General Division of the High Court · Decided 2 December 2021
Haribo Asia Pacific Pte Ltd v Aquarius Corp
Feedback & support[2021] SGHC 278 · Case no. Suit No 331 of 2018
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] Haribo Asia Pacific Pte Ltd (the “Plaintiff”), a company incorporated in Singapore, is part of a group of companies (the “Haribo Group”) in the business of manufacturing and selling confectionaries. The Plaintiff is responsible for the sale and distribution of the Haribo Group’s products in the Southeast, West, and East Asian markets. The Defendant, Aquarius Corporation, is a company incorporated in the Republic of Korea (“South Korea”). It is in the business of distributing food and beverage products in South Korea.
- [2]
[2] The present dispute pertains to a distributorship agreement into which they entered on 23 May 2016 (the “2016 DA”) for the Plaintiff to supply, and the Defendant to distribute, the Haribo Group’s products in South Korea. It is apposite to highlight from the outset that the 2016 DA was governed by German law, in respect of which the parties called experts to give evidence.
- [3]
[3] The 2016 DA was not, however, the first distribution agreement between the parties. Their relationship was formerly governed by an agreement entered into on 16 October 2014 (the “2014 DA”). Certain disputes arose in connection with the 2014 DA, and the parties negotiated a settlement. What followed was a settlement and contribution agreement (the “SCA”), as well as the 2016 DA. Under the SCA, the parties agreed to bring the 2014 DA to an end and settle all outstanding and potential claims arising therefrom. Connectedly, the 2016 DA served to enable the parties to restart their contractual relationship on a clean slate, with certain revised terms.
- [4]
[4] However, even after the 2016 DA and SCA were executed, the parties’ relationship continued to be strained. Naturally, they disagree on whose fault this was, but I will only set out their precise complaints later in my judgment. At this juncture, it is sufficient to note that the parties were unhappy – both in respect of some of the same issues which led to the termination of the 2014 DA, as well as new ones – and that the Plaintiff was the one to take the first step to bring their contractual relationship to an end. It did so by invoking cl 7.2 of the 2016 DA which states that parties may terminate the contract “with six (6) months’ notice to the end of a calendar month”.
- [5]
[5] The notice which the Plaintiff gave to effect the termination under cl 7.2 (the “Plaintiff’s First Termination Notice”) was issued on 25 October 2016, and given the notice period defined, the last day of the contract would have been 30 April 2017. For some time after issuing this notice, the Plaintiff demanded the Defendant to make payment for outstanding invoices totalling €1,526,224.76 for products delivered. However, its demand was not met, and it thus brought the present suit to recover this outstanding sum with interest.
- [6]
[6] The Defendant does not seem to dispute that it owes €1,526,224.76 for the products it received from the Plaintiff (although it disputes an aspect of the claim for contractual interest on this sum: see [13] below). It avers that the Plaintiff committed numerous breaches of the 2016 DA, and counterclaimed for damages (in the form of lost profits) resulting from those breaches which far exceeds, and entirely sets off, the Plaintiff’s claim. Indeed, the Defendant’s counterclaim for damages in the present suit is pleaded to be for approximately ₩54,719,088,182 or around €42.7 million. In response, the Plaintiff refutes the counterclaim entirely.
- [7]
[7] In support of their respective cases, the parties each called one factual witness. Nikolay Karpuzov (“Mr Karpuzov”), a director of the Plaintiff, gave evidence on its behalf. Evidence for the Defendant was given by Eric Hahn (“Mr Hahn”), its sole shareholder and up until April 2016, its president.
- [8]
[8] The parties also called experts to give evidence on: (a) the quantification of the counterclaim; and (b) issues of German law. In relation to (a), James Nicolson (“Mr Nicolson”) and Jenny Teo (“Ms Teo”) respectively gave evidence for the Plaintiff and Defendant. Mr Nicolson is a Chartered Financial Analyst and Head of Economic and Financial Consulting (Asia) at FTI Consulting. Ms Teo is a Chartered Accountant and Head of the Forensic Advisory Services Division (Asia) at Sedgwick. As regards (b), Professor Matthias Lehmann (“Prof Lehmann”) of the University of Bonn and Professor Hans Christoph Grigoleit (“Prof Grigoleit”) of the University of Munich gave evidence for the Plaintiff and Defendant respectively.
- [10]
[10] I will now detail the reasons for my decision, starting with a summary of the parties’ cases in the claim and counterclaim. Thereafter, I will set out the facts of the case, and where relevant, resolve the key factual matters in dispute. Finally, I will draw together my factual findings in relation to the issues arising from the parties’ cases. I have chosen to structure my judgment in this manner for two reasons. First, there are a substantial number of facts in dispute, and the significance (or lack thereof) of these disputed facts are best understood through the lens of the parties’ cases. Second, the parties have framed their cases around numerous alternatives. It is therefore preferable to have a working set of facts before I address each of those alternatives.
The Plaintiff’s claim
- [11]
[11] The Plaintiff’s case in the claim is straightforward. It asserts a debt of €1,526,224.76 for the Haribo Group’s products delivered to and received by the Defendant, with contractual interest provided for by the 2016 DA:
- [12]
[12] The Plaintiff pleads that the “base interest rate” prescribed by section 247 of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (the “BGB”) – the German Civil Code – is 7.12% and that it is entitled from 1 July 2016 until the date of full payment. Applying this rate and starting date, as at 13 August 2021 – the date on which closing submissions were filed – the Plaintiff calculates that it is entitled to €519,074.76 in interest.
- [13]
[13] The Defendant does not dispute that the Plaintiff is entitled to 8% over the rate of 7.12%. It contends, however, that the Plaintiff has no basis to claim interest from 1 July 2016. In support of this, the Defendant highlights that interest is only payable “from the expiration of the time provided for payment” (see [11] above). The earliest invoice on which the Plaintiff’s claim is based is dated 1 November 2016, and the invoice states that payment is to be made by the “3rd working day of [the] next month”. That is, 5 December 2016 – the 3rd and 4th of December being non-working days.
The Defendant’s counterclaim
- [14]
[14] As stated at [6], the Defendant has not seriously set out to dispute that it owes €1,526,224.76. Instead, its defence is contingent on the success of its counterclaim, and its consequential entitlement to set off that debt. As such, to resolve the dispute, it chiefly needs to be determined whether the Defendant should succeed in its counterclaim.
