General Division of the High Court · Decided 12 November 2021
EFG Bank AG, Singapore Branch v Surewin Worldwide Ltd and others
Feedback & support[2021] SGHC 227 · Case no. Suit No 732 of 2016
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] In 2008, the plaintiff implemented an investment structure and a credit structure for the second defendant. Under the investment structure, the second defendant subscribed for all of the units in a dedicated unit trust. As consideration for the subscription, the second defendant transferred substantial assets into an account which the trustee of the unit trust had opened with the plaintiff. Under the credit structure, the trustee pledged those assets to the plaintiff to secure a credit facility which the plaintiff extended to the first defendant.
- [2]
[2] The first defendant drew substantial sums on the credit facility. It now owes the plaintiff more than US$194m. It is unable to repay any part of that sum. The central issue in this action is whether the security which the plaintiff took under the credit structure is valid and enforceable as against the second defendant.
- [3]
[3] I have decided this action in favour of the plaintiff. I have accepted the second defendant’s case that its act in subscribing for all of the units in the unit trust was illegal under the law of Taiwan, the jurisdiction in which the second defendant is incorporated and carried on business. But I have also accepted the plaintiff’s case that it would be disproportionate in all the circumstances to hold its security to be invalid or unenforceable.
- [4]
[4] I now set out the reasons for my decision.
Background
The parties
- [5]
[5] The plaintiff is a private bank incorporated in Switzerland. It has branches worldwide, including in Singapore and in Hong Kong.
- [6]
[6] The first defendant is a special purpose company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands (“BVI”). The first defendant’s sole nominee shareholder has declared that it holds its shares in the first defendant on trust for the second defendant. The first defendant was struck off the BVI companies register in 2015. In that sense, therefore, it has ceased to be a legal person. I shall nevertheless continue to use the present tense in referring to it.
- [7]
[7] The second defendant is a company incorporated in Taiwan. Until 2014, it carried on business in Taiwan as a life insurer. In 2014, Taiwan’s Financial Supervisory Commission (“the FSC”) appointed The Taiwan Insurance Guaranty Fund (“TIGF”) as the second defendant’s receiver. In 2016, the second defendant went into insolvent liquidation. TIGF was appointed the second defendant’s liquidator.
- [8]
[8] The third defendant is a Singapore company engaged in the wealth structuring business. In 2012, the third defendant replaced the initial trustee of the unit trust. The third defendant is an affiliate of the plaintiff. The third defendant advances in this action a positive case that the plaintiff’s security interest is valid and enforceable in Singapore law. In all other respects, the third defendant takes a neutral position in this action.
The second defendant opens an account with the plaintiff
- [9]
[9] The facts relevant to this action begin in 2006. In that year, two Taiwanese businessmen – Huang Cheng-I and Teng Wen-Chung – acquired 96% of the second defendant. In February 2007, Mr Huang was appointed as the second defendant’s chairman and Mr Teng as its vice-chairman.
- [10]
[10] In April 2007, Mr Teng approached one Jolene Wu Hsiao-Yun, a client relationship officer at the plaintiff’s Hong Kong branch. According to the plaintiff, Mr Teng told Ms Wu that he and Mr Huang wanted to grow the second defendant’s assets through investment.
- [11]
[11] Mr Teng’s approach to Ms Wu had two results. First, in May 2007, the second defendant opened an account with the plaintiff’s Singapore branch (“the Singfor Account”). Second, in 2007 and 2008 the plaintiff implemented two investment structures and one credit structure for the second defendant. For reasons which will become apparent, I shall refer to the first investment structure as “the STAAP Structure” and to the second investment structure as “the SFIP-1 Structure”. Although the three structures are connected, the STAAP Structure has not given rise to any disputes. Only the SFIP-1 Structure and the credit structure are therefore the subject matter of this action.
The STAAP Structure
- [12]
[12] The STAAP Structure was established in 2007 by the following steps. The second defendant subscribed for all the shares in a special purpose company incorporated in the Bahamas named Singfor Tactical Asset Allocation Portfolio SA (“STAAP”). STAAP opened an account with the plaintiff’s Singapore branch (“the STAAP Account”). The second defendant transferred substantial assets into the STAAP Account. The plaintiff and the second defendant entered into a discretionary management mandate under which the plaintiff undertook to manage the assets in the STAAP Account for the second defendant (“the STAAP Mandate”).
The credit structure
- [13]
[13] The STAAP Structure was coupled with the credit structure. The credit structure was intended to allow the first defendant to borrow money from the plaintiff using the assets in the STAAP Account as security.
- [14]
[14] The credit structure was established as follows. In May 2007, the plaintiff acquired two special purpose BVI companies for the second defendant. One of these companies is the first defendant. The other is a company known as High Grounds Assets International Ltd (“High Grounds”). Upon acquisition, the nominee shareholder of each company declared that it held the shares in each company on trust for Mr Teng and Mr Huang personally. In June 2007, a month after acquisition, each company’s nominee shareholder declared that it held its shares in each company on trust for the second defendant. There is no suggestion that that declaration of trust has ever been revoked or superseded.
- [15]
[15] The first defendant and High Grounds each opened an account with the plaintiff’s Singapore branch. I shall refer to these accounts respectively as “the Surewin Account” and “the High Grounds Account”. In August 2007, the plaintiff extended a credit facility (“the Facility”) to the first defendant “[f]or investments outside the Bank”. In September 2007, STAAP pledged the assets in the STAAP Account to the plaintiff as security for the Facility (“the STAAP Pledge”).
The SFIP-1 Structure
- [16]
[16] Towards the end of 2007, Mr Teng approached the plaintiff’s James Lee. Mr Lee was the Deputy Chief Executive Officer of the plaintiff’s parent company. He was also a member of the plaintiff’s Executive Credit Committee and attended meetings of the plaintiff’s Operating Credit Committee. Mr Teng sought Mr Lee’s assistance in restructuring the second defendant’s investment portfolio and in boosting the second defendant’s investment returns. Mr Lee approached one Richard Levinson, co-founder of Canaras Capital Management LLC and Canaras LLC (collectively, “Canaras”), to design a solution which would achieve Mr Teng’s objectives.
- [17]
[17] In January 2008, Mr Huang retired and Mr Teng was appointed chairman of the second defendant. Also in or around January 2008, Mr Teng acquired all of Mr Huang’s shares. As a result, Mr Teng was the second defendant’s single most senior executive and its sole majority shareholder in and after January 2008.
- [18]
[18] Following the advice from Canaras, the SFIP-1 Structure was implemented in 2008 by the following steps. By a trust deed dated 7 March 2008 (“the Trust Deed”), the plaintiff established the dedicated unit trust in question (“the SFIP-1 Unit Trust”). Volaw Corporate Trustee Limited (“Volaw”) was appointed the trustee of the SFIP-1 Unit Trust at inception. Volaw is incorporated in and carries on business in Jersey. The Trust Deed is expressly governed by the laws of Jersey.
