General Division of the High Court · Decided 30 September 2021
Ok Tedi Fly River Development Foundation Ltd and others v Ok Tedi Mining Ltd and others
Feedback & support[2021] SGHC 205 · Case no. Suit No 628 of 2020 (Summons No 3880 of 2020)
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Introduction
- [2]
[2] The second defendant has applied to strike out the entirety of the plaintiffs’ claim against it under O 18 r 19(1) of the Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed). I have allowed the application. The plaintiffs have appealed against my decision. I now set out the grounds for my decision.
Background
The plaintiffs
- [3]
[3] The plaintiffs bring this action as representatives of all of the members of certain communities in the Western Province of Papua New Guinea which have been adversely affected by the environmental damage caused by an open pit gold and copper mine at Mount Fubilan in that province (“the Mine”). The plaintiffs refer to these communities as “the Affected Communities”. The members of the Affected Communities number over 147,000 individuals.
- [4]
[4] The first plaintiff is Ok Tedi Fly River Development Foundation Ltd (“the Foundation”). The Foundation is a company incorporated in Papua New Guinea in 2016. It brings this action as the assignee of causes of action originally vested in the members of certain communities forming a subset of the Affected Communities. In the alternative, the Foundation brings this action as trustee on behalf of those same individuals under O 15 r 14 of the Rules of Court.
- [5]
[5] The second to ninth plaintiffs are individual members of the Affected Communities. They bring this action as a representative proceeding under O 15 r 12 of the Rules of Court on behalf of all of the members of the Affected Communities.
The defendants
- [6]
[6] The first defendant is Ok Tedi Mining Limited (“OTML”). OTML is a company incorporated in Papua New Guinea for the specific purpose of owning and operating the Mine.
- [7]
[7] The second defendant is PNG Sustainable Development Program Ltd (“PNGSDP”). PNGSDP is a company limited by guarantee incorporated in Singapore in 2001 for the specific purpose of holding 52% of the shares in OTML (“the Shares”), receiving the dividends and other money arising from the Shares (“Distributions”) and applying Distributions, in part, to promote sustainable development within Papua New Guinea and to advance the general welfare of the people of Papua New Guinea – particularly those of the Western Province – by carrying out programs and projects for social and environmental purposes for their benefit.
- [8]
[8] The third defendant is Sir Mekere Morauta (“Sir Mekere”). Sir Mekere was the Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea from 1999 to 2002. He was the Chairman of PNGSDP’s board of directors (“the Board”) from 2012 to 2017 and a member of PNGSDP from 2013 until he died at the age of 74 in 2020. Sir Mekere has been credited with having had “the most impact in terms of reformist policies which set the conditions for prosperity, growth and new models for governance for his nation” and was described on his death as a “champion reformist” and “an extraordinary Pacific statesman”.
- [9]
[9] The fourth defendant is The Independent State of Papua New Guinea (“the State”).
- [10]
[10] The fifth defendant is TMF Trustees Singapore Ltd (“the Security Trustee”). The Security Trustee holds very broad security interests over virtually all of PNGSDP’s present and future assets – including the Shares and Distributions – as security for the punctual performance of PNGSDP’s obligation to indemnify certain persons (see [29]–[33] below). The fifth defendant replaced the original security trustee appointed under the security arrangements. Nothing material to this decision turns on this identity of the security trustee. I therefore draw no distinction between the fifth defendant and the original security trustee.
The previous litigation
- [11]
[11] This action is the latest episode in long running litigation over the past thirty years in Singapore, Papua New Guinea and Victoria arising initially from the Mine and its activities and, more recently, from attempts to assert control over PNGSDP and its assets.
- [12]
[12] The Singapore litigation commenced in 2013. That is when PNGSDP brought an application against the State seeking to reverse or annul the State’s attempts to assert control over PNGSDP. In 2014, PNGSDP’s application was converted into an action by the State against PNGSDP seeking, among other things: (a) a judicial determination that the State had the right to appoint a majority to PNGSDP’s Board; and (b) a full account of PNGSDP’s dealings with its assets.
- [13]
[13] The State failed in that earlier litigation, both at first instance and on appeal (see respectively Independent State of Papua New Guinea v PNG Sustainable Development Program Ltd [2019] SGHC 68 (“State v PNGSDP (HC)”) and Independent State of Papua New Guinea v PNG Sustainable Development Program Ltd [2020] 2 SLR 200 (“State v PNGSDP (CA)”)).
- [14]
[14] The plaintiffs in this action were not parties to that earlier litigation. The outcome of that litigation therefore gives rise to no res judicata which affects any of the issues in this action or in the striking out application now before me. But some of the findings from the two judgments in that litigation have some bearing on this application. I will refer to those findings as necessary.
The Mine and the environmental damage
- [15]
[15] The background to the plaintiffs’ claim against PNGSDP goes back to 1976. That was when the State and an Australian multinational mining company now known as BHP Group Limited (“BHP Group”) incorporated OTML to own and operate the Mine.
- [16]
[16] OTML shares were held as follows for most of its existence. BHP Group held 52% of OTML’s shares through its wholly owned subsidiary, BHP Minerals Holdings Pty Ltd (“BHP Minerals”). The State held 30% of OTML’s shares: 20% directly and 10% through a corporate vehicle. A minority shareholder held the remaining 18% of OTML’s shares.
- [17]
[17] The Mine is exceptionally lucrative, generating a substantial proportion of Papua New Guinea’s gross domestic product. Unfortunately, the Mine is also exceptionally harmful to the environment in the Affected Communities.
- [18]
[18] Between 1994 and 1996, as a result of the environmental harm which the Mine was causing to the Affected Communities, individual members of the Affected Communities brought proceedings against BHP Group and OTML in the Supreme Court of Victoria and in Papua New Guinea. In 1996, all of those proceedings were settled by a settlement agreement.
- [19]
[19] In 2000, the parties to the settlement agreement alleged that the agreement had been breached. As a result, they brought a class action against BHP Group and OTML in the Supreme Court of Victoria (“the 2000 Class Action”).
PNGSDP’s incorporation
The divestment
- [20]
[20] Soon after the 2000 Class Action commenced, BHP Group announced its plan to exit as a shareholder of OTML. The full factual background to the exit plan can be found in the two judgments in the earlier Singapore litigation (see [12] above). That background need not be repeated here. It suffices for present purposes to say that a key part of the exit plan was for BHP Minerals to divest its entire 52% shareholding in OTML to a special purpose vehicle.
- [21]
[21] PNGSDP was incorporated in Singapore in October 2001 to be that special purpose vehicle. PNGSDP’s corporate constitution is set out in three documents: (a) its Memorandum of Association (“the Memorandum”); (b) its Articles of Association (“the Articles”); and (c) a schedule to the Articles called the “Program Rules”.
PNGSDP’s objects
- [22]
[22] Clause 3 of the Memorandum sets out PNGSDP’s three objects (“the Objects”). The Objects can be summarised as follows:
(a) To promote sustainable development within Papua New Guinea and to advance the general welfare of the people of Papua New Guinea, particularly those of the Western Province, through programs and projects for social and environmental purposes for their benefit.
(b) To identify and evaluate, finance, project manage and report on programs and projects which support sustainable development for the people of Papua New Guinea, particularly those of the Western Province.