- [15]
[15] The case in the counterclaim is, unfortunately, slightly overcomplicated. It could have, in my view, been more simply pleaded. This is not aided by the Plaintiff’s many – bordering on excessive – alternative defences. Nevertheless, if distilled, the Defendant’s counterclaim can be understood as following two relatively straightforward steps. First, that the Plaintiff’s termination of the 2016 DA on 25 October 2016, was legally invalid. Second, that the Plaintiff breached several of its obligations under the 2016 DA, thus giving the Defendant a claim for damages suffered in the form of lost profits.
First step: Validity of the Plaintiff’s termination
- [16]
[16] The Defendant contends that the Plaintiff’s First Termination Notice was not legally valid, and thus did not have the effect of triggering the termination of the 2016 DA on 25 October 2016. It makes this claim on two alternative bases, one contractual and one statutory:
(a) One, that the Plaintiff failed to initiate, or at least participate in, the dispute resolution process required by the 2016 DA. These, on the Defendant’s case, were preconditions which must be met before the right to terminate with notice pursuant to cl 7.2 could be validly exercised.
(b) Two, that the way in which the Plaintiff effected the termination fell afoul of restrictions imposed by sections 138, 226, and 242 of the BGB on the exercise of contractual rights, including termination rights such as that under cl 7.2. Namely, that a contractual right cannot be exercised in a manner which: (i) is contrary to good morals; (ii) amounts to “unlawful chicanery” (ie, effected for no reason other than to cause damage to the other party); or (iii) is objectionable according to the standards of good faith and fair dealing.
- [17]
[17] To establish the latter, the Defendant set out to prove three groups of contractual breaches allegedly committed by the Plaintiff (these breaches also form the subject of the second step of the Defendant’s case in the counterclaim: see [37] below):
(a) One, that the Plaintiff was obliged under the 2016 DA to aid in the curing or investigating certain issues pertaining to the food safety of the Haribo Group’s products, and parallel imports into South Korea, but refused to do so.
(c) Three, that the Plaintiff did not (as stated at [16(a)] above) even attempt to engage in mandatory dispute resolution before issuing its First Termination Notice. In fact, it took active steps to conceal any purported dissatisfaction from the Defendant.
- [18]
[18] These acts – as well as refusals to act – the Defendant avers, show that the Plaintiff was not interested in securing the continued operation of the 2016 DA, contrary to its preamble which states that they “want[ed] to achieve a long-term partnership-like collaboration based on mutual trust”. It claims that, because the Plaintiff was unhappy with it for legitimately seeking aid in respect of the food safety and parallel imports issues, the Plaintiff terminated the 2016 DA to punish it for doing so. This, the Defendant pleads, was a “reprehensible purpose”, and the termination therefore: “had no other goal than to cause damage to [it]”; and/or was effected “in bad faith”, in violation of sections 138, 226, and/or 242 of the BGB. These three provisions state, per the agreed English translation:
- [19]
[19] In response, the Plaintiff disputes that its First Termination Notice was invalid. In full, cl 7.2 states: “This Agreement may be terminated by either party with six (6) months’ notice to the end of a calendar month.” Emphasising fidelity to the text, the Plaintiff’s case is that this clause: (a) provides a no-fault basis to terminate the 2016 DA which may be invoked at any time; and (b) that an invocation of cl 7.2 would be valid unless, and only unless, it is found to have contravened the three restrictions imposed by the BGB as set out at [16(b)] and [18] above. Further, as to (b), the Plaintiff avers that the threshold to be met in respect of the BGB restrictions is “very high”, and in any case, that it has not committed any contractual breaches on which the Defendant can hang its claim that sections 138, 226, or 242 of the BGB were violated (I will describe the parties’ factual cases on these breaches from [69] below).
- [20]
[20] As regards (b), the Defendant does not dispute that judicial intervention in respect of the three BGB provisions is “exceptional”. However, it avers that, where the parties were in a long-term commercial relationship, the provisions should be applied more strictly. Applying this standard, as stated at [18] above, the Defendant contends that the Plaintiff’s termination was, on the facts of this case, in violation of these provisions.
- [21]
[21] In respect of (a), the Defendant’s case is that, notwithstanding its plain words, the exercise of the right of termination pursuant to cl 7.2 is subject to preconditions in cll 7.5 and 8.7 of the 2016 DA. These provide:
- [22]
[22] The Defendant relies particularly on the words “shall” in both clauses in support of its position that they operate as preconditions to which the invocation of cl 7.2 is subject. It is on these bases – particularly cl 8.7 – that the Defendant avers that the Plaintiff’s First Termination Notice was invalid. On 12 and 14 October 2016, the Defendant sent emails to the Plaintiff titled “Official Dispute Escalation Procedure”. In these emails, it requested a meeting with the Plaintiff to “begin getting things back on track”. The Plaintiff, however, did not respond to these requests.
- [23]
[23] As stated at [19] above, the Plaintiff’s position is that cl 7.2 provides a generally unfettered right to terminate, so long as notice is properly given, and the termination does not fall afoul of the requirements in the BGB. It therefore refutes that cll 7.5 and 8.7 impose any form of restriction of cl 7.2. It makes two counterarguments in respect of each clause.
- [24]
[24] I start with cl 7.5. First, cl 7.2 does not expressly refer to cl 7.5. By contrast, cl 7.3 (by which parties may terminate the 2016 DA for cause, with immediate effect) expressly states its operation to be “subject to clause 7.5”. Given this lack of express reference, Profs Lehmann and Grigoleit agree that – for the procedure in cl 7.5 to be read into the application of cl 7.2 – German law requires that the parties understood that their contract would operate in a manner contrary to the plain wording of the clause. In this case, save for the mere existence of cl 7.5, the Plaintiff submits that there is no evidence which indicates the parties intended cl 7.2 to be limited in the manner proposed by the Defendant.
- [25]
[25] For context, cl 7.3 states:
- [26]
[26] Second, there was no practical or logical way in which cl 7.2 could have been limited by cl 7.5. The latter provides that, where breaches have been committed, the innocent party may issue a notice to the defaulting party to cure said breaches. If the defaulting party fails to do so, the innocent party may opt to terminate (see [20] above). This, the Plaintiff suggests, does not sensibly apply where the allegedly defaulting party is the one which invokes cl 7.2. Indeed, it is not clear what the Plaintiff’s specific obligation would have been if cl 7.5 were to operate in connection with cl 7.2.
- [27]
[27] I turn next to cl 8.7. First, the Plaintiff advances the same argument as stated at [24] above – that cl 7.2 does not expressly refer to cl 8.7. Second, it argues that the words of cl 8.7 plainly show that it relates to the commencement of dispute resolution processes rather than the termination of the 2016 DA. This can be gleaned from the last paragraph of cl 8.7 which refers to the submission of the parties’ dispute to the “Singapore High Court”.