- [19]
[19] Also on 7 March 2008, Volaw opened an account with the plaintiff’s Singapore branch (“the SFIP-1 Account”). On the same day, Volaw executed a document headed “Pledge of Assets as Security” (“the SFIP-1 Pledge”). It is the validity and enforceability of the SFIP-1 Pledge which is the central issue in this action. Despite the title of the document which Volaw executed and the abbreviation I have adopted, the security interest which this document created is a charge and not in truth a pledge.
- [20]
[20] By cl 2 of the SFIP-1 Pledge, in consideration of the plaintiff extending the Facility to the first defendant, Volaw charged “the Pledged Assets” to the plaintiff as continuing security for the due payment of all of the first defendant’s liabilities to the plaintiff. The SFIP-1 Pledge defines “Pledged Assets” as all of Volaw’s present and future interest in all assets which were to come into the possession of or under the control of the plaintiff for Volaw’s account. The SFIP-1 Pledge thereby charged the present and future contents of the SFIP-1 Account to the plaintiff as security for all of the first defendant’s debts. The SFIP-1 Pledge is expressly governed by Singapore law and confers non-exclusive jurisdiction on the courts of Singapore.
- [21]
[21] On 8 March 2008, Mr Teng issued letters addressed to EFG Bank and to Volaw consenting to the SFIP-1 Pledge (“the Consent Letters”). The signature block of these letters indicate that he claimed to sign them “for and on behalf of” the second defendant and in his capacity as the second defendant’s chairman.
- [22]
[22] In April 2008, the second defendant subscribed for all of the units in the SFIP-1 Unit Trust. As consideration for the subscription, the second defendant transferred bonds worth US$148.8m from the Singfor Account to the SFIP-1 Account.
- [23]
[23] On the same day, the second defendant granted the plaintiff a discretionary investment management mandate in respect of the assets in the SFIP-1 Account (“the SFIP-1 Mandate”). The SFIP-1 Mandate is expressly governed by Taiwanese law and contains an arbitration agreement stipulating that disputes under that contract are to be resolved by arbitration in Taiwan.
- [24]
[24] The second defendant subscribed on several later occasions for additional units in the SFIP-1 Unit Trust. As consideration for one of these subscriptions, the second defendant transferred all of the assets in the STAAP Account into the SFIP-1 Account. The STAAP Structure was then terminated. The STAAP Structure and the STAAP Pledge do not give rise to any dispute.
- [25]
[25] Between 2008 and 2012, the plaintiff increased the credit limit under Facility in stages, from US$30m to US$240m. The first defendant drew substantial sums against the Facility. All of those sums were paid to third parties for the personal benefit of Mr Teng rather than for the corporate benefit of the second defendant.
- [26]
[26] In 2012, the third defendant replaced Volaw as the trustee of the SFIP-1 Unit Trust. The third defendant is therefore also the chargor under the SFIP-1 Pledge.
The second defendant goes into receivership
- [27]
[27] TIGF took control of the second defendant in August 2014. Following its investigations, TIGF caused the second defendant to terminate the SFIP-1 Mandate in November 2014.
- [28]
[28] In February 2015, the plaintiff declared events of default under the Facility and terminated it. At the same time, the plaintiff terminated a separate, smaller credit facility that it had granted to the first defendant. The plaintiff has recovered a total sum of US$32.12m through rights of recourse apart from the SFIP-1 Pledge. The plaintiff applied these recoveries to discharge in full the first defendant’s liability under the smaller credit facility and then to discharge in part the first defendant’s liability under the Facility.
- [29]
[29] As of December 2015, US$199.7m remained due from the first defendant to the plaintiff under the Facility.
- [31]
[31] In 2016, Mr Teng and Mr Huang were prosecuted in Taiwan for criminal breach of trust and money laundering. The subject matter of the charges against them included their conduct in connection with the SFIP-1 Structure, the SFIP-1 Pledge and the Facility. In 2019, after appeals and a retrial, they were both found guilty and sentenced to lengthy terms of imprisonment.
- [32]
[32] The assets in the SFIP-1 Account have been realised. The account now holds US$194.57m in cash, plus accrued interest.
- [33]
[33] In July 2016, the plaintiff commenced this action against the first and second defendants. In March 2018, the plaintiff joined the third defendant to this action. The basis for the joinder was that the third defendant – as the current trustee of the SFIP-1 Unit Trust and as the chargor under the SFIP-1 Pledge – was a necessary and proper party to this action, given that the second defendant’s defence challenges the validity and enforceability of the SFIP-1 Pledge.
Relief sought
- [34]
[34] The only substantive relief which the plaintiff seeks by its claim is a declaration that the SFIP-1 Pledge is valid and enforceable.
- [36]
[36] The plaintiff advances a counterclaim to the second defendant’s counterclaim. It relies on this if I find that the plaintiff’s claim fails and the second defendant’s counterclaim succeeds. By its counterclaim to the counterclaim, the plaintiff seeks either damages against the second defendant equal to the value of the assets in the SFIP-1 Account or an indemnity for the loss it will suffer by reason of the SFIP-1 Pledge being held to be invalid or unenforceable. The plaintiff claims this relief on three grounds: (a) that the second defendant is liable to the plaintiff in misrepresentation; (b) that the second defendant is vicariously liable for Mr Teng’s and Mr Huang’s fraud or unauthorised activities; and (c) that the second defendant breached its contract with the plaintiff by failing to prevent Mr Teng’s and Mr Huang’s fraud or unauthorised activities.
Issues to be determined
- [37]
[37] This entire action turns on a single central issue: whether the SFIP-1 Pledge is valid and enforceable under Singapore law.
- [38]
[38] It is undisputed that the SFIP-1 Pledge is an authentic document and that it is, under Singapore law, a validly formed contract.
- [39]
[39] The second defendant mounts its challenge to the SFIP-1 Pledge by impugning both its contractual effect and its proprietary effect. On its contractual effect, the second defendant argues that the second defendant’s subscription for all of the units in the SFIP-1 Unit Trust and Mr Teng’s consent to the SFIP-1 Pledge are illegal under Taiwanese law. On the proprietary effect of the SFIP-1 Pledge, the second defendant argues that the security interest it creates in the plaintiff’s favour ranks after the second defendant’s beneficial interest in the assets in the SFIP-1 Account.
- [40]
[40] On the first ground of challenge, the second defendant also takes an overarching preliminary point. In August 2016, the second defendant commenced an arbitration in Taiwan against the plaintiff under the arbitration agreement in the SFIP-1 Mandate (see [23] above). In 2018, the tribunal delivered its final award, finding in the second defendant’s favour (“the Taiwanese Award”). The second defendant’s preliminary point is that the Taiwanese Award’s findings on certain issues of relevance in this action give rise to an issue estoppel preventing the plaintiff from relitigating those issues now.