(c) To carry out the sustainable development program set out in and in accordance with the Program Rules.
It is significant that the Objects refer generally to the people of the Western Province and of Papua New Guinea and do not refer specifically to the Affected Communities or their members.
The Program Rules
- [23]
[23] The Program Rules has effect as part of the statutory contract embodied in its Articles as between PNGSDP and its members for the time being. I analyse PNGSDP’s contractual obligations under the Program Rules in greater detail at [77]–[79] below. For now, it suffices to note the following two points.
- [24]
[24] First, the central provision of the Program Rules obliges PNGSDP to establish a fund known as the Long Term Fund. The purpose of the Long Term Fund is to hold, broadly speaking, two thirds of all Distributions and the accumulated investment income earned on the Long Term Fund. Under the Program Rules, PNGSDP undertook express contractual obligations to its members as to how it was to apply: (a) Distributions; (b) the Long Term Fund; and (c) investment income earned on the Long Term fund.
- [25]
[25] Second, cl 9 of the Program Rules, among other things, both permits and obliges PNGSDP to apply the Distributions for the benefit of two classes of people: (a) the people of the Western Province; and (b) the people of Papua New Guinea (see [78]–[79] below). Both of these classes include, but are not confined to, members of Affected Communities. This is because not all of the communities in the Western Province were affected by the environmental damage caused by the Mine. The members of the Affected Communities are therefore a subset of the people of the Western Province, who are in turn a subset of the people of Papua New Guinea. The plaintiffs complain about this feature of the Program Rules and describe it as “the Shared Benefits Arrangement”.
The exit plan is implemented
- [26]
[26] The exit plan was implemented between December 2001 and February 2002 in a number of steps. Four of those steps are relevant for present purposes.
- [27]
[27] First, BHP Group, OTML and OTML’s four shareholders (including the State and BHP Minerals) entered into a contract known as The Ok Tedi Mine Continuation (Ninth Supplemental) Agreement (“Ninth Supplemental Agreement”). By this contract, BHP Group confirmed its intention to exit OTML and agreed that BHP Minerals should transfer the Shares to PNGSDP.
- [28]
[28] Second, PNGSDP entered into a contract known as the “Master Agreement” with BHP Group, OTML and OTML’s shareholders (including the State and BHP Minerals). By cl 3.1 of the Master Agreement, BHP Minerals agreed to transfer the Shares to PNGSDP. The consideration for this transfer was PNGSDP’s contractual undertaking in cl 3.2 of the Master Agreement to comply with the Program Rules. PNGSDP gave this undertaking expressly for the benefit of four entities: BHP Minerals, BHP Group, the State and OTML. PNGSDP thereby gave each of these four entities a direct right to enforce the Program Rules against it, separate from and independent of its obligation to the members of PNGSDP for the time being to comply with the Program Rules as a component of PNGSDP’s corporate constitution.
- [29]
[29] Third, PNGSDP executed two deeds of indemnity: one in favour of BHP Group (“BHP’s Indemnity”) and another in favour of the State (“the State’s Indemnity”). Under BHP’s Indemnity, PNGSDP agreed to indemnify BHP Group, its subsidiaries (including BHP Minerals but not OTML) and all of those subsidiaries’ directors, officers and employees for any and all liability arising from any future environmental damage caused by the Mine, including BHP’s liability to the State. Under the State’s Indemnity, PNGSDP agreed to indemnify the State, its political subdivisions, instrumentalities and authorities and any Minister or officer of such instrumentality and authority acting in that capacity against all liability arising from any environmental damage caused by the Mine.
- [30]
[30] Finally, in February 2002, as security for the punctual performance of its obligations under BHP’s Indemnity and the State’s Indemnity, PNGSDP entered into a security deed (“the Security Deed”), an equitable mortgage over the Shares (“the Equitable Mortgage”) and a security trust deed (“the Security Trust Deed”. I shall refer to these three contracts collectively as “the Security Arrangements”.
- [31]
[31] The parties to the Security Deed are PNGSDP, OTML and the Security Trustee. By the Security Deed, PNGSDP created an equitable mortgage over Distributions and a fixed and floating charge over virtually all of PNGSDP’s present and future assets in favour of the Security Trustee for the benefit of the State and BHP as security for the punctual performance of its obligations under BHP’s Indemnity and the State’s Indemnity. The Security Deed required PNGSDP to deposit with the Security Trustee a duly executed blank transfer form in respect of the Shares and to direct OTML to forward the original certificates for the Shares directly to the Security Trustee upon issuance in PNGSDP’s name.
- [32]
[32] The parties to the Equitable Mortgage are PNGSDP and the Security Trustee. By the Equitable Mortgage, PNGSDP created an equitable mortgage over its present and future interest in the Shares, in all after-acquired Shares and in all future rights arising from the Shares in favour of the Security Trustee as security for the punctual performance of its obligations under BHP’s Indemnity and the State’s Indemnity.
- [33]
[33] The parties to the Security Trust Deed are the Security Trustee, PNGSDP, BHP Group, the State and OTML. The Security Trust Deed sets out the rights, duties, powers and immunities of the Security Trustee and, in particular, how it is to enforce its security rights under the Security Deed and the Equitable Mortgage and how it is obliged to distribute the proceeds of any such enforcement as between the many persons for whose ultimate benefit PNGSDP had granted the security.
The State expropriates the Shares
- [34]
[34] In 2013, during an intractable dispute between the State and PNGSDP over control of PNGSDP which led to the earlier litigation in Singapore (see [11]–[13] above), the State expropriated PNGSDP’s 52% shareholding in OTML without compensation. It did this by enacting legislation which cancelled the Shares and obliged OTML to issue to the State new shares equivalent to 52% of its issued and paid-up share capital.
- [35]
[35] As a result of this legislation, PNGSDP ceased to be a shareholder of OTML in 2013. PNGSDP therefore ceased receiving any Distributions in and from 2013. Part of the plaintiffs’ case against PNGSDP is that this amounted to Mine Closure within the meaning of the Program Rules and obliged PNGSDP to activate what the plaintiffs call “the Mine Closure Plan”. By that term, the plaintiffs refer to the combined effect of cll 9.4, 9.5, 10.3 and 10.4 of the Program Rules. I analyse the effect of these clauses at [79] below.
The plaintiffs commence this action
- [36]
[36] The plaintiffs commenced this action in July 2020 against OTML, PNGSDP, Sir Mekere, the State and the Security Trustee. For reasons which will become apparent (see [46] below), the impetus for this action was my judgment in the earlier Singapore litigation.
The plaintiffs’ claim against OTML
- [38]
[38] Of the plaintiffs’ multiple claims against OTML, the only one which is relevant for present purposes is the claim in deceit. That claim arises in the following way.
- [39]
[39] After BHP Group decided to exit its investment in OTML in 2000, OTML appointed teams of Community Relation Officers (“CROs”) to communicate the exit plan to the members of the Affected Communities. The plaintiffs’ case is that OTML, acting through the CRO teams, fraudulently made two misrepresentations in 2000 and 2001 to the members of the Affected Communities or their representatives about the nature of the exit plan. The plaintiffs call these representations collectively “the Share Offload Representations”.