- [28]
[28] These are the parties’ cases in respect of this part of the counterclaim. They engage on and give rise to two broad issues: (a) whether the exercise of cl 7.2 of the 2016 DA is subject to cll 7.5 or 8.7; and if not, (b) whether the Plaintiff’s exercise of cl 7.2 was nevertheless in violation of sections 138, 226, and/or 242 of the BGB. Before I go on to describe the second step of the case in the counterclaim, however, it is useful to explain why such emphasis was placed on the validity of the Plaintiff’s First Termination Notice.
Interjection: Significance of the Plaintiff’s termination
- [29]
[29] If the Defendant is successful in establishing either of the arguments set out at [16] above, the consequence would be my finding that the Plaintiff’s First Termination Notice had no legal effect. The invalidity of this notice is crucial to the quantification of the counterclaim. This is because, if the notice had been issued validly, any claim the Defendant has for lost profits would be cut-off by the date on which the notice was slated to end, ie, 30 April 2017 (see [5] above).
- [30]
[30] The reason for this cut-off, if not immediately apparent, is quite simple. If the Plaintiff properly exercised its right of termination under cl 7.2 of the 2016 DA, it is not open for the Defendant to claim that it has lost profits on the basis that the 2016 DA “would have continued” had the Plaintiff not committed the breaches it allegedly did. This is because, whether the Plaintiff breached the 2016 DA or not, the First Termination Notice would have brought it to an end on 30 April 2017. Thus, any profits which the Defendant says it could have earned had the Plaintiff not breached the 2016 DA, it would no longer have been able to earn past this date. Put simply, the Plaintiff’s valid exercise of cl 7.2 would break any causal link between profits lost after 30 April 2017, and the Plaintiff’s alleged breaches of contract.
- [31]
[31] The German law experts do not entirely agree as to the specific threshold of causation which the Defendant must prove. On Prof Lehmann’s account, lost profits can be recovered if they “could probably have been expected in the normal course of events”. On Prof Grigoleit’s account, such foreseeability of the profits need not be proven, and it need only be shown that they would have accrued to the claimant had the “liability event” not taken place, ie, simple sine qua non causation.
- [32]
[32] The differences in their views on this issue, however, do not have any bearing on this analysis. So long as the Plaintiff’s cl 7.2 termination was valid, the point at [30] above would still stand. Applying Prof Lehmann’s view, the Defendant cannot say that it would, “in the normal course of events”, have earned profits after the date of termination. The normal course of events would simply have been the end of the 2016 DA on 30 April 2017. On Prof Grigoleit’s view, assuming that the Plaintiff breached the 2016 DA, but nevertheless validly invoked cl 7.2, the profits lost by the Defendant after 30 April 2017 would have been lost irrespective of the Plaintiff’s breach. It thus cannot be said that the profits would have accrued “without the liability event”.
- [34]
[34] Accordingly, if the Plaintiff’s First Termination Notice had been validly issued, the Defendant would – at most – be able to recover: (a) any profits lost on or before 30 April 2017; and (b) damages for other losses suffered (ie, other than lost profits), whether before or after 30 April 2017 so long as they can be proven to have been caused by the Plaintiff’s breach(es) of contract. As regards (b), the Defendant does not plead that it suffered any other head of loss. In respect of (a), however, the Defendant’s claim for lost profits does include profits which were specifically lost during the six-month notice period ending on 30 April 2017. This aspect of its claim stems from its allegation that the Plaintiff halted product deliveries in October 2016 (see [17(b)] above).
- [35]
[35] Following the termination, the Plaintiff did not deliver most of the Defendant’s orders placed between July and December 2016, or delivered them late. This, the Defendant avers, caused it to suffer ₩3,678,138,396 (around €2.8 million) in lost profits between October 2016 and April 2017, from being unable to meet the full extent of its customers’ orders.
Second step: The plaintiff’s breaches of contract
- [36]
[36] I turn now to the second step of the Defendant’s case in the counterclaim. It is premised on the successful footing of its first step (the importance of which is emphasised above), ie, that the Plaintiff’s First Termination Notice did not validly trigger the termination of the 2016 DA. The effect of the success of the first step is that, as on 25 October 2016, this contract would not have ended on 30 April 2017. Rather, it would have continued running “for an indefinite period of time”, pursuant to its cl 7.1.
- [37]
[37] On this footing, the Defendant points to the above-mentioned breaches of contract (see [17]) and claims: (a) that those breaches were repudiatory; (b) that it gave the Plaintiff ample opportunity to cure those breaches in December 2016 and January 2017 in accordance with cl 7.5; (c) that the Plaintiff did not cure its breaches; and thus, (d) on the basis of these repudiatory breaches, the Defendant was the party that was entitled to terminate the 2016 DA. This termination – if valid – was effected immediately, by a notice issued on 3 February 2017 (the “Defendant’s Termination Notice”).
- [38]
[38] Thus, the Defendant avers that it has suffered lost profits flowing from the Plaintiff’s repudiatory breaches of contract, which ultimately forced it to terminate the 2016 DA on 3 February 2017. Put simply, the essence of the Defendant’s counterclaim is that, had the Plaintiff not acted in the way it did, the parties’ contractual relationship would not have ended, and it would have continued making profits from the distribution of the Haribo Group’s products for the indefinite period the 2016 DA could have run. This accounts for why, as stated at [6] above, the profits which the Defendant claims to have lost amount to a very substantial sum: ₩51,040,949,786, or around €39.8 million from May 2017 onwards (ie, not including the losses suffered during the six-month notice period ending on 30 April 2017: see [35] above).
- [39]
[39] Unsurprisingly, the Plaintiff disputes every aspect of the counterclaim. First, it claims not to have committed any of the contractual breaches on which the counterclaim is premised. Second, even if these breaches were committed and are established, it claims that they are not actionable on the basis of the SCA as well as certain terms of the 2016 DA. Third, even if these breaches are found to be actionable, it claims that the quantification of the Defendant’s lost profits is based on incorrect assumptions and unsupported by evidence.
- [40]
[40] As suggested at [19], the Plaintiff’s first point overlaps substantially with its case that it did not exercise cl 7.2 in violation of sections 138, 226, or 242 of the BGB. In essence, in the course of proving that it did not act in breach of the 2016 DA, the Plaintiff also showed that the provisions of the BGB were not violated. This is logical – the absence of breaches on the part of the Plaintiff would support the conclusion that its cl 7.2 termination was not contrary to good morals, unlawful chicanery, or objectionable according to the standards of good faith and fair dealing.