- [41]
[41] There are therefore three broad issues for me to determine:
(a) Does the Taiwanese Award give rise to any issue estoppel against the plaintiff?
(b) Does the plaintiff’s security interest under the SFIP-1 Pledge rank after the second defendant’s beneficial interest in the assets in the SFIP-1 Account?
(c) Is the SFIP-1 Pledge unenforceable by reason of illegality under Taiwanese law?
- [42]
[42] I deal with each of these three broad issues in turn.
Issue estoppel
The arbitration
- [44]
[44] In response, the plaintiff’s case in the arbitration was as follows:
(a) The plaintiff could not return the assets because they were now owned in law by the third defendant as the trustee of the SFIP-1 Unit Trust. If the second defendant wished to recover title to the assets, it therefore ought to bring a claim against the third defendant under the Trust Deed.
(b) Any contractual right which the second defendant may have had under the SFIP-1 Mandate to recover the assets and any property right the second defendant might have in those assets under the Trust Deed were subordinate to the plaintiff’s security interest in those assets “by virtue of the terms of the SFIP-1 Pledge and under Singapore law”. That security interest entitled the plaintiff to apply the assets in satisfaction of the sums due under the Facility notwithstanding the terms of the SFIP-1 Mandate and the Trust Deed.
The plaintiff maintained throughout the arbitration that the tribunal should make no finding on whether the SFIP-1 Pledge was valid and enforceable under Singapore law because the Singapore courts were the proper forum to determine that issue under the express terms of the SFIP-1 Pledge (see [20] above).
- [46]
[46] The second defendant submits that the Taiwanese Award contains six findings in the second defendant’s favour, all of which the plaintiff is estopped from relitigating in this action:
(a) First, that the second defendant’s subscription to shares in STAAP breached Taiwanese law (“the STAAP Illegality Finding”).
(b) Second, that the second defendant’s subscription to units in the SFIP-1 Unit Trust breached Taiwanese law (“the SFIP-1 Illegality Finding”).
(c) Third, that the breach of Taiwanese law on the first and second findings rendered the second defendant’s subscription for shares in STAAP and for units in the SFIP-1 Unit Trust void ab initio and not merely unenforceable (“the Subscription Voidness Finding”).
(d) Fourth, that the SFIP-1 Pledge breached Taiwanese law, with the result that the assets that the second defendant had transferred into the SFIP-1 Account never ceased to be the second defendant’s property (“the Pledge Illegality Finding”).
(e) Fifth, that the breach of Taiwanese law on the fourth finding rendered the SFIP-1 Pledge void ab initio and not merely unenforceable (“the Pledge Voidness Finding”).
(f) Sixth, that Ms Wu was aware that the money which the plaintiff was going to lend the first defendant under the Facility against the security of the SFIP-1 Pledge would be transferred to third parties for the personal benefit of Mr Teng rather than for the corporate benefit of the second defendant (“the Knowledge Finding”).
The law
- [47]
[47] The starting point for the test which determines whether an issue estoppel has arisen from a foreign adjudication (transnational issue estoppel), is the test which determines whether an issue estoppel has arisen from a local adjudication (domestic issue estoppel). Both parties therefore take as their starting point the test for domestic issue estoppel which the Court of Appeal set out in Lee Tat Development Pte Ltd v Management Corporation of Strata Title Plan No 301 [2005] 3 SLR(R) 157 (“Lee Tat”).
- [48]
[48] It was held in Lee Tat at ([14]–[15]) that a domestic issue estoppel arises if the earlier adjudication satisfies four conditions:
(a) It is a final and conclusive judgment on the merits;
(b) The judgment was entered by a court of competent jurisdiction;
(c) There is identity of parties; and
(d) There is identity of subject matter.
- [49]
[49] This test is modified in two ways when applied to transnational issue estoppel: Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp (formerly known as Merck & Co, Inc) v Merck KGaA (formerly known as E Merck) [2021] 1 SLR 1102 (“Merck”) at [35]. First, the foreign court must have had transnational jurisdiction over the party said to be bound by the estoppel. Second, there must be no defence to recognition of the foreign judgment in Singapore.
- [50]
[50] At the outset, I should note a quirk of timing. The second defendant commenced the arbitration in August 2016, a month after the plaintiff commenced this action. That is not, in itself, a ground for rejecting the Taiwanese Award as being capable of giving rise to an issue estoppel. That would be the result only if the second defendant’s conduct in securing the Taiwanese Award could be characterised as an abuse of process (Jixin Xu v Wei Wang (2019) 58 VR 536 at [107(d)]). The plaintiff does not suggest that the second defendant is guilty of any such abuse.
- [51]
[51] I now deal with the elements of a transnational issue estoppel. It is convenient to begin with identity of parties.
Identity of parties
- [52]
[52] There is identity of parties in so far as the second defendant is concerned. The second defendant was the claimant in the arbitration and is a party to this action.
- [53]
[53] There is also identity of parties in so far as the plaintiff is concerned. The respondents in the arbitration were named as “EFG Bank AG” and “EFG Bank AG, Hong Kong Branch”. The plaintiff in this action is named as “EFG Bank AG, Singapore branch”. These differences of nomenclature carry no legal or procedural significance for present purposes. EFG Bank AG is a single bank and a single legal person. The branches of a bank are simply different aspects of that single legal person: see TMT Co Ltd v The Royal Bank of Scotland plc (trading as RBS Greenwich Futures) and others [2018] 3 SLR 70 at [53].
- [54]
[54] The plaintiff submits, however, that identity of parties is absent because the third defendant was not a party to the arbitration but is a party to this action.
- [56]
[56] The plaintiff’s argument proceeds as follows. The third defendant is a principal player because it has an interest in the outcome of this action. It is the trustee of the SFIP-1 Unit Trust and is therefore the legal owner of the assets in the SFIP-1 Account. It is the chargor under the SFIP-1 Pledge. Further, the third defendant is not merely a nominal defendant in this action. It advances a positive case that the SFIP-1 Pledge is valid and enforceable. The position of the third defendant as the SFIP-1 Unit Trust’s trustee is especially important in this action because the second defendant’s case implies that the trustee acted in breach of trust in executing the SFIP-1 Pledge (as I have indeed found: see [149] below). In fact, the second defendant itself acknowledged in earlier interlocutory proceedings in which it challenged jurisdiction and service that the third defendant was a necessary and proper party to this action.
- [58]
[58] The third defendant is not a principal player in relation to the tribunal’s findings on any of the six issues on which the second defendant now seeks to rely. That is because the only interest which the third defendant has in this action, as established by the only positive case which it advances in this action, is on the issue of whether the SFIP-1 Pledge is valid and enforceable under Singapore law. That is not any one of the six issues on which the second defendant relies as giving rise to an issue estoppel.