- [40]
[40] The plaintiffs plead that the Share Offload Representations were to the effect that, in consideration of the members of the Affected Communities discontinuing the 2000 Class Action and releasing OTML, BHP Minerals and BHP Group from liability:
(a) the Shares and Distributions would belong beneficially to the members of the Affected Communities; and
(b) Distributions would be used to ameliorate the effects on the members of the Affected Communities of the environmental damage caused by the Mine.
- [41]
[41] The plaintiffs’ plead that the meaning and effect of the Share Offload Representations were that:
(a) The members of the Affected Communities would have a beneficial interest in the Shares and Distributions;
(b) The Shares and Distributions would be held on trust for the benefit of the members of the Affected Communities and/or for the purpose of ameliorating the environmental damage caused by the Mine; and/or
(c) The Shares would be unencumbered.
The plaintiffs refer to this meaning and effect as the “Share Offload Understanding”.
- [42]
[42] The plaintiffs then plead that OTML is liable to the members of the Affected Communities in the tort of deceit on the following four grounds, with each ground tracking the elements of the tort.
- [43]
[43] First, the plaintiffs plead that the Share Offload Representations are false in that:
(a) OTML did not have any honest belief or any present intention to carry out the Share Offload Representations at the time it made the representations; and
(b) the exit plan as eventually implemented falsified the Share Offload Representations in three ways:
(i) BHP Minerals transferred the Shares to PNGSDP outright and therefore the Shares were not held on trust for the members of the Affected Communities.
(ii) by reason of the Shared Benefits Arrangement, Distributions were not to be applied for the benefit of the members of the Affected Communities but were instead to be shared with Papua New Guineans who were unaffected by the environmental damage caused by the Mine.
(iii) the Shares were subject to the Security Arrangements and were therefore not unencumbered.
- [44]
[44] Second, the plaintiffs plead that OTML made the Share Offload Representations fraudulently, either knowing that the two representations were false or recklessly, not caring whether they were true or false.
- [45]
[45] Third, the plaintiffs plead that, in reliance on the truth of the Share Offload Representations, the members of the Affected Communities or their representatives executed:
(a) forms agreeing to opt out of the 2000 Class Action (“Opt-Out Forms”); and
(b) contracts with OTML known as Community Mine Continuation Agreements (“CMCAs”) providing for, among other things, the Mine to continue operations and for the members of the Affected Communities to discontinue the 2000 Class Action and release OTML, BHP Minerals and BHP Group from all claims arising from the operation of the Mine.
It is common ground that in or around 2012, through CMCA extension agreements (“CMCEAs”), the members of the Affected Communities have agreed to extend the life of the Mine to 2025.
- [46]
[46] Fourth, the plaintiffs plead that the members of the Affected Communities discovered that the Share Offload Representations were false only in April 2019, when I delivered my judgment in State v PNGSDP (HC). From that judgment, the members of the Affected Communities learned for the first time that the Shares and Distributions were not subject to any trust and were not unencumbered.
PNGSDP’s striking out application
- [47]
[47] The plaintiffs’ case against PNGSDP comprises four claims: (a) breach of fiduciary duty; (b) remedial constructive trust; (c) conspiracy by lawful and unlawful means; and (d) unjust enrichment.
The proposed amended statement of claim
- [49]
[49] In the course of argument on PNGSDP’s substantive grounds for striking out the plaintiffs’ claim, I pointed out to plaintiffs’ counsel a number of shortcomings in the plaintiffs’ statement of claim. As a result, before concluding his oral submissions, plaintiffs’ counsel tendered a proposed amended statement of claim (“PASOC”). He did so on the basis that the PASOC set out the plaintiffs’ best and final pleading on each of their four claims against PNGSDP.
- [50]
[50] It is a well-established principle that a defective pleading ought in general not to be struck out if its defects can be cured by amendment. I therefore allowed the plaintiffs to resist PNGSDP’s striking out application by relying on the PASOC, rather than their statement of claim as filed and served. I have accordingly approached PNGSDP’s striking out application on the basis that the plaintiffs cannot improve upon the manner in which they have pleaded their four claims against PNGSDP in the PASOC, either by further amendment or by supplying further particulars of the very serious allegations the plaintiffs make in it.
- [51]
[51] In the extracts from the PASOC which I quote in this judgment, I have omitted all underlining found in the original which signifies a proposed amendment to the plaintiff’s statement of claim as filed and served.
- [52]
[52] Having considered the parties’ submissions in light of the PASOC, I have allowed PNGSDP’s application in full and struck out all four of the plaintiffs’ claims against PNGSDP. I now summarise the law on striking out before explaining why I have struck out each of the four claims.
Law on striking out
- [53]
[53] A pleading may be struck under O 18 r 19(1)(a) if it discloses no reasonable cause of action. A reasonable cause of action is a cause of action with some chance of success when only the allegations in the pleading are considered. So long as the statement of claim discloses some cause of action or raises some question fit to be decided at trial, the mere fact that the case is weak and is not likely to succeed is no ground for striking it out under this limb of O 18 r 19(1): Ng Chee Weng v Lim Jit Ming Bryan [2012] 1 SLR 457 at [110].
- [54]
[54] A pleading may be struck out under O 18 r 19(1)(b) if it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious. There is no suggestion that the PASOC is scandalous. A pleading is frivolous or vexatious if it is obviously unsustainable (Singapore Civil Procedure 2021 vol 1 (Cavinder Bull gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 2021) at para 18/19/12). A pleading is plainly or obviously unsustainable if it is either (The “Bunga Melati 5” [2012] 4 SLR 546 (“Bunga Melati 5”) at [39]):
(a) legally unsustainable, ie where “it may be clear as a matter of law at the outset that even if a party were to succeed in proving all the facts that he offers to prove he will not be entitled to the remedy that he seeks”; or
(b) factually unsustainable, ie where “it is possible to say with confidence before trial that the factual basis for the claim is fanciful because it is entirely without substance, [for example, if it is] clear beyond question that the statement of facts is contradicted by all the documents or other material on which it is based”.
- [55]
[55] I now apply these principles to each of the plaintiffs’ four claims against PNGSDP to explain why I have struck it out.
Fiduciary duty claim
The plaintiffs’ pleaded claim against PNGSDP
- [56]
[56] The plaintiffs’ pleaded basis for their claim that PNGSDP owed a fiduciary duty to the members of the Affected Communities is that PNGSDP: (a) “voluntarily undertook to act in the interest of the members of the Affected Communities in circumstances giving rise to a relationship of trust and confidence”; and (b) PNGSDP had the ability “to affect the interests of the members of the Affected Communities”. The plaintiffs accordingly plead that PNGSDP owes the following five fiduciary duties to the members of the Affected Communities:
(a) a duty to “act bona fide in the interests of the members of the Affected Communities”;
(b) a duty “to act for proper purposes, including but not limited to ensuring that [PNGSDP] complies with the Program Rules”;
(c) a duty “not to advance or promote its own or external interest to the prejudice of or contrary to or in conflict with the interests of the members of the Affected Communities”;
(d) a duty “to administer the Objects for the benefit of the members of the Affected Communities in a trustee-like manner”; and
(e) a duty “to disclose to the members of the Affected Communities and/or their representatives any breaches of duty owed to the members of the Affected Communities”.