- [41]
[41] There is, however, a more specific and important point which arises from the Plaintiff’s case that it did not – as a matter of fact – commit any breaches of the 2016 DA. On the basis that it did not, the Plaintiff disputes the validity of the Defendant’s Termination Notice, and takes the position that such notice was invalid as there was no cause for the Defendant to terminate the 2016 DA with immediate effect. Indeed, beyond its alleged invalidity, the Plaintiff submits that the absence of actual cause rendered the Defendant’s attempt at termination, wrongful. Such wrongful termination was then itself cause for the Plaintiff to terminate the 2016 DA immediately, which it did by way of a notice issued on 9 February 2017 (the “Plaintiff’s Second Termination Notice”). Of course, the Defendant disputes the legal effect of the Plaintiff’s Second Termination Notice and claims that the 2016 DA was simply terminated by its notice on 3 February 2017.
- [42]
[42] This point is worth emphasising because the validity of the Plaintiff’s Second Termination Notice – on top of the First Termination Notice – has a further bearing on the quantification of the Defendant’s lost profits. This is because, if I find that the second notice is also valid, in line with my reasoning at [30] above, the Defendant’s counterclaim would be cut off on the earlier date of 9 February 2017, rather than 30 April 2017. This would in turn further reduce the amount of lost profit which the Defendant can claim for the six-month notice period (see [35] above).
- [43]
[43] With the parties’ broad cases, as well as the remedial significance of the Plaintiff’s Second Termination Notice in mind, I turn to the facts of this case and the key factual matters in dispute. I did not, in this section, granularly set out the parties’ cases as summarised at [37] and [39] above. This is because, without knowing the factual background giving rise to this suit, the breaches of contract alleged and denied will be difficult to appreciate.
The facts and key matters in dispute
- [44]
[44] The background to this matter comprises six events or series of events which I will describe chronologically: (a) the formation of the 2014 DA; (b) the disputes which arose during the 2014 DA; (c) the apparent resolution of these disputes by the SCA and the concurrent formation of the 2016 DA; (d) the disputes which continued into or arose during the 2016 DA; (e) the Plaintiff’s decision to terminate the 2016 DA in light of these disputes; and (f) the events after the Plaintiff’s First Termination Notice.
Formation of the 2014 DA
- [45]
[45] On the Defendant’s account, from around September of 2006, it was the “sole and exclusive” distributor for Haribo Group’s products in South Korea. The parties, however, did not have a formal written agreement until they entered into the 2014 DA. On Mr Hahn’s account, there was never a need for the parties to have a written agreement, as their contractual relationship had been a good one even without such formalities (at least until the disputes raised at [57] below arose). The 2014 DA therefore, according to him, was not entered to address any lack of clarity as between the parties. Rather, it was needed because of the presence of a significant number of parallel imports into South Korea, which made it necessary for the Defendant to assure its customers that it was still Haribo Group’s official distributor in South Korea.
- [46]
[46] On the Plaintiff’s side, Mr Karpozov was not involved in negotiating or executing the 2014 DA. On that basis, he accepts that he is not in a position to give evidence on why the parties entered into the 2014 DA. Nevertheless, this is not a significant gap in the narrative because the Plaintiff does not dispute that it had business dealings with the Defendant since 2006; nor are the terms of the 2014 DA (save for the one discussed immediately below) in issue. As such, the circumstances surrounding the formation of the 2014 DA, as well as the terms of the 2014 DA need not be scrutinised extensively.
- [47]
[47] The only matter which needs to be examined somewhat closely is the Defendant’s assertion that it was the “sole and exclusive” distributor for the Haribo Group’s products in South Korea under the 2014 DA and before. The Plaintiff does not accept this. Its position is there was no exclusivity under the 2014 DA, and that the Defendant was only appointed the “sole and exclusive” distributor for South Korea under the 2016 DA, where such words were expressly used in cl 1.1 for the first time.
- [48]
[48] At trial, the parties made much of this. During his cross-examination of Mr Karpuzov, counsel for defendant, Mr Vijayendran SC, took pains to suggest, by referring him to the correspondence between the parties, that exclusivity had existed since 2006 or at least under the 2014 DA. Mr Chou, counsel for plaintiff, placing emphasis on the text of the 2014 DA – or more accurately, the absence of the words “sole and exclusive” – did the opposite during his cross-examination of Mr Hahn.
- [49]
[49] This dispute about the facts was not made easier to resolve by Mr Chou erroneously conceding in his lead counsel’s statement that the Defendant was the exclusive distributor under the 2014 DA. His error led to a discussion on the status of lead counsel’s statements, during which Mr Chou essentially contended that parties are free to renege from concessions made, and positions taken in such statements, as they do not amount to pleadings. Although I agree that lead counsel’s statements do not supersede pleadings, I must emphasise that the role of counsel is to assist the court in arriving at a decision, not to add unnecessary layers of dispute. In fact, counsel hold a unique position. Where they state the factual positions of parties by reference to evidence admitted or to be admitted, especially those of their own client, the court generally accepts the accuracy of such statement. The court’s trust in counsel, however, cannot be taken for granted. I therefore take this opportunity to remind counsel to take particular care in ensuring the accuracy of their statements. I would also add that there may well be circumstances in which a statement made in the lead counsel’s statement or an opening statement may have been relied upon by the other party in such a manner that it would be unjust to permit the first party to resile from it. I hasten to add, however, that such was not the case here.
- [50]
[50] In any case, despite the parties’ efforts, my view is that the attention paid to the issue of exclusivity of the 2014 DA – principally, by the Defendant – was slightly misplaced. Ultimately, its exclusivity is at best, a loosely relevant fact on which nothing really turns. To appreciate why I have taken this view, we first need to understand the Defendant’s purpose in contending that the 2014 DA was also an exclusive agreement.
- [51]
[51] An allegation the Defendant makes in this case (cross-reference [17(a)] above and [89] below), is that a member of the Haribo Group, Haribo GmbH & Co KG (“Haribo GmbH”) (which deals largely with the sales and administration of the Group), had been supporting parallel imports into South Korea from as early as 2012. Relying on certain clauses in the 2016 DA, the Defendant claims that the Plaintiff was obliged to support its investigation into these parallel imports. However, the Plaintiff failed to do so and thus acted in breach of the 2016 DA. It is specifically with respect to this claim, that the Defendant characterises the exclusivity of the 2014 DA as a relevant fact.