- [59]
[59] Identity of parties is therefore present for the purposes of considering whether the Taiwanese Award gives rise to transnational issue estoppel. The plaintiff and the second defendant are the only principal players with respect to the six issues on which the second defendant relies as giving rise to a transnational issue estoppel.
Identity of issues
- [60]
[60] The plaintiff submits that there is no identity of issues, or at least no full identity of issues, because Jersey law and Singapore law are relevant to the validity and enforceability of the SFIP-1 Pledge but were not considered in the Taiwanese Award.
- [61]
[61] Full identity of issues is not required for an issue estoppel to arise. But the determination said to give rise to an issue estoppel must have been “fundamental and not merely collateral to the previous decision so that the decision could not stand without that determination”: Goh Nellie at [35], cited in Merck at [40]. The determination should not be merely a “[step] in a process of reasoning tending to establish or support the proposition upon which the rights depend”: Goh Nellie at [36]–[37], citing Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464 at 532.
- [62]
[62] Whether a determination is fundamental or merely collateral to a decision is assessed bearing in mind the balance between the public interest in finality in litigation and the private interest in not foreclosing a litigant from arguing an issue that, in substance, was not the central issue determined in previous proceedings: Goh Nellie at [37]. Further, in defining the issues in both proceedings, the court should interpret the decisions of a foreign legal system cautiously, particularly in ascertaining what was actually decided and whether the issue in question was necessary or merely collateral to the decision: Merck at [40], citing Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd and Others (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 853 at 918.
- [63]
[63] The second defendant does not explain how the STAAP Illegality Finding was fundamental to the tribunal’s decision. But the plaintiff does not allege that it was not. I therefore need not say any more about this finding.
- [64]
[64] I accept the second defendant’s submission that the SFIP-1 Illegality Finding, the Subscription Voidness Finding, the Pledge Illegality Finding and the Pledge Voidness Finding were fundamental to the tribunal’s decision in the Taiwanese Award. The chain of reasoning from the tribunal’s findings to its decision may be summarised as follows:
- [65]
[65] The second defendant also submits that the Knowledge Finding was fundamental to the tribunal’s decision, and in particular to the finding at [64(f)] above. I do not accept that submission. The finding at [64(f)] above was premised on a number of separate findings. The Knowledge Finding was only one of them. The second defendant does not explain how the Knowledge Finding was fundamental to the finding at [64(f)] above.
Defences to recognition
- [66]
[66] It is not disputed that a foreign arbitral award is capable of giving rise to a transnational issue estoppel. The Taiwanese Award is therefore to be treated for this purpose as the equivalent of a final and conclusive judgment of a foreign court. The question before me is whether there are any defences to the recognition in Singapore of the Taiwanese Award.
- [67]
[67] The plaintiff submits that the Taiwanese Award does not give rise to any issue estoppel in this action because the plaintiff has defences to the recognition in Singapore of the award. Those defences are that the tribunal issued the Taiwanese Award in excess of jurisdiction and in breach of natural justice.
- [68]
[68] The plaintiff has challenged the Taiwanese Award on two previous occasions. The first failed and the second succeeded. First, in February 2018, the plaintiff applied to set the award aside in Taiwan. That application failed at first instance and on appeal. The Taiwanese courts held that there were no grounds under Taiwanese law on which to set the award aside. Second, in October 2018, the plaintiff challenged the second defendant’s attempt to enforce the award in Hong Kong. In November 2020, the Hong Kong Court of First Instance (“HK CFI”) found that the tribunal had rendered the award in excess of jurisdiction and in breach of natural justice. In January 2021, the HK CFI refused the second defendant’s application for leave to appeal against its decision.
- [69]
[69] These foreign judgments cannot, of course, bind me on the issue of whether the plaintiff has defences to the recognition of the Taiwanese Award. Further, no party argues that either of these foreign judgments raise any sort of issue estoppel on the enforceability or otherwise of the Taiwanese Award. The submission is, instead, that I can adopt the reasoning of either the Taiwanese courts or the HK CFI on the issue of defences to recognition to the extent that I find that reasoning persuasive.
Pleadings objection
- [70]
[70] The second defendant takes a preliminary objection on the plaintiff’s pleadings. The second defendant objects to the plaintiff relying on the breach of natural justice ground as a defence to recognition because the plaintiff has not pleaded this ground.
- [71]
[71] The second defendant bears the burden of establishing the issue estoppel on which it relies. However, O 18 r 8(1) of the Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed) obliges the plaintiff to plead specifically the grounds on which it relies to argue that no issue estoppel arises. These grounds include the defences to recognition on which it intends to rely.
- [74]
[74] I therefore hold that the plaintiff is bound by its pleadings to advance only the excess of jurisdiction ground as a defence to recognition.
Excess of jurisdiction
- [75]
[75] The plaintiff argues that the tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction in making the SFIP-1 Illegality Finding, the Subscription Voidness Finding, the Pledge Illegality Finding and the Pledge Voidness Finding.
- [76]
[76] An award issued by a tribunal seated in Taiwan is enforced in Singapore under s 46(1) read with s 46(3) of the Arbitration Act (Cap 10, 2002 Rev Ed) and not under Part III of the International Arbitration Act (Cap 143A, 2002 Rev Ed) (“the IAA”). That is because Taiwan is not a contracting party to the New York Convention: Arbitration in Singapore: A Practical Guide (Sundaresh Menon ed-in-chief) (Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd Ed, 2018) (“Arbitration in Singapore”) at para 14.082. I proceed on the basis that the grounds for refusing enforcement under s 46 of the Arbitration Act are the same as the grounds set out in Art 36(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (“the Model Law”): see Arbitration in Singapore at para 14.083. In PT First Media TBK (formerly known as PT Broadband Multimedia TBK) v Astro Nusantara International BV and others and another appeal [2014] 1 SLR 372, the Court of Appeal held (at [84]) that the grounds for refusing enforcement under s 19 of the IAA of an international arbitration seated in Singapore are the same as the grounds set out in Art 36(1) of the Model Law. Those grounds should apply equally to enforcement under s 46 of the Arbitration Act: Arbitration in Singapore at para 14.026.
- [77]
[77] Excess of jurisdiction is therefore a defence to the enforcement of the Taiwanese Award in Singapore. Article 36(1)(a)(iii) of the Model Law provides that a Singapore court may refuse to recognise or enforce an award if:
- [78]
[78] Determining whether an award contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration for the purpose of recognising or enforcing the award under Art 36(1)(a)(iii) of the Model Law is analogous to determining whether to set aside an award on that ground under Art 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law. The determination involves a two-stage process (see CRW Joint Operation v PT Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero) TBK [2011] 4 SLR 305 at [30], citing PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (Persero) v Dexia Bank SA [2007] 1 SLR(R) 597 (“PT Asuransi (CA)”) at [40] and [44]):
(a) First, the court must determine what matters were within the scope of the submission to the tribunal; and
(b) Second, the court must determine whether the award involved those matters, or whether it involved “a new difference … outside the scope of the submission to arbitration and accordingly … irrelevant to the issues requiring determination” [emphasis in original].
