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Grounds publishedDecided 16 Feb 2021

General Division of the High Court

Tonny Permana v One Tree Capital Management Pte Ltd and another

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[2021] SGHC 37Case no. Suit No 751 of 2017

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] This case involves an investor making multiple allegations – fraud, negligence and breaches of various contractual and fiduciary duties – against his agents who rendered advice on his investment. The investment failed under questionable circumstances that, on their face, did not directly involve the agents. Both sides, unfortunately, suffered losses as a result of the failed investment, and the investor now seeks redress against his agents. The dispute presents interesting questions on the law of agency, specifically the duties owed by agents. As such, I have provided in the course of this Judgment a proposed framework for dealing with these issues.

  3. [2] The plaintiff, Tonny Permana, is an Indonesian businessman and investor. The first defendant, One Tree Capital Management Pte Ltd, is a Singapore incorporated company, and is in the business of investment fund management. Part of its business involves facilitating deals between investors and prospective investees in need of funding, ie, acting as a middleman. The second defendant, Gerald Yeo, is the director and sole shareholder of the first defendant. It is undisputed that the first defendant acted, at all material times, through the second defendant. I will hence refer to them collectively at the relevant portions of this Judgment as “the defendants”.

  4. [3] The dispute between the parties has its genesis in a project undertaken by Midas Landmark Sdn Bhd (which was later renamed CHN Commodity Trade Centre Sdn Bhd – for ease of reference, I refer to the company simply as “Midas”). Midas sought to purchase and renovate an existing shopping mall in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (“the Mall”) – I refer to this endeavour as the “Chinamall Project”. Midas required funding for this project, and the defendants were aware of this. Thus, the defendants raised to the plaintiff the prospect of investing in the Chinamall Project. The plaintiff agreed to make, and did make, an investment of about US$1.6m in the Chinamall Project. In the months that followed, the defendants continued to liaise with the plaintiff over the status of his investment, and several changes were made to the structure of the plaintiff’s investment.

  5. [5] The thrust of the plaintiff’s claim is that the defendants “unilaterally engineered a drastic change in the nature/structure of his investment during the course of the investment”. The plaintiff alleges that such conduct by the defendants, along with the correspondence and dealings between them in the course of the investment, constituted (a) fraudulent misrepresentation; (b) misrepresentation under the Misrepresentation Act (Cap 390, 1994 Rev Ed) (“Misrepresentation Act”); (c) a breach of fiduciary duties; (d) a breach of “duties as agent”; (e) negligence; and/or (f) dishonest assistance. The first five allegations pertain to both defendants, while the allegation of dishonest assistance pertains solely to the second defendant. Importantly, amidst the various allegations levelled against the defendants, the plaintiff has repeatedly emphasised that the defendants were his “agents” in the course of his investment. This undergirds the plaintiff’s case. From this, questions arise on the law of agency and the duties owed by middlemen “agents” to their principals, which I address in the course of my Judgment.

  6. [6] I add that while the defendants initially filed a counterclaim against the plaintiff, they informed the court during the Judge pre-trial conference on 8 June 2020 that they will not be pursuing this counterclaim. I accordingly do not consider it in my Judgment.

  7. The facts

  8. Background and preliminary negotiations between the parties

  9. [8] On or around 11 October 2013, the defendants were approached by one Mr Tan Chong Whatt and his son, one Mr Tan Chor Keng (collectively, “the Tans”). The Tans informed the defendants of their desire to procure investors to provide funding for the proposed acquisition and renovation of the Mall, ie, the Chinamall Project.

  10. [10] The plaintiff and the defendants had prior dealings in the form of the former’s investment in a project known as the “Yang Kee Deal”. The Yang Kee Deal involved the plaintiff investing about S$1.5m in a Singapore logistics company. This involved the plaintiff subscribing for convertible loans in the said company. In the course of the deal, the defendants acted as middlemen, and facilitated the plaintiff’s investment in the Yang Kee Deal. The plaintiff made a tidy profit. The defendants were paid for their assistance in the plaintiff’s investment in the Yang Kee Deal in or around April 2012. According to the defendants, following the success of the plaintiff’s investment in the Yang Kee Deal, the plaintiff sought further investments, and contacted the defendants to this effect.

  11. [11] Consequently, on or around 19 November 2013, the plaintiff and the second defendant discussed the idea of the former making an investment in the Chinamall Project. It is unclear whether this occurred over a phone call or via a meeting in person in Singapore. What is material and undisputed is that during this discussion, the second defendant shared with the plaintiff the details of the Chinamall Project. Notes of the discussion, specifically on the nature of the Chinamall Project, were summarised in an email dated 19 November 2013 (“the 19 November 2013 email”) from the second defendant to the plaintiff’s assistant, Ms Denie Tiolani (“Ms Tiolani”).

  12. [12] The 19 November 2013 email states, in material part, the following.

  13. (a) The Chinamall Project was a “fast turnaround” project. This was material to the plaintiff as it suggested a quick return on his investment.

  14. (b) The project had a “comfortable collateral buffer position”, given that project sponsors had already invested RM20m, and another RM30m to RM50m in investments was expected.

  15. (c) More than half of the units in the Mall (63%) were taken up by prospective tenants. The proposed rental rate of RM10 per square foot would result in a rental income “of RM45 million which makes debt servicing very comfortable”.

  16. (d) The project sponsors were prepared to provide personal guarantees, pledge all their shares in the project, and provide a conversion option into shares.

  17. The plaintiff accepts that after the aforementioned discussion and his perusal of the 19 November 2013 email, he was “interested in investing in the Chinamall Project as it appeared to be a good investment deal”.

  18. [13] On or around 21 November 2013, the plaintiff and the second defendant met in Jakarta. The plaintiff was provided with a draft document entitled the “China Mall (KL) Project Term Sheet” (“the Term Sheet”), which set out the terms of the potential investment in the Chinamall Project. The material parts of the Term Sheet are as follows:

  19. The parties proceeded to discuss the details of the Chinamall Project with reference to the Term Sheet. At the conclusion of this meeting, the plaintiff expressed to the second defendant his interest in investing the sum of US$1.6m in the Chinamall Project.

  20. [14] As a peripheral point relating to the Term Sheet, there was a separate undisclosed term sheet (“the Undisclosed Term Sheet”) that had been entered into by Mr Tan Chong Whatt, Mr Wang Jianguo and the second defendant on behalf of the first defendant. The material parts of the Undisclosed Term Sheet are identical to the Term Sheet, save that it included a “Service Fee” clause. This clause provided that the defendants stood to earn an “[a]rranger fee” of 3.5% of the total amount of funding raised for the Chinamall Project, payable upon successful completion of the project.

