkins’ conduct.

  15. [11] By the time Mr Grendus sued, Mr Lynch was already bankrupt (as of 4 January 2018). Still, Mr Lynch entered an appearance; but he did not file a defence in time, and on 23 November 2018 Mr Grendus obtained default judgment against him.

  16. [12] Mr Dale did not enter an appearance, and on 14 September 2019 Mr Grendus obtained default judgment against him.

  17. [13] Mr Dawkins and Aryan Search defended the claims against them, which proceeded to trial.

  18. Executive summary of decision

  19. [14] I dismiss Mr Grendus’ claims against Mr Dawkins and Aryan Search.

  20. [15] Mr Grendus has not proved that Mr Dawkins fraudulently made any false representations which induced Mr Grendus to make the Investments.

  21. [16] There are several inconsistencies between Mr Grendus’ pleadings, his Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief (“AEIC”), and his testimony at trial, as to the alleged representations supposedly made by Mr Dawkins. Mr Grendus’ case is built on shaky grounds:

  22. (a) his recollection of what was said to him (mainly by Mr Lynch rather than Mr Dawkins) over a lot of alcohol at the 24 May 2016 Meeting;

  23. (b) a mistaken assumption that Mr Dawkins had in his possession, by the time of the 24 May 2016 Meeting, the “Pitch Document” which was sent to Mr Grendus with the 10 June 2016 Email, such that Mr Dawkins could quote figures from the Pitch Document at the 24 May 2016 Meeting – what Mr Dawkins had was in fact an earlier version of the Pitch Document (the “May Pro Forma”), which contained figures that differed materially from the Pitch Document; moreover, I accept Mr Dawkins’s evidence that he had not read the May Pro Forma, or at least not fully or properly;

  24. (c) an assertion that Mr Dawkins and Aryan Search had done (financial) due diligence to check on what Mr Lynch and Mr Dale were saying about DataCore, and in particular to verify the figures in the Pitch Document (and if Mr Dawkins and Aryan Search had not done such due diligence, they were at least negligent); and

  25. (d) rationalisation after the fact, from what Mr Grendus found out about DataCore after he invested, and documents which he obtained in discovery.

  26. [17] Mr Dawkins and Aryan Search were recruiting for DataCore; they were not engaged to solicit investments for DataCore. Mr Dawkins did mention the possibility of investing in DataCore to Mr Grendus and others – Mr Grendus decided to invest, but others such as the Shanda Group (“Shanda”) decided not to. Mr Dawkins and Aryan Search were not obliged to do financial due diligence on DataCore, and they never did. In effect, Mr Grendus’ case is that he could invest on the faith of financial due diligence that Mr Dawkins and Aryan Search ought to have done – that is unsound.

  27. [18] Mr Grendus was informed in writing – by documents sent to him by Mr Lynch with the 10 June 2016 Email – that he might lose what he decided to invest in DataCore. This fundamentally contradicts Mr Grendus’ allegation that there was, at least, reassuring silence in response to him sharing his strategic investment objectives.

  28. [19] Mr Dawkins did not conspire with Mr Lynch and Mr Dale to defraud Mr Grendus (or anyone else). If there were any conspiracy between Mr Lynch and Mr Dale, Mr Dawkins was not involved in it.

  29. [20] As Mr Dawkins is not liable, it follows that Aryan Search is not vicariously liable. In any event, as the complaints about Mr Dawkins do not relate to anything done by him as a recruiter, Aryan Search ought not to be vicariously liable.

  30. Mr Dawkins’ role in the matter

  31. Mr Dawkins spoke to Mr Grendus about DataCore looking for investors, but Mr Dawkins did not “pitch” an investment in DataCore

  32. [21] It is common ground that Mr Dawkins told Mr Grendus that DataCore was looking for investors. Mr Dawkins says that this was done as part and parcel of him introducing DataCore to Mr Grendus, in the context of an opportunity for Mr Grendus to work for DataCore. Mr Grendus says that Mr Dawkins was “pitching” to him an investment in DataCore: that Mr Dawkins was soliciting investments for DataCore for reward, that Mr Dawkins had the financial acumen to do so, and that Mr Dawkins had done financial due diligence on DataCore (including verifying whether the pro forma financial statements in the Pitch Document were accurate).

  33. [22] I accept Mr Dawkins’ account of the context in which he had mentioned to Mr Grendus that DataCore was looking for investors – Mr Dawkins was acting as a recruiter, providing information about the company that he was recruiting for, and incidentally making investor introductions, but he did not “pitch” any investment in DataCore to Mr Grendus – he left it to Mr Grendus to discuss that directly with DataCore’s representatives.

  34. Mr Dawkins’ initial contacts with Mr Grendus were about work opportunities, not investment opportunities

  35. [23] Mr Dawkins was first introduced to Mr Grendus in December 2015, when Mr Dawkins did not even know about DataCore. Their initial exchanges were also about work opportunities rather than investment opportunities.

  36. [24] In December 2015, Mr Grendus’ flatmate shared Mr Grendus’ LinkedIn profile with Mr Dawkins. Mr Dawkins then made attempts in December 2015 and January 2016 (via LinkedIn) to contact Mr Grendus. At that time, Mr Dawkins did not even know about DataCore (which he would only hear about from Mr Lynch in February 2016) (see [29] below).

  37. [25] In the event, Mr Dawkins and Mr Grendus did not speak until around 13 May 2016 as Mr Grendus did not respond to Mr Dawkins’ earlier LinkedIn invite. They then proceeded to exchange messages on LinkedIn. Mr Grendus says he recalls receiving a LinkedIn message with a generic reference to “Opportunities”. The messages themselves are, however, more specific:

  38. (a) Mr Grendus said he was in Singapore and would split his time between Singapore and Saigon for the next few months, and that he was teaching at NUS part-time. He then said, “I would stay in Singapore for the right opportunity, but it has not surfaced up to this point.” [emphasis added]

  39. (b) Mr Dawkins then said, “I might have some options for you.”

  40. [26] I accept Mr Dawkins’ evidence that they were then discussing possible work opportunities rather than investment opportunities. The “right opportunity” which Mr Grendus was willing to stay in Singapore for was work-related rather than investment-related; up to that point investment had not come up as a topic between them.

  41. [27] The two of them spoke again on 24 May 2016. Over the telephone, Mr Dawkins provided Mr Grendus with information on two potential work opportunities, one of which was with DataCore.

  42. DataCore did not engage Mr Dawkins or Aryan Search to solicit investments

  43. [28] There is no evidence that DataCore had engaged Mr Dawkins or Aryan Search to solicit investments; the evidence points to the contrary.

  44. February 2016 – Mr Lynch told Mr Dawkins about DataCore, and Mr Dawkins introduced Shanda to DataCore

  45. [29] On 4 February 2016, Mr Lynch sent Mr Dawkins an email captioned, “Introduction to DataCore Innovations and Dominant Factor Indices” (the “4 February 2016 Email”). Mr Lynch attached various documents to that email. He said this was:

  46. (c) “updated collateral introducing our business and Dominant Factor Indices”;

  47. (d) “a few performance reports featuring index products that may be of interest to your client”; and

  48. (e) a “Smart Beta market survey” which he thought “you and your clients” will find very interesting.

  49. [30] Mr Lynch concluded by saying he had included a brief description of DataCore along with some background information that may be helpful as Mr Dawkins introduced Dominant Factor Indices (the products which DataCore offered as its main business activity) “to [his] contacts at Harvest Global”.

  50. [31] I accept Mr Dawkins’ evidence that he did not know why Mr Lynch was referring to Harvest Global; Mr Dawkins did not know who Harvest Global was. There is also no evidence that Mr Dawkins ever spoke to anyone from Harvest Global about DataCore.