- [79]
[79] In its request for arbitration, the second defendant asserted its primary claim that the express terms of the SFIP-1 Mandate obliged the plaintiff to return the assets upon termination of the SFIP-1 Mandate. The second defendant also asserted that the SFIP-1 Pledge afforded the plaintiff no excuse for failing to comply with this obligation because the SFIP-1 Pledge was void under Singapore law for lack of consideration.
- [80]
[80] Before me, the second defendant submits the plaintiff’s case in the arbitration was that the SFIP-1 Mandate was only one agreement out of a single composite transaction comprising a suite of agreements which also included the Trust Deed and the SFIP-1 Pledge, and that the plaintiff’s rights and the second defendant’s obligations under this single composite transaction gave the plaintiff a defence to the second defendant’s claim. On this basis, the second defendant now submits that the tribunal acted within its jurisdiction in arriving at its findings on the four issues (see [75] above).
- [81]
[81] I do not accept the second defendant’s submission. I find the analysis of the Taiwanese Award undertaken by the HK CFI to be persuasive. The arbitration agreement in the SFIP-1 Mandate confined the tribunal’s jurisdiction to disputes arising out of or in connection with the SFIP-1 Mandate. That contractual relationship was governed by Taiwanese law. The arbitration agreement did not give the tribunal jurisdiction to make any determinations binding on the plaintiff and the second defendant with regard to the Trust Deed or the SFIP-1 Pledge. Each of those is a separate instrument with its own dispute resolution clause. Further, the second defendant is not privy to any of those instruments. The Trust Deed is a unilateral declaration of trust by Volaw. The SFIP-1 Pledge is the unilateral creation of a security interest by Volaw (now, the third defendant) in favour of the plaintiff.
- [84]
[84] The plaintiff has therefore established that it has a defence to recognition in Singapore of the Taiwanese Award on these four issues (see [75] above). As a result, no issue estoppel can arise against the plaintiff in this action on those issues.
- [85]
[85] I now turn to consider the two grounds on which the second defendant challenges the SFIP-1 Pledge free of any issue estoppel. I begin with the proprietary consequences of the SFIP-1 Pledge and the question of priorities.
Priorities
Pleadings objection
- [86]
[86] The second defendant advances two arguments to support its submission that the plaintiff took its security interest under the SFIP-1 Pledge in the assets in the SFIP-1 Account subject to the second defendant’s beneficial interest in those assets. First, the second defendant argues that, if the plaintiff has a legal security interest, it was not a bona fide purchaser of that legal interest for value without notice of the second defendant’s beneficial interest. Second, the second defendant argues that, if the plaintiff has an equitable security interest, that equitable interest is postponed to the second defendant’s later equitable interest because the plaintiff was guilty of inequitable conduct.
- [87]
[87] The plaintiff accepts that the second defendant has at least obliquely pleaded the first argument. But the plaintiff submits that the second defendant has not pleaded the second argument: it has not even obliquely pleaded either the rule of inequitable conduct on which it relies or any particulars of the plaintiff’s inequitable conduct on which it relies. In response, the second defendant submits that the second argument is fundamentally a question of priorities and that it has adequately pleaded the issue of priorities by pleading that the plaintiff took the SFIP-1 Pledge subject to the second defendant’s equitable interest in the underlying assets.
- [88]
[88] I accept the plaintiff’s submission that the second defendant has not pleaded the material facts necessary to give the plaintiff adequate notice of the case it has to meet on the second argument. I therefore hold the second defendant to its pleaded case and consider only its first argument: whether the plaintiff is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of a legal interest in the assets in the SFIP-1 Account.
The issues
- [89]
[89] It is common ground that the second defendant has a beneficial interest in the assets in the SFIP-1 Account. Volaw was the original trustee of the SFIP-1 Unit Trust and was the plaintiff’s customer in respect of the SFIP-1 Account. Volaw became the legal owner of the assets in the SFIP-1 Account when the second defendant subscribed for units in the SFIP-1 Unit Trust and transferred its assets into the SFIP-1 Account as consideration. As the second defendant points out, Volaw declared the second defendant to be the beneficial owner of the SFIP-1 Account when it opened the SFIP-1 Account. The third defendant made the same declaration when it succeeded Volaw as trustee.
- [90]
[90] The plaintiff’s security interest under the SFIP-1 Pledge will be valid and enforceable if: (a) the second defendant consented to Volaw granting the SFIP-1 Pledge; and (b) the plaintiff was a bona fide purchaser for value of its security interest under the SFIP-1 Pledge without notice of the second defendant’s beneficial interest in the assets in the SFIP-1 Account.
- [91]
[91] I examine these two issues in turn.
The second defendant did not give its prior consent to the SFIP-1 Pledge
The Consent Letters bind the second defendant
- [92]
[92] The Consent Letters (see [21] above) constitute valid consent by the second defendant to the SFIP-1 Pledge if and only if: (a) Mr Teng had the second defendant’s authority to sign them on its behalf; and (b) the second defendant had the power and capacity to consent to the SFIP-1 Pledge. A common subsidiary issue is whether the second defendant was prohibited by Taiwanese law from consenting to the SFIP-1 Pledge. I therefore deal with that subsidiary issue first.
(1) Taiwanese law as pleaded did not prohibit consent
- [93]
[93] The second defendant submits that two provisions of Taiwanese law prohibited it from consenting to the SFIP-1 Pledge.
- [94]
[94] First, Art 16 of the Taiwan Company Act 1929 (Taiwan) (“the TCA”) provides (as translated) that “[a] company shall not act as a guarantor of any nature, unless otherwise permitted by any other law or by the Articles of Incorporation of the company”. The plaintiff’s and the second defendant’s Taiwanese law experts agree that “act[ing] as a guarantor” includes “[p]roviding the company’s property for creation of security interest for others”, citing the Taiwan Supreme Court decision in 74-Tai-Shang-Zi-703 (1985). It is also common ground that the second defendant’s corporate constitution contains no provision permitting the second defendant to act as a guarantor or to pledge its assets to secure a third party’s debts.
- [95]
[95] Second, Art 143 of the Taiwan Insurance Act 1929 (“the TIA”) (as translated) provides that “[a]n insurance company may not … act as a guarantor for a third party or provide its assets as collateral for the debt of another”.