  21. [15] On 25 November 2013, the second defendant sent the plaintiff and Ms Tiolani an email enclosing, inter alia, the following unsigned draft documents that he described as “legal documentation” (which I refer to collectively as the “Chinamall Project Draft Documentation”):

  22. (a) an unexecuted copy of the investment agreement between the first defendant, Midas, Mr Tan Chong Whatt and Mr Wang Jianguo, pertaining to the Chinamall Project (“the Investment Agreement”);

  23. (b) Schedule 1 of the Investment Agreement, which comprised:

  24. (i) the form of the Note Certificate to be issued to noteholders of convertible loan notes pursuant to the Investment Agreement; and

  25. (ii) the accompanying terms and conditions to these convertible loan notes;

  26. (c) Schedule 2 of the Investment Agreement, which comprised the form of the Request for Issue;

  27. (d) Schedule 3 of the Investment Agreement, which comprised the form of the guarantee accompanying the agreement;

  28. (e) Schedule 4 of the Investment Agreement, which comprised the form of the share charge; and

  29. (f) Schedule 5 of the Investment Agreement, which comprised the management accounts pertaining to the Investment Agreement.

  30. I will elaborate shortly on the specifics of the Chinamall Project Draft Documentation (see [20] below).

  31. [16] The plaintiff accepts that he was provided with these documents via the said email. He however claims that he did not understand the email and its contents until much later, when he instructed his current lawyers from Bih Li & Lee LLP. He claimed that at that point in time, he simply “follow[ed] [the second defendant’s] guidance… [b]ecause [the second defendant was] [his] agent”. Nevertheless, and despite this purported lack of understanding on the plaintiff’s part, the parties proceeded to take further steps towards effecting the plaintiff’s investment in the Chinamall Project.

  32. [17] On 27 November 2013, the second defendant emailed Ms Tiolani clarifying the currency that the plaintiff would be using for his investment (US dollars, and not Singapore dollars). In this email, the second defendant also requested for remittance of the investment sum from the plaintiff amounting to US$1.6m, and provided the details of the designated bank account to which the sum ought to be transferred. This email appears to have been sent pursuant to a telephone conversation between the plaintiff and the second defendant that took place earlier the same day. According to the defendants, in this phone call, the plaintiff informed that “he had reviewed the Chinamall Project Documentation and had no comments or issues on the same”, and confirmed that “he was agreeable to subscribe for a Convertible Loan Note in the amount of US$1.6million”.

  33. The plaintiff’s investment in the Chinamall Project

  34. [18] The next day, 28 November 2013, the plaintiff made his investment in the Chinamall Project. That day, the plaintiff arranged for the sum of US$1.6m (henceforth, “the Investment Sum”) to be transferred to the designated bank account (as per the second defendant’s email dated 27 November 2013). The Investment Agreement, the accompanying guarantee and the share charge were also executed on the same day. The Investment Sum was successfully remitted the next day, 29 November 2013. . Soft copies of the executed documentation were also emailed by the second defendant to Ms Tiolani on 29 November 2013. Midas accordingly issued the plaintiff’s convertible loan note for the sum of US$1.6m (“the Convertible Loan Note”). The Note Certificate issued to this effect was as per the form in Schedule 1 of the Investment Agreement, and subject to the same terms and conditions (“the CLN T&Cs”; see [15(b)] above). The second defendant emailed a soft copy of the Convertible Loan Note to Ms Tiolani on 28 November 2013. The hard copy original of the Convertible Loan Note was delivered to the plaintiff in or around early December 2013.

  35. [19] In addition to the plaintiff, there were 12 other investors who made similar investments (of various amounts) in the Chinamall Project. The total value of all the investments was S$9.5m and US$4.94m. The plaintiff claims he was not aware, at the time of the making of his investment, that there were other investors of this nature.

  36. [20] The material parts of the executed documents mentioned at [18] above are identical to the Chinamall Project Draft Documentation that was sent to the plaintiff on 25 November 2013. I reiterate below the salient portions of the relevant documents, which I refer to collectively as the “Investment Documents”:

  37. (a) The Investment Agreement was dated 28 November 2013 and was between the first defendant as “Agent”, Midas as “Borrower”, and Mr Tan Chong Whatt and Mr Wang Jianguo as “Guarantors”. The Investment Agreement was subject to the terms and conditions of the Convertible Loan Note.

  38. (b) The Form of Guarantee was dated 28 November 2013 and was executed by Mr Tan Chong Whatt and Mr Wang Jianguo (“the Guarantee”). Therein, they jointly and severally guaranteed to the first defendant and the noteholders under the Investment Agreement “prompt payment when due, of all present and future obligations and liabilities of all kinds of the Borrower to the Agent and the Noteholders arising out of the Agreement and under the terms and conditions of the Notes”.

  39. (c) The Form of Share Charge was dated 28 November 2013 and was executed by Mr Tan Chong Whatt and Mr Wang Jianguo (“the Share Charge”). It charged in favour of the first defendant:

  40. (i) all Mr Tan Chong Whatt’s and Mr Wang Jianguo’s ordinary shares in the capital of Midas held by each of them (including all such other shares in Midas as may be acquired by each of them from time to time) (the “charged securities”); and

  41. (ii) all rights, title and interest attaching to or benefits and proceeds arising from or in respect of any of the charged securities.

  42. These were charged as a continuing security for the payment and discharge of any and all sums which were or at any time would become due from them or from Midas to the first defendant and the investors, and for the observance and performance by Mr Tan Chong Whatt and Mr Wang Jianguo of their obligations under the Investment Agreement. I refer to the Share Charge and the Guarantee collectively as “the Security Documents”.

  43. (d) The Convertible Loan Note was dated 28 November 2013. It was issued by Midas as “Borrower” and certified the plaintiff as the registered holder of the Convertible Loan Note in the principal value of US$1.6m.

  44. (e) The CLN T&Cs applied to the Convertible Loan Note. These stipulated that the Convertible Loan Note would mature and had to be redeemed by Midas no later than 12 calendar months from the date of the Investment Agreement, ie, by 28 November 2014. Upon redemption, the plaintiff would be paid the Investment Sum and interest/returns of 20% on the same. The CLN T&Cs also referenced the Security Documents at cl 5.

  45. (f) Relevant also is the Form of Agency and Security Trust Deed as set out at Appendix D of the CLN T&Cs (“ASTD”). This document set out the terms of the agency relationship between the plaintiff and the defendants; I will set out its terms in a later part of this Judgment (see [120] below).

  46. The changes to the terms of the plaintiff’s investment

  47. [21] In the months that followed, the defendants made several proposed changes to the plaintiff’s investment.

  48. The Proposed Conversion

  49. [23] The Proposed Conversion, however, was never implemented, and the parties recognise this. In other words, the plaintiff’s investment was never altered along the lines of the Proposed Conversion. It is hence immaterial, and I will not canvass further details relating to the same. It suffices to note that there was constant correspondence between Ms Tiolani and the second defendant relating to the details of the Proposed Conversion between 3 March 2014 and 14 May 2014.

