General Division of the High Court · Decided 10 February 2021
Lim Siew Soo v Sembawang Engineers and Constructors Pte Ltd (in compulsory liquidation) (Metax Eco Solutions Pte Ltd, intervener)
Feedback & support[2021] SGHC 32 · Case no. Companies Winding Up No 90 of 2017
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
- [4]
[4] Those, in a nutshell, are the questions which the liquidator of Sembawang Engineers and Constructors Pte Ltd (“the Company”) raises on this application.
The factual background
This application
- [5]
[5] The liquidator seeks the court’s directions on these questions under s 273(3) of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) (“the Act”). This application poses the following questions to me:
- [9]
[9] The liquidator has appealed against my decision. I now set out my reasons in full.
The relationship between the Company and the defendant
- [10]
[10] The underlying facts are not in dispute and are not material other than as background or context.
- [11]
[11] The Company commenced suit against the defendant at the end of 2012 claiming about $3.6m in damages. The defendant rejected the claim and counterclaimed about $2.1m from the Company. The fact that the Company is the plaintiff in the suit is significant. It means that the parties’ dispute cannot be resolved simply by the liquidator adjudicating a proof of debt. The adjudication procedure operates only to resolve claims against the Company. It has no application to claims by the Company. The fact that the defendant has a counterclaim in the suit is also significant. It means that each party is simultaneously in the position of a plaintiff and a defendant in the suit.
- [12]
[12] The claim and counterclaim were tried before me over eight days in 2015. After the trial, parties filed and exchanged written closing submissions and written reply submissions in the usual way. A date was fixed in September 2015 for both parties to make their oral closing submissions.
The Company’s insolvency
- [15]
[15] The judicial management failed. In August 2017, the judicial managers applied for and secured their discharge. The Company was immediately placed in compulsory liquidation. The liquidator immediately took office as one of the Company’s liquidators.
- [16]
[16] The defendant’s counterclaim in the suit against the Company has been automatically stayed, first under s 210(10) of the Act, then under ss 227C(c) and 227D(4)(d) of the Act and finally under s 262(3) of the Act. The plaintiff’s claim against the defendant in the suit was, however, not stayed. That is because the automatic stays apply only to suits against the Company and not to suits by the Company. But because the Company’s claim cannot proceed to judgment separately from the defendant’s counterclaim, its claim against the defendant has been adjourned in parallel with the counterclaim.
The defendant files a proof of debt
- [18]
[18] The defendant has little prospect of recovering any meaningful dividend on its proof, even if the liquidator admits it. That is because the Company is deeply insolvent. It has assets estimated to be worth $24m but owes over 700 creditors $191m and owes contingent creditors a further $177m.
Discretionary costs vs costs as of right
Four points on terminology
- [24]
[24] Before going further, I make four points on terminology.
- [25]
[25] First, when this application was filed and decided, the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (Act 40 of 2018) (“IRDA”) had been passed but was not yet in force. I therefore refer to the relevant legislative provisions as they stood in the Act at the time of this application and not to their current counterparts in the IRDA. Having said that, I do not consider that the questions posed on this application would be answered any differently had the IRDA been in force at the material time.
- [26]
[26] Second, I assume for ease of exposition that a company’s liquidation commences on the day that the court orders it to be wound up and appoints a liquidator (contrary to the position deemed by s 255(2) of the Act). I also assume that a liquidator will take a decision whether to adopt or discontinue the litigation as soon as she is appointed (contrary to the practical realities). I therefore use the terms “pre-liquidation” and “post-liquidation” as convenient albeit inaccurate shorthand to refer to each side of the scintilla temporis on which the issues in this application turn.
The parties’ cases
- [29]
[29] Mr Paul Seah appears as counsel for the liquidator. Mr Chandra Mohan appears as counsel for the defendant.
Two propositions from Commonwealth authority
(a) The estate costs rule applies whether the liquidator commences litigation or merely adopts it.
The liquidator’s arguments
- [31]
[31] These two propositions are directly contrary to Mr Seah’s case. But it is common ground that there is no precedent which is binding on me which has established these two propositions as part of Singapore’s insolvency law.
The defendant’s case
The estate costs rule
The rule in Singapore
I should point out in passing that the super priority accorded by the estate costs rule is not absolute: it is subject to the direct costs of realising the assets (see ECRC Land at [4]; Re Movitex Ltd [1990] BCC 491 (“Re Movitex”) at 496E–F).
- [36]
[36] I consider the ratio of ECRC Land to comprise four propositions. I am, of course, bound by each of these propositions.
The estate costs rule is a rule of Singapore’s insolvency law
A costs order is a liquidation expense
A liquidator is personally liable for a breach
- [42]
[42] This third proposition is the only proposition which was in contention between the parties in ECRC Land (at [21], see also [15]). I therefore consider it to be the primary ratio of ECRC Land.
The competing policy considerations
The scope of the rule
- [44]
[44] My answer to the questions posed in this application begins with an analysis of the Commonwealth cases cited by both parties. These cases establish the two propositions at [30] above in the insolvency law of the respective jurisdictions.