- [57]
[57] Central to this claim against PNGSDP is the second pleaded duty: that PNGSDP owes the members of the Affected Communities a fiduciary duty to comply with the Program Rules. The plaintiffs’ case is that this encompasses a duty to administer the Long Term Fund in compliance with the Program Rules in a way which benefits the members of the Affected Communities. The plaintiffs disavow any suggestion that this is a duty to benefit only the members of the Affected Communities or to elevate benefiting the members of the Affected Communities over benefiting the people of the Western Province or the people of Papua New Guinea (see [25] above). The plaintiffs accept that PNGSDP owes this duty concurrently to the members of the Affected Communities as well as to Papua New Guineans who are not members of the Affected Communities, whether their communities are in the Western Province or outside the Western Province.
- [58]
[58] The plaintiffs cannot and do not allege that the members of the Affected Communities and PNGSDP have a relationship of trustee and cestui que trust. It is not their case, therefore, that the members of the Affected Communities have any proprietary interest in any of PNGSDP’s assets. Equally, they do not allege that PNGSDP is within any of the other settled categories of fiduciaries. They also do not, by this action, intend to invite the court to develop fiduciary law by establishing a new category of fiduciaries. Their claim is simply that, in the circumstances of this case, PNGSDP owes an ad hoc fiduciary duty to the members of the Affected Communities. The question is therefore whether this claim is unsustainable in either sense set out at [54] above. That in turn requires setting out the circumstances in which an ad hoc fiduciary duty arises.
When an ad hoc fiduciary duty arises
- [59]
[59] In Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd and others v Yeo Boong Hua and others and another appeal [2018] 2 SLR 655 (“Turf Club”), the Court of Appeal explained that there is no universal definition of a “fiduciary” (at [42]):
- [60]
[60] In the earlier case of Tan Yok Koon v Tan Choo Suan and another and other appeals [2017] 1 SLR 654 (“Tan Yok Koon”), the Court of Appeal set out three important principles of fiduciary law.
- [61]
[61] First, “the hallmark of a fiduciary obligation is that the fiduciary is to act in the interests of another person”: Tan Yok Koon at [192]. The core liability that this entails is a single-minded duty of loyalty to that other person. As authority for this, the Court of Appeal cited the judgment of Millett LJ (as he then was) in the English Court of Appeal decision of Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1:
- [62]
[62] Second, the term “fiduciary” is not a premise but is instead a label applied to a person once the court concludes that that person owes an obligation of a fiduciary character to another: Tan Yok Koon at [193]. To put it another way, a person “is not subject to fiduciary obligations because he is a fiduciary; instead, it is because he is subject to such obligations and rules that he is a fiduciary”: Turf Club at [42]. Thus, whether a person owes a fiduciary duty to another depends on the nature of his conduct in relation to that other person in the circumstances of the case and not purely on the category into which his broader relationship with that person falls (Turf Club at [43]):
- [63]
[63] Third, a fiduciary duty is voluntarily undertaken. It arises as a legal consequence of the fiduciary’s voluntary conduct and is not imposed by law independently of the fiduciary’s intention to engage in that conduct. But, because the obligation is a legal consequence, it can arise even if the fiduciary was not subjectively willing to undertake the obligation or to accept that legal consequence when he engaged in that conduct: Tan Yok Koon at [194].
- [64]
[64] In Susilawati v American Express Bank Ltd [2009] 2 SLR(R) 737 at [41], the Court of Appeal suggested obiter that Wilson J (dissenting) in the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Frame v Smith [1987] SCR 99 (“Frame”) had set out a helpful description of the three circumstances which will give rise to a fiduciary duty owed by one person (F) to another person (B): (a) F is entitled to exercise some discretion or power; (b) F is able unilaterally to exercise that discretion or power so as to affect B’s legal or practical interests; and (c) B is peculiarly vulnerable to or at the mercy of F.
- [65]
[65] In support of this aspect of its striking out application, PNGSDP cites the later decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Her Majesty The Queen in Right of Alberta v Elder Advocates of Alberta Society and James O. Darwish, Personal representative of the Estate of Johanna H. Darwish, deceased and Attorney General of Canada and Attorney General of British Columbia as Interveners [2011] 2 SCR 261 (“Alberta”). In Alberta, the Supreme Court of Canada held that Wilson J’s analysis in Frame is not a complete code for identifying when a fiduciary duty arises (at [29]). In particular, the court cited its own intervening authority which had established that vulnerability in the broad sense – ie, vulnerability resulting from factors external to the relationship between F and B – is not the most relevant consideration in ascertaining whether F owes B a fiduciary duty (at [28]). The most relevant consideration is whether any vulnerability arises from the relationship between F and B itself.
- [66]
[66] The Supreme Court of Canada therefore reformulated the elements from Frame and held (at [30]–[36]) that F owes a fiduciary duty to B if (the “Alberta framework”):
(a) F gives an undertaking of responsibility, express or implied, to act in B’s best interests. In other words, F must undertake “to act in accordance with the duty of loyalty reposed on” F (at [30]) and to forsake the interests of all others (including F himself) in favour of B in relation to the legal interest at stake (at [31]).
(b) B is vulnerable to F in the sense that F has a discretionary power over B or over the class to which B belongs (at [33]).
(c) F’s power may affect B’s legal interests or his substantial practical interests (at [34]).
- [67]
[67] The Supreme Court of Canada concluded this part of its analysis in Alberta with the following summary of when an ad hoc fiduciary duty arises (at [36]):
- [68]
[68] I consider the framework set out in Alberta to be consistent with the principles set out in the Court of Appeal authority which I have cited at [59]–[64] above. I therefore adopt and apply the Alberta framework to analyse whether the plaintiffs’ claim that PNGSDP owes the members of the Affected Communities an ad hoc fiduciary duty is sustainable. In my view, the plea is plainly and obviously unsustainable because the first and third elements in the Alberta framework (see [66(a)] and [66(c)] above) are absent.
- [69]
[69] I address these two elements in turn.
No undertaking to members of the Affected Communities
- [70]
[70] The first element of the Alberta framework requires PNGSDP to have given an undertaking of responsibility to act in the best interests of the members of the Affected Communities. To establish this element, the plaintiffs rely on the circumstances leading up to PNGSDP’s incorporation (set out at [15] to [33] above), the circumstances in which OTML made the Share Offload Representations (set out at [38] to [46] above) and the content of PNGSDP’s Objects (see [22] above).
- [71]
[71] The plaintiffs thus plead their case on the first element in the Alberta framework as follows:
- [72]
[72] The plaintiffs plead, further, that the content of PNGSDP’s undertaking to act in the interest of the members of the Affected Communities was to hold the Shares and to apply Distributions towards the Objects for the sole purpose of ameliorating the environmental damage caused by the Mine. The plaintiffs’ case is that PNGSDP gave this undertaking to the members of the Affected Communities when it entered into the Master Agreement. because that is the moment when PNGSDP accepted the Shares and the right to Distributions – assets to which it would not otherwise be entitled – and undertook to comply with the Program Rules in carrying out the Objects.