  50. The 26 July 2014 MOA and the 18 August 2014 Letter

  51. [24] On 26 July 2014, unbeknownst to the plaintiff, the first defendant (acting through the second defendant) entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with Mr Tan Chong Whatt and one Mr Wang Yingde for the purchase of shares in Midas (“the 26 July 2014 MOA”). Following this, the first defendant issued a letter dated 18 August 2014 (“the 18 August 2014 Letter”) to Midas, Mr Tang Chong Whatt and Mr Wang Jianguo stating, inter alia, that the defendants have terminated the Investment Agreement, and have fully discharged the Security Documents.

  52. [25] These two documents were only made known to the plaintiff upon commencement of the present suit. As will be made clear, these documents were integral parts of the eventual change to the structure of the plaintiff’s investment in the Chinamall Project.

  53. The Conversion

  54. [26] On 3 August 2014, the second defendant sent an email to Ms Tiolani, informing her that the structure of the plaintiff’s investment would be altered. The Investment Sum would be converted into a shareholder’s loan provided by the first defendant to Midas (the “Conversion”). The plaintiff would then be investing in the Chinamall Project through the first defendant by way of a trust deed (the “Trust Deed”), wherein the first defendant would hold its shareholder loan amounting to the Investment Sum on trust for the plaintiff. The Conversion would replace the Convertible Loan Note. This was to be the arrangement with respect to the other 12 investors in the Chinamall Project as well. The first defendant would then hold 80% of the shares in Midas, and hold its shareholder loan to Midas on trust for the respective investors to the extent of their investment sums that were previously structured as convertible loan notes.

  55. [27] Ms Tiolani sent the second defendant queries relating to the Conversion in an email dated 4 August 2014. The next day, 5 August 2014, the second defendant replied and confirmed that the Conversion involved a change in the structure of the plaintiff’s investment to the effect described in the previous paragraph.

  56. [28] The plaintiff’s evidence is at this point, “[w]hat [he] could understand was that the nature of [his] investment in the Chinamall Project had fundamentally changed”, and that under the Conversion, “[his] investment would be by way of a trust deed to be entered into between [the first defendant] and [himself]”. He also gave evidence that “[n]evertheless, [he] was not troubled by the change in the form / structure of [his] investment”, because he trusted the second defendant to “act in [his] best interest”. He did not want to “micro-manage” his investment, “so long as… [he] received [his] Investment Sum and Return by 28 November 2014”.

  57. [29] The second defendant’s evidence is that the Conversion was partly motivated by concerns over compliance with Malaysia’s legislative restrictions on moneylending and/or fundraising transactions; it is unclear whether this was conveyed to the plaintiff. Further, it is the second defendant’s evidence that at or around this time, the Chinamall Project was experiencing delays and Midas was facing financial difficulties – I will elaborate more on this in the course of this Judgment (see [201] and [202] below).

  58. [30] On or about 3 September 2014, the second defendant sent Ms Tiolani the Trust Deed, which was dated 31 August 2014. The parties to the Trust Deed, as indicated on the instrument, were the plaintiff and the first defendant; the Trust Deed states, inter alia, as follows:

  59. (a) the first defendant was the legal owner of a US$1.6m shareholder loan to Midas; and

  60. (b) the first defendant held the said loan and all interest accrued or to accrue on the same on trust for the plaintiff.

  61. [31] Attached to the Trust Deed sent to the plaintiff was a key document – a letter dated 30 June 2014 from the first defendant to Midas (the “OT Letter”). This was the first time the OT Letter was brought to the plaintiff’s attention (ie, in the second defendant’s email dated 3 September 2014). The OT Letter provided that the first defendant would provide shareholder loans to Midas in the aggregate sums of S$9.5m and US$4.94m on the following conditions:

  62. (a) The purpose of the loans was to finance the purchase of “Pandan Perdana Safari Lagoon Shopping Complex” in Ampang, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, ie, the Mall.

  63. (b) The status of the loans was stated as “[u]nsecured and subordinated”.

  64. (c) The final maturity date of the investment (by way of the loans) was “[u]ntil further notice from [Midas]”.

  65. (d) Repayment of the loans would be “at any time and in any amount as permitted by the project financing bank for the acquisition of [the Mall]”.

  66. (e) The applicable interest rate was 20% per annum on an uncompounded basis, payable after project completion. Revision to the interest rate shall be subject to agreement between the first defendant and Midas.

  67. (f) The appendix to the OT Letter also stated the breakdown of the various loans provided by the 13 investors (including the plaintiff). It also indicated that these “[r]emittances” to Midas were on behalf of the first defendant (which put the first defendant in the shoes of a loan holder or creditor).

  68. [32] Seen in context of the Trust Deed and the OT Letter, it is clear that the 26 July 2014 MOA and the 18 August 2014 Letter were steps taken by the defendants to implement the Conversion. The plaintiff was, of course, unaware as at 3 September 2014 (when he received the Trust Deed and the OT Letter) that such steps had in fact been taken.

  69. [33] Initially, the plaintiff did not sign and return the Trust Deed to the defendants. This appeared to be because of his concern over the lack of security over his investment if the Conversion was to take effect. This concern had two facets. First, the plaintiff “understood that the terms of the OT Letter… would seriously prejudice [his] investment”, due to the “[u]nsecured and subordinated” nature of the loan extended to Midas. He nevertheless, in these proceedings, adopts the position that he is not bound by the OT Letter, given that he is not a party to the OT Letter, and because the second defendant had issued it to Midas without his (the plaintiff’s) consent, knowledge or approval. Second, Ms Tiolani pointed out to the plaintiff that the Trust Deed made no reference to the Security Documents, which as mentioned formed the basis of the plaintiff’s security in the Investment Agreement (see [20(b)] and [20(c)] above). The plaintiff was concerned as a result, as he understood the significance of the Security Documents, and stated that these were “important” to him.

  70. [34] In this regard, in an email dated 17 November 2014, the second defendant expressly stated that no collateral would be provided by Midas. In this email, the second defendant also asserted that all the investors except the plaintiff had signed the relevant trust deeds. As a result, the plaintiff instructed Ms Tiolani to seek clarification from the second defendant regarding the Security Documents. Thus, on 18 November 2014, Ms Tiolani sent the second defendant an email, wherein she highlighted that the Trust Deed made no mention of the Security Documents, and sought clarification in this regard.

  71. [35] On 19 November 2014, the second defendant sent Ms Tiolani an email, wherein he explained, inter alia, that the Security Documents had “been voided, as per the spirit of our note certificate agreement since the majority investors (represented by One Tree, Wang Yingde and other investors behind us) have taken over the 80% shares to speed up our project”. In other words, the second defendant confirmed that the Security Documents no longer had effect and that the arrangement pursuant to the Trust Deed did not involve any security for the plaintiff’s investment.