- [96]
[96] The second defendant submits that the SFIP-1 Structure violates both Art 16 of the TCA and Art 143 of the TIA directly or by virtue of the Taiwanese doctrine of evasion of law. In response, the plaintiff submits that the SFIP-1 Structure violates neither provision and that the second defendant is precluded from relying on the evasion of law doctrine. I accept the plaintiff’s submissions for the following reasons.
(A) Statutory language
- [97]
[97] The plaintiff’s Taiwanese law expert, Prof Huang Yuh-Kae, takes the view that the second defendant neither acted as a guarantor nor provided its assets as security for a third party’s debts. That is because the SFIP-1 Structure did not involve the second defendant granting any pledge of its own assets. The SFIP-1 Pledge did not arise out of any contract to which the second defendant was a party. The plaintiff submits that the SFIP-1 Pledge involved Volaw pledging assets in Volaw’s account to the plaintiff in Volaw’s capacity as the legal owner of the assets. The only property of the second defendant which arose from the SFIP-1 Structure were the units allotted to the second defendant in the SFIP-1 Unit Trust upon subscription. The plaintiff held those units for the second defendant in the Singfor Account free of any pledge.
- [98]
[98] In response, the second defendant’s Taiwanese law experts, Prof Tseng Wang-Ruu and Prof Wang Hsin-Chun, say that the SFIP-1 Pledge breached both Art 16 of the TCA and Art 143 of the TIA. Prof Wang says that the question under both those provisions is economic effect rather than technical form: did the second defendant in economic effect provide its assets as security for a third party’s debts regardless of the form of the transaction? As Prof Wang puts it, “[o]ne needs to look at the effect of the transaction and see whether it is prohibited by the law”. On that basis, both of the second defendant’s experts are of the view that “[w]hat was pledged were assets which belong to [the second defendant]”.
- [99]
[99] To support the argument that the SFIP-1 Pledge was a pledge of the second defendant’s assets, the second defendant argues that the existence and nature of its beneficial interest in the assets transferred into the SFIP-1 Account continued uninterrupted and unchanged by the assets becoming subject to the SFIP-1 Unit Trust. The second defendant’s submission is that there was no scintilla temporis when the assets were comprised in the SFIP-1 Unit Trust and unitised to interrupt or change the nature of its beneficial interest. I accept that submission. But that does not establish that, for the purposes of Art 16 of the TCA and Art 143 of the TIA, the assets that became subject to the SFIP-1 Pledge were assets belonging to the second defendant.
- [100]
[100] The interpretation of Art 16 of the TCA and Art 143 of the TIA advanced by the second defendant’s experts is not reflected in the language of either provision. The language does not prohibit Volaw from creating a charge over assets that Volaw owns in law and in which a Taiwanese company has a beneficial interest. Nor is there any indication that either provision was intended to have extra-territorial reach so as to bind Volaw in Jersey. All that the second defendant did in connection with the SFIP-1 Pledge was ostensibly to consent to Volaw granting the SFIP-1 Pledge. As the plaintiff points out, the second defendant’s experts cite no authority to support an extended interpretation of either provision as prohibiting such consent. I therefore prefer and accept the plaintiff’s expert evidence. I hold that the SFIP-1 Pledge did not breach either Art 16 of the TCA or Art 143 of the TIA.
(B) Evasion of law doctrine
- [101]
[101] In the alternative, the second defendant’s experts say that the Taiwanese evasion of law doctrine prohibits a Taiwanese insurance company from circumventing Art 16 of the TCA and Art 143 of the TIA by entering into a transaction designed and intended to evade the restrictions in those provisions.
- [102]
[102] The plaintiff submits that the second defendant has not pleaded even the factual basis for the evasion of law doctrine, ie, that the plaintiff intended to evade or circumvent these Taiwanese law restrictions. In response, the second defendant says that it suffices that it has pleaded that the parties performed acts which were illegal under Taiwanese law and that they knew that this venture was illegal.
- [104]
[104] On the second defendant’s case as pleaded, therefore, I find that the SFIP-1 Pledge did not breach either Art 16 of the TCA or Art 143 of the TIA.
(2) The second defendant had power and capacity to consent
- [105]
[105] The second defendant next submits that, by reason of both Art 16 of the TCA and Art 143 of the TIA, it lacked the power and the capacity to charge its assets as security for a third party’s debts and therefore to consent to the SFIP-1 Pledge. Given my finding that Art 16 of the TCA and Art 143 of the TIA do not prohibit the SFIP-1 Pledge (see [93]–[104] above), I find also that neither provision deprived the second defendant of the power or the capacity to consent to the SFIP-1 Pledge.
(3) Mr Teng had authority to issue the Consent Letters
- [106]
[106] The plaintiff’s case is that Mr Teng had at all material times either the second defendant’s actual or ostensible authority to issue the Consent Letters consenting to the SFIP-1 Pledge for and on behalf of the second defendant. I accept the plaintiff’s case on Mr Teng’s actual authority but not on his ostensible authority. I address each type of authority in turn.
(A) Actual authority
- [107]
[107] Taiwanese law governs the issue of whether Mr Teng had actual authority to issue the Consent Letters on the second defendant’s behalf. That is because the second defendant is a company incorporated in Taiwan. The source of an agent’s actual authority to represent a principal that is a corporation “must ultimately derive from the law of the place of incorporation, which regulates the company’s capacity and internal management, including the identification of the persons authorised to act on the corporation’s behalf”: Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws vol 2 (Lord Collins of Mapesbury gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 15th Ed, 2012) (“Dicey, Morris & Collins”) at para 33-451.
- [108]
[108] The plaintiff submits that Mr Teng had actual authority to issue the Consent Letters for two reasons.
- [109]
[109] The plaintiff’s first submission is that Mr Teng was, loosely speaking, “the boss” of the second defendant. Two witnesses called by the second defendant at trial gave evidence to that effect: (a) Chyou Syan-Cheng, who was the second defendant’s Senior Vice President of Investment until March 2008; and (b) Liao Chia-Hsing, who was employed in the second defendant’s capital management department until 2015. When Mr Teng signed the Consent Letters on 8 March 2008, he was the chairman of the second defendant, a director of the second defendant and the majority shareholder of the second defendant. The second defendant’s senior executives invariably complied with his instructions. They did this even after the FSC suspended him as the second defendant’s chairman in January 2009.
- [110]
[110] I accept the plaintiff’s submission. But this takes the plaintiff only so far on actual authority. As the second defendant submits, the way the second defendant’s senior executives and other employees treated Mr Teng does not go to the issue of actual authority. The plaintiff has not pleaded that, under Taiwanese law, Mr Teng could acquire actual authority by the fact that the second defendant’s executives invariably complied with his instructions.