- [73]
[73] The plaintiffs’ case on the first element is plainly and obviously unsustainable. PNGSDP gave no undertaking whatsoever – voluntary or otherwise, express or implied, in respect of the Shares and Distributions or otherwise – to the members of the Affected Communities at any time, whether when it entered into the Master Agreement or otherwise. The only undertakings which PNGSDP gave in respect of the Shares and Distributions to anyone at any time are those which are set out in the suite of written contracts it entered into following its incorporation. And it gave them only to the counterparties to those contracts. These undertakings include, but are obviously not limited to, the undertaking that PNGSDP gave for the benefit of BHP Minerals, BHP Group, the State and OTML in cl 3.2 of the Master Agreement (see [28] above) to comply with the Program Rules.
- [74]
[74] The plaintiffs do not even suggest that PNGSDP gave a contractual undertaking to members of the Affected Communities to hold the Shares and to apply Distributions towards the Objects for the sole purpose of ameliorating the environmental damage caused by the Mine. This is for obvious reasons. The members of the Affected Communities have no contractual rights against PNGSDP under the Master Agreement or under any other contract, written or otherwise. None of them – whether then or now – are a party to any of the suite of written contracts PNGSDP entered into. As for the Master Agreement itself, it states the obvious (at least at common law) when it provides in cl 8.7 that it “confers rights only upon a person expressed to be a party, and not upon any other person”.
- [75]
[75] Further, it is plainly and obviously unsustainable to suggest that PNGSDP gave a non-contractual undertaking to members of the Affected Communities to hold the Shares and to apply Distributions towards the Objects for the sole purpose of ameliorating the environmental damage caused by the Mine. Any such undertaking would be wholly inconsistent with both the express contractual obligations which PNGSDP undertook and the express discretionary powers which PNGSDP acquired under the suite of written contracts it entered into.
- [76]
[76] I examine these obligations and these discretionary powers in turn.
PNGSDP’s express contractual obligations
(1) The Program Rules
- [77]
[77] By cll 9 and 10 of the Program Rules, PNGSDP undertook a cascading and comprehensive set of express contractual obligations as to how it was to apply Distributions, the Long Term Fund and investment income earned on the Long Term Fund both before and after Mine Closure. It undertook these obligations through the Articles to the members of PNGSDP for the time being and also through cl 3.2 of the Master Agreement (see [28] above) for the benefit of BHP Minerals, BHP Group, the State and OTML.
- [78]
[78] Before Mine Closure, PNGSDP undertook the following express contractual obligations under cll 9 and 10 of the Program Rules:
(a) To establish the Long Term Fund and to invest it and account for it as a separate fund, segregated from its general assets.
(i) first, to pay its own operating expenses for the next six months as approved by the Board;
(ii) second, to meet certain of its contractual obligations including any liability to indemnify BHP under BHP’s Indemnity and the State under the State’s Indemnity; and
(iii) third, to meet any call for capital by OTML, but only if certain conditions were met and if so determined by the Board.
(c) To pay into the Long Term Fund roughly two thirds of the Distributions which remained after discharging the high priority purposes;
(d) To apply the remaining roughly one third of Distributions which remained for the Objects at the discretion of the Board as follows:
(i) one third for the benefit of the people of the Western Province; and
(ii) two thirds for the benefit of the people of Papua New Guinea.
(e) To capitalise as part of the Long Term Fund and reinvest all investment income earned on the Long Term Fund, subject only to deductions necessary to make up any shortfall in meeting the high priority purposes out of Distributions;
(f) Not to draw on the capital of the Long Term Fund for any purpose other than to make up any shortfall in meeting (subject to certain immaterial exceptions) the first two high priority purposes out of Distributions and investment income.
- [79]
[79] After Mine Closure, PNGSDP undertook the following express contractual obligations under cll 9 and 10 of the Program Rules:
(a) To apply Distributions only to meet the high priority purposes (see [78(b)] above) and to pay the entire balance Distributions into the Long Term Fund;
(b) To apply Distributions and the investment income earned on the Long Term Fund to meet the first two high priority purposes;
(i) first, to make up any shortfall in meeting the first two high priority purposes out of the investment income;
(ii) second, to meet the third high priority purpose; and
(iii) only then, to carry out “Sustainable Development Purposes”.
The Program Rules define “Sustainable Development Purposes” as “projects and other applications which, in the discretion of the Company (acting in accordance with the Objects), are for long term social, economic and/or environmental benefits of the people of Papua New Guinea”.
- [80]
[80] As PNGSDP submits, this entire contractual framework of cascading obligations excludes any possibility of PNGSDP owing a single-minded duty of loyalty to the members of the Affected Communities in respect of the Shares, Distributions or the Long Term Fund.
(2) The Security Arrangements
- [81]
[81] The Security Arrangements also make it plainly and obviously unsustainable that PNGSDP gave any undertaking of responsibility to act in the best interests of the members of the Affected Communities. As PNGSDP submits, the Long Term Fund forms the bulk of PNGSDP’s assets. It therefore forms the bulk of the assets charged in favour of the Security Trustee under the Security Arrangements. The effect of the Security Arrangements is to subordinate the interests of the members of the Affected Communities even further in the application of Distributions and the Long Term Fund than provided in cll 9 and 10 of the Program Rules.
PNGSDP’s express contractual discretionary powers
- [82]
[82] The express contractual discretionary powers which PNGSDP acquired under the suite of written contracts it entered into also make unsustainable the plaintiffs’ case that PNGSDP gave any such undertaking of responsibility.
- [83]
[83] The Program Rules give PNGSDP the unqualified contractual discretion to undertake sustainable development projects for the exclusive benefit of persons other than members of the Affected Communities. The Program Rules make no reference whatsoever to PNGSDP applying any funds, whether before or after Mine Closure, to advance the best interests of the members of the Affected Communities as such, let alone for the purpose of ameliorating the environmental damage caused by the Mine. Before Mine Closure, cll 9 and 10 of the Program Rules treat the members of the Affected Communities no differently from Papua New Guineans in the Western Province outside the Affected Communities, and who are therefore unaffected by the Mine’s environmental damage (see [78(d)(i)] above). After Mine Closure, the Program Rules treat the members of the Affected Communities no differently from Papua New Guineans in general (see [79(c)(iii)] above). Both before and after Mine Closure, therefore, PNGSDP’s Board has an unqualified contractual discretion to confer no benefits at all on members of the Affected Communities. As PNGSDP submits, this discretion excludes any possibility of PNGSDP owing a single-minded duty of loyalty to the members of the Affected Communities in respect of the Shares, Distributions or the Long Term Fund.
- [84]
[84] This discretion also excludes any undertaking to act in the best interests of the members of the Affected Communities only at the last tier, after PNGSDP discharges its contractual obligations in respect of the high priority purposes under cll 9 and 10 of the Program Rules and when it considers applying funds for the benefit of the people of the Western Province or of Papua New Guinea. I accept PNGSDP’s submission that it cannot have given an undertaking of responsibility to act in the best interest of the members of the Affected Communities so as to owe them a duty of single-minded loyalty when it has an express and unqualified contractual discretion under cll 9 and 10 of the Program Rules to apply funds so as to confer no benefit at all on members of the Affected Communities. PNGSDP cannot have given an undertaking of responsibility to the members of the Affected Communities which would be breached by an act which is within PNGSDP’s express contractual discretion under the Program Rules.