  51. [32] Instead, Mr Dawkins spoke with Mr Lynch the day he received the 4 February 2016 Email, with a view to recruiting for DataCore.

  52. [33] Mr Dawkins also proceeded to introduce Shanda to DataCore later the same day. Mr Dawkins spoke to his contact at Shanda, and sent him an email saying, [a]s discussed I think this is a phenomenal concept and its [sic] going to fly, it looks like a cracking fintech startup with great potential”. He forwarded the 4 February 2016 Email from Mr Lynch, save that he edited out the phrase “to your contacts at Harvest Global” (which made no sense to him). Mr Dawkins also copied Mr Lynch in that email and asked that his contact at Shanda reach out to Mr Lynch directly, whose mobile number he provided in that same email. Having introduced the parties, and added his endorsement, Mr Dawkins then stepped away and left it to Shanda and DataCore to deal directly with each other. Thereafter, it was DataCore rather than Mr Dawkins that pursued potential financing from Shanda. That behaviour is not consistent with Mr Grendus’ theory that Mr Dawkins was engaged to solicit investments for DataCore.

  53. [34] Mr Lynch sent Mr Dawkins an email on 20 February 2016 to express gratitude on behalf of himself and Mr Dale, for the Shanda introduction (the “20 February 2016 Email”). Mr Lynch also said in that email:

  54. [35] The 20 February 2016 Email indicates that Mr Dawkins had not introduced Shanda to DataCore because he had been engaged by DataCore to do so. In that email, Mr Lynch said that if Shanda invested, he and Mr Dale would make sure Mr Dawkins was “looked after” – had Mr Dawkins been engaged to solicit investments from Shanda (and others), that assurance would have been unnecessary, and indeed out of place. Mr Lynch also said that they would be using Mr Dawkins for DataCore’s recruitment needs - that is consistent with Mr Dawkins’ evidence that he made investor introductions for DataCore in hope of becoming its exclusive recruitment partner (see [67] below).

  55. [36] I accept Mr Dawkins’ evidence that he had not asked or expected anything for the Shanda introduction to DataCore. He fairly accepted that by saying he would be “looked after” if Shanda invested, Mr Lynch could have meant a finder’s fee; but it could also have just meant Mr Lynch taking him out for a beer and a steak. In the end, neither Mr Dawkins nor Aryan Search were paid anything by DataCore for these introductions Mr Dawkins had made: Shanda never invested; Mr Grendus did; one Mr Paul Lee-Simion (“Mr Lee-Simion”) did not agree to invest, but he put some monies in escrow and said they had been misappropriated. It does not appear that any of the other DataCore investors Mr Grendus later became acquainted with and whom he says were similarly “defrauded”, had spoken with Mr Dawkins.

  56. April 2016 – Mr Lynch and Mr Dawkins discussed Shanda, and also the possibility of Mr Dawkins and Aryan Search investing in DataCore

  57. [37] Mr Lynch and Mr Dawkins continued to discuss the possibility of DataCore obtaining financing from Shanda, in an email exchange between 21-23 April 2016 (the “April 2016 Email Exchange”):

  58. [38] The above exchange shows that neither Mr Lynch nor Mr Dawkins then considered the Shanda financing to be “guaranteed” (in the sense of it being a certainty). Mr Dawkins recognised the possibility that financing from Shanda might not come through, and indicated that he could introduce two other venture capitalists. I will return to this point again below (at [142]).

  59. [39] In his email reply on 23 April 2016, Mr Lynch also said:

  60. [40] Mr Lynch was seeking to interest Mr Dawkins and Aryan Search in investing in DataCore – he would only send over further documents and details, if there was that interest. This is inconsistent with Mr Grendus’ theory that all along Mr Dawkins was engaged to solicit investments for DataCore – if so, Mr Lynch would simply have sent him documents and details to facilitate such solicitation, without it being a pre-condition that Mr Dawkins and Aryan Search themselves be interested in investing.

  61. [41] On 26 April 2016, Mr Lynch followed up with his earlier email and asked Mr Dawkins whether he wanted subscription documents to be sent over that day, or whether he would like to have a Skype call with Mr Lynch and Mr Dale first. Mr Dawkins responded to say, “[s]end over what you have for me to look at, I need to then call you back a bit later”. The discussion thus continued in a similar vein - Mr Lynch was trying to get Mr Dawkins and Aryan Search to invest; Mr Dawkins and Aryan Search were not engaged to solicit investments for DataCore.

  62. May-June 2016 – Mr Dawkins received the May Pro Forma, and DataCore tried to get Mr Dawkins and Aryan Search to invest

  63. [42] On 1 May 2016, Mr Lynch emailed Mr Dawkins (copying in Mr Dale). He said Mr Dale would send over DataCore subscription documents in the next few days and they could meet to have a discussion.

  64. [43] On 3 May 2016, Mr Dale emailed Mr Dawkins, thanking him for his “interest and support of [DataCore]” and provided him with “information circulars related to [DataCore’s] current Equity Offering”, including an attachment named “DataCore Innovations – Business Plan Financial Pro Forma and Assumptions – Q2 2016 – Confidential” (the “3 May 2016 Email”). That attachment was the May Pro Forma, which is an earlier version of the Pitch Document that Mr Lynch would later send to Mr Grendus in the 10 June 2016 Email.

  65. [44] In response, on 9 May 2016, Mr Dawkins said, “I’ve got some questions with regards to some of the details, a few colleagues and business partners are keen to learn more, hopefully tomorrow with Stephen [Mr Lynch] I’ll have a face to face catch up.”

  66. [45] On 10 May 2016, Mr Lynch met with Mr Dawkins and Mr Vikram of Aryan Search (the “10 May 2016 Meeting”). Mr Lynch tried to interest Mr Vikram into investing in DataCore, but Mr Vikram was not interested.

  67. [47] On 17 May 2016, Mr Dale emailed Mr Dawkins to say, “[t]hank you for your continued interest in our Dominant Factor index business and our Datacore Innovations LLC equity offering. Stephen [Mr Lynch] asked me to resend the attached documentation (originally sent May 2nd)” (the “17 May 2016 Email”). Mr Dale was referring to documents which he had sent earlier in his 3 May 2016 Email (see [43] above).

  68. [48] The attachments to the 17 May 2016 Email also included a copy of the May Pro Forma. Mr Dale concluded by saying:

  69. [49] The 17 May 2016 Email too was in similar vein to the earlier emails – Mr Dale was trying to get Mr Dawkins and his “business partners” (in the context, Mr Vikram of Aryan Search) to invest in DataCore. Mr Dawkins and Aryan Search were not engaged to solicit investors for DataCore.

  70. No financial due diligence was done by Mr Dawkins or Aryan Search

  71. [50] Mr Grendus contends that the reference to a “due diligence process” in the 11 May 2016 Email showed that Mr Dawkins and Aryan Search must have already done financial due diligence on DataCore. However, as Mr Dawkins says, the 11 May 2016 Email appeared to just be a standard email which Mr Lynch also sent to other of his own business contacts: “[w]e [Mr Dawkins and Mr Vikram] had done no due diligence, we had no in-depth discussions, we saw no numbers, we saw no profile”. In particular, neither Mr Dawkins nor Mr Vikram were ever sent actual financial statements of DataCore (whether audited accounts or unaudited management accounts), they only received pro forma financial statements (viz, the May Pro Forma) – with figures based on stated assumptions.

  72. [51] It is noteworthy that in cross-examining Mr Dawkins, Mr Grendus’ counsel took the position that Mr Dawkins first received the Pitch Document on 17 May 2016, which was after the 11 May 2016 Email – on that premise, even if Mr Dawkins and Aryan Search had performed any financial due diligence up to the point of the 11 May 2016 Email, they could not have done so in relation to figures in the Pitch Document which (on Mr Grendus’ own case) was not sent to them yet. In actual fact, the Pitch Document was never sent to Mr Dawkins or Aryan Search – it was only sent to Mr Grendus (see [120] below).