- [52]
[52] This characterisation, however, overstates its relevance. The crux of the Defendant’s allegation is that the Plaintiff failed to assist it in investigating Haribo GmbH’s alleged support of parallel imports. Such assistance was only sought after the Defendant discovered that Haribo GmbH had been supporting and supplying parallel importers in August 2016, three months after the 2016 DA had been entered into. As such, the existence and breach of such a duty should plainly be determined by reference to the 2016 DA, which the Plaintiff accepts was an exclusive agreement.
- [53]
[53] From this, it is clear that, the issue of whether the parties’ agreements prior to the 2016 DA were also exclusive, is not particularly salient. Even if the Defendant proves that its relationship with the Plaintiff was exclusive before the 2016 DA, to make anything of this, it will also need to show that the Plaintiff breached the relevant pre-2016 DA agreement. Even then, this would still not be directly relevant to the actual issue stated above. It would only be indirectly relevant to the extent that it informs the Plaintiff’s motives behind its alleged refusal – in late 2016 – to assist the Defendant’s investigation.
- [54]
[54] Indeed, this is precisely how the Defendant proposes to make use of the evidence. It suggests that the Plaintiff “historically courted other distributors in South Korea”, and points to a portion of Mr Karpuzov’s testimony where he stated that, because the 2014 DA was not exclusive, he had asked his colleagues to “find a way to work with” other distributors. This, Mr Karpuzov said, was a way to increase the volume of sales made by the Plaintiff and thus, its profits. Relying on this, the Defendant submits that the Plaintiff, “in the pursuit of greater profits, was ready to engage with other distribution companies”. In fact, given its “demonstrable readiness to breach the exclusive distribution agreement it had with [the Defendant] and polyamorous approach towards parallel distributors, it is thoroughly unsurprising that [the Plaintiff] was in the same spirit unwilling to provide any assistance to [the Defendant]”.
- [55]
[55] I will return to the question of whether the Plaintiff wrongfully failed to support the Defendant in its investigations of Haribo GmbH’s alleged conduct at [88] below. For now, I will simply observe that, ultimately, the Defendant’s allegation needs to be proven by contemporaneous evidence from the time it requested the Plaintiff’s assistance in its investigations. For example, Mr Hahn’s evidence is that on 30 August 2016, he met with Mr Karpuzov and raised the Defendant’s problems with parallel importers. Later, in September and October 2016, he continued to correspond with the Plaintiff’s representatives, to no avail. These exchanges are most significant as they directly concern how the Plaintiff responded to the Defendant’s request for assistance, and thus, whether it breached its contractual duty to cooperate.
- [56]
[56] Whether the Plaintiff’s response is also “thoroughly unsurprising” in the light of past conduct, is entirely ancillary. References to the Plaintiff’s past conduct alone is not sufficient to show that it specifically refused to support the Defendant’s investigations in late 2016. The evidential value of the Plaintiff’s alleged past conduct is, as such, minimal. It will only be of some significance if the contemporaneous evidence is equivocal, but not so equivocal that such past conduct cannot do anything to sway the conclusion either way. For these reasons, I do not find it necessary to determine whether the 2014 DA – or the parties’ unwritten contractual relationship before the 2014 DA – were exclusive agreements.
Disputes arising during the 2014 DA
- [57]
[57] I turn next to the period following the parties’ execution of the 2014 DA in October 2014. For approximately six months thereafter, their relationship as supplier and distributor carried on smoothly. However, sometime in April 2015, one of two issues arose which would ultimately lead to the parties terminating the 2014 DA, executing the SCA (the “settlement and contribution agreement”: see [3] above), and entering into the 2016 DA.
- [58]
[58] I will refer these two issues as the: (a) “Misrepresentation Issue”; and (b) “Misdescription Issue”. They relate to certain food safety concerns which arose in respect of the Haribo Group’s products. Before I set them out, however, it bears noting that – though these were issues which arose whilst the 2014 DA was still in force, and before the parties executed the SCA – they nevertheless form a part of the Defendant’s counterclaim based on the 2016 DA.
- [59]
[59] Briefly, the Defendant’s case is that these issues went unresolved even after the SCA and 2016 DA were executed; that the Plaintiff remained obliged to resolve them under the 2016 DA, notwithstanding the SCA; and thus, that the Plaintiff acted in breach of the 2016 DA. The Plaintiff refutes these claims on two bases. First, given that they arose during the 2014 DA, they were settled by the SCA. Second, in any event, even if such claims were not compromised by the SCA, the Plaintiff did not breach the 2016 DA. With the relevance of these two issues broadly in mind, I now set them out.
- [61]
[61] Haribo Produktions responded to the Defendant by way of a letter dated 8 April 2015, stating that it did conduct x-ray screenings “to sort out any foreign pieces” (the “Representation”). The Defendant claims that this assurance was shared with individuals in the South Korean government, businesses, as well as consumers for a period of “nearly one year”, before it discovered – in or around March 2016 – that the Representation was false.
- [62]
[62] The Plaintiff accepts that the Representation was false, and that no x-ray screenings were conducted on the Group’s products. Its explanation, however, is that the employee who prepared the Representation was mistaken as to the screening process, and that optical sorters were (and still are) used instead of x-ray screenings. Mr Karpuzov’s evidence is that optical sorters are more effective for the purpose of detecting foreign objects in the products.
- [63]
[63] Nevertheless, irrespective of the claimed effectiveness of optical sorters as compared with x-ray screenings, the pertinent fact is that the Representation was inaccurate. This inaccuracy forms the foundation of the Misrepresentation Issue. It is important to note, however, that the issue is not concerned with this inaccuracy per se. Rather, it relates to the Plaintiff’s alleged failure to cooperate with and support the Defendant’s efforts to correct the Representation.
- [64]
[64] This brings me to the Misdescription Issue. Separately, sometime in or around February 2016, the Defendant learnt that large quantities of the Haribo Group’s products had been made with a “new recipe” but packaged with foils which did not accurately describe the ingredients used. More specifically, the description was provided in both Korean and German, and although the ingredients were correctly described in Korean, the German description was inaccurate. As a consequence, these products could not be lawfully sold in South Korea.
- [65]
[65] On the Defendant’s account, when it informed the Plaintiff that its only option was to return the products, a representative for the Plaintiff asked that it falsify its declarations of the products’ ingredients. Naturally, the Defendant claims to have refused this alleged request, and instead issued a voluntary recall of the products with the South Korean Ministry of Food and Drug Safety (“MFDS”). This led to the Defendant being placed under investigation by the MFDS, the fact of which is not in dispute. To add straws to the commercial camel’s back, the Defendant claims around this time, also to have discovered the Plaintiff contacting two of its customers, in what it believed to be attempts at making direct sales.