  72. The execution of the Trust Deed

  73. [36] The plaintiff alleges that subsequently, there was a phone call between him and the second defendant on 20 November 2014. The defendants do not admit that there was such a phone call. For reasons that will be made clear, I am persuaded that the phone call occurred. In this phone call, the second defendant allegedly conveyed or expressed the following:

  74. (a) The second defendant confirmed what he had stated in the email dated 19 November 2014, specifically that the Security Documents were voided when the Convertible Loan Note was changed to a shareholder’s loan pursuant to the Conversion.

  75. (b) The second defendant requested the plaintiff to sign the Trust Deed before the maturity date of the Convertible Loan Note, ie, 28 November 2014.

  76. (c) The plaintiff was assured that the Mall was valuable and that it could be sold (and the investors paid back) if necessary.

  77. (d) The second defendant requested a three-month extension of time for repayment of the Investment Sum and the plaintiff’s returns on his investment, ie, by 28 February 2015. The second defendant represented that the interest/return on the Investment Sum would continue to accrue at a rate of 20%, as per the CLN T&Cs, until the end of the period of extension.

  78. [37] Based on what the second defendant had represented in the alleged phone call on 20 November 2014, along with the other information on the Chinamall Project that had been conveyed to the plaintiff via, inter alia, the email correspondence and the Term Sheet, the plaintiff agreed to sign the Trust Deed. Thus, on the same day, ie, 20 November 2014, Ms Tiolani emailed the second defendant informing him that the plaintiff had signed the Trust Deed. This email states, in material part:

  79. [38] The plaintiff emphasised in his affidavit evidence that he signed only the Trust Deed and not the OT Letter, chiefly because he did not consider himself to be a party to the OT Letter (which had been executed without his knowledge), and because he was not satisfied with the terms in the OT Letter, namely the lack of a fixed repayment date for his investment.

  80. [39] Despite the email sent by Ms Tiolani on 20 November 2014, the plaintiff did not receive confirmation on the extension of the maturity period from the second defendant.

  81. The collapse of the Chinamall Project and the liquidation of Midas

  82. [40] In 2015, things took a turn for the worse. As of 28 February 2015 (the date on which the plaintiff expected to see some returns given the second defendant’s three-month extension request), the plaintiff had not received any payouts from his investment.

  83. [41] On 20 April 2015, the defendants emailed Ms Tiolani, informing her that Midas was experiencing difficulties paying its investors, because funds were required in matters pertaining to the Mall, including (a) renovation funds; (b) funds to build a slip road from the nearby highway to the Mall; and (c) funds to acquire the remaining units in the Mall.

  84. [45] Following this, the defendants were advised by their solicitors to apply to remove Midas’ liquidator. The second defendant gave unchallenged evidence that the liquidator was attempting to sell the Mall for RM54m, and that the defendants were attempting to resist the liquidator’s efforts.

  85. [46] Thereafter, on or around 6 January 2017, the first defendant engaged Malaysian solicitors to assist in lodging a proof of debt with regard to the shareholder loan extended to Midas pursuant to the Conversion. This proof of debt encompassed the value of the plaintiff’s and other investors’ investments in the Chinamall Project. However, on 17 July 2017, Midas’ liquidator rejected the proof of debt in its entirety. The rejection was premised on, inter alia, grounds that the first defendant was not the party that extended the various loans to Midas – it was the investors (including the plaintiff) who directly remitted money to Midas, and accordingly the first defendant lacked locus standi to lodge a proof of debt of this nature.

  86. [48] Shortly thereafter, on 16 August 2017, the plaintiff commenced proceedings against the defendants. To date, the plaintiff has not been repaid the Investment Sum or any returns on the said sum.

  87. The defendants’ stake in the Chinamall Project

  88. [49] Apart from the arranger fee that the defendants stood to gain from the success of the Chinamall Project (see [14] above), they had also directly invested in the project and, in this sense, had skin in the game. In the course of the events detailed above, the defendants made significant investments in the Chinamall Project. The second defendant invested a sum of approximately S$0.5m through the subscription of a convertible loan note issued by Midas under the Investment Agreement, which was eventually re-documented as an investment through a shareholder’s loan. The investment was made in the name of the second defendant’s wife. These payments were:

  89. (a) a payment of S$150,000 made on 10 December 2013;

  90. (b) a payment of S$174,995 made on 8 January 2014; and

  91. (c) a payment of S$174,990 made on 18 February 2014.

  92. [51] Subsequently, as mentioned, sometime in or around March 2016, the first defendant also reached an agreement with the Midas Creditor to pay the sum of RM1.3m in settlement of the sum claimed in the winding up petition filed by the Midas Creditor against Midas. The first defendant paid one-third of the sum of RM1.3m on 4 March 2016.

  93. The parties’ cases

  94. [52] I canvass the parties’ cases in broad strokes at this juncture and will delve into the specifics at relevant points of this Judgment.

  95. The plaintiff’s case

  96. [53] The plaintiff’s pleadings were lengthy and somewhat disorganised, with the various distinct claims appearing to overlap and segue into each other. Having perused the pleadings, I herein briefly set out what I understand to be the plaintiff’s claims against the defendants.

  97. Relationship of agency and duties owed to the plaintiff

  98. [54] The plaintiff avers that there is an express or implied agreement between him and the first defendant, the terms of which are set out in the 19 November 2013 email and the Term Sheet (“the Agency Agreement”). To this effect, the plaintiff argues that the Agency Agreement, not the ASTD, governed the parties’ agency relationship, ie, the plaintiff’s position is that the ASTD is not binding.

  99. [55] According to the plaintiff, the Agency Agreement contains the following implied terms:

  100. (a) the first defendant will act in accordance with the instructions of the plaintiff;

  101. (b) the first defendant will use all reasonable skill, care, and diligence in carrying out its duties as agent of the plaintiff;

  102. (c) the first defendant will provide the plaintiff with timely information and/or advice on all material aspects of the Chinamall Project;

  103. (d) the first defendant will take all reasonable steps to protect the plaintiff’s interest and/or investment in the Chinamall Project;

  104. (e) the first defendant will not put itself in a position where its duty to the plaintiff may conflict with its personal interests or with the interest of others to whom it also owed duties; and

  105. (f) the first defendant will act in good faith and in the best interests of the plaintiff.

  106. [56] Further and in the alternative, the plaintiff avers that the defendants acted as agents for and on behalf of the plaintiff on any and all matters arising from and/or in connection with the Chinamall Project, including the first defendant’s assessment of the Chinamall Project as set out in the email dated 19 November 2013 and the provision of the Term Sheet to the plaintiff. The plaintiff reposed trust and confidence in the defendants as the plaintiff relied on the defendants to act for and on his behalf on any and all matters arising from and/or in connection with the Chinamall Project. The suggestion appears to be that the defendants were fiduciaries vis-à-vis the plaintiff.