  73. [52] It is also significant that the “follow ups” / “action points” mentioned in the 11 May 2016 Email from Mr Lynch do not cover checking the actual financial state of DataCore then, but only a Skype meeting with Mr Dale “to walk through the projected financials of the company and complete a formal introduction” [emphasis added], and introductions to two other individuals. I accept Mr Dawkins’ evidence that the proposed Skype meeting never happened.

  74. [53] Mr Grendus also submits that Mr Vikram confirmed that it was standard practice for Aryan Search to do “due diligence” on their customers (including DataCore), which would extend to satisfying themselves that their customers are “doing well” and “have money to pay our services”.

  75. [54] Mr Vikram, however, did not say that Aryan Search would do financial due diligence on its customers, to the extent of verifying their actual or pro forma financial statements (which is what Mr Grendus contends Aryan Search did, or ought to have done). Mr Vikram’s evidence was to the contrary. He explained that Aryan Search’s protocol was to “do some checks, whether the client is doing well”, to “make sure … [they] have money to pay [for] our services”. However, not only were these checks limited to ascertaining a prospective client’s ability to pay for Aryan Search’s services, they were also limited to publicly available information. Mr Vikram explained that Aryan Search did not request documents from prospective clients; he said, “[w]e don’t ask them anything … we’ll check it online”.

  76. [55] When Mr Vikram was asked why the 11 May 2016 Email - sent as a follow-up to the 10 May 2016 Meeting - mentioned a “due-diligence process”, he said he had very clearly told Mr Lynch at the 10 May 2016 Meeting that he was not interested in what Mr Lynch pitched, because his mind had been occupied with other matters (his mother in India was sick and he was preparing to return to India for some time); and DataCore’s products (the Dynamic Factor indices) - which he perceived as not being IT-related - were not within his area of expertise. Mr Vikram was also 100 per cent sure that he had told Mr Lynch at the 10 May 2016 Meeting that he was not keen on investing in DataCore, and 100 per cent sure that he did not mention the need to conduct due diligence on DataCore or anything along those lines. I accept Mr Vikram’s evidence on this.

  77. [56] Moreover, DataCore never sent Mr Dawkins, Mr Vikram, or Aryan Search, any actual financial statements of DataCore. The May Pro Forma contained figures that were expressly based on assumptions (with a summary of those assumptions on page five of that document). Figures were provided for periods into the future (viz, from 2016 Q3 until 2018), for which there could be no actual figures. Where figures were provided for periods in the past (viz, from 2015 Q4 to 2016 Q2), however, there was no indication whether these were actual figures, or still pro forma figures that might not have been updated to reflect actual figures.

  78. [57] Pages four to eight of the May Pro Forma, which carried the pro forma figures, each had the following prominent statement: “All figures provided in these materials are for discussion purposes only and do not represent any forecast of future financial performance of the Venture or its affiliates”. So even the figures for future periods were not regarded as a forecast; they were just figures based on assumptions, for discussion.

  79. [58] The May Pro Forma concluded with a “Disclaimer” on page nine which stated:

  80. [59] I accept Mr Dawkins’ evidence that he did not read the documents sent to him in the 3 May 2016 Email (including the May Pro Forma) or at least he had not read them “fully” or “properly”. This was vividly demonstrated when Mr Dawkins did not realise, when cross-examined on the contents of the Pitch Document on the mistaken premise that it was identical to the May Pro Forma, that the two documents were materially different. I elaborate on this below (at [160], [172] and [215]).

  81. [60] Finally, Mr Grendus’ position is that on the face of the Pitch Document, which contained pro forma financials, he could not tell if the figures in it were accurate. Mr Dawkins and Aryan Search would have been in no better position in relation to the May Pro Forma, which similarly contained pro forma financials.

  82. [61] In the event, as neither Mr Dawkins nor Aryan Search (ie, Mr Vikram) decided to invest in DataCore, there was no reason for them to verify the accuracy of the figures in the May Pro Forma.

  83. [62] Unlike Mr Dawkins and Aryan Search, Mr Grendus decided to invest in DataCore (and CorePlus). He was free to conduct whatever financial due diligence he wished on DataCore (including verifying whether the figures in the Pitch Document were accurate for periods in the past, and evaluating the assumptions made as to the future). But he cannot blame Mr Dawkins and Aryan Search, both of whom never decided to invest their monies into DataCore, for not doing such financial due diligence on DataCore.

  84. [63] Mr Grendus contends that Mr Dawkins and Aryan Search did do financial due diligence on DataCore, and so they knew the truth and defrauded him; alternatively, if Mr Dawkins and Aryan Search did no financial due diligence, then they were reckless or careless – and so they still defrauded him, or negligently misrepresented matters to him. I reject all of this.

  85. [64] Mr Dawkins and Aryan Search were not negligent in not verifying the accuracy of figures in pro forma financial statements of DataCore, a company which they were recruiting for, but decided not to invest in. They owed Mr Grendus no duty to do financial due diligence so that he could invest in the belief that they had done such due diligence.

  86. DataCore was not obliged to pay finder’s fees to Mr Dawkins or Aryan Search

  87. [65] Mr Dawkins did mention “finder fees” in an email on 20 June 2016 to Mr Dale (the “20 June 2016 Email”), but that needs to be viewed in context. In that email, Mr Dawkins informed Mr Dale that he had been working on “recruitment introduction” and “investor introductions”. Under “recruitment introduction” he listed “Paul Szego” and “Jason Grendus (was a dual conversation when introduced, e.g. work and investment)”. Under “investor introductions”, he listed “Shanda Group – WIP”, “Jason Grendus – agreed”, “Paul Simion Lee – WIP” and another “[S] – TBC for tomorrow”. Mr Dawkins concluded his email saying:

  88. [66] It is evident from Mr Dawkins’ 20 June 2016 Email (and the earlier email correspondence, including the 20 February 2016 Email, 3 May 2016 Email, 11 May 2016 Email, and 17 May 2016 Email) that no agreement had been reached on Mr Dawkins being remunerated for the investor introductions he had made on behalf of DataCore (if any resulted in investment) – and in the event no agreement was ever reached, nor any payment made.

  89. [67] I accept Mr Dawkins’ evidence that he made investor introductions as part of networking, and adding value to clients and potential clients; what he really wanted was recruitment work, and investor introductions were a way of strengthening that relationship – he wanted to be DataCore’s exclusive recruitment partner.

  90. [68] Of course, if DataCore were to give Mr Dawkins more recruitment work (and were able to pay for it), that would benefit Aryan Search and by extension Mr Dawkins. Not only was Mr Dawkins an employee of Aryan Search, there was an understanding between him and Mr Vikram, that if Mr Dawkins obtained permanent resident status in Singapore he would become a part-owner of the business; and if the business were sold he would be entitled to a share of its proceeds. The fact that Mr Dawkins would have been incentivised to get business for Aryan Search, however, does not show that Mr Dawkins was soliciting investments for reward, as distinct from making investor introductions as part of, or incidental to, his work as a recruiter.

  91. Mr Dawkins did not have the financial acumen of a financial advisor

  92. [69] Mr Grendus points to Mr Dawkins’ job scope in his employment contract, which includes: “[r]aise the profile of Aryan Search and implement a strategy (to) attract investment”. Mr Grendus argues that this shows that Mr Dawkins was capable of attracting investments for Aryan Search and others, and that Mr Dawkins’ description of his financial literacy should not be believed.

  93. [70] In this regard, Mr Dawkins says this about the 24 May 2016 Meeting in his AEIC:

  94. [71] I accept Mr Dawkins’ evidence on this. He had worked as a recruiter for some 24 years since 1997, after finishing his A levels. Mr Dawkins was not a trained accountant like Mr Grendus. Indeed, one theme running through Mr Grendus’ case is that Mr Dawkins should have been able to read financial statements like Mr Grendus could, to the extent of appreciating the significance of cashflow projections and headcount figures, and being able to quote figures from financial statements without referring to them. That is unfounded.