- [66]
[66] These issues, coupled with its later discovery of the inaccuracy of Haribo Produktion’s Representation in March 2016, were what eventually led the Defendant to terminate the 2014 DA with immediate effect on 5 April 2016. In its notice of termination, the Defendant cited the Plaintiff’s: (a) instigation and perpetration of illegal food distributorship activities; (b) improper handling of food safety claims in South Korea; (c) approaching of the Defendant’s customers in South Korea; and/or (d) instigation of a breach of cl 3.7 of the 2014 DA. For completeness, cl 3.7 of the 2014 DA simply provides that the Defendant is responsible for ensuring products do not infringe any South Korean regulations or trademarks in South Korea.
Settlement of disputes and formation of 2016 DA
- [67]
[67] Following the issuance of this notice of termination, the parties entered into negotiations to resolve their disputes under the 2014 DA, as well as discuss the future of their commercial relationship. The negotiations and discussions were successful, and as stated at [3], they resulted in the SCA and the 2016 DA, both executed on 23 May 2016. These two documents lie at the heart of the present dispute, but I will only set out their key terms from [70] below, when I describe the disputes that arose during the 2016 DA.
Disputes during the 2016 DA
- [68]
[68] As stated at [4] above, even after the parties entered into the fresh 2016 DA, their working relationship remained strained. I will begin by explaining how the Misdescription and Misrepresentation Issues – which led to the termination of the 2014 DA – continued to be sources of tension. Thereafter, I will describe three further issues which arose during the 2016 DA: the “MFDS Inquiry Issue”; the “Parallel Imports Issue”; and the “Product Delivery Issue”.
Old disputes: Misdescription and Misrepresentation Issues
- [69]
[69] From the Defendant’s point of view, notwithstanding the SCA, the Misrepresentation and Misdescription Issues had not been resolved. The food safety Representation (see [61] above) had not been corrected, and the MFDS investigation resulting from the Misdescription Issue (see [65] above) had not been closed.
(1) The Misdescription Issue
- [70]
[70] As such, early in September 2016, the Defendant wrote to the Plaintiff, asking for a representative to attend in South Korea to assist it in addressing the MFDS’s investigation into the Misdescription Issue. These investigations, Mr Hahn admits, were “not major”, and would likely result in the MFDS finding the Defendant to have inadvertently put out products which could not lawfully be sold. However, he claims that there was a small chance that the Defendant could have been found to have acted wilfully.
- [71]
[71] The bases on which the Defendant made such request, were cll 3.7, 8.8, and 8.9 of the 2016 DA. These clauses provide:
- [72]
[72] In the Plaintiff’s response to the request, it cited the SCA and stated that it had no obligation to “take any further liability” for issues which arose during the 2014 DA. This led to the parties engaging in quarrels over correspondence. On 14 September 2016, the Plaintiff wrote – in a letter to the Defendant – that their contractual relationship was in such a state where they ought to “seriously discuss exit scenarios and reasonable ways to unwind [their] partnership”. This in turn, caused the Defendant’s Mr Hahn to respond rather angrily in an email on 15 September 2016, where he harshly criticised the conduct of the Plaintiff’s representative handling this exchange.
- [73]
[73] Ultimately, no assistance was rendered by the Plaintiff to the Defendant in resolution of this issue. The former’s explanation for this is that the latter did not show any evidence that the MFDS had made further inquiries as regards the Misdescription Issue, after the execution of the SCA and 2016 DA. Therefore, there was nothing which required its intervention or assistance, insofar as its duties under the 2016 DA were concerned. Indeed, during cross-examination, Mr Hahn accepted that the MFDS did not ask further questions relating to the Misdescription Issue after mid-April 2016. It was an entirely unrelated matter which triggered the Defendant’s request on 14 September 2016.
- [74]
[74] On this basis, I accept the Plaintiff’s account that there was “no real or live issue” in respect of which it needed to support the Defendant, be it under cl 3.7, 8.8, or 8.9 of the 2016 DA. I emphasise, however, the narrowness of my finding. The parties’ relationship was, at this point, quite acrimonious and I do not ascribe any blame for that state of affairs. All I find is that the Plaintiff could not have breached its duties of cooperation under cl 3.7 or 8.9 given the absence of an issue in respect of which its cooperation was needed to solve. Correlatively, I also find that there was no breach of cl 8.8. If the Misdescription Issue was not a live one at the time the Defendant made its request for assistance, the Plaintiff’s failure to provide assistance surely cannot be construed as conduct that is “likely to destroy or seriously damage or undermine the relationship of trust and confidence”.
(2) The Misrepresentation Issue
- [75]
[75] At around the same time the parties butted heads over the Misdescription Issue, grievances regarding the Misrepresentation Issue were also being aired. The Defendant claims to have met with the Plaintiff’s representatives in April 2016 (before the formation of the 2016 DA), where it requested that the Plaintiff correct the Representation in its 8 April 2015 letter (see [61] above). No follow-up action was taken, and on 20 September 2016, the Defendant sent an email asking that the Representation be corrected. Again, no action was taken, and the Defendant sent another request on 3 October 2016.
- [76]
[76] The Plaintiff’s inaction was a sore point for the Defendant. In an email on 3 October 2016, the latter remarked that it considered the Plaintiff’s failure to reply, “very negligent and a sign of bad faith”. Ultimately, on the Defendant’s case, the Plaintiff did not act on the Defendant’s request until 23 January 2017, quite sometime after it had issued its First Termination Notice on 25 October 2016.
- [77]
[77] In response, similar to its position in respect of the Misdescription Issue, the Plaintiff avers that there was simply no need for it to have taken any action to correct the Representation. In support of this, it relied on two key points. First, contrary to the Defendant’s claim (see [61] above), there was no evidence that it used the Plaintiff’s 8 April 2015 letter to assure the MFDS, South Korean businesses, and consumers, of the safety of the Haribo Group’s products. Second, the MFDS had not requested the correction of the Representation. Accordingly, the Misrepresentation Issue was not a live one which required the Plaintiff’s intervention or assistance.