England
(1) Boynton v Boynton
(2) In re London Drapery Stores
- [52]
[52] The rule in Boynton was extended from probate to insolvency in In re London Drapery Stores (1898) 2 Ch 684 (“London Drapery”). This is the earliest direct authority cited to me for the two propositions at [30] above.
The ratio of London Drapery comprises the two propositions at [30] above.
- [55]
[55] Cases in England – as well as in jurisdictions based on English law – continue to cite London Drapery for these two propositions to the present day.
(3) Re Movitex
(4) Norglen Ltd v Reeds Rains Prudential
- [59]
[59] Norglen is thus recent and high authority that the two propositions at [30] above continue to form part of English insolvency law.
Australia
- [60]
[60] The Australian cases, following the English cases, have established the two propositions at [30] above also as part of Australia’s insolvency law: see Hypec Electronics Pty Ltd (in liq) v Mead and others (2004) 50 ACSR 448 at [104] and Re Mendarma Pty Ltd (No 2) (2007) 61 ACSR 601 at [45].
- [62]
[62] The DoCA, as amended, established two trust funds with the administrator as trustee. The administrator was to distribute the trust funds to the company’s creditors in accordance with the terms of the trust deed and in composition of the company’s debts.
Hong Kong
- [66]
[66] The Hong Kong cases, following the English cases, have established the two propositions at [30] above also as part of Hong Kong’s insolvency law.
- [67]
[67] In Typhoon 8 Research Ltd v Seapower Resources International Ltd and another [2002] 2 HKLRD 660 (“Typhoon 8”), a tenant took possession of premises under a lease. At the landlord’s request, the tenant paid the security deposit to the landlord’s parent company instead of to the landlord. As a result of the landlord’s breach, the landlord’s mortgagee terminated the lease prematurely. The tenant sued the parent company to recover the deposit. The tenant failed at first instance and appealed. Between the time of the first instance proceedings and the hearing of the tenant’s appeal, the parent company went in liquidation.
- [71]
[71] Both Typhoon 8 and Kenworth are authority that the two propositions at [30] above are part of Hong Kong’s insolvency law.
The rationale of the rule
The two principles
- [75]
[75] The Court of Appeal in ECRC Land expressly relied on the risk/reward principle (at [66]; see also [68]): “where a company is insolvent and the liquidator has insufficient resources at his disposal to take a particular course of action, the individual who reaps the fruit of that action should be the one to shoulder the risk of taking it” [emphasis added]. So too in Baring Futures (at [46]).
- [78]
[78] This is not a novel proposition. The Court of Appeal in ECRC Land cited with approval (at [9]) the following passage in In re Trent and Humber Ship-Building Company (1869) LR 8 Eq 94 (“In re Trent”) which relies on the risk/reward principle to bring home the risks of post-liquidation litigation to the creditors:
Insolvency engages the two principles
- [83]
[83] Once liquidation commences, the insolvency risk which is an inevitable feature of all litigation has eventuated. The company’s insolvency is no longer merely a possibility, a probability or even a certainty. It is now a fact.
- [86]
[86] As ECRC Land held, the position of a company in actual liquidation is a fortiori that of a company which is merely impecunious. This fundamental alteration of risk and reward justifies looking through the company and directly at those who will ultimately reap the rewards of the litigation, ie, the creditors.
- [90]
[90] I now turn to consider Mr Seah’s substantive arguments on the questions posed to me.
A costs order as a liquidation expense
Section 328(1)(a) of the Companies Act
- [93]
[93] Section 328(1)(a) of the Act provides as follows:
- [94]
[94] Mr Seah cites Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore vol 13 (Butterworths Asia, 2003). At para 150.460, the author draws a distinction between pre-liquidation creditors and post-liquidation creditors, and points out that s 328(1)(a) accords priority only to the latter:
Mr Seah relies on this passage to argue that the proposition at [30(b)] above contradicts s 328(1)(a) of the Act.
- [95]
[95] Mr Seah also relies on Barings Futures at [51] where the Court of Appeal held that the only post-liquidation liabilities are liquidation expenses.
The correct conceptualisation of a costs award
Nortel
Consistency with the judicial management regime
- [112]
[112] For this argument, Mr Seah relies on the High Court decision of Kotjo Johanes Budisutrisno v Ng Wei Teck Michael and others [2001] 2 SLR(R) 784 (“Kotjo”). In Kotjo, the judicial managers of a company at first adopted an employee’s employment contract and then disclaimed personal liability under it. Choo Han Teck JC (as he then was) observed in obiter dicta that a judicial manager who adopts a contract under s 227I is not liable for breaches of contract which occurred before he adopts it (at [15]):
- [114]
[114] In my view, Mr Seah’s reliance on Kotjo and the analogy which he draws between a judicial manager adopting a contract under s 227I of the Act and a liquidator adopting litigation is inapposite for four reasons.