  95. [72] At trial, Mr Dawkins was cross-examined on a mistaken premise: that he had received the Pitch Document (when he had not) by the time of the 24 May 2016 Meeting and so he provided Mr Grendus with information from it (see [59] above). Mr Dawkins did not realise that this was erroneous until after he was off the stand, when he checked the documents he had actually received and found that they did not include the Pitch Document – instead he had an earlier version of the pro forma financial statements (ie, the May Pro Forma), with materially different figures. I will return to this when I discuss the representations to which this relates.

  96. [73] As for the reference in Mr Dawkins’ employment contract to him raising the profile of Aryan Search and implementing a strategy to attract investment, that was in the context of Aryan Search itself; it did not concern soliciting investments for others. Mr Vikram explained that Evo-AI was a recruitment product that Aryan was using, and he wanted Mr Dawkins to see if he could get some investment for that particular product. That evidence, which I accept, is worlds apart from Mr Dawkins being expected to solicit investments for Aryan Search’s recruitment clients. He was never engaged for that. Mr Dawkins was not hired to act as a financial advisor, investment broker, or anything of the sort.

  97. Fraud

  98. Mr Grendus’ case on the representations allegedly made to him

  99. The representations as pleaded in the SOC

  100. [74] Mr Grendus pleaded at para 11 of his statement of claim (the “SOC”) that Mr Lynch and Mr Dawkins made 11 “Representations”, and at para 14 that Mr Lynch and/or Mr Dawkins and/or Mr Dale made certain “Further Representations”, all of which induced him to make the Investments.

  101. [75] The 11 Representations are:

  102. (a) the figures in the Pitch Document are accurate;

  103. (b) Mr Dale was a cash-contributing investor in DataCore;

  104. (c) DataCore was a going concern;

  105. (d) DataCore was on the verge of closing a Series A round financing at thrice its alleged current valuation of US$10 million (the “Financing”) and that the Financing was guaranteed;

  106. (e) the guaranteed Financing was provided by Shanda, which is based in China with a recently opened investment office in Singapore (the “Shanda Financing”);

  107. (f) if the subscription of the seed units were not fully subscribed, Shanda would purchase the remining units in the Series A round, in accordance with the guaranteed Financing;

  108. (g) DataCore had a pre-Financing head count of nine with payroll costs of US$95,000 per month;

  109. (h) DataCore had “a lot of interest from the insurance industry” and a deep sales pipeline had already been in development for some time with initial sales forecasted for June 2016 and US$965,000 total sales expected by end-of-year 2016;

  110. (i) DataCore was already involved in due-diligence processes with multiple banks and exchange traded fund (“ETF”) companies;

  111. (j) entering into the CorePlus Debenture will allow Mr Grendus to enjoy participation in DataCore as well as other projects CorePlus was involved in; and

  112. (k) of the said CorePlus projects referred to in (j) above were the underwriting of pet owner insurance, a “Green Energy” bond fund, a “Liquified Natural Gas” (LNG) fund and Skybridge Financial Pte Ltd (“Skybridge”) and a “Foreign Film Rights” fund said to be for and between Skybridge and Struans Capital Partners.

  113. (I shall refer to these as Representations (a) to (k).)

  114. [76] In the SOC, Mr Grendus described the context in which Mr Lynch and/or Mr Dawkins and/or Mr Dale made the Further Representation as follows:

  115. Mr Grendus’ particulars

  116. [77] On 3 December 2018, Mr Grendus provided further and better particulars of “[w]hether the alleged representation was made by [Mr Lynch] or [Mr Dawkins]” pursuant to a request by Mr Dawkins and Aryan Search. Mr Grendus clarified that although he had pleaded that Mr Lynch and Mr Dawkins had made the 11 Representations:

  117. (a) Representation (h) was just made by Mr Lynch;

  118. (b) Representations (d) and (e) were made by both Mr Lynch and Mr Dawkins orally; and

  119. (c) Representations (a), (b), (c), (f), (g), (i), (j) and (k) were made by Mr Lynch in the presence of Mr Dawkins; and Mr Dawkins by being present, the circumstances, and him not offering any contrary views, affirmed the representations made by Mr Lynch.

  120. [78] Mr Grendus treated Representation (h) differently from Representations (a), (b), (c), (f), (g), (i), (j) and (k): he did not say that Representation (h) was made by Mr Lynch in Mr Dawkins’ presence; he simply said Representation (h) was made by Mr Lynch, and he did not say that Mr Dawkins had affirmed it in any way. Mr Grendus’ particulars in effect abandoned the allegation in para 11 of the SOC that Mr Dawkins had made Representation (h).

  121. When and how were the Representations and Further Representations made?

  122. [79] As pleaded, the focus of Mr Grendus’ case against Mr Dawkins, is what happened at the 24 May 2016 Meeting. Mr Grendus pleads that it was after hearing the Representations, that he shared his investment objectives with Mr Dawkins at the 24 May 2016 Meeting, whereupon Mr Dawkins made the Further Representations at the same meeting by “not inform[ing] him otherwise that the said objectives may not be attained” (see [76] above).

  123. [80] Mr Grendus pleaded at para 13 of the SOC that the Representations and Further Representations were made by and/or are to be inferred from:

  124. (d) oral statements by Mr Lynch, Mr Dawkins, and Mr Dale;

  125. (e) the Pitch Document circulated by Mr Lynch and Mr Dale;

  126. (f) the 10 June 2016 Email from Mr Lynch to Mr Grendus and the documents attached thereto (including the Pitch Document); and

  127. (g) all other documents provided by Mr Lynch, Mr Dawkins, and Mr Dale to him.

  128. [81] The Pitch Document ((b) above) and the 10 June 2016 Email ((c) above) are not attributed to Mr Dawkins. The reference to “all other documents” provided by Mr Lynch, Mr Dawkins and Mr Dale ((d) above) was then omitted from para 20 of Mr Grendus’ AEIC, where he had set out the various sources from which the Representations and Further Representations were made and/or are to be inferred from. In relation to Mr Grendus’ claim against Mr Dawkins, that leaves oral statements by Mr Dawkins ((a) above), although from Mr Grendus’ particulars, he evidently also relies on silence by Mr Dawkins – specifically Mr Dawkins not contradicting what was said by Mr Lynch at the 24 May 2016 Meeting, and Mr Dawkins not telling Mr Grendus that his strategic investment objectives may not be attained.

  129. [82] Mr Grendus says that the Representations were made “[d]uring the 24 May Meeting and in subsequent conversations [and/or discussions]” with Mr Lynch and Mr Dawkins. Specifically, in his AEIC, Mr Grendus says that Mr Lynch and Mr Dawkins had “continued to repeat the representations” regarding the Shanda Financing even after the 24 May 2016 Meeting.

  130. [83] However, Mr Grendus’ pleadings were focused on the 24 May 2016 Meeting, and his evidence is thin on what those subsequent conversations or discussions are. From his pleadings and particulars, Representations (a), (b), (c), (f), (g), (i), (j) and (k) were made by Mr Lynch in the presence of Mr Dawkins; and affirmed by Mr Dawkins not contradicting Mr Lynch. That could only have happened at the 24 May 2016 Meeting. Mr Grendus does not point to any further meeting between the three of them, before he made the Investments on 24 June 2016 and so Mr Dawkins could not have affirmed anything said in any subsequent discussion just between Mr Lynch and Mr Grendus.

  131. [84] I will address whether Mr Dawkins had made (and repeated) Representations (d) and (e), which relate to the Shanda Financing, and are the only ones Mr Grendus pleaded Mr Dawkins made orally (rather than by keeping silent), below (at [131]).