- [79]
[79] Two further points support this finding. First, even on Prof Grigoleit’s reading of cl 3.7, the Plaintiff was only obliged “to cooperate in any way necessary to resolve food safety issues”. The necessary implication of this is that there must have been a food safety issue to resolve. The fact that a false statement was made to the Defendant is not, in my view, sufficient to give rise to such an issue. Based on the wording of cl 3.7, the Defendant would need to show that the misrepresentation caused it to infringe “food safety laws and regulations” (see [71] above). Thereupon, the Plaintiff would be obliged to provide support to ensure compliance. Without positive proof that the Representation had been used inadvertently to mislead the public, or that the MFDS had specifically requested a correction, I cannot find that the Plaintiff’s specific obligation in cl 3.7 was engaged.
- [80]
[80] Second, in any event, although the Plaintiff does not contest that it only formally addressed the Defendant’s request on 23 January 2017, it did issue letters on 26 February 2016 and 15 March 2016 which correctly stated that an “optical sorting machine” was used, rather than “x-ray screenings”. These letters were issued in response to other customer complaints that foreign bodies were found in the Haribo Group’s products. The Defendant does not dispute that these letters were sent, and that they constitute an “updated version” of the food safety screening process. As such, by the time the Defendant made its request for assistance on 20 September 2016 (see [75] above), it is unclear what more assistance the Defendant required in correcting the earlier 8 April 2015 letter. It could simply have utilised these newer letters.
New disputes: MFDS Inquiry and Parallel Imports Issue
- [82]
[82] It is clear from the foregoing that the matters which led to the termination of the 2014 DA – namely, the Misrepresentation and Misdescription Issues – were still areas of friction between the parties. However, they alone did not cause the parties’ eventual falling out. This brings me to the three new issues which only arose during the course of the 2016 DA: the “MFDS Inquiry Issue”; the “Parallel Imports Issue”; and the “Product Delivery Issues”.
(1) The MFDS Inquiry Issue
- [83]
[83] In sum, as regards the MFDS Inquiry Issue, the Defendant’s case is that early in October 2016, it learnt that the MFDS was investigating a complaint made by a South Korean customer earlier in August 2016. The complaint was that a metallic dental filling had been found in a packet of the Haribo Group’s product. The MFDS was, accordingly, requesting an official explanation as to the screening process Haribo Produktions uses to identify foreign contaminants. On this basis, the Defendant wrote to the Plaintiff on 4 October 2016, seeking its assistance in responding to the MFDS. Although this bears resemblance to the Misrepresentation Issue earlier described, it is distinct both in its basal facts as well as the Defendant’s precise complaint.
- [84]
[84] As regards the Misrepresentation Issue, the Defendant’s averment is that the Plaintiff failed, persistently, to cure the Representation (see [75] above). On the MFDS Inquiry Issue, the Defendant’s case is that the Plaintiff did not assist it in responding to the MFDS’s inquiry, but rather took over the management of the inquiry, and cut it out of the loop. This, the Defendant claims, was contrary to the terms of the 2016 DA – which provided that it was the Defendant’s role to communicate with the South Korean authorities – and also indicative of bad faith. The Defendant avers that it is indicative of bad faith because it was one of a number of steps the Plaintiff took to cut it off from its functions as a distributor, in preparation for its unlawful termination of the 2016 DA. Another step arises from the Product Delivery Issues (from [93] below).
- [85]
[85] The Plaintiff’s response is fourfold. First, that it attempted to cooperate with the Defendant to address the MFDS Inquiry, but that the Defendant did not provide the information needed for such cooperation. Second, that it had sent a statement to the Defendant to address the MFDS’ inquiry, but this statement was rejected. Third, given the Defendant’s response, the Plaintiff was justified in communicating with the MFDS directly. Lastly, that the Plaintiff had kept the Defendant apprised of its communications with the MFDS.
- [86]
[86] Having considered their respective cases, I find that the Plaintiff did not – through its conduct in respect of the MFDS Inquiry Issue – breach cl 3.7, 8.8, or 8.9 of the 2016 DA. My decision is based broadly on the Plaintiff’s first three responses.
(a) First, the parties exchanged emails between 4 and 12 October 2016, and these exchanges show that the Plaintiff asked persistently about the product which formed the subject of the inquiry, ie, the name of the product as well as its batch number. This, to me, is indicative that the Plaintiff was attempting to cooperate.
(b) Second, on 5 October 2016, the Defendant provided the Plaintiff with the relevant contact point in the MFDS. Although the Plaintiff could have, at this point, cut off the Defendant from the inquiry, it did not. On 7 October 2016, it sent the Defendant a response to the complaint. In fact, after the Defendant expressed concerns about the phrasing of the response, the Plaintiff followed-up with another response on 11 October2016. This suggests to me that the Plaintiff was not trying to “usurp” the Defendant’s role. To the contrary, it seemed to be cooperating with the Defendant’s request.
(c) Third, it was only on 23 January 2017 that the Plaintiff directly communicated with the MFDS to address its inquiry. By this point, the Plaintiff had already issued its First Termination Notice, and seeing as how the MFDS’s Inquiry had still not been resolved, it was not in my view, unreasonable for the Plaintiff to take it upon itself to issue a letter to correct any misconceptions about the process its factories use to detect foreign substances. While the Defendant was the appointed distributor for the Haribo Group’s products in South Korea, the reputation of the Haribo brand was, ultimately, the Plaintiff’s to protect. Further, though cl 3.7 provides that it is the Defendant’s responsibility to ensure compliance with food safety requirements, it does not positively exclude the Plaintiff from taking steps in that direction. In fact, the clause obliges the Defendant to “consult the [Plaintiff] prior to any correspondence with authorities, and any public statements or communication to the press” (see [71] above). This statement, in my view, makes it difficult to construe the imposition of responsibility on the Defendant, as excluding the Plaintiff’s involvement.
- [87]
[87] Before turning to the Parallel Imports Issue, however, I will explain why I do not accept the Plaintiff’s last response. The document on which it relies in support of its claim that it kept the Defendant apprised of communications with the MFDS merely states that it would keep the Defendant informed. It does not actually show that it kept the Defendant so informed.
(2) The Parallel Imports Issue
- [88]
[88] In relation to the Parallel Imports issue, the Defendant’s case as stated at [45] above, is that it was the sole and exclusive distributor for the Haribo Group’s products in South Korea since 2006. As an exclusive distributor, it was naturally concerned about parallel, unauthorised imports of the Haribo Group’s products into South Korea since such imports would affect its business operations. As such, the Defendant regards the Plaintiff’s conduct in relation to the Parallel Imports Issue, as a significant breach.
- [89]
[89] Sometime in August 2016, the Defendant claims to have discovered that Haribo GmbH (cross-reference [51] above) had been positively supporting and supplying parallel importers from as early as 2012. It must be emphasised that the allegation is not that the Plaintiff was itself providing such support, but rather its associate in the Haribo Group.