  107. [57] Based on the foregoing, the plaintiff avers that the defendants acted as agents for and on behalf of the plaintiff, and as a result owed the following duties to the plaintiff:

  108. (a) A duty of care to:

  109. (i) act in accordance with the instructions of the plaintiff;

  110. (ii) use all reasonable skill, care, and diligence in carrying out its duties as agent of the plaintiff;

  111. (iii) provide the plaintiff with timely information and/or advice on all material aspects of the Chinamall Project;

  112. (iv) take all reasonable steps to protect the plaintiff’s interest and/or investment in the Chinamall Project.

  113. (b) Fiduciary duties.

  114. [58] The duties enumerated above were simultaneously characterised as “duties as agent” by the plaintiff. It is unclear what significance such characterisation added to the analysis, apart from applying a different name/label to the aforementioned duties – the plaintiff never fully explained its position. This also made it unclear whether the plaintiff was pursuing a tortious claim in this respect (as suggested by “duty of care”), a contractual claim for “duties as agent” under the Agency Agreement, or a mix of both. I elaborate on this below (see [92] onwards).

  115. Breach of duties as agent, breach of fiduciary duties and/or negligence

  116. [59] The plaintiff argues that the first defendant breached its duties as agent of the plaintiff, and/or was negligent in failing to use all reasonable skill, care, and diligence in carrying out its duties as agent of the plaintiff. Relevant details in this regard include the correspondence between the parties in the course of the plaintiff’s investment in the Chinamall Project, and the various documents and instruments the second defendant sent to the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s overarching gripe appears to be that the defendants led the plaintiff to believe the Chinamall Project was a viable investment, which caused the plaintiff to make the said investment and consequently suffer a loss of the Investment Sum.

  117. [60] The plaintiff also argues that the first defendant breached the Agency Agreement, and that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties to the plaintiff. Rolled up into this claim appears to be further allegations of “breaches of … duties as agent”. The overarching tenor of these claims largely mirror that mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

  118. Claims in misrepresentation

  119. [61] The plaintiff argues that the defendants represented to the plaintiff, expressly or implicitly, during the phone call on 20 November 2014 that no alternative security was required for the plaintiff’s investment in the Chinamall Project, because the Mall was a valuable mall that could be sold, and the shareholders paid back if necessary (“the First Representation”). According to the plaintiff, this constituted an actionable fraudulent misrepresentation by the defendant, and/or an actionable misrepresentation under the Misrepresentation Act.

  120. [62] Further and/or alternatively, the plaintiff argues that the defendants represented during the 20 November 2014 phone call that the plaintiff’s investment in the Chinamall Project was due to end/mature on 28 November 2014, and therefore the second defendant had sought an extension of three months to make repayment of the Investment Sum (“the Second Representation”). The plaintiff argues that this likewise was a fraudulent misrepresentation, and/or an actionable misrepresentation under the Misrepresentation Act, which induced the plaintiff to sign the Trust Deed.

  121. [63] The plaintiff’s claim in misrepresentation is limited to these two representations. I clarified this during the trial with counsel for the plaintiff, who confirmed that this is the plaintiff’s case.

  122. [64] The plaintiff avers that it has suffered loss and damage due to the defendants’ actions and representations. These have been particularised at paragraphs 52–53 of the Statement of Claim (Amendment No 4) (“Statement of Claim”), which I will not reproduce here.

  123. The defendants’ case

  124. The defendants’ overarching argument

  125. [65] The defendants primarily emphasise that the plaintiff knowingly signed the Trust Deed, and that there accordingly was no unauthorised conversion of the form of the plaintiff’s investment. The plaintiff was apprised of the relevant information before he made each critical decision in the course of his investment, including, crucially, his execution of the Trust Deed.

  126. [66] As a result, the plaintiff is bound by the Trust Deed and the terms therein. This undergirds all aspects of the defendants’ case, as evident from their written closing submissions. According to the defendants, as a direct consequence of this fact, the majority of the plaintiff’s claims are untenable.

  127. The specifics of the defendants’ arguments

  128. [67] The defendants accept that the OT Letter was executed without the plaintiff’s prior knowledge or approval. They nonetheless stress that this is immaterial, because the OT Letter was made known to the plaintiff prior to his signing of the Trust Deed. The plaintiff “acknowledged and accepted” the Conversion by signing the Trust Deed.

  129. [68] The defendants appear prepared to accept that they were agents of the plaintiff, but argue that the relevant instrument governing this relationship is the ASTD, not the alleged Agency Agreement. The defendants’ duties, if any, are confined to those stipulated in the ASTD. This is to the exclusion of any other common law duties. The defendants were also not the plaintiff’s “personal advisors”; this is not contemplated in the ASTD.

  130. [69] The defendants argue that, in any event, there was no breach of their duties as agents, principally because the plaintiff had “full knowledge of the terms of his investment … prior to having made the decision to invest” [emphasis in original]. The same may be said as regards the plaintiff’s consent to the changes to his investment (via the Conversion and his execution of the Trust Deed). This is the basis of the defendants’ arguments against the plaintiff’s claims in contract (the terms of the ASTD), tort (negligence) and equity (breaches of fiduciary duties).

  131. [70] On the plaintiff’s misrepresentation claims, the defendants first dispute that they made the relevant representations. They then re-emphasise the point that the plaintiff had sight of the relevant contractual instruments, relying on the Court of Appeal’s decision in Broadley Construction Pte Ltd v Alacran Design Pte Ltd [2018] 2 SLR 110 (“Broadley Construction”). According to the defendants, Broadley Construction stands for the proposition that a plaintiff would not ordinarily be held to be induced by a misrepresentation if the express contractual terms, read and signed, contradict or correct the representor’s misrepresentation. They also argue that the circumstances, specifically the plaintiff’s informed consent to each relevant contractual instrument, show that the claims in misrepresentation are untenable on the element of reliance.

  132. Issues

  133. [71] As may be seen from the preceding paragraphs, the plaintiff has pleaded its case in an imprecise fashion, with multiple factual and legal issues intertwined. The precise basis of each claim also appears unclear at times (see for example [58] above). I hence elaborate at this juncture on the structure of this Judgment and the main issues to focus on.

  134. [72] To the extent that the plaintiff has identified nine distinct issues (see [34] of the plaintiff’s written closing submissions), I prefer not to adopt such an approach for considerations of clarity and precision. Instead, I identify four main issues arising that require sequential determination, as follows.

  135. (a) The Trust Deed: Whether the plaintiff was bound by the Trust Deed, and whether this represented the final form of his investment in the Chinamall Project. This is, by and large, a factual question.