  132. The Submission Representations

  133. [85] Having pleaded 11 Representations and certain Further Representations, Mr Grendus’ written submissions (the “Submissions”) instead identified eight representations (the “Submission Representations”). He repeated some of the pleaded Representations, reformulated some of them, split some of them, combined some of them, and dropped some of them. Representations (f), (i), (j) and (k) do not appear to feature in the Submissions – I will, for completeness, deal with them as they were pleaded, although they appear to have been abandoned.

  134. [86] The loose way in which Mr Grendus’ allegations are made, does not inspire confidence. Confusingly, Mr Grendus refers to the Submission Representations as “Representations and Further Representations”, in the same way as his pleadings were structured in the SOC. I shall refer to the each of the eight representations in the Submissions as Submission Representations (1) to (8), which are to be distinguished from Representations (a) to (k) pleaded in the SOC. I will address the Submission Representations in turn, save that I will collectively deal with the various allegations relating to the Shanda Financing.

  135. Did Mr Dawkins make the representations?

  136. The 24 May 2016 Meeting

  137. [87] I first make some observations about what happened at the 24 May 2016 Meeting.

  138. [88] It is common ground that when Mr Dawkins and Mr Grendus spoke over the telephone on 24 May 2016, Mr Dawkins told Mr Grendus about a potential opportunity to work for DataCore (see [27] above). It is also common ground that Mr Dawkins mentioned that DataCore was looking for potential investors. Mr Grendus then asked that Mr Dawkins arrange a meeting with DataCore.

  139. [89] Mr Dawkins contacted Mr Lynch and made arrangements for a meeting that day with Mr Grendus (ie, the 24 May 2016 Meeting). Mr Dawkins says that the three of them first met at a coffee shop in Geylang which was near his office, and then adjourned to a cigar bar. Mr Grendus pleaded that he cannot recall with particularity whether they first met at a coffee shop in Geylang, but he agrees that the three of them did meet at the cigar bar.

  140. [90] Mr Grendus says that during the 24 May 2016 Meeting, Mr Lynch and Mr Dawkins spent over five hours from 5pm to 10pm pitching potential investment opportunities in DataCore and CorePlus to him.

  141. [91] Mr Dawkins says that the meeting started at around 5pm, but they only adjourned to the cigar bar at around 10pm, and stayed there till around 2.30am the next day.

  142. [92] Under cross-examination, Mr Grendus acknowledged that the 24 May 2016 Meeting did not just last till 10pm (as para 17 of his AEIC suggests). When asked what time the three of them left the cigar bar, he said it may have been “past midnight”, “late in the morning”, potentially 1am; he could not remember exactly, but only that it was “late”. On this point, Mr Dawkins’ recollection is more specific and more reliable.

  143. [93] Mr Grendus acknowledged that they all had “quite a fair bit of drinking”. He agreed that “there was a whole lot of alcohol”, which could “have affected [his] recollection of some of the details”, but he said, “[t]he same goes for [Mr Dawkins]”. Mr Dawkins said “every single one of [them]” was “hammered drunk” by the end of the nine-hour session. According to Mr Dawkins, they had been drinking pretty heavily, having had 20 bottles of beer before leaving Geylang for the cigar bar. Mr Dawkins also said that Mr Grendus was “inebriated”.

  144. [94] Mr Dawkins acknowledged there were discussions between Mr Grendus and Mr Lynch regarding investments. Mr Dawkins said Mr Grendus and Mr Lynch were each showing off their knowledge about financial products and investments, but he was not too focussed or engaged in that discussion, indeed, he was “completely lost”. He was, however, quite happy to stay on for drinks and cigars, rather than to return home early to his partner (with whom he was having a difficult relationship).

  145. [95] Mr Dawkins’ account of his involvement (rather, non-involvement) in the discussion on investments at the 24 May 2016 Meeting is largely consonant with Mr Grendus’ pleaded position on the Representations, where he asserts that:

  146. (a) it was Mr Lynch that made Representations (a), (b), (c), (f), (g), (i), (j) and (k), though Mr Dawkins affirmed those by not contradicting Mr Lynch (see [77(c)] above); and

  147. (b) the only representations which Mr Dawkins made orally (together with Mr Lynch) were those in relation to DataCore’s Financing and the Shanda Financing (Representations (d) and (e)) (see [77(b)] above). Mr Dawkins agrees that he did mention Shanda when he first spoke to Mr Grendus over the telephone about a potential opportunity to work for DataCore, but denies representing that the Shanda Financing was “guaranteed”.

  148. [96] It was a long meeting, Mr Grendus had been drinking heavily, and his case against Mr Dawkins is largely based on what Mr Dawkins allegedly said (or, mostly, did not say). The circumstances of the 24 May 2016 Meeting diminish the reliability of Mr Grendus’ evidence of what happened. Moreover, when asked at trial if Mr Dawkins had actually made Representations (a)-(k), Mr Grendus then gave evidence that varied from his pleaded position.

  149. [97] I turn now to consider each of the Submission Representations and Representations.

  150. Submission Representation (1) / Representation (c)

  151. [98] Submission Representation (1), which corresponds with pleaded Representation (c) is: “DataCore was a going concern”.

  152. [99] Mr Grendus’ pleaded that this representation was made by Mr Lynch, and affirmed by Mr Dawkins not contradicting him (see [77(c)] above). However, in his evidence, Mr Grendus says that it was made by both of them, and that is what he submits happened.

  153. [100] In response to the letter of demand from Mr Grendus’ solicitors (the “Letter of Demand”), Mr Lynch said in his letter of 17 September 2018 (the “17 September 2018 Letter”) that he did say at the 24 May 2016 Meeting that DataCore was “an ongoing concern”. However, Mr Dawkins’ evidence (which I accept) is that Mr Dawkins never heard Mr Lynch say that DataCore is a going concern. Indeed, it would not be natural in a discussion on investments to expressly say that the company in question “is a going concern”.

  154. [101] However, DataCore was portrayed as a going concern, ie, expected to continue in business for the foreseeable future. It was not presented as a company that was insolvent, or about to go into liquidation. The work opportunity with DataCore (which Mr Dawkins spoke to Mr Grendus about), and the potential investment in DataCore (which Mr Lynch spoke to Mr Grendus about), were both premised on DataCore being a going concern. In undertaking recruitment work for DataCore in the first place, Mr Dawkins too assumed DataCore to be a going concern that could subsequently pay fees to Aryan Search.

  155. [102] In the circumstances, notwithstanding that this representation was not expressly made at the 24 May 2016 Meeting, I accept that Mr Grendus was given the impression that DataCore was a going concern. This is also supported by Mr Dawkins’ own account of what he had told Mr Grendus when he shared about the potential work opportunity with DataCore:

  156. Submission Representation (2) / Representation (a)

  157. [103] Submission Representation (2) is: “[t]he financial figures in the Pitch Documents were accurate and that there was imminent financing from Shanda” [emphasis added]. This is a combination of pleaded Representations (a), (d) and (e). I will deal with the aspects relating to Representations (d) and (e) (which concern the Shanda Financing) later. For the present, I will only focus on Representation (a), viz, that the figures in the Pitch Document were accurate.

  158. [104] The Submissions also broaden the reference to the Pitch Document that Mr Grendus received from Mr Lynch in the 10 June 2016 Email to Pitch Documents. Presumably Mr Grendus is referring to the rest of the documents that he received from Mr Lynch and Mr Dale, not just the pro forma financials contained in the Pitch Document. But this does not assist Mr Grendus – those documents include a Subscription Agreement containing various qualifications, warnings, and disclaimers. I will deal with these when I address the Further Representations. Moreover, on Mr Grendus’ pleadings, those documents are attributed to Mr Lynch and Mr Dale, not to Mr Dawkins.