- [85]
[85] PNGSDP’s power to amend the Program Rules is a contractual power which contradicts an undertaking of responsibility to act in the best interests of the members of the Affected Communities. Although Art 8 of the Memorandum is framed negatively, its contractual effect is to give PNGSDP the power to amend the Program Rules with the consent of BHP Group and the State. Thus, cl 3.2 of the Master Agreement specifically contemplates amendment of the Program Rules: it provides that PNGSDP’s obligation to comply with the Program Rules under that clause is an obligation to comply with the Program Rules “as those Rules may be amended from time to time”. Indeed, the Program Rules have been amended in accordance with Art 8 of the Memorandum twice: in April 2003 and April 2004.
- [86]
[86] PNGSDP has no obligation to seek the consent of the members of the Affected Communities before exercising its power to amend the Program Rules. PNGSDP therefore has the contractual power to exclude all projects for the benefit of the members of the Affected Communities from the scope of the Program Rules. No doubt this exercise of the power is purely theoretical: neither BHP Group nor the State is likely to consent to any such amendment. But what is important is the existence of the power and the potential for it to be exercised without the consent of the members of the Affected Communities and contrary to their interests. The mere existence of this power destroys any basis for an undertaking of responsibility to act in the best interests of the members of the Affected Communities.
No legal or substantial practical interest
- [87]
[87] The third element of the Alberta framework requires the plaintiffs to establish that PNGSDP has a power which may be exercised so as to affect the legal interests or the substantial practical interests of the members of the Affected Communities. The Supreme Court of Canada in Alberta explained this element as follows (at [35]):
- [88]
[88] The plaintiffs cannot establish this element as they have neither a legal interest nor a substantial practical interest at stake.
No legal interest
- [89]
[89] The plaintiffs submit that members of the Affected Communities had a legal interest for the purposes of this element as follows. Members of the Affected Communities had the legal right to sue OTML and others for the environmental damage which the Mine had caused to the Affected Communities. PNGSDP was created to receive and hold the Shares and to administer Distributions as part of a transaction in which the members of the Affected Communities agreed to discontinue the 2000 Class Action and to give up those legal rights.
- [90]
[90] I do not accept this submission. There is no way in which PNGSDP could ever adversely affect the legal right of the members of the Affected Communities to sue OTML or others. PNGSDP came into existence after the members of the Affected Communities had given up that entitlement. PNGSDP is able to do no more than hold the Shares and administer Distributions and the Long Term Fund.
No substantial practical interest
- [91]
[91] In the alternative, the plaintiffs submit that members of the Affected Communities have a substantial practical interest that may be adversely affected by PNGSDP’s exercise of power over the Long Term Fund as follows. PNGSDP alone has the financial resources to alleviate or ameliorate the environmental damage caused by the Mine’s past and ongoing activities and the harm to the health and well-being of the members of the Affected Communities.
- [92]
[92] The plaintiffs appear to be alleging that PNGSDP can affect the practical interests of the members of the Affected Communities by distributing or withholding funds for sustainable development projects that are for their benefit. If this is the plaintiffs’ case, I accept PNGSDP’s submission that withholding a benefit does not amount to affecting a substantial practical interest for the purposes of the Alberta framework. At common law, a person has no obligation to confer a benefit on another unless the benefit is bargained for as part of a contract or arises under an institutional trust. It is no part of the plaintiffs’ case that the members of the Affected Communities either bargained for these benefits or that PNGSDP is a trustee for them under an institutional trust.
- [93]
[93] Indeed, the plaintiffs accept that withholding a benefit, without more, cannot amount to affecting a practical interest for the purposes of the Alberta framework. But they argue that PNGSDP is not merely withholding a benefit. They assert instead that PNGSDP is failing to perform its duty under the Program Rules to administer, for the benefit of the members of the Affected Communities, assets that it received solely for the purpose of benefiting persons affected by the environmental damage caused by the Mine. But unless that submission presupposes the fiduciary duty it seeks to prove, PNGSDP’s duties under the Program Rules are contractual duties owed only to PNGSDP’s members for the time being and the four entities for whose benefit it gave its express contractual undertaking in cl 3.2 of the Master Agreement to comply with the Program Rules (see [28] above). And the fact that PNGSDP owes these contractual duties to third parties cannot transform the mere withholding of a benefit into an effect on a substantial practical interest for the purposes of the Alberta framework.
Conclusion on the third element
- [94]
[94] As PNGSDP submits, a failure to confer a gratuitous benefit on a person cannot affect a legal or a substantial practical interest of that person for the purposes of the Alberta framework. In Alberta, the court explained that a legal or a substantial practical interest must be connected to a specific and pre-existing interest recognised in private law (at [51]–[52]):
- [95]
[95] Like the government in Alberta, PNGSDP has an unqualified contractual discretion in applying the Long Term Fund for the benefit of Papua New Guineans in the Western Province and elsewhere in Papua New Guinea, subject only to its contractual obligation to comply with the Program Rules. The members of the Affected Communities do not have any property right or other private law interest which is adversely affected by PNGSDP’s exercise of its powers under the Program Rules. They also have no substantial practical interest at stake. The plaintiffs have failed to establish the third element in the Alberta framework.
Alberta cannot be distinguished
- [96]
[96] In an effort to argue that PNGSDP became subject to an ad hoc fiduciary duty to the members of the Affected Communities when it entered into the Master Agreement, the plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Alberta. It is therefore now necessary to consider the facts of Alberta.
- [98]
[98] The plaintiffs seek to distinguish Alberta on the grounds that in that case, one class of persons contended that they should receive more benefits from the government than another class of persons. Here, the plaintiffs argue that there are no competing classes: the members of the Affected Communities have a unity of interests with Papua New Guineans in the Western Province and Papua New Guineans elsewhere in Papua New Guinea. The interest of all three classes is simply that PNGSDP should comply with the Program Rules.
- [99]
[99] In my view, Alberta stands for a broader proposition than that advanced by the plaintiffs. That proposition is that an ad hoc fiduciary duty will rarely be owed to a group of persons who can be sub-divided into classes with competing interests where each sub-class has equally valid claims to the alleged fiduciary’s assistance (Alberta at [44]). A fortiori, an ad hoc fiduciary duty will rarely be owed exclusively to any one sub-class of the group. As the Supreme Court of Canada explained in Alberta (at [43]–[44]):
- [100]
[100] In Alberta, the government had an obligation to spread limited resources among competing groups of citizens with equally valid claims to the government’s assistance. Thus, the Supreme Court of Canada was satisfied that the government did not have to act with undivided loyalty to the plaintiffs, who, being residents of long-term care facilities, were a sub-class of the class of citizens.
- [101]
[101] It is true that the Supreme Court of Canada formulated this proposition in the context of a fiduciary duty alleged to be owed by a government to its citizens. But I consider it equally applicable to PNGSDP. PNGSDP has undertaken contractual obligations which oblige it in certain situations to prioritise certain interests over and above the best interests of the members of the Affected Communities. Thus, PNGSDP is contractually obliged to accord the highest priority under the Program Rules to its own expenses and then to the interests of very wide class of persons whom it agreed to indemnify under BHP’s Indemnity and the State’s Indemnity. Further, PNGSDP has an unqualified contractual discretion to decide how to spread its limited resources among competing groups of Papua New Guineans. PNGSDP even has the contractual power to exclude entirely the members of the Affected Communities from its bounty. I therefore consider Alberta a highly persuasive authority that PNGSDP cannot owe an ad hoc fiduciary duty to the members of the Affected Communities, even though Alberta was decided as between a government and its citizens.