  136. (b) Changes to the plaintiff’s investment: Whether the established sequence of events show that the nature of the plaintiff’s investment was materially altered without his knowledge or consent. This, likewise, is a factual question.

  137. (c) Relationship of agency: What was the nature of the “agency” relationship between the parties, ie, (i) what instrument, if any, governed this relationship; and (ii) what duties flowed from such a relationship. This question is both legal and factual, ie, it requires a clarification on the law of agency, the law on what duties arise from such an agency relationship, and a discussion on how the facts of the present case fit into the existing legal framework.

  138. (d) The plaintiff’s claims: Based on the foregoing, what reliefs the plaintiff is entitled to according to the various heads of claim he pursues in the present suit. In other words, I will discuss under this issue how my findings on the three preceding issues feed into the various claims advanced by the plaintiff. Herein, questions of breach of the relevant duties pleaded by the plaintiff will be discussed, where relevant.

  139. To the extent that narrower lines of inquiry have been identified by the parties (eg, the plaintiff’s nine identified issues), these may be subsumed under the four issues listed above. The former three issues iron out the key areas of factual and legal dispute between the parties. They also establish the important factual and legal premises, based on which the merits of the plaintiff’s various claims (under the fourth issue) may be fruitfully discussed.

  140. [73] I explain briefly the rationale and thinking behind the sequence of issues as stated above.

  141. (a) It must first be established what the plaintiff’s investment in the Chinamall Project looked like at the end of his dealings with the defendants. This is the purpose of my discussion on the first issue, ie, the Trust Deed. By properly setting out what the investment arrangement was at the end of the protracted negotiations, as well as the nature of the circumstances preceding the Trust Deed, a clear picture will emerge as to what the plaintiff’s ultimate position was with respect to the Chinamall Project.

  142. (b) Having established the above, it may then be determined whether the thrust of the plaintiff’s case, ie, that his investment was materially altered without his knowledge/consent, has been made out. This will be done by scrutinising the key investment events in totality. This is a factual question of whether the plaintiff knew and/or agreed that his investment would adopt the final form that it did, ie, the arrangement involving the Trust Deed. As will be made clear, I do not think that the plaintiff has properly characterised his case.

  143. (c) By addressing the second issue (ie, the nub of the plaintiff’s case or his case theory), there will be clarity on what exactly the plaintiff’s substantive complaint in the present case is or ought to be. I turn then to set out the parameters of the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendants, ie, what the plaintiff describes as the “agency relationship”. In so doing, the scope of the duties owed by the defendants to the plaintiff will be made clear.

  144. (d) Only then will I turn to address the plaintiff’s claims concerning breach of the various alleged duties by the defendants. This will form the bulk of my substantive analysis.

  145. This four-issue structure allows for, in my view, a clear and incisive resolution of the present dispute. It is with the above in mind that I turn to my analysis of the present case.

  146. The Trust Deed

  147. [74] As noted, the Trust Deed is a key factual pillar that folds into the central thrust of the plaintiff’s case, ie, that his investment was materially altered by the defendants without his consent/knowledge (see [5] above). We are concerned here with discerning what the plaintiff’s investment in the Chinamall Project looked like at the end of the plaintiff’s dealings with the defendants.

  148. [75] I have explained above that the plaintiff, after the alleged phone call with the second defendant on 20 November 2014, agreed to sign and did sign the Trust Deed (see [37] above). The Trust Deed accordingly bound the plaintiff. The plaintiff does not appear to contest this.

  149. [76] The effect of the arrangement as per the Trust Deed is this: the first defendant was the “legal owner of a US$1.6 million shareholder loan to Midas”, and it held “the said loan and all interest accrued… on the same on trust for [the plaintiff]”. There are a few important points arising from this:

  150. (a) The first defendant did not hold the Investment Sum on trust for the plaintiff. The Investment Sum was not even shown to be in the first defendant’s possession at the material time. Counsel for the defendants clarified, and counsel for the plaintiff did not dispute, that the Investment Sum had been in Midas’ hands, and remained in Midas’ possession throughout the course of the plaintiff’s investment. In other words, the Investment Sum is not trust property that was held by the first defendant.

  151. (b) The chose in action, ie, the right to bring an action against Midas if Midas defaulted on timely repayment of the loan was what was held on trust for the plaintiff. This resulted from the arrangement between the parties and was the manner in which the trust was structured.

  152. (c) Logically, should Midas repay the full extent of the Investment Sum that the plaintiff had transferred, that chose in action would lapse and the loan sum would be held on trust by the first defendant. Conversely, should Midas default on the repayment, any damages resulting from the enforcement of the chose in action would be held on trust by the first defendant for the plaintiff.

  153. [77] Another aspect of the Trust Deed is pertinent. Clause 10 of the Trust Deed is an “Entire Deed” clause, which states:

  154. Clause 10 thus had the effect of immediate revocation of all prior contractual instruments between the parties, upon the plaintiff’s execution of the Trust Deed.

  155. [78] The plaintiff contends that he “never knew” and therefore “could not have agreed” to the Trust Deed. This is the heart of his case theory that his investment was materially altered without his consent or knowledge. I do not see how this can be so.

  156. Whether the terms of the plaintiff’s investment were altered without his consent and/or knowledge

  157. [79] Neither party seems to dispute the fact that the nature of the plaintiff’s investment did change materially over time. Preliminarily, the Proposed Conversion never took effect; this is undisputed. It is therefore irrelevant and immaterial. I highlighted this to counsel in the course of the trial, and there was no meaningful reply by the plaintiff.

  158. [80] Instead, the relevant instrument to scrutinise is the Trust Deed. In my view, it cannot be said that the Conversion was effected without the plaintiff’s consent or knowledge. First and foremost, the plaintiff signed the Trust Deed. I have canvassed this in the previous section of this Judgment. In so doing, the plaintiff agreed to the change in the nature of his investment in the Chinamall Project; it cannot conceivably be then said that he did not consent to the change in investment structure.

  159. [81] Importantly, the plaintiff is also not making a case of non est factum. This is the argument one would expect when allegations are made to the effect that the investment one had entered into was not what one envisioned. This is an argument that one could not have consented to an agreement because one was incapable of knowing/understanding the contents of the agreement. The point has not been pleaded and I accordingly do not consider it. It suffices for me to note that there is nothing in the record demonstrating that the high threshold required for non est factum to be made out would have been met on the facts (such facts typically pertaining to incapacity of some sort that renders the contracting party unable to understand the contents of the contract he/she is signing).

  160. [82] The more pertinent question (and indeed the crux of the issue), which I expressly raised to counsel during trial, is whether there was informed consent obtained from the plaintiff. In my view, there are three possible ways of construing this argument based on how the plaintiff has argued its case at trial, all of which are untenable.