  159. [105] For now, I will focus on the Pitch Document which Mr Grendus received from Mr Lynch with the 10 June 2016 Email.

  160. [106] Mr Grendus’ case that Mr Dawkins quoted figures from the Pitch Document is fatally flawed, for at the time of the 24 May 2016 Meeting, Mr Dawkins had not received the Pitch Document – he only had the May Pro Forma, which was materially different. Mr Dawkins could not have quoted figures from the Pitch Document (which he did not have), and if he quoted figures from the May Pro Forma, the figures were different.

  161. [107] The Submissions compound the problem. Mr Grendus continues to assert that Mr Dawkins “received the Pitch Documents containing this information [ie, the pro forma financial figures] prior to the meeting with [Mr Grendus] on 24 May 2016” and that Mr Dawkins “knew that the figures in the Pitch Document were false”, or “could not have any genuine grounds to believe that the figures were true”.

  162. [108] The Submissions were filed on 12 May 2021, almost two months after it had been pointed out (on the last day of trial on 18 March 2021) that the May Pro Forma sent to Mr Dawkins in May 2016 was not the Pitch Document, and there were differences in the figures contained in both documents. There is no evidence that Mr Dawkins ever received the Pitch Document, or that the Pitch Document even existed at the time of the 24 May 2016 Meeting.

  163. [109] In Mr Grendus’ solicitors’ letter of 18 May 2021 to the court (the “18 May 2021 Letter”), it was then acknowledged that the May Pro Forma and the Pitch Document were different, but it was submitted that they did not differ in any material or meaningful aspect. Differences in relation to financing and headcount figures were noted, but were characterised as “minor”. I do not agree with this characterisation. I will deal with the differences between the figures for financing, headcount, and also revenue, when I discuss the representations they pertain to.

  164. [110] The simple point is: Mr Dawkins had not received the Pitch Document, and so he could not have quoted figures from it, or affirmed that the figures in the Pitch Document were accurate. Yet Mr Grendus maintains that Mr Dawkins quoted figures from the Pitch Document, including the valuation and the million dollars of expected revenue in the year 2016. I reject this. I also accept Mr Dawkins’ evidence that he had not quoted figures to Mr Grendus.

  165. [111] Indeed, it is not Mr Grendus’ pleaded case that Mr Dawkins had quoted revenue or headcount figures. Mr Grendus says it was Mr Lynch who said DataCore had a pre-Financing head count of nine, and that Mr Dawkins affirmed that by not contradicting Mr Lynch (Representation (g), as particularised: see [77(c)] above). Mr Grendus also says that Mr Lynch said US$965,000 total sales were expected by end-of-year 2016, but critically, he does not say that Mr Dawkins affirmed that (Representation (h), as particularised: see [77(a)] above). Had Mr Dawkins quoted revenue or headcount figures from the Pitch Document at the 24 May 2016 Meeting, Mr Grendus would not have limited Mr Dawkins’ role in relation to Representations (g) and (h) in the way he did in his pleadings.

  166. [112] Furthermore, Mr Grendus’ pleaded case is that Representation (a) was made by Mr Lynch, and affirmed by Mr Dawkins not contradicting him, ie, Mr Lynch said the figures in the Pitch Document are accurate, and Mr Dawkins did not say otherwise (see [77(c)] above).

  167. [113] By now saying that Mr Dawkins (rather than Mr Lynch) was quoting figures from the Pitch Document, Mr Grendus is departing from his pleaded case (except in relation to representations relating to DataCore’s Financing, in the context of the Shanda Financing, viz, Representations (d) and (e)). As Denning LJ (as he then was) said in Lazarus Estates Ltd v Beasley [1956] 1 QB 702: “The court is careful not to find fraud unless it is distinctly pleaded and proved” (at 712). It would not be right to allow Mr Grendus to now allege that Mr Dawkins quoted figures from the Pitch Document, when that is not his pleaded case.

  168. [114] Mr Grendus’ case thus reduces to this: Mr Lynch orally said things about DataCore at the 24 May 2016 Meeting which seemed to match what Mr Grendus later saw in the Pitch Document, and Mr Dawkins did not contradict Mr Lynch at the time of the 24 May 2016 Meeting. However, Mr Grendus can only sue Mr Dawkins for not contradicting Mr Lynch, in circumstances where one would expect Mr Dawkins to contradict Mr Lynch. That is not the case here. Mr Lynch was an insider to DataCore, Mr Dawkins was not. Mr Dawkins had no reason to believe that what Mr Lynch was saying about DataCore was untrue.

  169. [115] If there is no duty to speak (and there was none in the present case), silence is not actionable as a misrepresentation: Wang Xiaopu v Goh Seng Heng and another [2019] SGHC 284 (“Wang Xiaopu”) at [59]–[60]; EA Apartments Pte Ltd v Tan Bek and others [2017] 3 SLR 559 (“EA Apartments”) at [29]–[30].

  170. [116] At trial, Mr Grendus’ counsel told Mr Dawkins that the Pitch Document had been sent to him on 17 May 2016. That was factually wrong – on the evidence, Mr Dawkins never received the Pitch Document. In response, Mr Dawkins said he had not read the Pitch Document, indeed he had never seen that document. Mr Dawkins was right: what was sent to him on 17 May 2016 was not the Pitch Document which was sent to Mr Grendus by Mr Lynch in the 10 June 2016 Email (see [120] below).

  171. [117] The cross-examination of Mr Dawkins thus proceeded on the mistaken premise that he had been sent the Pitch Document on 17 May 2016 when the attachments to the 17 May 2016 Email (or indeed, the 3 May 2016 Email) (see [43] and [48] above) were not included in the trial bundles, and evidently had not been looked at.

  172. [118] At the end of Mr Dawkins’ testimony, I queried the basis on which it was asserted that the Pitch Document had been sent to Mr Dawkins prior to the 24 May 2016 Meeting. I was informed that “the earliest” Mr Dawkins would have received it, was with the 17 May 2016 Email, I was then informed that Mr Dawkins may have received the Pitch Document even earlier than 17 May 2016, that is, with the 3 May 2016 Email.

  173. [119] Mr Dawkins maintained that he did not read any of the documents sent to him in the 3 May 2016 Email or the 17 May 2016 Email, or at least he had not read them “fully” or “properly”.

  174. [121] I accept Mr Dawkins’ evidence that he did not read through the May Pro Forma, at least not fully or properly. Indeed, on the stand, he had not even realised that what Mr Grendus’ counsel was saying to him about his having received the Pitch Document in May 2016 was wrong.

  175. [122] On a related note, all of Mr Grendus’ evidence that is premised on Mr Dawkins having in his possession the Pitch Document before the 24 May 2016 Meeting, is flawed, including the following:

  176. (c) that financial figures from documents circulated by Mr Lynch and Mr Dale “subsequent to the meeting” were quoted by Mr Dawkins at the 24 May 2016 Meeting, including “the valuation and the million dollars of expected revenue in the year 2016”;

  177. (d) that while Mr Dawkins did not provide financial statements, he quoted figures from the financial statements in conjunction with Mr Lynch at the 24 May 2016 Meeting and Mr Grendus believed him.

  178. [123] Mr Grendus relies on the Pitch Document as proof that Mr Dawkins must have said the same things to him at the 24 May 2016 Meeting, but that is unsound for the simple reason that Mr Dawkins did not have the Pitch Document. This passage from Mr Grendus’ testimony illustrates his thinking:

  179. [124] I do not accept that Mr Dawkins represented that the figures in the Pitch Document are accurate – I thus reject Mr Grendus’ case on Submission Representation (1) (in relation to the Pitch Document) / Representation (a).

  180. Submission Representation (3) / Representation (b)

  181. [125] Submission Representation (3) is: “[Mr Dale] was a cash-contributing investor in DataCore”. This corresponds with pleaded Representation (b).