- [111]
[111] The plaintiff’s alternative submission is that the provisions of the TCA gave Mr Teng actual authority to issue the Consent Letters. Article 208-3 of the TCA provides that “[t]he chairman of the board of directors ... shall externally represent the company”. Further, Art 57 read with Art 208-5 of the TCA provides that “directors representing the company” “shall have the power to conduct all affairs pertaining to the business of the company”. This broad authority conferred by Arts 57 and 208-5 does not require the board of directors to resolve formally and explicitly to give the director specific authority before the director can exercise it.
- [112]
[112] The dispute on this aspect of the plaintiff’s case is whether consenting to the SFIP-1 Pledge constitutes “affairs pertaining to the business of the company”. The second defendant submits that an illegal act cannot constitute “affairs pertaining to the business of the company” within the meaning of Art 57 of the TCA (see [247] below). That may be so. But I have found that the SFIP-1 Pledge did not breach either Art 16 of the TCA or Art 143 of the TIA (see [93]–[104] above). The second defendant’s submission therefore fails.
- [113]
[113] I therefore find that Mr Teng did have actual authority under the TCA to issue the Consent Letters on the second defendant’s behalf consenting to the SFIP-1 Pledge.
(B) Ostensible authority
- [114]
[114] Because I have found that Mr Teng had actual authority to issue the Consent Letters, it is not necessary for me to consider whether he had ostensible authority to do so. But I will deal with the issue, given the parties’ extensive submissions on the underlying law and facts. I find that Mr Teng did not have ostensible authority to issue the Consent Letters on the defendant’s behalf.
- [115]
[115] The plaintiff and the second defendant accept that Singapore law governs Mr Teng’s ostensible authority to issue the Consent Letters. That is because the SFIP-1 Pledge is governed by Singapore law.
- [116]
[116] In Singapore law, an agent has ostensible authority to bind his principal as against a counterparty if his principal has represented to the counterparty that the agent has such authority with the intention that the counterparty should rely on the representation and the counterparty does in fact rely on the representation. The representation then clothes the agent with ostensible authority “to do all such acts as agents in his position usually do”: Walter Woon on Company Law (Tan Cheng Han gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd Rev Ed, 2009) at para 3.27.
- [117]
[117] The plaintiff submits that a third party would reasonably assume that an agent who is the chairman, a director and the majority shareholder of a company has the company’s authority to act on its behalf and to bind the company. I do not accept this submission. The mere fact that a person satisfies all three of these criteria does not amount to the company’s representation to third parties that that person has the company’s authority to do any and all conceivable acts on the company’s behalf.
- [118]
[118] In the alternative, the plaintiff submits that the second defendant represented to the plaintiff that Mr Teng had its authority to issue the Consent Letters in two documents: (a) the account-opening booklet for the Singfor Account (“the ACB”); and (b) the minutes of a meeting of the second defendant’s board held on 30 January 2008 (“the Board Minutes”). The plaintiff says that it relied on these representations in acting on the Consent Letters. I deal with each document in turn.
(I) The account-opening booklet
- [119]
[119] The ACB was executed on behalf of the second defendant by its president (one Chen Wen-Yen) (“President Chen”) and one of its directors (one Pu Yun-Hsi) (“Director Pu”). The second defendant points out that Mr Teng is not one of the authorised signatories listed in the ACB. It draws my attention to three versions of the ACB which are in evidence. These three versions appear at Tabs 7, 8 and 9 of the affidavit of evidence in chief of the second defendant’s witness, one Chen Hsiu-Fang (“Ms HF Chen”). Ms HF Chen was employed in the second defendant’s capital management and foreign investment departments until 2015. Ms HF Chen’s evidence is that the plaintiff sent the versions of the ACB at Tabs 7 and 8 to her. Ms HF Chen says that the Tab 7 version was the first version that she completed and submitted to the plaintiff. The version at Tab 9 is the ACB on which the plaintiff relies in these proceedings.
- [120]
[120] The Tab 7 version of the ACB is incomplete: it is missing the even-numbered pages. Part 5 of the ACB is the signature card setting out the specimen signatures of all authorised signatories. Part 5 of the Tab 7 version consists of a single page. That page sets out the names and specimen signatures of four signatories in the first four fields: President Chen, Director Pu, one Liu Ko-Hsien (a manager of the second defendant) and Mr Chyou. The fifth and sixth fields of the signature card are left blank. At the bottom of the signature card is the phrase “[End of Part 5]” and below that the page number “25”.
- [121]
[121] The Tab 8 version of the ACB is missing even more pages than the Tab 7 version. In the Tab 8 version, Part 5 sets out the same four names and their specimen signatures with the fifth and sixth fields left blank. This page is likewise paginated as page 25. But next to the phrase “[End of Part 5]” is the additional typed phrase “Page 1 of 2”. But there is no “Page 2 of 2” and there is no page 26.
- [122]
[122] The Tab 9 version of the ACB is complete and has no missing pages. Part 5 of the Tab 9 version is also at page 25 and also contains the same four names and their specimen signatures with the fifth and sixth fields left blank. This page also bears the typewritten phrase “Page 1 of 2” at its foot. But Part 5 of the Tab 9 version contains a second page, also paginated number 25, with the additional typewritten phrase “Page 2 of 2” at the foot. That second page sets out the names and specimen signatures of Mr Huang and Mr Teng. The first page of Part 5 in all three versions is countersigned by President Chen and Director Pu. However, the second page of Part 5 in the Tab 9 version is not countersigned by them.
- [123]
[123] From all this, the second defendant invites me to infer that, when the second defendant returned the completed ACB to the plaintiff, the ACB did not include the second page of Part 5 with Mr Teng’s name and specimen signature. The second defendant says that the plaintiff has failed to call a witness to prove that the plaintiff received this second page and incorporated it into the ACB. The second defendant therefore invites me to find that Mr Teng is not an authorised signatory of the Singfor Account.
- [124]
[124] I do not accept the second defendant’s submission. I find on the balance of probabilities that Mr Teng was an authorised signatory of the Singfor Account. I do so for three reasons.
- [125]
[125] First, as the plaintiff points out, the plaintiff’ has proven the complete ACB found at Tab 9. The affidavit of evidence in chief of one Albert Chiu Sin Chuen, the plaintiff’s Executive Chairman for the Asia Pacific Region, exhibits the complete ACB. It is correct that the plaintiff did not call a witness to testify specifically about the circumstances in which it received the second page of Part 5 and how that page came to be incorporated into the ACB. But counsel for the second defendant confirms that its case is not that the second page is a forgery. I am satisfied that the second page was duly incorporated into the ACB and constituted Mr Teng an authorised signatory of the Singfor Account.