- [118]
[118] Finally, a judicial manager and a liquidator have completely different roles and duties to be discharged for completely different purposes. The roles and duties of a judicial manager are multi-faceted. One of the purposes of appointing a judicial manager is to rehabilitate a distressed company as a going concern, for the benefit of all stakeholders (Re Genesis Technologies International (S) Pte Ltd [1994] 2 SLR(R) 298 at [6]). A judicial manager is therefore empowered to continue the company’s business. That includes causing the company to perform its existing contracts. The statutory rule in s 227I addresses the risk which the contractual counterparty faces in that situation by making the judicial manager personally liable under the contract, if he adopts it. The gloss which Kotjo put on the statutory rule ensures that a judicial manager is not deterred from adopting a contract by the risk of potentially unlimited personal liability for the company’s pre-adoption breaches of the contract, when those are beyond the judicial manager’s knowledge or control.
- [119]
[119] A liquidator’s roles and duties are completely different. Her foremost duty is to maximise the realisation of the company’s assets and to distribute the net proceeds of those realisations to the company’s creditors with all practicable speed (Korea Asset Management Corp v Daewoo Singapore Pte Ltd (in liquidation) [2004] 1 SLR(R) 671 (“Korea Asset Management”) at [36]). She is thus not expected, let alone permitted, to take on any personal risk to rehabilitate the company as a going concern. That is why, unlike a judicial manager, a liquidator is prohibited from continuing the company’s business unless it is necessary for beneficial winding up (see s 272(1)(a) of the Act). There is no policy imperative which encourages a liquidator to take on risk or which points towards ensuring that she is not deterred from doing so. It is therefore inapposite to draw an analogy between a judicial manager adopting a pre-judicial management contract and a liquidator adopting pre-liquidation litigation.
Four arguments on justice and fairness
(a) Limiting the estate costs rule to the receiving party’s post-liquidation costs strikes the right balance between the interests of a receiving party and the interests of the company’s general body of creditors.
(b) It is unjust for a receiving party to secure the windfall of super priority for its costs ab initio under the estate costs rule simply because judgment in the litigation is by happenstance rendered after the company has gone into liquidation rather than before.
(c) Not limiting the estate costs rule to post-liquidation costs will have a chilling effect on a liquidator litigating in the name of a company for the benefit of creditors, causing liquidators to abandon even meritorious litigation.
(d) Where a company in liquidation is the unsuccessful defendant in litigation, the plaintiff should not be accorded priority for its costs but should instead be left to prove for its costs together with its principal claim.
- [121]
[121] I do not accept any of these limbs of this argument. I deal with each limb in turn.
The right balance argument
- [124]
[124] I cannot accept this argument even as a matter of principle. The risk/reward principle and the reciprocity principle are equally engaged regardless of whether a liquidator commences or adopts litigation. Mr Seah suggests that the English case of In re Lundy Granite Company; Ex parte Heavan (1871) LR 6 Ch App 462 (“Lundy Granite”) is authority for a principled basis on which to redress the imbalance against a receiving party and in favour of a company and its creditors. The general rule is that liabilities arising from pre-liquidation contracts are not liquidation expenses and are merely debts provable in the liquidation. The principle derived from Lundy Granite is a specific exception to this rule. According to Lord Hoffmann in In re Toshoku Finance UK plc [2002] 1 WLR 671 (“Toshoku”) at [29]:
- [125]
[125] In In re Oak Pits Colliery Company (1882) 21 Ch D 322, Lindley LJ explained that the rationale underpinning the Lundy Granite principle is that a liquidator ought to pay as a liquidation expense any liabilities which arise from using the company’s property for the purposes of the liquidation (at 330–331):
- [126]
[126] In Toshoku, Lord Hoffmann explained that the effect of the Lundy Granite principle is not to convert the liability into a liquidation expense, but merely to treat it as though it were by an equitable fiction (at [27]):
- [128]
[128] In my view, the true principle to be extracted from Lundy Granite is this: where a pre-liquidation contract creates a recurring liability which continues post-liquidation and the liquidator takes the benefit of that contract for the purposes of the liquidation, it is just and equitable to treat that part of the recurring liability which accrues post-liquidation and which is necessary to secure that benefit as though it were a liquidation expense; but any part of the recurring liability which accrued pre-liquidation remains merely a provable debt (cf Roy Goode, Goode on Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 5th Ed, 2018) at para 8-38).
- [129]
[129] Thus, on the facts of Lundy Granite, it was entirely just and equitable that the liquidator who retained possession of the leased property post-liquidation for the purposes of the liquidation should be required to treat the rent which accrued during that post-liquidation period as though it were a liquidation expense. If nothing else, the liquidator would have had to enter into a post-liquidation lease elsewhere and pay rent to a different landlord to store the goods there for the benefit of the liquidation. That rent would undoubtedly have been a liquidation expense. The Lundy Granite principle, as I have put it, therefore leaves the general body of unsecured creditors no worse off, even though it accords priority to one part of the debt of one particular unsecured creditor under a pre-liquidation contract.
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