  182. [126] In the 17 September 2018 Letter by Mr Lynch to Mr Grendus’ solicitors, Mr Lynch admitted representing to Mr Grendus at the 24 May 2016 Meeting that Mr Dale was a cash-contributing investor in DataCore. Mr Dawkins’ evidence (which I accept) is that he does not recall if that was said at the 24 May 2016 Meeting; it may have been discussed between Mr Lynch and Mr Grendus, but he (Mr Dawkins) did not discuss that with Mr Grendus.

  183. [127] Mr Grendus’ pleaded case is that Representation (b) was made by Mr Lynch, and affirmed by Mr Dawkins not contradicting him. In his evidence, however, Mr Grendus seemed to suggest that Mr Dawkins himself had said this, and that was then asserted in the Submissions. Again, I do not allow Mr Grendus to depart from his pleaded case and make a new allegation of fraud against Mr Dawkins.

  184. [128] In any event, there was no way Mr Dawkins could have known if Mr Dale was a cash-contributing investor. He was not privy to DataCore’s internal financial affairs, and any limited checks which he and/or Aryan Search might have performed (see [54] above) would not have shed light on this. I do not believe Mr Dawkins said anything about whether Mr Dale was a cash-contributing investor.

  185. [129] Indeed, if Mr Lynch had said at the 24 May 2016 Meeting that Mr Dale was a cash-contributing investor in DataCore (and that had made an impression on Mr Dawkins), there would have been no reason at all for Mr Dawkins to disbelieve Mr Lynch, and contradict him.

  186. [130] I thus reject Mr Grendus’ case on Submission Representation (3) / Representation (b).

  187. Submission Representations (4) to (6) / Representations (d) and (e)

  188. [131] I take Submission Representations (4) to (6) together with the aspect of Submission Representation (2) relating to the Shanda Financing.

  189. [132] Submission Representation (4) is: “DataCore was on the verge of closing Series A financing at thrice its alleged valuation of US$10 million”.

  190. [133] Submission Representation (5) is: “the Financing was to be provided by a wealthy Chinese global investment firm called the Shanda Group, based in China and which had recently opened an investment office in Singapore”.

  191. [134] Submission Representation (6) is: “the Shanda Financing was guaranteed”.

  192. [135] An aspect of Submission Representation (2) is: “there was imminent financing from Shanda”.

  193. [136] Taken together, these representations correspond with pleaded Representations (d) and (e), which I reproduce in full below:

  194. (a) DataCore was on the verge of closing a Series A round financing at thrice its alleged current valuation of US$10 million (the “Financing”) and that the Financing was guaranteed;

  195. (b) The guaranteed Financing was provided by a wealthy Chinese Global Investment Firm “Shanda” based in China with a recently opened investment office in Singapore.

  196. [137] Representations (d) and (e) are the only two which Mr Grendus pleaded that Mr Dawkins himself made orally (rather than by Mr Dawkins merely affirming Representations which Mr Lynch made, by not contradicting Mr Lynch) (see [77(b)] above).

  197. [138] The most significant aspect of these representations is that the Shanda Financing was allegedly “guaranteed” (in the sense of it being a certainty). I do not believe that either Mr Lynch or Mr Dawkins represented that the Shanda Financing was “guaranteed”.

  198. [139] Mr Dawkins said in his AEIC that the allegation that he had represented that the Shanda Financing was guaranteed, was baseless. His evidence at trial was also consistent with his pleadings and AEIC. Mr Dawkins candidly acknowledged that he had mentioned to Mr Grendus that he had referred Shanda as a potential investor looking at Series A financing to DataCore. Mr Dawkins had mentioned this to Mr Grendus as part of him telling Mr Grendus about the job opportunity with DataCore.

  199. [140] Similarly, in the 17 September 2018 Letter from Mr Lynch, he says that DataCore were marketing and trying to close a Series A financing, and that he had told Mr Grendus that Shanda was one of the investors DataCore was approaching for Series A financing.

  200. [141] The 17 September 2018 Letter by Mr Lynch was sent in response to Mr Grendus’ Letter of Demand, where Mr Grendus alleged that Mr Lynch had represented to him that DataCore was on the verge of closing its Series A, which was to be financed by Shanda. However, in the Letter of Demand, Mr Grendus did not allege that it was represented to him that the Shanda Financing was “guaranteed”. The same applies to Mr Grendus’ letter of demand to Mr Dawkins. The complaint was simply that “the [Shanda Financing] did not materialize”, rather than Mr Grendus having been lied to about “guaranteed” Financing.

  201. [142] From the April 2016 Email Exchange between Mr Lynch and Mr Dawkins (see [37]-[38] above), it is clear that neither of them considered the Shanda Financing to be “guaranteed”. It was a possibility. Mr Dawkins expressed confidence that the Shanda Financing would come through, in response to Mr Lynch’s update on the situation, but Mr Dawkins also recognised the possibility that the Shanda Financing might not come through, and so he indicated that he could introduce two other venture capitalists in that event. Mr Lynch acknowledged that it might take another one to two more months for Shanda to reach a decision on financing. Mr Dawkins’ evidence at trial on his understanding of how Series A financing for start-ups generally worked was also consistent with that.

  202. [143] Mr Dawkins denied that he or Mr Lynch had at the 24 May 2016 Meeting represented that the Shanda Financing was imminent, let alone “guaranteed”. I accept his evidence on this.

  203. [144] For his case that Mr Dawkins had made Representations (d) to (e), Mr Grendus also relies on the fact that the Pitch Document had “budgeted” an investment of US$10m in DataCore (which he says was to be made by Shanda) in August 2016. However, the May Pro Forma had different figures in that regard.

  204. [145] The Pitch Document had a figure of US$10,115,000 in the August 2016 column for Investment Capital (Financing), but the May Pro Forma Mr Dawkins received has no US$10m figure as an injection of investment capital in the month of August 2016. Instead, there is a figure of US$5m in the July 2016 column, and another figure of US$5m in the October 2016 column.

  205. [146] Mr Grendus’ evidence was that “the numbers that were represented tie up to the representations in the documents”. Specifically, referring to the Pitch Document, Mr Grendus said:

  206. [147] If (as Mr Grendus says), the impression he was given at the 24 May 2016 Meeting was that there would be US$10m in financing from Shanda in August 2016, that could not have come from Mr Dawkins. The May Pro Forma, which is what Mr Dawkins had, instead had US$5m in the July 2016 column, and another US$5m in October 2016 column.

  207. [148] If Mr Lynch had represented at the 24 May 2016 Meeting that DataCore were trying to close US$10m in financing from Shanda by August 2016, Mr Dawkins had no reason to disbelieve Mr Lynch, and contradict him. From what Mr Dawkins knew, DataCore were seeking to close the Shanda Financing, and Mr Lynch had indicated in his email in the April 2016 Email Exchange between himself and Mr Dawkins that it would take another one to two months for Shanda to decide (see [37]-[38] above).

  208. [149] As for the alleged reference to the Shanda Financing being at triple the current US$10m valuation of DataCore, I accept Mr Dawkins’ evidence that he had not presented any specific numbers or facts to Mr Grendus. If Mr Dawkins did not read through the May Pro Forma, at least not fully or properly, which I accept (see [121] above), he could not have put forward any specific numbers or facts premised on figures in the May Pro Forma - and, if he had, that would not have corresponded with the figures that Mr Grendus later saw from the Pitch Document. I do not believe Mr Dawkins said that DataCore’s current valuation was US$10m, or that if Shanda invested it would be at a valuation that was triple of that. If Mr Lynch had represented this, Mr Dawkins had no reason to disbelieve Mr Lynch, and contradict him.