- [126]
[126] Second, as the plaintiff points out, although the second page of Part 5 is not countersigned by President Chen and Director Pu, the inclusion of Mr Huang and Mr Teng as authorised signatories is consistent with another part of the ACB which President Chen and Director Pu did countersign. As I have mentioned, Part 5 of the ACB is the signature card. But Part 3 of the ACB is where the plaintiff’s customer names its directors, its authorised signatories and its authorised representatives not having signing authority. The Tab 7 version of Part 3 is completely blank. President Chen and Director Pu nevertheless countersigned at the foot of the blank lists. On Ms HF Chen’s own evidence, the plaintiff then typed certain details into Part 3, which is the Tab 8 version. In the Tab 8 version, the same lists in Part 3 are completed with the names of six authorised signatories: Mr Teng, Mr Huang, Director Pu, President Chen, Mr Chyou and Mr Liu. As the plaintiff submits, the Tab 8 version thus confirms that the second defendant intended to name Mr Teng and Mr Huang as authorised signatories. The second page of Part 5 in the Tab 9 version thus complements the list of six authorised signatories in Part 3 by supplementing Part 5 in the earlier versions with the specimen signatures of Mr Huang and Mr Teng as the second defendant’s fifth and sixth authorised signatories.
- [127]
[127] Third, as the second defendant itself says, President Chen and Director Pu are the witnesses who can testify as to whom the second defendant authorised as its signatories. But, as the plaintiff points out, the second defendant did not call either President Chen or Director Pu to testify that the second defendant did not authorise Mr Teng to be a signatory of the Singfor Account. Absent such evidence, and given that it is not the second defendant’s case that Part 5 is a forgery or that there is anything sinister about the plaintiff completing the ACB for the second defendant, I find that the second defendant did appoint Mr Teng as an authorised signatory for the Singfor Account.
- [128]
[128] The second defendant points out that the account opening documents that Ms HF Chen sent to the plaintiff include minutes of a board resolution. The minutes record a resolution by the second defendant’s board that, among other things, the Singfor Account be opened and that Mr Chyou and Mr Liu operate the account jointly. Mr Teng and Mr Huang are not named in these minutes. Insofar as the second defendant relies on this document to submit that it did not intend to appoint Mr Teng as an authorised signatory in the ACB, I do not accept the submission. Although the minutes are signed, they are undated. Further, it is unclear what the context of these minutes was and what became of them. On Ms HF Chen’s evidence, the plaintiff completed the ACB after she provided the minutes to them (see [126] above). Because the second defendant does not allege that there is anything sinister about the plaintiff completing the ACB for the second defendant, I give more weight to the complete ACB document than to the contents of these minutes.
- [129]
[129] In the alternative, the second defendant submits that Mr Teng’s designation as an authorised signatory of the Singfor Account cannot be relied on as a representation that he was authorised to consent to the SFIP-1 Pledge. That is because the SFIP-1 Pledge was a pledge to secure a third party’s debts and did not relate to the operation of the Singfor Account.
- [131]
[131] I do not accept the plaintiff’s submission. The second defendant did not, by executing the ACB, represent that any of the authorised signatories listed in the ACB were authorised to consent to the SFIP-1 Pledge. An examination of the provisions of the ACB shows that the authority which the ACB conferred on the authorised signatories listed in it is to give instructions to the plaintiff on which the plaintiff is to act in relation to maintaining or operating the Singfor Account. Consenting to the SFIP-1 Pledge was not such an instruction: the SFIP-1 Pledge did not relate to the Singfor Account at all.
- [132]
[132] Thus, cl 2.1 of the ACB provides as follows:
- [133]
[133] Further, cl 2.4 provides as follows:
- [134]
[134] Finally, cl 4.2.1(d) provides as follows:
- [135]
[135] I accept, as the plaintiff submits, that the second defendant’s subscription for units in the SFIP-1 Unit Trust falls within the scope of the mandate which the ACB confers on the authorised signatories. That is because: (a) the consideration for the subscription was discharged by transferring assets from the Singfor Account to the SFIP-1 Account; and (b) the plaintiff thereafter held the units allotted to it in the Singfor Account.
- [136]
[136] But I do not accept that the consequence of that is that Mr Teng’s consent to the SFIP-1 Pledge also falls within the scope of the ACB mandate. That is so even though I accept that the SFIP-1 Unit Trust and the SFIP-1 Pledge were part of a single composite transaction intended to implement the SFIP-1 Structure, which includes the SFIP-1 Pledge. Clause 2.10(e) of the Trust Deed provides that the investor in the SFIP-1 Unit Trust (ie the second defendant) consents to the trustee executing a pledge to secure third-party obligations. As the plaintiff submits, this shows that the second defendant’s subscription to units in the SFIP-1 Unit Trust was factually connected to the Consent Letters. But that factual connection does not extend the representations made in the ACB to cover Mr Teng’s conduct other than in giving instructions to the plaintiff on which it was to act in relation to maintaining or operating the Singfor Account.
- [137]
[137] I therefore hold that the second defendant’s appointment of Mr Teng as an authorised signatory in the ACB does not constitute a representation that Mr Teng had any sort of authority to consent to the SFIP-1 Pledge on the second defendant’s behalf.
(II) The Board Minutes
- [138]
[138] I now turn to consider the Board Minutes (see [118] above). Mr Teng and President Chen signed the Board Minutes. They record a resolution that, among other things, Mr Teng and President Chen be authorised to sign “all documents” for and on behalf of the second defendant singly. The plaintiff says that it relied on the Board Minutes in acting on the Consent Letters, as the minutes confirmed Mr Teng’s authority to sign “all documents” singly and without limit.
- [139]
[139] The second defendant submits that the chronology of events makes it improbable, if not impossible, that the plaintiff relied on the Board Minutes when it received the Consent Letters and when Volaw executed the SFIP-1 Pledge on 8 March 2008. I accept this submission. The Board Minutes were backdated to 30 January 2008. It was only on 13 March 2008 – several days after Mr Teng issued the Consent Letters – that Ms HF Chen sent Edna Leung of the plaintiff a draft resolution authorising Mr Teng and President Chen to sign singly and without limit. Further, the minutes have a signature verification stamp and a date stamp that reads “26 May 2008”. As the second defendant submits, this suggests very strongly that the plaintiff received the document and verified the signatures on or about that date, well after Mr Teng issued the Consent Letters.
(C) Conclusion on authority
- [140]
[140] In summary, I find that Mr Teng had actual but not ostensible authority to consent on the second defendant’s behalf to Volaw executing the SFIP-1 Pledge. He therefore had actual, but not ostensible, authority to issue the Consent Letters for and on behalf of the second defendant. That finding suffices to hold that the second defendant is bound by Mr Teng’s consent to the SFIP-1 Pledge and therefore did itself consent to the pledge.
The Consent Letters were issued after the SFIP-1 Pledge was created
- [141]
[141] Having found that the second defendant consented to the SFIP-1 Pledge, I nevertheless find that Volaw executed the SFIP-1 Pledge without the second defendant’s prior consent. That is because Volaw executed the SFIP-1 Pledge on 7 March 2008, one day before Mr Teng issued the Consent Letters on 8 March 2008.
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