- [90]
[90] In light of this discovery, the Defendant sent an email to the Plaintiff on 20 September 2016, highlighting that such an issue existed. Thereafter, on 3 October 2016, the Defendant asked that the Plaintiff investigate the parallel imports apparently supported by Haribo GmbH. No investigation was ultimately ever conducted into this matter. On the Defendant’s case, this was because of the Plaintiff’s lack of willingness, predicated on bad faith. On the Plaintiff’s case, there was simply no evidence that Haribo GmbH had been supporting parallel imports into South Korea, and there was thus no basis for an investigation to be commenced.
- [91]
[91] Having considered the evidence, I accept the Plaintiff’s account for two reasons. One, the Defendant’s request for assistance was premised on its rather bare claim that Haribo GmbH had been supporting parallel importers. It is unclear how it made this discovery, whether there was supporting evidence, or whether its source was even reliable. Accordingly, I agree that more was required to engage the Plaintiff’s duty of cooperation. The existence of a duty of cooperation (here, under cll 8.8 and 8.9, but not cl 3.7 as that pertains only to food safety) cannot mean that the obligor must cooperate with all requests, whether grounded or not.
- [92]
[92] Two, as mentioned at [54] above, the Defendant avers that the Plaintiff “historically … actively courted other distributors in [South] Korea”. Even if this were true, it is not alone sufficient to prove that the Plaintiff refused to abide by its duty of cooperation for ulterior motives, in breach of contract. I have explained this at [55] and [56] above. For these reasons, I find that there is no evidence that the Plaintiff breached its duty of cooperation under the 2016 DA in respect of the Parallel Imports Issue.
(3) The Product Delivery Issue
- [94]
[94] These failures to deliver or delays in deliveries, the Defendant claims, were breaches of cl 9.3 of the 2016 DA, and therefore, that it is entitled to damages for the profits it lost from being unable to fully fulfil its customer’s orders by reason of its shortage of inventory. Clause 9.3 provides:
- [95]
[95] The Defendant’s allegation raises a whole host of alternative claims and defences. They can, fortunately, be grouped around two simpler, overarching issues. First, whether the Plaintiff was obliged, in the first place, to deliver the Orders. Second, if it was obliged to deliver, whether it has any alternative basis for its failure to do so.
(A) Plaintiff’s obligation to deliver
- [96]
[96] In respect of the first issue, the Plaintiff chiefly relies on the procedure by which the Defendant is supposed to place orders for products. The minutiae of the ordering process are not salient. That which is crucial, is the application or non-application of appendix 2, condition 2 of the 2016 DA:
- [97]
[97] Relying on this condition, the Plaintiff avers that it had not given any written confirmation, and therefore, it was not obliged to deliver the Orders. The Defendant has two responses. First, that condition 2 is invalid as a matter of German law; and second, that in any event, the orders had been confirmed in writing by the Plaintiff.
- [98]
[98] Having considered the matter, I find that condition 2 is not invalid under German law, and consequently that written confirmation is required. However, the evidence, in my view, shows that the Plaintiff had confirmed the Orders. I will address each finding in turn.
- [99]
[99] The Defendant relies on two provisions of the BGB to make its case that condition 2 was invalid, sections 308 and 307(1). They provide:
- [100]
[100] In respect of section 308, Profs Lehmann and Grigoleit agree that its application does not directly extend to transactions between businesses (“B2B” transactions). The Defendant’s argument can therefore be rejected on this basis alone. Indeed, Prof Grigoleit does not even suggest that it should apply, rather, his view is that a violation of this provision indicates that the term in question unreasonably disadvantages the other party, contrary to section 307(1).
- [101]
[101] This brings me then to section 307(1). The Defendant’s argument is that condition 2 fails the requirements of clarity and comprehensibility. Specifically, such failure stems from fact that the condition empowers the Plaintiff to: (a) take an indefinite period of time to issue a written confirmation; and (b) vary descriptions and images of products, even after written confirmation has been issued. This, the Defendant says, is not tolerable because it is left “hanging on potentially indefinitely”.
- [102]
[102] While I can appreciate the Defendant’s position, I do not agree that the effect of the condition is quite as dramatic as it suggests. In this regard, I accept Prof Lehmann’s view that condition 2 should be read with cl 9.3 of the 2016 DA (text at [94] above). The latter obliges the Plaintiff to use reasonable best endeavours to deliver goods in a timely manner in accordance with the sales reports produced by the Defendant. The result of this, Prof Lehmann states, is that the Plaintiff “does not reserve to itself the right to unreasonably long or insufficiently specific periods of time for acceptance or rejection of an offer or for rending performance”. Viewed in this light, it does not appear to me that condition 2 unreasonably disadvantages the Defendant.
- [106]
[106] This appears quite patently to be a concession that the Orders from July to October 2016 were confirmed in writing, by way of the pro forma invoices. This is further supported by two contemporaneous pieces of evidence.
- [107]
[107] Accordingly, for the above reasons, I find that the parties entered into binding contracts within the framework of the 2016 DA, and that the Plaintiff was obliged to make delivery on the Orders placed in July to October 2016.
- [111]
[111] Having found that the Plaintiff was obliged to deliver the Orders, I need then to consider the Plaintiff’s defences to its late and non-deliveries. Before I do so, however, I note as an aside, that the Defendant sought to rely on a doctrine in German law called “eloquent silence” in respect of Mr Karpuzov’s lack of a reply to the Defendant’s 20 December 2016 email (see [108] above). This is an exception to the general rule that silence cannot be interpreted as acceptance, and the Defendant raised it to make the argument that his lack of response constituted confirmation. However, given my analysis in the paragraphs above, reliance on this doctrine is unnecessary.
(B) Plaintiff’s defences for its failure to deliver
- [112]
[112] From the foregoing analysis, the Plaintiff had confirmed the Orders and was therefore obliged to deliver the Undelivered Portions to the Defendant. The question following this is whether it had been absolved from these delivery obligations by any defences. Four were raised by the Plaintiff.
(a) First, that the Defendant had sufficient stock to cover its usual orders until 30 April 2017, ie, the date on which the 2016 DA would have ended if the Plaintiff’s First Termination Notice was valid (the “Sufficient Stock Defence”).
(b) Second, that the Orders for October, November, and December 2016 far exceeded usual sales volumes, and as such, the Plaintiff was not obliged to fulfil them as the Defendant would only have been able to complete sales of the goods after 30 April 2017 (the “Unusual Volumes Defence”).
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