  161. [83] First, the plaintiff cannot claim that he did not know that the nature of his investment was in fact being changed – he, after all, signed the Trust Deed. He accepted that he knew that there would be a “change in the form / structure of [his] investment in the Chinamall Project” by way of the Trust Deed.

  162. [84] Second, the contention may be that the nature of the changes to the investment was different from what was represented to the plaintiff, ie, he did not have knowledge of how exactly his investment would be changed due to representations made by the defendants. In other words, the argument could be that the defendants misrepresented the nature of the changes to the plaintiff. This is a separate substantive question that is at the heart of the plaintiff’s misrepresentation claims, which I address from [178] onwards below. In short, I am not satisfied that the alleged misrepresentations operated on the mind of the plaintiff to the extent of obscuring the true nature of the Trust Deed and the Conversion consequent to it.

  163. [85] There is a third and separate gloss to this argument: the plaintiff takes issue with the fact that the defendants kept him in the dark over several key changes to his investment, in particular the discharge of the Security Documents and the agreement to the OT Letter. The issue then is whether the discharge of these documents without the plaintiff’s knowledge meant that he did not or could not make an informed decision in agreeing to the Trust Deed.

  164. [86] In my view, this line of argument does not aid the plaintiff. It may appear, at first blush, that the plaintiff was “cornered” into signing the Trust Deed, given that he was informed of the discharge of the relevant documents ex post facto. But several points are pertinent.

  165. (a) First, if the plaintiff’s real complaint is with respect to the unauthorised discharge of the Security Documents and Investment Agreement, it ought to be framed as a claim in repudiation or repudiatory breach. The plaintiff’s claim not framed as such. The plaintiff took the discharge of the documents in his stride and subsequently agreed to the Trust Deed. He is not making a claim in unauthorised repudiation; his claim is that in leading him to accept the Trust Deed, the defendants acted in breach of duty and/or made misrepresentations to him.

  166. (b) This feeds into the second critical point: it was open to the plaintiff to refuse to sign the Trust Deed and, as it were, nip the problem in the bud at that point. He was informed of the termination of the Security Documents via the OT Letter prior to signing the Trust Deed. The plaintiff could have withheld his signature and commenced an action in repudiation against the defendants and/or Midas. He did not. Despite knowing that the Security Documents were discharged, he agreed to the Trust Deed. There was informed consent.

  167. (c) Third, the significance of the Trust Deed, specifically clause 10, is that the plaintiff agreed to the superseding of prior contractual agreements between the parties. Accordingly, even if the Security Documents were not discharged prior to the Trust Deed, the Trust Deed would have had that same effect. In substance, the plaintiff agreed to a discharge of the Security Documents.

  168. (d) Fourth, even if the plaintiff’s claim was for the defendants’ repudiation of the relevant documents, I express doubts over the viability of such a claim. As the plaintiff voluntarily entered into the Trust Deed and decided to proceed with the investment, it may be said that he waived any prior repudiatory breach of the Security Documents and Investment Agreement on the defendants’ part. I say no more on this issue, given that it is not pleaded.

  169. [87] My findings on this issue inform the nature of the parties’ “agency” relationship, as well as the extent to which the defendants may be said to have acted with due skill, care and diligence; I will elaborate below. What is apparent and important is that the plaintiff at all relevant points in time was apprised of the changes to his investment in the Chinamall Project, and made his own decisions that altered his legal position.

  170. [88] I turn then to address the third issue: the nature of the agency relationship between the parties. As alluded to earlier, there are two components to this discussion. The first pertains to the nature of the agency relationship between the parties, and what exactly this constituted. Herein, we are concerned with identifying the parameters of the parties’ relationship and identifying the scope to which the defendants were allowed to act for or on behalf of the plaintiff, ie, the defendants’ authority. The second pertains to the duties that arose as part of this agency relationship.

  171. [89] Before that, however, I highlight a significant problem in the present case: the lack of clarity and precision with which the terms “agent” and “duties of agent” have been used in the parties’ various arguments. The plaintiff, in particular, has left it unclear whether “duties of agent” in the Statement of Claim pertains to contractual or tortious duties, and how these duties specifically arose. The structure of the pleadings also does not lend itself to an easy understanding of the agency issues at hand.

  172. [90] Accordingly, in my view, it would be apt to briefly reiterate and clarify the law of agency in Singapore, specifically on how one should engage in an analysis of an agent’s duties. This would be helpful, given that the court has not had a recent opportunity to clarify this matter. The bulk of contemporary case law has been primarily concerned with the issue of an agent’s authority: see for example Alphire Group Pte Ltd v Law Chau Loon and another matter [2020] SGCA 50 (“Alphire Group”); Goh Yng Yng Karen (executrix of the estate of Liew Khoon Fong (alias Liew Fong), deceased) v Goh Yong Chiang Kelvin [2020] SGHC 195 (“Liew Khoon Fong”); Blasco, Martinez Gemma v Ee Meng Yen Angela and another and another matter [2020] SGHC 247 (“Blasco Martinez”).

  173. The law of agency and the duties of agents

  174. [91] The legal term “agent” is not homogenous or monolithic. “Agent”, in its general sense, simply refers to a relationship, often undergirded by a contractual agreement, where one party is able to act for another party: see Tan Cheng Han, The Law of Agency (Academy Publishing, 2nd Ed, 2017) (“The Law of Agency”) at para 01.008. As a result of being able to act for his/her principal, and thereby influence his/her principal’s position and interests, the law imposes various duties on agents. These duties arise for the protection of the principal, who often reposes trust and confidence in the agent. Different duties may arise, attendant to a relationship of agency, such as fiduciary duties, duties of skill and care, and any contractual duties stipulated in the agreement between agent and principal. In this sense, the law of agency involves and overlaps with several other overlapping areas of law such as contract, tort and equity.

  175. [93] The extent of authority that an agent possesses is a question of fact that is discerned from any express agreement between the parties as well as “the parties’ conduct and the surrounding circumstances”: see the Court of Appeal’s decision in Alphire Group at [7], citing with approval The Law of Agency at para 03.027. Only then can “the existence of the agent’s authority and the scope of that authority” [emphasis in original] be determined: Alphire Group at [7]. In other words, agents and agency relationships exist across a spectrum. This must be borne in mind.

  176. [94] It is therefore unsurprising that each unique agency relationship will be accompanied by distinct sets of rights and obligations. It is not the case that every agent will owe, for example, fiduciary duties. In principle, the fact that fiduciary duties may be modified by the agency contract or even completely excluded would mean that situations of agency can and will involve agents that do not owe fiduciary duties: The Law of Agency at para 07.036, citing Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46. In general, it may be said that the more extensive the agency relationship, ie, the greater an agent’s authority or ability to affect the principal’s interests, the more onerous the duties imposed upon the agent will be. This follows, as a matter of first principles, from the various areas of law that are engaged in the agency analysis.