  209. [150] Mr Grendus also says Mr Dawkins repeatedly said he (Mr Dawkins) would triple his money by investing in DataCore. This was not pleaded as a separate representation on which Mr Grendus was suing, but Mr Grendus referred to it in the context of the Shanda Financing being at triple DataCore’s current valuation.

  210. [151] Mr Dawkins acknowledges he had said that he was interested in investing in DataCore. The April 2016 Email Exchange between Mr Lynch and Mr Dawkins also indicates that Mr Dawkins was interested in investing in DataCore; he said so to Mr Lynch, and there was nothing false about him saying so to Mr Grendus too.

  211. [152] If Mr Dawkins further said anything about tripling his money by investing in DataCore (and I am not convinced he did say this), this would only have been a response to Mr Lynch saying that the Shanda Financing would be at triple the current valuation of DataCore. Mr Dawkins had no reason to disbelieve Mr Lynch, and contradict him.

  212. [153] After the 24 May 2016 Meeting, Mr Dawkins and Mr Grendus continued to exchange messages (the “Messages”). In the Messages, there was further mention of:

  213. (a) the possibility of Mr Grendus working for DataCore;

  214. (b) the possibility of Mr Grendus and Mr Dawkins investing in DataCore; and

  215. (c) continued discussions between DataCore and Shanda.

  216. [154] Mr Grendus says the Messages corroborate his allegation that it had been represented at the 24 May 2016 Meeting that the Shanda Financing was “guaranteed”. However, the Messages do not support his allegation. If it had been represented at the 24 May 2016 Meeting that the Shanda Financing was “guaranteed”, there would have been be no need for Mr Dawkins to update Mr Grendus on the progress of such financing, but that was precisely what was discussed in the Messages. This extract from the Messages gives a flavour of the discussion:

  217. [155] In June 2016, Mr Grendus met with Mr Dale and Mr Lynch, and spoke with them. It was open to him to get an update from them on the Financing, in particular whether the Shanda Financing had gone through; and to ask them to “go over all the numbers” with him. Whatever transpired between Mr Grendus, Mr Dale, and Mr Lynch, however, did not involve Mr Dawkins.

  218. [156] I thus reject Mr Grendus’ case on the representations relating to the DataCore’s Financing and the Shanda Financing, ie, Submissions Representations (4) to (6) and part of Submissions Representation (2) / Representations (d) and (e).

  219. Submission Representation (7) / Representation (g)

  220. [158] Mr Grendus’ pleaded position is that Representation (g) was made by Mr Lynch, and affirmed by Mr Dawkins not contradicting him (see [77(c)] above); but when asked which of the pleaded Representations were actually made by Mr Dawkins, he said: “[Representation (g)] comes from the financial statements as in the pro forma”. That contrasts with what he said of the other pleaded Representations, eg, what he said about Representation (f), “is the first defendant, Stephen Lynch” and about Representation (h), “would be that meeting, first and second defendant”.

  221. [159] In so far as Mr Grendus attributes Representation (g) to “the pro forma”, ie, the Pitch Document Mr Lynch sent him with the 10 June 2016 Email, Mr Dawkins was not responsible for that document – Mr Dawkins was not copied in that email and was not even sent that document.

  222. [160] The May Pro Forma, which Mr Dawkins received, had different figures, in relation to headcount, from the Pitch Document, as shown in the following table:

  223. [161] Mr Grendus seeks to downplay the difference in figures, especially the figures for May 2016 (the very month when the 24 May 2016 Meeting took place) by saying – through the 18 May 2021 Letter from his solicitors – that the total global headcount numbers for 2016 Q1 (which are identical in both the Pitch Document and May Pro Forma) are what matter. That is a clear shift in his case:

  224. (a) Mr Grendus’ complaint is that “pre-Financing head count” of 9 is what was represented to him. Representation (g) therefore relates to the relevant headcount numbers of DataCore before any such Financing, which (as is common ground) did not yet take place at the time of the 24 May 2016 Meeting. As such, the headcount numbers for April and May 2016 were as relevant as those for 2016 Q1 (January to March 2016) were.

  225. (b) In Mr Grendus’ testimony, referring to the Pitch Document, he said: “Headcount – 9, line item ‘Head Count (Salary Staff or Consultants – part & full) – 9’. 2016 Q1. 2016 Q2. Further misrepresentation. As it stands, in the end there were only 6”. In his testimony, Mr Grendus did not restrict himself only to the headcount numbers for 2016 Q1, contrary to his present position that only the numbers for 2016 Q1 matter.

  226. (c) Mr Grendus’ counsel had cross-examined Mr Dawkins on what DataCore’s headcount was in May 2016:

  227. (d) In saying that Representation (g) was false, Mr Grendus complains that instead of a headcount of 9, DataCore only had a headcount of 6, all of whom (including Mr Lynch) he says were overpaid – but the financial statements of DataCore exhibited in Mr Grendus’ AEIC show that Mr Lynch was only paid from April 2016 onwards, ie, after 2016 Q1.

  228. (e) As a prospective investor, it makes no sense for Mr Grendus only to be interested in the historical headcount of DataCore up to 2016 Q1, and not what its current and prospective headcount was. Mr Grendus’ interest would not only have been in the company’s past, but also its present and future.

  229. [162] It was not Mr Grendus’ pleaded case that Mr Dawkins had said DataCore’s headcount was 9: he said that came from Mr Lynch and Mr Dawkins did not contradict him (see [158] above). In his testimony, Mr Grendus then said the headcount figure came from the Pitch Document (see [159] above). It was, however, put to Mr Dawkins that he had represented to Mr Grendus that DataCore already had a headcount of 9, which Mr Dawkins denied. Mr Dawkins maintained that he did not present a number to Mr Grendus. He knew there were only a handful of people, but he never gave a specific figure.

  230. [163] I believe Mr Dawkins on this. If he had looked at the May Pro Forma to see what was stated as the headcount for May 2016, he would have seen a figure of 11 (not 9) for “Head Count (Salary Staff or Consultants – part & full)”, and 14 (not 9) for “Total Global Head Count” (see [160] above). As stated earlier, I accept Mr Dawkins’ evidence that he had not read the May Pro Forma, or at least not fully or properly (see [121] above); but even if he had, he would not have put forward a figure of 9 as DataCore’s headcount.

  231. [164] In any event, I do not allow Mr Grendus to depart from his pleaded case, and add to his allegations of fraud in this way.

  232. [165] Mr Grendus saw the figure of 9 for DataCore’s May 2016 headcount in the Pitch Document, and so he alleged that that must have been what was represented to him at the 24 May 2016 Meeting – I reject that.

  233. [166] In any event, if Mr Lynch had mentioned a headcount of 9 (and I am not convinced he did), Mr Dawkins would have had no reason to think that was false, such that he should contradict Mr Lynch. As Mr Dawkins says, he “had never been presented with a hard number” of persons actually employed by DataCore at the time.

  234. [167] I thus reject Mr Grendus’ case on Submission Representation (7) / Representation (g).

  235. Submission Representation (8) / Representation (h)

  236. [168] Submission Representation (8) is: “DataCore had a lot of interest from the insurance industry and a deep sales pipeline had been in development for some time, with initial sales forecasted for June 2016 and US$965,000 total sales expected by the end of 2016”. This corresponds with pleaded Representation (h).

  237. [169] As I noted above, in his pleadings, Mr Grendus had attributed Representation (h) to Mr Lynch alone (see [77(a)] above). Mr Grendus did not say that Mr Dawkins had affirmed that by not contradicting Mr Lynch (as he had said about most of the other Representations). In effect, Mr Grendus had abandoned his claim on Representation (h) against Mr Dawkins.

  238. [170] In his evidence, though, Mr Grendus said about Representation (h): “would be that meeting, first and second defendant”. I do not allow Mr Grendus to add to his allegations of fraud in this way.

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