Conclusion on fiduciary duties claim
- [102]
[102] The fundamental flaw in the plaintiffs’ claim is that superimposing an ad hoc fiduciary duty upon PNGSDP’s obligations, discretions and powers under the carefully constructed suite of contracts which PNGSDP entered into undermines the entire framework of the law of obligations. The plaintiffs’ case is that PNGSDP owes an ad hoc fiduciary duty to the members of the Affected Communities which arises from but prevails over PNGSDP’s contractual obligations, discretions and powers. That would elevate the members of the Affected Communities above the counterparties to PNGSDP’s suite of contracts, even though: (a) if PNGSDP were to disregard the interests of the members of the Affected Communities, at most it would simply fail to confer a gratuitous benefit upon them; (b) none of the members of the Affected Communities provided any consideration to PNGSDP; (c) none of the members of the Affected Communities are privy to any one of the suite of contracts PNGSDP entered into; (d) the members of the Affected Communities are not identified as a distinct class for the purposes of any one of these suite of contracts; (e) ameliorating the environmental damage caused by the Mine is not identified specifically as any part of the purpose for which PNGSDP was established; and (f) the provisions of the suite of contracts are inconsistent with the content of the ad hoc fiduciary duty alleged.
- [103]
[103] Further, it cannot be said that the provisions in the suite of contracts merely shape the content of PNGSDP’s ad hoc fiduciary duty to the members of the Affected Communities. Those provisions directly contradict the existence of any such fiduciary duty.
- [105]
[105] For all of these reasons, I hold that the plaintiffs’ case that PNGSDP owes an ad hoc fiduciary duty to the members of the Affected Communities is plainly and obviously unsustainable. It is therefore struck out. Given this holding, the plaintiffs’ claim that PNGSDP has breached its fiduciary duty must also be struck out.
Remedial constructive trust claim
- [106]
[106] In Wee Chiaw Sek Anna v Ng Li-Ann Genevieve (sole executrix of the estate of Ng Hock Seng, deceased) and another [2013] 3 SLR 801 (“Anna Wee”), the Court of Appeal discussed the remedial constructive trust (“RCT”) obiter (at [169]–[185]). I assume in the plaintiffs’ favour, without deciding, that Singapore law recognises the RCT.
- [107]
[107] The plaintiffs seek an RCT over the Long Term Fund. Thus they pray in the PASOC for a declaration that PNGSDP holds all its assets derived from the Shares – which include Distributions and the Long Term Fund – on constructive trust for the members of the Affected Communities. They also seek orders that PNGSDP render an account of the Long Term Fund and that the Foundation take over from PNGSDP the administration of the Long Term Fund for the benefit of the members of the Affected Communities.
- [108]
[108] The plaintiffs submit that the RCT is both a right and a remedy: it is a trust imposed where “the defendant cannot conscientiously keep the property for himself alone, but ought to allow another to have the property or a share in it” (Koh Cheong Heng v Ho Yee Fong [2011] 3 SLR 125 at [43], citing Lord Denning MR in Hussey v Palmer [1972] 3 All ER 744 at 747). The basis for imposing a remedial constructive trust is “a state of knowledge which renders it unconscionable for the recipient to keep the moneys”: Anna Wee at [172].
- [109]
[109] I do not accept the plaintiffs’ submission. I accept instead PNGSDP’s submission that, even if Singapore law recognises the RCT, it is a remedy and not a right. Therefore, an RCT may be granted as a remedy only if a plaintiff is able to establish a right arising from a cause of action recognised in Singapore law. In Ching Mun Fong (executrix of the estate of Tan Geok Tee, deceased) v Liu Cho Chit [2001] 1 SLR(R) 856 (“Ching Mun Fong”) at [36], the Court of Appeal characterised an RCT as a “restitutionary remedy which the court, in appropriate circumstances, gives by way of equitable relief” [emphasis added]. In Anna Wee, the Court of Appeal also stated that the appellant’s argument for the imposition of an RCT as a remedy was “parasitic” on the success of her unjust enrichment claim (at [169]). To be clear, the Court of Appeal did not in that case hold that an RCT was available as a remedy for unjust enrichment. On the contrary, the Court of Appeal said it would be hesitant to recognise the RCT as a remedy for a claim in unjust enrichment because the availability of the RCT depends on fault whereas liability in unjust enrichment is independent of fault (Anna Wee at [182]).
- [110]
[110] A plaintiff can secure an RCT over a defendant’s property as a remedy only if it can first establish a right against the defendant arising from a cause of action known to law. In National Bank of Oman SAOG Dubai Branch v Bikash Dhamala and others [2021] 3 SLR 943, Tan Siong Thye J imposed an RCT over moneys and assets received by the defendants in that case. But the plaintiff in that case secured the RCT only as a remedy, after it had established that the defendants were part of an unlawful means conspiracy to induce the plaintiff fraudulently to disburse loans and thereafter to dissipate the moneys received from the plaintiff (at [55] and [66]).
- [111]
[111] Even as a remedy, an RCT will be imposed only if the conscience of the recipient of the property is affected while the recipient continues to retain the property (Ching Mun Fong at [36]; Anna Wee at [172] and [182]). The plaintiffs rely on the same factors to seek an RCT against PNGSDP as they do to claim that PNGSDP owes an ad hoc fiduciary duty to the members of the Affected Communities. For the same reasons that I have found that PNGSDP could not possibly owe the members of the Affected Communities an ad hoc fiduciary duty, I find also that PNGSDP’s conscience is not affected by the matters on which the plaintiffs rely so as to give rise to an RCT or to warrant extinguishing PNGSDP’s property rights in the Long Term Fund in favour of the Foundation. This is an alternative ground on which I have struck out the plaintiffs’ claim for an RCT, even if they were able to establish a recognised right sufficient to warrant in principle the award of an RCT as a remedy.
Conspiracy claims
- [112]
[112] The plaintiffs also advance against PNGSDP claims in lawful and unlawful means conspiracy. To establish a claim in unlawful means conspiracy, a plaintiff must prove the following (EFT Holdings, Inc v Marinteknik Shipbuilders (S) Pte Ltd [2014] 1 SLR 860 (“EFT Holdings”) at [112]):
(a) that two or more persons engaged in a combination to do certain acts;
(b) that those persons intended to cause damage or injury to the plaintiff by those acts;
(c) that the acts were unlawful;
(d) that the acts were performed in furtherance of the agreement; and
(e) that the plaintiff has suffered loss as a result of the conspiracy.
- [113]
[113] The elements of a lawful means conspiracy are the same as the elements of an unlawful means conspiracy save that element (c) requires the plaintiff to establish that the conspirators carried out lawful acts with the predominant purpose of causing injury or damage to the plaintiff, which purpose was in fact achieved (Quah Kay Tee v Ong and Co Pte Ltd [1996] 3 SLR(R) 637at [45]).
- [114]
[114] The plaintiffs plead against PNGSDP one lawful means conspiracy and four unlawful means conspiracies. They refer in the PASOC to the lawful means conspiracy as “Conspiracy A” and to the unlawful means conspiracies as “Conspiracy B” to “Conspiracy E”. I deal with each in turn.