  177. [95] From the perspective of contract law, this is simply a matter of holding parties to their bargain, as embodied by the contract of agency. This is trite and is rooted in the notion of consensus ad idem. The law will give effect to what the parties have expressly agreed on, nothing more and nothing less (save terms to be implied in fact or in law). If the agent agrees to owe the principal onerous duties, then the agent is so bound. If the principal fails to stipulate in the contract of agency the relevant duties that it wishes to impose on the agent, it cannot later cavil.

  178. [96] In the context of tort law, this is a question of the extent of the duty of care that arises on the facts. For instance, in the area of negligence, this is broadly construed based on the proximity between agent and principal. Trite factors in this inquiry include control, knowledge, reliance and assumption of responsibility: see the Court of Appeal’s seminal decision in Spandeck Engineering (S) Pte Ltd v Defence Science & Technology Agency [2007] 4 SLR(R) 100 (“Spandeck”).

  179. [97] The existence and contours of an agent’s tortious duties are also shaped by the specific context in which they arise, for example:

  180. (a) Where solicitors act as agents for individuals in property transactions: Tan & Au LLP v Goh Teh Lee [2012] 4 SLR 1 (“Goh Teh Lee”) and Fong Maun Yee and another v Yoong Weng Ho Robert [1997] 1 SLR(R) 751.

  181. (b) Where agents give advice to, and act for principals, in stockbroking transactions: OCBC Securities Pte Ltd v Yeo Siew Huan [1998] 1 SLR(R) 481 (“OCBC Securities”).

  182. (c) Where auditors act as agents for businesses in the sense that they conducted audits on behalf of the relevant businesses: JSI Shipping (S) Pte Ltd v Teofoongwonglcloong (a firm) [2007] 4 SLR(R) 460 (“JSI Shipping”).

  183. (d) Where duties are alleged to have arisen vis-à-vis individuals that may be characterised as independent contractors and involve questions of vicarious liabilities and non-delegable duties. In these more contentious areas, the concept of agency may instead be invoked as a justification or legal test that shapes the extent of the duties: see for instance the observations in Yoong, “Challenges in the Evolution of the Doctrine of Non-delegable Duty” (2018) 25 Tort L Rev 143 at pp 162–163.

  184. [98] Also relevant are the principles on the interface between contractual and tortious duties and how these interact. The relevant questions are whether, and to what extent, any contractual instrument curtails or expands on the common law tortious duties, and whether similar duties can coexist in both contract and tort. This is relevant to my discussion below on the defendants’ argument that the existence of the contractual agency relationship precludes common law tortious duties from arising on the defendants’ part (see [169]–[173] below).

  185. [99] Viewed from the lens of equity or the law on fiduciaries, this is a question of the extent of the agent’s position of ascendancy over the principal and authority to act on behalf of the principal. This is the cornerstone of all fiduciary relationships, in recognition of the fact that authority of this nature is often reposed in the agent in trust and confidence. Where an agent is able to unilaterally and significantly influence his/her principal’s position or interests and has been conferred such powers in trust and confidence, extensive fiduciary duties may arise. On the other hand, where the agent has limited authority and discretion, the agent will owe few, if any, fiduciary duties.

  186. [100] In particular, case law has clarified that just because an agent may be considered a fiduciary in a limited manner (specifically, for matters in which he or she is allowed to exercise judgment or discretion to affect certain interests of the principal), this does not mean that every duty the agent owes to the principal is a fiduciary duty. This is clear from the seminal decision of Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1998] 1 Ch 1 at p 16. Therein, Millett LJ stated:

  187. Millett LJ’s observation on the “unthinking resort to verbal formulae” is apt when one considers the looseness with which the term “agent” has been used by parties in the present suit. One must define with clarity the exact contours of each agency relationship and the attendant duties that arise.

  188. [101] The same observation has been made locally. Judith Prakash J (as she then was) observed in Nagase Singapore Pte Ltd v Ching Kai Huat and others [2007] 3 SLR(R) 265 at [28] that “care had to be taken not to equate the duty of good faith and loyalty owed by every employee with a fiduciary obligation” (citing Nottingham University v Fishel [2000] IRLR 471 with approval). The same logic extends to contractual agents, who may not be “employees” in the strict sense, but are nonetheless employed by their principals to engage in a certain course of action.

  189. [102] Agency stands at the intersection of these various other areas of law but does not displace the fundamental principles that undergird each. Defining a particular agency relationship hence depends on an application of the rules established within these different areas of law.

  190. [103] As for the evidential approach to questions of agency, any express agreement or implied agreement (as evinced by conduct) between the parties will be relevant; I have alluded to this at [92] above in referencing the Court of Appeal’s decision in Alphire Group ([90] supra). It is important in every case to identify and establish the existence and terms of any contractual instruments entered into by parties. Relevant also will be to scrutinise the conduct of the parties in the course of the relationship of agency, and how they have acted in transactions involving the principal. Specifically, one must focus on transactions in which the agent was able to exercise the authority conferred by the principal. Only then can one reach a conclusion on the degree to which an agent is able to affect the principal’s interests, and consequently the duties that are to be imposed on the agent.

  191. [104] Where the allegations pertaining to an agent’s authority are unclear, it will not be easy to distil the duties that arise from the agency relationship. I use the plaintiff’s pleadings as an illustration. The Statement of Claim is somewhat confusing and does not properly engage with the nuances present in situations of agency. I use the following aspects of the pleadings to illustrate:

  192. (a) On the one hand, the plaintiff avers that, according to the alleged Agency Agreement between the parties, the first defendant “will act in accordance with the instructions of the [plaintiff]”. Alongside this, the plaintiff avers that the first defendant will provide the plaintiff with “timely information and/or advice”. These collectively suggest that the plaintiff retained the final say on all material aspects of his investment, and the first defendant acted simply as an advisor.

  193. (b) On the other hand, the plaintiff avers that “the [plaintiff] reposed trust and confidence in the [defendants] as the [plaintiff] relied on the [defendants] to act for and on his behalf on any and all matters arising from… the Chinamall Project”. This averment is somewhat different, and suggests that the defendants had significant discretion in making important decisions on the plaintiff’s behalf.

  194. [105] From the above, it is unclear what the plaintiff’s case is. Is it that the defendants were substantially empowered to execute instruments/legally binding documents “on his behalf” (which is suggested by [104(b)] above)? Or is it that the defendants played merely an advisory role and acted as a “mere conduit”, and the plaintiff retained the final say in all material matters (which is suggested by [104(a)] above)? Or is it, perhaps, an amalgamation of both scenarios pleaded? These two positions are not readily reconcilable – the former involves a far more extensive degree of powers conferred on the agent.

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