Lawful means conspiracy
- [115]
[115] Conspiracy A is pleaded as a conspiracy between PNGSDP and Sir Mekere to stop the activation of the Mine Closure Plan after the State cancelled PNGSDP’s shares in OTML in 2013 and PNGSDP stopped receiving Distributions. It is common ground that PNGSDP has not implemented the Mine Closure Plan, including the obligation to draw on the Long Term Fund for Sustainable Development Purposes as required by cl 10.4 of the Program Rules. The plaintiff’s case is that this failure is a contravention of an implied term in the Program Rules to the following effect: if PNGSDP is deprived of Distributions while the Mine continues to operate, Mine Closure has occurred and PNGSDP must administer the Mine Closure Plan set out in the Program Rules.
Factually unsustainable
- [116]
[116] Conspiracy A is factually unsustainable. The factual basis of the plea in the PASOC that PNGSDP and Sir Mekere acted with the predominant intention to injure the members of the Affected Communities is bereft of particulars and of any evidential basis. It is completely fanciful.
- [117]
[117] The plaintiffs submit that evidence of the alleged conspirators’ predominant intention to injure the members of the Affected Communities is the failure to activate the Mine Closure Plan and to draw on the Long Term Fund for Sustainable Development Purposes in breach of the implied term. The plaintiffs’ case is that it makes no commercial sense for PNGSDP to attempt to continue to operate under the Program Rules as though Mine Closure has not taken place even though the flow of Distributions from OTML has permanently ceased. In response, PNGSDP submits that there is no such implied term in the Program Rules because the rules expressly define Mine Closure.
- [118]
[118] I accept PNGSDP’s submission. The concept of “Mine Closure” is of fundamental importance to the Program Rules. The parties to the Program Rules therefore addressed their minds directly to defining the concept and did so expressly. Clause 21.1 of the Program Rules defines “Mine Closure” as the “permanent cessation of all mining and milling activities at or in association with” the Mine [emphasis added].
- [119]
[119] The Program Rules make distinct and express provision dictating how PNGSDP must apply Distributions, the Long Term Fund and the investment income before Mine Closure (see [78] above) and after Mine Closure (see [79] above). The combined effect of these provisions is to leave no gap which the parties did not contemplate and which an implied term is necessary to fill (Sembcorp Marine Ltd v PPL Holdings Pte Ltd and another and another appeal [2013] 4 SLR 193 at [94]–[95], [101]).
- [120]
[120] It is common ground that the Mine has not permanently ceased all mining and milling activities. “Mine Closure” as defined in cl 21.1 did not occur in 2013 and has not occurred to date. It is plain and obvious that there is no implied term in the Program Rules to the effect pleaded by the plaintiffs. It is equally plain and obvious that PNGSDP was under no contractual obligation to implement the Mine Closure Plan in 2013 and is under no such obligation today. Therefore, the failure to activate the Mine Closure Plan is indistinguishable from PNGSDP complying with its contractual obligations under the Program Rules. The failure is incapable of evidencing a predominant intention to injure the members of the Affected Communities. The plaintiffs’ case on Conspiracy A is plainly and obviously unsustainable.
- [121]
[121] For completeness, I should add that Conspiracy A is wrongly pleaded as a lawful means conspiracy. The plaintiffs’ case is that PNGSDP’s and Sir Mekere’s conspiracy to breach a contract (ie, the alleged implied term) caused damage to the members of the Affected Communities. A breach of contract is an example of unlawful means for the purposes of the tort of conspiracy (Nagase Singapore Pte Ltd v Ching Kai Huat and others [2008] 1 SLR(R) 80 at [23]). I have rejected the existence of any implied term. Therefore, there cannot possibly be any breach of the Program Rules. Re-labelling Conspiracy A as an unlawful means conspiracy will not save it from being struck out.
Legally unsustainable
- [122]
[122] Conspiracy A is also legally unsustainable. I accept PNGSDP’s submission that the principle in Said v Butt [1920] 3 KB 497 prevents Sir Mekere from being held liable as a conspirator with PNGSDP, at least while he was a director of PNGSDP. If Sir Mekere is legally incapable of conspiring with PNGSDP to contravene the alleged implied term, Conspiracy A is unsustainable because PNGSDP would be the only remaining alleged conspirator.
- [123]
[123] The Court of Appeal explained the principle in Said v Butt in PT Sandipala Arthaputra and others v STMicroelectronics Asia Pacific Pte Ltd and others [2018] 1 SLR 818 (“PT Sandipala Arthaputra”) at [65] in these terms: a director is ordinarily immune from liability in tort for authorising or procuring his company’s breach of contract in his capacity as a director, unless he acted in breach of his personal duties to the company.
- [124]
[124] At the outset, I note that there is no contractual relationship between the members of the Affected Communities and PNGSDP. At first blush, it may appear that the Said v Butt principle is irrelevant. Nonetheless, it is the plaintiffs’ case that PNGSDP and Sir Mekere conspired to breach an implied term in the Program Rules. The Program Rules constitute a contract to which PNGSDP’s members for the time being are parties, and in respect of which PNGSDP gave a contractual undertaking to comply with for the benefit of BHP Minerals, BHP Group, the State and OTML. I am therefore satisfied that the principle in Said v Butt remains relevant and will now consider its applicability.
- [125]
[125] The plaintiffs plead that this case is within the exception to the principle in Said v Butt because Sir Mekere breached his fiduciary duty to PNGSDP. In particular, they allege that Sir Mekere failed to act in PNGSDP’s best interests because he caused PNGSDP to act with the predominant purpose of injuring the members of the Affected Communities. This allegation is bereft of all particulars and any evidential basis. It is the barest of bare allegations. I do not accept that this allegation brings this case within the exception to the principle in Said v Butt. To come within the exception, the Court of Appeal in PT Sandipala Arthaputra held that it is insufficient merely to allege that the director acted with the intent of injuring another (at [66]):
- [126]
[126] Even assuming that Sir Mekere acted with the predominant purpose of injuring the members of the Affected Communities, or attempted to cause PNGSDP to injure them, this does not necessarily entail that he breached his fiduciary duty to act in PNGSDP’s best interests. The suite of contracts which PNGSDP entered into expressly oblige and empower PNGSDP to act contrary to the interests of the members of the Affected Communities in dealing with the Shares, Distributions, and the Long Term Fund.
- [127]
[127] I also accept PNGSDP’s reliance on Chong Hon Kuan Ivan v Levy Maurice and others [2004] 4 SLR(R) 801 (“Ivan Chong”) for the proposition that it is insufficient for a plaintiff to make bare allegations in its statement of claim that a director-defendant acted outside the scope of his authority (at [45]). Additionally, Woo Bih Li J (as he then was) went on to say that merely alleging that a defendant-director acted with a sole or predominant intention to injure a plaintiff does not itself bring the plea within the principle in Said v Butt. A predominant intention to injure the plaintiff is an element of every lawful means conspiracy. If a bare pleading of this element sufficed to deprive a defendant-director of the protection of the principle in Said v Butt, the principle would be emasculated (at [46]).
Unlawful means conspiracies
- [129]
[129] The four pleaded unlawful means conspiracies may be summarised as follows:
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